Royal Institute of Philosophy

Mind and Body

Author(s): C. E. M. Joad
Source: Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 4, No. 14 (Apr., 1929), pp. 225-240
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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AND

MIND

BODY

C. E. M. JOAD, B.A.
I propose
between
diffieult

in this article to consider

of the relation
the question
and body.
This question
raises some of the most
of
issues in philosophy
the main problem
and constitutes
mind

psychology.
I shall begin by stating
the problem,
two of the
briefly describe
main solutions
and
mention
have put forward,
which philosophers
the difficulties
I shall conclude
to which these solutions
are exposed.
the factors for which any successful
solution
must
by enumerating
the lines along which, in my view,
and indicating
make provision,
the problem may be most fruitfully
approached.

The

Problem

of the relation between

The problem
mind and body can be stated
that there is such a thing
very briefly. Let us assume for a moment
as a mind,
and that the mind, though
related
to the
intimately
from the body. It is also different from the brain.
body, is different
If you were to open a man's skull and look within,
you would see
tiers

and

workings
true that
fact that
we mean

his brain, and their

layers of nerve cells; these constitute
are studied
it may be
Now, although
by physiologists.
this brain is modified
whenever
a man thinks or feels, the
these modifications
take place are not the whole of what

to assert when we say of anyone

that he is thinking
or
and feeling are, we should affirm, at least in part
Thinking
As such they cannot
occurrences.
be discerned
by any of
the senses;
nor
seen, touched,
smelled,
tasted,
they can be neither
heard;
they can only be experienced
by the mind in which they
feeling.
mental

which would of
They may have cerebral
accompaniments,
to the senses, but they do not consist merely
be perceptible
of cerebral movements.
The mind, then, if there is such a thing, is immaterial
and is not
the same as the brain.
different
from the body and brain, the mind is not
But, though
On the contrary,
is of the
indifferent
to them.
their relationship
are
closest
Mind
and
order.
interacting
possible
body
continually
occur.
course

in an infinite

number

of different

ways.

Mind

influences

body

and
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PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

life. If I am drunk,
of our waking
body mind at every moment
I see two lamp-posts
instead
of one; if I fail to digest my supper,
I have a nightmare
and see blue devils; if I smoke opium or inhale
visions
and pass into
oxide gas, I experience
rose-coloured
nitrous
a state of beatitude.
These are instances
of the influence
of the
If
I
see
a
will
stand
on
hair
the
mind.
end;
ghost,
my
body upon
if I am moved
to anger, my face will become
a
red; if I receive
of the influence
sudden shock, I shall turn pale. These are instances
are only
The examples
just quoted
body.
cases of what is going on all the time.
obvious
assert that there can be no event
in the
indeed,

of the mind upon

extreme
and rather
Many thinkers,
one which is not

the

event in the
accompanied
by some corresponding
the
event
too
small to be
be
other,
although
corresponding
may
mind and body is, at any rate, a
The interaction
noticed.
between
fact beyond
Yet, when we come to reflect upon the mode
dispute.
it is exceedingly
difficult to see how it can occur.
of this interaction,
which is immaterial;
if it were
Mind1 it is clear, must be something
it would be part of the body. The contents
of, or the events
material,
is to say, wishes, desires, thoughts,
which happen in, the mind?that
also immaterial.
The body,
hopes, and acts of will?are
aspirations,
on the other hand, is matter,
and possesses
the usual qualities
of
of
such as shape, size, weight,
inertia,
density,
occupancy
so
forth.
and
space,
in understanding
how one material
Now there is no difficulty
Each
can
influenced
another.
the same attri?
be
thing
by
possesses
in virtue of which each can, as it
butes of size, shape, and weight,
with or "get at" the other. Thus a paving-stone
were, communicate
can crush an egg because the egg belongs to the same order of being
as the stone.
crush a wish, or be
But how can the paving-stone
mass
a
Material
and
have no power over
affected by
force
thought ?
exert
do
ideas do not
force, nor
ideas;
they yield to mass. How,
has neither
nor shape, which
can that which
then,
size, weight,
and which does not occupy space,
cannot be seen, heard, or touched,
matter,

with that which has these properties

?
come into contact
seem to belong
to two different
Mind and matter
to
worlds,
of two different
orders of being, and the problem
of their
partake
is the problem
interaction
of the whale and the elephant
raised to
the nth degree.
at issue may, therefore,
The question
be stated
as follows:
If
mind and body are, as they appear
to be, radically
if
different,
and wishes are of a different
order of being from bones
thoughts
and blood, how are we to explain their interaction?
1 It is important to emphasize the fact the word "mind" does not mean
the same as the word "brain"; the brain is material.
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MIND

AND

BODY

II
Psycho-Physical

Parallelism

into prominence
The problem was first brought
by the philosophy
as
is
well
of Descartes.
known,
Descartes,
began his philosophizing
The process
ended in the
of thoroughgoing
doubt.
with a process
I
this
"I
therefore
axiom
to
famous
am,"
think,
axiom,
purporting
himself
as
with
assert the one fact which Descartes
regarded
knowing
of Descartes'
axiom is the
Among the implications
complete
certainty.
knows its own processes,
more
e.g. thinking,
of these processes,
the objects
e.g. what is
Descartes
was
maintain
a sharp
Hence
led to

that mind
suggestion
it knows
than
easily

about.
thought
mind and what was not mind,
a distinction
distinction
between
which
in its turn a complete
of mind from
involved
separation
in Descartes'
was rapidly developing
body. The science of dynamics
to show that,
and seemed
data, the motions
time,
given certain

if this were true,

could be calculated
mathematically;
were mechanical
and determined.
motions
of matter
Now, the
of material
the motions
therefore,
particles;
body was a collection
of the body were mechanical
and determined,
and, if the mind
with the body, this conclusion
were part of or continuous
would
of matter
the

be true also
who wanted

of the mind. This result was distasteful

to philosophers
to believe that mind was free, and taken in connection
I am," which implies,
"I think, therefore
axiom,
original

with the
as I pointed
out above, that the primary
of mind's know?
objects
are
states
and
not
external
its
own
to itself,
led
ledge
objects
Descartes
to maintain
that the mind was completely
independent
of bodily influences.
The Supreme
God, had, he held, created two
Substance,
namely
the essence
of the mind is thought,
mind and matter;
substances,
and of matter
or occupancy
extension
of space.
So different
are
these two substances
that they cannot
and
the
interact,
possibly
followers
of Descartes
were led, therefore,
to maintain
that there
is no effect of mind upon body or of body upon mind. Mind and
to this view,
on two parallel
lines, but
according
body,
proceed
matters
are so arranged
that an event in the one is always accom?
panied
by an
"Occasionalism."

event

in the other.
This doctrine
is known
as
In its nineteenth-century
form it was known
as
Parallelism.
Thus, the fact that my body assumes a
Psycho-physical
horizontal
I
when
will
to lie down,
does not mean that
position
there is any causal connection
between my willing and the movements
of my body. What it does point to is the active benevolence
of God,
who has provided
for a continuous
and miraculous
synchronization
between
mental
and bodily
without
which human
events,
beings
would
be unable
to survive.
The knowledge
of God's benevolent
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intervention
in the
given a priori.

STUDIES

PHILOSOPHICAL
affairs

of

the

world

is, it must

be presumed,

The gulf which

Descartes
established
mind and body
between
which has been engaged
has had disastrous
results for psychology,
ever since in a more or less unsuccessful
to put together
attempt
the pieces of the unity which Descartes
destroyed.
The
Descartes
For

of bringing
difficulties
so sharply
divided

what

body are
Therefore,
synchronized
keep time?

precisely

the two substances

which
together
almost
insurmountable.
are, indeed,
If mind and
does Descartes'
involve?
position
we cannot
their
interaction.
different,
explain

radically
they do not
clocks,
Because

but keep time like two perfectly

interact,
causal
without
connection.
do they
Why
of the benevolent
intervention
of God, who,
in human
a miracle
affairs,
performs
every

active
continuously
and wishes.
with our thoughts
time our bodies act in accordance
a
of divine
The invocation
assistance,
stumbling-block
always
of a theory,
to
distasteful
to the acceptance
proved
particularly
there
Was
no
other
science.
out
of
the
nineteenth-century
way
there was. The whole
had, it was
Obviously
difficulty
impasse?
the
initial
that
the
mind
arisen
from
and body
asserted,
asumption
But why should this assumption
be made?
are radically
different.
were open and should at least be explored.
Two
Other possibilities
if mind and body were not radically
at any rate were obvious:
either mind was the same as and a part of the body, or
different,
of the mind, a series of ideas and impressions
body was an illusion
The first
a
mode of perception
in the mind, or
by the mind.
was adopted
by many nineteenth-century
psychologists,
an integral
of materialism.
became
part of the philosophy
one of the presuppositions
of most Idealist
The second constitutes
Let us consider each alternative
separately.
philosophies.
alternative
and

III
Materialism
interaction
of mind-body
The materialist
explanation
presupposes
A brief descrip?
of the nervous system.
a knowledge
of the workings
that I place my
not be out of place. Suppose
tion will, therefore,
hand upon the poker, find that it burns me, and quickly withdraw
is it that has happened?
The heat of the
my hand. What exactly
the terminals
of the nerve cells in my fingers.
poker stimulates
are in contact
with other nerve cells,
These nerve cells or neurones
and a stimulus
passed on
applied to any one of them is accordingly
Each
of transference
is as follows:
The machinery
to the next.
nerve

cell

has

a number

of filaments

attached

to

and

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extending

MIND
from

it.

These

AND
are known

BODY

One filament
is
is
as
the
and
known
other,
longer
considerably
or impulse passes
axon, and it is through the axon that the stimuius
to
the
next
in
The points
nerve
cell
the
neurone
or
chain.
through
of contact
betwreen the axons, known as synapses,
act like valves,
that is to say, they let the stimuius
or impulse pass in one direction
it
is
not
to
its track. The central
allowed
return
on
only;
part of
the nervous
all
a
sort
which
of
forming
along
highway
system,
filaments

and

finer

than

as dendrites.

the

pass, is the spinal cord. Travelling

by this road the heat
to the nerve cells in my fingers reaches the brain. Here it
enters a complicated
These
of tiers and layers of neurones.
system
tiers or layers
act as the clearing-house
of the nervous
system,
out the different
received
from all parts of the
sorting
messages
impulses
stimuius

which of them shall be passed

on for the
body, and determining
of
a
on
for
the
action,
stimuius
of action
purposes
Passing
purposes
means transferring
it to another
as the
of
known
neurones,
system
effector
nerves or motor nervous
which
the
move?
govern
system,
ments
we make,
as opposed
to the receptor
nerves
or sensory
nervous
which receive and transmit
the sensations
we feel.
system,
that the brain has decided
to take action in respect
of
Assuming
the stimuius from the poker, it lets the stimuius
pass through to the
neurones

the motor nervous

these in their turn
composing
system;
on the stimuius
received
from the brain down the arm to the
as the result
of which
the latter
are withdrawn
from
fingers,
the poker. The whole procedure
may be likened to sending a message
pass

from the fingers to the brain in response

to which another message
is sent back to the fingers. Now the processes
involved
in the sending
of these messages,
as they appear,
seem, nevertheless,
complicated
when we look at them from the point of view of the body, to be
a penny into a slot-machine
purely automatic.
They are like putting
and taking out a box of matches.
Nor does it appear to be necessary
to introduce
a mind or consciousness
at any stage of the process to
what it is that happens
It may be true
or why it happens.
explain
that

we feel the heat of the poker, and that the feeling is a psycho?
as opposed
or mental,
to a physiological
or bodily
event;
logical
but it may also be true that this feeling has nothing
to do with the
withdrawal
of the fingers,
is a purely
result
of
which
automatic
the applied stimuius.
I have deliberately
taken the simplest
case, and one in
possible
which

the

action
of the body is, on any view of the mind-body
as
as it is possible
for it to be. But,
relationship,
nearly automatic
if we can explain
some of our actions,
without
however
simple,
this
it
be
not
introducing
thing mind, may
possible that
mysterious
the same sort of explanation,
of
course, but
enormously
complicated,
still confining
to
itself purely
to bodily
invoked
be
terms,
might
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account
interests

PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

for

all our actions?

In any event,
should we
of science leave no stone unturned
in order to
that an increase
the
in knowledge
about
so, hoping
at
of
which
gradually
present
dispose
many difficulties,
to explain not only action but thought
in bodily
attempt
Let us suppose
that we make the attempt.
How, then,
in bodily
terms
the conscious
of
explain
experience

not in the
make it do
will
body
beset the
terms ?
are we to

being hurt
have when we burn our fingers ? How, in
undoubtedly
answer
at all? The materialist
consciousness
fact, are we to explain
to this question
is that there is no such thing as mind or conscious?
ness regarded as a separate entity, distinct from the brain. Conscious?
ness is merely a function
from the brain, continuous
of or emanation
with it and in all respects determined
therefore,
by it. Consciousness,
is nothing more than an aspect of the brain's reaction
to the events
which

we

in the body.
occurring
It must be remembered
of nineteenth-century
that the tendency
of the
in every
the importance
science
was to belittle
direction
The work of
of the universe.
part played
by mind in the scheme
Darwin
had been used as the basis for a conception
of evolution,
to the
amceba
advance
of life from the primitive
man
and
for
without
was
described
accounted
developed
fully
the intervention
of mind or purpose at any stage of the
postulating
It
was
in species, to the fact that off spring did
to
variations
process.
that the
not entirely
the
characteristics
of their parents,
reproduce
life
for an
was
when
of
due.
Yet,
development
pressed
admittedly
Darwin
of
these
variations
and
how
occurred,
explanation
why
in which

the

to a prudent
be presumed,
environment
survived.
confessed
it must

agnosticism.
and those
The

fortuitously
just happened,
were best suited
to their
in the field, that of
other theory
the origin of variations
ascribed
They
which

only
Lamarck,
and the
The environment
to the influence
of environment.
changed,
the
either
with
or
itself
it,
penalty
species
adapted
paid
by changing
In any event the process
for its inability
to do so by extinction.
was automatic1;
the movement
and development
of life was due
of a plan, but
not to the fulfilment
of a purpose,
or the execution
the

French

materialist

to the influence of external material conditions

upon living organisms.
For the root cause of vital occurrences
we must, in short, look to
material
occurrences.
and
Geology
had enormously
size and spread

reinforced
these
conclusions.
Geology
astronomy
the
the age of the world,
extended
astronomy
of geological
of space, and in the vast immensities

1 The Neo-Lamarckians
deny that Lamarck held this view, and can invoke
one or two passagesinLamarck's
writings in their support. But these passages
are unrepresentative,
and in general Lamarck managed very well without the
conception of mind.
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MIND
time

and astronomical

life seemed

BODY
like

a tiny glow
for example,

flickering
the sun
(when,
uncertainly,
ultimately
conditions
the
too
maintain
suitable
cold
to
grew
upon
earth) to go
a
was
chance
occurrence
a funda?
in
out altogether.
Life, then,
a
across
an
alien
mindless
and
universe,
passenger
mentally
finish
its
to
destined
indifferent
environment,
pointless
journey
and

space

AND

doomed

with as little noise and significance

as, in the person of the amoeba,
it would
continue
to be at the mercy
it began it. Meanwhile
of
reflect
life
and
be
material
in
would
conditioned
forces;
changes
and living organisms,
in matter,
instead
of being
by prior changes
would
their
the cause of physical
occurrence.
events,
merely register
that the tendency
to reduce the status
It will be seen, therefore,
it to material
of mind, to subordinate
and importance
forces, and
as proceeding
of causation
always from the more material
in
the
was
air, and contemporary
less,
already
psychology
conclusion.
it
its
the infinite perto
Among
logical
merely carried
which the forms of matter
mutations
and combinations
through

to think
to the

there had occurred

had passed in the course of its evolution,
one in
matter
had become
conscious
of
which, so the scientists
argued,
of matter that was called mind.
itself. It was this self-consciousness
refined and attenuated
form of matter,
Mind, then, was a highly
a sort of halo surrounding
the brain. Its function
was to light up
this illumination
events
in the brain,
and, when
occurring
of the events.
we were said to be conscious
occurred,
The function
of the mind being limited to lighting up or registering
in the brain, it is clear that it cannot register what
events occurring

the

is not there; it follows that there can be no event in the mind unless
event in the brain. Mental events
there has been a preceding
are,
never the causes but always the effects of bodily
events.
therefore,
We are all familiar
with the kind of interpretation
which explains
such as, "I have been out in an
mental
with remarks
occurrences
me a headache
and made
has given
east wind which
me feel
all
"I
have
been
and am
life,
or,
drinking
heavily
my
depressed";
which
account
for what
to see things"?explanations
beginning
occurs in the mind in terms of what has first occurred in the body;
which was now extended
and it is precisely
this type of explanation
and rememberings?
to cover wilUngs, wishings,
thinkings,
hopings,
in a word all the workings
of the mind.
the organism,
outside
so also
Hence,
just as in the universe
itself causation
within the organism
always from the more
proceeds
of external
material
to the less. Man is the creature
forces, and his
in man's body are
of his body; just as changes
mind is the creature
to which he reacts, so also are
in the environment
due to changes
to his environment.
his
in
his
mind
due
to
bodily reactions
changes
from the stirrings
of life in
Thus the chain of physical
causation,
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OF

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STUDIES

as I am writing,
the first speck of protoplasmic
jelly to my thoughts
still
to be estab?
as
links
have
be
regarded
may
Many
complete.
a very few
it
in
for
at
is,
lished;
only possible
example,
present
the workings
cases to say how and in what way the body determines
a question
of
But the filling in of detail is merely
of the mind.
are
the
further
the
main
of
outlines
research;
already
picture
clear.
sufficiently
The structure
The bearing of this view upon Ethics is disastrous.
of Ethics is built upon the twin pillars of praise and blame. If you
cannot
and blame him for acting
praise a man for acting rightly
falls to the ground.
But praise and blame
Ethics
pre?
wrongly,
in the person praised or blamed,
some measure
of freedom
suppose
for him to do what was
they imply that it was at least possible
are
right, and to avoid doing what was wrong. But if our actions
if what we are pleased to call our
never the results of our volitions,
states of
are themselves
volitions
of certain
merely the reflections
the brain, it is clear that we do what we do, just as we think what
of our
we think and will what we will, because
of the condition
of our bodies is determined
bodies. And the condition
by the nature
in
of the stimuli to which they are reacting
now and have reacted
as to blame is impertinent.
the past. Hence to praise is as irrelevant
and feelings
of
so with iEsthetics!
The thoughts
As with Ethics,
as the movements
a poet writing a lyric are just as much determined
And they are as much
of his body when he falls out of a window.
determined
as the movements
of his body, because in the last resort
is what
of his body. For this precisely
they are the movements
the implica?
which pushes to their logical conclusion
Behaviourism,
tions

of psycho-physical
does
Behaviourism

parallelism

asserts.
deny the

existence
of mind or
actually
that if there is
it contents
itself with the assertion
about it.
know anything
as consciousness,
we cannot
we can observe
see what a man thinks,
we cannot
But, though
what he does. Hence,
of other people's
our knowledge
psychology
is based upon and confined to the observation
of their bodily move?
Let us, then, says the Behaviourist,
see how far we can go
ments.
in the attempt
actions
that
to explain
without
people's
supposing
not

consciousness;
such a thing

it is more than surprising,

it is
they think at all. It is surprising,
an
on
these
lines
to
find
what
to
humiliating,
lengths
explanation
can be pushed.
the Behaviourist
To assist him in his undertaking
Attention
was
invokes
the conception
of the 'conditioned
reflex.'
first drawn to the 'conditioning'
the
of
of reflexes
by
experiments
the psychologist
tied up a dog in a dark cabinet
Pavlov
Pavlov.
in which the dog is screened,
so far as possible,
from all outside
influences.
Food is put before him, and his mouth begins to water;
the stimulus
a response
which
in other words,
of the food causes,
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MIND
takes the form
an unconditioned

AND

BODY

of excretion

This is called
glands.
by the salivary
an
to
unconditioned
The next
stimuius.
response
time that food is put before the dog, a particular
note is sounded
and this is done on each of a number
on a gong;
of succeeding
the food always
the
of
occasions,
being accompanied
by
sounding
the note. After a time the note is sounded
it is
alone, whereupon
found to cause the salivation
was excited
which, in the first instance,
In
the
food.
other
the
salivation
is
now pro?
words,
by
response
which has come to be associated
duced by a new stimuius,
with
the original stimuius
it.
Salivation
through constantly
accompanying
to the

note alone is called a conditioned

or a
response
reflex. Practically
stimuius
which
is
suffi?
any
applied
with the food stimuius
often in conjunction
is capable
of
ciently
the
to
food.
This
is
true
even
of
conditioning
response
appropriate
Let us suppose
a painful
stimuius.
that the dog is pricked
on a
in response
conditioned

of occasions
when the food is put before him, and is later
in
the
same
the food;
instead
of causing
place without
pricked
of
and
the
will
now
fright,
pain
symptoms
prick
merely
produce
salivation.
abundant
is too technical,
and would take us too far beyond
The subject
to pursue here, but a word must
the scope of the present
inquiry,
number

of the inferences
drawn from these
One
of
the
of the
experiments.
apparently
great difficulties
which we have been examining
materialist
is to explain
hypothesis
are ultimately
to be regarded
as bodily
why, if all mental activities
be

added

on the
trivial

and

importance

all

movements
are to be interpreted
as
bodily
to stimuli,
comparatively
responses
simple stimuli should be capable
such a bewildering
of producing
and complexity
of so-called
variety
mental effects.
Materialists
of the nervous
point to the enormous
complexity
movements,

the fact that our knowledge

of the
system and the brain, emphasize
is still in its infancy,
mode of their working
and express
the view
will exhibit
that future research
connections
between
stimuli
and
which at present seem totally
unrelated.
But when every
responses
is made for these considerations,
allowance
the theory that we are
asked to accept of the ultimate
determination
of all mental activities
still seems to stretch
our powers
of credence
to
by bodily stimuli
the full.
for example,
that I am sitting dozing in an armLet us suppose,
dinner.
chair after
is relaxed.
My mind wanders,
my attention
I begin to think about a lecture I am to deliver
however,
Presently,
is one that I dread, and the ordeal fills me
next week. The occasion
with
leave

So much so
apprehension.
to pace the
chair, and begin
of spontaneous
say is an example

nervous
my

normally

that
room.
mental

I become
restless,
Here one would
activity,

namely
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JOURNAL

PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

with
certain
dread,
tinged
expectation
producing
physiological
The mind here is cause,
occurrences.
and the bodily
movements
effect. But the normal explanation
out
ruled
the
materialist
being
by
as
causation
of
from
the
the mind,
to
proceeding
always
theory
body
some other must be found.
of next week's lecture
must be
way my apprehension
in
terms
to
of
stimuli.
are
What,
then,
response
bodily
explained
the stimuli to which my body is exposed ? They are roughly
of two
and internal.
The external
stimuli
are constituted
kinds, external
In some

of the fire upon my face, and the pressure

of the
by the warmth
back
and
sides and seat of the chair against
The
internal
my
legs.
are constituted
of my bodily organs which
stimuli
by the activity
The assertion
that these stimuli
determine
digestion.
accompanies
of
a
lecture
to
be
delivered
in the following
to
think
mind
week,
my
requires a great deal
though not capable of logical disproof, certainly
And it is here that the theory
of the conditioned
of justification.
invoked.
in
the
be
case of the dog,
Just as,
fruitfully
may
response
come
has
note
of
to evoke
the stimulus
gong
through
conditioning
to a different
the response
stimulus,
dinner, so
appropriate
namely
the stimuli constituted
connected
by pressure of chair plus sensations
to have become capable through the
with digestion
may be conceived
a response
of evoking
to some
appropriate
process of conditioning
of a voice expatiating
different
on
stimulus,
e.g. the sound
entirely
of next week's lecture.
the importance
are not known. But, having
The details of the process admittedly
of the human brain and nervous
regard to the complexity
system,
of influences
to which they are exposed,
the immense
and
variety
of primitive
the
conditioning
responses
through
it is, it is urged, at least conof these influences,
of the kind should take place. Along these
that something
ceivable
of the theory
the reader is referred
lines (for an elaboration
to
books on Behaviourism)
various
an endeavour
Watson's
Professor
for the phenomenon
of thinking,
without
is made to account
introthe

multitudinous
effects

associative

and autonomous
mental activity,
ducing the concept of spontaneous
of the mind, like the movements
of the body, are
The activities
to stimuli.
The machinery
involved
is, no
merely forms of response
but the conclusion
of the process
doubt,
complicated,
immensely
The product
of a
is not for that reason any the less determined.
is
mechanism
no
less
of
automatic
than
the
piece
complicated
pro?
the mere fact that we do not know
duct of a simple one. Hence,
which end in the activity
called mathe?
details of the processes
as
we
well
know
so
those
involved
in the
matical
thinking,
instinctive
raising of the arm to shield the face from an expected
that the two processes
are not
blow, should not lead us to suppose
same
order.
the
Thus
the
of
of
mind
fundamentally
concept
may

the

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MIND

AND

BODY

be eliminated,
it is found to be unnecessary.
because
Even mathe?
matical
it
is
one
be
exhibited
as a
surmised,
thinking,
may
day
form of conditioned
an
to
internal
or an
response
bodily process
external
situation.
IV
Idealism
Of the second

which is to regard the body as in some

alternative,
I have already
in the second
article of this
mental,
spoken
series on Idealism,
nor do I wish to repeat the arguments
in favour
of this view there given.
to outline
I propose,
one Idealist
of
however,
briefly
theory
has a special
the mind-body
which
bearing
upon
perception,
sense

I am here concerned.
This is the theory
of
Leibniz rejected
Descartes'
view of psychoLeibniz.
as Descartes
That mind and body, conceived
parallelism.
them, could not interact he agreed. But this impossibility

with
problem
the philosopher

which

physical
conceived
of interaction

substances
was for him, as for the
different
between
the apparent
a sufficient
reason for denying
difference.
as
it is clear, since our own active
exists,
experience
are
which
we
certain.
the
one
of
is
units
indubitably
thing
thinking
That
we experience,
is
mind?
exist
But does anything
except
which
is
not
constican
be
how
but
experienced
anything
agreed,
a part or aspect of the
tuted,
by the very fact that it is experienced,
materialists,
The mind

in which it occurs ? So far from mind being able to interact

experience
with body, it cannot even interact with other minds, since in trying to
with another mind it would only succeed
enter into communication
effects of that other mind upon itself.
the alleged
in experiencing
consisted
of a
that the universe
Leibniz
was led to believe
Hence
units of experience,
which
number of separate
non-interacting
monads."
are known as "spiritual
with
there
can interact
Since
no monad
monad,
any other
in
that
connection
between
can be no causal
anything
happens
in the universe.
that happens
elsewhere
and anything
one monad
there
was a point-to-point
that
Leibniz
believed
Nevertheless,
and that
one monad
the
of
between
development
correspondence
so that any event in one is accompanied
of the others,
by corre?

vast

events in all the others. Since each monad registers all the
sponding
that there are, we may say that
in
all the other monads
events
We cannot, how?
a
is
mirror
of the universe.
or
reflects
each monad
another
monad
one
knows
that
one, since, if it did,
ever, suppose
and we are
the
monad
affected
it would be causally
known,
by
it
the
monads
and
other
connection
that
the
between
told
explicitly
Leibniz
the
monads
reason
called
this
a
For
causal
one.
is not
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235

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JOURNAL

PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

to signify that each monad

of its own experience.
The
not
know
each
do
other
and
monads,
although
they
each
nevertheless
is
to
are not affected
be
other,
keep step,
by
of
the
of
the
the
conception
pre-established
by
harmony
explained
a harmony
which is the work of the Creator, who ordered
universe,
in the best possible
in the universe
Our know?
manner.
everything
existence
this
of
must
of
the
be
to
again
harmony
ledge
presumed
as
Voltaire
in
be a priori,
showed
to
since,
Candide,
attempts
it by experience
are not as successful
demonstrate
as could be wished.
matter as a mode of perception
This theory represents
by mind,
the view that the material
and involves
body with which our mind
is an illusion.
That this conclusion
interacts
follows
apparently
"windowless,"
is completely
fact that the

the word being intended

up within the world

shut

from Leibniz's
can be seen by reflecting
necessarily
general position
in
of
our
belief
the
existence
the
of matter?
Asked
upon
ground
in
he
the
man
believed
would answer that he is
matter,
why
plain
aware of it in the experience
made directly
of the outside
world
his senses. We seem, that is to say, when we
which he has through
an object,
to be brought
into contact
with something
perceive
which is other than our own minds,
but which produces
an effect
upon our minds, the effect being that which causes us to say that
the object. To accept this common-sense
we are perceiving
account
t ant amount
would be, for Leibniz,
to admitting
that
could influence
or affect another,
since, as there are
the apparently
lifeless, external
only monads in the universe,
object
is really a collection
of monads.
Leibniz
Therefore,
regarded
per?
of perception
one monad

in which
not as a process
an object
affects
a
perceived
but as an event in the perceiving
monad which
monad,
perceiving
runs parallel with a corresponding
event in the perceived
monad.
From this it follows
that we are never aware of any happening
in ourselves;
which is not a happening
hence, we never experience
at all. Since the happenings
an external
world
in ourselves,
of
which we are aware, are mental events,
such as thoughts,
feelings,
ception

and so forth, the inference

is that the world is composed
volitions,
It is not very clear why, if Leibniz
of such events.
had really,
as
a complete
his theory
him to maintain,
inde?
required
developed
of everybody
and everything
else, he should have believed
pendence
in the existence
of anything
If the answer is that
himself.
except
his knowledge
of other monads
was a priori knowledge,
and, as
from experience,
but given to him by God to
such, not derived
to inquire
how he came to know that
begin with, it is necessary
there was a God to endow him with a priori knowledge.
He could
a priori, yet, unless there is a God,
only know of God's existence
a priori knowledge
is robbed of its validity
and its certainty.
But
this is not the place to press this criticism.
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MIND
In apparent

AND

contradiction

BODY

to the

conclusion

that

we never

per?
our belief in
ourselves,
the world.
result of our confused
way of perceiving
A
man's
in
levels
of
mental
The monads
development.
body,
vary
is a group of innumerable
for example,
but his mind or
monads,
or guiding
monad of the group, consists
soul, which is the central
The
have
of one monad
monads
views of the world which
only.
in
clearness
level
of development,
to
their
inferior
vary
according
the world, in the manner already explained,
more
monads mirroring
than
The
even
central
ones.
vision
of
the
monad,
obscurely
superior
which is the human mind, is infected with some degree of confusion,
as a result of which we see the world as matter extended
in space,
ceive

anything
matter was the

instead

outside

of as a collection

the

Leibniz

of mental
the

does
monad,
supreme
of self-contained
as a collection

world

monads.

appear
monads.

held

that

Only to God, who is

as it really is, that is,

Dualism
For my part I find myself
unable to accept either of the alter?
native views described
above. The objections
to which materialism
is exposed,
is absolutely
no single
one of them
final,
although
a cumulative
have
force which
is overwhelming.
Most of these
objections
we
which

to branches
belong
are here concerned.

of

other
than
that
inquiry
are derived
Some of them

with
from

a study of the special sciences

such as biology
and physics;
others
are philosophical
and follow
from
the
of
con?
logically
difficulty
of
the
universe
as
a
a
whole
in
manner
the
with
ceiving
compatible
of
materialist
mind.
to
Others,
however,
conception
belong
psycho?
with the mind-body
and are connected
itself.
To
logy,
problem
them here would take me too far beyond the scope of this
examine
aims merely
at indicating
alternative
hypotheses.
I
as
should
reason
for rejecting
the
however,
Briefly,
give
my
view that, if taken literally,
materialist
it seems to contradict
the
facts
of
our
That
I
an
am
active
plainest
experience.
everyday
unit and that, within
limits, I am free to choose what
experiencing
article,

which

I shall have, are facts than which nothing

I know can
experiences
Materialism
is a set of inferences
be more certain.
based
partly
obtained
as
to
the
in
which
upon knowledge
by physiologists
way
the body works. The inferences
may be more or less trustwrorthy?
some of them, in fact, in the existing
state of our knowledge
are
very precarious?but
they do not and never can reach the degree of
which
to my present
attaches
as a free con?
certainty
experience
scious unit, nor can they be used to impugn that experience.
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JOURNAL

PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

is reached by a
like any other philosophy,
all, materialism,
from
certain
of
deduction
facts, namely those of our
logical
process
In
these facts
as
conscious
experience
living organisms.
pronouncing
it
the very
at
and
at
best
be
worst
to
misleading,
illusory,
destroys
it
I
am
and
within
which
is
conscious
constructed.
foundation
upon
from
am
tells
me.
To
start
limits I
free; so much my experience
After

these

we

facts?and
which

conclusions
illusions
reached.

can

convict

is to stultify

the

others?and
to arrive at
of being
and freedom
both consciousness
are
arguments
by which the conclusions
start

with

no

inadmissible.
I find the Idealist
however,
hypothesis
Equally,
or so it seems to me, it leads us into Solipsism
Either,
(the view
are literally
the
states of the experiencing
that the mental
subject
the universe),
and that they constitute
only things in the universe,
the
this conclusion
or it evades
only at the cost of representing
unreal aspect of an
as a partial and partially
individual
experience
that my own
I do not believe
of thought.
all-embracing
unity
in
and I have tried to give reasons
is the universe,
consciousness
is a unity in
article against
the view that the universe
a previous
monistic
the sense required
philosophies.
by
both body and mind
while retaining
Is it, then, after all possible,
to make pro vision for their accomand different entities,
as distinct
within the bounds of a single organism ? I believe that it
modation
even
of this article
the limits
I cannot
within
and
is,
although
to work out a theory on these lines, I should like to conclude
attempt
certain considerations
upon which such a theory would
by indicating
lay emphasis.
would
from which the theory
(i) First, what are the materials
?
have to be constructed
Two things seem to be quite certain:?
can be
that
is a scientific
actuality
system
(a) The nervous
our
It is complex
measured
and weighed.
present
powers
beyond
of living units which
of the millions
if only because
of conception,
to be the seat of an activity
It appears,
it includes.
moreover,
overflows
it.
apparently
the
is our inner life of consciousness,
less
real, however,
(b) No
is
It
and
desires
and
stream
of our thoughts
purposes.
feelings,
all
others.
it
includes
for
our supreme
reality,
a know?
with (b) presupposes
(2) To say that (a) cannot interact
Modern
in
fact
we
not
of
that
do
by
physics
possess.
ledge
(a)
has cut the ground from
and mysterious
matter intangible
making
as to what
with its dogmatic
the old materialism
beneath
certainty
which

do and what it could not.

noted:?
points may be specially
Matter
to be
is
thought
(a)
usually

matter
Two

could

composed

of

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atoms.

We

MIND

AND

BODY

know these atoms except when they are absorbing

do not, however,
or radiating
that is to say, we only know them when they
energy;
in
the
of the atom occur when an electron
structure
change. Changes
in
case the atom loses energy
a
smaller
which
in
to
orbit,
jumps
or to a larger one, in which case the atom
the form of radiation,
these changes
We do not know, however,
absorbs energy.
directly;
to occur
we only infer them from certain effects which are observed
As
these
effects
field.
in the surrounding
spatio-temporal
approach
more
and more
a centre,
become
how?
marked;
when,
they
are
centre
from
which
said
reach
the
to
we
emanate,
ever,
they
our knowledge
stops. We do not, that is to say, know the atom at
in terms of energy
we can only say that the effects
the centre;
we
outwards
from the centre,
which
observe
radiation,
spreading
that
there
is
with the view
are compatible
there, like an
something
as the case may be, to cause them. In other
electron
or a proton
words, we never know a piece of matter at all; matter is an inference
in places where the matter is not.
from effects observed
in the atom in virtue of the effects produced
(b) Of the changes
which we infer that there is an atom, some are caused by the
from one orbit to another.
The changes
conjump of an electron
caused changes.
stituted
We do
by these jumps are not, however,

by

from one orbit to another,

not know
jumps
why the electron
we know laws which are in the nature of statistical
nor?although
the number of electronic
which in certain cases determine
averages,
that will take place over a given period?do
we know in
jumps
it will jump or when.
whether
electron,
respect of any particular
So far as the contents
of the physical
Two conclusions
emerge.
we have to abandon
the notion of
world are concerned,
altogether
from a locality.
a thing, and replace it by that of emanations
These
are partly
due to electronic
which
emanations
themselves
jumps,
There seems, in
appear to fall outside the cause and effect sequence.
of spontaneity
fact, to be an element
lurking at the heart of matter;
in saying
as if we were justified
it is almost
that the electron
wanted
to.
it
because
jumped
The

first

conclusion

is unfavourable

to

the second
materialism;
that
of what a
Together
they preclude
certainty
is like, including
the assurance
of its radical differ?
ence from mind, which has been the main grounds for the assertion
of its interaction
with mind.
of the impossibility
the
matter
is
not
of
It
as a 'thing' or as made
concept
only
(3)

determinism.
piece of matter

to

to rule interaction
out of court;
of 'things' which has been thought
no less great have arisen from a similar
difficulties
in
conception
It
is
mind.
to
revise
to
the
commontherefore,
necessary,
regard
of mind. If we think of mind as a pool or reservoir
sense notion
little mental
blobs like ideas, concepts,
of or containing
composed
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OF

JOURNAL

PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

to bridge the gulf between

wishes, and feelings, then it is impossible
the
it and the body. But if we substitute
the notion of an activity,
is
transformed.
problem
The importance
of rightly conceiving
the nature of mind may be
if we consider
realized
the analogies
which
have
been used to
its relation
to body.
illustrate
Materialists
have made great play
with the
emanation

The flame is an
the candle.
its
the candle
and
to
candle,
owing
being
the
when
candle
is burnt out; similarly,
it is said,
disappearing
from the brain,
the mind is an emanation
dependent
upon the
and ceasing to be when the brain disintegrates.
brain for its existence,
at issue. Suppose
But the use of such an analogy
begs the question
we substitute
the notion
wireless
that
of a portable
set, which
analogy
from

of

the

flame

and

the

If the water or other substances

waves.
in the
it ceases to function.
up, or the set is damaged,
therefrom
concludes
that the waves that were interBut nobody
no longer, have ceased to be.
cepted before, but are intercepted
from the material world is obviously
Now, although
any metaphor

intercepts
batteries

wireless
are used

when invoked
to describe
the mode of being of an
inappropriate
immaterial
entity such as the mind is here claimed to be, it is clear
drawn from a form of activity
or energy such as
that an analogy
current
or wireless
waves is less likely to mislead
an electric
than
one based upon the notion of substance.
that I should
The metaphor
like to suggest
then is one which
a
the
brain
as
sort
of
and mind as
exchange
telephone
represents
to transmit
its messages
an agency which uses the exchange
to the
of
Between
the
brain
and
an
Einstein
that
of
is
idiot
there
body.
at least it is not a difference
of such a
no perceptible
difference;
to tell which brain is Einstein's
kind as to enable the physiologist
must be located
The seat of the difference
and which is the idiot's.
in the

nature

brains

as their

of the

activities
which
respective
of expression.
This con?
cannot
be worked
out here, since the problems
which it
ception
than to the mind-body
raises belong rather to theory of knowledge
committed
to an
it, we find ourselves
Adopting
proper.
problem
all
view
so-called
mental
which,
eliminating
'epistemological1
reduces the mind to an activity,
entities such as ideas and concepts,
that
in short, is not a thing, it is
of
awareness.
The
mind,
namely
of things
is a mental
other than itself.
an awareness
Perception
of sense data occurring
in the body and brain; thinking
awareness
elsewhere,
are using

namely
the two

an awareness

of the world

means

of subsistence.

240

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