Julie Grgoire

Mattia Lelteig
Alice Fiorentini
Noemi Palazzetti

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

IRL1035

May 2014

Introduction

The German Foreign Policy makes Germany the shirker in the international
community in the eyes of its allies. Indeed the article from the Economist magazine
entitled No more shirking, is Germany ready to have a foreign Policy proportionate to
its weight?, published last February, deals with the dilemma that Germany currently
faces in the conduct of its external relations. On one side Germany has mostly and
continually appeared passive and neutral on the international stage since its
reunification, Germany has farmed out foreign policy to America, France and Britain,
its key allies, while refraining from playing a serious part in military missions in the
name of pacifism since the Second World War according to the article. On the other
side, Germany became one of the most powerful economies in the world, and has
assumed a leading role in the integration of Europe as well as in the crisis-periods of
the European community. The economic and organizational weight of Germany but
also its geopolitical position at the heart of Europe between the United States and
Russia led to the growing frustration in Washington, Paris and London that Germany
was not doing its fair share.

The current challenge that German Foreign Policy is

coping regards the last General Elections and the new ambitions of Frank-Walter
Steinmeier and Ursula von der Leyen, who are respectively the new German Foreign
Minister and Defense Minister. They both have emphasized the need for a more active
Germany thanks to a further military presence in Africa in cooperation with France for
example. During the recent Munich Security Conference taking place on 31 st January,
the Defense Minister defended the idea of Germany as a framework nation adding
that indifference is not an option for Germany. The first institutional illustration of
the deeper German engagement is [the repatriation] to the foreign ministry of the
main responsibility for managing relations with the European Union, which migrated to
the

Finance

ministry

during

the

darkest

days

of

the

Euro

crisis.

Nevertheless these recent discussions must be understood in a larger ideological and

domestic context. Angela Merkel, starting her third term as the Federal Chancellor, is
highly skeptical toward military intervention and follows the culture of restraint so
far implemented with her former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. Merkel
disillusioned with military missions is a sub-title of an article of Der Spiegel magazine,
which highlights the disillusion of Angela Merkel toward the military intervention in
Afghanistan, and her attitude to be influenced by domestic factors such as opinion
polls, which show a largely skeptical German public opinion about international armed
intervention. Furthermore, the desire for an internationally active Germany is still
subject to traditional logics of German intervention. If Germany is ready to be active
militarily, it is alongside France or in the framework of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy of the European Union, not unilaterally. More concretely, on one side

Germany is the first trading and commercial power according to its size, on the other
side, it is the seventh country according to its budget and defense policy reported to
its

GDP,

far

behind

from

France,

the

UK,

the

US

or

China.

As an exception to the rule, Germany is therefore a powerful economy on a global

scale, which uppermost performs a multilateral approach of foreign policy through
international and regional organizations instead of unilateral positions. Alongside a
multilateral approach, Germany often contains itself in international decisions and
interventions. Christian Tuschhoff, professor and political scientist at the Free
University of Berlin specialized in topics related to international security, thus
describes

Germany

as

reluctant

and

isolationist

power.

Regarding these brief presentation of the current German foreign policy, how can be
explained the imbalance between the economic power and the international
diplomatic and military weight of Germany? How does the country manage this gap,
with which foreign policy tools and alternatives? In other words, what are the
characteristic of German Foreign Policy since the national reunification? In the
framework of geopolitical and security challenges, in which extent can Germany
sustainably face a growing demand for a more active intervention on one side and
domestic

constraint

on

the

other

side?

To understand the German specificity, we are going in a first part to deal with the
inputs of the German Foreign Policy at a domestic level. After having coped with
historical, domestic and cultural factors, the demonstration, will in a second part
describe the outcomes and the main components of the German Foreign Policy since
its reunification, including its current security threats. Finally, a third section will be
composed of the main challenges Germany now faces on the international stage
geopolitically and the way the German political leaders have managed it so far,
notably during the recent Ukraine crisis.
***

I Foreign Policy inputs and factors: a historical and cultural impact on

domestic politics
The fall of the Berlin wall on the 9 th November 1989 followed by the proclamation of
the national reunification on 3rd October 1990 had an impact on the conduct of the
external relations of Germany. In the larger context of the Soviet Unions collapse and
the emergence of a new international order,

from a bipolar world to a multipolar

order, the unified Germany had to build its own foreign policy, so far controlled by
outside powers because of its limited sovereignty and the threat of the Eastern bloc.

Geopolitical great transitions resulted in the possibility for Germany to distinguish its
decisions from the United States. In the framework of the European integration
process, Germany found an opportunity to play a leading role and to promote Europe
as an independent actor on the international stage. Indeed Germany integrated the
post-Cold War order by promoting multilateralism through the European integration.
Regarding the communist past of East Germany and its constant multilateral
approach, Germany tends to consider Russia as an equal partner and to not demonize
it, as showed by the German mediation role with all parts during the Ukraine crisis.
But if the Germany takes well into account the importance of the triangulation game it
has to address between Russia, the United States and Europe in order to deal with
geopolitical challenges, German Foreign Policy is not the result of active and solid
positions as said in the introduction. Meanwhile there is an increasing demand for a
more active Germany, one of the only European countries, which perform economic
prosperity whereas France, the UK and Italy know turmoil. A flashback in history can
provide

elements

of

explanation

of

this

non-interventionist

tradition.

Before the reunification as well as in the unified Germany, the past desire for
expansionism and world domination during WWII continues to have a specific impact
on the conduct of external relations. After forced demilitarization and the division of
the country at the end of the WWII, participating in the peaceful European integration
process was the one of the only ways for the tied German foreign policy to exist.
Taking into account the failure of the Versailles Treaty and the punishments measures
imposed to vanquished countries, the allies and first of all the United States efficiently
let West Germany take a leading role in the economic community integration. After
reunification, the need for building of national identity in front of a recurrent fear of a
reunified and rising Germany, made the German international voice take a particular
direction. That is why German leaders privileged a multilateral approach for its foreign
policy rather a potentially suspicious unilateral one. Germany wanted to regain
legitimacy and at the same time restore its national identity during the reunification
process by choosing an orientation for its international role. As claimed in a
comparative study entitled Framing Europe: attitudes to European integration in
Germany, Spain

and

the

UK published

in

2004,

the

German

devotion

to

multilateralism demonstrates how it is important for Germanys abroad image to be

an active partner in the building of Europe. Germany has continually been concerned
with other countries misgivings. It is even argued that the unwavering prointegration attitude is less the product of an idealistic Europeanism than a pragmatic
quest for sovereignty and legitimacy among the population. That leads us to deal
with the impact of the German public opinion on the conduct of foreign policy. As well

as the national media, the German public opinion supported with consistency the main
tendencies of foreign policy. Germanys history making the German international
position still sensitive, opinion polls generally show a skeptical public opinion towards
active military involvement beyond the national borders. Thus, a current opinion poll
published last February found 62% of Germans are opposing Ms. Von der Leyens
ideas about making Germany active abroad, therefore the biggest hurdle remains
public opinion at home according to the Economist. This example illustrates a long
continuity in values and attitudes orientations. Indeed, the experiences of the
German past [] still create a pre-set framework for the political elites when redefining German security issues according to the article Germans to the front?
Attitudes towards a German contribution to worldwide military missions(2008). Based
on opinion surveys, the article highlights the general consensus that exists between
the German elite and the population. With her constant policy of restraint and
following this skeptical line, Angela Merkel collects high rates of approval, from 70% to
80%, higher than any other of her predecessors. German media are also in majority
part of the consensus and skepticism about foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr.
Moreover, they are not very much critical vis--vis some cases of German selfcontainment. For example, during the Libyan crisis and the vote of the 1973 Security
Council Resolution, German newspaper first remained mostly neutral on the contrary
of French and other foreign media, but they finally positioned against . German media,
as in the other cases of the Kosovo war or the Arab Spring, reflected the general
values and attitudes toward the international role of a country, which experienced
foreign supervision and a limited sovereignty after WWII. Thus, according to the work
entitled Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France
and Germany diverged over Libya published in the revue European Security, the
national news media justified the German abstention in the UN vote by the great
preference for finding a solution on the regional scale and respecting the sovereignty
of

Libya.

From historical and geopolitical factors to their consequences on the main values and
attitudes ruling Germanys international role, the overview of the main elements of
explanation of German Foreign Policy now lead us to present its main manifestations in
a second part. If multilateralism illustrates continuity and is a key line of conduct,
other components of the soft power practiced by Germany constitute specific
alternatives, in particular the economic one, to a military presence worldwide. In other
words, the following part is going to explain how Germany reconfigured its foreign
policy in order to regain legitimacy and become a great economic power at the same

time. Before analyzing the main outcomes of German Foreign Policy, we are going to
present the organization of the German Foreign Office in order to better introduce and
frame the Foreign Policys objectives.

II Foreign Policy outcomes: the specific manifestation of the German

external relations
a) Foreign Policy actors and institutions
The main foreign policy-making actors within the Federal Republic of Germany are at a
cabinet level :
The Federal Chancellor, Angela Merkel, which is the chief of the Armed forces and
the representative of Germany abroad

The Federal foreign office, which is headed since December 2013 by Frank-

Walter Steinmeier,

has the task to promote Germany's international relations,

creating intensive interactions with other countries as well as with the international
organizations.

The Ministry of Defence, now directed by Mrs Ursula von der Layen, who as

minister of defence is the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces;

The Ministry of Economic cooperation and Development, actually held by Gerd

Muller, it is responsible for promoting international cooperation in order to foster

economic development in Germany and in other countries. Thus, it collaborates with
International organizations engaged in development, as the United Nations, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Moreover, since almost all policy areas are involved in international jurisdiction, also
other federal ministries influence the foreign policy-making, even if partially, in fact
they may invite foreign guests or play a role in treaty negotiations with the approval of
the Federal Foreign Office.
On the other side, within the Bundestag, in which is exerted a supervisory control on
foreign policy, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, oversee the decision making
process about foreign and security affairs. In fact, its consent is required for the
ratification of foreign treaties. For instance, it deliberates whether the federal
government should be allowed to deploy soldiers abroad. Since the issues on which it
deliberates are very delicate, the committee on foreign affairs works behind closed
doors.
Mainly, the targets of Germany's foreign policy are managed by eight commissioners

and coordinators, organised within the federal foreign office, which are:

The commissioner for Franco-German Cooperation, whose aim is to coordinate

Franco-German relations , in particular within the framework of the European Union

and deepen regional and cross-border cooperation in order to achieve joint projects.

The Coordinator of German-Polish Cooperation; was established in 2004 with the

aim to reinforce the good-neighbourly bonds between the two countries, since Poland
has become one of the most important European partners for Germany from a
political, economic and cultural point of view. Accordingly, the main task of the office is
to consolidate intersocietal cooperation by strengthening and extending the network
of non-governmental

organisations,

bilateral institutions and social initiatives.

Moreover, another priority is to work towards a closer cooperation in the shared border
region, in order to deal with social, political and administrative hurdles that still
survive.

The Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation; the office was created in 1981,

with the purpose to strengthen the relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, as
the US and Canada remain Germany's closest allies. Actually, Philipp Missfelder, whose
administration aim at concluding a general free trade agreement between the EU and
the US, chairs it. Moreover, another important object of the office is to maintain and
intensify relations with American-Jewish community.

The Coordinator for Intersocietal Cooperation with Central Asia, Russia and the

Eastern Partnership Countries; since cooperation with this region is often obstruct by
tensions and crisis situations (such in Ukraine), which prevent intersocietal dialogue.
One of the efforts of the office is to promote the implementation of EU aid
programmes in this region, in order to lay the groundwork for a stable development.

The Commissioner for human rights policy and humanitarian aid, promote

universal respect of human rights, which is one of the cornerstone of German foreign
policy;

The Commissioner for disarmament and arms control; created in 1965, now

chaired by Rolf Nikel, works in close cooperation with EU member states, Alliance
Partners and other partner countries worldwide. Its main target is to analyse and
develop new disarmament and non-proliferation policy field, moreover it is involved in

the

implementation,

development

and

strengthening

of

existing

international

agreements. Furthermore, it is active in advancing the debate on in negotiation of new

agreements concerning spheres in which instruments for multilateral disarmament
lack.

The Social Representative of the Federal Government for Afghanistan and

Pakistan's main target is to strengthen diplomatic activities to improve stability in the

Area. Moreover, it draws an annual progress report on Afghanistan in cooperation with
all the Ministries involved in this mission;

The Commissioner for international cyber policy: has been instituted in 2011,

with the aim to safeguard internet freedom, to tackle the increasingly importance of
issues related with the cyberspace.
Moreover, after the federal elections on 22 September 2013, the foreign orientation of
the new Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, and the new Minister of Defense
Ursula von der Layen, has shifted towards a more active policy. In fact, the new
ministers , as well as Norbert Rottgen, head of the foreign affairs committee, and Mr
Joachim Gauck, President of Germany, who has no policy-making power but represents
the conscience of the Country, are urging Germany to step forward. However,
Chancellor Angela Merkel has not taken a clear and decisive position regarding the
shifted consensus. In fact, on the one side, Angela Merkel has always considered with
great care public opinion interests, which traditionally opposed to a more military
engagement of Germany abroad. However, on the other side the Chancellor as have
been argued in the economist wouldn't have allowed two of her ministers to forge
ahead so far if she did not sympathise fundamentally with their point of view.
Indeed, it is interesting to notice how Angela Merkel manages at the same time the
need to collect popular support in political life and the need to reassure diplomatic
partners about a more active German involvement. Thus, she recently gave a stronger
voice in the defense of a solid Germany to her ministers on the media stage, even if
she still controls the orientations of the German Defense Policy as she has the power
of command of the Armed forces.
After having described the main actors and institutions and having drawn the Foreign
Policys priorities. The main characteristics and outcomes of Germany's external
relations will be now presented.

b) The components of the German soft power: the alternatives to a further

military involvement
German foreign policy, in the wars aftermath, has being characterised by international
cooperation, within a legal framework and permanent institutions. This approach is
called multilateralism and it was particularly successful within the context of the
European community that became a vehicle of improvement for Germans economic
and policy, NATO that guaranteed its security, and the United Nations used at the
time, by the Federal Republic, as way to international rehabilitation.
In the years after the reunification, Germany has continued to exercise a multilateral
foreign policy. It has reformed and strengthened the collaboration between the United
Nations, NATO and EU, trying to build a network of security and foreign policy
pointed on states conflict prevention, crisis stabilization and on fighting international
terrorism. All these goals have to be followed in accordance of human rights' respect
and international law.
Germany joined the United Nations in 1973, and from that moment, it committed itself
to support UN development as a cornerstone of German foreign policy into a legal
international framework. The U.N. offers to Germany a context in which implement
international law, sanction international peacekeeping and peace-making attempts,
and increase sustainable development. In the past years, Germany has tried to obtain
a seat in the Security Council as a permanent member; it shows a Germans desire to
assume more responsibility in the global field. Both Chancellor Kohl in 1992 and his
successor, Schrder were demanding for it. However, when it comes to Merkels
government, it was decided to cease publicly the calling for a permanent German seat.
For Germanys foreign and security policy, EU and NATO are the central points.
Germany sets, as fundamental aims for its foreign policy, a deeper European
integration, the EUs enlargement eastward, an increased European foreign policy
coordination and the progress of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In
addition, another of its aim is to balance the need for a more capable Europe with the
allegiance to NATO as the base for European Security. Chancellor Merkel states that to
allow Germany and Europe to enhance the partnership with the United States, it is
necessary a more cohesive European foreign, defense, and security policy. Despite
this, Merkel, as her predecessor, Gerhard Schrder, wants to pursue, within the EU,
German interest more assertively. This, at times has led Germany to have problem

with other EU member states, and has caused to pose some questions on Germanys
commitment to European unity. As it happened in Greece after the implementation of
the austerity plans. Under A. Merkel, German policy for EU enlargement shows a
tempered enthusiasm and suspicion on many features of the European market
integration.
Regarding NATO, in the White Paper, 2006, on security policy, Merkels government
declares thatthe transatlantic alliance remains the bedrock of common security for
Germany and Europe. It is the backbone of the North Atlantic Alliance, which in turn is
the cornerstone of German security and defense policy.
Several factors affect German policy within NATO and its relations with its allies,
causing tension. One is related to the U.S. leadership within NATO, and the way in
which the United States, Germany, and other European allies try to maintain a
common strategy and an operational vision for the Alliance. A second issue regards
the ability of Germany to tackle the defense and security policy reforms. Many, the
United States in particular, believe that an engagement in out-of-area missions is
essential for Germany to satisfy its obligations to an evolving alliance.
If multilateralism is a key line of conduct and has led Germany to have an important
role in the international framework, other components of German soft power have
constituted specific alternatives, in particular economic, to a military presence
worldwide.
German power, is based primarily on its economic strength. In terms of GDP, it is
fourth in the world. Due to its economic weight, Germany has an important global role,
which is exercised for instance, in the G8 and G20 groups of leading economies or in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It has also a leading
role in the crisis-periods of the European community. Through its economic power,
Germany has more influence and more independence in its decision-making.
Furthermore, as one the most powerful economies, German exports make the country
the first trade and business power compared to Germanys size. Alongside business
cooperation and integration made by German companies, the external economic
policy is also based on development assistance. Instead of helping the poorest
countries in the world, Germany has strategically reserved its development funds to
the now strongest emerging countries, like China, India or East-European countries,
with which it has developed closed economic ties. Indeed, Germany has strategically
increased its economic integration in the globalized, but her development assistance
is more based on narrow bilateral partnerships rather than a multilateral basis.
Moreover, Germany is the first European donor and the fourth worldwide in terms of

humanitarian assistance. It is part of the larger component of the German soft power:
the civilian power. Through humanitarian and civil society organizations, Germany
exercises a peaceful but great economic presence thanks to financial aid. Germans
civilian power is also characterized by cultural relations. Through its embassies and
cultural missions, like the Goethe Institutes, Germany aims to promote the German
culture as well as the language and invests funds in cultural and bilateral relations.
Despite Germanys great economic power, she faces considerable constraints and
challenges. First of all, it is linked in the European Union, which both intensifies and
bounds the countrys capability to have a role in foreign policy. Moreover, Germany is
limited by political mentalities, in fact Germans people has a deep hostility to military
interventions. On security, it relies on its Western allies, especially the United States
which expect Germany to join in military operations abroad.
Regarding Security and Defense policy, after September 11, 2001, terrorist attack
against the United States, terrorist threats are evolving, considering this German
leaders have aimed at a more dynamic foreign policy. Nearly 7,400 German troops
today are disposed worldwide, in particular in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and
Germans keeps discussing about interventions. Politicians have tried to explain, the
more frequent troop disposition and the more active security and foreign policy as a
necessity to be a credible global partner and to keep the alliances solid. Indeed,
Germany identifies the same global threats as within NATO and EU, terrorism, regional
conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), migration and energy
security. All of these threats have to be dealt in a context of international law and with
a multilateral approach. However German society claims that this shift in the security
field has being too rapid, but the reality is another one. Although, Germans politicians
have stated to the allies for a more active role in supporting

NATO and European

defense commands, both security and defense budgets have being reduced of the
40% since the late 1980s. Moreover, military repatriation, from Afghanistan in
particular, was a claim of A. Merkel during her 2013 campaign and will be
implemented.
According to this, German military role is not going to change anytime soon. German
purpose is not going to become a more independent power in the military field.
Nevertheless, in the context of recent international scenarios and geopolitical crises,
Germany is urged to take more solid decisions and back its diplomatic partners due to
its geographical position.

III Germany facing growing challenges: the case of geopolitical crises

Since Germany lay in the middle of Europe, it has always sought to maintain a
"balance of power" in the continent. This ideology implies that when a nation tries to
gain more power and to emerge, the others create an alliance to balance that power.
The first German statesman, to be aware of this was Bismarck, who after the
unification in 1871, focused on maintaining a European equilibrium, in order to avoid
conflicts and prevent Germany from being attacked from both eastern and western
sides by France and Russia. The need for equilibrium and stability increasingly led to a
culture of restraint, a term used by the former Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle,
which determined the way German successive leaders managed so far near
geopolitical crisis and international conflicts between the different camps.
The most famous and recent case in which the "Culture of Restraint" has been applied
is the Libyan Crisis, which also represents a shift in the growing call for a strong
Germany internationally.
Started in 2011, the Libyan civil war opened a big debate within the international
community whether intervene or not, also arising difficulties to define "goods" and
"evils". In the end, NATO decided to intervene with the resolution 1973 approved by:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa,
France, United Kingdom and U.S.A with the abstention of Germany, Brazil, China, India
and Russia.
The decision of Germany, caused many doubts in the international community that
saw it's abstention as a sign of weakness and insecurity. It showed how Angela
Merkels desire to follow her political belief made her lose a very good opportunity to
increase the weight of her country in the field of international security. And also
because Libya is not so far from Germany, how this theory can directly harm Germans
interests, provoking for example a lot of migrants and political refugees that could
cause future economic and social troubles.
As we said before the recent changes in the German foreign policy claimed
orientations could be the opportunity to emerge in the international stage and to gain
more credibility, thereby the Ukraine crisis could be a great change to apply the new
enterprising politic.
Started from the Ukrainian revolution in February 2014, the Crimean crisis concerns a
region in the south of the country, which is in a strategic position on the Black Sea and
where the 58% of the population speaks Russian as mother tongue. In addition, Russia
has a very important naval base in Simferopol, the main city of Crimea.

U.S.A and Ukraine had strongly blamed Russia for its expansionism and also started to
apply economics sanctions, on the other side Russian government assure that they are
only helping and checking the process of self-determination in the peninsula, in all this
Germany could have a key role and use the "triangulation" to become a mediator.
Germany is strongly bonded with Russia for his energy demands, in fact 1/5 of the
German supplies come from Russia; will this shape their foreign policy? Will it be able
to avoid dramatic consequences for Europe and the Ukrainian population? We still do
not have an answer to this question, but a hypothesis could be draw from Steinmeier's
interview by German newspaper "Der Spiegel in which he states: "There is no military
solution to the conflict in the Ukraine. Even if it can sometimes be frustrating, I am
firmly convinced that only tenacious diplomatic work can bring us any closer to a
solution.

Conclusion
As a conclusion, we have presented the German Foreign Policy according to a
comprehensive and analytical approach. After having analysed the factors and inputs
of the country's conduct of external relations since reunification, we explained the
institutional framework of German Foreign Policy and its main manifestations.
Characterized by tools and instruments of soft power and multilateralism, German
Foreign Policy mostly demonstrates a non-interventionist tradition and a culture of
restraint. Nevertheless, as analysed in the third part, Germany faces a growing
demand for more intervention among its diplomatic allies, mainly because of recent
geopolitical challenges and crises in which Germany can perform a mediation role and
could take a stronger voice in the triangulation game. In reason of cultural and
domestic political factors, Germany still seems reluctant to assume a diplomatic and
military role proportionate to its economic weight. In fact, even its leading economic
power within the European Union and during the Euro-crisis sometimes raises
questions of legitimacy among EU members, like in Greece where were imposed
austerity

measures.

In his work entitled German Foreign Policy: navigating a new era (2003), Scott Erbs,
states that Germany's multilateral cooperative approach to Foreign Policy is likely to
persist because it rests on culturally shared values and because it works. Moreover
the author defends the German Foreign Policy's conduct as an example in a multi-polar
world: by historical irony, the most nationalist state of the early twentieth century
may be in position to play a leadership role in moving the international system away
from the kind of myopic national self-interest that has dominated world politics to this

day. Thus, described as a post-sovereign country, Germany could have a

leadership potential, particularly at the heart of Europe, thanks to a comprehensive
and cooperative approach towards bilateral and multilateral relations.

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