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Section 5

2. Kilosbayan vs Morato
Facts:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case has
already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter
(R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association
or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these
questions can no longer be reopened.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case,
petitioners suggest that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the
present case, acted otherwise than according to law. They cite the following statement in the opinion of the
Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7)
members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit.
The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent
litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the membership of the Court, with the
retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and
Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as
to petitioners' standing.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some ulterior
motives on the part of the new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except a
conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of the Court at the time they dissented in the first
case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the
other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does
not violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority
(Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was
later reversed.
Issue : Whether the petitioners have the legal standing to file motion for reconsideration and will it pursue?
Held:
There was thus no "formal commitment" but only a manifestation that the parties were not filing a motion
for reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly
could not be bound thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of standing. Much less were the
two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the parties. They believed that the ruling in the
first case was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res
judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five
(5) dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was
erroneousand no legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with equal
candor": "Why should this not be so?"

Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of change in
the membership of a court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R. No. L-10201,
Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of age on the date of the
election. On the other hand, the dissenters argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he
assumed office.
3. Kilosbayan, Inc. Vs Guingona
Facts: The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. The Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator
Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.
PGMC and PCSO, through TeofistoGuingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive
Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e.,
the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature
of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
Issue:Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing)
Held:The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case
demands.
Petitioners as tax payers claim that the issue immeasurably affects the social, economic and moral wellbeing of the people and the counterproductive and regressive effects envisioned in online lottery system.
The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition. Thus, the court invalidated the contact
for the operation of lottery.
4. Mariano, Jr. Vs COMELEC
5. Joya vs PCGG
6. Sotto vs COMELEC
FACTS
This is a petition filed by Vicente Sotto for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections which
declared the respondent Emilio M. Javier as the true and legitimate President of the Popular Front (Sumulong)
Party. The petitioner Vicente Sotto contends in his petition that he is the President of said Party, and prays that
said decision be reviewed and reversed and that petitioner be declared the legitimate President of the Party.
ISSUE
W/N the Supreme Court (S.C) can review Sotos petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth Act 657 w/c states
that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC by writ of certiorari
HELD:
Before proceeding to discuss the questions involved in this case, it is necessary to determine whether or not,
under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, we can review the findings of fact of the Commission on
Elections. Said section 9 provides:.

Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by
the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly the law, in using the words "may be reviewed by writ of certiorari," does not refer to the special
civil action of certiorari (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court), for by this special civil action the superior court can
only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when the respondent
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, in order to annul or modify the acts complained of.
By certiorari errors committed by the respondent can not be reviewed and corrected.
Under section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, as well as our Rules of Court, final
judgment and decrees of the inferior or lower courts may be reviewed by this Court by appeal, writ of error, or
certiorari. By appeal the appellate court reviews all the findings of law and of fact of the court a quo, as in
special proceedings (Rule 105, Rules of Court). By writ of error the appellate court reviews only the findings of
law or of fact of the lower court assigned in the assignment of errors of the appellant, as in ordinary civil actions
(section 19, Rule 48). And by certiorari the appellate or superior Court can only review questions or errors of
law decided or committed by the lower court, as provided in Rules 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of court.
Questions or findings of fact of the inferior tribunal, can not be reviewed on certiorari. "Evidence which is made
a part of the record can not be examined to determine whether or not it justifies the finding on which the
decision or judgment was made. (See the following rule.).
The general rule is that, in the absence of statue or local practice otherwise, questions or findings of fact,
in the inferior tribunal, are not reviewable on certiorari, and that evidence which is made a part of the
record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justified the findings on which the decision or
judgment was made; nor will rulings on questions of fact, within the inferior tribunal's jurisdiction, be
reviewed. (14 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 311, 312.) (Emphasis supplied.) .
In accordance with the provision of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, this Court can not, therefore,
review the rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections.
7. Macasiano vs Natinal Housing Authority
FACT: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No.
7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on
his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of
Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain
(executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being
a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy
that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said
sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully
carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully disbursed.
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintainsthat, the instant petition
is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for theexercise of judicial review in cases
involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that thereis no actual case or controversy with litigants
asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that thepetitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the
petitioner is not the proper party toquestion the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted
upon" and that thereis no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lismotapresented. He argues
thatSections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

Held:It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lismota presented. To
reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are:
(a) The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination,
(b) The constitutional question must be raised by a proper property
(c) The constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and
(d) The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts
or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no
actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is
filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections
of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."
Petition dismissed.
8. Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that
the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that
could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the
conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also
observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the
decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that
Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General
Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles. Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction
between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The
Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605,
which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety
of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. The measures in
question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the
acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the
specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted

principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial
ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be
general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures
under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent
law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of
the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions
prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein
prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree
or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that
"in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila,
including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate
existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must
obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the
ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the
guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the
issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the
execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of
speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra
vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions
the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in
effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to
the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the
sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances
were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction
of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties
upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may
attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong
decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition
against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for
Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in
Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of
license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as
well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
9. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc vs COMELEC
10. IBP vs Zamora
Facts:
President Estrada in verbal directive, ordered the PNP and Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of prevention and suppression of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila. In

compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief of Staff formulated a Letter of Instruction 02/2000
(LOI) which detailed the manner of the joint visibility patrols, called the Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted with the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. The services of the Marines in the AntiCrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.
In the case at bar, the IBP filed a petition for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the
Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Issues:
1) Whether the petitioners have a legal standing over the case.
2) Whether the court has discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing.
Held:
1) No. The court ruled that petitioner asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation
by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is
too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. The IBP also did not sustained
any form of injury nor any of its members has been arrested or that their civiI liberties have been violated by the
joint visibility patrol. The IBP only projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement
which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run.
2. YES. It is emphasized that the court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Thus, court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure. In the case, the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of the court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo,
the issues will not probably go away until the have been resolved.