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Abstract
Gas processing facilities and pipeline networks play a key role in energy distribution. There is an ever
increasing need to extend the life of the aging networks beyond their original design life and operators are
continually looking for requalification and extension of the service life aimed at ensuring the integrity,
functionality and availability of the network for the extended operating life. In order to ensure technical
and operational integrity of this ageing infrastructure, the fitness for service of these systems is required
be maintained for the intended service life.
Maximising the availability and functionality of the network, whilst operating safely and with minimal
impact on the environment, is a major concern for requalification and life extension. Gas processing asset
integrity management (AIM) and pipeline integrity management (PIM) consist of inspection, testing,
maintenance and repair programs are critical to ensure integrity and sustainability in gas production. The
AIM program is to assess and report upon the risks imposed on the community by natural gas supply
facilities, and based on the available information; identify opportunities for improvements to ensure the
risks to the community are as low as reasonably as practicable (ALARP) (UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS
SAFETY REPORT 2001). Detailed integrity assessments are needed to demonstrate that there is sufficient
technical, operational and organisational integrity to continue safe operation throughout an extended
service life. Information on characteristic data, condition data, historical performance, maintenance
management and inspection and testing results are required to assess the current state and to predict the
future state of the network subsystems and critical components and the possible extension of service life.
Effective record keeping and ongoing analysis of data are key inputs to a successful life extension program
(Nezamian and Altmann 2013).
This paper presents state of art practices in life extension of existing gas distribution and pipeline
facilities and an overview of a customised life extension methodology to address risk factors to the
integrity of a gas distributio and associated facilities. It covers the required procedures and re-assessment
criteria for a life cycle cost effective approach to decide on life extension in particular the one with the
importance such critical subsystems.
SPE-180889-MS
Introduction
Asset Integrity Assessment and Life Extension of gas distribution facilities is becoming an increasingly in
demand service in the Oil and Gas industry. ISO/TS 12474:2011 gives guidance to follow, as a minimum, in
order to assess the feasibility of extending the service life of a pipeline system, as defined in ISO 13623, beyond
its specified design life. ISO/TS 12747:2011 applies to rigid metallic pipelines. However, Pump stations,
compressor stations, pressure-reduction stations and depots are not specifically addressed in ISO/TS 12747:
2011. In addition, Many regulatory authorities have distributed guidance on asset ageing and life extension,
such as Oil & Gas UKs Guidance on the Mangement of Ageing and Life Extension for UKCS Oil and Gas
Installations. Health and Safety Executive has developed A guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 that
gives guidance on the Pipelines Safety Regulation, which complement a number of other onshore and offshore
regulations. The Regulations apply to all pipelines in Great Britain and to all pipelines in territorial waters of
the UK Continental Shelf, with a few exceptions that are also highlighted in the guideline. It is aimed at helping
operators and others involved with pipeline activities, or those who may be affected by the Regulations, what
the Regulations require. However, none of these guidelines provide detailed methodology and safety integrity
requirements for the life extension. This paper aims to demonstrate a new method for assessing the remnant life
of existing onshore gas processing, distribution and pipeline facilities. Further, a practical example is provided
based on a study conducted for a major gas utility in the South East Asian market.
The following section outlines a proposing methodology and step by step activities to evaluate the current
condition of a gas distribution facility, carry out the remnant life assessment and develop appropriate life
extension strategies to requialify and extend the life of the facility by the required number of years.
Functional and Design Data; The data describing the equipments physical characteristics, design
pressures / temperatures / loads and purpose)
Historical Data; The equipments historical maintenance / failure records
Current Condition Data; Visual inspection condition data which includes noise, vibration, corrosion, coating, incident reports, modifications, anomalies and condition monitoring reports
Data relating to obsolescence should also be collected. When considering obsolescences, the following
requirements should be considered:
Additional typical data to be collected may include but is not limited to:
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Asset Identification
After collection and collation of all functional, design, historical and current condition data, all assets
subsytems and critical components within the scope of the Life Extension assessment has to be identified
and listed. The asset identification is conducted as using a master asset register, or similar list, of
equipment based on an asset owners records. Asset data can also be found within drawings such as
P&IDs and general arrangement drawings. The asset hierarchy is produced and documented according
to ISO 14224:2006. A Functional Hierarchy is developed to define the relationship between maintainable components and each unit of plant. This describes the component structure of the plant item by
assigning functional locations to each component. This hierarchy provides an overview of equipment that
belongs together functionally, and shows the physical relationship between equipment, instruments,
valves etc. The purpose of the hierarchy is to:
Taxonomic Hierarchy
Definition
Examples
Petroleum, natural gas, petrochemical
Upstream (Exploration and Production), midstream,
downstream (refining), petrochemical
Oil/gas production, transportation, drilling, LNG,
refinery, petrochemical
Platform, semi-submersible, hydrocracker, ethylene
cracker, polyethylene, acetic acid plant, methanol
plant
Compression, natural gas, liquefaction, vacuum gas oil,
methanol regeneration, oxidation section, reaction
system, distillation section, tanker loading system
Heat exchanger, compressor, piping, pump, boiler, gas
turbine extruder, agitator, furnace, Xmas tree, blowout preventer
1
2
Industry
Business Category
Installation Category
Type of facility
Plant/Unit Category
Type of plant/unit
Section/System
Equipment Class/Unit
Subunit
Component/Maintainable Item
Part
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Obsolescences
Gas properties
Maintenance practices (breakdown, preventative fixed time or age based, predictive condition
based monitoring/reliability centred maintenance)
Damages (physical, spalling, weathering, expansion / contraction, subsidence)
Location and installation conditions
Semi-quantitative criteria include but are not limited to:
Age
Useful service
MTTF (mean time to failure)
Correlative functions (i.e. correlation between insulation on electrical equipment and failure rates)
Severity of failures and breakdowns
Severity of leaks
Wall thinning
Corrosion rates
Some damages if they can be trended and lead to direct estimation of remnant life (physical,
spalling, weathering, expansion / contraction, subsidence)
Based on the initial data collection activities and asset identification steps, a gap analysis is conducted
to determine the remaining gaps in data required to complete the remnant life study. If any gaps are found,
requests can be sent for their retrieval and closure to the asset owner. A site visit is a good way to
complement the assessment activity and aid closing out of outstanding gaps.
SPE-180889-MS
respective piece of equipment or asset. The first step in the determination of remnant life of a particular
item is scoring the particular degradation mechanisms and other remnant life parameters falling under
A score is assigned based on the quality of the data and/or the comparison of the collected information
with that of a benchmark. To reflect the relative importance of the parameters each of the scoring
parameters are then factored by a weighting factor dependent on the type of asset (static equipment,
rotating equipment, instrumentation and control equipment, electrical equipment or civil/structural items).
The factor considers the relative importance for life expectancy within each of the three categories. The
factors should be developed based on a case by case basis and also dependent on the type of gas facility,
condition of equipment and quality of data.
The weighted scores are then aggregated for each of the Design and Functionality Data, Historical Data
and Current Condition Data and then normalized to give an overall assessment score (OAS).
Influencing factors in the Life Extension evaluation option study are listed below:
Asset type;
Current Condition and Remnant Life of the asset
Special requirements such as compliance with statutory regulations or mandatory standards;
Trends from the maintenance records / past performance of the equipment;
Reliability, availability and maintainability requirements;
Redundancy;
Obsolescence;
Integrity management improvement options;
Industry past experiences;
Site feedback;
Business drivers; and
Options currently available from the market.
Life extension options may be assigned one of the following recommendations: RUN; REPAIR;
REHABILITATE; RE-DESIGN / MODIFY; RE-RATE; REPLACE or RETIRE. Description of what
each of these options entails is included in Table 2.
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REPAIR
REHABILITATE
Description
Equipment technical integrity and performance are
acceptable.
Revise the equipment performance standards and keep it
running with close monitoring to ensure that the revised
performance standards are achieved in the long term and
to identify any terminal decline before it becomes critical.
This may include revision to integrity management or
maintenance strategy to cater for changes in the
equipment condition, the process conditions, the level of
redundancy and the remaining life: without carrying out
any physical changes to the equipment.
Monitor the equipment to ensure that the extent and rate
of the damage does not change sufficiently to compromise
Safety & Integrity limits.
Analyze the margin between the equipment condition and
minimum code specification.
Remove damage with/ without repair; if necessary revise
the role & performance respective diagnostic tests.
Repair the component temporarily with/without removing
the damage.
Rehabilitate/ refurbish existing equipment/systems, bring it
back to its original performance.
RE-DESIGN / MODIFY
Modify existing equipment/systems to provide alternative
means to fulfil equipment function or reduce risk while
the equipment/systems is brought back to full
performance.
RE-RATE
REPLACE / MONITOR
Revise the role and live with the reduced performance for
the remainder of the lifecycle; i.e. by placing greater
dependence on other systems.
Change operating practices, de-rate the duty, or make
favourable modifications to process conditions or
chemistry.
Replacement with identical (like for like) or compatible
(different type).
Replacement with an asset of similar capacity.
Replacement with a larger capacity asset as part of
strategic requirements.
Replacement with a smaller capacity asset because
customer demands have reduced and are unlikely to be
increased.
RETIRE
Notes
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Scenario 1: The base or do nothing different case where the gas asset owner conducts the same
inspection, maintenance and testing (IMT) regime with no change to their current maintenance
strategy. This will set the baseline risk level (in monetary terms)
Scenario 2: An Improved scenario where a reduction in risk (in monetary terms) is achieved
through the development and implementation of a targeted, risk based IMT program
Scenario 3: An alternative case where consideration of life extension recommendations (Rehabilitation and Replacement) are implemented over and above the current maintenance strategy
from Scenario 1,to reduce the risk level (in monetary terms)
A reduction in Risk is the driving factor in the apportioning of costs and benefits between each
Scenario. In order to quantify risks, standard risk matrices is developed based on an industry standard 55
grid. These help assess the likelihood and consequences.
For the purpose of this CBRA, benefit over and above a base case is considered in terms of reduction
in risk, per unit cost of implementing the risk reduction. API RP 581 provide a guideline and basis for the
development of this CBRA methodology.
The industry standard definition of risk is taken and is defined as the product of the Likelihood and
Consequence of Failure according to:
Figure 1 below quantifies the drivers of Risk for the purposes of the analysis.
Probability of Failure
The Probability of Failure (PoF) is driven by the:
Management Factor (MF) The effectiveness of maintenance management systems and practices for IMT and analysis of the results of IMT. Value between 0 and 1 representing excellent to
baseline management respectively
Likelihood Factor (DF) Likelihood of age, damage mechanisms and rates and inspection
effectiveness (equally weighted) affecting the probability of failure of any one piece of equipment/
asset. Value between 0 and 1 representing high to low likelihood respectively.
X
Age: Note that age is represented by a percent value with bounds of 5% (1 year old asset) and
95%
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Damage Mechanisms: Likelihood that damage mechanisms and rates are present and able to
be captured by the IMT program. Values between 0 and 1 representing high to low damage
mechanisms and rates capture respectively.
Generic Failure Frequency The sum of the likelihood of failures according to the 4 risk
matrices (Health and Safety, Business, Environmental and Capital Asset). Each failure within a
respective Scenario is assigned a likelihood of failure which is then used to derive the generic
failure frequency.
Consequence of Failure
The Consequence of Failure (CoF) consists of the quantified effects of 4 types of risks:
Case Study
An operator has under its management a network of natural gas offtaking stations within a South East
Asian country. The energy regulator is currently reviewing the integrity of the natural gas network. It is
within this context that the operator has to produce a life extension assessment and verification for their
natural gas distribution assets. These assets were commissioned in the mid-90s and have currently reached
the end of their design life. The objective of the project was to conduct a life extension assessment of two
off-taking stations and associated pipelines by:
Review of any anomalous conditions such as metal loss and cracking from visual assessment
Evaluation of the corrosion rate of pipelines
Review maintenance records, identify key degradation mechanissms and determine degradation
rates
Development of a strategy to continue operations of the offtaking facilities
The proposed methodology was applied to the subjected assets. The outcome of the life extension study
indicated that most of subjected asset types achieve life extension viability with a few notable exceptions.
Table 3 shows the results of the life extension study including current condition assessment and remnant
life. It can be seen that for a life extension window of 10 years, most of the assets will need to be replaced
in general. However, the application of this methodology indicated that with more frequent inspection,
monitoring, testing and calibration intervals the decision to replace can be deferred dependent on the
continual monitoring of asset condition. As a result, the exisitng integrity and maintenance management
plans were updated to reflect a more risk based inspection and maintenance schedule and help extend the
life of the assets without incurring the need to replace in the first instance. This is a massive saving for
life extension compared with the common practice of replacing older component based on OEM
recommendations.
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Description
Active and Monitor
Active and Monitor
Station #
RL
LE Option
1
2
7
5
Replace / Monitor
Replace / Monitor
Drivers of RL
Valves
Filters
Replace / Monitor
Replace / Monitor
Replace / Monitor
Replace / Monitor
Pipeline
1 and 2
22
Run
Pressure
Pressure Differential Pressure
Transmitters
Transmitter with Capacitance
Sensing Element. 4-20mA output
1 and 2
Temperature
RTD, Thermocouple and Millivolt
Transmitters
Input. 4-20mA output.
1 and 2
Replace / Monitor
Replace / Monitor
Gas
Detectors
1 and 2
Replace / Monitor
Turbine Flow
Meters
1 and 2
Replace / Monitor
Remote
Terminal
Units
Instrumentation
Cables
1 and 2
Replace / Monitor
1 and 2
Replace / Monitor
10
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Conclusion
The outcome of this study has highlighted the importance of Asset Integrity Management programs in
particular the importance on record keeping of characteristic data, condition data, historical performance,
maintenance management, inspection and testing results. In assessing the remnant life of gas processing
and pipeline facilities it is imperative that a soild, technical and thorough life extension methodology
exists to systematically screen for troublesome assets and investigate root causes of integrity issues to
ensure the continued safe operations through an extended service life.
References
American Petroleum Institute, 2009, Recommended Practice for Risk-Based Inspection Technology,, API API RP 581
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO). 2010. Operating Procedure Gas Quality Guidelines, document reference
224235. June 2010. Accessed 05/04/2016.
Australian Standards (AS). AS 4564:2005 Specification for General Purpose Natural Gas. Accessed 05/04/2016.
Australian Standards (AS). AS 2885.1 2007 Pipelines - Gas and Liquid Petroleum. Part1: Design and construction.
Appendix P Environment-Related Cracking
Bergman, D. F., Tek, M. R. & Katz, D. L. 1975 Retrograde Condensation in Natural Gas Pipelines. American Gas
Association.
Church, B.J. & Winckles, G.D. 1999 High Wobbe Index gas A report on the 5th Draft report prepared on behalf
of OGS in Victoria.
Gas & Fuel Corporation, 1991 - Engineering Policy EP.DD.4005 - Policy on design temperatures for system
components
Gas Safety (Gas Quality) Regulations 2007 Victoria, Australia
HSE, A guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, Guidance on Regulation. Health and Safety Executive, London,
UK, 1996
ISO/TS 12747:2011 Petroleum and natural gas industries Pipeline transportation systems Recommended practice
for pipeline life extension
ISO 13686 - International Organisation for Standardisation 1998 - Natural Gas -Quality Designation
ISO 14224:2006 Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries Collection and exchange of reliability and
maintenance data for equipment
Nezamian, A., Altmann, J. (2013) An Oil Field Structural Integrity Assessment for Re-Qualification and Life Proc.
32nd International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering, OMAE2013-10968 Nantes, France 9-14
June 2013,
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Regulation 2004 Queensland.
UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS SAFETY REPORT PERIODS 1998 to 2000, Trasmission and Distribution, Prepared by
Office of Gas Safety, Victoria, Australia, 2001