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Notes

This is an overly confusing affirmative, so if you have any


questions come talk to me. If you cant find me then Leo wrote
this aff and you can talk to him too. He doesnt bite, but dont
talk to Henry, because he does bite.

-Crawford K.

1NC

Neoliberalism K
The Deleuzian thesis of the 1AC has been coopted by
neoliberalism
Vandenberghe 8Frdric Vandenberghe, a research professor in sociology at
the Institute of Social and Political Studies, 2008 (Deleuzian Capitalism, Available
online at http://www.academia.edu/859731/Deleuzian_capitalism, Accessed on
7/22/15)
A quarter of a century later, the process of accumulation has accelerated to the
point that capitalism itself has become Deleuzian in form, in style and in content.
This junction is not accidental. As usual, an ironic and profoundly perverse
relationship exists between the romantic ethic and the spirit of capitalism
(Campbell, 1987: 20227). Needless to say that I am not claiming that Deleuzes
libertarian critique of capitalism was anti-critical or phoney from the start and that
Deleuze is somehow the Giddens of the 1970s: a neo-liberal disguised as a
libertarian, or Thatcheron LSD. What I am claiming is, rather, that capitalism has
progressively integrated the critique of capitalism into its mode of functioning, with
the result that capitalism appears stronger than ever, whereas the critique of
capitalism seems rather disarmed
In their magisterial analysis of the new spirit of capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello
(1999: 24190) have convincingly demonstrated that capitalism has coopted the
postmodernizing critique of the 1960s and 1970s and used it as a way to reorganize
itself and expand innitely. The industrially organized capitalism of the golden
thirties (194573) was essentially Fordist. Bureaucratic, hierarchical, pyramidal and
centrally controlled, planned and taylorized, oriented to the mass production of
standardized goods, it was elephantine, rigid and alienating. The neo-corporatist
arrangement between the state, the employers and the unions guaranteed job
security, an indexed income, a steady career track and apension, but this security
hardly compensated for the employees lack of autonomy. Attacking the
dehumanizing and disciplining, massifying and standardizing nature of the
capitalist-bureaucratic-technical-totalitarian society of planned exploitation and
directed consumption (Lefebvre) in the name of spontaneity, creativity and
authenticity, the libertarian left took over the artistic critique of capitalism of the
bohemians and trans-lated their grievances in a language that was inspired by
surrealism and the masters of suspicion (Marx, Freud and Nietzsche). At rst, the
capitalists reacted to the artistic critique of the soixante-huitards in a traditional
way. They negotiated with the unions about quantitative demands and granted a
pay-rise but, realizing that the critique did not abate in spite of the concessions,
they opened discus-sions with the unions about the qualitative demands . To solve
the moti-vational crisis among the ranks of the disenchanted workers, they started
introducing changes in the workplace that granted more autonomy to the workers.
As the increase of freedom was being paid by a decrease insecurity, the result was
most ambivalent. Through this change of politics, autonomy was somehow
exchanged against security (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999: 274).

The impact is extinction neoliberal social organization


ensures extinction from resource wars, climate change, and
structural violence only accelerating beyond neoliberalism
can resolve its impacts
Williams & Srnicek 13
(Alex, PhD student at the University of East London, presently at work on a thesis
entitled 'Hegemony and Complexity', Nick, PhD candidate in International Relations
at the London School of Economics, Co-authors of the forthcoming Folk Politics, 14
May 2013, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-anaccelerationist-politics/)
At the beginning of the second decade of the Twenty-First Century, global
civilization faces a new breed of cataclysm. These coming apocalypses ridicule
the norms and organisational structures of the politics which were forged in the
birth of the nation-state, the rise of capitalism, and a Twentieth Century of unprecedented wars. 2. Most significant is the breakdown of the planetary
climatic system. In time, this threatens the continued existence of the
present global human population. Though this is the most critical of the threats
which face humanity, a series of lesser but potentially equally destabilising
problems exist alongside and intersect with it. Terminal resource depletion,
especially in water and energy reserves, offers the prospect of mass
starvation, collapsing economic paradigms, and new hot and cold wars.
Continued financial crisis has led governments to embrace the paralyzing
death spiral policies of austerity, privatisation of social welfare services,
mass unemployment, and stagnating wages. Increasing automation in
production processes including intellectual labour is evidence of the secular
crisis of capitalism, soon to render it incapable of maintaining current
standards of living for even the former middle classes of the global north. 3. In
contrast to these ever-accelerating catastrophes, todays politics is beset by an
inability to generate the new ideas and modes of organisation necessary to
transform our societies to confront and resolve the coming annihilations.
While crisis gathers force and speed, politics withers and retreats. In this paralysis
of the political imaginary, the future has been cancelled. 4. Since 1979, the
hegemonic global political ideology has been neoliberalism, found in some
variant throughout the leading economic powers. In spite of the deep structural
challenges the new global problems present to it, most immediately the credit, nancial, and scal crises since 20078, neoliberal programmes have only
evolved in the sense of deepening. This continuation of the neoliberal project, or
neoliberalism 2.0, has begun to apply another round of structural
adjustments, most signicantly in the form of encouraging new and aggressive
incursions by the private sector into what remains of social democratic institutions
and services. This is in spite of the immediately negative economic and social
effects of such policies, and the longer term fundamental barriers posed by the
new global crises.

The alternative articulates a counter-conduct voting neg


pushes towards a cooperative conduct that organizes
individuals around a collectively shared commons affirming
this conduct creates a new heuristic that de-couples
government from the demand for competition and production
Dardot & Laval 13
(Pierre Dardot, philosopher and specialist in Hegel and Marx, Christian Laval,
professor of sociology at the Universite Paris Ouest Nanterre La Defense, The New
Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society, pgs. 318-321)
This indicates to what extent we must take on board in our own way the main
lesson of neo-liberalism: the subject is always to be constructed. The whole
question is then how to articulate subjectivation with resistance to power.
Now, precisely this issue is at the heart of all of Foucaults thought. However, as Jeffrey T. Nealon has recently shown, part of the North American
secondary literature has, on the contrary, stressed the alleged break between Foucaults research on power and that of his last period on the history of
subjectivity.55 According to the Foucault consensus, as Nealon aptly dubs it, the successive impasses of the initial neo-structuralism, and then of the
totalizing analysis of panoptical power, led the last Foucault to set aside the issue of power and concern himself exclusively with the aesthetic invention
of a style of existence bereft of any political dimension. Furthermore, if we follow this de-politicizing reading of Foucault, the aestheticization of ethics
anticipated the neo-liberal mutation precisely by making self-invention a new norm. In reality, far from being oblivious of one another, the issues of power
and the subject were always closely articulated, even in the last work on modes of subjectivation. If one concept played a decisive role in this respect, it
was counter-conduct, as developed in the lecture of 1 March 1978.56 This lecture was largely focused on the crisis of the pastorate. It involved

forms of resistance of conduct that are the correlate of


the pastoral mode of power. If such forms of resistance are said to be of conduct, it
is because they are forms of resistance to power as conduct and, as such, are
themselves forms of conduct opposed to this power-conduct. The term
conduct in fact admits of two meanings: an activity that consists in
conducting others, or conduction; and the way one conducts oneself
under the influence of this activity of conduction.57 The idea of counterconduct therefore has the advantage of directly signifying a struggle
against the procedures implemented for conducting others , unlike the
term misconduct, which only refers to the passive sense of the word.58
Through counter-conduct, people seek both to escape conduction by
others and to define a way of conducting themselves towards others.
What relevance might this observation have for a reflection on resistance to
neo-liberal governmentality? It will be said that the concept is introduced in the
context of an analysis of the pastorate, not government. Governmentality, at least
in its specically neo-liberal form, precisely makes conducting others
through their conduct towards themselves its real goal. The peculiarity of
this conduct towards oneself, conducting oneself as a personal enterprise, is
that it immediately and directly induces a certain conduct towards others:
competition with others, regarded as so many personal enterprises. Consequently, counter-conduct as a form of resistance to
identifying the specicity of the revolts or

this governmentality must correspond to a conduct that is indivisibly a conduct towards oneself and a conduct towards others. One cannot struggle
against such an indirect mode of conduction by appealing for rebellion against an authority that supposedly operates through compulsion external to
individuals. If politics is nothing more and nothing less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the rst revolt, the rst
confrontation,59 it means that ethics and politics are absolutely inseparable. To the subjectivation-subjection represented by ultra-subjectivation, we

To neo-liberal governmentality as a specific


way of conducting the conduct of others, we must therefore oppose a no
less specific double refusal: a refusal to conduct oneself towards oneself
as a personal enterprise and a refusal to conduct oneself towards others
in accordance with the norm of competition. As such, the double refusal is not
passive disobedience.60 For, if it is true that the personal enterprises
must oppose a subjectivation by forms of counter-conduct.

relationship to the self immediately and directly determines a certain kind


of relationship to others generalized competition conversely, the
refusal to function as a personal enterprise, which is self-distance and a
refusal to line up in the race for performance, can only practically occur on
condition of establishing cooperative relations with others, sharing and
pooling. In fact, where would be the sense in a self-distance severed from
any cooperative practice? At worst, a cynicism tinged with contempt for those who are dupes. At best, simulation or double
dealing, possibly dictated by a wholly justied concern for self-preservation, but ultimately exhausting for the subject. Certainly not a counter-conduct. All

such a game could lead the subject, for want of anything better,
to take refuge in a compensatory identity, which at least has the advantage of
some stability by contrast with the imperative of indenite self-transcendence. Far
from threatening the neo-liberal order, fixation with identity, whatever its
nature, looks like a fall-back position for subjects weary of themselves, for
all those who have abandoned the race or been excluded from it from the outset.
Worse, it recreates the logic of competition at the level of relations
between little communities. Far from being valuable in itself,
independently of any articulation with politics, individual subjectivation is
bound up at its very core with collective subjectivation. In this sense, sheer
aestheticization of ethics is a pure and simple abandonment of a genuinely ethical
attitude. The invention of new forms of existence can only be a collective
act, attributable to the multiplication and intensification of cooperative
counter-conduct. A collective refusal to work more, if only local, is a good example of an attitude that can pave the way for such forms
the more so in that

of counter-conduct. In effect, it breaks what Andr Gorz quite rightly called the structural complicity that binds the worker to capital, in as much as
earning money, ever more money, is the decisive goal for both. It makes an initial breach in the immanent constraint of the ever more, ever more

The genealogy of neo-liberalism attempted in this book teaches us


that the new global rationality is in no wise an inevitable fate shackling
humanity. Unlike Hegelian Reason, it is not the reason of human history. It is itself
wholly historical that is, relative to strictly singular conditions that cannot
legitimately be regarded as untranscendable. The main thing is to understand that nothing can release us
rapidly.61

from the task of promoting a different rationality. That is why the belief that the nancial crisis by itself sounds the death-knell of neo-liberal capitalism is
the worst of beliefs. It is possibly a source of pleasure to those who think they are witnessing reality running ahead of their desires, without them having to
move their little nger. It certainly comforts those for whom it is an opportunity to celebrate their own past clairvoyance. At bottom, it is the least
acceptable form of intellectual and political abdication. Neo-liberalism is not falling like a ripe fruit on account of its internal contradictions; and traders

There
are only human beings who act in given conditions and seek through their
action to open up a future for themselves. It is up to us to enable a new
sense of possibility to blaze a trail. The government of human beings can be
aligned with horizons other than those of maximizing performance,
unlimited production and generalized control. It can sustain itself with
self-government that opens onto different relations with others than that
of competition between self-enterprising actors. The practices of
communization of knowledge, mutual aid and cooperative work can
delineate the features of a different world reason. Such an alternative
reason cannot be better designated than by the term reason of the
commons.
will not be its undreamed-of gravediggers despite themselves. Marx had already made the point powerfully: History does nothing.62

Overconformity Counter Advocacy


_________ and I advocate for the strict following of the law and
avoidance of the obscene underside of the law.
This solves the 1AC bestengagement in the obscene
underside of the law through the 1AC props up the system
only through strictly following the law can we tear down the
system
Krips 10Henry Krips, the Andrew W. Mellon All-Claremont Chair of Humanities
and Professor of Cultural Studies at Claremont Graduate University, 2010 (The
Politics of the Gaze: Foucault, Lacan and iek, Available online at
http://www.cultureunbound.ep.liu.se/v2/a06/cu10v2a6.pdf, accessed on 7/20/15)
Central to ieks account of the modern state is the concept of an obscene
underside of the law , namely widespread practices petty tax evasion, speeding,
walking on the grass, etc which, although strictly speaking illicit, are unofficially
tolerated. This network of practices is sustained thanks to what iek calls an
ideological phantasy that keeps them an open secret everyone knows about
and participates in them in private, but no one mentions them, let alone publicly
flaunts participating in them. Such practices constitute points of failure of the law in
so far as they fall in an indeterminate zone in relation to legal categories: on the
one hand, in so far as they are tolerated they are not straightforwardly illegal, but,
on the other hand, neither are they legal; and as such, constitute a fundamental
illegality at the heart of the legal system. ieks point is that, rather than
undermining the law, the obscene underside of the law sustains it the law is
tolerated because of the little secret pleasures that people derive from its obscene
underside. In Lacanian terms, we may say that the obscene underside of the law is
the set of necessary but repressed points of failure of the legal system in short, it
is the symptom of the legal system. In particular, in the context of a legal state
apparatus that is held in place by a panoptic system of surveillance, the obscene
underside of the law is a liminal zone of high anxiety tha t, like the Emperors body
under his new clothes, is obscenely visible to each of his subjects in the privacy of
their own visual eld, yet must be shrouded in a cloak of invisibility in the public
realm. This is the site of the gaze. How are we to oppose such a system, which
seemingly coexists with, indeed depends upon its own systematic transgression ?
According to iek, not by acts of resistance, since the system is readily able to
accommodate, indeed depends upon such acts. 6 Instead, iek suggests
opposition through acts of overconformity, which, rather than protesting let alone
breaking the law, insist upon it to the letter, even when ideological common sense
suggests otherwise. In particular, this means a refusal to turn a blind eye from
manifestations of laws obscene underside. As iek puts it: Sometimes, at least
the truly subversive thing is not to disregard the explicit letter of Law on behalf of
the underlying fantasies, but to stick to this letter against the fantasy which
sustains it.Is not an exemplary case of such subversion-through-identication
provided by Jaroslav Hseks The Good Soldier Schweik, the novel whose hero

wreaks total havoc by simply executing the orders of his superiors in an overzealous
and all-too-literal way (iek 1997: 30, 22, 31).

Case
1. This aff has zero solvencytwo people sitting in a room
affirming life resistance does not make any meaningful change,
and affirming their methodology is not a reason to vote aff.
2. They cant solve for deterritorialization because lines of
flight are static, and even if they do, deterritorialization can
restrict freedom
Bogard 6William Bogard, Raymond and Elsie Gipson DeBurgh Chair in the
Social Sciences, 2006 (Theorizing Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond,
Accessed online at https://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=t_J8AgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=theorizing+surveillance+the+p
anopticon+and+beyond+d+lyon&ots=gRaZxWldza&sig=jb9tMPT3Od54DLdMY5pCp
be9eiM#v=onepage&q=100&f=false, Accessed on 7/21/15)
Lyon notes that surveillance has a dual function, to both constrain and enable social
relations (in information societies, electronic surveillance is a means of control that
also generates the token trust necessary for social transactions) (Lyon 1994; Lyon
2001: 27). We can also understand surveillance in terms of capture and flight.
Capture involves xing or arresting a flow surveillance as a mode of
territorialization, determination, verication and identication, normalization, and so
on. Surveillance as flight, on the other hand, refers to its role in releasing a flow
escape, deterritorialization, indetermination and resistance. Flight and capture are
not opposed terms, however. Deleuze and Guattari note that some lines of flight can
become xed in their direction, speed, intensity, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:
2146). Surveillance becomes a police power (in the broad sense) precisely to the
extent that it arrests flows of information. In the same way, deterritorialization does
not always imply freedom. Postpanoptic surveillance has evolved deterritorialized
controls that radically subvert the movement to free societies . Hardt and Negri note,
for instance, that deterritorialized information networks are central to the
production and organization of global civil war and the global policing of society
(Hardt and Negri 2004: 1232).

3. The global surveillance system allows for surveillance both


ways and eliminates the binary of observer and observed
Bogard 6William Bogard, Raymond and Elsie Gipson DeBurgh Chair in the
Social Sciences, 2006 (Theorizing Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond,
Accessed online at https://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=t_J8AgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=theorizing+surveillance+the+p
anopticon+and+beyond+d+lyon&ots=gRaZxWldza&sig=jb9tMPT3Od54DLdMY5pCp
be9eiM#v=onepage&q=100&f=false, Accessed on 7/21/15)
On the other hand, if the emerging network Of global surveillance is an open system
in which each information node can and must connect to every oth er, then it makes
sense to call this system a rhizome.2 Certainly, surveillance today is more
decentralized, less subject to spatial and temporal constraints (location, time of day,

etc.), and less organized than ever before by the dualisms Of observer and
observed, subject and object, individual and mass. The system of control is
deterritorializing, and the effects of this are to intensify but also, in a very real
sense, to democratize surveillance. The very logic Of information networks that
information must be free to flow between any part of the system, for surveillance
means more ways to observe the Observers, bypass their rewalls, access their
databases and decode their communications. The question today is whether centres
of power states or corporations can control the global networks their Own
information requirements push them to produce. Certainly, they can make some
kinds of information very difficult to access, and this is easier for them the more
networks are like trees (where all branches emanate from a single trunk or central
stem). But if networks are rhizomes, information becomes next to impossible to
secure, and no rewall, password or encryption technology works for long. If
networks are rhizomes, power based on security Or secrecy has good reason to be
concerned.

4. Haggerty misinterprets Foucaultthe gaze isnt


unidirectional
Caluya 10Gilbert Caluya, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Hawke Research
Institute in the University of South Australia, 2010 (The post-panoptic society?
Reassessing Foucault in surveillance studies, September 15, Available online at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13504630.2010.509565, Accessed on
7/20/15)
Despite Haggerty and Ericsons allusion to Foucaults theory of power, it is clear that
they have misinterpreted it when they suggest that Foucaults panopticon could be
read as an extension of Orwells Big Brother. Similarly, Mathiesen makes the
mistake of fetishising the power of the gaze and failing to see how the gaze is only a
mechanism of power within a certain concrete assemblage. Both articles presume
the gaze to be unidirectional, both make the mistake of presuming the gaze to have
an inherent power and, importantly, both reinstate a sovereign subject behind
power. This is obvious from their fetishisation of the watcher as opposed to the
watched. Far from moving beyond Foucault their conception of power is decidedly
pre-Foucault; in emphasising the power of vision in Foucault, they miss Foucaults
vision of power. The question, it seems to me, is not whether we are a postpanoptical society, but whether the microphysics of power is no longer
conceptually useful.

5. Surveillance is rhizomatic and can be used to undermine


government control
Bogard 6William Bogard, Raymond and Elsie Gipson DeBurgh Chair in the
Social Sciences, 2006 (Theorizing Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond,
Accessed online at https://books.google.com/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=t_J8AgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=theorizing+surveillance+the+p
anopticon+and+beyond+d+lyon&ots=gRaZxWldza&sig=jb9tMPT3Od54DLdMY5pCp
be9eiM#v=onepage&q=100&f=false, Accessed on 7/21/15)

On the positive side, flows Of information in the global surveillance network are
never completely xed. A network is like a rhizome to the extent that any node in it
must connect to any other (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7). Ultimately no police
power is capable of controlling the deterritorialization of surveillance , because the
number of virtual connections in a rhizomatic network always exceeds the number
that can actually be monitored (if one path is blocked, another can be found). If
surveillance is about control and the police, it also has these 'anti- police', 'anticontrol' tendencies too, immanent to its deterritorialization. We see these
tendencies at work in resistant practices like le sharing and copying, hacking and
cracking, reverse engineering, spamming, identity theft, communications jamming,
and many more. Of course, these are police practices too, perhaps originally so,
since they are all means of information control. The difference is that the police try
to retain exclusive control of them, or block their use by anti-control forces with
rewalls, encryption, etc. (themselves resistant technologies). The tendency of
surveillance assemblages, information networks, and power relations generally,
however, to develop rhizomatic connections, suggests that exclusionary strategies
of information control are unlikely to succeed.

6. Even though the current system was founded on biopolitics,


Government control has become a system of biopolitical
production. This enables collaboration and allows us to control
our own lives.
Lyon 6David Lyon, directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of
Sociology, holds a Queens Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in
the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, 2006 (Theorizing
Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond, Accessed online at
https://www.scribd.com/doc/180770064/David-Lyon-Theorizing-surveillance-thepanoptic-Bookos-org-pdf#, Accessed on 7/21/15)
The new common, however, organized by biopower and subject to the controls of
networked surveillance, also has liberatory and democratic potentials, which Hardt
and Negri locate in what they call biopolitical production, the production of the
multitude (which for them has replaced industrial labour as the postmodern force
of revolutionary change) (Hardt and Negri 2004). Biopolitical production is not
biopower, although it is not the opposite of biopower either. Both engage the
production of life and social relations in their entirety, but in very different ways.
Hardt and Negri write, Biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereign
authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to
society and creates social relations and forms through collaborative forms of labor
(Hardt and Negri 2004: 945). Biopower is the new form of empire, whereas
biopolitical production is the new form of resistance to empire. Both are effects of
changes in the organization of production brought about by the advent of
postmodern systems of control; that is, by transformations in the surveillance
assemblage and the expansion of information networks. In arguments reminiscent
of Marx that the development of the means of global communication creates the
potential for the revolutionary organization of labour, they show how global

information systems have destabilized not only traditional forms of private property
and have cut across class divisions, but also race, gender and other hierarchies,
producing a common poverty from which new forms of democratic participation
and social creativity can emerge. It is as if biopower, the system of sovereign
control supported by global surveillance and the culture of war and fear, had
produced the very communicative and geopolitical conditions necessary for the
development of a shared humanity. Hardt and Negri are quick to point out, however,
that the idea of a new common does not imply the sameness of its elements or
some transcendent identity standing over society, but rather consists of
singularities whose differences constitute a heterogeneous multiplicity capable of
spontaneous organization and the power to deconstruct the global sovereign regime
of biopower (Hardt and Negri 2004: 1289). Today, despite differences of class, race,
gender, nation, occupation, language, religion, age, etc., new forms of resistance
are arising grounded in the common subjection of the global population to the
imperatives of biopower, and its common transformation of labour into a global
network of informated production.

7. Only through utilizing the surveillance assemblage as a tool


can we actually fight back against biopower
Lyon 6David Lyon, directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of
Sociology, holds a Queens Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in
the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, 2006 (Theorizing
Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond, Accessed online at
https://www.scribd.com/doc/180770064/David-Lyon-Theorizing-surveillance-thepanoptic-Bookos-org-pdf#, Accessed on 7/21/15)
Ironically, the surveillance assemblage has opened a new deterritorialized space of
communication that with time may undermine the regime of global biopower.
Biopower depends on the control of information, but also on the rhizomatic qualities
of networks to facilitate global production and coordinate the global division of
labour. These are contradictory ends, but beyond that, they point to a new refuge
from power in networks that is absent in panoptic systems. In the latter, one had to
nd a space within a conned area where one could hide in plain sight. In the
former, one can hide in all the multiplicity of ways information provides, and the
possibilities of resistance are greatly expanded.

2NC

Counter Advocacy
The counter advocacy solves best
Krips 10Henry Krips, the Andrew W. Mellon All-Claremont Chair of Humanities
and Professor of Cultural Studies at Claremont Graduate University, 2010 (The
Politics of the Gaze: Foucault, Lacan and iek, Available online at
http://www.cultureunbound.ep.liu.se/v2/a06/cu10v2a6.pdf, accessed on 7/26/15)
What constitutes such strategies of overconformity in the context of a modern
panoptic regime of surveillance? Answer: openly/publicly sticking to the letter of the
law by refusing the cloak of invisibility that shrouds the laws points of failure; in
other words, by refusing to indulge what iek calls the ideological fantasy ,
orchestrating a direct encounter with the objet a qua gaze. To put it in ieks
terms, it is a matter of actively endorsing the passive confrontation with the objet
a, bypassing the intermediate role of the screen of fantas y (iek 1997: 31). To be
specic, it is matter of not merely saying but also acting out publicly what everyone
knows in private but dares not say : not merely announcing in public that the
Emperor is naked, but arresting him for indecent exposure. By Lacanianizing
Foucault, as I have done here, we are able to understand the logic behind such
heterodox strategies for opposing modern regimes of surveillance

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