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Malaysia
Malaysia
Rahmat Lim & Partners
Azman bin Othman Luk, Chen Lee Won, Lum Sher Vin,
Karen Foong, Elaine Heung & Lim Teong Sit
1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
Financial Sector Blueprint 2011-2020
On 21 December 2011, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) the Central Bank of
Malaysia, published the Financial Sector Blueprint (Blueprint). The Blueprint
is intended to chart the direction of the Malaysian financial system over a
10 year period as Malaysia transitions towards becoming a high value-added,
high income economy. There are nine focus areas under the Blueprint: (i)
effective intermediation for a high value-added and high-income economy;
(ii) the development of deep and dynamic financial markets; (iii) financial
inclusion for greater shared prosperity; (iv) strengthening of regional and
international financial integration; (v) internationalisation of Islamic finance;
(vi) a regulatory and supervisory regime to safeguard the stability of the
financial system; (vii) electronic payments for greater economic efficiency;
(viii) empowering consumers; and (ix) talent development to support a more
dynamic financial sector.
In line with the Blueprint, new legislation in the form of the Financial
Services Act 2013 and the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, was brought
into force on 30 June 2013 to regulate the conventional and Islamic finance
industries respectively.
The Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA) is a single master-class statute
governing the conventional finance industry, and replaces the Banking and
Financial Services Act 1989 (BAFIA), the Insurance Act 1996, the Payment
Systems Act 2003 and the Exchange Control Act 1953. The Islamic Financial
Services Act 2013 (IFSA) is the FSAs counterpart for the Islamic finance sector,
and replaces statutes such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and the Takaful
Act 1984.
Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC)
Malaysia implements a dual banking system, namely a fully-fledged
conventional banking system operating in tandem with a fully-fledged
Islamic banking system. Islamic banks and international Islamic banks
subsist alongside conventional banking institutions and offer a wide range
of Islamic financial products in any currency to non-residents and residents.
Focus areas of the MIFC are sukuk origination, Islamic fund and wealth
management, international Islamic banking, international takaful and human
capital development. Various incentives are accessible to financial institutions
participating in the MIFC initiative, including new licences for conducting
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2. AUTHORITIES, REGULATORS
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also the sole authority in issuing currency as well as managing the countrys
international reserves. Other functions of BNM include the regulation and
supervision of financial institutions which are subject to the laws enforced by
it, exercising oversight of payment systems and providing oversight of money
and foreign exchange markets.
3. BANKING LICENCE
Malaysia
4. FORMS OF BANKS
4.1 State-owned banks
There are no state-owned banks in Malaysia, although there are Governmentlinked investment companies which control significant stakes in large
domestic financial groups.
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5. ORGANISATION OF BANKS
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by BNM); (ii) there should be not more than one executive director on the
board only in exceptional circumstances, will BNM allow up to a maximum
of two executive directors; and (iii) there should be a clear separation between
the roles of chairman, who should be a non-executive director, and CEO, to
ensure supervision and accountability of management.
The various committees described in section 5.2 also play a role in
the supervision of management. The audit committee, risk management
committee, nominating committee and remuneration committee are to be
chaired by independent directors. In terms of composition: (i) the majority
of the nominating committee should be non-executive directors; (ii) the
remuneration committee is to comprise only non-executive directors; (iii) the
risk management committee should comprise only non-executive directors;
and (iv) the audit committee is to comprise only non-executive directors
with at least three members, of which the majority should be independent
directors.
5.6 Compensation
BNMs guidelines stipulate that banks should provide for a formal and
transparent procedure for fixing the remuneration packages of board
members, CEOs and senior management. In this regard, the remuneration
committee is responsible for developing a clear policy and framework on
the remuneration of directors, CEO and senior management. In setting the
remuneration packages, the committee should ensure that the remuneration
policy supports the banks objectives, culture and strategy, remuneration and
employment conditions of the industry, the banks relative performance, and
that the performance-related elements of remuneration form a significant
proportion of the total remuneration package of executive directors. BNM
may require banks to submit the detailed formulae and details of the
remuneration packages of directors and CEOs together with the banks annual
financial reports.
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7. CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION
7.1 Role of consolidated supervision
Malaysia recognises the importance of international co-ordination and cooperation among regulators to ensure consolidated supervision of financial
institutions, particularly in todays environment. Many financial groups have
subsidiaries and operations in more than one jurisdiction. BNM continues to
pursue close co-operation and co-ordination with international supervisors to
support BNMs supervisory activities..
7.2 Requirements
Under the FSA and the IFSA, an overseas supervisory authority may, with
the approval of BNM, examine the books, accounts and transactions of:
(i) a representative office in Malaysia of a foreign institution; (ii) a bank or
financial holding company in Malaysia which is a subsidiary of a foreign
institution; or (iii) a bank which is a branch of a foreign institution. BNM
may also upon request by the relevant supervisory authority of a country,
territory or place outside of Malaysia, provide to the authority documents
or information on matters relating to: (i) the affairs of a bank or financial
holding company which is a subsidiary or associate of a foreign institution;
(ii) any office of a bank or financial holding company; (iii) any bank
or financial holding company for the purposes of assessing a proposed
establishment of any office by the bank or financial holding company.
Further, in assessing the merits of the applications by foreign banking
institutions for a licence, BNM takes into consideration the extent to which
the applicant is regulated and supervised by a competent home regulatory
authority, and if the applicants home country legislation allows for the
gathering and exchanging of information for cross-border establishments.
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As part of the application process, BNM will require that the home
supervisor provide a letter of no objection, and confirmation that it performs
consolidated supervision over the applicant and its affiliates, including the
Malaysian subsidiary.
In addition, it is a requirement that a licensed bank obtain BNMs prior
written approval before it (i) establishes or relocates an office; (ii) establishes
or acquires a subsidiary; or (iii) acquires or holds any material interest in any
corporation, whether in or outside Malaysia.
In line with the Basel Committees recommendations to improve
the supervision of financial groups globally, the FSA and the IFSA have
introduced the concept of financial holding companies. A financial holding
company is one which holds an aggregate of more than 50 per cent of
interest in shares of a licensed person, or has an aggregate interest in shares
of 50 per cent or less but has control over a licensed person, and has obtained
the approval of BNM to be a financial holding company of such licensed
person. Prudential requirements that apply to a licensed bank will also apply
to a financial holding company and its subsidiaries. BNM is empowered to
exercise oversight over financial groups for the purposes of promoting the
safety and soundness of a licensed person, and to impose requirements as to
group capital adequacy, liquidity, corporate governance, risk management
and related party transactions.
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Malaysia
under the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, will also require
the prior written approval of BNM. From the sellers perspective, a seller
may not enter into any agreement or arrangement to dispose of shares
without obtaining the prior written approval of the Minister (acting on
the recommendation of BNM) where the seller has an aggregate interest in
shares of the bank of: (i) more than 50 per cent; or (ii) 50 per cent or less but
has control over the bank, if such disposal would result in the seller holding
an interest in shares of less than 50 per cent or ceasing to have control over
the bank.
Approval is a two-step process. Approval is required at first instance to
commence negotiations, and again, prior to the execution of the sale and
purchase agreement. It should be noted that approval is required for both
direct and indirect acquisition of the shares in a bank.
An acquirer who holds an aggregate interest in shares of more than 50
per cent in a bank must also be approved by BNM as a financial holding
company. Unless BNM otherwise approves, a financial holding company of
a bank is not permitted to carry on any business, other than the business of
holding investments directly or indirectly in corporations which are primarily
engaged in financial services.
The prior approval of the Minister, acting on the recommendation of
BNM, is required for any agreement or arrangement for the reconstruction
or amalgamation of a bank. The prior written approval of BNM is required
for any agreement or arrangement for a scheme to transfer the whole or
part of the business of a bank. In the premises, if the acquisition of a bank
is to be effected by way of an acquisition of business and assets, the prior
approval of the Minister or BNM (as the case may be) must be sought and
obtained.
The IFSA contains corresponding provisions in relation to Islamic banks.
9. RESOLUTION
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9.3 Bail-in/bail-out
The Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (MDIC) was established in 2005
under the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 2005 (which has
since been replaced by the MDICA). Banks licensed under FSA and IFSA are
member institutions of MDIC (together with insurance companies and takaful
operators). A deposit insurance system was established under the MDICA to
protect depositors against loss of their deposits in the event of a failure of their
bank and to preserve confidence in the financial system. Deposits covered by
the deposit insurance system include RM denominated deposits in current and
savings deposit accounts, fixed deposits, cheques and bank drafts, and foreign
currency denominated deposits. Deposits not payable in Malaysia, money
market deposits, negotiable instruments of deposit, other bearer deposits,
repurchase agreements and any other liability or financial instrument as
may be specified by MDIC are not protected by MDIC. Presently, the deposit
insurance limit is RM 250,000 per depositor per member bank.
Under the MDICA, BNM may notify MDIC in writing where BNM is of
the opinion that a member institution has ceased to be viable or is likely to
cease to be viable, whereupon MDIC has the powers to, inter alia: (i) require
the member institution to take any step or action or refrain from any act
or thing, in relation to itself, its businesses or its officers, to cease soliciting,
taking or repaying deposits or carry on its business or such part of its business
as MDIC may direct or to restructure the whole or part of its business as may
be specified by MDIC; (ii) acquire or subscribe to the shares of the member
institution; (iii) assume control over the member institution, carry on the
whole or part of its businesses and manage the whole or part of its assets,
liabilities and affairs including disposal of its assets or businesses or any part
thereof, or appoint any person to do so on behalf of MDIC; (iv) apply to
the relevant HC to appoint a receiver, manager or receiver and manager to
manage the whole or part of the assets, liabilities, businesses and affairs of
the member institution; (v) subject to the approval of the Minister, present a
petition to the relevant HC for the winding up of the member institution; (vi)
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with the approval of the Minister, designate one of its subsidiaries as a bridge
institution; or (vii) transfer such assets and liabilities of the non-viable
member institution to the bridge institution on terms as MDIC determines.
Where MDIC has assumed control or appointed a person to do so on
its behalf, MDIC or the appointed person may carry out any resolution
comprising a transaction or series of transactions that involves the sale or
restructuring of all or a part of the assets of the bank.
Where a subsidiary of MDIC has been designated as a bridge institution,
the designation will expire two years after it is made unless extended or earlier
terminated in accordance with the provisions of the MDICA. The bridge
institution is authorised to carry on business as a bank of the non-viable bank
during the designated period.
Further, the MDICA contains additional provisions, and powers of
MDIC, for the winding up of banks. In fact, the MDICA purports to make
it mandatory for the relevant HC to make a winding up order in respect of
a member institution upon presentation of a winding up petition by MDIC
(although the constitutionality of this provision has not yet been tested).
Any liquidator appointed must carry out his functions under the direction
and supervision of MDIC. The deposit liabilities are to be paid in priority to
all other unsecured liabilities. The costs and expenses of the liquidator, the
preferential debts to employees as set out in the CA and debts due to the
Government under section 10 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 must,
however, be paid in priority to the deposit liabilities.
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