Defences I: Insanity and Automatism

DEFENCES I: INSANITY AND AUTOMATISM

INSANITY
There are two points at which insanity may be relevant:
(a) Mentally disordered at the time of committing the offence (the substantive
defence of insanity)
(b) Unfitness to stand trial

Insanity at the time of the alleged offence

The definition of insanity
The issue of the defendants insanity at the time of the crime can be raised in
three ways:
1) The defendant straightforwardly claims he was insane at the time of the
offence.
2) The defendant raises a defence of no mens rea or automatism, but the
judge decides that the evidence discloses a defence of insanity. The judge
may then instruct the jury to consider the issue of insanity.
3) If the defendant raises a plea of diminished responsibility then the
prosecution is entitled to rebut the defence by producing evidence of
insanity.
Definition
A defendant who wishes to plead that he was insane at the time of the offence
must demonstrate that he was suffering from a defect of reason caused by a
disease of the mind which meant that either:
(i) he did not know the nature or quality of his actions; or
(ii) he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
If successful in his plea the defendant will be found not guilty, but insane
Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, as amended, s. 2 :
Where in any indictment ... any act ... is charged against any person as an
offence, and it is given in evidence on the trial of such person for that offence that
he was insane, so as not to be responsible, according to law, for his actions at the
time when the act was done ..., then, if it appears to the jury before whom such
person is tried that he did the act ... charged, but was insane as aforesaid at the
time when he did ... the same, the jury shall return a special verdict that the
accused is not guilty by reason of insanity.

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J. Gunn No excuses (2002)
It is quite clear that in a legal arena the concept [of mental disorder] belongs to
lawyers and jurymen. On many occasions due deference is given by lawyers and
jurymen to medical opinion, thus conferring apparent power to psychiatrists.
This is an illusion because the power is on loan and can be withdrawn when the
politics of a case, usually a high profile case, demand it.
MNaghten Rules. The Rules (1843)
... every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of
reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved ...; and ... to
establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.
Burden of proof
Thomas [1995]
In Sullivan (1983), the HL confirmed that a defendant is to be sane and approved
the definition of insanity found in the MNaghten Rules, first set out in 1843.
This definition can be broken down into three requirements.
Disease of the mind
Defect of reason
The defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act or that it was
wrong
1. Disease of the mind
Kemp [1957]
Point of Law -> The phrase disease of the mind is to given in its normal meaning,
it is not a medical term. What must be shown is that the defendant was
suffering from a disease which affected the functioning of the mind. There is no
need therefore, to show that it was a disease of the brain as such.
This means that diabetes, for example, can amount to a disease of the mind if it
produces a malfunctioning of the brain.
Bratty v A.G. for Northern Ireland [1963]
Lord Denning suggested that a disease of the mind was a mental disorder which
manifested itself in violence and was prone to reoccur. However, these dicta has

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since been rejected and it is clear that a disease of the mind need not be prone to
recur nor manifest itself in violence.
It should also be stressed that just because there was a malfunctioning of the
mind it does not follow that this was a disease. If the defendant was hit on the
head by a brick and suffers concussion there might be no disease and so the
concussion could not amount to a disease of the mind.
Sullivan [1983]
Point of Law -> This judgement rejected the Bratty decision that a disease of the
mind need not be prone to recur nor manifest itself in violence.
Details of Case -> Patrick Sullivan was visiting an 80 year old friend of his when
he had an epileptic seizure, during which he kicked his friend in the head,
inflicting grievous bodily harm. He admitted causing the injuries but sought to
rely on the defence of automatism. The trial judge ruled that the facts revealed
insanity, rather than automatism. In order to avoid being found not guilty by
reason of insanity (and compulsory detention in a special hospital) Mr Sullivan
pleaded guilty to an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was convicted
and sentenced to probation under medical supervision. He appealed against the
conviction on the basis that the judges ruling was incorrect and he should have
been able to plead the defence of automatism. The CA dismissed his appeal and
the case went to the HL.
Held -> Was the defendant to be labelled as insane or could he rely on the
defence of automatism? Automatism is available only where the cause of the
mental condition is an external one. This led the HL to conclude that an epileptic
defendant could not rely on automatism and therefore he was labelled insane.
Per Lord Diplock at 677: I agree with what was said by Devlin J in R v Kemp
that mind in the MNaghten Rules is used in the ordinary sense of the mental
faculties of reason, memory and understanding. If the effect of a disease is to
impair these faculties so severely as to have either of the consequences referred
to in the latter part of the rules, it matters not whether the aetiology of the
impairment is organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment
itself is permanent or is transient and intermittent, provided that it subsisted at
the time of commission of the act.
Hennessey [1989]
Quick [1973]
Burgess [1991]
2. Defect of Reason

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It must be shown that the disease of the mind gave rise to a defect of reason: the
defendants power of reasoning must be impaired. It is not enough to show that
the power of reasoning was available but not used.
Clarke [1972]
Point of Law -> Someone who absentmindedly was unaware what she was doing
cannot rely on insanity, as absent-mindedness is not a disease of the mind. Of
course, absent minded people may well be able to plead that they have no mens
rea.
A.-G. for South Australia v Brown [1960]
3. The defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act or that it
was wrong
It must be shown that as a result of the defect of reason caused by the disease of
the mind either (i) the defendant did not know the nature or quality of his act or
(ii) he did not know it was wrong.
(i)
Not knowing the nature and quality of the act.
This requires proof that the defendant did not know what he was doing. This
would be so in the following situations:
a) The defendant had no awareness of what was happening. For example, the
defendant was suffering from a seizure of some kind.
Sullivan [1983]
If the defendant had no awareness of what was happening this would constitute
as him not knowing the nature and quality of his act. The defendant in Sullivan
suffered from an epileptic seizure.
b) The defendant was aware what he was doing, but was deluded as to the
material circumstances of his actions, rendering the act fundamentally
different. For example, a defendant who thought he was killing a
monstrous creature when in fact he was killing a person.
c) A person who was unaware of the consequences of his act, for example he
was unaware that his act would kill the victim.
Stephen (1887)
Stephen gave the example of a person who cut off the head of someone who was
asleep because it would be great fun to see him looking for it when he woke up.

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(ii)
Not knowing that the act was wrong
There is much uncertainty about the meaning of wrong here. Wrong may mean
that the act was morally wrong, or may mean that the act was illegal.
Windle [1952]
This judgement preferred illegality as a test, because what was or was not
immoral was too uncertain.
Codre (1916)
This case argued that Windle should not be regarded as a strong authority and
that a subsequent court could depart from it. The argument is that the
discussion on this issue was obiter and that it ignored earlier authorities in
favour of the immorality view.
DPP v Harper (1998)
It was suggested that Windle applied only to murder cases, and in all other cases
wrong meant immoral, although no explanation was offered for the distinction.
Stapleton v R (1952)
R. v Johnson (Dean) [2007]
Effect of special verdict
s.3 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991.
Insanity and offences of strict liability
Hennessy (1989)
Point of Law -> Insanity was a defence to a strict liability offence.
DPP v Harper (1998)
Held -> Insanity was not a defence to a strict liability offence.
Commentary -> But, many commentators take the view that this decision was
wrong. It made no reference to an earlier decision, Hennessy, which had stated
that insanity was a defence to a strict liability offence. The reasoning used in
this case is suspect. It was claimed that insanity is a denial of mens rea.
However, if that was all insanity was there would be no need to have a special
defence of insanity because any defendant who was legally insane would simply
be able to claim they lacked the mens rea of the offence.

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Insanity and Intoxication
Lipman (1970)
The defendant took LSD and he claimed as a result had an hallucination in
which he was attacked by a many-headed monster. He killed the monster. On
recovering, he discovered that in fact he had killed his girlfriend. He was not
permitted to plead insanity because it was his voluntary intoxication, rather
than any disease of the mind, which had caused him to be unaware of the
nature of his acts.
Burns (1984)
If however, a defendant can show that although intoxicated it was his disease of
the mind that caused his lack of awareness then insanity may be available.
The Human Rights Act 1998 and the definition of insanity
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with the
procedures described by law;
c) the lawful detentionof persons of unsound mind
Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979)
The European Court of Human Rights explained that:
In the Courts opinion, except in emergency cases, the individual concerned
should not be deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown to be of
unsound mind. The very nature of what has to be established before the
competent national authority that is, a true mental disorder calls for objective
medical expertise. Further, the mental disorder must be of a kind of degree
warranting compulsory confinement. What is more, the validity of the continued
confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder.
In the light of this decision on Article 5 the present law on the detention of those
found not guilty by reason of insanity could be challenged under the Human
Rights Act. The following arguments could be made:
1) As already noted, the legal definition of insanity is far wider than the
medical concept of mental disorder. It is certainly arguable that the
detention of an epileptic who has been found not guilty by reason of
insanity infringes Article 5 because such a person is not of unsound
mind.
2) The Winterwerp requirement that there be objective medical expertise
could be used to challenge the English law on the basis that the doctors

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under English law have to use the legal, not medical, understanding of
mental disorder.
3) A defendant is presumed sane unless the contrary is proved. The burden
of proving the defence falls on the defendant on the balance of
probabilities. This is a departure from the normal rules governing
defences, where the prosecution must disprove any defence raised by the
defendant. The placing of the burden of proof on the defendant may be
challengeable as contrary to the presumption of innocence that is
protected under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Unfitness to Plead
Criminal Procedure (Insanity & Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991
When the accused is brought up for trial he may be found unfit to plead under
sections 4 and 4a of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. The key issue is
whether the accused is able to understand the charge and the difference
between a plea of guilty and of not guilty. The accused must also be able to
challenge jurors, to instruct counsel, and understand the evidence. In summary,
the defendants mental capabilities must be sufficient for him to be able to
conduct his defence adequately. Once it has been determined that the defendant
is unfit to stand trial the judge has a wide discretion as to the appropriate
course of action (except in the case of murder). The 1991 Act includes disposals
ranging from an absolute discharge to admission to hospital with a restraining
order.
Padola [1960] ; Robertson [1968]
Details of Case -> This was a controversial decision which concerned a defendant
who suffered from hysterical amnesia which prevented him from remembering
events, but whose mind was otherwise completely normal.
Held -> It was held that he was fit to plead. The case was difficult because on the
one hand the defendant was at a clear disadvantage in presenting his defence
because he could not remember what happened. On the other hand he was fully
mentally competent at the time of the trial. Indeed if Padola had been unfit to
plead it would probably have meant that a defendant who was so drunk during
the commission of the crime that he could not recall what happened would also
be able to claim to be unfit to plead.
The issue of fitness to plead can be raised by the defence, the prosecution or the
judge. Once the issue is raised it must be decided by the jury. Before a defendant
is found unfit the jury must receive written or oral evidence of two or more

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registered medical practitioners (at least one of whom is approved by the Home
Secretary as having expertise in mental disorder). The jury must consider
whether or not the defendant did the act alleged. The explanation for this
requirement is that it would be unfair if a defendant who was unfit to stand trial
was somehow presumed to have committed the offence alleged without there
being some evidence that he did. Therefore if the jury are not convinced that
there is sufficient evidence that the act alleged the jury must simply acquit the
defendant, like any other person found not to have committed the actus reus.
This has produced some difficult questions about what the act means. The CA
has held that that it means that the actus reus but not the mens rea of the
offence must be proved. But there are some difficult lines to be drawn. Some of
the decisions to date on the meaning of act here found the following:
1) When considering a charge of murder the jury did not have to find that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim.
2) When considering whether the defendant did the act in question the jury
should not examine whether the defendant might have been able to raise
the defence of provocation.
3) In Antoine (2000) in the HL it was confirmed that diminished
responsibility could not be raised by a defendant following a finding that
she was unfit to stand trial.
Although a definitive ruling is awaited, it seems likely that a jury could consider
whether or not the defendant was acting in self-defence, because the courts have
held that where successful a plea of self-defence negates the actus reus of the
offence.
R v H (fitness to plead) (2003)
Details of Case -> The appellant was charged with two offences of indecent
assault committed against a girl aged 14. A jury was convened to decide whether
he was fit to stand trial. It was decided that he was unfit. At a further hearing a
different trial found that the appellant had committed the acts alleged. He was
absolutely discharged and registered as a sex offender. The appellant appealed
against the finding of the second jury, arguing that the procedure was
incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
CA dismissed the appeal.
Held -> HL held that the procedure under the 1964 Act was compatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights.
Pritchard (1836)
There are three points to be inquired into: First whether the prisoner is mute of
malice or not [Pritchard was a deaf mute; but he might have been a
hearing-speaking man just refusing to communicate]; secondly, whether he can

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plead to the indictment or not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to
comprehend the course of the proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper
defence - to know that he might challenge any of you to whom he may object and to comprehend the details of the evidence ...

Attorney General v ODriscoll Jersey Royal Court, 2003

In the ODriscoll case the basic test was the notion of capacity to participate
effectively in the criminal process, and in deciding whether that capacity is
present, the court must have regard the ability of the accused:
(a) to understand the nature of the proceedings so as to instruct his lawyer
and to make a proper defence;
(b) to understand the substance of the evidence;
(c) to give evidence on his own behalf;
(d) to make rational decisions in relation to his participation in the
proceedings, (including whether or not to plead guilty), which reflect true
and informed choices on his part.

AUTOMATISM
Automatism is a fully automatic state, where a person has no control over their
actions and no deliberate control over their mind.
To plead
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

automatism a defendant needs to show:

he had suffered a complete loss of voluntary control
this was caused by an external factor
he was not at fault in losing capacity

Automatism occurs when a defendant suffers a complete loss of self-control

caused by an external factor. A popular example is a defendant who is hit on the
head by a rock and then loses all awareness of what he is doing and injures
someone. Such a defendant will be able to rely on the defence of automatism.
Automatism involves more than a claim that the individual lacked mens rea. It is
a claim that he is not acting; it is a denial of the actus reus. The significance of
this is that automatism is a defence even to a crime of strict liability which has
no mens rea requirement.
Bratty v A.G. for N. Ireland [1963]
The defendant was charged with murder. But he claimed he felt really strange
when he committed the murder and pleaded insanity and automatism. Criminal

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law and culpability is based primarily based around choices and what one
chooses to do.
an action without any knowledge of acting, or action with no consciousness of
doing what was being done. per Viscount Kilmuir L.C. at p. 402.

Hill v Baxter [1958]

The defendant drove his van through a stop sign and hit a car. He claimed he
couldnt remember what happened, and expert witnesses were unable to say if
he had lost consciousness.
If there is some temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally it is
reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and that it is safe to let an
acquitted man go entirely free. per Devlin J at p.285.

Fully automatic state a complete loss of voluntary control

Attorney General's Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1993]
Point of Law -> To rely on automatism there must be a complete loss of voluntary
control.
Details of Case -> The respondent was the driver of a heavy goods lorry. He had
been driving six out of the preceding twelve hours and covered 343 miles when
he steered onto the hard shoulder of a motorway. He crashed into a stationary
white van. Two people were killed. The tyre marks indicated that the
respondents lorry had braked only at the very last minute. At his trial on a
charge of causing death by reckless driving, the respondent produced evidence
from a psychologist that he was suffering from a condition known as driving
without awareness caused by repetitive visual stimuli which created a trancelike state. The respondent claimed this amounted to automatism and that
therefore he was not driving. He was acquitted by the jury, but the AttorneyGeneral referred the case to the CA.
Held -> The CA emphasized that to rely on automatism there must be a full
automatic state, a complete destruction of voluntary control, not partial.
Commentary -> The requirement that there be a complete loss of self-control
appears to be very harsh. It would deny a defence to a person who had only a
vague awareness of what was happening to him. Some commentators have
suggested that this strict approach should be limited to driving offences or
crimes of strict liability, and that for other crimes it is not necessary to show
that there was a complete lack of control. However, there is nothing in the
judgement of the CA in Attorney-Generals Reference (No 2 of 1992) that
explicitly restricts their discussion to driving offences.
However, we take the point more generally to raise the question: What are
the requirements and limits of the defence of automatism?"

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"The effect of those decisions is that if the defence of automatism is said to
arise from internal causes so as to bring the defendant within the M'Naughten
Rules [see M'Naughten's case (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 200], then, if it succeeds, the
verdict should be one of not guilty by reason of insanity. An epileptic seizure (in
Sullivan), a stress disorder, prone to recur and lacking the features of novelty or
accident (in Hennessy) and sleep-walking (in Burgess) were all regarded as
internal causes. If, however, automatism is said to arise from an external cause,
for example a stone hitting the driver on the head, then a successful defendant is
entitled to be acquitted.
The first of those question is the one raised by this reference. In our
judgment, the 'proper evidential foundation', was not laid in this case by
Professor Brown's evidence of 'driving without awareness'. As the authorities
cited above show, the defence of automatism requires that there was a total
destruction of voluntary control on the defendant's part. Impaired, reduced or
partial control is not enough. Professor Brown accepted that someone 'driving
without awareness' within his description, retains some control. He would be
able to steer the vehicle and usually to react and return to full awareness when
confronted by significant stimuli. per Taylor L.C.J.
Broome v Perkins (1986)
Defendant was charged under the Road Traffics act, as he drove very erratically
when driving home and drove into the mini. He said he had no recollection of
getting into the car and the only thing he can remember is getting home because
his wife gave him a mars bar.
When driving a motor vehicle the drivers conscious mind receives signals from
his eyes and ears, decides on the appropriate action and gives direction to his
limbs to control the vehicle. When a persons actions are involuntary and
automatic his mind is not controlling or directing his limbs. per Glidewell L.J. at
p.332.
On the facts they [the magistrates] could only conclude that for parts of the
journey D's mind was controlling his limbs and thus he was driving. per
Glidewell L.J. at p.333.
Quick [1973]
The defendant was admitted in a mental hospital and hit a patient. He was a
diabetic who had taken his insulin and then had gone to the pub and had a few
drinks but not eaten properly. Quick claimed he did not know what he was doing
because he was hypoglycaemic.
Charlson [1955]
The defendant had been a normal parent until he hit his son across the head
with a mallet and threw his son in the river. He went to the doctor and was
diagnosed with a tumour that can cause violent outbursts. He did have some

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memory of hitting his son, but even though it went to the jury who acquitted
him by reasons of insanity.

Self-Induced Automatism
Self induced automatism will not be accepted if the person should or could have
reasonably have foreseen that automatism would be the result of their actions.
The defendant cannot plead automatism if he is responsible for causing his
conditions. So if the defendants mental state is caused by taking alcohol or an
illegal drug he cannot plead automatism. There may be other ways in which the
defendant is responsible for his condition and so will not be able to rely on the
defence. For example, if the defendant is a diabetic and is aware that if he does
not eat adequate food he may enter a state of lack of awareness, but refrains
from eating when symptoms first appear, he may be held responsible for his
condition. It seems, although there is no definitive case law on the question, that
the test is subjective; was the defendant aware that his actions or inactions
would cause his mental condition; rather than asking whether the defendant
ought to have been aware that his actions or inactions would cause his mental
condition.
Quick [1973]
The defendant was admitted in a mental hospital and hit a patient. He was a
diabetic who had taken his insulin and then had gone to the pub and had a few
drinks but not eaten properly. Quick claimed he did not know what he was doing
because he was hypoglycaemic.
CA: "In our judgment the fundamental concept [of insanity] is of a
malfunctioning of the mind caused by disease. A malfunctioning of the
mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body by some
external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetic, and
hypnotic influences cannot be said to be a disease of the mind. A
self-induced incapacity will not excuse nor will one which could have been
reasonably foreseen as a result of doing or omitting to do something." per
Lawton L.J. at p. 922.
Bailey [1983]
He was diabetic and was living with someone. She left him and went to live with the victim.
Bailey went to visit the victim claiming he was unwell where he was given sugar. He said he was
hyperglycaemic.
CA:
It is quite clear that even if the incapacity was due to the voluntary
taking of drugs or alcohol, specific intent may be negatived.

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It is common knowledge that those who take alcohol to excess or certain
sorts of drugs may become aggressive or do dangerous or unpredictable things.
They may be able to foresee the risks of causing harm to others, but
nevertheless persist in their conduct. But the same cannot be said without more
of a man who fails to take food after insulin. If he does not appreciate the risk
that such a failure may lead to aggressive unpredictable and uncontrollable
behaviour and he nevertheless deliberately runs the risk or otherwise disregards
it this will amount to recklessness. per Griffiths L.J. at p.506-7.
Marison [1996]
The diabetic defendant suffered a hyperglycaemic event when driving. He
crashed into a car and killed someone. In the previous months he had suffered a
few of these events where he crashed into a car. Although it was not a self
induced state, it was not a case of automatism even if he was in automatism
when he crashed. He knew that he was prone to attacks and that could lead to
losing control of the car therefore he was reckless and couldnt rely on his
automatic state
Although this was not a self-induced state (unlike alcohol) the relevant matter
was M's knowledge of the circumstances at the start of his journey. It was not a
case of automatism, even if M became an automaton at the moment of the attack
he had already committed the offence of driving by then."

Hardie [1984]
The defendant was charged with arson. He claimed he was in a automatic state when he did this
because he had been taking valium. CA said that it was not known to the person that taking this
amount of valium would result in aggressive behaviour. Drew a distinction between dangerous
drugs or non dangerous drugs.
CA:
There was no evidence that it was known to the appellant or even
generally known that the taking of valium in the quantity taken would be
liable to render a person aggressive or incapable of appreciating risks to
others or would have side effects such that its self-administration would
itself have an element of recklessness. It is true that valium is a drug and
that it was taken deliberately and not taken on medical prescription, but
the drug is, in our view, wholly different in kind from drugs which are
likely to cause unpredictability or aggressiveness. It may well be that the
taking of a sedative or soporific drug will, in certain circumstances, be no
answer, for example in a case of reckless driving, but if the effect of a drug
is merely soporific or sedative, the taking of it, even in some excessive
quantity, cannot in the ordinary way raise a conclusive presumption
against the admission of proof of intoxication for the purpose of disproving
mens rea in ordinary crimes, such as would be the case with alcoholic

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intoxication or incapacity or automatism resulting from
self-administration of dangerous drugs. per Parker LJ at p.853.

the

Sane automatism and Insane Automatism

If a person acts while unaware of what he is doing such a person may either be
an automaton or be insane. The distinction between the two is whether the
persons mental state was caused by an internal or external factor.
1) If it is caused by an internal factor the person is classified as insane.
2) If it is caused by an external factor the person has the complete defence of
automatism.
Internal causes = insanity
External causes = [sane] automatism
It can be extremely difficult to tell whether a factor was an internal or external
one.
Examples of external factors are a blow to the head or the taking of prescribed
medication.
Internal factors include mental illnesses.
Bingham [1991]
Quick (supra)
...the fundamental concept is of
disease. A malfunctioning of the
application to the body of some
anaesthetic and hypnotic influences
mind per Lawton LJ at p.922.

a malfunctioning of the mind caused by

mind of transitory effect caused by the
external factor such as, drugs including
cannot be said to be due to a disease of the

Hennessy [1989]
The defendant was diabetic who was charged with taking a car and driving it
when he was disqualified. He pleaded not guilty. The defendant had failed to take
his insulin because of the stress he was under. However the courts said it was
the disease itself that had caused the automatism so it would be regarded as
insanity.
In our judgment stress anxiety and depression can no doubt be the result of
the operation of external factors, but they are not, it seems to us, in themselves
separately or together external factors of the kind capable in law of causing or
contributing to a state of automatism. They constitute a state of mind which is
prone to recur. The hyperglycaemia as caused by inherent defect - diabetes and
not by the insulin. per Lane L.C.J. at p 294
Burgess [1991]

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Burgess went to the victim house and confessed undying love to the victim. The
victim did not feel the same way but agreed to let him stay and watch a video.
But the defendant picked up the video recorder and hit her over the head. When
she shouted at him he came to his senses and called an ambulance and was
quite remorseful. He claimed he was sleepwalking. The trail judge said sleep
walking was a internal cause and therefore it must be treated as insanity, as it
has to be an external cause for it to be considered as sane automatism. It used to
be thought that sleepwalking was an external factor, but this in this case it was
held to be an example of insanity, because it is a mental condition that the
everyday tensions and pressure will not constitute external factors.
There is no such external factor here. The possible disappointment or
frustration caused by unrequited love is not to be equated with something such
as concussion." per Lane L.C.J p.1210
"It seems to us that if there is a danger of recurrence that may be an added
reason for categorising the condition as a disease of the mind. On the other
hand, the absence of the danger of recurrence is not a reason for saying that it
cannot be a disease of the mind. at p.1212
Sullivan [1983]
Epilepsy was regarded as an internal factor, and so treated as insanity.
Smith [1982]
PMS case
Mixed internal and external causes
Rabey [1978]
Details of Case -> A Geology student became attached to the victim. He picked
up a rock and asked her what he thought of another student, she said Oh, hes
just a friend just like you. He hit her with the rock. He claimed he had felt
strange when he had done this. The psychiatrist said he was in a dissociative
state that was caused by shock.
Held -> The Canadian Supreme Court in Rabey (1980) held that a defendant who
suffered a disassociated state and killed his former girlfriend was not an
automaton. He sought to plead automatism, arguing that his lack of awareness
was caused by an external factor (his girlfriend telling him she was leaving him).
The Supreme Court held that this was a case of insanity; the reasoning being
that many people have boy/girlfriends leaving them without it leading to
complete lack of awareness, suggesting that it was the mental state of the
defendant, rather than the girlfriends actions which caused his mental state.
CA: The trial judge erred in holding that the psychological blow was an
externally originating cause. Rather, she should have held that if the accused
was in a dissociative state then he suffered from a disease of the mind. p.416.

Defences I: Insanity and Automatism

R v T (1990)
The defendant had robbed the victim and threatened him with a Stanley knife.
She was arrested but was passive an was unaware of what was going on around
her. She had injuries from rape as 3 days earlier she had gone to the police to
tell them about this. She was suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. The
rape was held to be an external factor. Rape could not be described as part of the
ordinary stresses and disappointments of life.