Hazop

HAZOP is an abbreviation for HAZard and OPerability analysis. Originally developed

for use at manufacturing facilities such as oil refineries, offshore oil platforms,
petrochemical and chemical plants, natural gas processing plants and power plants, its
application has expanded to other areas as well. It is a systematic method for examining
complex facilities or processes to find actual or potentially hazardous procedures and
operations so that they may be eliminated or mitigated. HAZOP Studies are performed by
a team consisting of plant operators, engineers, managers and others, some of whom
should be intimately familiar with the facility being studied.
The origins of HAZOP Studies are in the British chemical industry and its adoption was
driven by the 1974 Flixborough explosion, where lack of a systematic review of
modifications by appropriately qualified personnel was identified as a contributing factor.

Methodology
The methodology may be applied to any process or project although most practitioners
and expertise originate in the chemical and offshore industries. A HAZOP uses guide
words (e.g. "more", "less", "as well as") and parameters (e.g. "temperature", "control",
"ventilation") to consider process intent, possible deviations from the intended process,
the consequences of any deviations, and the hazards presented by these consequences.[1][2]
[3]
The following table gives an overview of commonly used guide word - parameter pairs
and common interpretations of them.
Guide
Word

More

Less

None

Reverse As well as

Flow

high flow low flow

reverse
no flow
flow

Pressure

high
pressure

vacuum

low
pressure

high
low
Temperatu
temperatur temperatur
re
e
e

Partly

Other
than

deviating
contaminatio deviating
concentratio
n
material
n

delta-p

explosio
n

different
level

Level

high level low level no level

Time

sequenc
too long / too short /
backward missing
e step
too late
too soon
s
actions
skipped

Agitation

fast
mixing

Reaction

fast
slow
reaction /
reaction
runaway

slow
mixing

wrong
time

no
mixing

unwante
d
reaction

no
reaction

Start-up /
too fast
Shut-down

too slow

Draining /
too long
Venting

too short

none

high
pressure

low
pressure

none

Inertising

extra actions

actions
missed

Utility
failure
(instrumen
t air,
power)

failure

DCS
failure

failure

Maintenan
ce

none

deviating
pressure

wrong
recipe

wrong
timing

contaminatio wrong
n
material

Vibrations too low

too high

none

wrong
frequenc
y

Once the causes and effects of any potential hazards have been established, the system
being studied can then be modified to improve its safety.