The Extent To Which Environmental Change Can Cause Violent Conflict Editing

Forced migration and resettlement
The extent to which environmental change can cause violent conflict

Prince Perry Sarpong
2819937
Department of Social Policy
1
London South Bank University

The aim of this essay is to determine the extent to which environmental change causes violent
conflict. It would be appropriate to know what is meant by environment to start with. But is
environmental change really occurring? Why would it attract the attention of policy makers? Will
it initiate violent conflict? How would violent conflict be the outcome of environmental change?
These are the questions this essay will try to find answers to in the quest to find how connected
environmental change is to violent conflict. This is going to be done by: assessing the reality of
environmental change; knowing the level of attention it has attracted and the reasons for such
high interests in it (the likely implications of environmental change on the livelihoods of people);
will such changes on livelihoods spark violence? This will lead us to look at how environmental
change shapes social processes that are likely to be followed by violence.
The term environmental is defined by Libiszewski (1995) to mean the interaction between
living beings and their environment which is based on the concept of ecosystem which was
developed by Ernst Haeckel. It is further explained that the ecosystem operates at equilibrium
within a period but any shift in the equilibrium means a change in the systems operation.
According to the Stern Review, there has been a steady rise in global temperatures which has
been caused by the swelling amount of greenhouse gases (like carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxides) in the atmosphere. The Stern Review reports that the stocks of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere has risen to 430 parts per million (ppm) CO2 compared to 280 ppm prior to
the industrial revolution. The report also predicted that the amount of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere may be double of the pre-industrial years in 2050 even without further emission of
greenhouse gases but emission is being lowered. The IPCC (in Kristiansen and Smith) predicts an
increase of 1-3o C over the next 50 years which will cause floods, tropical storms, and decline in
water levels, decreased rainfall and melting glaciers.
Fowler (1995), based on physical arguments, empirical evidence, global climate models (GCM)
results, made qualitative statements about the impact of climate change on global precipitation.
According to Fowler, a warmer world would be in the most likely of positions to an increased
frequency of heavy precipitation which is associated with a warmer climate whose water-holding
capacity is reduced coupled with the intensification of the hydrological cycle which increases the
Environmental change and violent conflict
submitted on 24 th May 2010
risk of floods and erosion. One way soils are being degraded is through soil erosion as strong
winds and rain rips top soils away which are the most fertile. It is estimated that about 20 million
hectares of land is retired due to soil erosion (Schramm et al. in Norton et al., 2006).
Desertification is a problem with a global reach. It is estimated that about 65 million hectares of
productive land is lost to desertification over the last 50 years in Africa alone (Schramm et al. in
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Norton et al., 2006). The situation is no better for the Near East, South Asia and South America
(Schramm et al. in Norton et al., 2006).
Irrigation has been a very great advance in agriculture but it has not been without setbacks.
According to Food and Agricultural Organization about half the worlds irrigated land is salinized
whereas others estimate it at a quarter of the worlds irrigated land. About 20-25 million hectares
of has also been affected by salinization (in Schramm et al. in Norton et al., 2006).
The earths forested areas have reduced to about half its size in the last century. The process of
deforestation is at a more rapid pace in countries like the Ivory Coast, Paraguay, and Brazil
(Schramm et al. in Norton et al., 2006).
The United Nations Conference on Human Environment created broader awareness about
global environmental problems. The conference was held in Stockholm in 1972 where
discussions held by a group of experts to tackle the problem of environmental change. The UN
conference held in Rio de Janeiro also addressed the problem of environmental change (Baechler
in Suliman, 1999). The Kyoto Protocol and the meeting in Copenhagen both by the UN were
meant deal with the problem of climate change. The UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change has also advocated for the reduction carbon gases during the UN climate talks in Nairobi
in 2006, through Bali to Poznan in 2008 (Okereke and Dooley, 2009). Concerns about the
problem have risen to the point that Al Gore was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his
contribution to slowing down climate change (Wagner and Tol, 2008).
The problem of climate change has been securitized by the UN (Barnett and Adger, 2007). The
CNA Corporation (2007) after in-depth interviews with some retired army generals in the USA
and UK came out with the following findings: climate change is a security threat to the USA;
climate change is a threat multiplier to volatile regions in the world; it has the capability of
causing tensions in developed countries; climate change, national security and energy dependence
are bound up. How will environmental change spark violence? This will lead into finding the
detrimental effects of climate change and how the effects affect security and the structural and
individual responses to such threats to security.
The buildup of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere has caused temperatures to
soar for its greenhouse qualities. There are fears that the heating of the atmosphere would source
global water. For instance the Levant is already the most water-scarce region in the world
whereas climate models are predicting hotter, drier climate in future in the area. Low annual
rainfall in the region means that the region has arid and semi-arid conditions. The problem of
3
aridity may be compounded by high temperatures and the reduction in rainfall as have been
predicted by climate models. The drying up of rivers is likely to follow the turn of events, for
example there are fears that the flow of the Euphrates will reduce by about 30 percent- and
streams will be reduced and also affect the ability of aquifers to recharge because of increased
runoffs. Runoffs also affect the ability of dams to store water because of sedimentation (Brown
et al., 2009). Decline in precipitation coupled with the high temperatures means that the ability of
the soil to support crops due to limited water and evaporation which adversely affects food
security (Brown et al., 2009). There are also problems of water-scarcity in India, China and for
Peru. Experts forecast the problem to beyond redemption by 2015 with as much as 70 percent of
the population not having access to water (Kristiansen and Smith 2009) Davis (in Barnett and
Adger, 2007) admits that drought has a role t play in famine.
It was also projected by Brown et al., (2009 ) that the rise in sea level would affect the supply of
drinking water because of increased saltwater water intrusion into coastal aquifers, for instance,
the Gozan coastal aquifer which is the source of water supply to about 1.5 million people (Brown
et al., 2009).
Environmental change has rendered lands which were once cultivated unusable for agriculture
because of degradation through activities like erosion reducing entitlement to land (see Schramm
et al. in Norton et al., 2006).
In effect environmental change has the capacity of making people vulnerable because of the
negative impact it has on agriculture. According to Kristiansen and Smith (2009) the outcome of
environmental change could be felt in the negative changes around agriculture, water, health,
urbanization and migration.
There are also fears that health problems would result from the increases in temperature, water
shortage, and food scarcity which include malaria, cholera and other water-borne diseases which
could even trigger epidemics (Kristiansen and Smith 2009). Storms and cyclones cause disasters
as sanitation and drinking water are adversely affected by heat waves.
Dwindling access to resources like food and water could be the basis of increased migration and
rapid urbanization because. Those who suffer the consequences environmental degradation
stretches to include those involved in the secondary and tertiary sectors of economies, for
instance, agricultural extension officers, suppliers of inputs, transport operators, etc (Barnett and
Adger, 2007).
To this end, environmental change causes scarcity of resources because of its negative impact on
agriculture, land, and other renewable resources.
According to Wagner and Tol (2008) there is a strong correlation between climate change and
conflict. They argued that abnormally colder years were associated with more violence in Europe.
4
Their works draw much on the work of Zhang in Asia who associated extremely cold
temperatures with higher prevalence of wars.
Homer-Dixon et al. (1993) contend that resource scarcity causes violent conflict. They are of the
view that the problem of scarcity can be brought about in three ways: by reducing the quantity
and degrading the quality of resources faster than their ability to be renewed through human
activities; population growth; and changes in the distribution of resources within a society. These
three roots of scarcity can precipitate conflict in isolation or in combination.
A typical population explosion/conflict case is that of Bangladesh. The UN projected that the
population of country would reach 235 million by 2025 from 125 million in 1993 (Homer-Dixon
et al., 1993). It had a population density of 785 persons/sq km and was estimated that the
amount of cropland available per person would reduce by half in 2005. Flooding and ineffective
management of water resources compounded the problem of lack of land for farming (HomerDixon et al., 1993). There were waves of migration from Bangladesh to neighbouring areas of
India. It was estimated that Bangladeshi migrants and their descendants had caused population in
neighbouring areas of India to expand by 15 million (Homer-Dixon et al., 1993). The waves of
migration into India caused social changes in the receiving Indian states. Conflict was triggered
by alteration in land distribution and shifts in the balance of power-political and economicbetween different groups-ethnic and political (Homer-Dixon et al., 1993).
Homer-Dixon and his colleagues further argue that population growth combined with other
sources of scarcity can alter access to resources. This happens through the reduction in the
quality and the quantity of renewable resources which brings about developments that tend to
marginalize the less powerful in terms of access to resources. They cited the case of Senegal: the
country had abundant land for agriculture but the land was being degraded through human
activities like erosion and overirrigation. Population density was 780 persons/sq km with a
population growth rate of 2.7 percent as at 199 but bordering Mauritania was arid desert and
semi grassland but with a low population density of 20 persons/sq km. Both countries did not
have enough cropland to support their populations intensive farming. Senegal was saddled with a
problem of chronic food shortages in the 1970s hence the construction of the Manantali Dam
which was to provide irrigation and hydro-electric power. The construction of the dam had
unforeseen consequences: the value of land along the river where intensive agriculture was viable
soared; the elite (the White Moors of Mauritania) rewrote legislation to change land ownership
therefore the initial occupants of the land were stripped of the rights to remain on the land; black
Mauritanians were eventually declared to be Senegalese therefore their property were seized.
This led to increased violence against the white Moors.
According to Homer-Dixon (1993) and his colleagues, population growth interacts with unequal
access to resources to produce environmental damage. For them, environmental damage deprives
5
people of economic opportunities which goad them into insurgencies and rebellion. According to
Gough (2002 in Barnett 2007) it is worth linking the contraction of states to the occurrence of
violence because of the decline in peoples access to opportunities. An instance is the internal
strife which followed the economic crises in the Philippines including guerrilla attacks and
assaults on the military station; the formation of the Peoples Army and the National Democratic
Front in the 1970s and the 1980s (Homer-Dixon et al., 1993).
Environmental problems have the capacity of weakening the administrative systems of states.
Weakened state systems create the possibility of violence by increasing the population of the
rural-poor and the number of people who require assistance from government to survive. It
means how states respond to situations become vital in assessing the possibility of violent
conflict. For instance, the presence or absence of government interventions like subsidies,
income support, and distortion of prices can spur or impede economic productivity which can
improve or diminish peoples livelihoods which is a determinant of violent conflict (HomerDixon et al., 1993).
On the other hand, loss of renewable resources reduces the wealth-creation capacity of states
which reduces tax revenues. For Homer-Dixon and his colleagues, this has three effects: magnify
popular grievances; wear away state legitimacy; and heighten competition between elite factions
over resources. Brown and Crawford (2009) are of the view that water scarcity in the Levant
might generate violent conflict.
Can the relationship between resource-scarcity and violent conflict be that simple knowing the
complexities involved in analyzing violent conflict? According to Libiszewski (1995) the ecology
is just one aspect of the environment-political, social- and to overemphasize the influence of the
ecology over the components of the environment is misleading (Barnett and Adger, 2007). Can
violence be traced to other causes? Will everybody get themselves involved in violent when there
is a problem of scarcity or even social stress?
According to Khal (2006 in Barnett and Adger, 2007) the extent to which environmental change
can make people vulnerable is a function of the operation of states. He explains that states can
shield citizens from the dreadful effects of environmental change-contraction in livelihoods- by
providing rights to personal security, social services and economic opportunities. He also points
out that states can undermine the livelihoods of certain groups of people.
State interventions in the events of contractions in livelihood can inhibit imminent violence, for
instance: income support; food aid; short-term employment programmes; provision of economic
freedoms; political freedoms and social opportunities like education (Sen, 1999 in Barnett and
Adger, 2007). For Sen, the presence of these state functions means that people have the chance
to develop themselves and therefore are less likely to be involved in violence. The presence of
6
these functions in themselves, according to Sen, boosts economic growth which also causes
poverty levels to fall. Such states are referred to by Sen as strong states because of their capacity in
terms of administrative structures and control mechanisms to prevent people from feeling the
effects of environmental change. According to Nafsiger and Auvinen (2002 in Barnett and
Adger, 2007) the risk of violence looms in countries where economic and social opportunities are
limited which in themselves are a reflection of the poverty of the population. There is also a
positive correlation between failure of states and violence (Mazo, 2010).
Another argument that contravenes the resource-scarcity argument is that of adaptation. The
possibility of violent conflict largely depends on whether or not a group is able to develop
adaptive cultures in the event of environmental shocks. Adaptation is also a function of the
ability and willingness of a group. On the other hand, groups do not stand alone in the analysis of
violent conflict. The influence of neighbouring groups- whether hostile or friendly- need to be
considered (Mazo, 2010). According to Mazo, the war in Rwanda was a typical case of resourcescarcity vis--vis population growth. Mazo, however, goes on to give contrasting examples by
citing Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He argues that the two states have similar conditions
therefore both states could have had similar fate. He therefore attributes Haitis chronic weakness
to cultural causes. To this end environmental problems can illicit responses. He identifies
agriculture, population growth, permanent settlements and social and technological complexity as
cultural adaptations to climate change in his analysis of ancient cultures. He also identifies
migration as one way of adapting to changes in the environment.
Changes in climatic conditions could have varied effects (positive of negative results) depending
on how cultures adapt. For instance the drought around 3200-3000 BC in Mesopotamia led to
cultural sophistication and complexity which precipitated the Sumerian civilization but on the
converse, the drought at the end of the Early Bronze Age around 2200 was followed by the
collapse of the Akkadian Empire (Mazo, 2010).
Mazo goes on to assess the sustainability of adaptive cultures. According to him, there is a
positive correlation between the complexity and fragility of social and economic systems. He
refers to the global financial crises of 2008 as a case in point. He further contends that adaptation
can in itself constrain further adaptation. He makes this claim social and economic responses to
climate change could limit adaptive culture. The establishment of permanent settlements means
that hunters and gatherers cannot always follow sources of food.
Mazo again observes that some cultures are pre-adapted to some changes in climate because of
the habit of mobility and flexibility for instance, how the Anasazi culture abandoned urbanized
7
settlements without recourse to violence but Mazo is quick to point out that adaptation of this
nature is limited by space.
According to Mazo (2010) cultural, social and political barriers stand in the way of adaptation and
mitigation. He argues that people may feel reluctant to abandon unsustainable lifestyles because
of cultural values thus drifting from rationality. He cited the cases of China and Russia as
examples- China was dynamic in communism but Russia was not. Russia still cleaved on to
communist philosophies of governance despite the fact that it waned in terms of results. The
case of China was different in that it kept pace with the changing world system by adapting
steadily it hence the rise of China and the demise of Russia.
Mazo (2010) also contends that administrative systems influence the adaptation because they
determine how policies are formulated and enacted: authoritiarian systems can act in the good of
the collective but can one predict the how an authoritarian regime will act? On the other hand
implementation of policies may face pockets of resistance in democratic states.
In this case the physical capacity of community to adapt is enhanced or inhibited by cultural
factors or willingness.
Will all vulnerable individuals decide to get involved in violence? There are rational as well as
irrational explanations as to why individuals decide to get involved in violent acts (Barnett and
Adger 2007). Based on the works of Otilsson, Goodhead and other scholars, Barnett and Adger
(2007) claim that frustration may breed violence. They argue that contradiction in livelihoods
shatters the dreams of young men. Because their aspirations have been cut short, they tend to
resort to violence as a means of achieving status in society. Violence becomes imminent when
they are made to believe that an individual of group is responsible for their poverty. It was argued
in Barnett and Adger that young men would not recourse to violence if they have opportunities
to progress. The question of relative susceptibility to indulge in violence is also addressed in
Barnett and Adger (2007). They observe that the opportunity cost for poor men to join armed
groups is how they have nothing to lose but high for women because of their reproductive and
domestic obligations. They also notice that because of the grave atrocities they suffer, they are
less likely to engage in violence.
Some authors hypothesize that it is not really about contradictions in livelihood but the fear of it
in terms of security that moves people to join armed groups arguing that the certainty of aid
mitigates violence springing out of the fear of insecurity pointing to the welfare systems in
developed countries to partly explain the minimal occurrence of violent conflict (Barnett and
Adger, 2007).
Barnett and Adger also observe that at the heart of problem of contracting livelihoods is the
problem of declining access to land or the returns from the uses of land therefore the tendency
of joining armed groups is high when access to land declines. They refer to Bobrow-Strain (2001)
8
as a case in point (see Barnett and Adger 2007).

The case is broadened to capture lack of opportunity for social mobility because it is not just
about absolute poverty. Relative or transient poverty, for instance, poverty of opportunities
inspired people, especially young men, to join militias in Sierra Leone (Keen, 2000 in Barnett and
Adger, 2007).
Rationality alone does not explain why people engage in violent acts because joining armed gangs
can meet some psycho-social needs: sense of power, excitement, sense of belonging, recognition.
Milgram also contends that people may engage in violence as part of obedience to authority
(Barnett and Adger, 2007).
People might also choose to play a part in violence because of their perception about it: if they
think of violence as a means of eliminating threats of their security. Leaders play a crucial role in
fuelling or mitigating violence in this light (Barnett and Adger, 2007).
Notwithstanding, violent conflicts in part, have been sourced by other factors. Ethnicity could be
a salient factor in understanding violent conflicts (OECD, 2004). An ethnic-based division of
labour, to a lesser extent, contributed to the civil strife in Rwanda in 1994 (Andre and Platteau in
OECD, 2004).
Suliman argues that to think of fault lines as the root-cause of violent conflict could be vacuous.
He contends that the existence of fault lines like ethnicity and religion increase in effect when the
initial causes of violence become less potent. For him, fault lines are catalysts. Environmental
changes could lead to adaptation which is reflected in the material culture of groups, social
organization, dressing and even language. Allocation of resources could cause quarrels between
neighbouring groups. Quarrels lead to discord which produces ethnic rivalry and produces a
violent series of revenge. Conflicts of this nature linger even when resource disputes are settled.
According to Barett and Adger, (2007), violence can also be fuelled by the availability of arms
which is backed by Mazos (2010) report that there was an influx of arms into Sudan during
Sudanese war.
History of war has also been found to contribute to violent conflict (Barnett and Adger, 2007)
for instance, in the Levant.
Considering the disgraceful effects of wars for example; death, distraction of property, epidemics
etc. it would be the last option for factions which provides a good means of preventing imminent
war at some, through corporation.( Suliman, 1999)
There have been structures that have been put to resolve disputes between competing groups
over resources and opportunities at the global level, regional levels and even within countries at
the local level.
Since its formation, one of the achievements of the UN is its contribution to global peace by
settling disputes through corporation between countries. An example of this was the
9
establishment of the GATT (which Hs become the World Trade Organisation) to settle trade
disputes between countries. (http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm)
Local established structure in traditional system of governance like chieftaincy, native courts have
the capacity of managing disputes concerning law and other resources before they turn violent. (
Mazo 2010). The erudition of these mechanisms is an erosion of one of the factors that stands in
the way of violence.
With reference to international mechanism, they have seen a number of agreements between
countries over resources like water. There have seen some treaties to regulate the water resources
the Nile. The 1902 treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan was meant to prevent the construction of
any dam along the Nile or any of its tributaries and that between Egypt and Sudan, in which
Sudan was obliged not to interfere with the run of the Nile, by a way of Dam construction in
1929. Though the water treaties has been challenged for their validity since they came into being
in colonial times, they cannot be said to have been void since no waterwar has broken out. This
is not to say that, there havent been any threats as Boutros Ghali put it the next war in our
region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics (International Herald Tribunal, 2 nd
February 1985 in Suliman, 1999:131)
Tracing causality between environmental change and violence is not straightforward since the
analysis is blurred by several factors. First, it is about the problem of scarcity which is bound up
with demography and migration. Will individuals or groups be able to adapt? Can states mitigate
the dreadful effects of environmental change? Are there established mechanisms to promote
peace between competing factions? Groups or individuals even choose to engage in violent
conflict and for what reasons? Is there a history of conflict? Is there the existence of fault lines
which can breed conflict? What perception do people have about conflict? Understanding these
helps in determining the extent to which environmental changes can cause violent conflict.
Case study: Sudan
There were drastic shortages in the supply of resources like food, land and water owing to environmental change
coupled with unsustainable population growth (Hermann, 2008). The Darfur region had the highest growth rate
3.1 percent. There have even been predictions that the population of the region of Darfur would double in the next
25 years, all things being equal. There were drastic declines in the production of food items like millet and
sorghum. For instance, millet production in Northern Darfur dropped more than six times during the famine of
the early 80s (Hermann, 2008). Yields of Sorghum also fell, with a decrease of nearly 90percent for total amount
10
produced. There was dramatic decrease in the yields of sorghum, millet, sesame, and groundnuts. Decline in yield
was followed by famine and inflation of food prices (Hermann, 2008).
According to De Waal (in Hermann, 2008) there was corporation between factions (the Jalul, nomadic Arabs
and the black Tanjur) over resources though not of peaceful nature including the use of ethnic epithet. The times
following the shortage of resources saw increased resentment and tension between groups because they no longer
shared resources such that resources were kept within ethnic groups (De Waal in Hermann, 2008). There was an
increase in violence, vigilantes, armed conflict and killing when resources became scarce. De Waal also observed
that there was more violence during the famine in Sudan.
The amendment of land policy in the 1970s worked against individual land ownership and eventually all land
became state-owned (Mazo, 2010). The effect was that lands which were once under the control of specific groups
could be encroached upon by others.
The powerful nomadic Arabs of the north encroached on the land in the South which was previously the preserve of
the black Tanjur farmers. This was done with the help of the Sudanese government by sponsoring the Janjaweed
militant group to commit acts of violence against the black Tanjur (Mazo, 2010). All these started with the
nomadic Arabs search for pasture land.
Also hailing from the policies of the 1970s was the destruction of local conflict resolution mechanisms which means
that the mitigating structures have been reduced. The conflict also took the form of ethnic hostilities between the
Arabs and the Tanjur (Mazo, 2010).
NB: The Sudan was at a time When Sudan had not been split.
There is a high tendency of explaining the war in Darfur in terms of resource scarcity but this
could be misleading if other factors are not considered. Considering the history of ethnic tension
means that there was a history of conflict and the ethnic division means there are lines along
which to trace fault lines which represent a good condition under which violence can occur. The
destruction of the legitimacy of traditional structures, for instance chieftaincy, meant that the
traditional structures could not stand in the way of violence.
The rule of law with particular reference to property rights meant that the role of the state in
ensuring order could fuel or mitigate imminent violence. This claim is magnified by the
governments sponsorship of the Janjaweed. The nomadic Arabs have adapted for so long but
why did they fail to adapt this time around? In effect government policy worked against the
culture of adaptation.
Though many factors blur the analysis, it is clear that scarcity results from problems like land
degradation, water degradation and global warming which could be worsened by the impact of
population growth. But beyond the problem of scarcity lies a range of responses which have their
consequences for instance adaptation or cooperation. Responses like adaptation and corporation
also have their limits as factors like ethnicity or even history come get into the spectrum as some
11
conflicts even predate some environmental crises. To this end, it really depends on where people
belong and what they stand to gain should they engage in violence.
It can be concluded that environmental change is instrumental in sourcing violence when it
causes scarcity of resources but to the extent that: communities fail to adapt; it breeds inequality
which causes frustration among marginalized groups; attempts meant to enhance coorperation
between opposing groups become unfruitful; it reinforces fault lines which predate current
conditions that promote conflict; government policies work against some particular groups;
individuals who engage in violence believe that they have to engage in it.
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Forced migration and resettlement