ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v CA

G.R. No. 77425/77450 June 19, 1991

DOCTRINE
There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is
stipulation for automatic reversion. Nonetheless, the stipulation is against
public policy and thus, is void.
FACTS
The administrators of the estate of deceased spouses Eusebio and Martina De
Castro filed a complaint to nullify the deed of donation, rescission of contract, and
reconveyance of the property against spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao, Roman
Catholic Bishop of Imus,and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. The
administrators alleged that in 1930 the De Castros executed the deed of donation
over their Cavite property to the Archbishop, said deed allegedly providing that the
latter cannot dispose or sell the property within 100 years from execution. The
administration of the said properties was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962.
And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold the property to the spouses Ignao. The Ignaos
were then able to transfer the TCT under their names. The lower court ruled that the
action had already prescribed and dismissed the complaint. This was reversed by
the CA. The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of action had already
prescribed, relying on Art. 764 which provides that
"(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails
to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed uponthe latter," and
that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised
against the donee's heirs.
ISSUE
WON the action has already prescribed
HELD / RATIO ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED
. Art. 764 is not applicable in this case. The deed of donation involved expressly
provided for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the,
as was correctly recognized by the CA.A judicial action for rescission of a contract is
not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for
violation of any of its terms and conditions. This cancellation can be applied in the
case at bar. Art. 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be
governed by the general provisions oncontracts and obligations in all that is not

determined by the law ondonations.In contracts providing for automatic revocation,

judicialintervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicialdeclaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded, but inorder to determine whether
or not the rescission was proper.Thus, the cause of action has not yet prescribed
since an actionto enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. Article
764was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment
orcontravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if andwhen the
parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of suchdonation upon the
occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein.That is not the situation in the
case at bar.
NONETHELESS
, while the action may not be dismissed byreason of prescription, the same should
be dismissed on the groundthat the estates of the De Castros have NO CAUSE OF
ACTION against the Ignaos and other petitioners.The cause of action of the De
Castros is based on the alleged breach of the resolutory condition that the property
donated shouldnot be sold within the prohibited period. Said condition, however,
constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership and is,
therefore, contrary to public policy and should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition. The Ignaos won. The CA decision is reversed.
PUIG v. PENAFLORIDA- Donation Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos
The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her
lifetime in the deed does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her
lifetime but that the donor merely reserves power to destroy the donation at any
time.

FACTS:
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving
certain properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived
by nephews and nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and
sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston Magbanua. Besides her will, the deceased
had executed two notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTIS
CAUSA, was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her niece, Estela
Magbanua. The deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled
"ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela
Magbanua Peaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land.
Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the
reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in

the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that title had passed to the donee in her
lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous.

ISSUE:
Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

HELD:
The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but
also the fact that the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance
to be one of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed
until after her death.
The power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any
time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her
death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere.

Garrido v. CA

Central Phil Univ v CA

When a person donates land to another on the condition that a construction be
made, the condition is akin to a resolutory (not suspensive) one. The non-

compliance to the condition extinguishes the right to the donation, but it need not
occur first in order for the donation to be effected and validated.

FACTS:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board of trustees of
Central Philippine University when he executed a donation to the school, stating
that the land must be for exclusive use of a medical college. 50 years later, The
heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul the donation, stating the failure of the
school to construct the medical college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition

RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to construct a medical
college would give the heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting the
property back to the heirs of the donor. It is therefore a resolutory condition.
Although, the period was not stated, and the courts should have fixed a period, in
this case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a period
would serve no purpose and the property must already be reverted back.
Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the obligations are unconditional,
and the fulfillment, performance, existence or extinguishment is not dependent on
any future and uncertain event. It is more accurate to say that the condition stated
is not a resolutory condition, rather a obligation itself, being an onerous donation.
Since this is an onerous donation, it has to comply with the rules on Oblicon, and
therefore the courts should have fixed a period.

Republic of the Philippines v. Leon SilimG.R. No. 140487. April

2, 2001Kapunan,
J.:

Facts:Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land infavour of
the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In theDeed of
Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said propertyshould "be used
exclusively and forever for school purposes only." This donationwas accepted by
Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through anAffidavit of Acceptance
and/or Confirmation of Donation.A school building was constructed on the donated
land. However,
theBagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for thedonate
d parcel of land could not be released since the government required thatit be built
upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicamentBuendia was
authorized to officially transact for the exchange of the old schoolsite to a new and
suitable location which would fit the specifications of thegovernment. Pursuant to
this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deedof Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot ownedby the latter. The Bagong
Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the newschool site and the school
building previously erected on the donated lot wasdismantled and transferred to the
new location.The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay
learnedthat Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donatedpro
perty. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was novalid
acceptance made by the donee and that there was a violation of thecondition in the
donation.Issue:
(1)
Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC?(2)Was the
condition in the donation violated?Ruling:
(1)
Yes. There was a valid acceptance.The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the
acceptance is made in aseparate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form,
andthis step shall be noted in both instruments. The purpose of the formalrequirem
ent for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance isduly
communicated to the donor.Here, a school building was immediately constructed
after the
donationwas executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the schoolb
uilding. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred tothe
new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house onthe
donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange.The
actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of theschool
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donationby the
donee be communicated to the
donor.Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to accept the donationpersonally,
or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose,or with a

general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.The respondents
claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donationwas ineffective because of the
absence of a special power of attorney from theRepublic of the Philippines. The
donation was made in favor of the Bureau of

Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendias acceptance was authorizedunder
Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:SEC. 47.
Contracts and Conveyances
. - Contracts or conveyances maybe executed for and in behalf of the Government
or of any of its branches,subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever
demanded by theexigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are
notprohibited by law.(2)No. The condition was not violated.The exclusivity of the
purpose of the donation was not altered or affectedwhen Buendia exchanged the lot
for a much bigger one. It was in furtheranceand enhancement of the purpose of the
donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for
the construction of Bagong Lipunanschool building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of thedonated lot.

CASE: QUILALA vs. ALCANTARA

TOPIC: MAKING ANG ACCEPTANCE OF DONATIONG.R No.: 132681 December 3,
2001FACTS:On February 20, 1981,
Catalina Quilala (donor)
executed a"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
VioletaQuilala (donee)
over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz,Manila and registered in her name.The
"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of twopages. The first page contains

the deed of donation itself, andis signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala
andVioleta Quilala, and two instrumental witnesses. The secondpage contains the
Acknowledgment, which states merely thatCatalina Quilala personally appeared
before the notary publicand acknowledged that the donation was her free
andvoluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand marginof the second
page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and oneof the witnesses, and on the righthand margin the signaturesof Violeta Quilala and the other witnessOn November 7,
1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilalalikewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner
Ricky Quilalaalleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.Meanwhile,
respondents Gliceria Alcantara, LeonoraAlcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes,
claiming to beCatalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civildegree of
consanguinity instituted an action for thedeclaration of nullity of the donation
inter vivos
, and for thecancellation of the TCT in the name of Violeta Quilala.The trial court
rendered a decision declaring null and void thedeed of donation of real property
inter vivos executed byCatalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala. The trial
courtfound that since it was acknowledged before a notary publiconly by the donor,
Catalina, there was no acceptance byVioleta of the donation in a public instrument.
The decisionwas affirmed by the CA
.ISSUE: Whether or not the donation executed by Catalina infavor of Violeta is valid
HELD:
valid even if the acknowledgment was only signed by the donor
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,donee and their
witnesses affixed their signature. However,the Acknowledgment appearing on the
second pagementioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trialcourt ruled
that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge heracceptance before the notary public, the
same was set forthmerely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of
theinstrument.We disagree.As provided for in Section 112, paragraph 2 of PD No.
1529,the second page of the deed of donation, on which theAcknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and onewitness on the left-hand margin. The
donee and the otherwitness signed on the right hand margin. Surely,
therequirement that the contracting parties and their witnessesshould sign on the
left-hand margin of the instrument is notabsolute. The intendment of the law merely
is to ensure thateach and every page of the instrument is authenticated bythe
parties. The requirement is designed to avoid thefalsification of the contract after
the same has already beenduly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting
partyaffixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certifythat he is
agreeing to everything that is written thereon atthe time of signing.Simply put,
the specification of the location of the signatureis merely directory

. The fact that one of the parties signs onthe wrong side of the page does not
invalidate the document.In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by
thedonee before the notary public does not also render thedonation null and void.
The instrument should be treated inits entirety. It cannot be considered a
private document inpart and a public document in another part
. The fact that itwas acknowledged before a notary public converts the deedof
donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact thatthe donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in theacknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure,
it is theconveyance that should be acknowledged as a free andvoluntary act. In any
event, the donee signed on the secondpage, which contains the Acknowledgment
only. Heracceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized
deed of donation, was made in a publicinstrument.Petition is granted. The appealed
decision of the CA isreversed.

Bonsato vs CA
95 PHIL 481
FACTS: The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, by
respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea
Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that
on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had
been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of
his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively,
transferring to them several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Mabini
and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in
the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations
were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants,
Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in
their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by
them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the
use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the
dismissal of the case.
After trial, the CFI rendered its decision finding that the deeds of donation were
executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or
intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition
making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the
properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the
coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only
valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described
therein.

ISSUE: W/N the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos?
HELD: Donation inter vivos. If it was a donation mortis causa, then the
documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil.,
108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs.
Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the
late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owners share of the fruits or produce (de los productos mientras viva el donante
tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo), a reservation that would be
unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor.
Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the
donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be irrevocable, a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not
lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil
Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase that after
the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective (que despues
de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion). However, said
expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus
taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donors death, the donation
will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated
property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the
donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such
reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the
donors death, when full title would become vested in the donees.
Sec of Educ v Heirs of Dulay