Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Corporate Finance
Lecture Program
A
1
2
Term Structure
Forward Rates
Swaps
B
3
Capital Structure
Capital Structure
Corporate Finance
Recommended Literature
Basic
Literature
Further
Readings
Corporate Finance
1 Forward Rates
Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
Chair in Banking and Finance
1 Forward Rates
Structure
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1 Forward Rates
1.1 Goal of the Session
Given the spot curve, the interest rates for financial investments on
the capital market starting in the future (so-called forward rates)
are also determined implicitly; correspondingly, forward rates
concern the price for a capital commitment which takes place in
some future point in time
Forward rates represent the re-investment assumptions of the NPV
method if there is a non-flat term structure; we show, how forward
rates can be hedged
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
Notation
rt
ft
Remark:
Forward rates can also refer to several periods; therefore, you will
also find the notations ft (T ) and ft,T , where t denotes the beginning
and T denotes the end of the future financial investment
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
Spot Rates
r2
r1
t=1
t=0
f1
rT
t=2
f2
t=T
f3
Forward Rates
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
From the definition, the 1st year spot rate and the forward rate
for the 1st year (actually, the 1st period forward rate does NOT
refer to a future financial investment) are equal:
r1 = f 1
1 r2
1 f 1 1 f 2
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
1 r2
f2
1 r1
1 rt
1
t 1
1 rt 1
t
ft
10
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
1 r3
1.13
f3
1
1 18.46 %
2
2
1.06
1 r2
3
11
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
If the spot curve is normal, then forward rates are above the
corresponding spot rates:
rt rt 1
(1 rt )t
(1 rt )t
1 ft
1 rt
t 1
t 1
(1 rt 1 )
(1 rt )
f t rt
If the spot curve is inverse, then forward rates are below the
corresponding spot rates
Note:
Future spot rates must NOT be identical to todays forward rates
Corporate Finance Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling www.finance.ovgu.de
12
1 Forward Rates
1.2 Spot and Forward Rates
Rate
5%
Yield
Spot Rate
Forward Rate
4%
3%
2%
1
Maturity [Years]
5
13
1 Forward Rates
1.3 Hedging of Forward Rates - Example
In this example, we hedge the forward rate for the 2nd period using
zero bonds with a maturity of 2 years and 1 year, resp.
Assume, there are the following zero bonds traded on the bond
market (all face values amount to 100):
Maturity t
Price P (t )
1 Year
96.15
2 Years
90.70
14
1 Forward Rates
1.3 Hedging of Forward Rates - Example
We (short-) sell a 1-year zero bond and invest the amount in a 2-year
zero bond
Short Position
Zero Bond 1
96.15
100
Long Position
Zero Bond 2
96.15
96.15
(= 90.7090.70 )
106.01
96.15
(=10090.70 )
100
106.01
Sum
By this strategy, the forward rate f2 = 6.01 % for the 2nd year is
hedged
15
1 Forward Rates
1.3 Hedging of Forward Rates - Example
16
1 Forward Rates
1.4 Formulae for Bond Prices
1 r1
1 r2
t 1
1 rt
...
C N
1 rT
1 rT
17
1 Forward Rates
1.4 Formulae for Bond Prices
C
1 f1
t 1
1 f1 1 f 2
...
C N
1 f1 1 f 2 1 fT
N
T
(1 f j ) (1 f j )
j
j
1
18
1 Forward Rates
1.4 Formulae for Bond Prices
C
C
C N
...
T
y
1 rTy 1 r y 2
1 rT
T
T
t 1
1 r 1 r
y
T
y
T
19
Corporate Finance
2 Swaps
Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
Chair in Banking and Finance
2 Swaps
Structure
2.1
2.2
2.3
21
2 Swaps
2.1 Goal of the Session
22
2 Swaps
2.1 Goal of the Session
Dec. 2006
Dec. 2007
Dec. 2008
418,131
100%
595,341
100%
591,963
100%
40,271
9.6%
56,238
9.45%
49,753
8%
291,581
70%
393,138
66%
418,678
71%
18,668
4.5%
26,599
4.5%
39,262
7%
229,693
55%
309,588
52%
328,114
55%
43,221
10%
56,951
10%
51,301
9%
7,488
2%
8,469
1.5%
6,494
1%
Commodity contracts
7,115
2%
8,455
1.5%
4,427
1%
28,650
7%
57,894
8%
41,868
7%
Other
43,026
10%
71,146
12%
70,742
12%
23
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps
24
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps
25
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps
Payer:
Receiver:
26
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps
WestLB receives
WestLB pays
1.696
1.646
1.957
1.907
2.283
2.233
2.553
2.503
2.771
2.721
2.964
2.914
3.121
3.071
3.250
3.200
3.361
3.311
10
3.459
3.409
27
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps
28
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps Side Note
29
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps Side Note
Example:
Companies A and B each seek for a credit amounting to 10m.
Banks offer the following terms for floating and fixed credit
financing
Fixed rate
Floating rate
Company A
6.0 %
6-month-EURIBOR + 2.4%
Company B
7.1 %
6-month-EURIBOR + 2.9%
Spread
1.1 %
0.5%
30
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps Side Note
Pays in a
swap
Receives in a
swap
Net payment
6%
EURIBOR
3.9%
EURIBOR+2.1%
EURIBOR+2.9%
3.9 %
EURIBOR
6.8%
31
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps Side Note
A
6.0 %
4.0 %
Bank
6mEURIBOR
6mEURIBOR
6m-EURIBOR
+ 2.9 %
32
2 Swaps
2.2 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swaps Side Note
Bank receives
B pays
Initial situation
EURIBOR +
2.4%
7.1 %
Credit contract
6.0 %
EURIBOR+2.9 %
Swap contract
EURIBOR
ERiBOR 3.9 %
4.0 %
3.9 %
4.0 %
EURIBOR
EURIBOR
EURIBOR +
2.1%
0.1 %
6.9 %
Total
33
2 Swaps
2.3 Valuation of Interest Rate Swaps
S B fix B float
Corporate Finance Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling www.finance.ovgu.de
34
2 Swaps
2.3 Valuation of Interest Rate Swaps
B float
L k
(1 r )t
35
2 Swaps
2.3 Valuation of Interest Rate Swaps
36
2 Swaps
2.3 Valuation of Interest Rate Swaps
5
5
5
105
B fix
100
102.7135
0.25
(1 0.1025)
37
Corporate Finance
3 Capital Structure
Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
Chair in Banking and Finance
3 Capital Structure
Structure
3.1
3.2
Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
3.3
Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
39
3 Capital Structure
3.1 Goal of the Session
40
3 Capital Structure
3.1 Goal of the Session
Debt ratio in %*
43.2
Food Production
22.9
30.4
Equipment
19.1
Retailers
21.7
Chemicals
17.3
Computer Software
3.5
21.5
41
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
Franco Modigliani
(*1918, 2003, Nobel price winner 1985)
Merton H. Miller
(*1923, 2000, Nobel price winner 1990)
the market value of any firm is independent of its
42
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
43
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
Investors
Balance Sheet
Equity
Expected return
Cost of equity
Equity holders
Debt
Interest
Cost of debt
Debt holders
Assets
44
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
45
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
Normal
Expansion
Probability
1/3
1/3
1/3
800
1,800
2,800
Suppose that
Value of unlevered firm: V U= $1,500 (100 shares at $15)
Levered firm has D L= $600 of risk free debt at rD= 10%, with
principal and interest repayable next period
Show that the value of the equity of the levered firm E L must be
$900.
Corporate Finance Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling www.finance.ovgu.de
46
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
F Us payoff in $
Recession
Normal
Expansion
Probability
1/3
1/3
1/3
800
1,800
2,800
F Ls payoff in $
Recession
Normal
Expansion
Probability
1/3
1/3
1/3
800
1,800
2,800
660
660
660
140
1,140
2,140
47
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
Normal
Expansion
1/3
1/3
1/3
To debt
6.60
6.60
6.60
To equity
1.40
11.40
21.40
Total
8.00
18.00
28.00
Total
8.00
18.00
28.00
Payoffs
Buy xL:
Buy xU:
Hence, the cost of holding such portfolios (i.e., their market values)
must be identical: Cost of unlevered position: 1% 1500 = $15
Cost of levered position: 1% (E L + D L) = 0.01 E L + 6
Therefore: 0.01 E L + 6 = 15 which gives: E L = 900
E U= E L+ D
Corporate Finance Prof. Dr. Peter Reichling www.finance.ovgu.de
48
3 Capital Structure
3.2 Modigliani-Miller Proposition I
49
3 Capital Structure
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
rWACC E rEL
EL
EL D
rD
D
EL D
50
3 Capital Structure
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
Leverage effect
E rEL rWACC
rWACC
D
rD
EL
51
3 Capital Structure
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
r
E rE
E (rEL )
rT rWACC
rD
D
E
52
3 Capital Structure
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
F Us payoff in $
Recession
Normal
Expansion
Probability
1/3
1/3
1/3
800
1,800
2,800
46.7%
20.0%
86.7%
Return on equity
Expected return to equity = 1/3 (46.7%) + 1/3 (20%) + 1/3 (86.7%) = 20%
F Ls payoff in $
Recession
Normal
Expansion
Probability
1/3
1/3
1/3
800
1,800
2,800
660
660
140
1,140
2,140
-84.4%
26.7%
137.8%
Return on equity
660
53
3 Capital Structure
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
Owning all of the firms debt and equity should give also rT:
(Expected cash flow to the firm/Market value of the firm) 1
= (1,800/1,500) 1= 20%
Check MM Proposition II
rWACC E rEL
EL
EL D
rD
D
EL D
54
3 Capital Structure
3.3 Modigliani-Miller Proposition II
WACC Fallacy
Debt is better because debt is cheaper than equity
Because (for essentially all firms) debt is safer than equity,
investors demand a lower return for holding debt than for holding
equity. (True)
So, companies should always finance themselves with debt
because they have to give away less returns to investors, i.e.
debt is cheaper. (False)
WACC fallacy ignores the hidden cost of debt: Raising more
debt makes existing equity more risky.
55