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G.R. No.

L-59514 February 25, 1988


PACIANO REMALANTE, petitioner,
vs.
CORNELIA TIBE and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Disputed in this case is the ownership of
six (6) parcels of land. The trial court awarded
three (3) parcels to petitioner and the other
three (3) to private respondent, but the Court of
Appeals held otherwise and awarded all six (6)
to private respondent.
In a complaint filed before the trial court,
private respondent Cornelia Tibe, as plaintiff,
sought the annulment of certain contracts and
other documents which became the bases for
the transfer of six (6) parcels of land from
private
respondent
to
petitioner
PacianoRemalante, the defendant below. Private
respondent claimed that petitioner, through
fraud, deceit, abuse of confidence and
misrepresentation, induced her to sign three (3)
affidavits of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M),
purported to be bail bonds, that transferred
three (3) parcels of land under Tax Declaration
Nos. 20280, 20273 and 20274 to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter presented the affidavits to
the Provincial Assessor and caused the three (3)
parcels of land to be declared under Tax
Declaration Nos. 20323, 20324 and 20325.
Private respondent also claimed that
petitioner forged her signature in a deed of
absolute sale (Exhibit 22) whereby her other
three parcels of land described under Tax
Declaration Nos. 13959, 17388 and 16999 were
transferred to petitioner's name.

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL

COURT AND IN NOT ADOPTING THE SAME IN


TOTO.

RULING
Thus, while previously petitioner asked
the Court of Appeals to modify the decision or
the trial court which awarded him only three (3)
parcels of land and awarded the other three (3)
parcels of land to private respondent, by
awarding him all six (6) parcels of land, now,
with the second assignment of error, he wants
this Court to reinstate the decision of the trial
court from which he appealed.
His prayer causes even more confusion.
In his petition (entitled 'Appeal By Certiorari'),
petitioner prayed "that defendant-appellant be
declared as the real and absolute owner of the
properties declared and described in Tax
Declaration Nos. 20323,20324 and 20325 and
that plaintiff appellant been joined to deliver the
ownership and possession of the same also to
defendant-appellant plus costs of suit." [Rollo, p.
9]. However, in his brief he prayed "that a new
decision be promulgated reversing the previous
decision of the Court of Appeals by
adoptingintoto the decision of the trial court."
[Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, p. 13].
Petitioner's
change
of
midstream takes him nowhere.

theory

at

The Court likewise finds no basis to


disturb the findings of the Court of appeals,
which adopted the findings of the trial court on
the ownership of the three parcels of land
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 13959,17388
and 16999:
However, Exhibit 22, the deed of sale
respecting the properties declared and
described in Tax Declaration Nos.
13959, 17388 and l6999 is vitiated with
substantial error and fraud. It seems
that the consent of the plaintiff
respecting their disposition was secured
through substantial error or fraud, the
plaintiff believing the same to be merely

an undertaking for the provisional


liberty
of
the
defendant
in
a
concubinage case. This was substantial
error and fraud because if plaintiff knew
that what she was signing was a deed of
sale in favor of the defendant of the
lands in question, she would not have
consented to their alienation ...
The misrepresentation of the defendant,
upon an illiterate woman, not knowing
how to read, write and understand the
English language is fraudulent. Had
plaintiff known that the document she
was about to affix her signature was a
sale rather than a mere bail bond, she
would not have done so.
xxxxxxxxx
Since it has been established by
uncontradicted
evidence
that
the
plaintiff is practically unschooled and
illiterate, not knowing how to read, write
and understand the English language in
which Exhibit 22 was drafted, it would
have been incumbent upon the
defendant to show that the terms
thereof have been fully explained to the
plaintiff. The evidence is entirely lacking
at This point, and the lack of it is fatal to
the cause of the defendant for his
failure to discharge and burden of proof.

Consequently, as the decision of the


Court of Appeals is based on its finding of
preponderance of evidence in the record and is
in accord with law and jurisprudence, this Court
finds no cogent reason to overrule the decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 118509. September 5. 1996]


LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING,
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and
NATIONAL BOOK STORE,

FACTS:
Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons
Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the
Courts resolution of March 29, 1996, which
set
aside
the
Courts December
1,
1995 decision and affirmed in toto the
Court of Appeals decision dated August 12,
1994.
It is argued, albeit erroneously, that the
case should be referred to the Court En
Banc as the doctrines laid down in Abrenica
v. Gonda and De Gracia, 34 Phil.
739, Talosig v. Vda. deNieba, 43 SCRA 473,
and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc.,
et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified or
reversed. A more circumspect analysis of
thesecasesvis-a-vis the case at bench
would inevitably lead petitioner to the
conclusion that there was neither reversal
nor modification of the doctrines laid down
in
the Abrenica, Talosigand Villonco cases. In
fact, the inapplicability of the principle
enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this
case
has
already
been
extensively
discussed in the Courts resolution, hence
the same will not be addressed anew. As
regards the case of Villonco, petitioner
mistakenly assumes that its case has a
similar factual milieu with the former. The
Court finds no further need to elaborate
on the issue, but will simply point out the

significant fact that the offer of the buyer


in Villonco, unlike
in
this
case,
was
accepted by the seller, Bormaheco, Inc.;
and Villonco involves a perfected contract,
a factor crucially absent in the instant case
as there was no meeting of the minds
between the parties.

possible, whereas the direct testimonies in


these cited cases were delivered orally in
open court. The best that counsels could
have done, and which they did, under the
circumstances was to preface the crossexamination with objection.
x xx xxx xxx

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should have
be decided by the court en banc.

RULING:
Corollarily, as the petitioners exhibits
failed to establish the perfection of the
contract of sale, oral testimony cannot take
their place without violating the parol
evidence rule.[9] It was therefore irregular
for the trial court to have admitted in
evidence testimony to prove the existence
of a contract of sale of a real property
between the parties despite the persistent
objection made by private respondents
counsels as early as the first scheduled
hearing. While
said
counsels
crossexamined the witnesses, this, to our view,
did not constitute a waiver of the parol
evidence rule. The Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba,
[10]
and Abrenica
v.
Gonda
and
de
Gracia[11]cases cited by the Court in its
initial decision, which ruled to the effect
that an objection against the admission of
any evidence must be made at the proper
time, i.e., x xx at the time question is
asked,[12] and that if not so made it will be
understood to have been waived, do not
apply as these two cases involved
facts[13] different
from
the
case
at
bench. More importantly, here, the direct
testimonies
of
the
witnesses
were
presented in affidavit-form where prompt
objection to inadmissible evidence is hardly

As a logical consequence of the above


findings, it follows that the court a quo
erred in allowing the appellee to introduce
parol evidence to prove the existence of a
perfected contract of sale over and above
the objection of the counsel for the
defendant-appellant. The records show that
the court a quo allowed the direct
testimony of the witnesses to be in affidavit
form subject to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel. If the purpose thereof
was to prevent the opposing counsel from
objecting timely to the direct testimony, the
scheme failed for as early as the first
hearing of the case on February 28, 1989
during the presentation of the testimony in
affidavit form of Pedro Revilla, Jr., plaintiffappellees first witness, the presentation of
such testimony was already objected to as
inadmissible.[14]
The other points raised by petitioner
need no further discussion as they have
already been considered in the resolution
sought to be reconsidered, and no
compelling reason is shown to urge this
Court to change its stand.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners motion for
reconsideration and motion to refer the
case to the Court En Banc are hereby
DENIED WITH FINALITY, without prejudice to
any and all appropriate actions that the
Court may take not only against counsel on
record for the petitioner for his irresponsible
remarks, but also against other persons
responsible for the reckless publicity anent
this case calculated to maliciously erode

the peoples faith and confidence in the


integrity of this Court.
SO ORDERED.

ISSUE:
whether a holographic will which was
lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982


RULING:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO
APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA deceased, MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositorsappellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.

FACTS;

On January 11, 1977, appellant filed


a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432,
was
opposed
by
the
appellees
AmparoAranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla
TreyesExpedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla:
The appellees likewise moved for the
consolidation of the case with another case
Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was
granted by the court in an order dated April
4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the
consolidation of the cases, the appellees
moved again to dismiss the petition for the
probate of the will. They argued that:

Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil


Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its
due execution has been proved. The
probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If
contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the
holographic will has been lost or destroyed
and no other copy is available, the will can
not be probated because the best and only
evidence is the handwriting of the testator
in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator. In
the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the
Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic
will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself
as material proof of authenticity." But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court," Evidently, the

photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or


destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.

approve the will of the late Ricardo B.


Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower
court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration
dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated
July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to