Lambino v Comelec

FACTS:
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for
an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number
of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with
each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of
its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC
registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks
to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art
XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift
the president bicameral-presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006,
denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution this is in
pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al
contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding
to the parties within that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements
of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity
and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested
parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,
often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no
presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained,
or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to
the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the
petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where
people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the
proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution
and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling
rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue.
The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory
provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more
rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand
can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids
questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to
resolve an issue at bar.

AGAN VS PIATCO EN BANC

G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003 En Banc [Non-legislative power of
Congress; Police Power; Delegation of emergency powers]
FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) for the implementation of the project and submitted with its
endorsement proposal to the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two
daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative
proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A
of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air
Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds
Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive
proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo
Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to
PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of
PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA
Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement).
The
Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the
said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules

stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement

provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the
option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and
operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession
contracts with various service providers to offer international airline
airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp
and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo
handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international
airlines at the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service
providers, claiming that they would lose their job upon the
implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for
prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition
assailing the legality of the various agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that
she will not honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branchs
legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected
with public interest.
RULING:
Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the government to pay
reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal
Complex.
The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the
operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the
government is not required to compensate the private entityowner of the said business as there is no transfer of
ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entityowner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just
compensation for the use of the said business and its properties as the
temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its police
power and not of its power of eminent domain. Requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of

the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes the

Constitution.

BENGZON V BLUE SENATE RIBBON COMM

Facts: A petition for prohibition was filed to enjoin Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin
Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group in several corporations. Earlier,
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile had delivered a speech asking the Senate to
look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because of the said purchase.
Issue: Whether or not Senate has authority to conduct inquiry?
Decision: Petition granted. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes
the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
SENATE V ERMITA
Facts

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.

464; Section 1 thereof prohibited officials of the executive branch of
the government from appearing before either House of Congress
without her consent. These officials were further enumerated in
Section s2(b) and 3.

The constitutionality of EO 464 was then questioned because it

was allegedly in violation of Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution.

Counterclaims allege that the appearance of department heads

is discretionary upon them under Section 22 of the aforementioned
Article.
Issue: WON:
(1) Section 1 of EO 464 is constitutional; and
(2) Sections 2(b) and 3 thereof is constitutional?
Held
(1)
PARTIALLY. Under Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution,
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary
upon them. Thus, Section 1 is constitutional in terms of question hour,
but not when Congress requires their appearance in aid of legislation.
(2)
NO. Executive privilege, or the exemption from disclosure
requirements, may only be wielded by the President, and cannot be
delegated to her subordinates. Thus, Sections 2(b) and 3 are
unconstitutional.

SABIO V GORDON
Facts: Executive Order No 1 Section 4 (b) limits the power of legislative
inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any
judicial or legislative or administrative proceeding. Petitioners refused
to appear before the Senate Committee due to this.
Issue: Whether or not legislative power of inquiry is superseded by EO
No 1?
Decision: Petition for habeas corpus dismissed and EO No1 Section 4
(b) declared repealed by the Constitution. Either house may institute
any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct
or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights or privileges or
any matter affecting public interest upon which it may be important
that it should have exact information and in respect to which it would
be competent for it to legislate.

NERI V SENATE
Fact:
Neri appeared before the Committees and testified for about 11 hours
on matters concerning the NBN Project, a project awarded by the DOTC
to ZTE.
Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
informed PGMA of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on PGMA and his
discussions relating to the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege.
Committees persisted in knowing Neris answers to (a) w/n PGMA
followed up the NBN Project, (b) w/n she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) w/n she directed him to approve it, required him to appear and
testify once more on Nov. 20 2007. On that day, Neri did not appear
upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege.
On Nov. 22, the Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him
to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On Nov. 29, Neris
replied that he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were
those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also

manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new

matters to be taken up. He requested that he be furbished in advance
as to what else he needs to clarify.
Issue:
1.
w/n there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system
2.
w/n there is factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by executive
privilege
3.
w/n Committees have shown that the communications elicited by
the 3 questions are critical to the exercise of their functions
4.
w/n Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the contempt order
Held:
1.
Yes. In Almonte v. Vasquez, the Court affirmed that the
presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation
of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution. The Court articulated that there are certain
types of information which the government may withhold from the
public, that there is governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters; and that the right to information does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings.
2.
Yes.
a.
Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan
does not relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power, because the Constitution does not vest it in the President
alone, but also in the Monetary Board. Quintessential is defined as
the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence
of substance. Non-delegable means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains
with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power and the final decision in the exercise of
the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President
even when it has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board because it is only a form of check and balance.
b.
Committees contend that the application of the doctrine of
operational proximity for the reason that it may be misconstrued to
expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to
communications between those who are operationally proximate to
the President by who may have no direct communications with her.

In the case at bar, the danger is absent because the official involved
here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term
advisor of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her
official family.
c.
Committees contend that the Court erred in upholding the
Presidents invocation, through Exec. Sec., of executive privilege
because
i.
Between Committees specific and demonstrated need and the
Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to
strike the balance in favor of the former
o
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive
privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in
confidentiality. The Letter dated Nov. 15 of Exec. Sec. Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and
economic relation with another sovereign nation as the bases for the
claim.
o
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction that information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of
national interest.
ii.
In the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution on government transparency, accountability,
and disclosure of information
o
The constitutional provisions cited by Committees do not
espouse an absolute right to information. It must be emphasized that
the assailed Decision did not enjoin the Committees from inquiring into
the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters
that are covered by executive privilege.
3.
No. Committees contend the information elicited by the 3
questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative function,
among them,
a.
To consider the 3 pending Senate BillsThere is simply a
generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise
of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to
pending Senate Bills. And it is further expressed by the counsel of
Committees that even without Neri answering the 3 questions, the
Senate can still come up with legislations.
b.
To curb graft and corruptionThe potential culpability of high
government officials in a given government transaction is not a task for
the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not
to determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.
4.
Yes. Committees contended that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita,
requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in

furtherance thereof is not provided for by the Constitution and is

merely an obiter dictum.
o
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. The requirements set
forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not
unduly limit Congress power. Witnesses should be adequately
informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will allow
them to prepare the pertinent information and documents.
o
The language of Sec. 21 Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that
the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules
are null and void. Onyle those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expresses in Sec. 21 Art. 6 of the Constitution.
PIM INTEL V JOINT COMMITTEE
Facts

Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed a motion on June 22, 2004 to

declare the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress
null and void, due to the adjournment of Congress on June 11, 2004.

The present Congress argued that their term of office was until
June 30, 2004.
Issue: WON the Joint Committee should be declared null and void?
Held
NO. Under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution also directs the
Congress to canvass the votes of the presidential elections, and also
prohibits them from adjourning without complying with said duty. In
this case, the present Congress cannot adjourn without canvassing the
votes of the presidential elections.
Even if the adjournment was to be considered valid, Article VIII, Section
4 of the Constitution, the term of office of the Senators shall be six
years and shall commence on the thirtieth day of June. The Court also
ruled that legislative functions of the Congress may come to a close
upon adjournment, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions,
such as being the National Board of Canvassers. In this case, as of June
22, 2004, the Joint Committee still possesses the function of
canvassing the votes of the presidential elections, for the Congress
remains in office until June 30, 2004. Thus, the Joint Committee cannot
be declared null and void.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner
Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property,
documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda
Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in
Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such
order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG
Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from
questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking
permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain
guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The
Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the
rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot
Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay
proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the

sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2
commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a
sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie
case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies
an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the
existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence
to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2
PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive
and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The

Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the
property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos
intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and

cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot
accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the
sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to
strike it down on sight.
ESTRADA V ARROYO
CLU V EXEC SEC
CRUZ V COA
NAC V COA
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile
in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to
request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order
to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines."
The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive
power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers
by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing
power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power
(Section 23).

The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be

said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
DENR V DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum
order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to
Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the
DENR Region 12 Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as
provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR
by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato
City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by
the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
BLAQUERA V ALCALA
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the productivity
incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employees one month basic salary but which amount not be less than
P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits
shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
agencies, including government boards of government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited
from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government

departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year
1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29
authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO
29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized
payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of
P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the
government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries
or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power
and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power
includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec.
17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The
Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or
nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive
benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his
power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and
awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying
the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance

from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution
of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, is his control of executive departments.
HUTCHISON PORTS V SBMA
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL)won a public
bidding made by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The
project was to develop and operate a modern marine container
terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA Board of
Directors already declared HPPL as the winner but later on, the Office
of the President reversed the decision of the Board and ordered a
rebidding. In the rebidding however, HPPL was no longer among the
qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for injunction to
enjoin SBMA from conducting the rebidding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case
against SBMA.
HELD: No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as
the winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No.
620, all projects undertaken by the SBMA are subject to the approval of
the Office of the President. Hence, the Board of SBMA is under the
control and supervision of the President of the Philippines. Therefore,
the declaration made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of
HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign corporation
registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did not register
here in the Philippines.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated transaction.
The conduct of bidding is not an isolated transaction. It is doing
business here in the Philippines. The Supreme Court emphasized that
as a general rule, doing or engaging in or transacting business in
the Philippines is a case to case basis. It has often been held that a
single act or transaction may be considered as doing business when
a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some
of the functions for which it was organized. The amount or volume of
the business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely
incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporations intention to
do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes doing business
because it shows the foreign corporations intention to engage in

business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an

exercise of the corporations reason for creation or existence.
Therefore, HPPL has done business here without license. It cannot now
sue in the Philippines without license because its participation in the
bidding is not merely an isolated transaction.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign
corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines to submit
itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to enable the
government to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of
their activities in this country.
NEA V COA
JONAS DIGEST
PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President,
insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for nonpersonal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local
fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO
372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President
consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies
and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will
help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain
any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in
local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management;
and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than
30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal

autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and
the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of
10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
HERNANDEZ V TORRES

There was a vacancy for the post of Provincial Prosecutor of

Tarlac

Bermudez was the 1st Asst Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac, who

was a recommended by DOJ Sec. Guingona.

Quiaoit was the one recommended by Congressman Jose Yap.

FVR appointed Quiaoit. Quiaoit assumed office.

Bermudez refused to vacate the office claiming that the original

copy of Quiaoits appointment had not yet been released by the DOJ
Secretary.

Bermudez and Quiaoit were both called to the office of DOJ

Secretary. Bermudez was ordered to wind up his cases and turn-over
the office to Quiaoit.

Thus, Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily

on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the
DOJ Sec. Bermudez relies on the Revised Admin Code stating that
prosecutors shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the DOJ Sec.
ISSUE: Is the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary absolutely
essential to the appointment of Quiaoit as Prosecutor?
SC: ABSOLUTELY NO.
An appointment to public office is the unequivocal act of designating or
selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to
discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
APPOINTMENT NECESSARILY CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE APPOINTING POWER.
The power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power
has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is the prerogative
of the appointing power. The RIGHT OF CHOICE IS THE HEART OF THE
POWER TO APPOINT.
The President, as HEAD OF GOVT has the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the
authority to alter or modify or even nullify or set aside what a

subordinate office has done, as well as to substitute the judgment of

the latter, as when the former deems it to be appropriate.
Hence, the President has the power TO ASSUME DIRECTLY the
functions of an executive department, bureau or office.
The recommendation of the DOJ Secretary should be interpreted to be
a MERE ADVICE, EXHORTATION, INDORSEMENT, which is essentially
persuasive in character, NOT BINDING, NOR OBLIGATORY, upon the
President. The recommendation is nothing really more than advisory in
nature.

SARMIENTO V MISON
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and Carague as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power
in appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the
CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads,
ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to
appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are

initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the

Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention.
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments
is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA V SALONGA
FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they
are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No.
163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged
ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim
appointment.
RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution,
which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President,
vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that
she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its
constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments,

cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has

reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not
apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to
remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
CALDERON V CARALE
FACTS:
(1) This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and
legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of
the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the
same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to
Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715, stating:
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to
any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
(2) Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not
decisive of the issue in this case for in the case at bar, the President
issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting
them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715)
which requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of such appointments.The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses
Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the

president to governmentofficers additional to those expressly

mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
whoseappointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby
declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
RATIO:
(1) To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it
is unconstitutional because:
(1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; and
(2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
with the President.
(2) It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in
accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the
legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.
MANALO V SISTOZA
Facts: RA 6975 was enacted by Corazon Aquino, creating DILG. Secs 26
and 31 pertain to the Chief of PNP as well as PNP officers and members
as having to be confirmed by the CA before assuming their duties.
Executive Secretary Drilon promoted the 15 respondent officers and
appointed them to the PNP in a permanent capacity. The petitioners
assail the legality of such appointment because, invoking said
provisions of RA 6975, confirmation of CA is needed. They also assail
the disbursements made out by the DMB Secretary (Salvador Enriquez
III)s for the officers salaries and emoluments.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA 6975 is a valid law

(2) Whether or not PNP officers are akin to the AFP, whose positions
need CA confirmation
(3) Whether or not Salvador Enriquez III acted with grave abuse of
discretion
Held:
(1) Partly. Secs 26 and 31 go against the Constitution because
according to Sec 16, Art 7, the PNP officers do not fall under the first
group which requires the confirmation of the CA. courts have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit delineated by the fundamental law.
However, the remainder of RA 6975 remains valid because assailed
provisions are severable from the main statute.
(2) No. The constitution expressly provides for their distinction (See
Secs 24 and 6 of Art 16). Also, RA 6975 provides that no element of
the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be
occupied by active members of the AFP.
(3) No. The disbursements and emoluments disbursed for the
respondents are valid.
Experience showed that when almost all presidential appointments
required the consent of the CA, as was the case under the 1935
Constitution, the commission became a venue for horse-trading and
similar malpractices. On the other hand, placing absolute power to
make appointments in the President with hardly any check by the
legislature as what happened under the 1973 Constitution, leads to
abuse of such powers. 1987 Constitution attempts a middle ground.
SORIANO V LISTA
Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted
by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval
Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a
petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.
Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging
the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the
law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate
or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit

because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not
involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was
transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of
the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC).
IN RE VALENZUELA
Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by
the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said
constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4
(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution
two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1)
and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments
comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably
made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of
the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies
in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no
showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the ban
DE RAMA V CA
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13,
1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the

appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his

recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said
employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the
appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC
upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had
already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena
City, and for petitioners failure to present evidence that would warrant
the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment
initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are
proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service
law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing
Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides
that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn
or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in
effect until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be
recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the
procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b)
Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; (c)
Violation of the existing collective agreement between management
and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing
civil service law, rules and regulations.
MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
LARIN V EXEC SEC
Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office of the Excise Tax Service.
In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave misconduct. His
conviction was reported to the Office of the President, at the same
time, an administrative complaint was filed with the same office. The
President then, based on the Sandiganbayan conviction, created a
committee to investigate Larin. Eventually, Larins removal was
recommended. The President dismissed Larin.
ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.

HELD: No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career

service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general rule that the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such power to remove I
with limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be found in the
fact that Larin is a career service officer and under the Administrative
Code of 1987, such officers who fall under career service are
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with
that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to
a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer,
Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can only be removed
from his office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code of
1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was his conviction in
the Sandiganbayan this is not one of those grounds enumerated in
the Administrative Code. Further, the Supreme Court notes that when
Larins conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court actually absolved Larin.
BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ
FACTS
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they
made during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez
because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then
sentenced to life imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant
Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under
the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order
to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the
14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of
the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as
charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino
was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political

offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal

prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences
of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,
and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36, RPC). While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he
is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense;
it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the
accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of
said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that
invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he
may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to
the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses
having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party,
conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants
and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding
in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to
the benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in accordance
with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as
the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the
terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to
cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or
claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the
evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
VERA V PEOPLE
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others (97 in all) were
charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo
Lozanes. They invoked the benefits of the amnesty proclamation of the
president and the case was referred to the 8th guerilla amnesty

commission. none of the petitioners admitted having committed the

crime. Vera was the only one who took the witness stand and denied
having killed lozanes. The commission said it could not take
cognizance of the case because the benefits of amnesty could only be
invoked by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting commission of
the crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of
the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided
the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied the appeal,
adding that the facts of the case showed that the victim was a member
of another guerilla group and that the murder seemed to have
stemmed from a rivalry between the two groups.
Vera brought the case to the Court of Appeals, asking the CA to also
rule, one way or another, of the murder case. But the CA ruled that
amnesty applies only to those who had admitted the fact but said they
should not be punished for the crime done was in pursuance of
resistance to the enemy. It also said it could not take cognizance of the
murder case because that came from the amnesty commission, which
had no jurisdiction over the murder case.
The case was brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People vs
Llanita, which said that it was inconsistent for an appellant to justify an
act or seek forgiveness for something which he said he has not
committed.
Held: Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have
any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain
conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove
the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the
pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability
therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring
the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.
CRISTOBAL V LABARADOR
Cristobal vs Labrador is a petition for a review of the lower courts
decision on an election case.
On March 15 1930, Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and
sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and the accessories, and to
return the amount taken. Despite this, Santos continued to be a
registered elector in Malabon, Rizal, and between 1934 and 1937 even
served as municipal president. On August 22 1938 the Election Code
was approved, which had a provision that disqualifies Santos from
voting, having been declared by final judgment guilty of a crime
against property. Santos applied with the President for an absolute
pardon, which was given him on December 24 1939. The pardon said
that his full civil and political rights were restored except that his right

to hold public office was limited only to positions which involved no

money or property responsibility.
On November 16, 1940, Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos
excluded from the voters list on the basis of sec 94 of the
Commonwealth Act no. 357. The court ruled that the pardon given
Santos excluded him from the disqualification created by the New
Election Code.
Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not extend
to the enjoyment of political rights, for that would allow the President
to encroach on the powers of the legislature, in effect exempting some
people from the effects of the law. Cristobal said the pardoning power
of the Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions and would
amount to an unlawful exercise of the Executive of a legislative
function.
The Court ruled that the Constitution imposes only two limits on the
power of clemency: that it be exercised after conviction, and that it
does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted
or controlled by legislative action.
Held: Saying that paragraph b of section 94 of Commonwealth Act no
357 does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the
Chief Executive would lead to the impairment of this power.
PELOBELLO V PALATINO
JONAS DIGEST
IN RE LONTOK
Marcelino Lontok, a lawyer, was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to
8 years imprisonment on February 27 1918. This was confirmed by the
Supreme Court on September 18, 1919.
On February 9, 1921, he was pardoned by the Governor General on
the condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct.
A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred
because he has convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Lontok however argued that pardon reaches the offense and blots it
out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
Ratio: When proceedings to strike an attorneys name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a
conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has
been granted.
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the
professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has
culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the
effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his

act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding,

inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that
the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit
or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
Ex parte Garland was cited, in which a lawyer pardoned by the
president being a member of the confederate congress during the
secession of the South was allowed to practice law, although lawyers
were supposed to take an oath saying they have never aided any
government hostile to the US.
It was held that the exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for
the offense would be to enforce a punishment for the offense, when he
has already been pardoned for it. This the court had no right to do.
HELD: Petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and the
proceedings must be dismissed.
TORRES V GONZALES
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws
again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against
in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring
that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions
of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet
final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a
court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his
pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final

judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for

the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted
and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon
has or have been violated. To no other department of the Government
[has] such power been intrusted.
AQUINO V ENRILE
OLAQUER V MV
NAVALES V ABAYA
LANSANG V GARCIA
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party
caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889
which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos
urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups.
Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia
for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the
validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does
not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had
the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to
annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly,
hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including
two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was
divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected
lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there
was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign

to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC

unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
IN RE DE VILLA
DAVID V ARROYO
CONSTANTINO V CUISIA
PEOPLES MOVEMENT FOR PRESS FREEDOM V MANGLAPUS
COMM OF CUSTOMS V EASTERN SEA TRADING
GO TEK V DEPORTATION BOARD
BELTRAN V MACASIAR
GLORIA V CA
MMDA V JANCOM
PEOPLE V GACOTT
MERALCO V PASAY TRANS CO
GARCIA V MACARAIG
NITAFAN V COMM OF INTERNAL REVENUE
IN RE GONZALES
SANTIAGO V BAUTISTA
FELIPE V LEUTETRIO
PRUDENTIAL BANK V CASTRO
CONSING V CA
CRUZ V DENR
VALLADOLID V INCIONG
NUNAL V COA
PEOPLE V BULGARIAN
HERFANDEN V CA
YAO V CA
DIZON V JUDGE LOPEZ
ASIAVEST V CA
TICHANGCO V ENRIQUEZ
FR. MARTINEZ V CA
RE: DEKAYS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
IN RE DEMETRIA
PEOPLE V PILOTING
MONDIGUING V ABAD
PEOPLE V SOLA
ZALDIVAR V GONZALES
IN RE CUNANAN
AGUIRRE V RANA BAR MATTER
IN RE EDILLON
IN RE IBP ELECTIONS
DE LA LLANA V ALBA