Cases - Dec.7

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007]
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and
set the case for continuation of trial.3
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO

and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law
Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for
the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme
Court alone.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City,
in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No.
00-1705;1 and the RTC's Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC
No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings,
the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive
writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 001705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and
The antecedents:
that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no
civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of
Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the
RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature
of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner's Second Motion Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing
had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and
assigns the following errors:
I.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer
for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of
necessity of granting the writ;
the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance
in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision
of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
RULE 138-A
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC'S).4
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal
clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and
in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc
clarified:
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.
his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a
or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil
liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of
a private prosecutor is not possible.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlibrary
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:8
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was
no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of
the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such
as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the to the criminal action.10
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A.
In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and
supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[Bar Matter No. 712. July 13, 1995.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, Petitioner.
Benedicto Malcontento for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO

CITIZENS OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. The practice of law is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high
personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY AS TO THE MORAL CHARACTER IS BROADER IN SCOPE THAN IN Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
A DISBARMENT PROCEEDING. It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the;1993 Bar Examinations in this
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. All
Courts En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking was not, however, allowed to take the lawyers oath of office.
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorneys oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994.
those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten.(10) months from the time
norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
Bar.
progressive destruction of our peoples confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2
The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive
RESOLUTION
effect:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In Re Farmer: 3
"x
x
x
FELICIANO, J.:
This upright character prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicants right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and . . .
as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
x
x
x
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June home, in its ultimate effect, to every mans fireside. Vast interests are committed to his
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients
set at two (2) years, counted from the probationers initial report to the probation officer
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
assigned to supervise him.
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
x" 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
". . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
"It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
Ann./Cas. 187):
from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission The-public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the
to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the
law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is
board of bar examiners, as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will
scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling
for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead
and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
license."
seeking admission to the Bar, The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment:
In Re Keenan: 6
Re Stepsay: 10
"The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to
carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only "The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding."
All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit Re Wells: 11
from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only
those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it."
". . . that an applicants contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar
the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has
Re Rouss: 7
been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding,
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicants character as
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
learning, is merely a test of fitness."
disbarment."
cralaw virtua1aw library
Cobb v. Judge of Superior Court: 8
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
"Attorneys are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
progressive destruction of our peoples confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of system as we know it. 12
the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to
Mr. Argosinos participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice."
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at
the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at-the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorneys
oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist,
inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period
of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He
should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten.(10) days from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
ENBANC
[BarMatterNo.712.March19,1997.]
RE:PETITIONOFALARGOSINOTOTAKETHELAWYERSOATH
SYLLABUS
1.LEGALETHICS;POWEROFTHECOURTTOREGULATETHEADMISSIONTOTHEPRACTICE
OFLAW.Thepracticeoflawisaprivilegegrantedonlytothosewhopossessthestrictintellectualand
moralqualificationsrequiredoflawyerswhoareinstrumentsintheeffectiveandefficientadministrationof
justice.ItisthesworndutyofthisCourtnotonlyto"weedour"lawyerswhohavebecomeadisgracetothe
nobleprofessionofthelawbut,alsoofequalimportance,toprevent"misfits"fromtakingthelawyersoath,
therebyfurthertarnishingthepublicimageoflawyerswhichinrecentyearshasundoubtedlybecomeless
thanirreproachable.
2.ID.;ADMISSIONTOTHEBAR;LAWYERSOATH;NOTAMERECEREMONYORFORMALITY
FORPRACTICINGLAW;EVERYLAWYERSHALLATALLTIMESWEIGHHISACTIONS
ACCORDINGTOTHELAWYERSOATHANDTHECODEOFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY.
Afteraverycarefulevaluationofthiscase,weresolvetoallowpetitionerAlCaparrosArgosinototake
thelawyersoath,signtheRollofAttorneysandpracticethelegalprofessionwiththefollowing,admonition:
InallowingMr.Argosinototakethelawyersoath,theCourtrecognizesthatMr.Argosinoisnotinherently issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that
he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
ofbadmoralfiber.Onthecontrary,thevariouscertificationsshowthatheisadevoutCatholicwitha
genuineconcernforcivicdutiesandpublicservice.TheCourtispersuadedthatMr.Argosinohasexertedall imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
effortstoatoneforthedeathofRaulCamaligan.Wearepreparedtogivehimthebenefitofthedoubt,taking
judicialnoticeofthegeneraltendencyofyouthtoberash,temerariousanduncalculating.WestresstoMr. In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges,
ArgosinothatthelawyersoathisNOTamereceremonyorformalityforpracticinglaw.Everylawyer
shouldatALLTIMESweighhisactionsaccordingtotheswornpromiseshemakeswhentakingthelawyers and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
oath.IfalllawyersconductedthemselvesstrictlyaccordingtothelawyersoathandtheCodeofProfessional scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latters family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
Responsibility,theadministrationofjusticewillundoubtedlybefaster,fairerandeasierforeveryone
concerned.TheCourtsincerelyhopesthatMr.Argosinowillcontinuewiththeassistancehehasbeengiving
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to
tohiscommunity.Asalawyerhewillnowbeinabetterpositiontorenderlegalandotherservicestothe
comment on petitioners prayer to be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
moreunfortunatemembersofsociety.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his
son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophytes helplessness implying abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA,J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioners conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight
(8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
b. He consented to the accuseds plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of
one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday
1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They
also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning
of his sons involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in
his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioners application for probation.
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer s oath, thereby further tarnishing
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioners discharge from probation.
irreproachable.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyers oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons
for allowing or disallowing petitioners admission to the practice of law. The senseless
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes
impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good
moral character." 1
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyers oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter,
to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of ones child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to
causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties.
The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of
death.
Atty. Camaligans statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused
is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyers oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
SYNOPSIS
For respondents stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since the latters constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino
the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondents name from its
is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he
Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
the Philippines, questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice
and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1
of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense
that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyers oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
promises he makes when taking the lawyers oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
strictly according to the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
concerned.
that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an
administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
are valid exercise of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a
The Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971,
lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate;
authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure designed
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty
paramount police power of the State. The Acts avowal is to "raise the standards of the
provisions for non-payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
Courts jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is
public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integration of
expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent
the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. The State, in order to
promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
SYLLABUS
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218),
for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the
supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. An "Integrated Bar" is a
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v.
State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to 5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. Even
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
of law," (Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that this
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
offending member.
6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYERS
2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. All legislation directing the integration Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does
of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a
becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
State the administration of justice as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The expression
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
power"
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED
BY LAW. There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latters
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. If the power to impose the fee as a resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to ". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
responsibilities.
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent members name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
THE SUPREME COURT. The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
concerned."
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities. The power of the On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be
misused or prostituted.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillons comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties
Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a lawyers stubborn refusal to pay his were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondents pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the
RESOLUTION
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent members name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2
Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to
CASTRO, C.J.:issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
cralaw
virtua1aw library
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
of the Court Rule:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
"SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be
known as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, composed of all persons whose names now membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
Rule:
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
. ."
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The core of the respondents arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the
Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
are void and of no legal force and effect.
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties
Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
administration of justice as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed
body."
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502).
granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
chanroble s law library
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court
to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The
Acts avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence,
the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
unobjectionable . . ."
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, Et Al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power
of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them
seriatim.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers. 9
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
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1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
state. 10
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
interest in his concerns.
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
EN BANC
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the
vs.
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. . ."
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
The Courts jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5)
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
RESOLUTION
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
PER CURIAM:
illegal.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per
curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the Court's
extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument adduced in the Motion for
Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions
and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious
quotations and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do
not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the conclusions
reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal
Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only course of action open to the Supreme
Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139,
"Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court,
(1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to
supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided
charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt." for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person,
rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own
motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio proceedings for
which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine if
both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule
member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The Court may, of course,
of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes
refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual
used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts."
investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the
Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which Court (page 18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it
were made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and [was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and
statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest
constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements
judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution
ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made
dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are
subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve
the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to such issues."
present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment
upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules
of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to from a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out
charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of
that the majority in Green v. United States,through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other
Court."
things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for
criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of
constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison
terms of more than one year be based on grand jury indictments.
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court
pointing out that:
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court
such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General
is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the
Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before
the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of
this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule
139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only
necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious

manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the
foundation of the United States the constitutionality of the power to punish for
contempt without the intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First
Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of
their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight that
reported the bill to the Senate, five member including the chairman, Senator,
later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional
Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard
Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less
than nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously introduced
the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse
under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more explicitly
the summary power vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence
of the power but merely defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in
an Act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2,

1831, 4 Stat 487.
preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an

absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition."
xxxxxxxxx
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court
to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late
Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,supra, p. 899).
(Emphasis Supplied) 4
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court
throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to
mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to
punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best. The
judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so not
really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the
authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on
the part of all persons who appears before it, and most especially from those who are officers of
the court.
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe
that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in
such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free
speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiamResolution of October 7, 1988. It is
important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a
duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to
violence or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the
apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
in disciplinary and contempt charges."
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader
evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more
of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which
"substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder
penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly
or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic
incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing
of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant
the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and
present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of
freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which
has been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court,
speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to
hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually
said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his
conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim
the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand,
not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the

"hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however,
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes
without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA
of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from an examination of
835, 858 [1960]:
acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an
intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by simply
the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging
pleading a secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is
the freedom of speech and of the press.The realities of life in a complex society
scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his
criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's
ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to
punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."
[A.C. NO. 5838 - January 17, 2005]

SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, Complainants, v. ATTY.
EDWIN A. HIDALGO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends in the
United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however,
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses Benjamin Santuyo
unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court
went to some length to document the state of our case law on this matter in its per
and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that would suggest to this dishonesty for breach of his lawyer's oath and the notarial law.
Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land
reversed.
covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider this a substantial
constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far
from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it
were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his
own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to
purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards
of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the
courts.
and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III,
Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of
notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land.
The case was estafa through falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent
denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged
his notarial signature on said deed.2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale
contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondent's notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the
signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and
notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of respondent's seal or signature on
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.3
denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the
Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied
having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent,
he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was
asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several
documents in that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He
explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the
senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done.
He claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would
affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the
law firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their
community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before
him as notary public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually appeared
before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the
latter's husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from
the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that
an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not
strokes were smooth and mild.
have been commissioned as notary public.
rbl r l l lbrr
He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondent's signature
which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that
matter as had been the case herein.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the
subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on
vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one
of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost
He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial
registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, on somebody else.10
report and recommendation. In a report5 it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the
alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in
signatures in other documents he submitted during the investigation of the present
the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his
case.6 However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is
secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry
not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years
seal and notarial register.7 It thus recommended:
from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts
would be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent's
commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or SO ORDERED.
he should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt
hereof.8
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically
state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their
appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the
document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants
themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were
sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge
as well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
rbl r l l lbrr
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent's contention that he only met
complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale.
Respondent's assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on
November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite
respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to
be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and
respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge
a deed of sale concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx. crvll
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent
should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant, v. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of

the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the
Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the
notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C.
Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the
said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25,
2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a
contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for
the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs
amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For
the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10,
2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical
Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by
virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated
in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 5864 : April 15, 2005]
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had
already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4,
2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4,
2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco
sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA
was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document
that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forumshopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later
dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing
rules and regulations of PD 1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the
Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were
recommended for filing against him.
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent
notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant
executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers
commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons
who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared
before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added
that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance
of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds
and documents will be undermined.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However,
2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report:
respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4,
2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of
respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the
instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it
evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
was already dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and execution.14
Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the
latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special
Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the
Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans. 7
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of
falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the
Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public trust.
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.8
Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously
performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the
fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the
check amounting toP3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's
all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator.
accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001.
According to the COA Special Task Force:
He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His
act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation
of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, 9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality
was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he
of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services
would not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable
in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the
profession.10
Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract
amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or
fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and
counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All
these were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to undue
injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount ofP3,700,000.00 was made in the
absence of the required outputs. x x x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended
by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and
brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[ADM. CASE No. 3319. June 8, 2000.]
LESLIE UI, Complainant, v. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, Respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disablement against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City 1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an
illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter
sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of
Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived
with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents
funds. 6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the Respondent. Complainant then Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the
malicious and groundless disbarment case against Respondent.
legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with
Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui.
In her Reply 7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her
well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
would come to an end.
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
chanrobles.com .ph:red
chanrobles.com : law library
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came
The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, 2 respondent averred that she met Carlos It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and
had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of
formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. 3
1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to
live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same
would live together. 4
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in
the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any
she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui.
better/stronger (U.S. v. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then
left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their
two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law
respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
firm 5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos
conclusion/recommendation.
Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with
her.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed
for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 8
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Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
of Justice, but the same was dismissed 9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had
prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or
1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to
to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent
Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent
true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the
the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a
1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to
picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral
complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to
manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of
hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig
Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the
in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for
Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack the appeal by the Department of Justice 21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty
of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that
cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral
she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith
her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995, and raised the lone issue of the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to
by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the
bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good
respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by
moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that
respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
document containing an intercalated date.
immoral manner. 17
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum, 24 respondent stated that complainant
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that
this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married,
contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was
Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so
made known to Respondent.
open in his courtship. 18
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Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending
is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
in court;
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with
him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother,
Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of
the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It
a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should
has been held:
deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed
her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
girl.
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
x
x
x"
moral character. (Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for
Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe
of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
penalty."
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We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
are:
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui,
she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are
not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our
legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far
cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus
must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising
situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about
Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of

morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort
to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of
in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is
her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN
simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the
in courting her.
same or similar offense in the future.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship
with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage,
cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to
the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention
of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare
assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably
failed to do.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997.]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, Complainant, v. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., Respondent.
Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
Jose Remi S. Maranon for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in 1971, against
respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar candidate in the 1970 Bar examination,
praying thereto that herein respondent be denied admission to the legal profession. In her
petition, complainant averred that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child
out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent failed to fulfill his promise to marry
her after he passes the bar examinations. Hence, complainant charged him of gross
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer,
immorality.
we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the
photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year
permanent exclusion of herein respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at premarital sexual relations with the complainant and promises to marry suggest a doubtful
bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
moral character on his part but the same does not constitute gross immoral conduct. To
experience and highly improbable.
justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral but
grossly immoral. Additionally, even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and
sufficient punishment therefor. Henceforth, the Court hereby dismissed the instant petition
circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
and herein respondent should be allowed to take his lawyers oath.
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more
than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the
latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned
that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS; GROSS IMMORALITY; Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers deposition in 1972. In February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
oath because of charges of gross immorality by complainant. Respondent bore an
Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
illegitimate child with his sweetheart who claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition.
her after he passes the bar examinations. These facts do not constitute gross immorality Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the
warranting permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. Engaging in
earlier comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present
premarital sexual relations and promising to marry suggests a doubtful moral character but case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must be grossly immoral. "A grossly
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. 2 Respondents third motion to
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988,
or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang
of the community.
Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and
good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending
as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. 4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees. 5
RESOLUTION
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
ROMERO, J.:June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed
the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966,
1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and
July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953,
when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort
to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a
son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was born,
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate
child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on
his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that
to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6

It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community. 7
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We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a
man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on
and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even after she
had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
EN BANC
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him.
[A.C. NO. 4585 : November 12, 2004]
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and
was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent
chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man
for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely
and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted
into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. 10
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to
take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr.
is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for having
been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral
turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.2
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco
and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the Information.
He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and fine double the amount of the
check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to
Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.3
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial

Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter11 to the First Division Clerk of Court
alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case involving the victims
of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,
Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by
the Court of Appeals.
On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10)
days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution5 requiring him to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply with
our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a fine of In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,12 it appears
P1,000 for respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to comply with our that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doa
previous resolution within ten days.6 On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an additional Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was issued a check
P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment within ten
for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of his wife and two
days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until his
daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then deposited
compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared
in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he
respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000
Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolutions. 8 as his attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple
legal service - he would collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial court ordered Atty.
Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral
and exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported9 that respondent was
arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by
remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory tactics during the trial,
citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite having been
granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.13
In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that time
undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
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3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in

respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result of his
moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of herein
complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present administrative case.
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties appeared
before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June
2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997 and that dismissal is warranted
because "the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is
extinguished upon his death."
We disagree with respondent's contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable Supreme
Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a
probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires
disciplinary sanctions.
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various capacities
(from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost 17
years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16

February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's daughter,
Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished with a copy of
respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives next door to
As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the
complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now
Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an failed to do so.
utter lack of good moral character.
Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP

Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore
justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In
re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA
1,People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to herein
complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several opportunities to
present evidence by this Court20 as well as by the IBP.21 Indeed, he only has himself to
blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several occasions to do so. It is now too
late in the day for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited
for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the
records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP's
findings.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution16 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation,17in the instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is tantamount

to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although admittedly the practice of
law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to adduce
evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at by the
Investigating Commissioner; and
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Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue
with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one involving moral
turpitude.22
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through Justice
good morals."23 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the
honesty, modesty, or good morals."24
circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded
check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the erring lawyer was indefinitely manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
good morals.28 (emphasis supplied)
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and
stated:
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated that:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense'26 (emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections27 and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by final
judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It
shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a
series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel,
405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low regard for her commitment to the oath she
has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October
2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover
the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that a lawyer may not
be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to
show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a check office of attorney."30
knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation
of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioner's averment that he was not a lawyer,
we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the
practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is "to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and
be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
affects the good moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a
confidence."31 "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice
them."32 "Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or
private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor - or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court." 33
provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that
for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. 36 It is
noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful
disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as a penalty for disobedience
thereof.37
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the fact that he
served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a
higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that if "given another chance independence,38 and his conduct should be above reproach.39 The fact that respondent has
to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely
chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to conduct himself in
different from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate length of time
less honorable - or indeed in a less than honorable - manner.
respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the original
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, 40 demanding a high degree
petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
41
for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent falls short of the
1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted said exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice
of law. We agree.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply, his
Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v.
complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined while undergoing medical
treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one year's suspension for nonpayment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon
the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any
partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of
explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first
the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for eitherestafa or B.P. Blg. 22.
Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely,
that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,
upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him, which for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
argument has already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the Commission convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda,
as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution which is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P.
on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to "have his day in Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from
the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which inaction also unduly delayed the court's
prompt disposition of this petition.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held
disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus:
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a

lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his conviction.
We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final
but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent
unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that,
by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of
justice.44
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted of the crime of attempted
bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And since bribery is
admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this
Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his
disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127."46
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no
question that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty
and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot now be questioned,
his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)50
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,51 the conditional pardon extended to the erring
lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the
crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a deed of sale of
a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and that the vendor
had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that disbarment follows as a consequence
of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and since
the crime of falsification of public document involves moral turpitude, we ordered
respondent's name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring lawyer acknowledged the 8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld the recommendation of
execution of a document purporting to be a last will and testament, which later turned out the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through
to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of falsification of public documents, because she was "totally unfit to be a member of the legal
public document, which the Court held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act
profession."54
being contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred.
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a lawyer was disbarred for
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty. Gutierrez having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds of his
was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was granted a
client.
conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not absolute and thus did
not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term, the
court nevertheless disbarred him.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa for
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We held thus: position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."56
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby dISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115, September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO L.
UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for
unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private
complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-infact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim
(Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita by virtue of an
Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in
SPEC. PROC. No. 95-75201 (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a
stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing
real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation,
Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria
La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3
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In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. Separately, the Investigating
averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate half-cousin,6 continuously failed and
Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases aresui
refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in- generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22
interest to all of Pacitas properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery
of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas stockholdings in the On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent
aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial
lacked the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of P54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the formers
Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule
in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was recommended. 23
10
owner of the same. Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property
by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca
approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation.
claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various
legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCI agreed to transfer the subject
The Issue Before the Court
property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas allegations
liable.
and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that
Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the
The Courts Ruling
subject trust agreement. He also contended that the parties transactions in this case were
made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal profession,
into the picture and instituted various suits covering the same issue. 14 As such, he sought engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of moral damages and
attorneys fees by way of counterclaim.15
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint 16 in CBD Case No.
05-1484 for the reason that the facts surrounding the same arose out of a
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute.17
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion depends on the factual circumstances of each case.
for Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent
continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession. 19
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative
case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as well
as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the
subject propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Court sees it, his failure to comply with the demands of Rebecca which she takes as an
issued his Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement as well as respondents acts of
in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and,
mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his own
thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months. 21
assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said
courses of action eludes the Courts determination, for that matter had never been resolved
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion to on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion
withdraw did not serve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation of the
to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a misapprehension
administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the
of the real facts surrounding their dispute and even adds that respondent had fully
Rules of Court which provides that [n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x to her entire
reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges,
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satisfaction, leading her to state that she is now fully convinced that [her] complaint has
no basis in fact and in law.25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the
observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water
so as to support the finding of serious misconduct which would warrant its recommended
penalty.
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the
apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have
exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action
which would endanger the Bars reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent
blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal
profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him
as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been
ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay
a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6057 : June 27, 2006]
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
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Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules 1.012 and
1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for

perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No.
33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent
liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier - a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted,
own real property in his name - agreed that the property be transferred in the name of with modification, the Report and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice
Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
of law for six months.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents
that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as
provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing
Mr. Stier's free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business
operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent
extended to Mr. Donton.6
stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the
termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.
Complainant averred that respondent's act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his
name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in
because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been
violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
referred to the Court.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Bonifacio
A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant's witness in the criminal
case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
SO ORDERED.
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware
of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant's name.
But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13 including
the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier's recognition as the actual owner of
the property despite its transfer in complainant's name. In effect, respondent advised and
aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against
foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of
law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit
concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the
practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be
single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of

Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Instance. in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he
had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law
then in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after
its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of
evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer
to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading
testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States v. H. D. Terrell,
1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf,
and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges
aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order
suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk
of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as
a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1203. May 15, 1903. ]
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W . A. Kincaid for defendant.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were
such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts
of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of
such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an
attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
1. ATTORNEYS; SUSPENSION. The promotion of an organization for the purpose of
violating or evading the penal laws amounts to such malpractice on the part of an attorney office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.)
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the
at law as will justify removal or suspension.
conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
SYLLABUS
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of United States v. Terrelle
was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and
as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to
be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice
will be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the
Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.
DECISION
PER CURIAM: It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended form the practice of
law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members
of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political
activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the
EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the
justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by
President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452
and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion
on 19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de
officio (sic) be declared functus officio and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be
notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No.
26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases
against his client be dismissed.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 159486-88. November 25, 2003.]
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON.
EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE "During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the
court several portions of the book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice
OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner
filed a motion pleading, among other things, that
RESOLUTION
"a) . . . President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements
contained in Justice Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation
to the prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in
PER CURIAM: the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it
read:
"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio

Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the
Department of National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever
supporting documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in
the proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited
in the book of Justice Panganiban, including the material events that led to that
proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada v. Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 67.)
"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting
through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et at. The Petition
"The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner
prays
pertains to what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the
"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify Sandiganbayan; viz:
themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;
The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the
TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, Et Al., last January 20, 2001 in:
"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of

The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the
permanent disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding
public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the
constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of his justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
cabinet; and
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in
ESTRADA v. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability. JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or
trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are Supreme Court. (Urbano v. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd
obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition, Rollo, to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL
pp. 1314.)
act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well "Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed.
hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
(In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595.)
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his
client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul "The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question
and disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago,
pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the
(Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency,
insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto,
Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
(Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos
and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of the
"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion
reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estradas Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, "It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the
2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly
"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners
disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before
motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned
Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making,
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby
directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of
DENIES the Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross
insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the
extraordinary relief of petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the
members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before
it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as
being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Paguia went on to state that
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders
Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE,
within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court."
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In
a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier
claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give
some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members,
provides
insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of
justice.
"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to
avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in
other partisan political activities."
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public
statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan political activities;" Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition.
the law states:
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say
"The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law?
which shall include:
It renders the decision in Estrada v. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President
"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate; committed to the other party GMA with a judgment already made and waiting to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?"
propaganda for or against a candidate.
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become
mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently,
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
he has chosen not to at all take heed.
oppose the election of any candidate; or
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate."
law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of
the Court.
It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in its statutory context,
relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The
of the Philippines and all courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.
taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The
SO ORDERED.
assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from
their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalAddress by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task Carpio, J., took no part.
of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our
peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should
SECOND DIVISION
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing
them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:
[G.R. No. A.C. No. 4497. September 26, 2001.]
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755, 5 for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, Complainants, v. ATTY. FLORANTE E. Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an
MADROO, 1 Respondent.
acquaintance who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a
member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
DECISION
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, 6 for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his corespondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustianos firearm.
QUISUMBING, J.:
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, 7 for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that
Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner
by final Judgment who thereafter escaped.
For our resolution is the administrative complaint 2 for disbarment of respondent, Atty.
Florante E. Madroo filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33, 8 filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of
allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as
them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being
related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed
at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano
Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Misamis Oriental.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from
cases againstRespondent.
the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they
suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their children
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383, 3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave
had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to their cases.
threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against Respondent. Respondent
was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative cases
unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude.
from the service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without forfeiture of
Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the complaints he
retirement benefits.
filed against complainants was manufactured. He adds that he "was so unlucky that
Saburnido was not convicted." 9 He claims that the complaint for serious irregularity
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was able to antedate
v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No. an entry in the police blotter stating that his service firearm was lost. He also points out
MTJ-90-486. 4 In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu
that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his watch. As for his
charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by mentioning this case in
the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in
the present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the attention of the
whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
take the goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the
goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant
guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in
1995 only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told the turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one candidate and that
practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she proceeded to authority so to do. . .
dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her relative lost in that election
while respondents son won.
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to discipline Respondent.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, 10 we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. 12 While
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
and his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty
January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his
will suffice to accomplish the desired end. 13 In this case, we find suspension to be a
right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent submit sufficient sanction against Respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended
his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. 14
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in
respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
and recommendation of the IBP.
to all the courts concerned.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 11 Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects
on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a
decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were
instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondents tenacity
in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession.
It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6672 : September 4, 2009]
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr.

Rm. M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City
RESOLUTION
Tel: 362-7820
Fax: (632)
362-7821
Cel.: (0926)
2701719
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients2to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services,
he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling card:6
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
rbl r l l lbrr
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.

Front
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a
10
11
complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and other canons of the Code of Professional
ground for disbarment.16
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal 17
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
18
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
of ethical rules.
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals' suits.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyer's services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not produce a more favorable result.
a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of
law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
rbl r l l lbrr
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labiano's "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano's connection to
legal business.
his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,

respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client's clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's case, the
lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence
to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally
interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided
and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.
24
fidelity to the client's cause.
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138
exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
more severely.
legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best SO ORDERED.
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104599. March 11, 1994.]
JON DE YSASI III, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed
have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the
grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention
despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court
cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment
accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit, 5
petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or
not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary,
petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts
with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical
received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature
and dental expenses.
of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private Respondent. For this purpose, he conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason the
lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the
Courts resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
Arbiter. 8
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In
worth noting:
June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
"This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the
special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could
During the entire periods of petitioners illnesses, private respondent took care of his
very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
this case is an action filed by an only son, his fathers namesake, the only child and
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latters salary. Petitioner
therefore the only heir against his own father. 9
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary
from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondents auditor and legal adviser, as well as
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
". . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work,
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees.
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of
just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as
penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
Courts ruling in Wenphil Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Et. Al. 2 On terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3 petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
cralawnad
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written
citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d], Rule 46 and
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding
the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
separation pay rates provided by law. 15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
co-employees health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the formers dismissal from
each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the
employment. 17
interest of due process.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the want of substantial bases, in fact or in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and
decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his
conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency, such
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
submitted in the case. 12
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, acceptance:
who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was
later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, "It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December
presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of
1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
regularity in the performance of a public officers functions, 13 which petitioner has not
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula
successfully rebutted.
under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod
City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application
of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of "This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency
to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of ones position
"During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence. instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative
matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer
x
x
x
may validly terminate an employment, to wit: (a) serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c)
fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against basic human experience, petitioners illness and strained family relation with respondent
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi IIIs
absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event,
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
"The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and
Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific

control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs
the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not
qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was
at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of
farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983
to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness
and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were
"This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In
irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent
Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated
arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from
refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend
which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in
to petitioners personal affairs and activities.
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . . Mere absence is not
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with)
employee simply does not want to work anymore.
requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of
residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
"There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights,
petitioners absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is
nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an
justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
employer-employee relationship.
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter
(Annex J) informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his sons
Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention the payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and
to abandon his employment. 20
paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of
December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
The record show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioners confinement would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work
in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent,
denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioners state of health as the former whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until April, 1984 was in
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son,
stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only
petitioners ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding
in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance
periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and jail.
as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there
was justifiable cause for petitioners absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
deposition regarding petitioners alleged statement to him," (h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioners
intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment
be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to
in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself
support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts
where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the
the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep
cralaw:re d
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated
petitioners illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his fathers accountant and legal adviser
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed by private respondent
about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner
x
x
x
contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether
as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in
view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27
"That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his sons plans That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents I HEREBY NAME,
APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged
though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full
JON de YSASI III
knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer
returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place
basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given
the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or
Moreover, private respondents claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even
receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for
petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services
directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly my proper disposition.
evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said
Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery
check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the
payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a CROSSED CHECK."
Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private respondent through Atty.
Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
x
x
x
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a fathers prerogative to request or
even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering
remained in force even after petitioners employment was supposed to have been
the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioners numerous requests for an
involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone.
explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and
other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or
even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the workers last
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latters intention known address.
to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without
the presence of petitioners counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve
x
x
x
reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity
to cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative
Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important "Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as stated against
him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with
afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,
pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioners entitlement "Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
"Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioners
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by
employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such
filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
childs welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and
x
x
x
required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondents theory that petitioners alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
"Sec. 11. Report of Dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
fathers agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered emanating during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for
from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment, the positions
last held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy
as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to
imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without guidance and statistical purposes."
any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his
employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee Private respondents argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner
was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his
of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served
by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5,
hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of
seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private
respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the
abandoned his employment. 40
second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in thereof at the employees last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is
conceded that it is the employers prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when
Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The
"Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has
him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
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employee. 42
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement."
On the executive labor arbiters misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
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Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some
"The Labor Arbiter held thus:
cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of
granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance
and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when managerial
Labor and Employment for his sons (sic)/complainants (sic) aba(n)donment as required
employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is
by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what
was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic)
the law accords him. 48
existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor Generals ratiocination, to
for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, wit:
G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex C Petition), . . .
"As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
"This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the
Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales v. NLRC,
must not be rewarded re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. v. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the
Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made
employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In
which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable
the present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same
a justifiable excuse." 43
ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a
reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
between the parties (Morales, v. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
"In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employers report on dismissed employees relationship is hardly possible." 49
to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
dismissed by the employer.
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one
denial:
for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the
"Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages, under Article
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be
allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time adjudicated. 51
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
We are well aware of the Courts rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected
of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that
or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their
customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a
clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel, however, that an award of
exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of
the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the their respective clients.
case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and
exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers capricious exercise of power.
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims.
The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a
faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this
bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
petitioner.
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans
sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the
strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges
"The Labor Arbiters decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no
victorious. It is the Courts earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and
voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his
extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually
absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay
backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month(s)
SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of
in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a
for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault." 54
fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
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The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
SO ORDERED.
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond merely
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
presenting their clients respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if
not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function
of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising
settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits
than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that" (a) lawyer shall
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28546. July 30, 1975.]
VENANCIO CASTAEDA and NICETAS HENSON, Petitioners, v. PASTOR D. AGO,
LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Quijano & Arroyo, for Petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In a decision of the Supreme Court affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in a replevin case, Pastor Ago was ordered to deliver personal properties or pay
sums of money to the plaintiffs therein. The case was consequently remanded to the trial
court for execution, levy was made on Agos house and lots, and auction was scheduled.
Ago moved to stop the sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which dismissed it. This dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Efforts to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction having failed, the sheriff sold the house and lots and
awarded them to herein petitioners as highest bidders. As Ago failed to redeem, a final
deed of sale was executed in favor of the vendee in whose favor the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued writ of possession to the properties.
Subsequently, Ago, joined by his wife, filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
an action to annul the sheriffs sale on the ground that the obligation upon which judgment
had been rendered against Ago was his personal obligation that could not legally affect his
wifes half-share in their conjugal house and lots levied upon and sold for the satisfaction of
the judgment. The Quezon City court issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the registration of the final deeds of sale and the carrying out of any writ of
possession. For a couple of times this was lifted and then restored, before the said court
finally lifted the restraining order. While these processes were being pursued, Ago filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. The same was
dismissed for lack of merit and so with a similar petition in the Court of Appeals. The
dismissal by the Court of Appeals was the subject of another petition in the Supreme Court
which was likewise dismissed.
Finally, the spouses succeeded in having another petition of the same nature given due
course by the Court of Appeals which granted, and later made permanent, the preliminary
injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half
share in the properties involved belonging to the wife. This decision of the Court of Appeals
is the subject of the instant petition.
The Supreme Court ruled that an injunction cannot be availed of to protect a wifes halfshare in the conjugal properties for her share is merely an inchoate interest, not a right in
esse. It likewise condemned respondents and their counsels misuse of legal remedies and
maneuver of tactics for fourteen years to resist satisfaction of judgment. It motu proprio
examined the records of Civil Case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present action) and
found that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemented and amended, are
all untenable.
which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husbands activities; (2)
the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in
the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5)
the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed; the civil case, in which Ago was joined by his obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution;
wife ordered dismissed without prejudice to the re-filing of petitioners counterclaim in a (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964, when Pastor Ago failed to
new and independent action; treble costs against respondents to be paid by their lawyer.
redeem; (8) the husband had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be
levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent
execution and; (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for
annulment of the sheriffs sale upon the issue that the wifes share in the properties cannot
SYLLABUS
be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a
party to the replevin suit. The spouses had every opportunity to raise the issue in the
various proceedings but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
1. COURTS; ORDERS; INTERFERENCE WITH ORDERS OF A CO-EQUAL COURT NOT

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WIFES HALF-SHARE IN THE PROPERTY LEVIED A MERE EXPECTANCY;
ALLOWED; DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The CFI of Manila, in Civil Case INJUNCTION NOT AVAILABLE TO PROTECT A RIGHT NOT IN ESSE. The Court of Appeals
No. 27251, issued a writ of possession to the properties sold to enforce a writ of execution. decision enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the oneThe CFI of Quezon City, in Civil Case Q-7986, countermanded this order by issuing an ex half share in the properties involved belonging to the wife of the judgment debtor. HELD:
parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the registration of the final deeds of sale and
That half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy,
carrying out of any writ of possession. Subsequently, the latter court lifted the preliminary
constituting neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title only when upon
injunction it had previously issued. The Court of Appeals, in another petition
liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. The decision sets
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA GR-39438-R) granted
at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
and which may never arise.
from the one-half share in the properties involved. HELD: The doctrine that a court may
not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court cannot apply in the case at bar. The CFI of 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISUSE OF LEGAL REMEDIES TO THWART SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT,
Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its coCONDEMNABLE. The attitude of respondents and their counsel of maneuvering for
equal court, the CFI of Quezon City, as the latter lifted the restraining order it had
fourteen years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and
previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila courts writ of possession. It is the
from one court to another is to be condemned because far from viewing courts as
Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, they tried to use them to subvert the very ends of
justice.
2. JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION; RIGHTS OF THIRD
PARTIES, EFFECT; RULING IN THE CASE OF OMNAS v. RIVERA. The ruling in the case of
6. ATTORNEYS; CONDUCT; LAWYERS INSISTENCE DESPITE PATENT FUTILITY OF HIS
Omnas v. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim CLIENTS POSITION, A DISREGARD OF HIS MISSION AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT.
of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a
Where counsel has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator
complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
issuance of a writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have
and moral justice, he has forgotten his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
supervened. This ruling is inapplicable to the present case for here, there has been no
exalted position as an officer of the court.
change in the ownership of the properties or any interest therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the time the writ of possession was issued, and even up to the
present.
3. ID.; ID.; LEVY ON PROPERTY OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR; CLAIM FOR EXCLUSION FROM
LEVY OF SPOUSES CONJUGAL SHARE BARRED BY LACHES. It is much too late in the
day for the respondents to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to the wife who was not a party to her husbands business venture
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon
City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then rerestored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining
order.
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being
fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court
Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966
the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830Court, in Ago v. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the
issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We dismissed the petition
a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Agos house and lots in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
for certiorariwith the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago petition forcertiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The
appealed. On January 31, 1966 this Court, in Ago v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., L-19718,
said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;"
his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the "WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession
highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu
17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case
Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Qpossession to the properties.
7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs."
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his coFailing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present
plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
to annul the sheriffs sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which
judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a cothat Lourdes Yu Agos one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued
levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of
judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously
suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against
issued against the enforcement of the Manila courts writ of possession; it is the Court of
husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husbands venture in the
Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the
conjugal partnership.
2. Invoking Comilang v. Buendia, Et Al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld,
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case
registering the latters final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents certificates of
invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
title and issuing new ones to the petitioners are from carrying out any writ of possession. A instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case,
situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husbands business
court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
venture.
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the
3. Relying upon Omnas v. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement.
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property.
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, By the Manila courts writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the
for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business
decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the
that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The
by. the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife,
of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during
that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with
coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval
between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs
parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the
the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14)
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husbands activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
"far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain to subvert the very ends of justice." 6
the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final
sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his
and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriffs sale upon the issue that the wifes
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every
opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did
"A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his clients cause must
not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar.
"Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
"It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
declined to assert it." 2
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable."
7
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the onehalf share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in 7. In view of the private respondents propensity to use the courts for purposes other than
esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below
equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have
appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present
that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4 case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the
merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castanedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new partiesdefendants;
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of
the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it
does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an did not affect the sheriffs sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no Agos.
action has yet been taken on this motion);
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension
to the suspension of time to file answer.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
(Expediente, p. 815)
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless,
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated.
the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Complaint
The Counterclaim
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties
of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to
Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin
suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is
whether or not the wifes inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same
issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of
the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was
herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the
complaint.
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded
and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for
not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action
besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas
and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain
machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of
P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of
action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy
and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the
registration of the sheriffs final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers
acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriffs sale of the conjugal properties was to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants lawyer and his wife also
irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank
pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at also acted in bad faith.
the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of
title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago
defendants bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case
27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint,
which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to
the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio
Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano
(60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that
the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have
already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is
barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the petitioners counterclaim in a new and independent. action. Treble costs are
assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file
of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause
of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the
Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriffs levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true:
if the sheriffs levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO

1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO

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Cobb v. Judge of Superior Court: 8

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other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

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"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

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under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the

Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious

an Act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2,

preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an

...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the

[A.C. NO. 5838 - January 17, 2005]

He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.

ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant, v. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., Respondent.

In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of

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a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

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d. a person of good moral character;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

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We agree with the findings aforequoted.

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It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of

a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6

The dispositive portion of the same states:

In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial

2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and

3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in

We disagree with respondent's contention.

On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16

Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP

1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is tantamount

1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

The Ruling of the Court

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of

Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.