REFLECTIONS ON COMMENCEMENT OF WRITING SEPOY REBELLION OF 1857-59

REINTERPRETED
MAY 1998
AGHA.H.AMIN
INTRODUCTION
The rebellion of the Bengal Army in 1857 was a traumatic event in the history of British rule in India. Even
today it is difficult to describe it as a 'War of Independence', 'Revolution', 'Religious War' or a 'Mutiny'. The
discussion is made more complicated because of the fact that India is a jigsaw puzzle of races and ethnic
groups made further complicated and confusing by the presence of a variety of religions, castes etc.
Thus Indo-Pak History has always remained a far more confusing affair than lets say French or British

History. Any event in Indian History is hard to judge because of presence of various aspects like diversity of
race, religion etc. The Indo-Pak Sub-Continent has the unique distinction of being invaded, colonised and
ruled by a multiple number of actors motivated by racial, religious, economic or commercial reasons.
Thus whenever we pick any book on Indo-Pak History we come across so many conflicting and confusing
views like the Muslim view, the Hindu view, the British view etc. Behind every happening in Indo-Pak
history there is some 'Conspiracy Theory', some ethnic or religious bias, some personal elements or
grievances etc. One may think that this is true for all types of history.
However in our case it is felt that these biases are much more pronounced because of the fact that we are
still undergoing the historical processes through which many other parts of the world underwent five
hundred or a thousand years ago. Perhaps all this is there because India and Pakistan even today are not
cohesive integrated states with a clearheaded Intelligentsia or Leadership in the real sense.
Perhaps the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent cannot be called a country or two or three countries in the real sense.
One may add that Bangladesh is less trouble or confusion free being a nation state in the real sense despite
its junior vintage in terms of length of years. We may state with conviction that writing anything on any
aspect of Indo-Pak History is a much more arduous task than writing history of any other country.
Coming precisely down to Indo-Pak History 1857 is particularly a very challenging subject to write about.
The major difficulty in writing stems from the fact that little is available from the Indo-Pak side since most
of the people who formed the core elements of the rebels or freedom fighters or whatever anyone may
choose to call them were either hanged or blown off the mouths of guns or destroyed in the Terai Jungle by
disease or tigers.
All those who were left were either living in British India and thus rendered unable to state anything based
on truth because of fear of life or forfeiture of liberty.
Some were so overwhelmed by disgust and grief that they thought it pointless to leave anything for
posterity.
Some who managed to save their life by escaping were so much pressed by privation and misery that they
died premature deaths and were unable to leave for the future historians anything which may have proved
useful in arriving at a rational explanation of the design of events and may have enabled historians to
understand whether the outbreak was based on deliberate planning or was a spontaneous outbreak.
Thus we are left with three broad categories of historical accounts i.e. the 'Original British Viewpoint', the

'Indian Viewpoint while under Subjugation' and 'Modern Indo-Pak Reinterpretations'.

Things are made yet more complex by other schools of thought like the 'Religious', 'Ethnic' and the 'Class
Warfare' etc. Karl Marx called it the failure of the policy of divide and rule. Muslim revivalist historians call
it Jehad, Hindus have their own explanations, Modern Nationalist Historians have further made it more
colourful and glorious by liberally mixing myth with reality!
The British are ever keen to prove that it was a mutiny of troops. Thus anyone striving to write about history
of 1857 has to struggle with various conceptual pitfalls and obstacles based on racial, religious and personal
biases.
The aim of this work is to interpret the events of 1857 not from the religious or racial or any other personal
bias but from the pure historical point of view; so that correct conclusions can be drawn; not as a Muslim or
a Hindu or a Sikh or as a North Indian or a Punjabi or as any other thing.
It is important because today the countries of Indo-Pak Sub-Continent are going through a critical phase in
terms of historical reinterpretation, today people are questioning various issues which were previously too
sacred to be discussed; today history has again become much more crucial than it was fifty or hundred years
ago. It is so because today we are less emotional and more objective than lets say in comparison with 1947
or in 1859.
Today there are less pressures and less compulsions than there were when Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was
writing on 1857. At that time the issue was pure survival, today the issue is not immediate survival but longterm progress. Today religious divisions are less meaningful than they were in 1947 because today we are
more clear about what motivated leaders to manipulate their followers in a certain direction to achieve
certain ends!
Today the issue is not confrontation but reduction of armies and economic progress in the real sense.
Another aspect of 1857 outbreak's importance was its influence on future British policy about India. In this
sense this was in a way negative since the British reversed the policy of rapidly modernizing India and
started supporting the feudal classes who Dalhousie was bent upon destroying. A foundation was laid for the
communalization of the Indian Army. The policy of Divide and Rule received great impetus since the British
realized that if the Hindus and Muslims combined like they had in 1857, India may prove to be very difficult
to be ruled. Thus we see that after 1857 some very paradoxical policies were adopted by the British
Government. On one side it was held that the Muslims were the main culprits of 1857, whereas the majority
of the troops of the Bengal Army which mutinied were Hindus. This led to reduction of the Hindustani i.e.
East of Jumna troops both Hindu and Muslims while Punjab became the main area of recruitment with

preference being given to Punjabi Muslims. Another effect of 1857 was that it induced Muslims to show
greater loyalty to British in order to wipe out the stigma of disloyalty.
1857 remains a major landmark in the march towards Indian Independence since it convinced the Britishers
that India could not be held at leisure and fear of another mutiny continued to haunt the British rulers right
till 1947. On the other side another subtle effect on the freedom movement if it can be called one was the
fact that Indians realized that the military option was not viable and thus Indians resorted to social reform
and inner regeneration to prepare themselves for the challenges of the modern era. In this regard the main
contribution of educating the Indians lies with the British.
The Great Rebellion of 1857 occupies a decisive place in the history of Indo-Pak Sub-Continent. It
destroyed the English East India Company and destroyed a social order which was many centuries old. It
was a highly complex event and even today many aspects of this phenomenal event defy comprehension. It
influenced every class and section of the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent and acted as a primer for the complex set
of events which finally led to the partition of India in 1947.
There is no dearth of works dealing with the events of 1857. These cover every aspect of this great event.
However invariably all works suffer from either of the following handicaps : -(1) The British writers even if they don't want to unconsciously keep on presenting it as yet another example
of 'How Great the British were!' They magnify the odds which their countrymen faced and exaggerate the
sepoy numerical strength.
(2) The historians most of whom are civilians go into unnecessary details at the cost of the essentials. They
try at times to fit inadvertently adopted British actions into subtle but essentially ridiculous theoretical
frameworks.
(3) The nationalist historians try to glorify it and while doing that endeavour without much success to
present it as a super-human idealistic effort. The fact is that this rebellion had little in common with the
Congress or League. It did not have the remotest connection with the two Nation or Greater Bharat theories!
(4) The Indo-Pak historians with a narrow regional approach try to project it as success of one ethnic group
while condemning other ethnic groups who, in their opinion were misguided or collaborators or
opportunists!
(5) There is yet another class of outwardly impressive historians who are slaves of preconceived ideas they
digested without much understanding at so-called elite universities in the western world. They are always

attempting to submit 1857 to the servitude of tools of conceptual analysis, they learnt while studying
overseas. When one sees them one is reminded about a remark which Gibbon, the great historian made
about one of the so-called great universities of the western world, that the days that Gibbon had spent in that
university were the most futile and barren days of his life!
1857 has been repeatedly analyzed by historians right from the year it took place. All historians or social
scientists dealing with modern Indian history cannot get anywhere unless they study 1857. But then
unfortunately 1857 has mostly been misunderstood.
Thus correct conclusions have mostly not been drawn. Even today with so much of knowledge there are
many misconceptions, half truths and sweeping judgements pertaining to 1857. For the sake of posterity it is
important to remove these prevalent misconceptions and misunderstandings. This is, thus, my aim which has
compelled me to make a humble endeavour to write something about 1857.
Unfortunately it is an absolutely clear fact that whenever anyone belonging to the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent
reads Indo-Pak history he or she finds very little which is positive or inspiring and a lot which makes one
feel disgusted and disillusioned.
This region is rich not only in culture but also in contradictions and paradoxes. '1857' however is an
inspiring saga whether it is the 'Rebel' or the 'British' side.
We see genuine, very inspiring and titanic figures on both sides struggling against seemingly impossible
odds. We see genuine patriots who defied death and destruction.
We see the triumph of 'Heroes' on the British side and the triumph of opportunism on the Indian side.
We are tempted to be led to the conclusion that if Mangal Pandey had instead gone to the Grays or Lincoln's
Inn he would have fared much better! Or if Lance Daffader Basharat Ali of 3rd Light Cavalry instead of
rebelling had fought on the British side in perhaps the Hodson's Horse, may be his grandson may have
become a Field Marshal in the Indian or Pakistan Army. How foolish were the sepoys of Bengal Army who
mutinied!
Had they remained proper their descendants may have had big Jagirs in Sargodha and Khoshab or in
Rampur, Karnal, Mahmudabad or Nanpara, and would have been today's Senators!
The history of India and Pakistan after 1857 till 1947 has been called 'Freedom Struggle'.

But closer examination reveals that it was more of a series of debates conducted in posh drawing rooms and
magnificent conference halls. Indians and Pakistanis on both sides hardly shed any blood fighting against
the British but much more blood fighting for the British in two World Wars or in cutting the throats of
unarmed civilians during the transfer of power year of 1947.
Thus, we see politicians spending a considerable amount of energy in downplaying the Indian National
Army or the Bombay Naval Mutiny just because they did not want to be robbed of the phenomenal glory of
having led a bloodless freedom movement which produced more bloodshed during partition than all
combined unnatural deaths in Indian history from at least 1707 till 1947!
But then all this is true in general for most parts and ages of the history of mankind. Man has always
struggled in vain for utopian ideals which have mostly eluded him. Every titanic struggle only took us
further away from the ideals for which we had aspired but this is how history is and so far historians have
struggled in vain to arrive at an all encompassing theory of history.
Intellectual disgust with absolute distortion of history in Pakistan, in the name of religion, ideology
hero worship and nationalism forced me to write this book.
I have no axe to grind. I have no fervent desire to project any race or religion at the cost of history.
An attempt has been made to tell the whole story without manipulating bits that support one side or the
other. Naturally the picture which emerges as a result of this approach cannot be smooth and highly orderly
CHAPTER ONE
THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CONQUEST OF INDIA 1757-1849
When the Uzbeks ejected Babur, the future Mughal Emperor of India from Central Asia, they knew little,
what this great man or his descendants would achieve in India. The Mughal Empire was the predecessor of
the British Empire in India. In between the demise of Mughals and the foundation of British Empire there
was a dark period of anarchy which started from 1707 and continued almost uninterrupted till 1849 when
the English East India Company conquered Punjab.
The term 'English East India Company's conquest of India' is both misleading and incorrect. The East India
Company did conquer India single handedly but with the help of Indians who constituted some three fourth
of their army. These Indian mercenaries were called 'Sepoys' by the British Company.

An English form of the word 'Sipahi' in Urdu language which means a 'Soldier'. These 'Sepoys' were
mercenaries who joined the English Company's army for a number of reasons in which the foremost one
was economic necessity.
The process of engaging Indians in the English East India Company's military service started in the
seventeenth century.
In 1600 Queen Elizabeth I granted a charter to the 'Company and Merchants of London trading with East
Indies'1.
1n 1613 Jahangir, the Mughal Emperor granted the Company permission to establish a permanent trading
station at Surat2. This was the start of a Company which laid the foundations of the British rule in India. The
Company established its offices and factories and enrolled Indians as 'guards' or 'chowkidars' for local
protection of their business premises.
These 'chowkidars' were the beginning of the East India Company's Native Army3.
It was cheaper to employ Indians than Britishers and thus economic necessity was as much the necessity of
the Company to enrol Indians as it was for the Indians to agree to enrol. Later on regimental espirit de corps
continued to gain greater importance as the Bengal Madras and the Bombay Armies gradually evolved into
full time conventional armies.
Technically speaking the regular English East India Company's Native Army was established in 1748. Major
Stringer Lawrence enrolled natives in Madras area in order to use them in the war which had started
between France and Britain.

Major Stringer Lawrence , the founder of English East India Companys private army .It later came to be
known as the Indian Army .was divided into Indian and Pakistan Army and Pakistan Army was again
divided into Pakistan and Bangladesh Army in 1971

Thus, the East India Company's native army was created basically to fight against the French. It is of interest
to note that the French had started using natives as soldiers from 1676 when Francois Martin, the Governor
of Pondicherry enrolled 300 native soldiers.
Francois's successor Dumas enlarged this force in 1740 to some 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers, mostly Muslims
armed and trained in the European fashion4.

Coat of arms of French East India Company

The three main ports and trading stations of the English East India Company were Madras on the south east
coast, Bombay on the western coast and Calcutta on the Bengal coast.

The wars between the English and French East India Companies

Thus, from mid-eighteenth century all these three trading ports raised their separate Indian mercenary forces
which were by late 18th century known as the 'Bombay', 'Madras', and 'Bengal' armies.
An important point to note that the Bengal Army had no Bengali soldiers at all.
These three were separate and distinct forces and were employed in their respective geographic theatres
though many a times they supplemented and cooperated with each other.

Area where the English and French companies fought most of their wars

In the early days however the Bengal army was under the Madras administration.
These three forces which later on came to be known as 'Presidency Armies' had two essential components
i.e. a nucleus of European officers and soldiers which formed the core of the force and secondly a majority
native component.
The European were of two types i.e. one was the component known as the Royal Army i.e. troops loaned on
payment to the East India Company, the second were East India Company's own European soldiers and
officers, these were mostly ex-officials of the Company or mercenaries, deserters, soldiers of fortune
belonging to Britain and other countries of Europe.

Flag of the English East India Company

Bernadotte who became one of Napoleon's Marshals and subsequently King of Sweden was at one time a
common private soldier in Madras5! The first regiment of the Regular British Army loaned to the Company
was the 39th Foot which arrived in India in 1754 6.

General Sir Eyre Coote , one of the finest generals of the English East India Company in 1770s and
1780s

The Development of the Armies of the English East India Company

Robert Clive, the hero of Plassey played an instrumental role in the formation of the native component of
the East India Company's Army. Thus, Clive raised the first Battalion of the Bengal Army in 1757 consisting
of various Indian free booters including Muslim Pathan, Rohillas, Rajputs etc.

Lord Clive , who started as a clerk in English East India Company , laid the foundations of English East
India Companys Indian Empire by winning the Battle of Plassey by bribing an overwhelming Indian army
opposing him in 1757 and became Indias viceroy and was later tried for corruption by the British.He
ended his life by suicide

This battalion was known as 'Lal Paltan' because its troops wore the British Red Coats.

A typical soldier of Clives nativearmy

Its strength/composition was as following7:a. One Indian Commandant (with nominal powers), one Indian adjutant, ten Indian Subedars, thirty
Indian Jemadars and 820 Indian rank and file.
b. One European captain, two subalterns, one sergeant major and ten sergeants.
Subsequently this unit was known as the Ist Bengal Native Infantry or Ist Native Infantry. It took part in the
Battle of Plassey in 1757 which laid the formation of British rule in India. It was in Cawnpore in 1857 and
mutinied on 4th June, 1857.

Battle of Plassey ,1757 ,Clive bribes his way to victory

It is important to note that there were hardly any Bengalis in this unit. The EEIC (English East India
Company) Regiments had a wide choice of applicants who wanted to enlist and they mostly consisted of
Muslims from areas west of Bihar including Rohillas, Hindustanis, Pathans, Rajputs, Hindu Jats etc8.

Captain Richard Knox of the Madras establishment was Lal Paltan's first commanding officer. This was the
first unit of the Company's native army to be organized on a battalion basis of the British Royal Army
pattern.
Robert Clive has been described as treacherous, greedy and selfish. I consider him far superior to most of
Indo-Pak leaders of even today namely for one reason.
He was a brave man and served his country 'Britain' well, and laid the foundation of British Empire in India
just like Mohammad Bin Qasim or Ghauri laid the foundation of Muslim rule in India!
In direct contrast to Clive most of the ruling classes of India and Pakistan are descendants are those who did

not play significant role in Indo-Pak freedom movement during the period 1857-1942.
Thus this was the beginning of the Bengal Army which mutinied in 1857. Following the Battle of Plassey,
Clive raised another sepoy battalion. Similarly he raised six battalions in Madras in 1759.
In Bombay, also the same trend took strength and units composed of Muslim Arabs, African Abbysinians,
Hindustani Mussulmans and Hindu Mahrattas were raised as independent companies in 1760 and as
battalions in 1767 9.
Thus the sepoys played an important role in establishing East India Company as a significant power in India
in a direct manner and Britain as a world power by virtue of annexation of Bengal in an indirect manner!
Eminent military thinkers like J.F.C Fuller placed 'Plassey' in the list of decisive battles of the western
world. At this point in time, our supposedly north of Chenab martial races had not entered the stage.
In 1764 a predominantly Sepoy army defeated the Nawab of Oudh and the Mughal Emperor in the decisive
battle of Buxar which brought Oudh state i.e. half of northern India under the vassalage of the English East
India Company.

Plaque commemorating the English Companys victory at Buxar1764.Ironically Major Hector Munro was
later defeated by Hyder Ali in the south

Shuja Ud Daula the Persian speaking Nawab of Oudh who was defeated at Buxar in 1764

In this battle just about one thousand Europeans, eight battalions of sepoys i.e. about 8,000 men and about
one thousand Mughal mercenary cavalry decisively defeated an opposing Oudh Army with a sizeable
Durrani contingent totalling some 50,000 men10.

The Mughal Emperor Shah Alam Grants the revenue of two major provinces after defeat of Buxar to Sir
Robert Clive
The battle was a convincing proof that discipline, superior training and superior leadership can offset
numerical superiority in battle.
The East India Company's force in this battle was commanded by Major Hector Munro. It is of interest to
note that this same Munro was decisively defeated by Haider Ali in September, 1780. Sir John Fortescue, the
official historian of the British Army called Munro's failure in 1780 as the 'greatest calamity that had ever
befallen the British arms' 11 .
1764 was a very significant year for the Bengal Army.
The first major sepoy mutiny took place in this year at Manji on 8th September, 1764 when Lal Paltan
mutinied and imprisoned its officers.
The mutiny was, however, quickly suppressed by the British using 6th Bengal Native Infantry. Munro tried
the mutineers by court martial and had 20 of them tied to the artillery guns and blown off.

This was probably a Mughal punishment which the British borrowed for punishing native mutineers. The
effect of this scene was such that even the European soldiers watching the punishment had tears in their
eyes12. In the end 20 were executed and four were sent to another station.
Many mutinies took place in the European units during this period but these were suppressed more easily
since the Europeans were afraid that native troops may be employed against them.
As a matter of fact one of the European officer mutineers a certain 'Fletcher' who Lord Clive wanted to have
shot in 1766 subsequently became a member of British Parliament.
Later on, Fletcher again came to India as Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army 13.
The three separate armies i.e. the Bengal, Madras and Bombay continued till 1895, however the overall
Commander-in-Chief , India was the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army14. By 1765, the sepoy
battalions were organized as Brigades by Lord Clive15.

India in 1765-70.Territory held by English East India Company in red borders

In 1779 the English East India Company employed its three forces to defeat an almost all India alliance of
Indian rulers against it16.

Original battle standard of Hyder Alis army captured by Indian troops under General Sir Eyre Coote at
Battle of Sholingur-1780

In the year 1796 the first major reorganization of the English. East India Company's armies was undertaken.
At this time following was the strength of the English East India Company's Army17 :a. Europeans - 13,000
b. Natives - 57,000
1) Bengal Army - 24,000
2) Madras Army - 24,000
3) Bombay Army - 9,000
In the Bengal these troops were organized as :-18

a. European Artillery :- Three Battalions of five companies each.

b. European Infantry :- Three Regiments of ten companies each.
c. Native Cavalry:- Four Cavalry Regiments of six Troops each.
d. Native Infantry:-Twelve Regiments of two battalions each.
By 1805 the English East India Company had used the three armies to subjugate whole of India except Sikh
Punjab and Sindh and Baluchistan. Following was the strength of the East India Company's armies in 1805
19 :-

BENGAL
MADRAS
BOMBAY
TOTAL

BRITISH / EUROPEAN
7,000
11,000
6,500
24,500

NATIVE
57,000
53,000
20,000
130,000

TOTAL
64,000
64,000
26,500
154,500

During this period certain changes took place in the recruitment pattern in the Bengal Army20:-a) Till 1764 most men of Bengal Army were Muslims who travelled all the way from Oudh, Rajputana
and even Punjab to join the Company's service.
b) After the battle of Buxar the Company started recruiting from the Oudh Brahman and Hindu
Rajputs. Muslims were recruited but they were from 20% to 25%. The reason for recruiting more

Hindus was simple. The Hindus formed the vast majority of the population of the Bengal presidency
area and after 1764 the army was considerably expanded.
c) In 1774-75 the English East India Company annexed the Benares area of Oudh state. This brought
more Oudh Hindu Brahman and Rajputs into the Bengal Army.
d) In 1801 the English East India Company annexed the bulk of Ganges Jamna Doab, Rohailkhand
and Eastern districts of Gorakhpur belonging to the Oudh state. This region as even now contained
the bulk of India's population. This annexation further increased the number of Oudh Hindu Rajputs
and Brahmans.
Thus as the Company expanded westwards its recruitment pattern changed.

General Gerard Lake defeats the Hindu Marathas and captured Delhi from the Marathas in 1803.The
Mughal king was a menial pensioner of Marathas

The size of the Bengal Army also increased because after 1803 since the principal threat to the East India
Company was in the north; in the shape of the Sikhs and the Afghans. Thus after 1805 the Bengal Army
started becoming bigger than the Madras and the Bombay armies.
The Role of the Bengal Army in the British Conquest of India
CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE

The English East India Company defeats the Marathas and captures Delhi

The British employed the Bengal Army in various campaigns starting from the Battle of Plassey in 1757.
The major campaigns were as follows 20a:a) Plassey 1757.
b) Campaign against the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam from 1758-1761.
c) Campaign against Mir Qasim from 1763-1764.
d) Campaign against Nawab of Oudh 1764-1765.
e) The First Mahratta War 1778-1782.
f) The Rohilla War 1774.
g) The Second Mysore War 1782, Third & Fourth Mysore Wars.
h) The Second Mahratta War 1803-1805.
i) The Anglo Nepalese War 1814-1816.
j) The First Burma War 1824-1826

k) The First Afghan War 1839-1842.

l) The Conquest of Sindh 1843.
m) The First Sikh War 1845-1846.
n) The Second Sikh War 18481849
o) The Second Burma War 1852
p) Various expeditions against the Trans Indus Frontier Tribes 1849-57.
CLICK MAP TO ENLARGE

Delhi as it looked like in 1803 from east of the river Jamna when it was captured by the private army of
English East India Company under General Gerard Lake

CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE

The English East India Company defeats the Marathas at Assaye decisively

In addition the Bengal Army also went on following overseas expeditions21:a) Expedition to Malaca (Malaysia) 1791
b) First Egyptian Expedition 1801
c) Expedition to Macao 1808
d) Capture of Mauritins 1810
e) Expedition to Java 1811-13
Thus the Bengal Army bore the brunt of the British wars in India from 1757 to 1857 and proved their mettle
against a wide variety of races ranging from the Afghan, Sikh, Gurkha, Mahratta to the Sindhi Baluchi and
Frontier tribesmen.
The rationale behind listing all these campaigns is to illustrate that the post-1857 British theory that the
Bengal Sepoy of the pre-1857 army were no good has no basis.

The Oudh sepoy fought well without a cause whether it was Kabul or Nepal or Punjab or in the Kohat hills.
Statistically more Bengal Sepoys were in British service till 1857 than Bombay or Madras Sepoys, yet after
1857 it became fashionable to brand them as poor soldiers and non-martial. Philip Mason described this
state of the mind in the following words:'From now on, it was even more common for officers to divide the people of India sharply into two
classes, good and bad, and in the good classes fell the people of the north who had come to their help
during the mutiny. What had first been a tendency hardened into a doctrine. These were the martial
classes, and only they would make a soldier 22.'
The illogical myths in Pakistan that Hindus are less martial or east of Jamna races are less martial are
similarly baseless. But for this we do not have to go as far as 1849 since we have the example of the 1965
war!
Purely Military Mutinies in the Native Units before 1857
Mutiny has been a very normal feature in armies all over the world. Mutiny can be based on many factors,
however broadly speaking a mutiny may take place due to the following broad reasons:-(1)Racial/religious factors like in 1857.
(2) War weariness combined with class warfare as in the Russian Army in 1905 and in 1917 or in the
German Navy in 1918.
(3) As a protest against the behaviour of an individual commander with his troops.
(4) As a protest against payment of arrears of pay or over allowances as in Bengal Army in 1841-42, or in
Ahmad Shah Abdali's army after Panipat22 a .
Various mutinies had been taking place in the native army ever since the Lal Paltan was raised in 1757 as
we have seen in the preceding pages.
There were many purely British mutinies like in 1765-66. Sir Robert Fletcher later the C-in-C Madras Army
was described by Foretescue the official historian of the British Army as one 'always on side of mutiny' 23
In 1806 a mutiny took place at Vellore in the Madras Army area.
This mutiny was, however, swiftly suppressed by virtue of decisiveness and resolution on part of a British

officer Gillespie 24.

The Vellore mutineers had planned to capture Vellore Fort where Tipu Sultan's sons were lodged. They rose
at Vellore where they were on duty on 10th July 1806 and over powered the 370 Europeans. The Indians
were 1500 in number.
Europeans survivors took the news of this disaster to Arcot 16 miles away. Colonel Rollo Gillespie the
Commanding Officer of 19th Dragoons at Arcot was a man of action.
Gillespie rushed to Vellore with his troops. The rebellion was crushed after some 350 Indians were killed25.
Subsequently many were court martialled and executed or awarded life imprisonment etc.
The significance of this mutiny was two fold :-(a) The Indians were overawed due to the swiftness and decisiveness of Gillespies's measures. A proof that it
is the man on the spot who matters during crisis situations and the outcome depends on the conduct of each
man. It may vary from resounding success to total failure.
(b) Serious reforms were instituted in the Madras Army in order to ensure that the Sepoys are not provoked
into a situation where they decide that the only course open is mutiny.
The Dress Regulations which had contributed to the mutiny were declared null and void. On 24th September
1806 a general order was published which prohibited any orders which lead to interference with the natives
religious or social norms. The Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army was recalled 26.
Thus in 1857 not a single unit of the Madras Army mutinied. Here it is worth-examining the broad reasons
which led to mutiny/rebellion in the Sepoy units(1) Perception that religious customs or beliefs are being prejudiced or outraged.
(2) For increase in pay and allowances or as a protest against decrease in pay and allowances.
Thus we see two major factors i.e. one that was connected with religion or caste and the second which had a
material basis.
While in Madras Army a precedent was established at Vellore which discouraged rebellion in future, in the
Bengal Army a different trend was being set.

In 1824 General Edward Paget, a British Regular Army Officer who was then commanding the Bengal
Army laid the foundation of a chain of events which contributed a significant deal to Sepoy distrust of the
British as far as the Bengal Army was concerned. Paget had taken over as Commander-in-Chief Bengal
Army with no prior experience of India or the Sepoy Army.
He mishandled the 47th Native Infantry over a minor administrative matter and without any visible
provocation on 47th Native Infantry's part used force against them while trying to disarm them.
In the process he ordered European artillery to open fire on them without prior warning resulting in killing
of between 60 to 100 Sepoys.
The next day he instituted a court martial which sentenced 41 Sepoys to death. All this happened just
because 47th Native Infantry had genuinely complained about their knapsacks being old and torn while
under orders to march to Burma. Paget's conduct was severely criticized in Britain 27.
The mishandling of 47th Native Infantry was a symbolic event for the Sepoys of the Bengal Army. It
increased their distrust of the British rule and definitely contributed in a way towards all that happened in
1857.

After the first Burma war, various economy measures were introduced by the Governor General Lord
Bentinck. These economy measures further affected the general discipline of the Bengal Army.
Several financial privileges and allowances were discontinued. Thus during the First Afghan war, the

64th Bengal Native Infantry refused to accept its pay and to advance into Afghanistan as ordered
until its allowances were increased and warm clothing was issued.
After considerable persuasion however the 64th accepted its pay and obeyed the orders given to it.
In February, 1844 the 34th Bengal Native Infantry and 7th Bengal Light Cavalry disobeyed orders to
proceed to Sindh unless they were paid additional allowances.
The British were thus forced to disband the 34th Native Infantry at Meerut28. The 4th and 69th Native
Infantry also subsequently became mutinous and many of their soldiers were forcibly discharged. The 64th
Native Infantry also again mutinied in 1844.
The British dealt severely with this mutiny and various soldiers were executed or imprisoned. It is
significant to note that the 64th had at this time just returned after having fought in the First Afghan war and
was now under orders to proceed to Sindh to take part in the Sindh campaign.
In 1850 the 66th Bengal Native Infantry mutinied at Govindgarh near Amritsar and was disbanded29. In
1855 Brigadier General Mackenzie, the Commander of the Hyderabad contingent was attacked and severely
injured by Shia Oudh Muslims of 3rd Light Cavalry when he tried to interfere with the Tazia procession
which was crossing in front of his house. Lord Dalhousie declared Mackenzie's conduct as 'indiscreet'. All
these were pointers towards a general mutiny, which finally came in 1857 30 .
The economic factor was well explained by a retired British Officer in his paper titled 'Mutiny in the Bengal
Army' published in 1857; 'The entire army of India amounts to 315,520 men costing 9,802,235 pounds. Out
of this sum no less than 5,668,110 pounds are expended on 51,316 European officers and soldiers. Moreover
the European corps takes no share in the rough ordinary duties of the service. They are lodged, fed and paid
in a manner unknown to other soldiers'31.
The important factor which distinguished the Bengal Army from both the Madras and Bombay armies was a
large percentage of Hindu Brahmans and Rajputs who had the highest status in Hindu society and who were
fussy about their daily rituals and caste prejudices.

1 Page-332- Concise Oxford History of India- Edited by Percival Spear-First Published 1919-Revised
Edition Oxford University Press-New Delhi-June 1957
2 Page-333-Ibid.
3 Page-326-The Imperial Gazetteer of India-Volume Four-Administrative-New Edition-Published

under the Authority of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.Oxford Clarendon
Press-1907-The Essay on the Evolution of the Indian Army in Chapter Eleven of this volume was
written based on material supplied by Lieutenant General Sir Edward Collen.
4 Ibid.
5 Page-47- Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Native Army to the Year 1895 Lieutenant F.G
CardewOffice of the Superintendent of the Government Printing-India-Calcutta-1903.Bernadotte
was then a sergeant in the French East India Company's Army !
6 Page-327-Ibid.
7 Page-10- Fidelity and Honour- Lieutenant General S.L Menezes-Viking-New Delhi-1990.
8 Page-328-Imperial Gazetteer-Op Cit.
9 Pages-326, 327 & 328-Ibid.
10 Page-99-J.W Fortescue-Op Cit.
11 Page-448- History of the British Army-Volume Three-1763-1793 Hon J.W Fortescue.Macmillan
and Company London- 1911.
12 Page-195- The Decisive Battles of India-Colonel G.B Malleson-Oxford-1885.
13 Page-34-F.G Cardew-Op Cit .Pages 169, 170 & 171- Lord Clive Sir Alexander John ArbuthnotT.Fisher Unwin- Paternoster Square-London-1899 and Page-91 Lieut General S.L Menezes-Op Cit.
14 Initially the Bengal Establishment was under Madras Presidency ( Page-327-Imperial GazetteerOp Cit).However later on the C in C of Bengal Army was also the overall British C in C in India.
15 Page-30-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.
16 Page-329-Imperial Gazetteer-Op Cit.
17 Page-333-Imperial Gazetteer-Op Cit.
18 Ibid.
19 Page-335-Ibid.
20 Page-329-Imperial Gazetteer-Op Cit. And Page-5- Lieut F.G Cardew Op Cit.
20 a Pages-1 to12, 36 to 48, 70 to 89, 117 to 144, 145 to 198, 205 to 218, 244 to 268, 305 to 388, 412 to
499-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.
21 Ibid.
22 Page-314- A Matter of Honour- Philip Mason-Jonathan Cape -London-1974.
22 a 426- The Cambridge History of India-Volume Four-The Mughal Period Edited by Richard
Burn-Reprinted by S.Chand and Company-New Delhi-1987.
23 Page-430-J.W Fortescue-Op Cit.

24 Page-240 & 241-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

25 Ibid.Gillespie an extremely bold and dashing officer was killed in the Anglo-Nepalese or Gurkha
War of 1814-16 and was buried at Meerut.
26 Political and Secret Department-L/P & S/3/3 OF 18 May 1807.-British Library-Oriental and India
Office Collection.
27 Page-108 & 109-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.
28 Page-113 to 118-Ibid.
29 Page117 to 122-Ibid.
30 Page 120 & 121-Ibid and
31 Page-6-Mutiny in the Bengal Army- by a Retired Officer-London-1857