Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
3, 1963
FACTS:
Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US
citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a
will, devising unto Maria Helen a certain
amount of money and giving the rest of his
estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the
partition on the ground that she is deprived of
her legitime. Her contention is that the law of
California directs that the law of the domicile
(Philippines) should govern the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the
domiciliary law should apply
HELD:
The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the
national law of the decedent. In the present
case, the national law of Edward is the laws of
California. However, there were two conflicting
California laws regarding succession. One is
enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does
not provide for legitimes) and another is
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code
(which provides that the law of the
domicile applies). SC held that the
national law is Art. 946, which is the
conflict of laws rule of California. The
reason is that In Re Kaufman applies only to
residents while Art. 946 is specific to nonresidents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a referback to Philippine laws (the law of the
domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her
legitime.
Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of
Texas. He left two wills -- one devising a certain
amount of money to his first wife and three
illegitimate children and another, leaving the
rest of his estate to his seven legitimate
children. Before partition, the illegitimate
children who are Filipinos opposed on the
ground that they are deprived of their
legitimes.
ISSUE: Whether the applicable law is Texas law
or Philippine laws
HELD:
Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas
should govern the intrinsic validity of the will
and therefore answer the question on
entitlement to legitimes. But since the law of
Texas was never proven, the doctrine of
processual presumption was applied.
Hence, SC assumed that Texas law is the
same as Philippine laws, which upholds
the nationality rule.
Page 1
acknowledgment
by Hix in
the
presence of 2 competent witnesses
Witnesses
subscribed to will in
presence of the testator, and of each
other
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction
the existence of such law in West Virginia
as a prerequisite to the allowance and
recording of said will?
Held:
Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do
not prove themselves in our courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws
of the various states of the American
Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts.
Here the requirements of the law were not
met.
Page 2
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration that Turkish
laws are impertinent to this case;
Whether or not the appellants exclusion from
the will is valid?
Held:
1st issue
The oppositor did not prove that said
testamentary
dispositions
are
not
in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as
he did not present any evidence showing
what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such
laws, they are presumed to be the same
as those of the Philippines.
The refusal to give the oppositor another
opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the
trial court, and, taking into consideration that
the oppositor was granted ample opportunity
to introduce competent evidence, the Court
finds no abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that
the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed.
2nd issue
The institution of legatees in this will is
conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but
in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is
void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of
the civil Code provides the following:
Linnie
Jane
Hodges
died
giving
her
testamentary provisions to her husband. At the
time
of
her
death, she was citizen of Texas but, was,
however domiciled in the Philippines. To see
whether
the testamentary provisions are valid, it is
apparent and necessary to know what law
should
be
applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.
RULING:
Prior evidence already presented to prove the
existence of Texas Law.
It is necessary that the Texas law be
ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a
renvoi
will
happen or whether Texas law makes the
testamentary provisions valid. In line with
Texas
law,
that which should be proven is the law
enforced during the death of Hodges and not in
any
other
time.
The Supreme Court held that for what the
Texas law is on the matter, is a question
of fact to be resolved by the evidence
that would be presented in the probate
court. Texas law at the time of her death
(and not said law at any other time).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that
the national law of the person whose
succession
is
under
consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found,
Page 3
Suntay v. Suntay
Jose B. Suntay died intestate leaving properties
in the Philippines and a house in China. He is
survived by children from the 1st marriage and
a child and his widow from the 2 nd. Intestate
proceedings were instituted. Thereafter the
widow filed a petition for a probate of a will but
was later denied when the will was lost after
the filing of said petition. On appeal, the
petition was granted since there was
sufficiency to prove the loss of the will. In spite
of the fact that a commission from the probate
court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the
taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting
witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the
probate court denied a motion for continuance
of the hearing sent by cablegram from China
by the surviving widow and dismissed the
petition. In the meantime the Pacific War
supervened. After liberation, Silvino claimed to
have found a will by his father which was filed,
recorded and probated in the Amoy district
court, Province of Fookien, China and thus filed
a petition in the intestate proceedings praying
for the probate of the will.
Issue:
May a will filed, recorded, and probated in
China be reprobated in the Philippines?
Held:
As to the will claimed to have been executed
on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on
the point in Rule 78.
Page 4
Held:
Page 5
Facts:
This case relates to the determination and
settlement of the hereditary estate left by the
deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws
applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born
in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British
parents and married in the City of Manila on
January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia
Stevenson another British subject) died on
February 22, 1951 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife
moved and established their permanent
residence since May 10, 1945. In his will
executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947,
and which was duly probated in the Superior
Court of California on April 11, 1951,
Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as
his sole heiress to the following real and
personal properties acquired by the
spouses while residing in the Philippines.
Ancillary administration proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the settlement of the estate in the
Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was
duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian
Murray
Statt
was
appointed
ancillary
administrator of the estate, filed a preliminary
estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared
therein finally appraised at their values six
months after the death of Stevenson.
Preliminary return was made by the ancillary
administrator in order to secure the waiver of
the Collector of Internal Revenue on the
inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.
which the estate then desired to dispose in the
United States. Acting upon said return, the
Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the
valuation of the personal properties declared
therein, but increased the appraisal of the two
parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing
their fair market value. After allowing the
deductions
claimed
by
the
ancillary
administrator for funeral expenses in the
amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and
administration expenses in the sum of
P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the
amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and
P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of
P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were
paid by the estate.
The ancillary administrator filed in
amended estate and inheritance tax
return in pursuance of his reservation
made at the time of filing of the
preliminary return and for the purpose of
availing of the right granted by section 91
of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her
rights and interests in the estate to the
spouses,
Douglas
and
Bettina
Fisher,
respondents herein.
The ancillary administrator filed a second
amended estate and inheritance tax return.
This return declared the same assets of the
estate stated in the amended return of
September 22, 1952, except that it contained
new claims for additional exemption and
deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the
amount of P4,000.00 from the gross
estate of the decedent as provided for in
Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal
Page 6
whether
the
estementary
dispositions,
especially those for the children which are
short of the legitime given them by the Civil
Code of the Philippines, are valid?
Facts:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by
Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and
Edward Bohanan to the project of partition
submitted by the executor and approving the
said project.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate
a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan,
executed by him in Manila. In the said order,
the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the
testator was born in Nebraska and
therefore a citizen of that state, or at
least a citizen of California where some of
his properties are located. This contention
is untenable. Notwithstanding the long
residence of the decedent in the Philippines,
his stay here was merely temporary, and he
continued and remained to be a citizen of the
United States and of the state of his pertinent
residence to spend the rest of his days in that
state. His permanent residence or domicile in
the United States depended upon his personal
intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his
homicide and therefore at the time of his
death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody
can choose his domicile or permanent
residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C.
O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a
citizen of the United States and of the State of
Nevada and declares that his will and
testament, is fully in accordance with the laws
of the state of Nevada and admits the same to
probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust
Company, named as the executor of the will, is
hereby appointed to such executor and upon
the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00.
The executor filed a project of partition dated
January 24, 1956, making adjudications, in
accordance with the provisions of the will.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her
two children question the validity of the
testamentary provisions disposing of the
estate in the manner above indicated,
claiming that they have been deprived of
the legitime that the laws of the forum
concede to them.
Moreover, the court below had found that the
testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that
divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922;
that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C.
Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this
marriage was subsisting at the time of
Issue:
Ruling:
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to
this case because the testator died in
1944,
expressly
provides
that
successional rights to personal property
are to be earned by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question.
Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless,
legal
and
testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is
in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country in which it is found.
(par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the
same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it
was found out and it was decided that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada
because he had selected this as his domicile
and his permanent residence. It is not disputed
that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to
dispose of all his properties by will. It does not
appear that at time of the hearing of the
project of partition, the above-quoted provision
was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada,
being a foreign law can only be proved in
our courts in the form and manner
provided for by our Rules, which are as
follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record.
An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the
case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the
motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign
law, especially Section 9905, Compiled
Nevada Laws was introduced in evidence
by appellant's counsel. Again said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor
and admitted by the Court during the
hearing of the case on before Judge
Rafael Amparo.
Page 7
Page 8
law
is
Ruling:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be
admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the
officer having legal custody of the records
or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a
secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer,
and with the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is
intended to justify the giving of full faith and
Page 9
However,
intestate
and
testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national
law of the person whose
succession
is
under
consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be
found. (10a)
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino
Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage
as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows
the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as
legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class
of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of the constitution.
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this
Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative
case,
whatever
the
corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
Art. 17.
All
marriages
performed
outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they
were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except
bigamous,
polygamous,
or
incestuous
marriages
as
determined by Philippine law.
(19a)
Art. 124.
Art. 16.
1.
Page 10
2.
If the husband
is a
foreigner and the wife is a
citizen of the Philippines,
the laws of the husband's
country shall be followed,
without prejudice to the
provisions of this Code with
regard
to
immovable
property. (1325a)
Art. 815.
Art. 816.
Art. 818.
Art. 819.
Art. 829.
Art. 1039.
Page 11
Section 2.
1.
2.
3.
Those
born
before
January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who
elect
Philippine
citizenship
upon
reaching the age of
majority; and
4.
Those
who
are
naturalized
in
accordance with law.
Page 12
Section 5.
Art. 16.
Art. 50.
Art. 51.
Art. 99.
Art. 1251.
However,
intestate
and
testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national
law of the person whose
succession
is
under
consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be
found. (10a)
Art. 66.
Art. 1039.
Save
marriages
of
an
exceptional
character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under
Article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local
civil
registrar
of
the
municipality where either
contracting party habitually
resides. (7a)
Page 13
Art. 829.
dual
allegiance.
By
swearing
to
the
FACTS:
the
argues
that
RA
9225
is
is
Cases:
9225.
unmistakable
and
categorical
concerned
foreign
country.
What
of
naturalization.
origin
even
Congress
after
was
their
given
for
this
the
Court,
judicial
to
rule
department,
on
issues
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
4.
b.
The
Republic
of
the
Philippines has a defensive
and/or offensive pact of
alliance with the said foreign
country; or
The
said
foreign
country
maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided,
That
the
Filipino
citizen
concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or
acceptance
of
said
commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident
thereto, states that he does so
only in connection with his
service to said foreign country:
And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering
service to, or is commissioned
in, the armed forces of a
foreign country under any of
the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph (a) or (b), shall
not be permitted to participate
nor vote in any election of the
Republic of the Philippines
during the period of his service
to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said foreign country.
Upon his discharge from the
service of the said foreign
country,
he
shall
be
automatically entitled to the
full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino
citizen;
6.
7.
By cancellation of
the of the
certificates of naturalization;
By having been declared by competent
authority, a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted; and
In the case of a woman, upon her
marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.
Page 18
Tecson v. Comelec
Page 19
Page 20
Page 21
Issue:
Whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal
residence of one year immediately prior to the
general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be
eligible to the office of municipal president of
Luna, Province of La Union?
Ruling:
It is an established rule that "where a voter
abandons his residence in a state and
acquires one in another state, he cannot
again vote in the state of his former
residence until he has qualified by a new
period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71,
par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used
is synonymous with 'domicile,' which
imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." (People vs.
Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first
residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote
and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna,
he needed to reacquire residence in the latter
municipality for the length of time prescribed
by the law, and for such purpose, he needed
not only the intention to do so, but his
personal presence in said municipality.
VELILLA VS. POSADA
Facts:
Page 22
Ruling:
To effect the abandonment of one's
domicile, there must be a deliberate and
provable choice of a new domicile,
coupled with actual residence in the place
chosen, with a declared or provable
intent that it should be one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home.
There is a complete dearth of evidence in the
record that Moody ever established a new
domicile in a foreign country.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of
error of the appellant, the court affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the
property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at
the time of his death was located and had its
situs within the Philippine Islands and, second,
because his legal domicile up to the time
of his death was within the Philippine
Islands.
Page 23
Ruling:
The court a quo, in denying the petition,
made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications
for
reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is that the
applicant 'shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before
he applies for naturalization' [Section
3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This
'residence' requirement in cases of
naturalization,
has
already
been
interpreted to mean the actual or
constructive
permanent
home
otherwise known as legal residence or
domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic
of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in
a country or state where he lives and stays
permanently, and to which he intends to
return after a temporary absence, no
matter how long, is his domicile. In other
words domicile is characterized by
animus manendi. So an alien who has
been admitted into this country as a
temporary visitor, either for business or
pleasure, or for reasons of health, though
actually present in this country cannot be
said to have established his domicile here
because the period of his stay is only
temporary in nature and must leave when
the purpose of his coming is accomplished.
In the present case, petitioner, who is
presently a citizen of the United
States of America, was admitted into
this country as a temporary visitor, a
status he has maintained at the time
Page 24
Page 25
Page 26
4.
conjugal
partnership
without
her
husbands consent; c
that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines in effect prohibits
contingent fees; c
that the contract in question has for its
purpose to secure a decree of divorce,
allegedly in violation of Articles 1305,
1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
that the terms of said contract are
harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
Held:
The first objection has no foundation in
fact, for the contract in dispute does not
seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By
virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely
bound herself or assumed the personal
obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees,
20% of her share in said partnership. The
contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to
the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or
real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of
said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is,
likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already
been held that contingent fees are not
prohibited in the Philippines and are
impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No.
13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday
vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.)
Such is, likewise, the rule in the United States
(Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
in the United States, the great weight of
authority recognizes the validity of contracts
for contingent fees, provided such contracts
are not in contravention of public policy, and it
is only when the attorney has taken an
unfair or unreasonable advantage of his
client that such a claim is condemned.
(See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq; Ballentine, Law
Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
b.
Page 27
Page 28
ISSUE:
Held:
RULING:
Page 29
4.
5.
Art. 15.
Personal status
legal position of an
individual in a society
Capacity
power to acquire and
exercise rights
Incidental to personal
status
Foreign laws regulating the persons status and
capacity are to be disregarded where they are
political or penal in character;
Legislative jurisdiction authority of the state
of his nationality or domicile or where he may
be physically present to promulgate laws
affecting his status;
Judicial jurisdiction the authority of the court
to hear and determine the cause of action
Beginning of personality conception provided
subsequent birth
End death
Other questions of status
1.
Nota bene:
The following are the requisites of res
judicata:
1. the former judgment must be final;
2. the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties;
3. it is a judgment on the merits; and
4. there is between the first and the
second actions an identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action.
3. Minority
CAPACITY
1.
Page 30
2.
Nota bene:
Prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property,
and those which have, for their
object, public order, public
policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by
laws
or
judgments
promulgated,
or
by
determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign
country. (11a)
Art. 66.
Art. 71.
All
marriages
performed
outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they
were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except
bigamous,
polygamous,
or
incestuous
marriages
as
determined by Philippine law.
(19a)
Art. 75.
Marriages
between
Filipino
citizens
abroad
may
be
solemnized by consuls and
vice-consuls of the Republic of
the Philippines. The duties of
the local civil registrar and of a
judge or justice of the peace or
mayor with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be
performed by such consuls and
vice-consuls. (n)
FC Article 1.
Art. 17.
Page 31
Art. 7.
by:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Article. 8.
FC Art. 10.
The
marriage
shall
be
solemnized publicly in the
chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the
office
the
consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the
case
may
be,
and
not
elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote
places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or
where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at
a house or place designated by
them in a sworn statement to
that effect. (57a)
Marriages
between
Filipino
citizens
abroad
may
be
solemnized
by
a
consulgeneral, consul or vice-consul
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines. The issuance of the
marriage license and the duties
of the local civil registrar and of
the solemnizing officer with
regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by
said consular official. (75a)
Art. 26.
All
marriages
solemnized
outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner
is
validly
celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall
have
capacity
to
remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
FC Art. 35.
The following marriages shall
be void from the beginning:
1. Those contracted by any
party below eighteen years
of age even with the
consent of parents or
guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any
person
not
legally
authorized
to
perform
marriages
unless
such
marriages were contracted
with either or both parties
believing in good faith that
the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without
license,
except
those
covered
the
preceding
Chapter;
4. Those
bigamous
or
polygamous marriages not
failing under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through
mistake of one contracting
party as to the identity of
the other; and
6. Those
subsequent
marriages that are void
under Article 53.
Art. 36.
Art. 37.
Marriages
between
the
following are incestuous and
void
from
the
beginning,
whether relationship between
the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
Page 32
1.
2.
preceding
paragraphs,
the
essential requisites
and
legal
impediments
to
marriage, divorce,
paternity
and
filiation,
guardianship
and
custody of minors,
support
and
maintenance,
claims
for
customary
dower
(mahr), betrothal,
breach of contract
to
marry,
solemnization and
registration
of
marriage
and
divorce, rights and
obligations
between husband
and wife parental
authority, and the
properly
relations
between husband
and wife shall be
governed by this
Code and other
applicable Muslim
laws.
Art. 38.
The
following
marriages shall be void from the beginning for
reasons of public policy:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Muslim
Code
13. Application.
Between
collateral
blood relatives whether
legitimate
or
illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
Between step-parents
and step-children;
Between parents-in-law
and children-in-law;
Between the adopting
parent and the adopted
child;
Between the surviving
spouse of the adopting
parent and the adopted
child;
Between the surviving
spouse of the adopted
child and the adopter;
Between an adopted
child and a legitimate
child of the adopter;
Between
adopted
children of the same
adopter; and
Between parties where
one, with the intention
to marry the other,
killed
that
other
person's spouse, or his
or her own spouse. (82)
PD
1083,
Art. 180.
Law
applicable.
The
provisions of the Revised
Penal Code relative to the
crime of bigamy shall not
apply to a person married in
accordance with the provisions
of this Code or, before its
effectivity, under Muslim law.
Art.
Art. 14.
2.
Art. 3.
marriage are:
The
requisites
of
Page 33
1.
2.
3.
Art. 5.
Authority
of
the
solemnizing officer;
A
valid
marriage
license except in the
cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
A marriage ceremony
which takes place with
the appearance of the
contracting
parties
before the solemnizing
officer
and
their
personal
declaration
that they take each
other as husband and
wife in the presence of
not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
(53a, 55a)
Art.
15. Essential
d.
Legal
capacity
of
the
contracting parties;
Mutual consent of the parties
freely given;
Offer (ijab) and acceptance
(qabul) duly witnessed by at
least two competent persons
after the proper guardian in
marriage (wali) has given his
consent; and
Stipulation of customary dower
(mahr) duly witnessed by two
competent persons.
Art. 35.
The
following
marriages shall be void from the beginning:
Those contracted by any
party below eighteen years
of age even with the
consent of parents or
guardians;
2. Those solemnized by
any person not legally
authorized to perform
marriages unless such
marriages
were
contracted with either
or both parties believing
in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do
so;
3. Those solemnized without
license,
except
those
covered
the
preceding
Chapter;
4. Those
bigamous
or
polygamous marriages not
failing under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through
mistake of one contracting
party as to the identity of
the other; and
6. Those
subsequent
marriages that are void
under Article 53.
1.
Art. 4.
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of
Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together
for about a month, when the plaintiff returned
to the home of her parents.
That the defendant, one month after he had
contracted
marriage
with
the
plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that
the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of
the defendant and refused to perform any act
other than legal and valid cohabitation; that
the defendant, since that date had continually
on other successive dates, made similar lewd
and indecorous demands on his wife, the
plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just
refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the
defendant and induce him to maltreat her by
word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips,
her face and different parts of her body; and
that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means
to induce the defendant to desist from his
repugnant desires and cease from maltreating
her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Issue: whether or not that the wife may
claim for support against her husband
outside of their conjugal abode?
Ruling: marriage partakes of the nature of an
ordinary contract. But it is something more
than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties, and obligations of which rest
not upon the agreement of the parties
but upon the general law which defines
Page 34
Facts:
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a
decision finding petitioner to be legally
married to Perfecto Blas and admitting
her into the country as a non-quota
immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the
Board of Commissioners of which petitioner
was duly informed in a letter sent on the same
date by the Secretary of the Board. However,
the same Board of Commissioners, but
composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision
reversing that of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to
be excluded from the country. Petitioner
filed a motion for new trial requesting an
opportunity to clarify certain points taken in
the decision, but the same was denied for lack
of merit. Whereupon, petitioner initiated the
instant petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction before the Court of First Instance of
Manila which incidentally was considered by it
as a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner declared that she came to the
Philippines in 1961 for the first time to
join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom
she was married in Chingkang, China ;that
they had several children all of whom are not in
the Philippines; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village
leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision
finding, among others, that petitioner is legally
married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and
admitted her into the country as a non-quota
immigrant; that this decision was affirmed by
the Board of Commissioners of which petitioner
was duly notified by the Secretary of said
Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a
motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners composed of a new set of
members the latter found that petitioner's
claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto
Blas was without basis in evidence as it was
"bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife
relationship"; that said Board further held that,
it appearing that in the entry proceedings of
Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he
declared that he first visited China in 1935 and
married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly
sustain her claim that she married Perfecto
Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August
9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to
China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his
re-entry declaration he admitted that he first
went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in
1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas
in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he
first went to China when he was merely four
years old so that computed from his date of
birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.
In view of the discrepancies found in the
statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband Perfecto Blas in the several
investigations conducted by the immigration
authorities concerning their alleged marriage
before a village leader in China in 1929,
coupled with the fact that the only basis in
support of petitioner's claim that she is the
lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral
and
documentary
evidence
bereft
of
Page 35
Page 36
PEOPLE V. DUMPO
62 Phil 247
Facts:
Page 37
1.
2.
3.
4.
Issue:
Who is the legal wife?
5.
Held:
It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various
occasions, depending upon his interest and
convenience at the particular time, state that
Maria Lao was his querida and not his wife. It is
6.
Page 38
7.
Oppostiors
were
declared
the
acknowelged natural children of the
deceased since the legality of the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee
in China had not been proven to be
valid to the laws of China.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Facts:
Page 39
only on valid,
moral grounds.
1.
2.
Muslim Code
Art. 34.
Art. 73.
PERSONAL RELATIONS
Family Code
Art. 70.
Art. 69.
and
serious,
The
spouses
are
jointly
responsible for the support of
the family. The expenses for
such
support
and
other
conjugal obligations shall be
paid from the community
property and, in the absence
thereof, from the income or
fruits
of
their
separate
properties.
In
case
of
insufficiency or absence of said
income
or
fruits,
such
obligations shall be satisfied
from the separate properties.
(111a)
Either spouse may exercise any
legitimate
profession,
occupation, business or activity
without the consent of the
other. The latter may object
Page 40
Art. 118.
c.
Art. 124.
By custom. (1315a)
Art. 144.
Civil Code:
Family Code:
Art. 74.
Art. 75.
Marriages
between
Filipino
citizens
abroad
may
be
solemnized by consuls and
vice-consuls of the Republic of
Art. 117.
Page 41
Art. 77.
7.
Art. 147.
Art. 80.
The
following
marriages shall be void from the beginning:
1. Those contracted under the
ages
of
sixteen
and
fourteen years by the male
and female respectively,
even with the consent of
the parents;
2. Those solemnized by any
person
not
legally
authorized
to
perform
marriages;
Those solemnized without
a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional
character;
4.
Bigamous or polygamous
marriages not falling under
Article 83, Number 2;
5.
Incestuous
marriages
mentioned in Article 81;
6.
3.
Those
between
stepbrothers
and
stepsisters
and
other
marriages
specified
in
Article 82. (n)
Page 42
All
marriages
performed
outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they
were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except
bigamous,
polygamous,
or
incestuous
marriages
as
determined by Philippine law.
(19a)
Family Code
Art. 45.
Muslim Code:
Art. 37.
Art. 38.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Annulment
Civil Code:
Art. 66.
Page 43
Art. 46.
Any
of
the
following
circumstances shall constitute
fraud referred to in Number 3
of the preceding Article:
1.
2.
Non-disclosure
of
a
previous conviction by final
judgment of the other party
of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
Concealment by the wife of
the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other
than her husband;
3.
Concealment of sexually
transmissible
disease,
regardless of its nature,
existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4.
Concealment
of
drug
addiction,
habitual
alcoholism
or
homosexuality
or
lesbianism existing at the
time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage. (86a)
Art. 47.
Art. 48.
2.
4.
5.
Art. 49.
Art. 50.
3.
Page 44
support
of
the
common
children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as
well as of the absolute
community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of
the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it
is situated, shall be adjudicated
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of Articles 102 and
129.
Art. 51.
Art. 54.
Art. 55.
A petition for legal
separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
1.
2.
3.
Attempt of respondent
to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in
prostitution,
or
connivance
in
such
corruption
or
inducement;
The
delivery
of
the
presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way
prejudice
the
ultimate
successional rights of the
children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the
parents; but the value of the
properties already received
under the decree of annulment
or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on
their legitime. (n)
4.
Final
judgment
sentencing
the
respondent
to
imprisonment of more
than six years, even if
pardoned;
5.
Drug
addiction
or
habitual alcoholism of
the respondent;
6.
Lesbianism
homosexuality
respondent;
7.
Contracting
by
the
respondent
of
a
subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in
the
Philippines
or
abroad;
8.
Sexual
infidelity
perversion;
9.
Attempt
by
the
respondent against the
life of the petitioner; or
Art. 52.
Art. 53.
Repeated
physical
violence
or
grossly
abusive
conduct
directed against the
petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the
petitioner;
Physical violence or
moral
pressure
to
compel the petitioner
to change religious or
political affiliation;
of
or
the
or
10. Abandonment
of
petitioner
by
respondent
without
justifiable cause for
more than one year.
Page 45
2.
Civil Code:
Issue:
Held:
45-55 supra
Art. 27. By a husband. Notwithstanding the
rule of Islamic law permitting a
Muslim to have more than one
wife but one wife unless he can
deal with them with equal
companionship
and
just
treatment as enjoined by
Islamic law and only in
exceptional cases.
Art. 34.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the
Philippine Islands and at present residents of
the City of Manila. They were married in the
City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived
together as man and wife in the Philippine
Islands until the spring of 1926. They
voluntarily separated and since that time have
not lived together as man and wife. Of this
union four children were born. Negotiations
between the parties, both being represented
by attorneys, whereupon it was mutually
agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and
that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500)
monthly; this amount to be increased in case of
illness or necessity, and the title of certain
properties to be put in her name. Shortly after
this agreement the husband left the Islands,
betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured
in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the
ground of desertion. Shortly thereafter the
defendant moved to California and returned to
these Islands in August 1928, where he has
since remained. On the same date that he
secured a divorce in Nevada he went through
the forms of marriage with another citizen of
these Islands and now has three children as a
result of that marriage. Defendant, after his
departure from these Islands, reduced the
amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the
support of his wife and four minor children and
has not made the payments fixed in the Reno
divorce as alimony.
Issue:
Page 46
HELD:
Page 47
ARCA V. JAVIER
95 PHIL 579
Held:
Issue:
Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire
jurisdiction of both spouses and effectively
rendered a judgment in rem when it granted
divorce to Javier?
Held:
Page 48
Page 49
Held:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties in question are
conjugal?
RULING:
There is no doubt that the decree of
divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in
1954 is not valid under Philippine law,
which has outlawed divorce altogether;
that the matrimonial bonds between Jose
Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been
dissolved, although their conjugal partnership
was terminated in 1957; and that the former's
subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad
Teodoro is bigamous and void.
In the present case, however, we find no need
to pass on this question. The particular
properties involved here which were admittedly
acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be
deemed to belong to such co-ownership
because, as found by the trial court and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds
used in acquiring said properties were
fruits
of
respondent's
paraphernal
investments which accrued before her
"marriage" to Corominas. In other words
they were not acquired by either or both of the
partners in the void marriage through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries,
and hence cannot be the subject of coownership under Article 144. They remain
respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the
reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt
of Corominas.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
Page 50
Issue:
WON the adultery case be sustained even
though there has already been a finality of a
divorce decree.
Held:
Page 51
Issues:
Page 52
legally
Page 53
Art. 99.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore
be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
3. There is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
4. A valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
LEGAL SEPARATION
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be
filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure
to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or
induce the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the
respondent to imprisonment of more
than six years, even if pardoned;
(5)
Drug
addiction
or
alcoholism of the respondent;
habitual
Legal Separation
Civil Code:
Art. 97.
A
separation may be filed:
1.
2.
petition
for
legal
Page 54
Page 55
Civil Code:
Art. 15, supra
Art. 335.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Capacity to Remarry
Art. 26.
All
marriages
solemnized
outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner
is
validly
celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall
have
capacity
to
remarry under Philippine
law.
(As
amended
by
Executive Order 227)
2.
of
VIII. Parents
Relationship)
and
Children
(Parental
The
1.
2.
3.
following
cannot
be
Muslim Code:
TITLE V
Parental Authority
CHAPTER I
Nature and Effects
Art. 71.
Nota bene:
1.
Art. 339.
adopted:
Who exercises.
(1) The father and the mother
shall jointly exercise just
and reasonable parental
authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their
legitimate
and
acknowledged children. In
case of disagreement, the
father's
decision
shall
prevail unless there is a
judicial
order
to
the
contrary.
(2) The mother shall exercise
parental authority over her
children
born
out
of
wedlock, but the court
may,
when
the
best
interests of the children so
require, appoint a general
Page 56
guardian.
.chan
virtual law library
Art. 72.
robles
Duty to parents.
(1) Children
shall
respect,
revere, and obey their
parents always unless the
latter
cast
them
into
disbelief.
Art. 74.
Art. 78.
property
of
Parental
authority
nontransferable.
Parental
authority
can
neither
be
renounced
nor
transferred
except as otherwise provided in
parental
CHAPTER II
Custody and Guardianship
Art. 75.
of
(1) Parental
authority
terminates upon the death
of the parents or the child,
or upon emancipation.
(2) Subject to Article 78, the
widowed
mother
who
contracts a subsequent
marriage
shall
lose
parental
authority
and
custody over all children by
the deceased husband,
unless the second husband
is related to them within
the prohibited degrees of
consanguinity.
(3) The court may deprive a
person
of
parental
authority or suspend the
exercise thereof if he treats
his children with excessive
harshness,
gives
then
corrupting
or
immoral
orders and counsel, or
abandons them.
Extinguishment
Page 57
.chan robles
library
(e) The court.
Art. 80.
virtual
law
be
Page 58
Page 59
Page 60
Page 61
Page 62
Issue:
Whether or not the minor children of a
deceased resident Chinese merchant have a
right to enter the territory of the Philippine
Islands;
Held:
It is true that the petitioner, Ng Hian, had never
been in the Philippine Islands before. It is also
true that the said Marcosa S. Dy Jingco
was his stepmother. She swore positively
that she had adopted him. That fact is not
denied of record. Until the fact is denied we
must accept it. There is nothing in the
record which shows or tends to show that
she had not adopted him in good faith.
The question whether or not Marcosa S. Dy
Jiongco could bring Ng Hian into the territory of
the Philippine Islands as her adopted son has
been discussed by the Federal Courts of the
United States. In the case of Ex parte Fong
Yim (134 Fed. Rep., 938), the court held
that:
A Chinese merchant domiciled in the
United States has the right to bring into
this country with his wife minor children
legally adopted by him in China, where it
is shown that the adoption was bona fide,
and that the children have lived as
members of his family and have been
supported by him for several years.
Page 63
Issue:
Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce
obtained from a foreign country such as
support and custody of the children can be
determined in our courts?
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign
judgement must clearly show that the
opposing party has been given ample
opportunity to do so under the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent
was not given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German Court, therefore, legal
effects of divorce must be determined in our
courts. The court held that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the issue between the parties
as to who has the parental custody.
Page 64
Page 65