INDIRA R. FERNANDEZ, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANDMARK ANTHONY

B. RODRIGUEZ.
G.R. No. 176296.
June 30,2008.
------ Jurisdiction of the COMELEC to decide on matters involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts with limited jurisdiction
FACTS
In the July 15, 2002 SK elections of Barangay Pandan del Sur, Pandan,
Catanduanes, respondent Rodriguez won as SK chairman over petitioner Fernandez.
Fernandez filed a protest in the MCTC of Pandan. On January 12,2004, MCTC declared
Fernandez as the winner and ordered her proclamation. Adversely affected,
respondent Rodriquez appealed the case to the COMELEC. On December 4, 2006, the
COMELEC First Division rendered the assailed Resolution6 nullifying the MCTC's
decision. It ruled that 3 ballots marked as Exhibits "1", "4"and "5" should not have
been credited to the Fernandez, given that they were tampered to show that they
represented votes for Fernandez, when in truth they were for Rodriguez. It ruled that
where a person other than the voter crossed out the originally written name of a
candidate and replaced it with that of another, the vote should be admitted for the
original candidate and rejected for the second. Thus, deducting the 3 votes from the
29 votes of the petitioner and adding the same to the 24 votes of the respondent, the
result would be 26 for Fernandez and 27 for Rodriquez, with the latter winning by a
single vote. Thus, then COMELEC reversed the MCTC decision. Fernandez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. So Fernandez went to the Supreme
Court arguing that that the COMELEC has no appellate jurisdiction over contests
involving SK officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the decision rendered by the
trial courts of limited jurisdiction?
RULING
The court ruled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction. The Constitution stated in
Article IX-C, Sec. 2(2) so provides that it vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. Construed in relation to the provision in RA 7160 or otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, it is said that includes in the enumeration of barangay
officials the SK chairman under Sec. 387(a), the constitutional provision indeed
sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving the
position of SK chairman, as in the instant case. Hence, the court ruled that they found
nothing improper in the COMELECs assumption of jurisdiction over respondents
appeal. The petitioners reliance on the ruling in Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors (1995) that contests involving the SK chairman does not fall within
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, is misplaced. The doctrine therein, as explained in the much later
Marquez vs. Commission on Elections (1999), is no longer controlling. Thus, the
present rule is that trial courts of limited jurisdiction have exclusive original
jurisdiction over election protests involving barangay officials, which include the SK

chairman, and that the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such
protests. It is also noted that the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot and
academic. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the term of office of the
SK chair already expired. The discussion on COMELEC jurisdiction is for the guidance
of the bench and bar. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
JOSE L. ATIENZA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188920
February 16, 2010
Facts:
Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP),
announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. But Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of
party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement
without consulting his party. Thereafter, Atienza hosted a party conference to
supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the
assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected
new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the
COMELEC to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the
partys electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National
Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that
under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year
term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007. On the other hand, Atienza claimed
that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the assembly. The election
of new officers on that occasion could be likened to "people power," wherein the LP
majority removed Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the
amendments to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP
officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the
term of Drilon and the other officers already ended. The COMELEC issued a resolution,
partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the elections and ordered
the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of
Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not
convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to
the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed
to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until
new officers were elected. Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge
the COMELEC rulings. A divided Court issued a resolution, granting Drilons petition
and denying that of Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC
had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution
had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, Drilons term as LP president
was to end only on November 30, 2007. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to
elect new party leaders before Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of
the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however,
several persons associated with Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and
raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting
installed Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president. Atienza and company

filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction before the COMELEC against
Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al.
sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the
NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the
existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been
based on a list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both
Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it
showed that the NECO had 103 members. Atienza, et al. also complained that
Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that
some members, like Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the meeting.
Atienzas allies allegedly raised these issues but Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them
down and "railroaded" the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to
another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienzas allies. On the
other hand, Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully
complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The partys 60th
Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members
because supervening events changed the bodys number and composition. Some
NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting
positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the
May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members
who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of
national stature also became NECO members upon Drilons nomination, a privilege
granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the
NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening
circumstances. Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed Atienza, ZaldivarPerez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers. This
was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently
ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez,
forfeited their party membership when they ran under other political parties during
the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying Atienza, et al.s
petition.
As for the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC
observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within
the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was
beyond its jurisdiction to resolve. Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution, Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the
NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the
issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue
concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and 3. Whether or not
Roxas, et al. violated Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by the latters
expulsion from the party.

Ruling:
One. Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO
membership should be pegged to the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program.
There would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did
not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. The NECO was validly convened
in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Roxas, et al. explained in details
how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party
leaders. The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the
NECO that elected Roxas as LP president. Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in
the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like Drilon, that
would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position
violated the Courts resolution. But the Courts resolution in the earlier cases did not
preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under the amended LP Constitution. The
party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Second. Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its
jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the
legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on
the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court,
they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party
leadership disputes. But, as Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the
validity of the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the
NECO assembly that elected Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as
upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the
LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled
petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held. Consequently,
Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party
leadership issue or on the election of Roxas as president so that it was indispensable
for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or
invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party.
It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction. What
is more, some of Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO assembly
regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with
the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld,
voted out those objections. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra -party disputes is
limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies
involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities
without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal
to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already
been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw vs. Commission on Elections that
the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
"include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate

officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination
of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intraparty leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
The validity of Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to
settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority
for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It
is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of
nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP
president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party. The law also grants a
registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit
of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political
parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the
leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly
conduct of the elections.
Three. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the
internal affairs
of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only
administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental
acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality
"contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function." The constitutional limitations that generally apply to
the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies. Although
political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right
to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual
has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by
a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to
other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon
among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have
recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process
issue against the government or any of its agencies. But even when recourse to
courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and
disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In
Sinaca vs. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves
the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue
interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open
party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people. To conclude, the
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP
president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the
party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs
performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the

same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP.
Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in
which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over
political parties.

[RICARDO P. PRESBITERO, JR., JANET PALACIOS, CIRILO G.ABRASIA,

ARMANDO G. ALVAREZ, NENITO A. ARMAS, RENE L.CORRAL, JOEMARIE A. DE
JUAN, ENRILICE C. GENOBIS, WILLIAMA. PRESBITERO and REYNO N.
SOBERANO, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, ROMMEL YOGORE, GLORY
GOMEZ, DAN YANSON, JOENITO DURAN, SR.,LUCIUS BODIOS and REY
SUMUGAT.
G.R. No. 178884. June 30, 2008.
A contention on failure of election and exercise of grave abuse of discretion by
COMELEC
----- FAILURE OF ELECTION
FACTS

The MCTC Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental ordered the

Municipal Election Officer (EO) of Valladolid to include the names of 946individuals in
the list of qualified voters of the said municipality for the May 2007elections.Prompted
by the advice of COMELEC Manila that decisions of trial courts of limited jurisdiction in
inclusion/exclusion cases attain finality only after the lapse of five days from receipt of
notice sans any appeal there from, the acting provincial election supervisor (PES),
directed the Election Officer on May 13, 2007not to comply with the MCTC order. Thus,
the said 946 were disallowed by the board of election inspectors to vote. These 946
moved for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent the
Municipal Board of Canvassers from canvassing the election returns & from
proclaiming the winning candidates for the local positions in the municipality. Such
was granted. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers continued canvassing and
proclaimed the winning candidates. Presbitero and others thus filed before the
COMELEC a petition for declaration of failure of election and the holding of a special
election because 946 voters were disenfranchised, the Election Officer of the
municipality (also the Ex-officio Chair of the Municipal Board of Canvassers)was
abruptly replaced, the number of voters was unusually low, no less than2,000
supporters of petitioners failed to vote as their names were missing from the list of
voters. To the contrary, petitioners admitted that elections were held, that 70% of the
registered voters were able to cast their votes, and that there spondents emerged as
winners. The Municipal Board of Canvassers defied the TRO, and the acting provincial
election supervisor and acting election officer threatened & coerced the vice-chair
and member-secretary of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to continue with the
canvassing and the proclamation.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a failure of election and contending that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in the issuance of the said resolution?
RULING
The court ruled in favor of the COMELEC and that there was no failure of
elections. A failure of election may be declared only in the three instances stated in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code:1. the election has not been held2. the
election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law3. and the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns have given rise to the consequent failure to
elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner. Furthermore, the reason for such
failure of election should be force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking
to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established,
namely:
1. no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law
or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect
2. the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In the instant case, it is
admitted by the petitioners that elections were held in the subject locality. Also, the
private respondents and four of the petitioners won in the elections and were
proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials.

There is nothing in the records from which the Court can make even a slim
deduction that there has been a failure to elect. Absent any proof that the voting did
not take place, the alleged disenfranchisement of the 946 individuals and 2,000 more
supporters of the petitioners cannot even be considered as a basis for the declaration
of a failure of election. Had petitioners been aggrieved by the allegedly illegal
composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, then they should
have filed the appropriate pre-proclamation case contesting the aforesaid
composition or proceedings of the board, rather than erroneously raising the same as
grounds for the declaration of failure of election. On the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the MCTC and the subsequent defiance thereof by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, suffice it to state that the propriety of suspending the canvass of returns
or the proclamation of candidates is a pre-proclamation issue that is solely within the
cognizance of the COMELEC. In sum, petitioners have not adduced any ground which
will warrant a declaration of failure of election.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED.

JAPSON VS. COMELEC

Dual Citizenship/ Dual Allegiance

----- RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT

Facts:
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty)
were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to
disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born
Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani
Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses
Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was
a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year
before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he
never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991
Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make
trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20
January 2007.
Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records.
He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or
related laws.
Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty
from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of
Candidacy.
Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and
subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior
to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the
following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in
Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic

of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport
indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St.,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was
approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March
2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the
Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July
2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again
stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship.

He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American

citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore,
Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15
May 2007.[7]
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of
Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to
wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on
October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19,
2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or
occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned
officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen
Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned
that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as
U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts
thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14
May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to
obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant

Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion
and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July
2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc,
respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or cancelling Ty's
Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC
already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections.
The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating
the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the
Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty
failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as
a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court finds no merit in
the Petition at bar.
. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office
of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007,
he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his
Philippine citizenship.
The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court
of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he
ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under
68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective
positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all
touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its

provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent
of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To
the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes,
that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months
preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is
not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support
and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with
the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the
14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything
wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as
long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court
already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in
which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the
most number of votes.
To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate
that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be
Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.

DIZON VS COMELEC
January 30, 2009
-----3-TERM LIMIT
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case
with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat
on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous
consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon
alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus,
Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to
run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the
1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the
RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His
term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his
second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It
took judicial notice of SCs ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007
where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and

2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the
three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a
gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC
En Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not applicable here for: 1) Morales was not
the duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term
primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) Morales
has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already
relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to
the end of his supposed term.
ISSUES:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
HELD:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales
during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December
2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004
elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat
for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001,
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales
from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit.
Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales proclamation for the 1998-2001
term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales service with
respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only
on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from
office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007
and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office
of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up
to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no
matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service.
Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th
term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. NO.
Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1
1
1
1

July
July
July
July

1995
1998
2001
2004

to
to
to
to

30
30
30
16

June 1998
June 2001
June 2004, and
May 2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected
mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of
Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of
2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
term. Morales occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to
16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term
limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010
term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through
lengthy litigations. In other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with
impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the
technicalities arising therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v.
COMELEC:
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between
petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and
resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not
lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There
is neither specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political
maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was
not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest
while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution
of the regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and
ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the
COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally sought by
the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be

elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral
election. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
----- EFFECT OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ON THREE TERM LIMIT
FACTS:
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should
not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks
to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was

elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his
2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days
in relation with a criminal case he then faced.
This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order;
hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos
favour in its Resolution of November 28,2007. It reasoned out that the three-term
limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the2004-2007
term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and
Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes
the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in
Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time
three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word
"term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified
interruption
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections 7 presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public
official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his
supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment.
We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms
The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections,
not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully

serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term exempting

an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This
has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of
the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best
indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

G.R. No. 180363

April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G.
TEVES
--- CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE

Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat
in the May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him
in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.
The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the
latter lost in the said election.
Issue:
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioners
conviction.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in
Sandiganbayan in 2005 did not involve moral turpitude.
As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use
his influence, authority or power to gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit.
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by
the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its
illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or
makes such possession of interest inherently immoral
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. It was held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other
branches of the government to deal with.
Being so, the Court reversed the Comelecs decision of disqualifying petitioner.
The case was not moot since the resolution of which would determine petitioners
qualification in future elections.

HERMILINA N. ABAINZA vs ERNESTO ARELLANO AND COMELEC

Dec 8, 2008

----- Original Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over Petition for Correction of

Manifest Errors
Facts:
On September 3, 2007, COMELEC annulled the proclamation of Hermiliana
Abainza as councilor of the the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay due to erroneous tally of
votes. The tally showed that 114 votes were in favour of Ernesto Arellano but only
indicated 14 votes in words and figures in the election return. After counterchecking
the copy of the said return, members of the Board of Elections admitted the clerical
error of votes. The, MR was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the petition for correction of
manifest error; and
(2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the petition for correction of manifest
error which was in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy despite the
proclamation and oath by petitioner as elected councillor.
Held:
1) Yes, it has jurisdiction over correction of manifest error pursuant to Sec.5, Rule 27
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sec. 5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which
May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. - (a) The following pre-proclamation
controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or
tallying of the results during the canvassing as where
(1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more
than once,
(2) two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more
copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated separately,
(3) there has been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the statement of
votes or into the certificate of canvass, or
(4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass,
and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the
exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had already
been made.
A manifest error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding; that which is open, palpable, incontrovertible, needing no evidence to
make it more clear. As stated in the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC, the error in
the entry in the election return is very evident to the eye, needing no evidence to
make it clear. Petitioners proclamation, and eventual assumption of office, was
predicated on a clerical and manifest error, not on the legitimate will of the
electorate.
The petition was however dismissed because the petition raised purely
technical objections and did not dispute the finding of the COMELEC on the error in
the total number of votes reflected in the election return.

MARUHOM V. COMELEC
JULY 27, 2009
---- JURISTICTION OF THE COMELEC TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY
OF A VOTERS REGISTRATION AS AN INCIDENT OF A PETITION FOR
DISQUALIIFICATION AND TO DENY DUE COURSE TO OR CANCEL THE COC
UNDER SEC 78 OF BP 881
Petitioner: Jamela Salic Maruhom (Maruhom)
Respondent: Mohammadali Mericano A. Abinal (Abinal)
Maruhom and Abinal are both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao,
Lanaodel Sur, for the the 14 May 2007 national and local elections.
On April 1, 2007, Abinal filed a Petition for Disqualification and to Cancel the
Certifiate of Candidacy (COC) of Maruhom under Sec. 78 of BP blg. 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code(OEC)
Abinal alleged that Maruhom
O Is a double registrant . Maruhom supposedly registered first in Marawi and only
after 3days, she registered in Marantao, without cancelling her Marawi registration;
O Made false representations on both of her registrations .; and She supposedly
indicated that
1) she was registered in 2 different cities,
2) that she placed different birth dates, and
3) she indicated different names on her COCs
O Made false material representation in her COC .
Maruhom answered that she was qualified to run as municipal mayor of Marantao.
She further added that a candidate could only be disqualified for a ground provided
by law, and there was no law declaring double registration as a ground for
disqualification.
ISSUES:
1. W/N COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when they declared petitioner a double registrant?
2. W/N COMELECs decision to declare petitioner a double registrant valid?
HELD:
1.NO. the case is well within the jurisdiction of COMELEC as provided for under Sec.
78 of the OEC. The Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
Under Sec. 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is
aground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must

pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election
for which he filed his COC.
It is within the competence of COMELEC to determine whether false representation
as to material facts was made in the COC.
If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, COMELEC
is empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC.
Upon cancellation of his/her COC, the person is not treated as a candidate, as if
such person never filed a COC.
2. YES. Given that when she filed in Marantao without cancelling her prior registration
to Marawi, she cannot be considered a registered voter in Marantao. Since she
claimed to be one in her COC, she made a false representation.
Material facts with regards to under Sec. 78 of the OEC:
Candidates eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or
status as a registered voter.
An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not
make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself.

ATIENZA v. COMELEC
16 Feb 2010
---- INTRA-PARTY DISPUTES
Refresher:
2005: Drilon (Liberal Party president) withdrew his support from the Arroyo
administration2006: Atienza (LP chairman) hosted a party conference/assembly which
proceeded to elect new officers for all positions. Atienza won as LP president. Drilon
filed a petition before COMELEC for the nullification of the election.
2007: National Executive Council (NECO), the partys electing body, convened for the
election of new set of officers before Drilons term expired. Manuel Roxas II was
installed as new LP president. Atienza and other LP members filed a petition for
mandatory and prohibitory injunction to enjoin Roxas from assuming his position,
alleging illegal constitution of the NECO and illegal expulsion/exclusion of Atienza
from the party and its election.
Issues:
1. WON the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president was
validly constituted- YES
2. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of validity of Atienza, et al.s
expulsion from the party- NO
Doctrine:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have
blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties.
Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from
the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when
necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The COMELECs jurisdiction
over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court
ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions
under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the
identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The
Court also declared in another case 17 that the COMELECs power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.xxx
courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within
apolitical party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its
constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said

that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing
the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with
the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the
free choice of the people.

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010
----- JURISDICTION OF THE HRET OVER PARY LIST REPRESENTATIVE
FACTS:
In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting
percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner
Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the said party-list group.
Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr. ,Erlinda
Cadapan, Antonia Flores, and JoselitoUstarez are members of the other party-list
groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
nominee, Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of
Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and underrepresented
sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had no
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to
assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such
question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparans qualifications. Palparan filed a motion for
reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of
the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
HELD

YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the House
of Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be elected from legislative
districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Thus, it is the part-list
representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or organizations.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list
representatives and districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.
ABC PARTY LIST v COMELEC
GR 193256, 3/22/2011
SUMMARY: Disqualification case against a party-list. Contention whether
HRET or COMELEC has jurisdiction.
------- JURISDICTION OF COMELEC AND HRET
FACTS:

5/25/2010: Mauricio jr filed petition for cancellation of registration of ABC

(Alliance for Barangay Concerns)Party list on grounds that it's a front for a religious
organization, Ang Dating Daan.

Respondent states that it was established by James Marty Lim, 11 years

president of Association of Barangay chairmen, has national constituency, and
represents a marginalized sector and is not identifiedwith any religious sector.

6/2010: Petition dismissed on procedural and substantial grounds.

ABC won a seat in the HoR.

COMELEC en banc reviews case, stating that Mauricio was not given chance to
present evidence, sets hearing.

ABC counters stating that COMELEC has no more jurisdiction since ABC was
already proclaimed winner and COMELEC committing grave abuse of discretion upon
their holding of hearing/recognizing Mauricio's petition.

Hence, certiorari by ABC.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC still has jurisdiction over ABC when it was already proclaimed a
winner of the elections

RULING:

Petition dismissed for lack of merit. COMELEC can proceed with hearing as they
have jurisdiction.
HELD:

COMELEC has jurisdiction over PARTY-LIST REGISTRATIO (derived from CONSTI )

while HRET has jurisdiction over DISTRICT AND PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVES
QUALIFICATION (from CONSTI).

G.R. No. 193256

March 22, 2011.
ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED BY
ITS CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM VS COMELEC
----- JURISDICTION OF COMELEC AND HRET
FACTS:
On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with
the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC
Party-Liston the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it
is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1)of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act .
On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution dismissing
the petition. The dismissal on procedural grounds was grounded on the lack of proper
verification of the petition. According to the COMELEC, Second Division, the
Verification with Certification Re: Forum Shopping and Special Power of Attorney
was not duly notarized in accordance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as
amended. Sections 1 and 6, Rule II require that the person appearing before a notary
public must be known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity. In this case, the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the
verification did not contain the name of private respondent who supposedly appeared
before the notary public, and he was not identified by any competent evidence of
identity as required by the rules on notarial practice. The COMELEC, Second Division
also dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is not a
religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from registration.
However, the COMELEC en banc found that the petitions verification page
substantially complied with the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice, and that the records
of the case showed that the Resolution of the Second Division was issued without any

hearing, contrary to RA No. 7941, which deprived Mauricio of the opportunity to

submit evidence in support of his petition.
In filing this petition, Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no longer
had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of registration and
accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already proclaimed as one of the winners in
the party-list elections of May 10, 2010. Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of
R.A. No. 7941, which states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition, is
applicable only to a non-winning party-list group.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Comelec has jurisdiction to hear the case on ABC partylists
cancellation of registration
2. Whether or not a cancellation case should be summary
HELD: The petition is denied.
Jurisdiction and powers of the Comelec to cancel party list registration.
First issue:
Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority
to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the
registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is
reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. In the case of the party-list
nominees/representatives, it is the HRET, in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but
it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relates to the
qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative, while the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is over petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition. In sum, the COMELEC en banc had
jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation of
petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.
Second issue:
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion when it singled out this case and directed that it be set for hearing when
other cases of the same nature were summarily and motu proprio dismissed by the
COMELEC, citing the cases of BANAT v. CIBAC Foundation and BANAT v. 1-Care and
APEC. However, in both cases, the proceedings were summary because the
registration/qualification/cancellation of the party lists had already been decided in
another case.
Petition is DISMISSED.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

APRIL 8, 2010
----POLITICAL PARTIES
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied
the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and
contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of
accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA

7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field
personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything
else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which
are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action,
or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace
the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability
or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds

amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than

a tool to further any substantial public interest.

G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization
composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the
elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application
was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the

Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec
failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be
detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally
vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application
should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the partylist system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor
by any international laws to which we adhere.

BANAT vs. COMELEC

GR 17927
April 21, 2009
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number
of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the
recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECs national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC
en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be
resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing
said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1)
Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI
of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

(2)
Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
(3)
Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list
elections?
Held:
(1)
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of
the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2)
No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of
RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.
(3)
No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
G.R. No. 179695 December 18, 2008
MIKE A. FERMIN, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL
BAYAMDILANGALEN
G.R. No. 182369 December 18, 2008
MIKE A. FERMIN,
petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAMDILANGALEN,
respondents.

----- CANDIDATES AND COC. SEC 68 AND SEC 78 OF BP 881

FACTS:
Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay
Payan, Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of
Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for
the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the
creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006,
formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter,
on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of
his voting record and registration as a voter of Barangay Indatuan, Northern
Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.
Private respondent filed a disqualification case against petitioner. The petition alleged
that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy and
that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record.
Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said
case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor.
Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13 of Cotabato City. On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2 nd Division, disqualified
Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his
declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of
office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could nothave been a resident of
Barangay Indatuan for at least one year. Petitioner argues that he has been a resident
of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of
residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration record from
Barangay Payan to Barangay
Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency
requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a
newly created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is
reckoned from the effective date of its creation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared
petitioner as not a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14,
2007 elections.
HELD:
YES. The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it
precipitately declared that Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at
least one year prior to the said elections. COMELEC relied on a single piece of
evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay
Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before
Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident
of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of
evidence does not necessarily support a finding that petitioner was not a resident of
Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May 14, 2007
elections. Petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as of
April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent
with his subsequent claim tha the complied with the residency requirement for the

elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April
27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006.Neither does this evidence support the
allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for the
transfer of his voting record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a
voter is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six
months immediately preceding the election, petitioners application for transfer on
December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier admission that he was a resident
of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006.The mere filing of a petition and the
convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he
seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing
evidence must substantiate every allegation.

MENDOZA VS COMELEC
GR. No. 191084March 5, 2010
-------ELECTION PROTEST
FACTS:
Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed winner in the May 14, 2007
governatorial race in the Province of Bulacan. Respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan
who opposed him filed an election protest with the COMELEC questioning the election
results in all the precincts in the province due to massive electoral #ra d that
Mendoza allegedly committed on December 1, 200- the COMELEC Second Division
decided the election protest and proclaimed Pagdangananas the duly elected
Governor of Bulacan. Mendoza opposed Pagdangananas motion for e ec tiono# the
decision before the second division and filed a motion for reconsideration of that
decision with the COMELEC En banc. On February 3, 2010 the COMELEC En banc
denied Mendozas motion for reconsideration. Reacting to it, he filed an urgent motion
to recall the February 3 resolution on the ground, among others ,that the En banc
issued such resolution a5 without the concurrence of the majority of its members
and !5without conducting a rehearing under section+, Rule13 of the Revised rules
of procedure. Only three commissioners voted to deny his motion for reconsideration.
commissioner dissented while three others took no part. On February 10, 2010
the COMELEC en banc issued an order for the rehearing of the motion for
reconsideration on February 1*, 2010. Meanwhile, on February 12 Mendoza filed with
this court the present petition, raising the same grounds which he cited in the urgent
motion to recall that he earlier filed with the COMELEC En banc. Following its February
1* rehearing, the members of the COMELEC En banc maintained their votes. On
March 4, 2010 the en banc issued an order directing the immediate election of the
Second Divisions decision. This prompted Mendoza to file a supplement to his petition
before this court, bringing up the recent developments in the case
ISSUE!

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse o# discretion under the
Rule 13, sec. + of the Revised Rules of procedure.
RULING!
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC
over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction in"o8ed, which
in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. when a decision of a
trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the
division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal
proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends
without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed.
upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought
before the COMELEC is an original protest in"o8ing the original jurisdiction of the
commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which
process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division
ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original
action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed
affirmed. It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two
protests, one as original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest
process reaches the COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the
COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will
complete the process. ; If at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the
protest. in a protest placed before the commission as an appeal, there has been a
completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. to that when the COMELEC, as
an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an
inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision
appealed from is affirmed. The petition is GRANTED. The election protest o#
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan is hereby DISMISSED.

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections

Background of the case
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with
the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The
Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of
2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come
from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations
or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying some of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the
existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to
accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio
Carpio was tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the
status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52
petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing
the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
THE RULING
In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpios
ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and remanded these petitions to the
Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that
obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to make
it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine
whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters set
forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the
poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may be granted
accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013
elections.
The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting
on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court

regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who
may participate in the party-list system.
New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in
the May 2013 party-list race and subsequent party-list elections
The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines
state that these parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.'
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering
under the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates. These
parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred from
participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral
wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an
independent sectoral party linked to a political party through a coalition.
The question is: where does
underrepresented sectors come in?

representation

of

marginalized

and

The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in

the party-list system.
The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either
represent marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking welldefined political constituencies. The high court went on to enumerate marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to
represent also applies only to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court
ruled that it is enough that [a] majority of the members of the sectoral parties or
organizations must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent.' The same is true for those who lack well-defined political
constituencies.
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new
guidelines provide that they must either be members of the sector or have a track
record of advocacy for their sector.

Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations be disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The party-list system, according to the Decision
Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high
court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The
high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave
out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral
groups.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal
to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.
To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, also known as the Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of
Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector

Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the
others, could only mean that they are not one and the same.
Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum
As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case
of
Ang
Bagong
Bayani
v.
Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm)
and
BANAT
v.
Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm).
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states
that while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out
that there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since
the requirement that the major political parties should represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified these major
parties from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the
guidelines in this ruling merely formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if through
their allied sectoral organizations.
My 2-cents
Flip-flopped as it may have in the case of Atong Paglaum, I agree with the
Supreme Court in this Decision. No less than the Constitution provides in Sec. 5(1),
Art. VI that national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations may
participate in the party-list system a fact that may not be denied in spite of where
public discourse and sentiment tend to sway in as far as the party-list system is
concerned.
If we want the party-list system to truly represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and party-list groups to come from the non-traditional
political parties, then what needs to be done is amend the law. The Supreme Court
cannot go beyond its duty of interpreting the law and may not perform a
constitutional function and mandate which is solely that of the legislative branch.
Doing so would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
I totally agree that allowing national and major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections does not make any sense if there were no distinction or
requirement that the marginalized and underrepresented should be the
constituency. Why then create a separate system if it is, in fact, free for all?

But this is an issue best left to Congress to resolve, heart-wrenching as this may
sound to those whose desire is to provide a platform for a truly non-traditional mode
of politics. For now, let us accept that we cannot go beyond what the law provides.

G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.
Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission.The crucial
question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there
basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14,
2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18,
2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless
proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newlydiscovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She
assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification
from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process
of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure
in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be
liberally construed in order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a
petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly
discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity
to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27
March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to
adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity
or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that
due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where
a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove

that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born
citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof
as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not
being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who

lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective

sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona
fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined
political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people,
in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for
the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED
for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they
do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor
candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a
national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in
the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by

their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that
Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.