SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA.

ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.

Facts: Alvaro Pastor Sr. was a Spanish subject who died and was survived by his widow Sofia
Bossia who died subsequently. They had 2 legitimate children Alvaro Pastor Jr. and Sofia Pastor,
and an illegitimate child Barlito Quemada. QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. (CASE1) with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (probate court). After hearing, probate court appointed Quemada as special
administrator of the entire estate. QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against
PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate in
another branch of CFI (CASE 2), which included the properties subject of the legacy and which
were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor,
who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. Pastor Jr. and
Sofia filed their opposition to the appointment of Quemada as special administrator.
CFI 1st and 2nd Decision: The probate court admitted the will to probate. (1 st Order) The case
reached the SC which ordered the remand of the case to the probate court.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading
after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said
legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court.
The probate court set the hearing for the intrinsic validity of the will in CASE 1 but no hearing
was made due to the opposition of SOFIA and PASTOR, JR. on the ground of the pendency of
CASE 2.
One of the properties included in the estate is 60% shares in the ATLAS Mining Company. By
virtue of a statement submitted by ATLAS to the probate court, it was found that it had paid
legacies to QUEMADA in the amount of 4.5% of the 60%. SOFIA and PASTOR, JR. also
submitted their position papers on how much share QUEMADA should receive.
Probate court issued an order of execution (purportedly an execution of Order 1) and
garnishment ruling that the legacy paid to QUEMADA was not inofficious. (2nd Order)
The order of execution was issued without a statement on the intrinsic validity of the will and the
ownership of the subject mining claims. SOFIA and PASTOR,JR. sought reconsideration thereof
primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it
resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's
legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the
PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his
assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration. Without awaiting the

resolution of the motion for reconsideration, PASTOR, JR. and his wife file a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
CA Decision: The CA denied the petition on the ground that the MR was still pending.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the ORDER OF
EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT without resolving first the intrinsic validity of the will
and the ownership of the subject mining claims.
SC Ruling: YES. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto,
but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title. The rule is that the execution must conform to the dispositive
portion, which it purports to execute.
In this case the Order 1 was sought to be executed by the probate courts ORDER OF
EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT. However, this order was premature since Order 1 was
confined to the extrinsic validity of the will and the propriety of appointing a special
administrator. There was no ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will nor the ownership of the
subject mining properties. Order 1 even stated that it is Subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties pending in another
branch. The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs
in concrete figures could not be ascertained. It was then not possible to determine whether the
legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the
entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the
compulsory heirs. (note: remember that Order 2 ruled that the legacies paid to Quemada were
not inofficious) The circumstances of this case constitute an exception to the rule that and MR is
a precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari. It is within a court's competence to order
the execution of a final judgment; but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even
meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of existing
rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party
to the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is
issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced
certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,
SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,
ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO,
NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,
and RAFAEL TITCO,
Petitioners,
vs.

LORENZO LAXA,
Respondent.
Facts:
Pacencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made he last will and testament entitled "Tauli
Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Pacencia Regala" (September 30,1981).The will was executed in
the house of retired Judge Limpin, witnessed by Dra. Maria Limpin, Francisco Garcia and
Faustino Mercado. The will was read twice to the testatrix. Her signature was affixed at the end
of the said document on page 3 and on the left margin of 1,2 and 4 thereof. The witnesses affixed
their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margins of page 1,2 and 4 thereof in
the presence of Pacencia and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public. All properties were
bequeathed to respondent Lorenzo Laxa, and his wife Corazon Laxa and their children Luna and
Katherine. Lorenzo is Pacencia's nephew whom she treated as her own son. Six days after the
execution of the will, Pacencia left for the United States , there, she resided with Lorenzo and his
family until her death on January 4, 1996.
On April 27,2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua , Pampanga for the probate
of will of Pacencia and the issuance of the letters of administration in his favor.
RTC Decision: The RTC issued an Order allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June
22,2000. Dra. Limpin testified as to the execution of the last will of Pacencia and attested to the
present condition of his father retired Judge Limpin who acted as the notary public.
On June 23,2000, petitioner Antonio filed an oppositioj which was joined by the other petitioners
contending that Pacencia's will was null and void and because ownership of the properties had
not been transferred to Pacencia before her death and that Lorenzo is disqualifiedto be appointed,
he being a citizen and resident of USA.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an order denying both of their requests. Proceedings on the
petition for the probate of will continued, and Dra Limpin was called again for crossexamination. Also, Monico Mercado testified as to his fathers (Faustino) condition that his

father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. On the part of Antonio, he
presented Rosie.
Rosie testified that Pacencia is in the state of being "magulyan" or forgetful based on her
personal assessment. Antonio testified that the execution of will was attended with force. The
RTC denied the petition giving weight to the testimony of Rosie that Pacencia is forgetful, hence
she is unfit to execute a will.
On appeal to the CA, it was reversed.
CA Decision: The CA ruled that" the state of being magulyan or forgetful does not make aperson
mentally unsound so as to render Pacencia unfit for executing a will.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the will complied with the requirements of law
2. Whether or not the will complied with the requirements set forth in Section 11, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court.

Held:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 75:" Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to the executiom. No
will shall be passed either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be valid as to its execution.
" Due executiom of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of
sound mind freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Upon
examination of the will, it shows that the formalities laid down by the law is faithfully complied
with. Furthermore, the burden to prove that Pacencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulder of the petitioners. There was no substantial evidence
presented that will show that Pacencia was of unsound min at the time of the execution of the
will.
2. Yes. Section 11, Rule 76 states that " If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses and
the notary public in the case of the wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if
present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death,
absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. " Applying it to the
foregoing, the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. Thus, the SC hold that, for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity qnd failure of thr said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. It is an established rule, that a
testament, may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due
execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses
declare in favor of its legalization.