Royal Institute of Philosophy

Tolstoy, Death and the Meaning of Life

Author(s): Roy W. Perrett
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 232 (Apr., 1985), pp. 231-245
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751001
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Tolstoy,Death and the Meaning

of Life
ROY W. PERRETT

To live rationallyone mustlive so thatdeathcannotdestroylife

(WhatI Believe, VIII)
been regarded
Questionsabout the meaningof lifehave traditionally
as being of particularconcern to philosophers.It is sometimes
complainedthat contemporaryanalyticphilosophyfails to address
recentdiscussionsof
such questions,but theredo existilluminating
thesequestionsby analyticphilosophers.1
Perhapswhatlurksbehind
close
thecomplaintis a feelingthatthesediscussionsare insufficiently
thin
situations
and
hence
often
seem
rather
and
bland
actual
to
living
ofsuchsituationsin autobiography
comparedwiththevividportrayals
I
want
to
focus
on two worksby Tolstoy-one
or fiction. therefore
autobiographical,one fictional-and try to see what philosophical
withregardto questions
lessonscan be learnedfromthem,particularly
abouttherelationof deathto themeaningoflife.2
Tolstoy'sA Confession(1879) is a vivid recordof his own crisis
connectedwith his search forthe meaningof life. He tells how in
middlelife,in fullpossessionof all his physicaland mentalpowers,a
happy man with family,wealthand fame,he suddenlysufferedan
'arrestof life'as he began to ask himself,'Whatis it for?Whatdoes it
lead to?' (p. 15). And to thesequestionshe could findno answerthat
satisfiedhim in the face of his own inevitabledeath. His familyand

See, forexample,the selectionsin the anthologyThe MeaningofLife,

E. D. Klemke (ed.) (New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1981), and the
discussion in Robert Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanations (Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1981), Ch. 6.
2 Referencesto Tolstoy's works are to the Maude translationsin the
TolstoyCentenaryEdition. In particular,volumes11 and 15: A Confession
and The Gospel in Brief (Oxford UniversityPress, 1933) and Ivan Ilych
and Hadji Murad (OxfordUniversityPress, 1934). A usefulgeneralstudy
views is Gordon WilliamSpence, Tolstoythe
of Tolstoy's ethico-religious
Ascetic(Edinburgh:Oliverand Boyd, 1967).
Philosophy60 1985

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231

RoyW. Perrett

his art, which had formerlybeen the centreof his life, could no
longerprovidemeaningto lifein the faceof death:
Today or tomorrowsicknessand deathwill come (theyhad come
already)to those I love or to me; nothingwill remainbut stench
and worms.Sooner or latermy affairswhatevertheymaybe, will
be forgotten,and shall not exist. Then why go on makingany
effort?(pp. 19-20).
He studied science and philosophyhopingforsome aid but to no
avail. The experimentalsciences seemed to him to refuse to
acknowledgehis problem,addressingthemselvesinsteadto theirown
independentquestions. Philosophy,on the otherhand, whilerecognizinghis problemas legitimateseemedto have no answer.Indeed,
as Tolstoyputs it, 'thoughall the mentalworkis directedjust to my
question,thereis no answer,but insteadof an answerone gets the
same question,only in a complexform'(p. 30). Hence the question
he had posed himselfremainedunanswered:'Is thereanymeaningin
my life that the inevitabledeath awaitingme does not destroy?'
(p. 24).
In his despair it seemed to him thatthereare only fourpossible
thatlifeis absurd. But this
responses.The firstis not understanding
was obviouslynot available to Tolstoy himselfsince 'one cannot
cease to knowwhatone does know'(p. 39). The second,adoptedby
the majorityof his circle,is 'epicureanism',i.e. makingthe mostof
the pleasuresof lifewhile recognizingits ultimatehopelessness.But
such conduct Tolstoy found himselfunable to imitate,lackingthe
requisite'dullness of imagination'.The thirdoption is suicide and
this seemed to Tolstoy the 'worthiestway of escape' (p. 41). But it
was the fourthway, thatof 'weakness',thathe himselfadopted. To
his self-disgust
he foundhimself'seeingthetruthofthesituationand
yetclingingto life,knowingin advancethatnothingcan come of it'
(p. 41).
At this point in his personal storyTolstoy's thoughtssuddenly
turn:
takea different
The reasoningshowingthe vanityof lifeis not so difficult,
and
has long been familiarto the verysimplestfolk; yet theyhave
lived and still live. How is it they all live and never thinkof
doubtingthe reasonablenessof life?(p. 43).
Thus he infersthat'thereis a wholehumanitythatlivedand livesas
if it understoodthe meaningof its life,forwithoutunderstanding
it,
it could not live' (p. 43). This led him to breakaway fromhis own
narrowcircleof social equals in orderto attendto whatthe simple
folkhad to teach him. And thisin turnled himto concludethat:
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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningof Life

Rationalknowledge,presentedby thelearnedand thewise,denies

the meaningof life,but theenormousmassesofmen,thewholeof
mankind,receivethatmeaningin irrationalknowledge.And that
irrationalknowledgeis faith(p. 47).
But in this conclusionhe foundno comfort,for'it appears that in
orderto understandthe meaningof lifeI mustrenouncemyreason,
the verythingforwhichalone a meaningis required'(p. 47). That
is, thoughthe problemof the meaningof life can only arise fora
rationalbeing,it is hardlya solutionto it to abandonrationality.
In the face of this paradox he tries to clarifythe distinction
between'rationalknowledge'and 'irrationalknowledge'.In termsof
rationalknowledgehe now recognizeswhyhis questionis unanswerable:
The solutionof all the possible questionsof lifecould evidently
not satisfyme, for my question, simple as it at firstappeared,
includeda demandforan explanationof the finitein termsof the
infinite,and vice versa (p. 48).
The answers given by faith, however, though 'irrationaland
distorted'attemptto provide such a relationbetween finiteand
infinite,which is unavailable throughrationalknowledgeand yet
'withoutwhich there can be no solution' (p. 49). Consider the
catechism:
How am I to live-According to the law of God. Whatreal result
will come of my life?-Eternal tormentor eternalbliss. What
meaninghas life that death does not destroy?-Union with the
eternalGod: heaven (p. SO).
But faithis not to be identifiedwiththesepropositionalelementsso
far as Tolstoy is concerned,for he admits these 'answers' to be
'irrationaland distorted'.Rather'faithis a knowledgeofthemeaning
of life in consequence of which man does not destroyhimselfbut
lives' (p. 51).
Though faith is not to be identifiedwith these propositional
elements,they are neverthelessstill involved. Tolstoy says 'I was
now readyto acceptanyfaithifonlyit did notdemandofme a direct
denial of reason-which would be a falsehood'(pp. 53-54). But
inevitablyhe found himselfconfrontedwith rival faithsand interpretationsso thatreason is once again introducedto arbitrate.This
in turnleads to his prolongedand seriousstudyof the Gospels and
theology.
Tolstoy's positionon faithis verymuch in keepingwithmodern
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RoyW. Perrett

accountsof revelationand faith.3He is opposedto

non-propositional
the traditionalpropositionalaccountthatmakesfaiththe acceptance
of a body of propositionaltruthswhichare not accessibleto human
reason. This view posits an evidentialgap betweenrevealedtruths
and the truthsof naturaltheology.That in turntypicallyleads to an
emphasis on the role of the will in religiousfaith,for volitional
responseis supposed to bridgethe gap. Faith becomesthewillingto
believe somethingthat cannot be knownthroughreason (Tolstoy's
'irrationalknowledge'). But this is not the view of faithTolstoy
himselfwantsto embrace.Ratherforhim faithis an experiencing
of
the world as significant.It is not thereforeopposed to rational
knowledge,as it is on the propositionalaccount.Whilereasonis not
allowed to displace experienceas the source of the basic data, it is
involved in the systematicformulationand criticismof what is
believed on the basis of faith. Faith then is a non-propositional
knowledgeof how to live, thoughthisknowledgemayimplycertain
propositionsthatare open to rationalcriticism.This accountof faith
has becomewidespreadwithinProtestantChristianity
in thiscentury
and it accordswell withTolstoy'sown radicallyProtestantattitudes
to scriptureand theologyas expressedin WhatI Believe.
This resumeof Tolstoy'sargumentis briefand failsto capturethe
powerof the original.However,let us pause to considermoreclosely
two importantphilosophicalpointsthatarise. In thefirstplace recall
Tolstoy's claim that the peasants must understandthe meaningof
life,since withoutunderstanding
it theycould not carryon as they
do. Now it mightseem that there is no reason why the peasants
should not just carryon and spend theirtimeas Tolstoyhad spent
the firstfifty
yearsof his life,ignoringthesuspicionthatthereis any
problemabout meaningfulness.
To this Tolstoy would presumably
replythat the peasants lack the opportunitiesfor diversionwhich
enabled him to avoid facing the problem squarely for so long.
AntonyFlew, however,has challengedTolstoy's originalinference
hereon othergrounds.4.Flew suggeststhatthoughthepeasantsdo not
sufferfromTolstoy's 'arrestof life',this does not implythat they
possesssome knowledgeoflife'smeaningthatTolstoydoes not. Flew
3 For an account of modern developmentsalong these lines see John
Baillie, The Idea of Revelationin Recent Thought(New York: Columbia
UniversityPress, 1956). An outstandingphilosophicaldefence of this
non-propositionalview is to be found in the writingsof John Hick,
especiallyhisFaith and Knowledge,2nd edn (London: Macmillan,1967).
4 AntonyFlew, The Presumption
ofAtheism(London: Elek/Pemberton,
1976), Ch. 12. (This chapteris a revisedversionof Flew's earlierpaper
'Tolstoi and the Meaningof Life', Ethics 73 (1963), 110-118.)

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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningof Life

invokesRyle'sdistinction
betweenknowing
howand knowingthat:'the
peasantsmayindeedknowhowtolivetheirlivesfreeofallsophisticated
psychologicaldisabilities,but this by no means presupposesthe
possession of any theoreticalknowledgenot vouchsafedto their
unfortunatesocial superiors' (pp. 162-163). The secret that the
peasantshave and Tolstoylacksis not the knowledgethatthingsare
thusand thus,buttheknowledgehowto go on living.and in thiscase,
Flew claims,thisis 'onlyanotherwayofsayingthattheyall enjoyrude
mentalhealth'(p. 164).
This analysisis not fullyconvincing.It is truethatto knowthe
meaningof lifeis to knowhowto live (as Tolstoydid notat thetime
of his crisis),but it is notso clearthatto admitthisis to ruleout the
possibilitythatsome knowledge that is nevertheless
involvedhere.
This is because of the epistemicpoint that knowledgehow and
knowledgethat are not as entirelyunrelatedas Flew's analysis
suggests.If I knowhow to speak Japanesethisknowledgehow need
notbe reducibleto a set ofknowledgethatstatements.
None theless,
the truthof the claim 'I know how to speak Japanese fluently'
generallyimpliesthe truthof othersentenceslike 'I knowthat the
Japaneseword forcat is "neko"' and so on. Or again,ifwe thinkof
knowledgehow as knowledgeof a technique(like the craftsman's
knowledge)we generallyimply that the knowerhas some understandingof the principlesinvolvedin the activityin question. He
maynotactuallybe able to articulatetheseprinciplesin practice,but
they are neverthelesstheoreticallyformulable.In other words,
knowinghow impliessome knowingthateven ifknowinghow is not
reducibleto knowingthat.
Nor will it do to weakenthe sense of 'knowinghow' used herein
orderto tryto save the analysis.As Ronald Hepburnacknowledges,
thereis a weak sense of 'knowinghow' used in ordinarylanguage
such thatit is applicableto the baby who knowshow to cryor even
the bird thatknowshow to build a nest.5But thisis not enoughfor
Flew's analysisto hold. In the firstplace it is surelymisleadingto
call theselattertypesof cases instancesof knowinghow at all. Rather
we need to drawa distinctionbetweenknowinghow to do something
and being able to do it. It seems preferableto reserve'knowing
how' forcases wherethe knowerhas some implicitunderstanding
of
the principlesinvolved in the activity.I am able to bend my
but I do not know how to do this. Similarlyanimalsare
forefinger
able to do manythingsbut it seems reasonableto be agnosticabout
whethertheyknowhow to do thesethings.In thesecondplace, even
5 R. W. Hepburn, 'Questions About the Meaning of Life' in E. D.
Klemke,op. cit. 215.
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RoyW. Perrett

if we concede that this weak sense of 'knowinghow' is indeed

knowinghow, thenwe lose an importantdimensionof the problem
thatsuch 'knowledgehow' is beingclaimedto be the solutionof. As
Hepburn points out (pp. 215-216), the knowledgehow that the
of'knowinghow' is no longerthe
peasantshave on thisinterpretation
knowledgeTolstoy was searchingfor,because their'knowledge'is
too unproblematicto be a solution to his problem. It is the
dimensionof a problemstruggledwithand solved thatis lackingin
thiscase.
The second point I want to commenton in Tolstoy'saccountis
the way in whichhe mightseem to assumethatthe finality
of death
entailsthe meaninglessnessof life. Flew takeshim to task forthis,
pointingout thatit is by no meansobviousthat'nothingcan matter
unless it goes on forever; or, at any rate, eventuallyleads to
somethingelse which does' (p. 160). Now Flew is surelycorrectin
sayingthatwe value some thingspreciselybecause oftheirtransitoriness: considerthe Japanesecult of the cherryblossom.And again,
thinkof Tolstoy's question 'What for?' asked of activitieslike his
workon his estate,or the educationof his son, or the writingof a
book (p. 16). If what is being assumed is that an intelligible
justificationfor these activitiesmust lie in somethingthatgoes on
forever,somethingoutside mortallife,thenthis is also wrong.Just
how would Tolstoy's immortalityhave justifiedthese activities?
Furthermore,if these immediate activities can be called into
question,then so too can any largerscheme of justification
that is
put forwardas givingpointto theseactivities.
But clearlyTolstoy was aware of this. Doesn't it indeed generate
his crisis?So Flew is wrongto claimthatTolstoycontendsthat'our
lives can have meaningonly on the assumptionsof the existenceof
God and of human immortality'
(p. 154). The catechismfromA
Confession(p. 50) whichFlew quotes is notTolstoy'sown view.As I
have pointedout, it is offeredas an illustration
of the 'irrationaland
distorted'repliesgivenas propositionsto be believedon faith,where
'faith'is interpreted
in the traditionalpropositionalsense. Moreover
in his later work What I Believe (Ch. VIII), Tolstoy denies that
should involveany beliefin physicalresurrection
Christianity
and
sternlyrenouncesthe idea thatimmortality
is a necessarycondition
of the meaningfulness
of life. SimilarlyTolstoy's own doctrineof
God is a ratherthin demythologized
one. Flew himselfnotes that
Tolstoy'sfaithis an idiosyncratically
attenuatedformof Christianity.
Nor is Tolstoy guiltyof any obvious muddles about the limitsof
explanationand justification;considerthis passage towardsthe end
ofA Confessionwherehe triesto expressthe special characterof the
religiousknowledgethatgivesmeaningto life:
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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningof Life

I shall not seek the explanationof everything.I know that the

of everything,
like the commencement
explanationof everything,
mustbe concealedin infinity.But I wish to understandin a way
which will bringme to what is inevitablyinexplicable.I wish to
recognizeanythingthatis inexplicableas beingso notbecause the
demandsof my reasonare wrong(theyare right,and apartfrom
themI can understandnothing),but because I recognizethelimits.
of myintellect.I wishto understandin such a waythateverything
thatis inexplicableshall presentitselfto me as being necessarily
inexplicableand not as being somethingI am underan arbitrary
obligationto believe (pp. 80-81).
Hence Flew's interpretationis too ungenerous a reading of
Tolstoy'sviews on death and meaning.In WhatI Believe, Tolstoy
wiselyremarks:'To live rationallyone mustliveso thatdeathcannot
destroylife' (p. 430). A Confessionrecordsthe experiencedcollapse
of the supposed rationalityof one man's life in the face of the
realizationof his own inevitabledeath. The lifeTolstoywas living
to
was one thatdeathwould defeat,builtas it was upon attachment
conquerableby death:
his familyand his art- attachments
I feltthatwhat I had been standingon had collapsedand that I
had nothingleftunder my feet. What I had lived on no longer
existed,and therewas nothingleft(p. 17).
of thissort
The possibilityof livinga lifenot builtupon attachment
is the goal beforeus. And to know how to live such a life is to
discoverthe meaningof life. That this seems platitudinousshould
not surprise us. The knowledge that involved in knowingthe
as this.
meaningof life may simplybe some truthas unsurprising
we
to live meaningfully;
This is whyknowledgethatis notsufficient
also have to knowhow to live in termsof thisknowledgethat.There
is a parallel here with our experienceof art. When pressedto say
whatwe have learnedfroma workof artwe oftencan onlycome up
withsome platitude.We can onlysay we now knowthatp, wherep
is some propositionwe surely already knew to be the case. But
perhaps what we are sometimestryingto say is that althoughwe
already knew that p, now we know how to operate with our
knowledgethat. If thisis so thenit is no accidentthatmanyofthese
mattersare illuminatedforus in Tolstoy'sgreatstoryThe Death of
Ivan Ilych (1886).6
philosophicaldiscussionof this storyin Ilham
6There is an interesting
Dilman and D. Z. Phillips,Sense and Delusion (London: Routledgeand
Kegan Paul, 1971).
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RoyW. Perrett

In A Confession,Tolstoy tells how his questions,'What is it for?

Whatdoes it lead to?' seemedat firstof no real relevance.But their
continualreappearancebeganeventuallyto disturbhimas 'likedrops
of ink always fallingon one place theyran togetherinto one black
blot' (p. 16). He immediatelyfollowsthis simile with a striking
passage:
Then occurredwhathappensto everyonesickeningwitha mortal
internaldisease. At firsttrivialsigns of indispositionappear to
whichthe sick man pays no attention;thenthese signs reappear
periodof
more and moreoftenand mergeintoone uninterrupted
The suffering
increasesand, beforethesickmancan look
suffering.
round,whathe took fora mereindispositionhas alreadybecome
else in theworld-it is death!
moreimportant
to himthananything
(p. 16).
of The Death ofIvan Ilychis remarkable.
The prefiguring
froma fatalillness
The Death ofIvan Ilychtellsof a man suffering
lifehe has led is
imminent
death
the
in
face
of
his
the
that
who sees
Ivan's
life
that the story
it
is
to be judged meaningless.Although
his
case
is
be
viewedas an
clear
that
to
presentsforus, it is also quite
entirelytypicalone: 'Ivan Ilych'slifehad been mostsimpleand most
he had
ordinaryand thereforemost terrible(p. 11). Appropriately
been a memberof the Courtof Justiceand, as he had judgedothers,
so he is forcedto come to judge himself.His lifehad been a storyof
legal
steadyand reliableprogressin his own sphereof government
appointments.He had always done his duty as it was expectedof
him, for'he consideredhis dutyto be what was so consideredby
thosein authority'(p. 12). In turnhe expectsthatthosein authority
will similarlydo theirdutyby him and steadilypromotehim. And
this expectationis duly satisfied.Althoughhe brieflysuffersone
unpleasantsetback in his career expectations,in his eyes order is
soon restoredand he is appointedto the positionof powerhe sees as
his due: 'aftera stumble,his lifewas regainingits due and natural
and decorum'(p. 24). But at
characterof pleasantlightheartedness
the heightof his triumphhe suffersan apparentlytrivialaccident'he made a falsestep and slipped' (p. 26)-that bringson an internal
illness which eventuallyproves fatal. He is confinedto bed and
forcedto confronthis imminentdeath. In the faceof thishe realizes
thatthe lifehe has led is empty.
When Ivan firstrealizes that he is dyinghis reactionis one of
despair, for 'not only was he not accustomedto the thought,he
simplydid not and could not grasp it' (p. 44). Althoughhe must
have knownthathe was to die some time,he has neverreallylivedin
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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningof Life

termsof thatknowledge.Death is somethingthathappensto other

people:
The syllogismhe had learntfromKiezewetter'sLogic: 'Caius is a
man, men are mortal, thereforeCaius is mortal', had always
seemed to him correctas applied to Caius, but certainlynot as
applied to himself.That Caius-man in the abstract-was mortal,
was perfectly
correct,but he was not Caius, not an abstractman,
but a creaturequite quite separatefromall others(pp. 44-45).
Ironicallyin the openingpages of the storywe see Ivan's one-time
colleaguestreatingIvan's own deathin an identicalfashion,complacent that'it is he who is dead and not I' (p. 2). Schwartzwinksat
Peter Ivanovich 'as if to say: "Ivan Ilych has made a mess of
things-not like you and me"' (p. 3). And Peter Ivanovichsees in
the expressionon the corpse'sfacea warningto the livingthatseems
'out of place, or at least not applicableto him' (p. 5). When told of
Ivan's terriblesufferings
in his last days Peter Ivanovichpauses for
an instant:
'Three daysof frightful
and thendeath!Why,thatmight
suffering
suddenly, at any time, happen to me', he thought,and for a
momentfelt terrified.But-he did not himselfknow how-the
customaryreflectionat once occurred to him that this had
happenedto Ivan Ilychand notto him,and thatit shouldnotand
could not happen to him... Afterwhich reflectionPeter Ivanovich feltreassured,and beganto ask withinterestaboutthedetails
of Ivan Ilych's death, as thoughdeath was an accidentnaturalto
Ivan Ilych but certainlynot to himself(p. 9).
This is the spiritof deceptionthat screenedIvan fromhis own
deathuntilit was imminentand caused his familyto tryto denythat
his dyingwas reallyhappening:
The awfulterribleact of his dyingwas, he could see, reducedby
those about him to the level of a casual, unpleasant,and almost
indecorousincident(as if someone had entereda drawing-room
diffusingan unpleasantodour) and this was done by that very
decorumwhichhe had servedall his lifelong (pp. 51-52).
The onlyexceptionto thisfalsity,thisrefusalto recognizedeathas
inevitableforeveryone,is the peasantlad Gerasimwho servesIvan
in his last days. It is Gerasimwho remindsPeter Ivanovichat the
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RoyW. Perrett

beginningof the story:'It's God's will. We shall all come to it some

to Ivan:
day' (p. 11). And it is Gerasimwho says frankly
'We shall all of us die, so why should I grudge a little
trouble?'-expressingthe fact that he did not think his work
burdensome,because he was doing it fora dyingman and hoped
someonewould do the same forhim whenhis timecame (p. 52).
But for Ivan, whose whole way of life has screenedhim from
havingto face this truthabout death, dyingis an incomprehensible
and terriblebusiness.He comes to realizethatthe lifehe had feltto
be so pleasantis in fact'somethingtrivialand oftennasty'(p. 63). As
he looks back on his life it begins to seem to him thatonly in his
childhood is there somethingworthwhile.Everythingelse is a
gradualdecline:
It is as if I had been goingdownhillwhileI imaginedI was going
up. And that is really what it was. I was going up in public
opinion, but to the same extentlife was ebbing away fromme.
And now it is all done and thereis onlydeath (p. 64).
In the face of this realizationIvan experienceslifeas 'senselessand
horrible'and in terrorsearchesforsome meaningto it all. Then he
glimpsessomething:
'Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done', it suddenly
occurredto him. 'But how could thatbe, when I did everything
properly?'he replied,and immediatelydismissedfromhis mind
this, the sole solution of all the riddles of life and death, as
somethingquite impossible(p. 64).
It takes Ivan quite some timeto admitthathis flawlesslycorrect
life is not the life he ought to have lived, to see that 'all that for
which he had lived. .. was not real at all, but a terribleand huge
deceptionwhich had hidden both life and death' (p. 69). As he
resiststhisnotionhe screams,'I won't'and thenjust,'Oh! Oh! Oh!'
as he feels himselfbeing forciblythrustinto a black hole. The
screamingcontinuesforthreedays untilon the thirdday he stops:
'Yes, it was all not the rightthing,'he said to himself,'but that's
no matter.It can be done. But whatis the rightthing?'he asked
himself,and suddenlygrewquiet (p. 72).
he is causinghis
At this pointhe becomes aware of the suffering
familyas he catchessightof his distraughtson and wife.Then the
answerto his question,'Whatis the rightthing?'becomesclear:
And suddenlyit grewclear to himthatwhathad been oppressing
him and would not leave himwas all droppingaway at once from
two sides, fromten sides, and fromall sides. He was sorryfor
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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningof Life

them,he must act so as not to hurtthem: releasethemand free

himselffromthesesufferings
(p. 73).
And now 'in place of death therewas light'. Ivan says to himself,
'Death is finished.. . It is no more!' and he dies.
Ivan had built his life upon attachmentsconquerableby death.
This is whyhe suffersso much in the faceof death,forwhathe has
lived foris renderedmeaninglessby death:
This is wrong,it is not as it shouldbe. All you have livedforand
stilllive foris falsehoodand deception,hidinglifeand deathfrom
you (p. 70).
His lifehad been builtupon his desireforcontroland power.Hence
his distressat minor flaws in the environmenthe has created-a
stainedtablecloth,a chippedplate,a scratchedtable,or eventheway
his daughter'shair is done (pp. 27, 31, 47). His increasingconcern
with his illnessresultsin a correspondingsensitivity
to any lack of
control:
He had formerlyborne such mischances,hopingsoon to adjust
whatwas wrong,to masterit and attainsuccess,or makea grand
slam. But now everymischanceupset him and plungedhim into
despair(p. 35).
But it is the lettinggo of such controlthat is required. Death
inevitablydefeatssuch controland the attemptto hold on to it in the
It is onlywhenhe recalls
faceof deathcauses Ivan terriblesuffering.
the sufferingof his familyand desires to 'release them and free
himselffromthese sufferings'
(p. 73) that the fearof death leaves
him. Then 'in place of deaththerewas light'.Until thenthe kindof
lifehe has led has screenedhimfromtherealityofdeathand theway
in whichit will destroyall he has builthis lifeon. Whenhe glimpses
and resiststhisknowledge.But
thistruthabout deathhe is horrified
with
the associatedjudgmentof the
he
admits
it, together
eventually
of
the
life
he
has
led.
He considersnot himselfand
meaninglessness
but
other
his controland power,
people. Having forgonethis old
desire for control and power, he can say to himself,'Death is
finished... It is no more',fornow deathcannotdefeathim.
How does thisconnectwithour originalquestionsaboutdeathand
the meaningof life? First, it is the knowledgeof death that once
again generatesthe crisis. Ivan (like any adult person) must know
thathe will die, but sincehe refusesto facethisfacthe has no idea of
how to live in the lightof it. He does not knowhow to live. In the
face of his death he comes to know that the way he has lived is
wrong, for his death rendersmeaninglessthe life he has led by
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RoyW. Perrett

destroyingthatto which he is so attached,viz, powerand control.

Once again it is the peasants who provide us with a positive
paradigm.In this case it is Gerasim,who knowsthathe will die as
willwe all and who knowshow to live in termsofthisknowledge.He
does not grudge Ivan his services but just sees them as what is
neededby a dyingman and hopes thatsome day someonewilldo the
same forhim.
or meaninglessnessof life is not
Secondly, the meaningfulness
Tolstoy
assumedto be dependentupon the prospectof immortality.
is carefulto leave the question of survivalafterdeath completely
open. The imageryof lightis entirelycompatiblewitha naturalistic
reading of the story: Ivan is enlightenedas he turns fromthe
darknessof deceptionand falsehood.Again,considerthepointin the
and failsto
storywhen Ivan attemptsto ask his family'sforgiveness
mouththe words properly.None the less, he is content'knowing
that He whose understandingmatteredwould understand'(p. 73).
But thisdoes not commitTolstoyto the beliefthatforIvan's lifeto
be meaningfultheremustexista God. It is entirelyconsistentwith
the point of the storythat this is simplya statementabout Ivan's
of the truthof the claimthatthereis such
beliefs,not an affirmation
a 'He'. Nor need it suggestthatsuch a beliefis necessaryfora person
to considerhis lifemeaningful.Ivan's convictioncan be understood
sense: ifthereis such a He
or even a counterfactual
in a hypothetical
thenHe willunderstand.This pointconnectswithanotherthatarises
in responseto thefollowingpossibleobjection.
So farI have arguedthatTolstoydoes notcommitthecrudeerror
thatFlew attributesto him: thatif somethingis to be worthwhile
it
must last foreveror lead to somethingthat does. But perhaps
Tolstoy does tacitlyassume anotherand rathersimilar principle
which is less absurd, though it may likewise be false. Tolstoy
suggeststhatdeathrobs life(or a certainkindof life)of its meaning.
Does it followthatlifeis meaningless?Not necessarily.Considerthe
thesisthatone thingof value is pleasure.Then lifehas value whileit
is pleasurableand sicknessand deathtakeawaythatvalue. However
they do not renderlife valuelesswhile it is pleasurable.It is only
when the pleasure ceases that it lacks value. To get the desired
conclusionsomethinglike the followingprincipleis required:thatif
a thinghas value at a certainmomentof timethenit alwayshas that
value (or at all latertimes). And this principleis in turnplausible
because it suffersfroman ambiguity.If pleasure (or being in a
valuable then it is eternallytrue
pleasurablestate) is intrinsically
(presumably)that pleasure has that value. However, my life has
value onlybecause it instancessuch stateswithvalue. And it has this
value only while it does instancethose states. Thus valuable states
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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningof Life

are eternallyvaluable, whereas thingswhich instancethose states

enjoy the value only while they enjoy the states. Now apply the
principlewronglyconstruedto my life. If it has a certainvalue then
it will alwayshave it. Howeverthevalue thatpleasurebestowson my
life is obviouslystolen by death. So my life neverhas thatvalue,
even while it is pleasurable.
If Tolstoy is playingwithsuch a principlehe maybe in trouble,
for then life could be meaningfulonly if either: (i) it instances
valuable or meaning-conferring
states eternally(and this seems to
imply the necessityof immortality);or (ii) there are some states
instancedconfereternalsignificanceon a
which thoughtransiently
life.Tolstoywantsto eschew(i) so he mustembrace(ii). And clearly
he does thinkthereare such states-perhaps those statesinstanced
by those who live out the spiritof the gospels. How do thesediffer
frompleasure?Undoubtedlytheydo, but it is not clear why. Why
are Florence Nightingale'scompassionateacts still significantor
valuable,whereasNero's pleasuresare not?
In replyto thiswe need firstto notethatmeaningsare soughtfor
lives as wholes. Lives (like stories)can have significanceand value
that are more than just the significanceand value of theirparts.
Secondly,we need to drawa distinction
betweenwhatI shallcall the
'objective' meaning of a life and the 'subjective'meaning. (This
need not commitus to any particularpositionon the
terminology
orsubjectivity
ofvalueingeneral.)A lifecanhavesubjective
objectivity
meaningin so faras itinstancesstatesofvalueforthepersonwhoselife
itis. Thus pleasurecan confersubjectivemeaningon a lifein thisway,
though sickness and death will rob a life of such subjective
meaning-notinthesenseofmakingitno longereternally
truethatthe
lifeinstancedpleasureat sometime,butin thesensethatthelifedoes
notnowinstancepleasure.This devaluationofa lifeis quitecompatible
withthe truththatthis does not renderthe lifevaluelesswhileit is
pleasurable.If a lifeas a wholeis onlysubjectively
meaningful
itsvalue
ceases whenthelifeends. But a lifecan also haveobjectivevaluein so
faras it instancesstatesofvalueforothers,and deathdoes notdestroy
suchvalueinthewayitdestroyssubjectivevalue.Personalpleasurecan
onlyhavesubjectivevalueinthissense,andthisis whyNero'spleasures
are no longer significantsince Nero's death. Other states like
compassioncan instancevalueforothersand hencenotbe devaluedby
death as are subjectivelyvaluable stateslike pleasure. So Florence
Nightingale'sactsoutliveher.
Worriesabout the meaningof lifeare typicallyworriesabout how
to integrateboth senses of 'meaning'; that is to live a life which
instancesobjectivemeaningthatis not destroyedby death and also
to enjoysuch a lifeas affording
to the person
subjectivesatisfaction
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RoyW. Perrett

who leads it. The lifethat Ivan Ilych led beforehis illnesswas one
thatinstancedonlysubjectivemeaning.It was builtupon the values
and decorum'(p. 24). He had been able
of 'pleasantlightheartedness
to incorporatetemporarysetbackspreciselybecause he had always
believed thingswould soon be restoredto theireven tenor.Death
bringshome to him the realizationthatthe subjectivemeaninghis
lifehas cannotguaranteeobjectivemeaningforit and such subjective
meaningas it has will be destroyedby his death.
It mightseem a consequenceof thisviewthatobjectivemeaningis
if
dependentupon the existenceof others.This will pose a difficulty
we considerthe life of the last human agent. What would confer
objectivesignificance
upon it?And ifobjectivesignificance
cannotbe
conferredupon it, does this retrospectively
undercutthe objective
value of other lives? One possibilityis that God providesthe last
humanlifewithobjectivevalue. (This view has a certainBerkeleian
flavour.) But what provides God's existencewith objectivevalue?
His eternalexistencetogether
withHis omnipotence
guaranteethatthe
subjectivevalue of His existencecannotbe destroyed.So perhapsthe
problemofintegrating
objectiveandsubjectivevaluejustdoesnotarise
for God. Anotherpossibilityis thatthe objectivevalue of the last
humanlifecan be guaranteedina counterfactual
sense.That is, ifthere
wereotherstheywouldfinditobjectively
meaningful.
(God's existence
couldbe objectivelymeaningful
in thesameway.) This tiesin withmy
earliersuggestionthatwe mightinterpret
Ivan's convictionthat'He
whose understandingmatteredwould understand'(p. 73) in a
counterfactual
sensewithoutdevaluingtheobjectivemeaningfulness
of
his life.
Understandingthe meaningof lifedoes indeed involveknowledge
how. But in relationto death it also involves,(as knowledgehow
generallydoes), knowledgethat. In thiscase the knowledgethatwe
shallall die oughtto lead us to theobviousconclusionthatitwouldbe
irrationalto build our lives on what can be destroyedby death.A
and TheDeath ofIvan Ilychrecordinstancesofmencoming
Confession
to the knowledgethat theirlives are so built and hence rendered
meaningless
bydeath.Knowinghowto livea lifenotso built,knowing
how to integratethe subjectiveand objectivesignificance
of a life,is
themeaningof life.An important
whatis involvedin understanding
partofsuchknowledgehow(a partTolstoydwellsupontogreateffect),
is theknowledgethatwe shallall die andthat'toliverationally
onemust
live so thatdeathcannotdestroylife'.Tolstoysees the peasantslike
Gerasim as havingsuch knowledge.As to the prospectsof others
gainingsuchknowledge,Tolstoyseemspessimistic.Ivan gainsit only
and too late forhimto do morethandie well.
afterterriblesuffering
And at the startof the storywe see thatIvan's familyand colleagues
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Tolstoy,Death and theMeaningofLife

havelearnednothingfromhis death.Presumablytheonlyhopeis that
the readerof the storymightlearnsomethingfromIvan's death. It
mightwellturnoutintheendthatthe'He' ofthelastchapterwillbe the
reader,thepersonwho Tolstoyhopedwould understand.7

University
ofOtago

7 My thanks to Graham Oddie and Jim Harvie for various valuable

suggestions.

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