PELAYO v.

LAURON
12 PHIL. 453, January 12, 1909

FACTS: Plaintiff , Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money amounting to 500 pesos, stating that on or about October 13 ,
1906, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, Marcelo Lauron and
Juana Abella, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to
render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child;
that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it was found
necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of FORCEPS
which operation was performed by Plaintiff who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which
services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day,
he visited the patient several times. The just and equitable value of the services rendered by
him was P500, which the defendants, Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason.
The defendants argues that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said
childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a
separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she
gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances
CFI: Dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient evidence.
denied for lack of merit.

The motion was likewise

ISSUE: Who is bound to pay the bill, is it the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the
husband of the latter?
HELD: The husband has the obligation to pay and not the father and mother-inlaw.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. If every obligation
consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are mutually bound
to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of
illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation
to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he
or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to
furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical
expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual
obligation which the law has expressly established between the married couple.
The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for
his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the
imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered
that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish
his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially
established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable
While recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a
person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established the rule that

the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability
arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be held.
The father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon
the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his
wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a
contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is
obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to
pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves.

Ayala Investment vs. CA

286 SCRA 272, February 12, 1998

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation. As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed
security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly
and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus,
AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo
Ching with the Court of First Instance.

RTC: ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC
the principal amount of P50, 300,000.00 with interests.
The lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. However, Private
respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance
to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. The lower court issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public
auction. However , CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving
way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate
of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD: NO. The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and
not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove
that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has
a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt

and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly
not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the
conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM. The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since
the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from
the loan.

Homeowners Savings Bank vs. Dailo

G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005

FACTS: Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8,
1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot . The Deed of Absolute
Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof
to the exclusion of his wife. Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house
and lot. The husbandt defaulted in payment of the loan. Petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. Respondent
instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale.
RTC: Declared the forclosure of mortgage void. Subject property was conjugal in nature.
CA: affirmed the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property
acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.
ISSUE: (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS
UNDIVIDED SHARE.

(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE
LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD: NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

In

applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community orconjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under
the Civil Code or other laws.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the

conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent
of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. Both the trial court and
the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondents consent.

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1)

Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other

to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat
and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[ The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.

ATIENZA v. DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006

FACTS: In 1983, Petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico
Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent
Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations. In the course of time, the
relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man,
he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out
of their union, two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda
for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel- Air subdivisionLupo said Yolanda
bought the said property with his own funds Yolanda on the other hand said shebought it
with her own funds.

RTC: Rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the contested property as owned in common
by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal shares.

CA: Reversed the RTCs ruling. Ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family
Code vis--vis the evidence on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole
ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA,
Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the subject property was
purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.

On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the
acquisition of the property because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner
adding that under Article 484, NCC, for as long as they acquired the property during their
extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed
by the rule on co-ownership

ISSUE: WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda

HELD: Yes . It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each
other because Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a
state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385
Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718;
Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or
way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article
148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
(Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.). It is the petitioners posture that the respondent,
having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the
dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the
property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24,
1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the
vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. The claim of co-ownership in the
disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged
contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside
from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must
be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that

other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either
insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls
under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure
to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently
established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from earnings, not
only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending and jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account
statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay
the purchase price of the subject property.