23 SPOUSES ANSELMO and PRISCILLA BULAONG

vs. VERONICA GONZALES

G.R. No. 156318
September 5, 2011
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
This case involves conflicting claims of two sets of
parties over two parcels of land. The first parcel of land,
with an area of 237 square meters and covered by TCT
No. T-249639 was originally registered in the name of
Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha Limpo. 6 The other
parcel of land, with an area of 86 square meters and
covered by TCT No. T-249641, 7 was originally registered
in the names of Pacifica E. Limpo, married to Nicanor C.
Sincionco, and Fortunato E. Limpo, married to Bertha
Limpo.
These parcels of land were mortgaged by the daughter
of Fortunato and Bertha Limpo, Regina Christi Limpo,
upon the authority of her father, to the Bulaongs, to
secure a loan in the amount of P4,300,000.00. The
mortgage was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage dated
January 13, 1993. The Bulaongs alleged that before they
executed the mortgage, Regina gave them the owners
duplicates of title of the two properties. In early January,
Anselmo Bulaong, together with his counsel, Atty.
Roberto Dionisio, allegedly went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan to check the titles of the
properties to be mortgaged. According to the Bulaongs,
the Register of Deeds, Atty. Elenita Corpus, assured
them that TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641 were
completely clear of any liens or encumbrances from any
party. Relying on this assurance, Anselmo Bulaong
agreed to the execution of the mortgage over the two
properties.
After the execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs once
again went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to register and annotate the mortgage on the
titles. They learned then that the Register of Deeds
copies of the two titles were among the records that
were burned in the fire that destroyed the entire office of
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on March 7, 1987. Atty.
Elenita Corpus convinced them to cause the
reconstitution of the originals of the titles, and further
assured them that the mortgage over the properties
would be protected since a copy of the Deed of
Mortgage had already been given to her office for
annotation.
On February 4, 1993, the newly
reconstituted titles were issued, still in the names of
Fortunato Limpo, and of Pacifica Limpo and Fortunato
Limpo, respectively.
Thereafter, on February 24, 1993, new titles were again
issued upon the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Reginas parents. To the Bulaongs astonishment, the

new titles in Reginas name now contained entries

pertaining to Writ of Execution. It appears that a certain
Veronica Gonzales had filed a criminal case for estafa
against Regina and on October 28, 1991, it rendered a
decision acquitting Regina, but at the same time
ordering her to pay Veronica actual damages in the total
amount of P275, 000.00. By virtue of a writ of execution
issued on December 29, 1992, the above-quoted notice
of levy was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Registry of Bulacan on January 4, 1993. However, this
was not annotated on the titles themselves because at
the time of the levy, the properties had not yet been
transferred to Regina, but were still registered in the
name of her parents. Based on the annotation referring
to the notice of levy, the subject of the levy was Reginas
interest in the properties which, in turn, was anchored on
a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by her
parents on November 5, 1991 to transfer their interest in
both properties to her. Notably, Regina never registered
this sale with the Register of Deeds.
To satisfy Reginas judgment debt, the two lots were sold
at public auction on June 8, 1993 to Veronica, the only
bidder, for P640,354.14. The Certificate of Sale was
annotated on the titles on June 8, 1993 as Entry No.
2075. Upon the lapse of the one year redemption period
on June 20, 1994, Veronicas titles over the properties
were consolidated. A final deed of sale was issued in
Veronicas name and annotated as Entry No. 40425 on
TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396 on June 24, 1994.21
On the other hand, the Bulaongs also had the mortgage
extrajudicially foreclosed, with the sheriff conducting the
auction sale on August 22, 1994. The Bulaongs were the
highest bidders, buying the properties for the sum
ofP4,300,000.00. They also paid the corresponding
capital gains tax of P215,000.00, plus P64,500.00 for the
documentary stamp tax, which were required before the
titles to the lots could be transferred in their names. The
Certificate of Sale in their favor was inscribed on August
23, 1994 on TCT No. T-30395 and TCT No. T-30396 as
Entry No. 46739.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Bulaongs. According to the
RTC, allowing Veronica to levy on the properties worth at
least P5,000,000.00 for a judgment of P275,000.00
would result in gross unjust enrichment. The RTC thus
ordered the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue new
titles in the name of the Bulaongs, but only after the
Bulaongs had reimbursed the amount of P275,000.00 to
Veronica, with interest.
Both parties appealed to the CA. The CA upheld the
validity of the Notice of Levy on Execution, noting that it
created a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the
property. According to the CA, when the Bulaongs
received the owners copies of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T30396, the Notice of Levy was already annotated on the

titles and, thus, should have put them on guard. As

mortgagees of the lots, the Bulaongs had the option to
redeem the properties within the redemption period
provided by law. Since they failed to avail of this remedy,
the consolidation of titles in Veronicas name was proper.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Veronica has a superior right over the
properties; and
Assuming the notice of levy earlier annotated in favor of
Veronica to be valid, whether there was a valid
foreclosure sale.
HELD:
Petition Granted.
Redemption not the proper remedy
The CA faulted the Bulaongs for not redeeming the
properties from Veronica when they had the option of
doing so. For failing to exercise this right, the CA
concluded that the consolidation of the titles to the lots in
Veronicas name thus became a matter of course.
We disagree. Reginas interest in the properties is not
established
The levy on execution for judgment is "the act x x x by
which an officer sets apart or appropriate[s,] for the
purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a part or
the whole of the judgment debtors property." 33 Every
interest which the judgment debtor may have in the
property may be subjected to levy on execution. 34 As
established by the Court in Reyes v. Grey:35
The term "property" as here applied to lands
comprehends every species of title, inchoate or
complete; legal or equitable. This statute authorizes the
sale under execution of every kind of property, and every
interest in property which is, or may be, the subject of
private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable
rights and interests as it deals with legal, without
anywhere expressly recognizing or making any
distinction between them.
We think the real test, as to whether or not property can
be attached and sold upon execution is does the
judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest in such
property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for
value? If he does, then the property is subject to
execution and payment of his debts.36
Although we recognize the validity of the annotation of
the levy on the execution in the present case, the
question of whether the levy itself is valid remains to be
determined. To do this, Reginas interest in the subject
properties at the time of the levy has to be ascertained.
To recall, Veronicas notice of levy on execution is based
on Reginas interest in the two properties, which she
acquired via the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
executed by her parents in her favor on November 5,
1991.
The subject properties were finally registered in Reginas
name, not by virtue of the 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale,

but by virtue of succession, specifically by the

"Adjudication" that Regina filed with the Register of
Deeds on February 24, 1993,40 pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. If she had already
acquired her parents interest in these properties in
1991, she would not have needed any authority from her
father to execute the mortgage with the Bulaongs; she
would have done so in her own capacity.
The spring cannot rise higher than its source. 44 Since
Regina had no established interest in the subject
properties at the time of the levy, Veronicas levy had
nothing to attach to in the subject properties.
Unregistered sale of land cannot bind third parties. Even
assuming that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Reginas
favor was valid, we still cannot uphold the validity of the
levy and execution sale in Veronicas favor.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies
From the standpoint of third parties, a property
registered under the Torrens system remains, for all
legal purposes, the property of the person in whose
name it is registered, notwithstanding the execution of
any deed of conveyance, unless the corresponding deed
is registered.45 Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is
binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it
does not affect innocent third persons.
FIRST DIVISION

MACTAN-CEBU
INTERNATIONAL G.R.
171535
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,

No.

P
r
e
s
e
n
t
:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
SPOUSES EDITO and MERIAN
TIROL and
ALEJANDRO Promulgated:
and MIRANDA NGO,
Respondents. June 5, 2009

SPOUSES

x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse, annul and set aside
(i) the May 27, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals
in
CAG.R.
CV
No.
72867
entitled Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol, et
al. v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority, and (ii) its February 17, 2006
Resolution[2] denying
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration.
The instant case finds its genesis in a
complaint for quieting of title filed on August 8,
1996 by respondents, Spouses Edito and Merian
Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Miranda Ngo,
against petitioner Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA). The facts were aptly
summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
The instant appeal revolves
around a certain parcel of land, Lot
No. 4763-D, over which the parties
to the above-entitled case assert
ownership and possession.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs-appellees
and
business partners, Edito P. Tirol and
Alejandro Y. Ngo, along with their
respective spouses, claim to have
purchased a 2,000 square meter
parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, from
a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a
Filipino citizen married to a certain
Mr. Scott Edward Jenkins, an
American citizen, per Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 15,
1993. Plaintiffs-appellees bought
the said property on the strength of
the apparent clean title of vendor
Jenkins as evidenced by the Tax
Declaration and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 18216, all under Mrs.
Elma Jenkins name, which bear no
annotation
of
liens,
encumbrances, lis pendens or any
adverse claim whatsoever. After
the
sale
wherein
plaintiffsappellees
were
purportedly
purchasers for value and in good
faith, they succeeded in titling the
said lot under their names per
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
27044 on September 20, 1993, and

further proceeded to pay realty

taxes thereon. It was only in
January
1996
that
plaintiffsappellees discovered a cloud on
their title when their request for a
Height
Clearance
with
the
Department of Transportation and
Communications was referred to
the
defendant-appellant
Mactan[-]Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on
account of the latters ownership of
the said lot by way of purchase
thereof dating far back to 1958.
At this point, it becomes
imperative to trace the chain of
ownership over Lot No. 4763-D. It is
undisputed that the original owners
of said property were the spouses
Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef,
who owned the entire Lot No. 4763,
of which Lot No. 4763-D is a portion
of (sic). Unfortunately for herein
parties, this is where the similarity
of facts end (sic), and the instant
controversy begins.
According to plaintiffs-appellees:
Originally, the entire Lot No. 4763
was decreed in the names of
spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act on June 1,
1934. [In] January 1974, spouses
Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef
sold Lot No. 4763 to Spouses
Moises
Cuizon
and
Beatriz
Patalinghug. The latter spouses
thereafter succeeded to secure the
reconstitution of Original Certificate
of Title of Lot No. 4763, Opon
Cadastre as evidenced by Court
Order dated July 3, 1986. Said
Court Order subsequently became
final and executory, thus a
reconstituted title, OCT No. RO2754, was issued in the name of
the original owners-spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. On
September 12, 1986, the Deed of
Absolute Sale between spouses
Julian Cuison/Marcosa Cosef and
spouses
Moises
Cuizon/Beatriz
Patalinghug was registered and
annotated on OCT No. RO-2754,
which was cancelled to give way to
the issuance of TCT No. 16735 in
the name of spouses Moises Cuizon
and
Beatriz
Patalinghug.
Thereafter, the latter sold a

portion, denominated as Lot No.

4763-D, to Mrs. Elma Jenkins on
December 15, 1987, who[,] as
earlier discussed, sold the same lot
to herein plaintiffs-appellees on
September 15, 1993. Plaintiffsappellees
contend
that
all
throughout the chain of ownership,
the
titles
albeit
from
a
reconstituted one of the previous
owners were absolutely devoid of
any
annotations
of
liens,
encumbrances, lis
pendens,
adverse claim, or anything that
may cause a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence and diligence to
suspect the contrary. Furthermore,
plaintiffs-appellees have been in
actual, uninterrupted and peaceful
possession of the property since
1993, and if the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest be tacked,
plaintiffs-appellees would be in
constructive, uninterrupted and
peaceful possession for sixty-two
(62) long years as of the date of
filing their Complaint for Quieting
of Title in the court a quo.
According
to
the
defendantappellant: On March 23, 1986[3],
the original owners, spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot
No. 4763 to the government,
through the [then] Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA, for brevity). In
a Certificate dated March 19, 1959,
vendor Julian Cuison confirmed that
he was the possessor and actual
owner of Lot No. 4763 which was
located within the Mactan Alternate
International Airport and that the
duplicate copy of the certificate of
title was lost or destroyed during
the last war without him or his
predecessor(s)-in-interest
having
received a copy thereof. Since
then, the government, through
defendant-appellant MCIAA, has
been in open, continuous, exclusive
and adverse possession of the
property in the concept of owner.
Said lot allegedly became part of
the Clear Zone of Runway 22 for
purposes of required clearance for
take-off and landing. Moreover,
defendant-appellant asserts that
plaintiffs-appellees
are
nothing
more than trustees of Lot No. 4763D in favor of defendant-appellant
MCIAA, being merely successors-in-

interest of the original owners,

spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef, who undertook in paragraph
4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale, to
assist in the reconstitution of title
so that the land may be registered
in
the
name
of
vendee
government, through defendantappellant MCIAA. In paragraph 5 of
the same Deed of Absolute Sale,
the parties also agreed that the
property be registered under Act
3344 pending the reconstitution
and issuance of title. Purportedly,
in gross and evident bad faith and
in open violation of their Deed of
Absolute Sale, the spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef again
sold the same property to spouses
Moises
Cuizon
and
Beatriz
Patalinghug, who in turn sold the
lot to Mrs. Elma Jenkins, who
eventually sold the same to herein
plaintiffs-appellees.
Defendantappellant MCIAA further imputes
bad faith to plaintiffs-appellees
under the rationale that because
their
title
came
from
a
reconstituted one and that Lot No.
4763 was within the Clear Zone of
Runway 22 of the airport, plaintiffsappellees should have exerted
effort in researching the history of
ownership and cannot possibly
claim to be innocent of MCIAAs
ownership and possession thereof.
[4]

In its December 4, 2000 Decision, [5] the

trial court ruled in favor of petitioner MCIAA in
this wise:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the Court rules in favor
of defendant and thus DISMISSES
the complaint of plaintiffs for want
of merit.
The
Republic
of
the Philippines, represented by the
defendant MCIAA, is adjudged
as (sic) the lawful owner of the
entire Lot 4763, Opon Cadastre.
The Deed of Absolute Sale
involving Lot 4763-D in favor of
plaintiffs is hereby declared null
and void.
Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 27044 for Lot 4763-D under the
names of plaintiffs is likewise
deemed null and void.

The Register of Deeds is

directed to issue to the defendant
MCIAA a transfer certificate of title
covering the whole Lot 4763.
The
counterclaim
of
defendant, however, is denied for
lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held that there was a valid transfer
of title from Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef
to
the
Civil
Aeronautics
Administration (CAA),
and
accordingly,
the
respondents did not buy Lot No. 4763-D from a
person who could validly dispose of it. It likewise
ruled that the government (through the CAA, and
now respondent MCIAA) has been in possession
of the disputed land since it bought the same in
1958, when a public deed of absolute sale was
executed in its favor. Lastly, respondents were
considered as having bought Lot No. 4763-D in
bad faith since they ignored circumstances that
should have made them curious enough to
investigate beyond the four corners of the
Transfer Certificate of Title. In the trial courts
view, the facts that Lot No. 4763-D (i) is only
about 320 meters from the center of the runway
and therefore part of the clear zone and (ii) has
been vacant for several decades should have
alerted the respondents to the possibility that the
lot could be part of the airport complex and
therefore owned by petitioner.
Respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration[6] on January 23, 2001, and a
Supplemental (sic) to
Motion
for
Reconsideration[7] on May 17, 2001. Petitioner
duly filed its Opposition[8] to the said Motions on
April 10, 2001 and June 13, 2001, respectively.
In an Order[9] dated August 9, 2001, the
trial court did a complete volte face and reversed
its Decision. Holding that Article 1544 [10] of the
New Civil Code which set forth the rule on double
sales finds application to the instant case, the
trial court ratiocinated:
In the words of the Supreme
Court in Cruz vs. Cabana, this Court
finds that in the case of [a] double
sale of real property[,] Article 1544
of the New Civil Code applies.
Defendant was certainly the first
buyer and the plaintiffs [were] the
subsequent buyers, to be exact
fourth (sic).

But who among the parties

herein has a better right to Lot No.
4763-D? To answer this question, it
is necessary to determine first the
issue [of] whether or not the
plaintiffs were buyers in good faith.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not convinced
that indeed the plaintiffs were
buyers in bad faith. xxx The
registration of the deed of absolute
sale by the defendant at the
Registry of Deeds under Act No.
3344 sometime in 1959 is not the
registration being contemplated
under the law. Registration under
Act No. 3344 differs materially
from
registration
under
the
Spanish Mortgage Law and under
the Land Registration Act. In the
Spanish Mortgage Law[,] there is
[an] express provision (Article 17)
to the effect that titles recorded
thereunder cannot be annulled or
invalidated by prior unrecorded
rights, while the Land Registration
Act (No. 496) contains a special
disposition that only transactions
noted on the certificate of title and
entered in the registry books can
bind the land. On the other hand,
transactions registered under Act
No. 3344 cannot defeat a third
person with a better right. Of
course[,] the law does not define
exactly what may be considered a
better right, leaving the matter of
its construction to the courts. The
main reason for the difference in
the operation of Act No. 3344
compared with the other systems
of registration lies obviously in the
fact that recordings under said Act
No. 3344 are not preceded by any
investigation,
judicial
or
administrative, as to the validity or
efficacy of the title sought to be
recorded. It is undisputed that Lot
No. 4763 was a registered land,
only that at the time of registering
defendants document of sale there
was no copy of the certificate of
title because the same was not
available due to the after effect of
the last global war.
Hence, the Court agrees
with the plaintiffs when they
contended that even at the time

when OCT No. RO-2754 was

issued[,] there was no document
allegedly proving its (defendant)
ownership being annotated on the
certificate of title. At the time when
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
16735, 18216 and 27044 were
issued to the plaintiffs and their
predecessors-in-interest,
there
were no annotations of the alleged
claim of the defendant. Thus, the
plaintiffs have all the good reasons
to rely on the validity of the titles.
xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The fact that Lot No.
4763-D was within 320 meters
from the center of the runway and
within airport premises, was part of
the clear zone, and had long been
vacant are not enough warning to
third persons dealing [with] such
land. It was undisputed that the lot
in controversy is outside the
perimeter fence of the defendant.
The fact that the said lot was part
of the clear zone is not sufficient
justification to warn the plaintiffs
in (sic) buying it. Such fact was
merely
for
the
purpose
of
construction of buildings, not for
realty ownership.[11] (italics in the
original)
Aggrieved, petitioner then appealed to the Court
of Appeals which rendered a Decision [12] on May
27, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed
Order dated August 9, 2001 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On June 21, 2005, petitioner seasonably moved
for its reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in its February 17, 2006
Resolution.[13]
Hence this appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, where petitioner argues
that:
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AUGUST 9, 2001 ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT EVEN IF THE SAME IS

NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE

ON RECORD.[14]
Simply stated, the issue may be
synthesized as follows: Between respondents
Spouses Tirol and Spouses Ngo, on the one hand,
and petitioner MCIAA, on the other, who has the
superior right to the subject property?
We rule in favor of the respondents, but on
grounds different than those relied upon by the
Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of
the New Civil Code is misplaced. In Cheng v.
Genato, et al.,[15] we enumerated the requisites
that must concur for Article 1544 to apply, viz.:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions
must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions
must pertain to exactly the same
subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over
the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting
interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over
the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each have bought
from the very same seller.
Obviously,
said
provision
has
no
application in cases where the sales involved
were initiated not by just one vendor but by
several successive vendors.[16] In the instant case,
respondents and petitioner had acquired the
subject property from different transferors.
Petitioner, through its predecessor-in-interest
(CAA), acquired the entire Lot No. 4763 from its
original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef, on March 23, 1958. On the other
hand, respondents acquired the subject parcel of
land, a portion of Lot No. 4763, from Mrs. Elma
Jenkins, another transferee, some thirty-five years
later. The immediate transferors of Elma Jenkins
were the spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz
Patalinghug who, in turn, obtained the subject
property from spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef. Therefore, the instant controversy cannot
be governed by Article 1544 since petitioner and
respondents do not have the same immediate
seller.
This notwithstanding, we find that
respondents have a better right to Lot No. 4763D.
Petitioner does not contest that Lot No.
4763, of which the property subject of this case is
a part, was registered under Act No. 496 (the
Land Registration Act) even before the Second

World War. Paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute

Sale[17] between petitioner and Spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef stipulates, in relevant
part:
That since the Original/Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
of
the
aforementioned property has been
lost and/or destroyed, or since the
said lot is covered by Cadastral
Case No. 20 and a decree issued on
July 29, 1930, xxx the VENDEE
hereby binds itself to reconstitute
said title at its own expense and
that the VENDOR, his heirs,
successors
and
assigns
bind
themselves
to
help
in
the
reconstitution of title so that the
said lot may be registered in the
name of the VENDEE in accordance
with law. (italics supplied)
Additionally, in his Certification[18] dated March
19, 1959, Julian Cuison stated that the duplicate
copy of the certificate of title for [Lot No. 4763]
was lost or destroyed during the last war without
having been received by [him] or [his]
predecessor-in-interest.
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that
registration of instruments must be done in the
proper registry in order to effect and bind the
land.[19] Prior to the Property Registration Decree
of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land Registration
Act) governed the recording of transactions
involving registered land, i.e., land
with
a Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No. 3344,
as amended, provided for the system of recording
of transactions over unregistered real estate
without prejudice to a third party with a better
right.[20]Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by
a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is registered
under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land
Registration Act, the sale is not considered
registered[21] and the registration of the deed
does not operate as constructive notice to the
whole world.[22]
Consequently, the fact that petitioner
MCIAA was able to register its Deed of Absolute
Sale under Act No. 3344 is of no moment, as the
property subject of the sale is indisputably
registered land. Section 50 of Act No. 496 in fact
categorically states that it is the act of
registration that shall operate to convey and
affect the land; absent any such registration, the
instrument executed by the parties remains only
as a contract between them and as evidence of
authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make
registration, viz.:
SECTION
50.
An
owner
of
registered
land
may
convey,

mortgage,
lease,
charge,
or
otherwise deal with the same as
fully as if it had not been
registered. He may use forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases, or other
voluntary instruments like those
now in use and sufficient in law for
the purpose intended. But no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument,
except
a
will,
purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as
a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the clerk
or register of deeds to make
registration. The act of registration
shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the land, and in
all cases under this Act the
registration shall be made in the
office of register of deeds for the
province or provinces or city where
the land lies. (italics supplied)
Hence,
respondents
may
not
be
characterized as buyers in bad faith for having
bought the
property notwithstanding the
registration of the first Deed of Absolute Sale
under Act No. 3344. An improper registration is
no registration at all. Likewise, a sale that is not
correctly registered is binding only between the
seller and the buyer, but it does not affect
innocent third persons.[23]
Petitioner, however, is of the impression
that registration under Act No. 3344 is
permissible because the duplicate copy of the
certificate of title covering Lot No. 4763-D had
been lost or destroyed. This argument does not
persuade. Our pronouncement in Amodia Vda.
de Melencion, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.[24] is apropos:
In the case at bench, it is
uncontroverted that the subject
property was under the operation
of the Torrens System even before
the respective conveyances to
AZNAR and Go Kim Chuan were
made. AZNAR knew of this, and
admits this as fact. Yet, despite this
knowledge, AZNAR registered the
sale in its favor under Act 3344 on
the contention that at the time of
sale, there was no title on file. We
are not persuaded by such a lame
excuse.
xxx xxx xxx

In this case, since the ExtraJudicial Partition of Real Estate with

Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
AZNAR was registered under Act
No. 3344 and not under Act No.
496, the said document is deemed
not registered. Rather, it was the
sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan
which was registered under Act No.
496.
AZNAR insists that since
there was no Torrens title on file in
1964, insofar as the vendors,
AZNAR, and the Register of Deeds
are concerned, the subject property
was unregistered at the time. The
contention is untenable. The fact
that the certificate of title over the
registered land is lost does not
convert it into unregistered land.
After all, a certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership
or title over the particular property
described
therein. This
Court
agrees with the petitioners that
AZNAR should have availed itself of
the legal remedy of reconstitution
of the lost certificate of title,
instead of registration under Act
3344. We note that in Aznar
Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,
AZNAR, beset with the similar
problem of a lost certificate of title
over a registered land, sought the
reconstitution
thereof.
It
is
unfortunate that, in the instant
case, despite the sale of the
subject property way back in 1964
and the existence of the remedy of
reconstitution at that time, AZNAR
opted to register the same under
the improper registry (Act 3344)
and allowed such status to lie
undisturbed.[25] (italics supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner MCIAA did
not bother to have the lost title covering Lot No.
4763-D
reconstituted
at
any
time,
notwithstanding the fact that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed in 1958, or more
than
fifty
years
ago. Vigilantibus,
non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come
to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.
[26]
As a matter of fact, this entire controversy
may very well have been avoided had it not been
for petitioners negligence.
Furthermore,
under
the
established
principles of land registration, a person dealing
with registered land may generally rely on the

correctness of a certificate of title and the law will

in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine
the legal status of the property,[27] except when
the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.
[28]
Applying this standard to the facts of this case,
we rule that respondents exercised the required
diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the
title to the subject property as to be considered
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
We quote with favor the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals in this respect:
Defendant-appellant MCIAA
also asseverates that the close
proximity of the property to the
runway of the airport (320 meters
from the center line of the runway)
and the fact that it has been
vacant for a considerable period
should have caused [plaintiffsappellees] to be dubious of the title
of the previous owners thereof. This
was, in Our opinion, satisfactorily
explained by plaintiffs-appellees
when witness Mr. Edito Tirol
testified in open court that he
never thought it strange that the
land had always been vacant, and
that besides, there were private
houses beside the vacant lot,
suggesting that the property must
be of private ownership and not
that of the airport. Furthermore, he
testified that he undertook great
care in verifying the clean title of
the said land, [e.g.,] deputizing an
employee to do the necessary
research,
personally
copying
pertinent documents registered in
the Registry of Property and even
consulting legal advice on the
matter. These, for Us, are badges
of good faith. Besides, being
allegedly part of the Clear Zone,
ATO aviation rules proscribe merely
the installation of buildings and
other physical structures, except
landing facilities. Aviation rules
(which,
although
repeatedly
invoked, interestingly were not
presented before the court by
defendant-appellant MCIAA) do not
prohibit realty ownership.[29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is
hereby DENIED. The May 27, 2005 Decision and
the February 17, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:

- versus -

BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION,
Respondent.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I

certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

R
EYNA
TO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to
address the issue of the proper scope of the
delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in
land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349,
which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas [2] in LRC Case
No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting
respondent
Bantigue
Point
Development
Corporations (Corporation) application for original
registration of a parcel of land. Since only
questions of law have been raised, petitioner
need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the assailed CA Decision before filing this
Petition for Review.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporation filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an
application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land with an assessed value
of 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed
value of 14,920 for the entire property, more
particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D,
San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less
10,732 square meters, located at Barangay
Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3]
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting
the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.
[4]
On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order
setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.[5]
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the
application for registration on 8 January 1998
while the records were still with the RTC. [6]

G. R

Pres

CAR
BRIO
PER
SER
REY

Prom

Mar

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court

transmitted motu proprio the records of the case
to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed
value of the property was allegedly less
than 100,000.[7]
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General
Default[8] and commenced with the reception of
evidence.[9] Among the documents presented by
respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its
favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in
question is within the alienable and disposable
zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to
respondent Corporation.[13]
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, [14] the
CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower
court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court on appeal.[15] The CA further found that
respondent
Corporation
had
sufficiently
established the latters registrable title over the
subject property after having proven open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by itself and
its predecessors-in-interest even before the
outbreak of World War II.[16]
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner
Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and
raised the following arguments in support of its
appeal:
I.
THE
REPUBLIC
CANNOT
BE
ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
THE
JURISDICTION
OF
THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE
APPLICATION
FOR
ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE
EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
APPLICATION
FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND
TITLE.[17]
The Courts Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but
remand the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings in order to determine if the property
in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

I
The Republic is not estopped
from raising the issue of
jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is
not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court, even if the former raised the
jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is
settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.[18] Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by the Constitution or
the law.[19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver
or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
[20]
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be
cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.[21]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party
may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional]
question if he has actively taken part in the very
proceeding which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event
that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the
doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of
that doctrine first enunciated by this Court
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the partylitigant actively participated in the proceedings
before the lower court and filed pleadings therein.
Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an
adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate
court, did the party-litigant question the lower
courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts
in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal.
In Figueroa
v.
People,[24] we
cautioned
that Tijam must be construed as an exception to
the general rule and applied only in the most
exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar
to that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case,
making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable.
Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to
the application for registration when the records
were still with the RTC. [25] At that point, petitioner
could not have questioned the delegated
jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case
was not yet with that court. When the records
were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither
filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief
from
that
court.
On
appeal,
petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in
its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of
estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant
appeal.
Laches has been defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done

earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a

right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
[27]
In this case, petitioner Republic has not
displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect
that would lead us to conclude that it has
abandoned or declined to assert its right to
question the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
The Municipal Trial Court
properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts,
petitioner Republic raised two points of
contention: (a) the period for setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of
the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
application, because the RTC set the date and
hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day
period provided under the Property Registration
Decree.[28]
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial
hearing, publication, etc. - The court
shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order
setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of
the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original
registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18
July 1997, or a day after the filing of the
application, the RTC immediately issued an Order
setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997, which was 96 days from the Order. [30] While
the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day
period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner
Republic therein contended that there was failure
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for
original registration, because there were 125
days between the Order setting the date of the
initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We
ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance
of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and
the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal
to the application.Thus, we held:
x x x [A] party to an action
has
no
control
over
the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court

acting as a land court; he has no

right to meddle unduly with the
business of such official in the
performance of his duties. A party
cannot intervene in matters within
the exclusive power of the trial
court. No fault is attributable to
such party if the trial court errs on
matters within its sole power. It is
unfair to punish an applicant for an
act or omission over which the
applicant has neither responsibility
nor control, especially if the
applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.[32]
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice
to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing
its application for registration on account of
events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on
7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997,[33] within the 90-day period
provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that
the jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the
second Order was issued more than five days
from the filing of the application, again contrary
to the prescribed period under the Property
Registration Decree.[34]
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing within five
days from the filing of the application for
registration, as provided in the Property
Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period
was merely directory, and failure to issue the
Order within that period did not deprive the RTC
of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that
compliance with the five-day period is mandatory
would make jurisdiction over the subject matter
dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent
upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the
statutory periods with impunity. We cannot
assume that the law deliberately meant the
provision to become meaningless and to be
treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the records
of this case do not show such blatant disregard
for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the
case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the
application for registration,[37] except that it had
to issue a second Order because the initial
hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period
provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since
the selling price of the property based on the
Deed of Sale annexed to respondents application
for original registration was 160,000,[39] the MTC

did not have jurisdiction over the case. Under

Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended,[40] the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to
try cadastral and land registration cases is limited
to lands, the value of which should not
exceed 100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over
cadastral and land registration cases is indeed
set forth in the Judiciary Reorganization Act,
which provides:
Sec.
34. Delegated
Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land
Registration Cases. - Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no
controversy
or
opposition,
or contested lots where the
value of which does not exceed
One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the
claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are
more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of
the real property. Their decision in
these cases shall be appealable in
the same manner as decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts. (As
amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in
cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or
opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed 100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first
instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporations application for registration on 8
January 1998.[41]
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the
second instance, because the value of the lot in
this case does not exceed 100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of
the land should not be determined with reference
to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the
value of the property sought to be registered may
be ascertained in three ways: first, by the
affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of
the respective claimants, if there are more than
one; or, third, from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property.[42]
In this case, the value of the property cannot be
determined using the first method, because the

records are bereft of any affidavit executed by

respondent as to the value of the property.
Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the
second method, because this method finds
application only where there are multiple
claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property. Here,
only respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be
ascertained with reference to the corresponding
Tax Declarations submitted by respondent
Corporation together with its application for
registration. From the records, we find that the
assessed value of the property is 4,330, 1,920
and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920
for the entire property.[43]Based on these Tax
Declarations, it is evident that the total value of
the land in question does not exceed 100,000.
Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization
Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO
is not sufficient proof that the
property in question is
alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the
MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we
find that the lower court erred in granting
respondent Corporations application for original
registration in the absence of sufficient proof that
the property in question was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State.
[44]
The applicant for land registration has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership
by
establishing
through
incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to
be registered is alienable or disposable based on
a positive act of the government. [45] We held
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO
certification is insufficient to prove the alienable
and disposable character of the land sought to be
registered.[46] The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has
approved the land classification and released the
land in question as alienable and disposable.[47]
Thus, the present rule is that an
application for original registration must be
accompanied
by
(1)
a
CENRO
or
PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.[49]
Here,
respondent
Corporation
only
presented a CENRO certification in support of its

application.[50] Clearly, this falls short of the

requirements for original registration.
We therefore remand this case to the
court a quo for reception of further evidence to
prove that the property in question forms part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
If
respondent
Bantigue
Point
Development Corporation presents a certified
true copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary, the application for
original registration should be granted. If it fails
to present sufficient proof that the land in
question is alienable and disposable based on a
positive act of the government, the application
should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to
prove that the property sought to be registered is
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
SO ORDERED.

was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ENAT
O C.
CORO
NA

WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case

WILLEM BEUMER,
Petitioner, vs.
AVELINA AMORES,
Respondent.G.R. No. 195670 December 3,
2012SUMMARYDutch national seeks to reimburse funds he
invested in allowing his Filipina spouse tobuy parcels of Filipino land
after their marriage was declared null
.FACTSPetitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina,
married in March 29,
1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of
their marriage. Consequently,petitioner filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for thedistribution
of properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence
of their marriage. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots W, X,
Y, and Z, parcels of land,were registered in the name of respondent,
these properties were acquired with themoney he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit sincerespondent did not
have sufficient income. He also claimed that the joint affidavit
theysubmitted was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid. The RTC ruledthat, regardless of the source of funds for the
acquisition of Lots W, X, Y and Z,petitioner could not have acquired
any right whatsoever over these properties aspetitioner still
attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of
theconstitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private
lands. This was madeevident by the sworn statements petitioner

executed purporting to show that the subjectparcels of land were

purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the
hereinrespondent.
Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he
had paid to purchase
the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied
for not having cometo court with clean hands. CA affirmed.
Petitioner appealed.
ISSUEW/N a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the
purchase of Filipino land
DECISIONThe Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA. In
In Re: Petition For Separationof Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller
the Court had already denied aclaim for reimbursement of the value
of purchased parcels of Philippine land institutedby a foreigner
against his former Filipina spouse. It held that the foreigner cannot
seekreimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowinglybought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine landenshrined under Section
7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Undeniably,petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
above-cited constitutionalprohibition" and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondentregistered the
subject pr
operties in the latters name.
Clearly, petitioners actuations
showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On
the basis of suchadmission, the Court finds no reason why it should
not apply the Muller ruling. The time-honored principle is that he who
has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, alitigant may
be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
hasbeen inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
Surely, a contract thatviolates the Constitution and the law is null and
void, vests no rights, creates noobligations and produces no legal
effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners
claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. It does
not apply if the actionis proscribed by the Constitution.
G.R. No. 170757: November 28, 2011
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in
behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO,
BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and
NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners,
v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO
ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC
an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated
in
Barrio
Galicia,
Municipality
of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their

Motion to Dismiss the application on the following
grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been
declared alienable and disposable; (2) res
judicata has set in to bar the application for
registration; and (3) the application has no
factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application
for registration.
On
July
3,
1989,
the
private oppositors' Motion to
thereafter ensued.

RTC
denied
Dismiss. Trial

In support of their application for registration,

petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their
uncle Basilio who purchased the land from a
certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of
Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in
Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in
question from May 19, 1916 until his death in
1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous,
peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and
in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death,
the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land
until 1966, whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and
violently dispossessed them of their property,
which compelled them to file complaints of Grave
Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15,
1995, granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved
by
the
Decision,
the
private oppositors and the Republic, through
Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an
appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial
court's findings in its Decision dated June 23,
2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the piece of land in
question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
HELD: Petition denied.
Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established
that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only
questions of law may be raised. This rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of
these is when the findings of the appellate court
are contrary to those of the trial court. Due to the
divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC,

the Court will now re-examine the facts and

evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove
that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2)
they,
by
themselves
or
through
their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners

to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible
evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we
must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain. Verily, the rules on the confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply unless and until the
land subject thereof is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.
FE H. OKABE, Petitioner,
v.
ERNESTO A. SATURNINO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196040
August 26, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
The subject of the controversy is an 81 square
meter property located in Makati City, which was
initially covered by TCT No. 175741 under the name of
the wife of respondent Ernesto A. Saturnino. Sometime
in 1994, the couple obtained a loan with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), which was secured by the subject
property. Because of the couples failure to settle their
loan obligation with the bank, PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage.
On August 24, 1999, the Certificate of Sale was
inscribed on TCT No. 175741. Considering that the
property was not redeemed by respondent during the
redemption period, consolidation of ownership was
inscribed on October 13, 2006 and a new TCT was issued
in favor of PNB. Without taking possession of the subject
property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe H. Okabe on
June 17, 2008. TCT No. 225265 was later issued in
petitioners name on August 13, 2008.
On November 27, 2008, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an Ex-Parte
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession over the
subject property.

The RTC ruled, among other things, that the

right of the petitioner to be placed in absolute possession
of the subject property was a consequence of her right of
ownership and that petitioner cannot be deprived of said
possession being now the registered owner of the
property. Meanwhile, on November 23, 2009, the RTC
rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, which granted
her ex-parte petition and ordered that the corresponding
writ of possession over the subject property be issued in
her favor.
The CA reversed RTCs decision and opined,
among other things, that althoughit may be true that by
virtue of the contract of sale, petitioner obtained the
same rights of a purchaser-owner and which rights she
derived from erstwhile mortgagee turned owner PNB,
this does not mean that the right to file an ex-parte
motion for a writ of possession under Act 3135 had also
been transferred to the petitioner. Such a special right is
granted only to purchasers in a sale made under the
provisions of Act 3135.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ex-parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession was the proper remedy of
the petitioner in obtaining possession of the subject
property.
HELD:
NO. Section 7 of Act No. 3135,28 as amended
by Act No. 4118,29 states:
Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this
Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First
Instance of the province or place where the property or
any part thereof is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond
in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a
period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case
it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of
this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and
filed in the form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court
shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province
in which the property is situated, who shall execute said
order immediately.
Under the provision cited above, the
purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for
a writ of possession during the redemption
period, upon an ex-parte motion and after
furnishing a bond.
GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI
Bank: the Court held that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure
is summaryand ministerial in nature as such proceeding
is merely an incident in the transfer of title.
China Banking Corporation v. Ordinario: the
Court held that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession
of the property.
Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez v.
Spouses Carlito Alindog
and
Carmen
Alindog: although the Court allowed the purchaser in a

foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land during

the redemption period, it still required the posting of a
bond under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure
sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is
entitled to the possession of the said property and can
demand it at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title.
When bond required
The buyer can in fact demand possession of the
land even during the redemption period except that he
has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after
the redemption period if the property is not redeemed.
Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of
the
purchaser
as
confirmed
owner.
Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court.
Here, petitioner does not fall under the
circumstances of the aforequoted case and the provisions
of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, since she
bought the property long after the expiration of the
redemption period. Thus, it is PNB, if it was the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale, or the
purchaser during the foreclosure sale, who
can file the ex-parte petition for the issuance of
writ of possession during the redemption
period, but it will only issue upon compliance with the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
Remedy of purchaser subsequent to the
foreclosure sale purchaser
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at
expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or
given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of
the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days
have elapsed and no other redemption has been made,
and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption
has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the
conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment
obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from
the date of registration of the sale to redeem the
property. The deed shall be executed by the officer
making the sale or his successor in office, and in the
latter case shall have the same validity as though the
officer making the sale had continued in office and
executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption,
the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to

and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the
judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the
levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer
unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
When issuance of writ of possession is ex-parte
and non-adversarial
From the foregoing, upon the expiration of the
right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall
be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest
and claim of the judgment debtor to the property, and its
possession shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which
case, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be
ex-parte and non-adversarial.
When issuance of writ of possession requires
hearing
Thus, where the property levied upon on
execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment
debtor, the procedure is for the court to conduct a
hearing to determine the nature of said possession, i.e.,
whether or not he is in possession of the subject property
under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor.
Summary of rules
It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court be applied to cases involving
extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by
a purchaser and later sold to third-party-purchasers
after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy
of a writ of possession, a remedy that is
available to the mortgagee-purchaser to
acquire possession of the foreclosed property
from the mortgagor, is made available to a
subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing
and after determining that the subject property
is still in the possession of the mortgagor.
Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a
third party during the redemption period, a
writ of possession may issue ex-parte or
without hearing. In other words, if the
purchaser is a third party who acquired the
property after the redemption period, a hearing
must be conducted to determine whether
possession over the subject property is still with
the mortgagor or is already in the possession of
a third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is
in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession
could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of
possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but
he can wrest possession over the property through an
ordinary action of ejectment.