Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151243
SO ORDERED."
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando,
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
58133, solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision
of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and
severally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997
Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984
executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that
Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings.
It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M.
Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President,
Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed
Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the
RTC in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 14686-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe
since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her
guardian. Said Decision already became final and executory when no
one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already
judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all
contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null and
void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she
executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the
findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C, having participated in the said guardianship proceedings
through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC
explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale as among those present
during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001
a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she
could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to establish
that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own
Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence
since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his
right to the subject property as owner upon Naves death in
accordance with the laws of succession. It must be remembered that
Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed transfer of his
rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a
quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied
for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and
Atty. Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988
CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE
No identity of parties
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and
estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of
a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person
"suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take
care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation."14
it was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and
19 November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was
supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held
on the same dates. However, the said Orders by themselves cannot
confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings
and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said
hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to
submit and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was
the father of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the
Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives evidence prior to the
submission of the case for judgment. 17 It must be pointed out that, in
this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark
Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to
submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only
after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment,
but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision
in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments
and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the
court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under
exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after
having rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain
finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein
with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why
she did not present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends
of justice would have been best served if she was allowed to present
additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the
general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.19 Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is
not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did
not deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December
2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the
following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein
respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship
proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned
therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri]
submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their
filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage,
cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their
father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the
effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted
to submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC
hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not
confirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings.
Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the
Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject property, which
was executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper
authority, Jose Pabales presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said
proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness
of judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she
executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale
siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986,
thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and
estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale
siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was
an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence,
rendering the said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it
must be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other
in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not
automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v.
Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was
declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after
the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so
when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-
from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves
incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in
1984. And other than invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish with
her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she
executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property
in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988
Decision in the former on Naves incompetency by the year 1986
should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter
case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she
executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20
February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review
is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.
March 4, 2004
support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No.
72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Pias, Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise
Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including
the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos.
120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta.
Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the
resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building,
pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares
of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed onethird (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth
(1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise
agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on
June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings
and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge
of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On
June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662.
Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the
petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the
complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant
thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the
signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June
6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June
22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995
at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no
appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared
for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the
respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted
the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed
the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On
July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition
and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could
not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches
and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies were no longer available through
no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said
remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her. 16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial
court nullifying her and the respondents marriage was null and
void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor
to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion
between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear
for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which
was sought to be annulled.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors for the
Courts consideration:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED [A]
SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION (ANNEXES A AND B) IN
Acquisition of Jurisdiction
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in
court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of
summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is null and void." 18 In an action
strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the
summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable
reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to.
While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual
method of service." 19 Hence, it must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the rules. Indeed, "compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as much important as the
issue of due process as of jurisdiction." 20
Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which
applies to this case provides:
SEC. 8. 21 Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office
or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
PNOC EXPLORATION
CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 23, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the September 22, 2005
decision2 and December 29, 2005 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration
Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 167. The complaint, docketed as
supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be
declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with
notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in
default, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may
warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant
may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that
he failed to file his answer on time. That was in fact why
he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Answer." But respondent
moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not
for the declaration of petitioner in default. In its February
6, 2004 order, the trial court stated:
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the
presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely ordered that
"despite and notwithstanding service of summons by
publication, no answer has been filed with the Court
within the required period and/or forthcoming.
["] Effectively[,] that was a finding that the
defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in
default for failure to file an answer or any
responsive pleading within the period fixed in the
publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be
found and for which reason, service of summons by
publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the
defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on
account of the reality that he was no longer residing
and/or found on his last known address and his
whereabouts unknown thus the publication of the
was unclaimed.
CorrectnessOf
Non-Admission Of Answer
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required
period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the
admission of his answer had he filed it on time.
Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying its
admission.
Petitioners plea for equity must fail in the face of the
clear and express language of the rules of procedure and
of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for
filing the answer. Equity is available only in the absence
of law, not as its replacement.19Equity may be applied
only in the absence of rules of procedure, never in
contravention thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
and petitioners TCT NO. 272191, are void because the area they
cover is entirely within their (respondents) land, specifically, Lot
89, as shown by the notation in the said titles, i.e., "This survey
is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496; and "This survey is entirely
inside No. 89, II-4755."7 Respondents further averred that since
the controverted lot is already a private land, the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
had no jurisdiction to approve Macarios application and to issue
Free Patent No. 495269. The pendency of this action was
allegedly inscribed in the defendant heirs title (TCT No. 186516)
on August 4, 1992 and carried over to the petitioners' TCT No.
272191.8
In their Answer,9 the defendant heirs contended that Lot 89 was
never part of respondents TCT No. 257152 which originated
from OCT No. 730. Respondents own exhibits, i.e., the
documents purportedly issued by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibits
"E" and "F"), show that Lot 89 was covered by OCT No.
734 and not OCT No. 730. Defendant heirs further stated that
respondents TCT No. 257152 was issued in lieu of TCT No.
22395 which is a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046. Upon
verification with the Register of Deeds of Rizal, TCT No. 45046,
covers a different parcel of land situated in San Juan, Rizal, and
measuring about 356 square meters only. The defendant heirs
also raised the defenses of laches and prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they are
purchasers in good faith and for value and that they have no
knowledge of any defect in the title of the Corporation from
whom they purchased the controverted lot. The notice of lis
pendens alleged to have been inscribed in TCT No. 186516 on
August 4, 1992 does not appear in the Corporations title, TCT
No. 271604 nor in their title, TCT No. 272191. Absent said
notice, petitioners claim that they cannot be charged with
knowledge of any defect in the Corporation's title. Neither does
the note "This survey is covered by F.P.A. No. (III-1) 4496;" and
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
assailed order of the trial court. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a resolution dated July 6,
2005.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for resolution is whether a judgment on the
pleadings is proper in the instant case.
x x x x.
16
xxxx
4.2.6 Moreover, the fact that the subject property was covered
by TCT No. 271604 duly issued by the Registry of Deeds in the
name of the corporation without any encumbrance, liens or
adverse claims annotated thereon negates any possibility that
the subject property belongs to any person other than the
corporation.18
It is clear from the foregoing that the pleadings filed in the
instant case generated the following issues: (1) whether
respondents TCT No. 257152 is valid; (2) whether Lot 89 is
covered by TCT No. 257152; and (3) whether petitioners are
purchasers in good faith. This is clearly not a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the Answers
tendered factual issues. The trial court rendered a summary
judgment on March 21, 2003 and not a judgment on the
pleadings.
In Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,19 the
Court explained the distinction between a proper case of
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, in this wise:
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings.
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending
partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of
a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e. facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answerbut the
issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not
genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. x x
x.
The Facts
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong
national, and respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino
citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate
Church.3
Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena
from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)directing
her to appear before the said agency because her permanent
residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings.
Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the
court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished
with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-010177; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-0306; (3) Decision,4 dated December 11,
2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 260 (RTC), Paraaque City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (4)
their marriage contract5 with the subject decision annotated
thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with
respondent had been declared void ab initio. The above
documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a
petition for declaration of nullity6 on the ground of psychological
incapacity before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
CV-01-0177. Respondent stated that petitioners address was
600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. There was no showing of its
status, whether pending, withdrawn or terminated. On July 19,
2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of
Nullity7 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306. Respondent indicated
that petitioners address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the
xxx
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must
be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind
the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The
date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries
made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done,
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
xxx
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether
said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa
St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon
City, after several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
The said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02030629 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his servers return,30 the
process server resorted to substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately
opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days
from the issuance of the summons. The servers return stated
the following:
SERVERS RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted
service of summons with copy of petition, were effected to