1. Pimentel vs. Aguirre GR no. 132988 July 19, 2000.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Sec 1 of Administrative
Order no. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to
reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 if the order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Held: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy which does not rule out any
manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that
local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely
directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision
over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the
power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic
stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
2. Marcelino vs. Cruz
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape on August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against him and rested its case. On the
same date the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within
which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz
gave them 30days or until September 4, 1975 and only Marcelino submitted his
memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, judge Cruz filed with the clerk of court a copy of his decision
bearing the same date of November 28, 1875, in which the promulgation of decision
was schedule on January 1976. The 3 month period within which the lower courts
must decide on cases had already lapse thus the lower court lost its jurisdiction over
the case.
Is the period to decide provided for by the constitution mandatory

Constitutional time provision directory

Sec 15(1) Article VIII, 1987 constitution- the maximum period within which a case or
a matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall be
24 months- SC
12 months- lower collegiate court
3 months- all other lower court
Rationale:
Statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings are usually those which relate to the
mode or time doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
legislature or some incident of the essential act- thus directory
Liberal construction- departure from strict compliance would result in less injury to
the general public than would its strict application

Courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within 90 day
period.
Only for the guidance of the judges manning our courts
Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against
the defaulting judge.
A certification to this effect is required before judges are allowed to draw their
salaries
In practice the SC is liberal when it comes to this provision which is mandatory, its
merely directive. Extensions can be granted to meritorious cases. To interpret such
provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless
SC warned lower courts to resolve cases within prescribed period and not take this
liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later period.

3. Brehm Vs. Republic

Gilbert Brehm a US citizen temporarily assigned in Subic Bay serving with the US Navy
married Ester Mira a Filipino citizen, which had a daughter by another man which was also
an American Navy whom they havent heard from since 1952, the spouses filed a joint
petition with the juvenile and domestic relations court for the adoption of the minor
Elizabeth to promote her best interest and to give her a legitimate status, and which that the
child be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural father and be for all legal intents and purposes the child of the petitioners with all
the rights pertinent thereto.
Republic of the Philippines opposed to the petition saying Brehm is disqualified for adoption
for being nonresident alien based on art 335 (4) of new civil code.
Brehm replied using Art 338 of new civil code which expressly authorizes the adoption of a
step child by step father and manifested that he intends to reside in the Philippines after his
tour of duty with the us naval force.
The juvenile and domestic relations court rendered judgment and granted petition for
adoption
The solicitor general took exception from the judgment claiming that it was an error for the
court to grant adoption

Issue:
Whether or not a non resident alien may adopt his step-child
Held
Brehm is a non resident alien attested by his own testimony is not qualified to adopt
Elizabeth.
Article 335 is clear to require interpretation, and article 338 be construed in connection with
article 335

Article 335 is a mandatory provision cause it contains words of positive prohibition and
couched in negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise that
designated
Article 338 which uses the word may be is merely directory and can only be given operation
if it does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Article 335
It is article 335 which confers jurisdiction to the court over the case and before article 338
may or can be availed such jurisdiction must first be established
4. Don tino realty and development corp vs. florentino
Feb 6, 1997- don tino filed an ejectment suit against florentino over a parcel of land
in Bulacan in which through force , strategy and stealth was occupied by florentino
Florentino was required to answer within 10 days from receipt of the summons.
Florentino filed his answer through Roel Alvear the president of
samahangmagkakapitbahay in BalagtasBulacan a duly recognized association
organized to protect the rights of its members to possession of the property in
contention was located, answered was not verified in violation of Section 3b of the
RRSP
While the trial court set the case for preliminary conference on April 13 Don Tino
filed a motion to cancel the preliminary conference because the answer of Florentino
was filed out.
Trial court granted Don tinos motion declaring that Florentino failed to comply with
Section 3b and Section 5 of the RRSP and that Alvear had no authority to represent
Florentino due to lack of SPA executed in his favor
Preliminary conference was cancelled and case was submitted for decision.
The MTC rendered its decision, ordering Florentino to vacate the premises and turn
over possession to Don tino, to remove improvements made on land and to pay a
rental fee of P2000 from Mar 26 until he vacates it
Florentino filed a motion to lift order contending that he was deprived of due process
when Mtc disregarded his tardy answer, that it was filed late and by non lawyer
because he was too poor to hire a lawyer, he ask the court to consider this as honest
mistake and an excusable negligence even if decision was already rendered
Trial court approved the motion but the Malolos RTC affirmed the ruling of MTC.
The CA reversed the MTC and RTC decision ruling that Don Tino loses nothing if the
answer will be admitted by court. Suits should be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities and that liberal construction on the rules was necessary to achieve
substantial justice to Florentino
Issue: whether or not the revised rule on summary procedure may be liberally
interpreted to allow admission of an answer filed 1 day late
Held: No the view of the CA that such provision should be liberally interpreted is
misplaced
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Section 6. Effect of failure to answer- should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period provided the court motuproprio or upon motion on the
plaintiff shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed theirein.
Mandatory / Directory Prohibitory
The use of the word shall in the rule on summary procedure underscores their
mandatory character
The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases under justifiable causes and circumstances.
5. Bensabahl vs. Avila
Facts: Congressman Pendatun of Cotabato filed a complaint for libel against mayor
escribano of tacurong before court of first instance(RTC) questioning judge avilas
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the offense contending that the city
fiscal of cotabato is the only one empowered to conduct preliminary investigation
pursuant to RA 4363 and Art 360 of the RPC w/c does not empower the court of first
issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an
amendment made for Art 360
Issue whether the court of first issuance is invested with the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigations of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged
exclusively in the city atty of that city.
Held yes it may conduct preliminary investigations because the power is not lodge
exclusively in the city atty . the enumeration in the law of the public officers and the
courts that may conduct preliminary investigation was designed to divest the
ordinary municipal court of the power but not to deprive the court of first instance of
that same power. The power of CFI to conduct preliminary investigation was derived
from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination
and to issue warrants of arrest and the CFT and search warrants. Preliminary
investigation of CFT is exception to the rule and not general rule
6. Lokinjr.vs Comelec
7. Enriquez vsenriquez
Maximo Enriquez later substituted by his heirs, filed with RTC branch 71 of
Ibazambales a complaint for partition of land in Amungan against petitioners. He
alleged that he owns 10/18 undivided portion of the property 9/18 purchase and
1/18 by inheritance; and that petitioners have been residing in the premises without
his knowledge and consent, thereby depriving him of his undivided share of the
property.
Petitioners in their answer averred that ciprianoenriquez one of the petitioners owns
of the property, while the others are in possession of the other areas with his
knowledge and consent.
RTC ordered petitioners to vacate the property and to surrender possession thereof to
respondents.
A copy of the decision was received by counsel for petitioners on June 22, 1998

CA dismissed the appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay appellate court docket
fee.
Motion for recon- denied
Hence, this petition for review.
Won the CA correctly dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to pay
appellate court docket fee.
Held:
Yes, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended now require that appellate docket
and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.
Sec 4, Rule 41 provides within the period for taking an appeal the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
The word shall underscores the mandatory character of the rule
Litigation is not a game of technicalities and that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented
and justly resolved.
The rules must be faithfully followed except when for, persuasive and weighting
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with
his failure to comply within the prescribed procedure
8. Gachon vs. Devera
Gr L-30375
Interest reipiciae ut sit finis litium public interest requires that by the very nature of
things there must be an end to a legal controversy

Gachon v. Devera, Jr
ISSUE: whether Sec 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which reads should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the Court,
motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, SHALL render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein, is mandatory or directory, such that an answer filed out of time may be
accepted
RULING: mandatory
Must file the answer within the reglementary period
Reglementary period shall be non-extendible
Otherwise, it would defeat the objective of expediting the adjudication of suits
9. Adasa vs de vera
10. Luna vs Rodriguez
JOSE LINO LUNA vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 13744. November 29, 1918
Facts: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th
day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los

Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast were
counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial
board of Canvassers, who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having
received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected governor of said province. Jose Lino
Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new trial was ordered. Additional evidence was
adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors in Binangonan did not close the polls
at 6 oclock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time. The judge
then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without ascertaining how
many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid.
Held: The ballots were valid. The law provides that at all elections, the polls shall be
open from seven oclock in the morning until six oclock in the afternoon. The polls
should be open and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear
and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote
if the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is
prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason
of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some
fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply
because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter
should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of
his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors
should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be
punished and not the innocent voter.
11. Rodriguez vs comelec
RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC
259
RA 296, 1996
Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the
Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said
position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private
respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally
on the allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private respondent
revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted
grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los
Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a
ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local
Government Code according to Marquez.
Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration
showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to
the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles
Court.
Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or

punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted

indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.
12. Aguila vs borje
13 .Querubin V. CA
Gr# l2581
Facts :
Petioner defeated Mamuri in mayoralty election in Ilagan, Mamuri filed an
action for protest in the court, lost and filed appeal thereafter which was not acted
upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost
jurisdiction.
Issue:

Does the CA had lost its jurisdiction to decide on the appeal

Held: No. Sec 178 of Election code provides that appeals from decisions in election contest
should be decided within 3 months after filing, this provision is directory in nature
since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of law
The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice.
14.Tatad Vs Sandiganbayan
GR# 72335-39
Facts: complainant Antonio delos reyes filed a report with legal panel of presidential
security command on October 1974 for charges of alleged violations of RA 3019
against then Secretary of Public information Tatad. The said report sleep in the office
of PSC until the end of 1979 when it became known tha the Secretary Tatad had a
falling out with Pres Marcos and had resigned from the cabinet. On December 12,
1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of formal complaint with
tanodbayan which acted the complaint filed on April 1, 1980, 2months form Tatads
resignation, the complaint was referred to CIS pres sec command for investigation
and report, and on June 16, 1980 CIS report was submitted to the tanod bayan
recommending filing of charges for graft and practices act against tatad and cantero.
By Oct 25, 1982 all affidavits and counter affidavits were in the case was already for
disposition by tanodbayan however it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was
approved by tanod bayan 5 criminal information was charged to Tatad alone
Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D'
Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered
for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on
three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the
calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made
alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had
a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures
prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of
affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a
ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period
fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can
not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in
the case at bar.

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC Case Digest

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC
259 SCRA 296, 1996

Facts:

The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of
Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was
Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a
petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation
that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private respondent revealed that a charge
for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal
property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court.
Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his
disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code
according to Marquez.
Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration
showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to
the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles
Court.

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the

compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a
promulgated judgement of conviction.