David Krsnak

Moral Relativism

3/29/2006

Moral Relativism, defined as the belief that conflicting moral judgments can be
equally correct or equally justified1, is often defended against attacks from objectivistsi
regarding moral theory, in direct defiance of what seems to be a empirical truth: that
objective judgments of actions such as right and wrong, or good and evil seem to
carry no real substance outside a particular and specific cultural significance. Despite the
widespread acceptance of particular methods of behavior, modern cultural anthropology
has presented a convincing case that even so-called fundamental moral beliefs can vary
greatly between cultures: creating societies that express values Western cultures would
consider gross and depraved. The existence of these societies, and the evidence of their
existence in the past, implies that the content to which such judgments as 'right' and
'wrong' refer are arbitrary or dynamic values, defined by particular factors within the
growth of a culture and influenced by those events that define other aspects of that
culture. Thus, the belief that there exists a single, authoritative collection of moral
principles that underlies all true morality is not only incoherent, but dangerously rigid. It
is the purpose of this paper to present and defend a formal argument against the concept
of moral objectivism as well as evaluate a plausible form of moral relativism such as is
presented in Thomas Scanlon's Fear of Relativism and its response to several common
arguments presented against it, including the 'argument from moral authority', in the hope
of demonstrating plausibility of Relativism and the relative implausibility of Moral
absolutism.

Thomas Scanlon, Fear of Relativism, Moral Relativism: A Reader Paul Moser & Thomas Carton (eds.)
(Oxford UP, New York 2001)pp.142

Moral objectivists would like to claim that certain acts are inherently right or
wrong, independent of human opinion or social background. In support of this theory,
some objectivists will subscribe to the theory that there are moral facts within the
world,that is, information that can be divined by reason, intuition, or divine guidance that
allows us to make judgments about the actions of the people around us independent of
human subjectivity. However, despite this claim, there seems to be a large difference in
agreement over how many facts there are, and what the appropriate interpretation of each
one would be! In a paper entitled Anthropology and the Abnormal Ruth Benedict
describes several examples of cultures that practice values and beliefs that many within
contemporary society would consider immoral in the extreme. In the following excerpt, a
glimpse into the behavior of the Kwakiutl, a Pre-industrial society of Native Americans in
the Northwest continental United States is given. These Natives defined their entire
culture by the distribution, acquisition, and disbursement of wealth, whether it be in the
form of songs, honor or material goods, though what interests us most here is their
attitude towards human life and the nature of Justice. The Chief's sister and daughter have
disappeared and thus the chief is put upon with grief, he asks his tribe:
'..who shall wail? Shall I do it or another?' the spokesmen answered of
course, 'Not you, Chief. Let some other of the Tribes.' Immediately they
set up the war pole to announce their intention of wiping out an injury, and
gathered a war party. They set out, and found seven men and two children
asleep and killed them. 'They felt good when then arrive at Sebaa in the
evening.'2

Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the AbnormalMoral Relativism: A Reader Paul Moser & Thomas
Carton (eds.) (Oxford UP, New York 2001)pp.85

Their response seems to immediately conflict with our current notions of what is
right and wrong, yet an entire society practiced these beliefs and held them to be their
own, valid interpretation of natural law. If 'Moral Facts' like the ones that objectivists
describe exist, then surely these people would have encountered them and created a moral
system of behavior that had at least similar elements of behavior within it, yet there are
clear examples that this seems not to be the case. In fact, many of the values displayed
here are reprehensible under many contemporary views. Here now seems to be a serious
problem for the moral objectivist: the basis of his claim is that there are certain facts
about the moral nature of actions that are universal, yet there are cases where societies
have embraced values that differ greatly from each other, even to the point of direct
conflict, yet are comparatively vibrant and viable. Where does that leave his theory of
moral facts? Perhaps the answer is not found in facts for that very reason, but instead in
another expression of moral truth. However,if, as some moral objectivists do, he
abandons his focus regarding independently existing moral facts, and instead attempts to
appeal to a reasoned argument in favor of a particular outcome,(such as in Utilitarianism)
the means to which would be good, he seems to encounter similar problems: by what
standard is the net outcome determined to be good? Perhaps more pointedly, by virtue of
what is that standard a reliable determiner of good? In the first example, it is not clear
what these moral facts would be, or how one could distinguish genuine moral facts from
those manifested within a society. In the second, a similar doubt occurs as to the ultimate
goal that is being pursued. In both cases, the ability of a group to determine 'right' from
'wrong' seems to be determined by a subjective evaluation of information that results in
possible falsehood. If we expand this to consider any system that relies on the idea of

objective morality, defined as the belief in a principle or set of principles that concludes
that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinionthen it
seems that there must be a way of determining those acts without resorting to human
interpretation and opinion, since an 'opinion' is a view, judgment, or appraisal formed in
the mind about a particular matter; and is subsequently seen to be bias. From these
considerations the following argument against moral objectivism(as described here) has
been formulated below, tentatively named the 'argument from alienation'
1. If Moral Objectivism is true, then the objective value of moral acts can be
determined independent of human opinion;
2. It is not the case that the objective value of certain moral acts can be determined
independent of human opinion;
3. Therefore, moral objectivism is false. (C 1,2)
In response to this argument, a moral objectivist might reject premise one on the
grounds that 'human opinion' is not an appropriate limiting factor, since it could be the
case that the opinion of someone corresponds with the fact of the matter. Since opinion
has been defined as a particular belief about a state of affairs, argues the objectivist,
though it is seen through 'lens' of humanity, you cannot rule out that intelligent or
inspired individuals could perceive the true nature of things and find moral facts or ideals
that seem to have no refutation. Further, though it seems that there exists an apparent
paradox is searching for truths outside of man's experience, do we not do the same with
science with predicable accuracy? If certain beliefs or ideals coincide with results that
can be objectively compared and weighted, then there is a basis for evaluation that is both
objective and reliant on human opinion, resulting in a meaningful comparison of values

that would produce objective definitions of 'right' and 'wrong.' This is a convincing
response, yet it seems that there is a fundamental difference in the nature of moral and
empirical judgments, particularly when considering the various dispositional states that
an individual or even a society could potentially possess. From each person, the relative
level of fulfillment will vary, as will the criteria that would allow for this meaningful
comparison to occur, once again leaving the 'objective' nature of these moral acts to be
unclear. Similar attempts dealing with large scopes, such as comparing the overall
benefit of each system in an attempt to determine objective good seems to fail on several
counts, the least of which being that likely criteria, such as 'the relative level of social
justice in a society' seem inextricably linked to the current ideals that are seen as good,
ideals that have been demonstrated to change and vary through time. From these
considerations, it seems unlikely that there can be objective values of 'right' and 'wrong'
but rather that these determinations are made by a moral system that is variable in
response to changing social concepts, resulting in relativistic picture of morality. This
Relativism in regards to morals, however, seems to lead to as many problem as it
resolves, superficially eroding the objective basis for belief and moral judgment while
putting nothing comparable in its place.
In his paper, Fear of Relativism, Thomas Scanlon presents a system of
relativism that responds to three common objections presented to the view, all connected
with the effect that relativism would have on moral authority and personal conviction 1)
moral relativism would allow for someone to have no need for moral judgments or
principles at all, and would act without heed, 2) Similar to one, if moral wrongdoing is a
relativistic matter, than it seems a consequence of this view that people are free to treat

others in ways that may seem heinous to many; and finally, 3) That moral relativism
threatens the justification for any particular way of life as preferable,since, all views
being equal, there is no reason to believe in any one particular code of conduct or way of
living. To begin, Scanlon defines what he means as 'relativism' by the following
explanation of 'condition R:'
I will take it to be a necessary condition for an account of judgments of a
certain kind to be relativistic that it must hold that the cardinal virtue of
judgments of a certain kind(whether being true, being justified, or some
other property) cannot be assigned absolutely, but only relative to certain
conditions or parameters. These parameters can vary, and a relativistic
view must hold that particular ways of setting these parameters are not
subject to appraisal(e.g. As true, or justified) by the standards appropriate
to judgments of the kind in question.3
By defining relativism in such a way, he avoids a critical logical flaw that
is basic to many formulations of relativism, namely that the statement 'Every
judgment is relative. What is true for you, may not be true for me' seems at first to
present a logical paradox: if that statement is true, then it is truth is relative, and
therefore undetermined. Since the Relativistic parameters described in this view
are independent from the judgments that they contain, they cannot be subject to
those selfsame standards. In contrast to absolutism, the standards of relativism are
defined by the society, and therefore cannot be held to an objective criteria.

Thomas Scanlon, Fear of Relativism, Moral Relativism: A Reader Paul Moser & Thomas Carton (eds.)
(Oxford UP, New York 2001)pp.142

The first objection, namely that accepting the doctrine of relativism in

regards to morals would promote or result in individuals or groups possessing no
moral beliefs at all, is immediately dismissed by Scanlon, and used as a medium
to consideration of the second. Yet, even so, the argument against his view seems
fairly straightforward: In order for someone to accept the doctrine of moral
relativism and not some form of skepticism or moral nihilism, they must
themselves ascribe to a set of moral beliefs or at least respect that such beliefs
exist in the minds of others. While it may seem possible that upon the realization
that multiple standards of conduct may be seen as valid, the conclusion would be
that none in fact are, this seems to be directly contrary to the claim of equal
justification that is inherent in any form of relativistic system.
The second objection, that relativism of moral judgments erodes the moral
authority from which we make such determinations as 'right' and 'wrong' and
therefore erodes the authority to judge ourselves and others; seems at first to be a
very powerful one. Taken to its reasonable extreme, even actions that would seem
completely irredeemable are immune from moral judgment outside of their own
moral set on the principle that under a certain moral system, such actions would
be seen as at least neutral. For example, Scanlon cites the case of Adolf Hitler and
his campaign of genocide against the Jews during his years of influence in
Germany. If we accept a doctrine of relativism, it seems our ability to judge his
actions as 'wrong' disappears. However, there seems to be another way. Citing
Philippa Foot's discussion of relativism, Scanlon suggests that rather than thinking
in terms of 'unrestricted relativism,' where literally anything goes, a limited form

of relativism that deals with the nature of the meaning 'moral' and its underlying
characteristics seems to best describe the kind of theory he is advocating..
According to this theory of relativism, the term 'morality' can be applied to only a
set of things that exist within 'definitional starting points.' This view, supposes that
like the relation 'is tall' in English, 'is moral' applies to a certain judgments and
assumes certain standards, without which such a relation would be meaningless.
Relativism in belief enters the equation because these standards 'underdetermine'
what qualifies as moral acts and allows for various 'contingent principles' to
explain any variation in the moral view. Thus, while the basic 'definitional starting
points' determine a recognizable similarity between cultures, contingent
principles, individual to each society and socio-historic context, explain variation.
Some cultures may share the same 'definitional starting points' but differ in their
'contingent principles',;recognizing that a view is consistent to a particular set of
moral definitions while differing in the overall outcome and evaluation. Scanlon
believes that this creates a valuable distinction between what we may believe and
what we may respect as a view, allowing contradictory claims to be held as
mutually valid without seemingly reducing the set of moral acts to all things that
are desirable. The last objection continues the objection raised in the second, and
applies it to the individual component of the moral view. Simply put, if all moral
systems are seen as equal, what reason is there to adhere to yours, or for that
matter any particular one system, accepting their judgments as valid. In
responding to this objection, Scanlon hits on a fundamental reason for relativism
in the first place, namely that moral systems are inherently bias to particular

human preferences, and therefore, that as those preferences vary, so will the moral
systems that describe them. In other words, while the acceptance of moral views
other than your own deprives it of its supposed moral force, it simultaneously
allows for the recognition that there are 'different strokes for different folks' and
that while your moral systems are distinct, that in and of itself does not constitute
a rational reason to disregard a pattern of belief. Justification for this view is
strongly based in the concepts of 'definitional starting points' and 'contingent
principles' that were mentioned before. Like in objection two, the recognition that
a moral belief is comprised of both 'dispositional points' and 'contingent
principles' allows for a differing of belief. Through tradition and experience, the
moral system that you practice conditions you to recognize and become
comfortable with one system of belief, such that it would be preferable over other
systems based on familiarity and fitness to each society's conditions.
Given the wide range of acceptable behaviors and cultural standards that
exist within our society, a modern formulation of 'moral objectivism' seems
immediately suspect. Further, considering the powerfully accurate descriptive
nature of moral relativism and the world of shades that it describes, it seems
reasonable for one to accept the following formulation of relativism as it is
presented here. Despite the lack of definition in regards to where 'definitional
starting points' end and 'contingent'(arbitrary or social) principles' begins, it is
clear that there is substance behind that meaning of these terms and their
application to moral dilemma. While individuals may differ in their evaluations
regarding moral judgments, the underlying values that are used to produce theses

judgments seem to share the quality of 'moral' that would place with within the
definitional starting points, giving the foundation from which varying cultures can
produce contingent principles that fit their historical context.

I use the term here to describe someone who denies the claim above, citing the existence of an ultimate or objective
standard of truth regarding moral judgments