Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 31

01 Pelizloy Realty Corp v. The Province of Benguet GR No.

183137 April 10 2013


Facts: Pelizloy Realty Corporation (Pelizloy) owns Palm Grove Resort, which is designed for recreation and which has
facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of
Benguet.

filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the
petitioner
Issue: WON the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term capital in its 2011 decision?

On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the
Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 (Tax Ordinance). Section 59, article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on
gross receipts from admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

Held: The Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Our Constitutions Preamble wants to conserve and develop our patrimony, hence, the State should fortify a
Filipino-controlled economy.

It was Pelizloys position that the Tax Ordinances imposition of a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admission
fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the
Province. He further aurgue that Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance is a violation of the limitation on the taxing
powers of LGUs

The Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term capital which refers to the shares with voting rights, as well as
with full beneficial ownership (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled
with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Courts interpretation of the term capital was not
erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied. (Commercial or Trade, Technical or Legal Meaning)

On substantive grounds, the Province argued that the phrase other places of amusement in Section 140 (a) of the LGC
encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots since the LGC dined amusement as
pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

To construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-voting
preferred

shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns
the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the
public utility. (Dictated by Context - Broad sense
to a word of ordinarily limited meaning)

Issue: WON provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the LGC.
Held: No, although provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of
percentage taxes.
Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators
of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement." However, resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the
LGC as being subject to amusement taxes.
Under the principle

of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or
to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned."
Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered
venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While
it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or
operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.

indisputably, construing the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and
non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear
abdication of the State's constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens.

03. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 148560 November 19, 2001


Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon
the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice
of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of
mens rea (guilty mind) in crimes already punishable under The RPC saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the
accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.
Issue: WON the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge (void for
vagueness)
Held: Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance that ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not
invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

02. Gamboa v. Teves GR No. 176579 October 9, 2012


Facts: Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of PLDT (owned by PTIC) to First
Pacific, increasing the latters common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7% to 37%, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. Gamboa contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on

On its face invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of
the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolved in the

Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds
the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words.
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics
who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law.

04. Jalosjos v COMELEC GR No. 193237 October 9, 2012; 05 Cardino v Jalosjos GR No. 193536 October 9, 2012
Facts: Petitioners Dominador Jalosjos and Agapito Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in May 2010 Elections. Cardino filed a petition to deny due course and to cancel the candidacy of Jalosjos on the
grounds that Jalosjos made false material representation in his COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible to
run for the Office of the Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his COC, Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced for prision mayor. Jalosjos admitted the conviction but asserted
that he has been granted probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections, the COMELEC denied a petition
for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.

the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period,
states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty is
the perpetual

or the temporary special disqualification. (Doctrine of Last Antecedent-Reddendo singula singulis)


Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications
but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible
for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in
the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered

to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. (Ratio


Legis - Words and phrases must be interpreted in relation to other provisions, and not in isolation)
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature.
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January

1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of


irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of
legislative

will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.

The COMELEC granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos COC, concluding that Jalosjos has indeed committed
material misrepresentation when he declared under oath that he is eligible for office he seeks to be elected when in fact
he is not by reason of final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which has not yet been served. Jalosjos then filed
this petition for certiorari challenging these Resolutions.

When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.Bersamin, concurring.

Held: The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a
material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. A
sentence of prision mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under the LGC and OEC.

05. Gulf Air Company Philippine Branch v Commissioner of Internal Revenue GR No. 182045 September 19, 2012

The penalty of prision mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification
produces the effects of deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to
such office while perpetual special disqualification means that the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitutes ineligibilities to hold elective public office. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible
perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public officer form the time his judgment of conviction became final.
Jalosjos COC was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his COC.
Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. Cardino as the only qualified
candidate actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of mayor.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. The perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually

or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold
any public office during the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective
antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during

Facts: Petitioner Gulf Air Company Philippine Branch (GF), availed of the Voluntary Assessment Program of BIR for its 1999
and 2000 Income Tax and Documentary Stamp Tax and its Percentage Tax for the third quarter of 2000, paying a total of
P11,964,648.00. It also made a claim for refund of percentage taxes for the 1st, 2nd and 4th quarters of 2000.
In lieu with this, BIR issued a letter of authority (LOA), authorizing its revenue officer to examine their books of accounts
and other records to verify its claim. After its submission of several documents and an informal conference with BIR
representatives, GF received its Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) for deficiency amounting to P32,745,141.93 and a
letter which denied its claim for tax credit or refund of excess percentage tax remittance for the said quarters and
requested the immediate settlement of its deficiency. Later, GF received the Formal Letter of Demand for the payment of
the total amount of P33,864,186.62. In response, it filed a letter to protest the assessment and to reiterate its request for
reconsideration on the denial of its claim for refund. However, the Deputy Commissioner, OIC of the large Taxpayers
Services of the BIR, denied its protest for lack of factual and legal basis and requested the immediate payment of the
deficiency.
Aggrieved, GF filed a petition for review with the CTA, which dismissed the petition after finding that Revenue Regulation
(RR) No. 6-66 was applicable rule providing that gross receipts should be computed based on the cost of the single
one-way fare as approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Moreover, it noted that GF failed to include in its gross
receipts the special commissions on passengers and cargo. Finally, it ruled that the RR 15-2002, allowing the use of the net
rate in determining the gross receipts could not be given any or a retroactive effect. Thus CTA affirmed the decision of the

BIR and ordered the payment of the deficiency plus 20% delinquency interest. GF elevated the case to CTA En Banc which
also affirmed the decision of the CTA in Division.
Issue: WON the definition of gross receipts, for purposes of computing the 3% Percentage Tax under Section 118(A) of
the 1997 NIRC, should include special commissions on passengers and special commissions on cargo based on the rates
approved by the CAB.
Held: There is no doubt that prior to the issuance of Revenue Regulations No. 15-2002 which became effective on October
26, 2002, the prevailing rule then for the purpose of computing common carriers tax was Revenue Regulations No. 6-66.
While the petitioners interpretation has been vindicated by the new rules which compute gross revenues based on the
actual amount received by the airline company as reflected on the plane ticket, this does not change the fact that during
the relevant taxable period involved in this case, it was RR No. 6-66 that was in effect.
GF itself is adamant that it does not seek the retroactive application of RR No. 15-2002. Even if it were inclined to do so, it
cannot insist on the application of the said rules because tax laws, including rules and regulations, operate prospectively
unless otherwise legislatively intended by express terms or by necessary implication. Although GF does not dispute that RR
No. 6-66 was the applicable rule covering the taxable period involved, it puts in issue the wisdom of the said rule as it
pertains to the definition of gross receipts.
GF is reminded that rules and regulations interpreting the tax code and promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, who has
been granted the authority to do so by Section 244 of the NIRC, "deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts in
view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their specific expertise in their respective fields."
Moreover, the validity of the questioned rules can be sustained by the application of the principle of legislative approval
by re-enactment. Under the aforementioned legal concept, "where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it
by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the Legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions
without substantial change, such action is to some extent confirmatory that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose."
Thus, there is tacit approval of a prior executive construction of a statute which was re-enacted with no substantial
changes.

In this case, Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 was promulgated to enforce the provisions of Title V, Chapter I (Tax on Business)
of Commonwealth Act No. 466 (National Internal Revenue Code of 1939), under which Section 192, pertaining to the
common carrier's tax, can be found:
Sec. 192. Percentage tax on carriers and keepers of garages. -Keepers of garages, transportation contractors,
persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air, or water, except owners of bancas,
and owners of animal-drawn two-wheeled vehicles, shall pay a tax equivalent to two per centum of their monthly gross
receipts.
The law-making body was aware of the existence of Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 and impliedly endorsed its
interpretation of the NIRC and its definition of gross receipts.

06. ABAKADA Guro Party-list v Executive Secretary GR No 168056 September 1, 2005


Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect
on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of RA No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Constitution.
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
Issue: WON RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the
recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
Held: There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
It is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of
the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact whether by December
31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred,
the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the 'No-Amendment Rule'
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Art. VI. ' 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of
Congress, not to the conference committee report.

The Court reiterates here that the 'no-amendment rule' refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of
Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for
its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill
after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be
deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution
cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications
to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions set forth therein are
satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of the law are clear. It does not provide for a
return to the 10% rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to 12%, the VAT
collection goes below the 24/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the national government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year does not exceed 1 1/2%.
Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations be introduced where
none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress may tread upon.
Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case the Court finds none,
petitioners' argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for petitioners' fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because
the law itself does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no
longer present. The rule is that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for
the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.

07. Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia GR No L-11860 May 29, 1959


Facts: RPS Misamis Oriental, a unit of the Philippine Navy, was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents bound for
Pusan, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers there. It was used for transportation purposes and it made trips
between Korea and Japan. While RPS Misamis Oriental was in Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles which
are subject to customs duties. Upon arrival in the Philippines, these articles were forfeited because of violations of
Customs Law. Commissioner of Customs argued that RPS Misamis Oriental is subject to Administrative Code Sec. 1363
which says that unmanifested merchandise found in the vessel shall be forfeited.
Issue: Are Navy vessels, like RPS Misamis Oriental, required to have a manifest?
Held: Yes. Even if Sec. 1221 of the Administrative Code is entitled Entrance of Vessels in Foreign Trade, Sec. 1228 states
that it is required that every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete written or typewritten
manifests of all her cargoes. Also, RPS Misamis Oriental claimed to have submitted one to a certain Mr. Ysla, but was
denied by the latter.
StatCon maxim: The title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or as to the
intention of the legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise.
Resort to the title of a statute as an aid in interpretation thereof is an unsafe criterion, and is not entitled to much weight.
The title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature in
enacting it, not otherwise.

Whether the vessel engaged in foreign trade (Sections 1221 and 1225, Revised Administrative Code) or not (Section 1228),
and even when the vessel belongs to the army or the army or the navy (Section 1234), the universal requirement from a
reading of all the foregoing provisions is that they be provided with a manifest.
To sustain the proposition that vessels owned by the government are are not within the pale of the customs laws and
regulation is not only absurd but also fraught with serious implications, for the irony thereof is that such vessels may
bring, unhampered, into this country dutiable and/or prohibited merchandise and goods, or, to state it bluntly, they may
engage in the every activity which they are called upon to prevent and suppress.

08 Cueva v CA GR No 178845; CSC v CA GR No 176162 October 9, 2012


Facts: Dante G. Guevarra and Augustus F. Cezar were the OIC President and Vice President for Administration,
respectively, of PUP in 2005. On September 27, 2005, petitioner Atty. Honesto L. Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel,
filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official
documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section
4 of RA 6713.
Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable
Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal
and administrative cases, despite the fact that Guevarra and Cezar have 17 cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case. This was denied and Guevarra was subsequently placed under preventive
suspension for 90 days.
Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning
the jurisdiction of the CSC. On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and
setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction citing EO
292(Administrative Code of 1987) which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction"
thereby bestowing upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar.
Issue: WON the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. According to the SC, the CSC have original jurisdiction over cases filed to it. The CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the government, has the power to discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.
Based on the constitution, the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a
government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and
are subject tothe provisions of E.O. No. 292.

In the case of Camacho v. Gloria, the SC stated that under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university official may
be filed with either the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission.
This is further emphasized on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases stating that CSC shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal. Also, Sec. 7 of the same rules
further provides that Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall
have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective officers and employees.
These rules, according to the SC, are a reasonable interpretation of EO 292 (Administrative Code).
This concurrent jurisdiction means that if a case is filed to the CSC and the CSC assumes jurisdiction over the case, then it
shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Even if the CSC delegates the investigation to
other department or agency like the disciplinary tribunal, it does not deprive the CSC of its jurisdiction. In the same way, if
the Disciplinary tribunal of PUP or its Board of Regents takes jurisdiction over the case, it shall be to the exclusion of the
CSC.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of
statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what
it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and
prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to
defeat the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust
or lead to absurd results.

The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a
statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute
taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative
intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would
lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.
A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a complaint directly with the CSC. For
administrative cases instituted by government employees against their fellow public servants, the CSC would only have
appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a plain reading of the subject provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of
its original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be tantamount to
disenfranchising government employees by removing from them an alternative course of action against erring public
officials.
Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and harmonizing laws is the best method of interpretation
in order to form a uniform, complete, coherent, and intelligible system of jurisprudence, in accordance with the legal
maxim interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. Simply because a later statute relates
to a similar subject matter as that of an earlier statute does not result in an implied repeal of the latter.

09 Theodore and Nancy Ang v Spouses Alan GR No 186993 August 22, 2012
Facts: On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang obtained a loan in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand U.S.
Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang. Respondents executed a promissory note in favor of the
petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
upon demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.

On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in the USA, executed their respective Special Powers of
Attorney in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty. Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the
respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.
Issue: WON Atty Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not the real party in interest in the case.
Held: Atty Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real party in interest of the case. Section 2,
Rules 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case as he does not stand to be
benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the
limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not
mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. Being
merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file
the complaint against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners the real parties in
interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron.
This Court held that there can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence
in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides. Thus:
Section 377 provides that actions of this character "may be brought in any province where the defendant or any necessary
party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff." The plaintiff in this action has no residence in the Philippine Islands. Only one of the parties to
the action resides here. There can be, therefore, no election by plaintiff as to the place of trial. It must be in the province
where the defendant resides.
The petitioner's reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty. Aceron is likewise a
party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall
be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit
of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise deemed as the
real party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title of the
case.
Under the plain meaning rule, or verba legis, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without interpretation.

10 Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate of the Philippines GR No. 196271 October 18, 2011

Facts: RA 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM, scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials. RA 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001. RA 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA 9333 reset
for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted COCs for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June
30, 2011, RA 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153.

Held: In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the
foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]
A constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present
but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and
unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a
great length of time, to be progressive and not static. (Progressive Interpretation)
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Applying this principle to
determine the scope of local elections, we refer to the meaning of the word local, as understood in its ordinary sense.
Applying this principle to determine the scope of local elections, we refer to the meaning of the word local, as
understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political
subdivision. Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao, fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough
reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.

The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional.
Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the hold over option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective
term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of
the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those

The second group of officials the President can appoint are all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The second sentence acts as
the catch-all provision for the Presidents appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the Presidents appointment power should be strictly construed and
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM
regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear
constitutional basis.

11. PACIFICO GO vs. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT


FACTS: Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim are registered individual owners of condominium units. Respondent
Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is a real estate developer, engaged in the development
of condominium projects. Petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for
unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. They alleged that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their
circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be available in the condominium and failed to
perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR. Aggrieved, DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, on the ground that the HLURB decision was a patent nullity constituting an act without or beyond its
jurisdiction and that it had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. The CA ruled that the HLURB
had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did not fall within the scope of the
administrative agencys authority under P.D. No. 957.

HELD: Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action.
13. Hospicio de San Jose de Barili v. DAR
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. With respect to the HLURB, to determine if said agency has
jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action, an examination of the laws defining the HLURBs jurisdiction and authority
becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Section 3, granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." Then came P.D. No. 1344 expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA
(now HLURB), as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
(a) Unsound real estate business practices;
(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
This provision must be read in light of the laws preamble, which explains the reasons for enactment of the law or the
contextual basis for its interpretation. A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted, and to
construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.
12. JULIO AGCAOILI vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. He continued to occupy
the said office until the age of 65. Later, Act No. 3107 was enacted. Petitioner was then ordered to vacate the office in
view of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years. Agcaoili filed protests and waited for a reply
but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of quo warranto.
HELD: Act No. 3107 should not be given a retroactive effect. Act. 190 is likewise cannot be applied to the petitioner to
defeat his action for quo warranto. Section 216 of Act 190 provides that "Nothing herein contained shall authorize an
action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act
complained of was done or committed; nor an action be brought against an officer to oust him from office, unless within
one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose. The Court held that this provision is
applicable only to private officials. With reference with sec. 216, it can be seen that after the word committed, there
is a semicolon. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in
the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must
have relation to the same matter which precedes it.
A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the
expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of
introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and
parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the
comma. The punctuation used in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a
doubtful statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the
semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to
officers of a corporation. Hence, it has no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace.

FACTS: Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili (Hospicio) is a charitable organization created as a body corporate in 1925
by Act No. 3239. Section 4 of said Act provides that [t]he personal and real property donated to the [Hospicio] by its
founders or by other persons shall not be sold under any consideration. On 10 October 1987, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be
placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as legal basis for the order.
HELD: Section 4 of Act 3239 prohibits the sale under any consideration of the lands donated to the Hospicio. But the land
transfers mandated under PD 27 cannot be considered a conventional sale under our civil laws.
Generally, sale arises out of a contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that
is the presence of consent. Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement. The absence or vitiation of
consent renders the sale either void or voidable. In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicios property did not arise as a
consequence of the Hospicios consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand,
and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract that is to
serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by
compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27.
The crucial question now arises, whether the sale prohibited under Section 4 of Act No. 3239 includes even a forced sale. Of
course an overly literal reading of the provision would justify such inclusion, but appropriately a more sophisticated
approach to statutory construction is warranted.
Was it the intent of the framers of Act No. 3239 to exempt the Hospicio from all judicial processes, even those arising from
civil transactions? We do not think so. The contemporaneous construction of Section 4 indicates that the prohibition
intended by the crafters of the law pertained only to conventional sales, and not forced sales. The law was promulgated in
1925, or when the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was in effect. The provisions in the Civil Code referring to "forced sales" were
not derived from the Spanish Civil Code. On the other hand, the consensual nature of the contract of sale, and of contracts
in general, is recognized under the Spanish Civil Code. Under Article 1261 of the Spanish Civil Code, there is no contract
unless the consent of the contracting parties exists.
Evidently, the word "sale," as contemplated by the framers of the law in 1925, pertains to its concept in civil law, with the
requisite of consent being present. It cannot refer to sales or dispositions that arise by operation of law, such as through
judicial execution, or, as in this case, expropriation.
It is axiomatic that where a general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, the Court will not curtail nor add to the
latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others. We cannot simply impute into a statute
an exception which the Congress did not incorporate. Moreover, general welfare legislation such as land reform laws is to
be construed in favor of the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of the people.
14. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC.
FACTS: The Republic sought the expropriation of certain properties of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. The latter refused
to honor the order of expropriation. The Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which
was denied by the lower court. Later, its motion for reconsideration was also denied by the said court.

Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA
a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its
Resolution dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days or until May 4,
2009 within which to file its petition for certiorari.
On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing the lower court's orders for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by
the Republic on the ground that the same was filed out of time .
HELD: Prior to its amendment, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court allows, for compelling reasons, extension of time
not exceeding fifteen (15) days in filing the petition. However, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 no
longer gives authority to proper courts to grant extensions. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari.
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is
presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning
of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to
its amendment.
16. Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
FACTS: It was found out that petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum.
HELD: Petitioner's invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-888, reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], is proper. BIR Ruling No.
551-888 provides that cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their
members.
There is nothing in the ruling to suggest that it applies only when deposits are maintained in a bank. Rather, the ruling
clearly states, without any qualification, that since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any
other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks, cooperatives are not required to withhold the
corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. This interpretation was reiterated in
BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] dated October 5, 2006, which was issued by Assistant Commissioner James H. Roldan upon the
request of the cooperatives for a confirmatory ruling on several issues, among which is the alleged exemption of interest
income on members deposit (over and above the share capital holdings) from the 20% final withholding tax.
It bears stressing that interpretations of administrative agencies in charge of enforcing a law are entitled to great weight
and consideration by the courts, unless such interpretations are in a sharp conflict with the governing statute or the
Constitution and other laws. In this case, BIR Ruling No. 551-888 and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] are in perfect harmony
with the Constitution and the laws they seek to implement. Accordingly, the interpretation in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that
cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their
members, which was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], applies to the instant case.
The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is apparent in Articles 61 and 62 of RA 6938, which
read:
ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. - Duly registered cooperatives under this Code which do not transact any
business with non-members or the general public shall not be subject to any government taxes and fees imposed under the
Internal Revenue Laws and other tax laws. Cooperatives not falling under this article shall be governed by the succeeding

section.
ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. - Cooperatives transacting business with both members and nonmembers
shall not be subject to tax on their transactions to members. Notwithstanding the provision of any law or regulation to the
contrary, such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax exemptions; x x x.
This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized that cooperatives exist for the benefit of their
members. In fact, the primary objective of every cooperative is to provide goods and services to its members to enable
them to attain increased income, savings, investments, and productivity. Therefore, limiting the application of the tax
exemption to cooperatives would go against the very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the exemption to
members of cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of the legislature. Thus, although the
tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this should be construed to include the members, pursuant to Article 126 of RA
6938, which provides:
ART. 126. Interpretation and Construction. - In case of doubt as to the meaning of any provision of this Code or
the regulations issued in pursuance thereof, the same shall be resolved liberally in favor of the cooperatives and their
members.
We need not belabor that what is within the spirit is within the law even if it is not within the letter of the law because the
spirit prevails over the letter.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
17. OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section
68 of the Forestry Code. The lower court ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession
of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.
HELD: Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him.
In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact
that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Forestry Code is a special law where criminal intent is not necessary, thus, mere possession of forest
products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is
the law.
18. Isabelita Lahom v. Jose Melvin Sibulo
FACTS: In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose
Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Later, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which
she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom
and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went
into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
HELD: It was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted
in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the

family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after
RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection Projects of the NPC. COA Unit Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance for the
payment of legal services rendered by Atty. Satorre to the National Power Corporation (NPC).

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree
even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty
of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live
with.

RULING: In the main, petitioner posits that the phrase "handling of legal cases" should be construed to mean as conduct of
cases or handling of court cases or litigation and not to other legal matters, such as legal documentation, negotiations,
counseling or right of way matters. Contrary to the view espoused by petitioner, the prohibition covers the hiring of
private lawyers to render any form of legal service. It makes no distinction as to whether or not the legal services to be
performed involve an actual legal controversy or court litigation. Petitioner insists that the prohibition pertains only to
"handling of legal cases," perhaps because this is what is stated in the title of the circular.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now
hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come
into force, no longer could be pursued. (Effectivity of Statutes -Statutes continue to be in force until changed or repealed
by the legislature.)
19. In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim
FACTS: Petitioner, married to an American citizen, filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the
trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura lex sed
lex is not applicable to adoption cases.
HELD: It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed
the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
courts decision denying the petitions for adoption.
Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. The use of the word shall in the provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no
room for ambiguity.
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
xxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
xxx
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law
is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.

To rely on the title of the circular would go against a basic rule in statutory construction that a particular clause should
not be studied as a detached and isolated expression, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its part.
A retainer fee has been defined as a "preliminary fee to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and
induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of
the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and payment of such fee, in the absence
of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its
payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to
perform." To give such a technical interpretation to the term "retainer fees" would go against the purpose of the circular
and render the same ineffectual.
Hence, while the circular uses the phrase "retainer fees," such should not be given its technical interpretation but should
mean any "fee" paid for any legal service rendered. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, any interpretation
of subject circular to the contrary would open the floodgate to future circumventions thereof. No dictum is more
fundamental in statutory interpretation than that the intent of the law must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever
is within the spirit of the statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in an absurdity, injustice
and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
21. GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Assailed in this petition is the decision dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19621,
affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision finding petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months
on each count, to be served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals' resolution dated July 8, 1997 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
RULING: While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless
checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must
find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it
life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert
it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of
rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two
years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

20. DANTE M. POLLOSO vs. HON. CELSO D. GANGAN


FACTS: In 1994, the National Power Corporation (NPC), represented by its President Dr. Francisco L. Viray entered into a
service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre. Under said contract, Satorre was to perform the legal services for the

22. Manuel T. De Guia vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in
the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only
one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379,
approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010
holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and
maintained that election of Sanggunian members be at large instead of by district.
HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of
R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its
legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine
its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it
to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that process
is the purpose of the act. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief
to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended. A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning
that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are
sought to be attained by the enactment.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of
R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all
be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.
23. ANTONIO D. DAYAO VS. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS: The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while petitioner FPII is an
association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country.
Private respondent LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and
energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue their common objective of providing quality, safe and
reasonably priced gas and oil products. The group advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by household consumers.
On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a
petition for registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010 elections under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry
and other allied concerns. It averred that one of its programs is the promotion of fair trade practices and prevention of
re-entry of cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing the initial gains of oil deregulation, and vigilant advocacy for the
curtailment of bureaucratic and regulatory procedures and governmental practices detrimental to the entry, development
and well-being of small LPG entrepreneurs.
RULING: Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list accreditation thus,
the COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition. For the COMELEC to validly
exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due

notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for
disqualification in Section 6 exists.
Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for registration be previously interposed so that a
complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the law does not impose such a condition, the COMELEC,
notwithstanding its delegated administrative authority to promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws,
cannot read into the law that which it does not provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer
election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them.
The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic definitions. To refuse is to decline or to
turn down, while to cancel is to annul or remove. Adopting such meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of
registration happens during the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the roster of
COMELEC-registered party-list organizations through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the other hand, takes
place after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu propio or upon a verified complaint, on
whether a registered party-list organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law. Refusal is handed down to a
petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the registration itself after the petition has been approved.
A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion.
The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal" and "cancellation" should be taken in its ordinary
significance " "refusal and/or cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or "refusal or cancellation". It has been
held that the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be
used interchangeably.
The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" or that one
word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the
legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive "and"
will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone.
Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation" according to how Section 6
intended them to be employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union; it is pertinently
defined as meaning "together with", "joined with", "along or together with." The use of "and" in Section 6 was
necessitated by the fact that refusal and cancellation of party-list registration share similar grounds, manner of
initiation and procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters, "refusal"
and "cancellation" must be taken together. The word "or", on the other hand, is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. As such, "refusal or cancellation", consistent with their
disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to mean that they are separate instances when the COMELEC can
exercise its power to screen the qualifications of party-list organizations for purposes of participation in the party-list
system of representation.

24. Southern Cross Cement vs PCMC, July 8, 2004


RATIONALE
: A writ of attachment shall not issue to enjoin tax collection.
FACTS: Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of cement manufacturing, production and importation. On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and

Industry (DTI) accepted an application from Philcemcor (PCMC), alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in
increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment;
as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of provisional, then later,
definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the SMA (Rep. Act No. 8800, also known as the
Safeguard Measures Act. After preliminary investigation, the Bureau of Import Services of the DTI, determined that critical
circumstances existed justifying the imposition of provisional measures. The DTI then issued an Order, imposing a
provisional measure equivalent to Twenty Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P20.60) per forty (40) kilogram bag on all
importations of gray Portland cement for a period not exceeding two hundred (200) days from the date of issuance by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) of the implementing Customs Memorandum Order. The corresponding Customs Memorandum
Order was issued on 10 December 2001, to take effect that same day and to remain in force for two hundred (200) days
due to DTIs imposition of the provisional measure, Southern Cross filed with the Courts Very Urgent Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction (TRO Application), seeking to enjoin the DTI
Secretary from enforcing his decision.
Issue: Whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the collection of taxes is proper?
Rulings: The court cannot grant a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the collection of taxes, a preemptory judicial act
which is frowned upon, unless there is a statutory basis for it. In that regard, Section 218 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997
prohibits any court from granting an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge
imposed by the internal revenue code. Therefore, a writ of attachment shall not issue to enjoin tax collection.
The Court agrees with the observation of the [that] when an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. (Grant of Jurisdiction)
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting a key provision of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974,
construed the phrase "relates to" in its normal sense which is the same as "if it has connection with or reference to." There
is no serious dispute that the phrase "in connection with" is synonymous to "relates to" or "reference to," and that all three
phrases are broadly expansive. This is affirmed not just by jurisprudential fiat, but also the acquired connotative meaning of
"in connection with" in common parlance. Consequently, with the use of the phrase "in connection with," Section 29 allows
the CTA to review not only the ruling imposing a safeguard measure, but all other rulings related or have reference to the
application for such measure.
Clearly, therefore, the scope and reach of the phrase "in connection with," as intended by Congress, pertain to all rulings of
the DTI Secretary or Agriculture Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the
imposition of a safeguard measure is taken.
The position of the respondents is one of "uncritical literalism" incongruent with the animus of the law. Moreover, a
fundamentalist approach to Section 29 is not warranted, considering the absurdity of the consequences. Even assuming
arguendo that Section 29 has not expressly granted the CTA jurisdiction to review a negative ruling of the DTI Secretary, the
Court is precluded from favoring an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity. Adopting the
respondents' position favoring the CTA's minimal jurisdiction would unnecessarily lead to illogical and onerous results.

25. SOLID HOMES, INC., vs. SPOUSES ANCHETA K. TAN and CORAZON DE JESUS TAN
FACTS: The respondents acquired a land sold by solid homes on April 7, 1980 from Joe Uy and Myrna Uy. It is a subdivision
lot with an area of 1069 square meters located at Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision. From then on, respondents visited their
property a number of times, only to find out the sad state of development thereat. There was no infrastructure and utility

systems for water, sewerage, electricity and telephone, as announced in the approved plans and advertisements of the
subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot and its surrounding areas. In short, there has been no development at all.
Accordingly, in a letter dated December 18, 1995, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility
systems and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions by the end of January, 1996 to enable them to start the
construction of their house thereon and to allow other lot owners in the area a full access to and peaceful possession of
their respective lots, conformably with P.D. No. 957 which requires an owner or developer of a subdivision project to
develop the same within one year from the issuance of its license.
Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field Office of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). After due proceedings, the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, rendered judgment for the respondents by
directing petitioner to perform its obligation to provide subdivision facilities in the subject premises and to rid the
premises of squatters. In the alternative, at the option of complainants, to replace subject lot with a lot of similar size and
with available facilities, located in the subject subdivision and to pay complainants P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees.
Dissatisfied, petitioner went on appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which, in a decision affirmed that of the
Arbiter. From there, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President. In a decision, the O.P. affirmed with
modification the appealed decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The first paragraph of the decision appealed
from was affirmed with the modification that in case Solid Homes, Inc. fails to replace subject lot with a lot of similar size
and with available facilities located in the subdivision, because it had already sold or transferred all of its properties in the
subdivision, it shall pay spouses Ancheta Tan and Corazon Tan the total amount received from them as purchase price,
with legal rate of interest until fully paid. The respondents file a motion for reconsideration but the O.P. denied said
motion. Both parties then went to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision of the HLURB on
May 23, 2000 subject to the modification that if there is no more available lot in Loyola Grand Villas to replace subject lot,
Solid Homes, Inc. should pay the spouses Tan the current market value of their lot.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not respondents right to bring the instant case against petitioner has already prescribed.
2. In the event respondents opt to rescind the contract, should petitioner pay them merely the price they paid for the lot
plus interest or the current market value of the lot?
HELD
1. No. The 10-year prescriptive period should not commence either on April 7, 1980, when petitioner originally sold the lot
to spouses Uy; or in February, 1985, when the respondents thereafter bought the same lot from the Uy couple. Article
1144 of the Civil Code specifically states that the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the date the
cause of action accrued and a cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which
should not have been done is done. The period should not be made to retroact to the date of execution of the contract on
January 15, 1975 as claimed by the petitioner for at that time, there would be no way for the respondents to know of the
violation of their rights.
2. Solid Homes Inc. should pay the respondents the current market value of the lot otherwise, petitioner would enrich
themselves at the expense of herein lot owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value. Article 1385 of
the New Civil Code cannot be applied in this case because its literal import would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results.
After all, it is the function of courts to see to it that justice is dispensed, fairness is observed and absurdity prevented.
Were we to follow the letter of Article 1385, we will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby subdivision
developers who have reneged on their contractual and legal obligation to provide utility systems and facilities for the use
of subdivision lot owners may themselves profit from their very own wrongs and shortcomings.
In many instances, this Court has refused to apply the literal import of a particular provision of law when to do so would
lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results. After all, it is the function of courts to see to it that justice is dispensed, fairness is
observed and absurdity prevented.

A literal application of any part of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or
contradict the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. Unlike the CA, we find that the literal application of the
aforesaid sections of the Tax Code and its implementing regulations does not operate unjustly or contradict the evident
meaning of the statute taken as a whole. Neither does it lead to absurd results. Indeed, our courts are not to give words
meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.
Were we to follow the letter of Article 1385, we will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby subdivision
developers who have reneged on their contractual and legal obligation to provide utility systems and facilities for the use of
subdivision lot owners may themselves profit from their very own wrongs and shortcomings.
26. ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO VS CA HON TOMAS AFRICA ET AL
FACTS: Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-law-spouses Eddie B. Fernandez
and Gloria C. Leonardo. In her birth certificate, her given surname is that of her mother, Leonardo. As petitioner's parents
later wanted her to carry the surname of her father, the latter executed an affidavit to this effect and wrote a letter of to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of petitioner's registered surname.
The Local Civil Registrar of Manila denied the request of petitioner's parents on the ground that petitioner, being
illegitimate, should carry her mother's surname as provided under Article 176 of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988. The registrar also cited Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that no entry in the civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
HELD: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Article 176 of the Family Code repealed Title XIII, Book I of the New
Civil Code regarding the Use of Surnames. Article 254 of the Family Code reads:
Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code
of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural
child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the
classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children
and natural children by legal fiction.
Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use her father's
surname.
27. BPI V. CA
FACTS: For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a
total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% "contractors percentage tax" then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing for the said year amounting to P27,783,725.42.
On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that finance and leasing companies
registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means
that companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for "contractors percentage tax" under
Section 205 but are, instead, subject to "gross receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC

had earlier paid the aforementioned "contractors percentage tax," it re-computed its tax liabilities under the "gross
receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of
P777,117.05, representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as "contractors percentage tax" and
P361,924.44 it should have paid for "gross receipts tax."
The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund and held that RR 19-86, may only be applied prospectively
such that it only covers all leases written on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all
received prior to 1986, it follows that this was derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not
covered by the RR.
A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was filed, but was denied. BLC then appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals. BLC submits that the Court of Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that RR 19-86 may be applied retroactively
so as to allow BLCs claim for a refund of P777,117.05.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the date of effectivity of RR 19-86 is clear and
unequivocal, leaving no room for interpretation on its prospective application.
ISSUES:
WON RR 19-86 is legislative or interpretative in nature.
WON RR 19-86 is prospective or retroactive in nature.
WON BPI failed to meet the quantum of evidence required in refund cases.
RULE:
1ST ISSUE BLC attempts to convince the Court that RR 19-86 is legislative rather than interpretative in character and
hence, should retroact to the date of effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret. A legislative rule is in the matter of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative
rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing. The Court finds the questioned RR to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of RR 19-86 plainly states that it was
promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC (now Section 244), an express grant of authority to the Secretary of
Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. Verily,
it cannot be disputed that RR 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus
making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.
2ND ISSUE The Court now resolves whether its application should be prospective or retroactive. Statutes, including
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest
by express terms or by necessary implication. In the present case, there is no indication that the RR may operate
retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it "shall take effect on January 1, 1987," and that it
"shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date." Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of
RR 19-86 for lease rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.
3RD ISSUE Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, these are to be strictly construed against the person
or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims the exemption and he must be able to
justify his claim by the clearest grant under Constitutional or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted to rely upon vague
implications. Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax refund.
Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and substance: legislative and interpretative. A
legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly
states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express grant of
authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the NIRC. In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court recognized that
the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it
cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of
Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.

28. EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR


These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the
power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical
injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four
others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed
before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3)
consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final
approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a busload of
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police
service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese nationals,
the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto.
The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is
not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting
provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the
same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing
the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative
design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor,
Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided
for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional
provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter.
By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the
Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to
Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in
the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof
be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.33 Otherwise stated,
the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction
over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the
wisdom of the legislature, which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.

30. Hacienda Luisita vs PARC GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011


FACTS: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural
lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a
6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita
was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against
TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed
to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was
subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock
Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land
ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off
corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA)
proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago,
approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently
contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003,
each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA.
They claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives
havent really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution
89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the
revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated
land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For
FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian
reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
HELD: The wording of the provision is unequivocalthe farmers and regular farmworkers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY
OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distributiondirect and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect
transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by
individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be
found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal
entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. The word collective is defined as indicating a number of
persons or things considered as constituting one group or aggregate, while collectively is defined as in a collective
sense or manner; in a mass or body. By using the word collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of

land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that land reform may become
successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities composed of farmers.
With the view We take of this case, the stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian
reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the
landless appears to be the dominant theme of that policy, We emphasize that Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, as
couched, does not constrict Congress to passing an agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership by
farmers and no other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the intention were otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have worded said section in a manner mandatory in character.
Corollarily, courts will not pass upon questions of wisdom, expediency and justice of legislation or its provisions. Towards
this end, all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law and the validity of the acts and
processes taken pursuant thereof.
31. Bayan vs Zamora (2000)
FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines (RP) and the United States of America (US) forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. The RP-US Military
Bases Agreement expired in 1991 without having been renewed. Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship
between the Philippines and the US continued pursuant to a Mutual Defense Treaty entered into on August 30, 1951.
In 1997, negotiations began between the RP and US for a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). President Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February
10, 1998.
Subsequently, President Estrada ratified the VFA and officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines the Instrument
of Ratification for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred
the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on National Defense and Security for joint hearing.
Thereafter, Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. It became
re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of
Notes between Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for
regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines.
Petitioners - as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers - assail the constitutionality of the VFA
and impute grave abuse of discretion in the ratification of the agreement.
HELD: A basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to a special legislation on
the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not
applicable, and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor
specially should prevail. Lex specialis derogatgenerali. (Special over General)
Section 25, Article XVIII does not require foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements Since the Constitution
makes no distinction between "transient' and "permanent. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
We do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but
merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the disjunctive word
"or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration, such that,
the provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign

bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section
25, Article XVIII Compliance with Section 25, Article XVIII Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. (Use of the
disjunctive or)

petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA assailing the order of the trial court, but it was denied.
Hence, the present petition in SC.

The "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII which requires that concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII. The
Senate is composed of 24 senators. The two-thirds requirement means that no less than 16 votes is necessary to ratify the
VFA.

HELD: NO, Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court may direct one or
more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge. The provision does not make any distinction as to the kind of evidence the prosecution may present. What it
simply requires, in addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of the accused concerned, is the presentation of
such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions exist for the discharge, so as to meet the object of the law,
which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime charged. No
exemption from the term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude the testimony of the accused. When the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

The phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. To require the other contracting state (USA) to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant
to its Constitution is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed,
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an international instrument concluded between
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments, and whatever its particular designation. There are many other terms used for a treaty or
international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromise d' arbitrage, concordat, convention,
declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. The names or titles of international agreements
included under the general term treaty have little or no legal significance and they furnish little more than mere
description.
32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. NAZAR U. CHAVES
FACTS: A Criminal information for Multiple Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family were filed against Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe. It was originally filed
before the RTC of Gingoog City, however by virtue of Administrative Order, the case was transferred to RTC of Cagayan de
Oro which was presided by Judge Nazar Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other accused were
at large. Two years later, Felizardo Roxas was identified as another member of the group who was responsible for the
murder. With that, an amended information was filed before the same court. During the preliminary investigation, Roxas
implicated Atty. Miguel Paderanga, his counsel, as the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the amended information
was again amended to include Atty. Paderanga as one of the accused.
During the trial, the court ruled that before Roxas be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be
discharged as a state witness, otherwise the prosecution cannot present him as a hostile witness. The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration, in the alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state witness. The trial court issued an Order
allowing the presentation of the testimony of Felizardo Roxas for purposes of proving the conditions of Rule 119, Section 9
of the Rules of Court on the discharge of a state witness. However, the trial court ruled against Roxas on the ground that
the presentation of Roxas testimony will be tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state witness even before his
discharge as such; that the qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by evidence other than his own
testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge of a proposed state witness, only his sworn statement can be
presented and not his oral testimony, thought the prosecution may still present any other evidence in support of the
discharge. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Thereupon, the prosecution filed a

ISSUE:
Is the evidence that needs to be presented by the prosecution in its motion to discharge limited to the sworn statement
executed by its proposed witness?

In the case at bar, there is no other evidence more competent than the testimony of the proposed witness himself to
prove the conditions that his testimony is absolutely necessary; that there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense; that his testimony can be corroborated in its material points; that he does not appear
to be the most guilty; and that he has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Further, the trial judge
will not be able to clarify matters found in the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses if they are not allowed to
testify.
33. ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
1.On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting candidate Chevylle V. Farias who
withdrew on April 3, 1998.
2.On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Petition" with the COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy
of the Certificate of Candidacy of Farias.
3.On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC dismissed Ruizs petition, and stated, "[T]here is none (sic) in the
records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no
certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.
4.On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of votes in Ilocos Norte showed
that Farias got a total of 56,369 votes representing the highest number of votes received in the first district. Farias was
duly proclaimed winner.
5. On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias could not validly substitute for Chevylle
V. Farias, since the latter was not the official candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an
independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate.
6.On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives.
7. On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner
averred that he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be
adversely affected by Case No. SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that Farias, having failed to file his Certificate of
Candidacy on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to the remedy of
substitution provided for under Section 77of the Omnibus Election Code and thus, Farias disqualification was in order.
Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and special
elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farias.

Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited
only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.14 [Art. VI, Sec. 6 provides: "No person
shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election."] Consequently, he claims that any issue which does not involve these
constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET. The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory
qualification under the Omnibus Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET, according to him.
HELD: This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive. Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be
circumscribed lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non
distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish.
34. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI) vs. QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA,
a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA"
FACTS: Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion
Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles
must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents. In support of the
application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce
said he was informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi compound and had seen
empty Coke bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding
large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was informed by the
security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's yard on
July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases.
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking the joint deposition of the
witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01 to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at
Pepsi's Naga yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.
In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers
who included them in their return to make up for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining
beforehand the return of empty Coke bottles as they simply received what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles
in their yard was not intentional nor deliberate.
The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search warrant. Coca-Cola opposed the
motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It
insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that the
respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and other similar
containers.
The RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of the crime of unfair competition, even as
it implied that other laws may have been violated by the respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the issuing MTC judge.
The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as
it expands the meaning of unfair competition to include "other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to
discredit the goods, business or services of another."

HELD: "Intellectual property rights" have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the Code to consist of: a) Copyright
and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; c) Geographic Indications; d) Industrial Designs; e) Patents; f)
Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g)Protection of Undisclosed Information.
Given the IP Code's specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question arises on whether a matter is covered by
the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual property as defined in the Code. If it does not, then coverage by the Code may
be negated.
A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an intellectual property right as defined above, is whether it
falls under the general "unfair competition" concept and definition under Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The
question then is whether there is "deception" or any other similar act in "passing off" of goods or services to be those of
another who enjoys established goodwill.
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory construction giving particular attention, not so
much to the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in particular. Under the principle of "noscitur a
sociis," when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" - as defined and charged by the petitioner - does not fall
within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name
or service mark that the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner. Nor
are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently "passing off" their products or services as those of the petitioner.
35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO
This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction over graft charges filed against the Legal Department Head of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) and his co-accused.
In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After
investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one,
an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a
discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held by
the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was
done, according to the Committee, to enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors
to pay lesser taxes.
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former
AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan,
Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171,
paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g).
Acting on the Committees recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the acquisition of lands in Iloilo City
informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique
A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel,
Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of
falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.

Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand
of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB, which
challenges such order.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.

The Ruling of the Court


After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, however, the Court finds this additional definition of
"manager:"
A manager is one who has charge of corporation and control of its businesses, or of its branch establishments,
divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes "divisions, or departments," which are
corporate units headed by managers. The United States case of Braniff v. McPherren also referred to "divisions" and
"departments" in relation to the position of "manager." Under this definition, respondent Bello would fit into the term
"manager," he having charge of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place.
In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine
of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a proper construction may be had by considering the company of words in which
the term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is associated.6 Given that the word "manager" was in the
company of the words "presidents, directors or trustees," the clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the
meaning of the term "manager" to officers who have overall control and supervision of government-owned and controlled
corporations.
But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in Section 4(a)(1) should be understood to
refer to a range of positions within a government corporation. By the variety of the functions they perform, the "presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers" cannot be taken to refer only to those who exercise "overall" control and supervision of
such corporations.
Since "managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as presidents, they belong to
a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a corporation's "divisions or
departments." This brings Bello's position within the definition.
36. CHAVEZ vs JBC
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Petitioner argues that Article VIII,
Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC shall have only one representative from
Congress.
HELD: Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

37. PBA vs CA
Petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency
amusement tax. Petitioner PBA contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that Section 13 of the Local
Tax Code of 1973 limits local government units to theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement in the collection of the amusement tax.
HELD: Sec. 13. Amusement tax on admission. -The province shall impose a tax on admission to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement.
While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional basketball games are
definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
Thus, in determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the prior enumeration of
theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional
basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter
basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.
38. GUINHAWA vs PEOPLE
Jaime Guinhawa was convicted of the crime of other deceits penalized in Article 318(1) for selling a damaged van under
pretense that it was brand new. The petitioner asserts that based on the allegations in the Information, he was charged
with estafa through false pretenses under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the allegation
that the private complainant was defrauded of P591,000.00, it is the RTC, not the MTC, which has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
HELD:The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is
one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads:
Art. 318. Other deceits. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage
caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by
any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
This provision was taken from Article 554 of the Spanish Penal Code. (Intrinsic Aid)
The petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision reads:

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. xxx the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that
is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. (Number and Gender of Words - Singular)

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new, is not the deceit
contemplated in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes things of a particular class
or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature
with those particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the contrary.
Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties, nor diminished or
waived by them. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation
to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the criminal complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for
the crime charged at the time of its commission. (Grant of jurisdiction)
39. PELIZLOY vs BENGUET
Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort, which is designed for recreation and which has facilities
like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. The Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved an ordinance
levying a ten percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs and tourist spots. Petitioner assailed the ordinance as being a (supposedly) prohibited percentage tax per
Section 133 (i) of the LGC. The Province of Benguet argued that provinces can validly impose amusement taxes on resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots, these being amusement places.
HELD: Provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes.
Section 133 (i) of the LGC prohibits the levy of percentage taxes except as otherwise provided by the LGC.
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general rule in Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly
allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places expressly
mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether
amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots
hinges on whether the phrase other places of amusement encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or
to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
In the present case, the Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory construction. Section 131 (c) of the LGC
already provides a clear definition of amusement places:
Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:
(c) "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
(Statutory Definition)
40. FRANCIS ONG vs ALEGRE
Francis Ong has previously served a full term as mayor from 1995 to 1998. On the May 1998 elections, Alegre and Francis
Ong ran for the office of mayor of with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest.

Alegre subsequently filed an election protest before the RTC. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in
that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the
1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality.
Francis ran again for the May 2004 elections, but was disqualified by the COMELEC for having served three consecutive
terms. Francis nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong, as substitute candidate. The COMELEC denied due course to the
substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong.
HELD: We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and should be counted as
a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that
Alegre would - under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless
electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election. (Construction to avoid absurdity)
41. ROMMEL ONG vs ALEGRE
Same facts as above.
HELD: While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute
for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the
certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of
the OEC.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial
and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
42. CIR vs MLHUILLER
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued memorandums imposing a 5% lending investor's tax on pawnshops.
Pursuant to these issuances, the BIR issued an assessment notice against Lhuillier demanding payment of deficiency
percentage tax inclusive of interest and surcharges. Lhuillier argues that it was not the intention of the Legislature to
impose percentage taxes on pawnshops because if it were so, pawnshops would have been included as among the
businesses subject to the said tax. Inasmuch as revenue laws impose special burdens upon taxpayers, the enforcement of
such laws should not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.
HELD: RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 were issued in accordance with the power of the CIR to make rulings and
opinions in connection with the implementation of internal revenue laws, which was bestowed by then Section 245 of the
NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273. Such power of the CIR cannot be controverted. However, the CIR cannot, in the
exercise of such power, issue administrative rulings or circulars not consistent with the law sought to be applied. Indeed,
administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law. (Necessary Implication Limitations on Grant of Power)
While it is true that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money, they are not considered "lending investors"
for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage taxes. Both the NIRC of 1986 and the NIRC of 1977 dealt with pawnshops
and lending investors differently and subjected them to different tax treatments. Verily then, it was the intent of

Congress to deal with both subjects differently. Hence, we must likewise interpret the statute to conform with such
legislative intent.

amounting to P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997.63 Obviously, these amounts are
over the maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.

Section 116 of the NIRC of 1977 (now Sec. 175 in the NIRC of 1986), subjects to percentage tax dealers in securities and
lending investors only. There is no mention of pawnshops. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon
which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter alia, for certain purposes,
patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. It is the
entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or
its debts. (Commercial or Trade, Technical or Legal Meaning)

Sec. 175. Percentage tax on dealers in securities, lending investors. -- Dealers in securities shall pay a tax
equivalent to six (6%) percent of their gross income. Lending investors shall pay a tax equivalent to five (5%) percent of
their gross income.

45. Arnel U. Ty vs NBI

44. STERLING vs LAGUNA LAKE


Petitioner Sterling then filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC, contending that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry
business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA. Petitioner argued that under R.A. No. 6977,
the law prevailing at the time of its registration with the SEC, cottage industry was defined as one with assets worth
P50,001.00 to P500,000.00. Since, based on its Balance Sheet, its total assets when it was incorporated amounted only to
P312,500.00, it qualified as a cottage industry.
HELD: The interpretation given by the LLDA should be given greater probative value. As a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body, the LLDA is mandated to pass upon, approve or disapprove all plans, programs and project[s] proposed by local
government offices/agencies, public corporations and private [corporations]. It is in the position to construe its own rules
and regulation. By implication, plaintiff corporation arrogates unto itself the privilege bestowed upon a cottage industry.
However, there is nothing in the Resolution that includes jewelry making as included in the term cottage industry. (Grant
of Jurisdiction)
Section 2 of the LLDA Resolution then set out the activities exempted from complying with the clearance requirement, to
wit:
Section 2. Exemptions. The following activities, projects, [or] installations are exempted from the above subject
requirements:
30. Cottage industries including
- stuffed toys manufacturing
- handicrafts and
- rattan/furniture manufacturing.
As the regulation stands, therefore, all cottage industries including, but not limited to, those enumerated therein are
exempted from securing prior clearance from the LLDA. The provision did not restrict the exemption to the three activities
therein mentioned.
Thus, this Court has previously held that it necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration
was not intended to be exclusive, or where the enumeration is by way of example only. The maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example. Said legal maxim should be applied only as
a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest.
The P312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital stock already subscribed and paid up by the company's
stockholders. It does not, however, represent the totality of its assets, even at the time of its registration. It had assets

Petitioners were charged for violation of BP 33. Relying on the third paragraph of the above statutory proviso, petitioners
argue that they cannot be held liable for any perceived violations of BP 33, as amended, since they are mere directors of
Omni who are not in charge of the management of its business affairs. Since Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, clearly provides
and enumerates who are criminally liable, which do not include members of the board of directors of a corporation,
petitioners, as mere members of the board of directors who are not in charge of Omni's business affairs, maintain that
they cannot be held liable for any perceived violations of BP 33, as amended. To bolster their position, they attest to being
full-time employees of various firms as shown by the Certificates of Employment they submitted tending to show that they
are neither involved in the day-to-day business of Omni nor managing it.
HELD:It may be noted that Sec. 4 of BP 33 enumerates the persons who may be held liable for violations of the law, viz: (1)
the president, (2) general manager, (3) managing partner, (4) such other officer charged with the management of the
business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity, or (5) the employee responsible for such violation. A common thread
of the first four enumerated officers is the fact that they manage the business affairs of the corporation or juridical entity.
In short, they are operating officers of a business concern, while the last in the list is self-explanatory.
Thus, the application of the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the thing upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. The fourth officer in the
enumerated list is the catch-all "such other officer charged with the management of the business affairs" of the
corporation or juridical entity which is a factual issue which must be alleged and supported by evidence.
Sec. 4 of BP 33, as amended, clearly indicated firstly the president of a corporation or juridical entity to be criminally liable
for violations of BP 33, as amended. Evidently, petitioner Arnel, as President, who manages the business affairs of Omni,
can be held liable for probable violations by Omni of BP 33, as amended.
46. MALINIAS vs COMELEC
During the canvassing of election returns, candidates Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELEC for
violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881 by respondents. Petitioners claimed
that they and their supporters were prevented from proceeding to the provincial capitol building by policemen. The
complaint was dismissed by the COMELEC for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
HELD: The COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election
offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is
unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses
criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not punishable as a criminal election offense.

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC
to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a
non-criminal act.

Held: ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. - A federation, national union or industry or trade union center or an
independent union shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following xxx:

"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor Code as Article 234-A to read as follows:

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the
principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are based
on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon one's own voluntary act and
not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned."
47. COA vs PROVINCE OF CEBU
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local
Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that
would accommodate students in the public schools. Invoking the legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"
petitioner alleges that since salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship grants are not among those authorized as
lawful expenditures of the SEF under the Local Government Code, they should be deemed excluded therefrom.
HELD: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of a statute. Undoubtedly, the aforecited exchange of views clearly demonstrates that the legislature
intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes. (Legislative History, Legislative
Debates and Deliberations)
Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their
services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
But, unlike payment of salaries of teachers which falls within the ambit of "establishment and maintenance of extension
classes" and "operation and maintenance of public schools," the "granting of government scholarship to poor but
deserving students" was omitted in Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it.

48. SMC EMPLOYEES UNION, versus SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNION
The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent (a trade union) as a legitimate labor organization.
Petitioner posits that respondent is required to comply with Article 234(c) of the Labor Code which stipulates that any
applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled
to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration

ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a Local Chapter. - A duly registered federation or national union may
directly create a local chapter by issuing a charter certificate indicating the establishment of the local chapter.
xxx
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but interestingly, the provision indicating the procedure for
chartering or creating a local or chapter, namely Article 234-A, still makes no mention of a "trade union center.
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory
interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a
law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one
exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are
excluded. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters. Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily and
conveniently included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local.
Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is
intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein.
The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, since under the
pertinent status and applicable implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter
or local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is without authority to
charter directly.
49. CADAYONA, vs. CA and THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF LEYTE
On March 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal stating that
although there was substantial compliance with the Circular on forum shopping, the failure to submit certified true copies
of Annexes D, E and F of the petition is a fatal flaw justifying dismissal of the petition:
The petitioner posits that under the Circular, 'What is required to be certified are the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from and material portions of, the record referred to in the petition. The other supporting papers do
not have to be certified true copies.' He backs up his theory with the so-called doctrine of last antecedent supposedly
enunciated in Felipe vs. De la Cruz, 99 Phil. 940, under which the qualifier succeeding phase "such material portions of the
record as are referred to therein," and does not include the remote phrase "other supporting papers."
CA ruling: Petitioner's legal hermeneutics is faulty and his reliance on the Felipe case is misplaced. The term "certified true
copies," being the only qualifier in the phrase 'such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other
supporting papers,' must refer to both 'material portions of the record' and 'other supporting papers'. In the Felipe case,
there were two qualifiers; hence, it was held that each must refer to the object nearest to it.
But even granting that petitioner's interpretation is correct, The purpose of the requirement that they should have been
certified as true copies is to expedite the determination by this Court of whether or not the petition is prima facie

meritorious on the basis of authentic documents so as to warrant further action or proceedings. Accordingly, for being
fatally flawed under Revised Administrative circular No.1-95, the dismissal of the petition is justified
Held: Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules "shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." In line with this guideline, we do not construe the
above-quoted section as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be
certified true copies. A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid or technical sense, which would frustrate and not promote
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules were made, their aim would be defeated.

50. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BATANGAS


Petitioner's Contentions
Petitioner contends that its exemption from realty tax is based on the first sentence of Section 5 of RA 7678. Petitioner
claims that the evident purpose of the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" is to limit the real properties that are subject to
realty tax only to properties that are not used in petitioner's telecommunications business. Petitioner asserts that the
phrase "exclusive of this franchise" must not be construed as a useless surplusage.
Petitioner further argues that under the Local Government Code, the realty tax is imposed on all lands, buildings,
machineries and other improvements attached to real property. A franchise is an incorporeal being, a special privilege
granted by the legislature. Hence, to read the first sentence of Section 5 of RA 7678 to mean that the franchisee shall pay
taxes on its real properties used in its telecommunications business would render the phrase "exclusive of this franchise"
meaningless.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appearing for respondent, contends that the first sentence of Section 5 provides for petitioner's general liability to pay
taxes and does not provide for petitioner's exemption from realty tax. The OSG invokes the doctrine of last antecedent
which is an aid in statutory construction. The OSG argues that under this doctrine, the qualifying word or phrase only
restricts the word or phrase to which the qualifying word or phrase is immediately associated and not the word or phrase
which is distantly or remotely located. In the first sentence of Section 5, the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" restricts
only the words "personal property" which immediately precede the phrase "exclusive of this franchise." This means that
the franchise, an intangible personal property, should be excluded from the personal properties that are subject to taxes
under the first sentence of Section 5. The OSG adds that the use of the comma to separate "real estate, buildings" from
"personal property" exerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent. Further, the OSG
reiterates that laws granting exemption from tax are to be construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing power.
Held: Sec. 5. Tax Provisions. - The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and personal
property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay.
In addition thereto,xxxx a franchise tax as may be prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or other
telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee; Provided, xxxxx.

The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or
his duly authorized representative in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be subject
to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
We rule that the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" simply means that petitioner's franchise shall not be subject to the
taxes imposed in the first sentence of Section 5. The first sentence lists the properties that are subject to taxes, and the list
excludes the franchise.
A plain reading shows that the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" is meant to exclude the legislative franchise from the
properties subject to taxes under the first sentence. In effect, petitioner's franchise, which is a personal property, is not
subject to the taxes imposed on properties under the first sentence of Section 5. However, petitioner's gross receipts from
its franchise are subject to the "franchise tax" under the second sentence of Section 5. In short, petitioner's franchise is
excluded from the properties taxable under the first sentence of Section 5 but the gross receipts from its franchise are
expressly taxable under the second sentence of the same Section.
The historical usage of the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" in franchise laws enacted by Congress indubitably shows
that the phrase is not a grant of tax exemption, but an exclusion of one type of personal property subject to taxes, and the
excluded personal property is the franchise.
51. City of Manila vs Judge Laguio
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), owner and operator of Victoria Court, challenges the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 7783 which prohibited certain types of business from being established or operated in the Ermita-Malate
area on the basis that these businesses use women as tools in entertainment and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community on the ground that:
(1)
(2) Ordinance is ultra vires -- the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as the Local
Government Code of 1991 grants it only the power to regulate.
(3)
Held: The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be
construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
construed against the City Council. As a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power
to regulate or to license, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
(Local government units- power to enact ordinances, Requirements of validity.)
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate
only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.


4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
(Administrative rules and regulations, requirements of validity)
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the power to
control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit."
Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to
the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised.
Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is
tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules
of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create
new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.

Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended
that the restricted sense was to be used.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment
"proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint" to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution
goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.
We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to
precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability of judicial decisions.
53. Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Palomar

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail
and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute
repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably
inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. If there is an inconsistency
or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and
reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override the
earlier.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are
recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths,
hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also
defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or
fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where
one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances."
Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to
recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their
appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under
consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.
52. Gutierrez vs. House Committee on Justice
Two impeachment complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, were
referred to the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent). After hearing, public respondent, by
Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form. Thereafter, public respondent, by Resolution of
September 7, 2010, found the two complaints sufficient in substance.
Petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September
2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints.
Held: Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is
a statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is,
to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.

Caltex launched a contest named Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which asked
participants to guess and estimate
the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at Caltex stations would dispense within a specified period. No payment of
whatever consideration or fee or purchase of any Caltex product was asked to be made to be able to join the contest. The
entry forms were made available upon request at the Caltex stations and a sealed can was provided for the keeping of the
stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the
transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. The Acting Postmaster General Palomar opined then that the scheme fell
within the purview of the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law and declined to grant the requested clearance.
Held: The Court held that the contest was not a lottery nor a gift enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, which the law did not prohibit. The term "lottery" extended to all schemes for the distribution of
prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling.
The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest lacked the
element of consideration and hence cannot be deemed a lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a
valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term gift
enterprise also could not embrace the scheme at bar. There is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached
as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy
the appellee's products.
By virtue of statutory principle of noscitur a sociis, it was only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which was consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. If lottery
was prohibited only if it involved a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly,
there was not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.
54. AMORES, versus HRET and VILLANUEVA
Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the
time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of
30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of
affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six

months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No.
7941.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public respondent held that
it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector,
which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondent's shift of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in
party-list affiliation.
Held: Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is xxxx and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years
of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent's interpretation that Section 9 applied only to those nominated
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or
sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter
may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine
party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible form
nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections.
Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or
speech is the index of intention.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent's ratiocination that after the third congressional term from the
ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
55. People vs. Jabinal
A complaint was filed against Jose Jabinal for feloniously keeping in his possession and custody a revolver. However, he
claimed that he should be exonerated because even if he had no license, he had an appointment as a Secret Agent from

the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and
the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. That he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero. The
trial court held Jabinal criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa.
Held: The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. The
Mapa case was decided on a later date and cannot apply retroactively to Jabinal thus he is entitled to acquittal.
The interpretation upon a law by the SC constituted, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely established the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends
to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities was a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio
legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the
time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true
that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws,
where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

56. ADASA vs. VERSUS ABALOS


Petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal or petition for review despite its having been filed after
the accused had already been arraigned. It asserts that the fact of arraignment of an accused before the filing of an appeal
or petition for review before the DOJ "is not at all relevant" as the DOJ can still take cognizance of the appeal or Petition
for Review before it.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 violated
three basic rules in statutory construction.
First, the rule that the provision that appears last in the order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail.
Second, the rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the officers who enforce it
should be given weight.
Third, petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalo's Statutory Construction where the word "shall" had been
construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.
Held: Petitioner's reliance to the statutory principle that "the last in order of position in the rule or regulation must
prevail" is not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 needs no construction (clear and
unambiguous), the cited principle cannot apply because, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no
irreconcilable conflict between Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the circular provides:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. - The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the
same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of
the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review.

On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:


SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. - The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He
may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:
(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;
Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above, Section 7 pertains to the action
on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the
disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course and
must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or
petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the
arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12,
must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give due course to, and
must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.
True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the officers charged with the
enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the latter's construction
of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction necessarily controlling or binding. For
equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule
construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists,
and where the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.
Petitioner's posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word "shall" is misplaced. It is petitioner's
view that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a
matter within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a portion of Agpalo's Statutory
Construction which reads:
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that "banks or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of funds xxx,.. implies not a mandatory,
but a discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability of funds." Similarly, the word "shall" in the
provision to the effect that a corporation violating the corporation law "shall, upon such violation being proved" has
been construed as "may."
It becomes apparent that the same is not applicable to the provision in question. In the cited passage, the word "shall"
departed from its mandatory import connotation because it was connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the
availability of funds" and "upon such violation being proved." No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section
7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory import.
A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same provision to limit its application to appeals
from original resolutions and not to resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that "when the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish" finds application in this regard.
57. IBAA vs Inchong
Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy
Instruction No. 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to all its employees. Petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution
to enforce the arbiter's decision of August 25, 1975, whereby the respondent bank was ordered to pay its employees their
daily wage for the unworked regular holidays.

Respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of execution alleging, among others, that: (a) its refusal to
pay the corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated
August 25, 1975, is based on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules implementing P.D. 850;
and (b) that the said award is already repealed by P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16, 1975, and by said Policy
Instruction No. 9 of the Department of Labor.
Held: Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides:
"Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. - (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays,
except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. . . . . "
The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof
which reads:
"Art. 82. Coverage. - The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings,
whether for profit or not, but not to government
employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members
of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of
another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
"xxx xxx xxx".
From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the
benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit - it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce
it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must
be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or
statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power.

58. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS


Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, Manila Prince matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. Perhaps apprehensive that the sale will consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince
came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Manila Prince invokes Sec. 10, second paragraph, Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument of Philippine heritage and
culture. it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy.
Held: Section 10.
xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xxx
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmarka living testimonial of Philippine heritage. It has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved
to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history.

Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City
Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f): To operate on its own, either directly or through a
subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports
facilities. Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority approved the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance. drawing the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue: Does ZAMBOECOZONE has the authority to do so ?

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. When the Constitution mandates
that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just thatqualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
59. VICTORIA, vs. COMELEC and CALISIN
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained
in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted
therein.
Held: We are not persuaded.The Local Government provides:
"SEC. 44 xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election"
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything
about factoring the numbers of voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply
the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim,
index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
60. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) vs PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION
INCORPORATED (PEJI)

Held: The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or
license games of chance/gambling. Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate
on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games,
amusements and recreational and sports facilities.
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention),
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or
will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.
Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from
"game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a
pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which
chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Not any of these instances is present in the case at bar, however.
Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to
absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily
employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to
operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903.
But they did not.
61. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned
from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. In this
petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE

Held: ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.

It appears that a case for bigamy was filed against Nello Y. Roa in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Case No. 962). In the
course of the trial held in June 13 and 30, 1948, former Judge Roman A. Cruz was placed on the witness stand by the
defendant to prove that his wife Elena Muoz has already secured a decree of divorce against him in July 1944. The
prosecution moved for the striking out of the above testimony of Judge Cruz, and when the motion was denied, the
prosecution again brought the case to this Court through certiorari (G. R. No. L-2483), and again the petition was denied
on the ground that the respondent judge had power and authority to rule on the question raised therein. After the steps
taken by the prosecution to foil the attempt to prove the alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence proved futile, the
private prosecution filed the present petition for declaratory relief.
Issue: whether the subject matter of the petition is among those that can be determined by way of declaratory relief
under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Section 1, rule 66, of the Rules of Court, under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder." This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a
statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is
under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

62. ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Respondent.
64. MARTIN CENTENO vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the
beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita
Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction
materials particularly the cement.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After
explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two
boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant's Office, signed
the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently,
CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries.
Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the municipality was valid
since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the
municipality's poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA
Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its
transactions.
HELD: The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three elements:
a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to
some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property
earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act,
no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malversation.
63. EULOGIO R. LERUM and G. VIOLA FERNANDO vs. ROMAN A. CRUZ, ELENA MU?OZ and NELLO Y. ROA,

Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without
a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against petitioner for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for
religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of
the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes
Issue: The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose
Held: Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law), provides as
follows:
"Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or
public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for a permit in the
form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development, the Regional Director or
his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the
application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075.
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by
its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The

rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
65. LYDIA O. CHUA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, Republic Act No. 6683(The Early
Retirement Law), filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for
every years of service commencing from 1980.
Issue: Is the petitioner should be included as a beneficiary of such statute?
Held: Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to
sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are
similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the
applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: No statute can be enacted that
can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding events of the future.
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is
the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And
every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so
because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.
66. JOSE ESCRIBANO vs. HON. DAVID P. AVILA
On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of
First Instance of that province (now North Cotabato) a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong,
Cotabato (now the province of Sultan Kudarat). Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the offense. On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside.
Issue: The issue is whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged
exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
Held: Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be
conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article."
The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the preliminary
investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius that maxim is not a rule of law. It is just a tool of statutory construction or a
means of ascertaining the legislative intent. It is not of universal application and is not conclusive. It cannot be used to
defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking body. The maxim is inapplicable if there is some special reason for

mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the statute, so that the absence of any
mention of such other will not exclude it. The maxim does not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the
operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or
things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them.
"The maxim is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate the
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive"
The maxim cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance is not
mentioned in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation,
has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the court must look
to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it
should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will
defeat it.

67. ORLANDO PRIMERO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL
"On or about November 12, 1975, on their way home from Tarlac where they joined a parade, Angelita Maycong and one
Elena Garcia saw Orlando Primero emerge suddenly from the talahib along their path, brandishing a bayonet at them
Elena, Garcia ran away. Angelita Maycong descended on the 'pilapil' to her left side and also tried to run away.
Unfortunately, Angelita stumbled, as a result of which, Orlando grabbed her and pinned her down on the ground (Ibid),
Fighting back, she kicked Orlando near his organ and struck him with left hand. In the struggle, Angelita was able to get the
bayonet. In the meantime, Elena Garcia shouted for help. Angelita also shouted for help. Upon seeing the bayonet in the
possession of Angelita, Orlando Primero ran away. Not long after, the father of Angelita Maycong, who was then tending
his farm from where he heard the shouts for help, arrived. Having learned of the attempt made on the honor of her
daughter, father and daughter reported the matter to the Barrio Captain. The bayonet was surrendered to the police force
of Camiling, Tarlac.
After trial, the lower court convicted the defendant of the violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 the defendant is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Five (5) Years as minimum to Ten (10) Years as maximum. The bayonet, Exhibit is
ordered confiscated in favor of the government.
Issue: The respondent Court failed to pass upon the contention that bayonet ii not one of the weapons the carrying of
which outside one's residence is punished under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9.
Held: It cannot be disputed that, ordinarily, the enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed as an exclusion
of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears. However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
is only an auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application-neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to
defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other . . . things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be invoked. Applying the same in the instant case, it cannot be convincingly
argued that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon, possession of which outside of one's residence is decreed
by P.D. No. 9 to be illegal. True enough, if the carrying outside one's residence of such weapons as fan knife, "balisong" or
club, which are less deadly than the bayonet, are prohibited under the law, there is no logical reason why the bayonet
should be exempted from the prohibition.
68. EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo
(Marcelo), the owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales
assigned to Marcelo all its rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well as receivables from the lots already
sold. Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes.
On appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space. The OP
ruled that Lot 11, Block 5 was an open space, because it was the site of the water installation of the Subdivision, per
Marcelos official representation on file with the HLURB National Capital Region Field Office. The OP further ruled that the
open space required under P.D. 957 excluded road lots; and, thus, the Subdivisions open space was still short of that
required by law.
Issue: Is Lot 11, Block 5 an open space?
Held: The term open space is defined in P.D. 1216 as an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational
uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and
amenities. The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Therefore, we resort to statutory
construction to determine whether these areas fall under other similar facilities and amenities. The basic statutory
construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular
and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to
things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying this principle to the
afore-quoted Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the
community. Thus, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like manner.
69. AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the
respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The
petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its
prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin. COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer
used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
Issue: Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.
Held: The Court held that the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind
or class as those specifically referred to. The COMELECs contention that a candidates jingle form part of the prohibition,
categorized under the phrase and the like, could not merit the courts approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it
had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which
provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the
importation into the Philippines of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application
therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to
section seven thereof.
The auditor of the Central Bank, however, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed
by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not
exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Issue: The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law
Held: Again, it is noteworthy that under Republic Act 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601,
"industrial starch", which does not always refer to food for human consumption, was added among the items grouped
with stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the
term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in
the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". Since the law does not
distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of
toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general
sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when
used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
71. CATHOLIC ARCHBISCHOP OF MANILA vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a
request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory
coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was
based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to
businesses and activities organized for profit.
Issue: Can CATHOLIC ARCHBISCHOP OF MANILA be exempter of taxes?
Held: Appellant's contention that the term "employer" as defined in the law should - following the principle of ejusdem
generis - be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which
are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase "activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any
trade, business, industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where
there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered
and defeated.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express
terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at
the cost of the candidates constitutional rights.

72. Spouses Delfino vs. St. James Hospital, Inc.

70. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as AUDITOR GENERAL and ISMAEL MATHAY
as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Respondent assails the decision on the ground that the court had erroneously interpreted the 1991 comprehensive
land use plan (CLUP) or the comprehensive zoning ordinance of the municipality of sta. Rosa Laguna, in ruling that St james
hospital is a non-conforming structure under the 1991 zoning ordinance and the expansion of the hospital into a

four-storey, forty bed capacity medical institution within the mariquita pueblo sub-division is prohibited under the
provision of the 1991 zoning ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa rosa zoning ordinance.
HELD: Under the maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Interpreting the whole section 2, article VI, it expressly enumerated the
allowable uses within a residential zone, and those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since
hospitals are not among those enumerated, thus hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from the structures
permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Sta. Rosa Laguna.
Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any building, structure or land
at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the
provisions of this Ordinance.
1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a greater area
or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in
whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such non-conforming use exist at the time of
the adoption of this Ordinance.
It is clear from the above quoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the expansion of a non-conforming building
is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. Moreover, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered
to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity"
in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the
only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a
residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now
prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company. "Any
person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person
other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable
to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject. "Any person or
company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any
person acting as agent, subagent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance,
the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate
shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person."
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted
from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context.
This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. More importantly, the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in
which it is found or with which it is associated. Thus, after going over to the case, the accused did not violate Section 189
of the Insurance Act.

74. Twin Ace Holdings vs Rufino (2006)


73. MAPALAD AISPORNA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On or before June 21, 1969, defendant-appellant Mapalad Aisporna acted as agent in the solicitation or
procurement of an application for insurance of Eugenio Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. without
securing a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. The trial court found her
guilty of violating the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Moreover, the CA construed that the first
paragraph of Section 189 is independent from the two succeeding paragraphs and that the receipt of compensation for
the issuance of an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act. The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed, hence this petition.
HELD: The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:
"No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any
commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have
first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as
hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications
for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any
insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or
within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written
application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and countersigned by the company such
person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as
he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such
certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the year

Facts: Petitioner Twin Ace Holdings Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines and
liquor under the name and style "Tanduay Distillers." On the other hand, respondent Rufina and Company is engaged in
the production of patis and other food seasonings and uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority
or permission from the latter. Twin Ace filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of personal property, permanent
injunction and damages against Rufina and Company. In its Answer, Rufina claimed that the marked bottles it used as
containers for its products were purchased from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.
Held: Republic Act No. 623, "An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels
and Other Similar Containers," as amended by RA No. 5700, was meant to protect the intellectual property rights of the
registrants of the containers and prevent unfair trade practices and fraud on the public. However, the exemption granted
in Sec. 6 thereof was deemed extremely necessary to provide assistance and incentive to the backyard, cottage and
small-scale manufacturers of indigenous native products such as patis, sisi and toyo who do not have the capital to buy
brand new bottles as containers nor afford to pass the added cost to the majority of poor Filipinos who use the products as
their daily condiments or viands. The exemption contained in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 623 applies to all manufacturers of
sisi, bagoong, patis and similar native products without distinction or qualification as to whether they are small, medium or
large scale. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application. In the case at bar, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the exemption under the law is unqualified as the law did not make a distinction that it
only applies to small scale industries but not to large scale manufacturers. Thus, even if the court in said case held that the

exemption is primarily meant to give protection to small scale industries, it did not qualify that the protection therein was
intended and limited only to such.

enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction
used to denote a joinder or union.

75. Llenares v. Valdeavella

77. People v. Martin

Facts: The defendants Felisa Valdeavella and Alfonso Zoreta in their answer allege that Felisa Valdeavella never has been in
possession of the parcels as owner: that she and her husband some four years prior to the filing of the answer (October
22, 1918) were in possession of the land as tenants of Irineo Valdeavella, the true owner of the land; and that the
defendant Alfonso Zoreta has been in possession under an agreement made with Zacarias Zabella whereby Zoreta was to
have the use and benefit of the land as security for a debt of P100. Subsequent to the filing of this answer Irineo
Valdeavella was impleaded. In his answer he alleges that he is the owner of the land and has been in possession thereof
for over fifteen years. Under the second assignment of error the appellant argues that the sale, under execution by virtue
of which she claims ownership of the land, was valid. This assignment cannot be sustained.

FACTS: This appeal by the People of the Philippines from the order dated August 2, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of La
Union dismissing criminal case A-392 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, was certified by the Court of Appeals to this
Court, the issues raised being purely of law.

HELD: The levy of an execution is defined as the acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates for the purpose of
satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of a judgment debtor's property. In the absence of statutory
provisions no special formalities are required for a valid levy, and in regard to real property it has usually been held
sufficient if the seizure of the property is made known to the occupants thereof and endorsed on the writ. But it is
otherwise where, as in this jurisdiction, the matter is regulated by statute; there a substantial compliance with the statute
is indispensable.
The statutory provisions to this case are found in section 450 and 429 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 450 states
that property "may be attached on execution in like manner as upon writs of attachment." This provision while permissive
in form must, nevertheless, be regarded as mandatory. No other method of effecting the levy is prescribed and it is an old
rule that powers through the exercise of which a person may be divested of his property are always strictly construed and
that the provisions regulating the procedure in their exercise are mandatory as to the essence of the thing to be done.

76. Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
Facts: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay
the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the
contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador
to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the
government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide
the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated in
the approved subdivision plans.
Held: Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of
the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the
execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was
made by the developer. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not
only to other forms of development but also to facilities, improvements, and infrastructures. The complete and
applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest
antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word "and" between
"facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's theory,

The central issue is the proper interpretation of the provisions of section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by
Rep. Act 144 and Rep. Act 827, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act. Section 46 of Commonwealth Act 613,
as amended, reads as follows: "Any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceal or harbor any alien
not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under the
terms of the immigration laws, or attempts, conspires with, or aids another to commit any such act, and any alien who
enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines
by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a material fact, shall be guilty of an offense and upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than ten thousand pesos, imprisoned for not more than ten years, and
deported if he is an alien. "If the individual who brings into or lands in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien not
duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside herein, or who attempts, conspires with
or aids another to commit any such act, is the pilot, master, agent, owner, consignee, or any person in charge of the vessel
or aircraft which brought the alien into the Philippines from any place outside thereof, the fine imposed under the first
paragraph hereof shall constitute a lien against the vessel or aircraft and may be enforced in the same manner as fines are
collected and enforced against vessels under the customs laws: Provided, however, That if the court shall in its discretion
consider forfeiture to be justified by the circumstances of the case, it shall order, in lieu of the fine imposed, the forfeiture
of the vessel or aircraft in favor of the Government, without prejudice to the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment
provided in the preceding paragraph."
Held: To be stressed at the outset is the significant repetition, in the second paragraph above-quoted, of basic words and
concepts set forth in the first paragraph. Thus, the first paragraph begins with: "Any individual who shall bring into or land,
in the Philippines or conceal or harbor any alien . . . ;" the second paragraph starts with: "If the individual who brings into
or lands in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien . . . " (emphasis ours) Scanning section 46 in its entire context, it
is at once apparent, there being no indication to the contrary, that the act of bringing into, the act of landing, the act of
concealing, the act of harboring, are four separate acts, each act possessing its own distinctive, different and disparate
meaning. "Bring into" has reference to the act of placing an alien within the territorial waters of the Philippines. "Land"
refers to the act of putting ashore an alien. "Conceal" refers to the act of hiding an alien. "Harbor" refers to the act of
giving shelter and aid to an alien. It is of course understood that the alien brought into or landed in the Philippines, or
concealed or harbored, is an "alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside
within the Philippines under the, terms of the immigration laws." The rule is too well-settled to require any citation of
authorities that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from each of
the other things enumerated unless the context requires a different interpretation. While in, the interpretation of
statutes, 'or' may read 'and' and vice versa, it is so only when the context so requires.

79. THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, THE MAYOR, and THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MANDAUE, PROVINCE OF CEBU
Facts: Petitioner contends that (1) the phrase "gross value in money or actual market value" employed in the questioned
ordinance (Ordinance No. 23, series of 1966, as amended by Ordinance No. 25, series of 1967) clearly referred to "sales or

market price" of the articles or commodities manufactured thereby indicating a manifest intent to impose a tax based on
sales, and (2) that to impose a tax upon the privilege of manufacturing beer, when the amount of the tax is measured by
the gross receipts from its sales of beer, is the same as imposing a tax upon the product itself. Respondents on the other
hand insist that the tax imposed in the questioned ordinance (1) is not a percentage tax or a tax on the sales of beer but is
a tax on the privilege to engage in the business of manufacturing beer, and the phrase "actual market value" was merely
employed as a basis for the classification and graduation of the tax sought to be imposed; (2) that it is not a specific tax
because it is not a tax on the beer itself, but on the privilege of manufacturing beer; and (3) that with the conversion of
Mandaue into a city on June 21, 1969, the appeal has become moot, because the prohibition against the imposition of any
privilege tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon, is applicable only to municipalities.
Held: Well settled is the rule that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, technical or commercial terms and
phrases, when used in tax statutes, are presumed to have been used in their technical sense or in their trade or
commercial meaning. Thus, the phrase "gross value in money" has a well-defined meaning in our tax statutes. It must be
noted that the ordinance specifically provides that the basis of the tax is the "gross value in money or actual market value"
of the manufactured article. Considering that the phrase "gross value in money" is followed by the words "or actual
market value", it is evident that the latter was intended to explain and clarify the preceding phrase. For the word "or"
may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same significance as that which
follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or expository of the preceding word. Certainly We
cannot assume that the phrase "or actual market value" was a mere surplusage, for it serves to clarify and explain the
meaning and import of the preceding phrase. In any event, it is the duty of the courts, so far as reasonably practicable, to
read and interpret a statute as to give life and effect to all its provisions, so as to render it a harmonious whole. Thus,
ordinance imposed a tax based on sales and therefore beyond the authority of the municipality to enact.

80. Aparri vs CA GR L-30057


Facts: Mr. Bruno Aparri appointed as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to
take effect on January 116, 1960.On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat
that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In
accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent
general manager until March 31, 1962. Petitioner, file a mandamus with preliminary injunction praying for the annulment
of the resolution of NARRA board.
Held: It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to
interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the
office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is
rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of
the president of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the
language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. The reason for the rule is that the
legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by the
expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

82. TEODULO RURA vs. THE HON. GERVACIO A. LEOPENA


Facts: This case involves the application of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended), more specifically Section 9
thereof which disqualifies from probation those persons: (c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and or a fine of not less than Two Hundred
Pesos.
Held: We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When
he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. The
statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. The petition is
granted and the respondent judge is directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for probation.