1AC v Harker EM

Framework
The rez is a question of state obligations since the state alone has the
power to prohibit nuclear power prefer actor specific obligations since
they differ police have a duty to arrest criminals but civilians dont.
This is different from individual morality the state doesnt have an
intent since policymakers pass laws for different reasons, and doesnt
have the reflexive capacity of individuals so it cant be valued
intrinsically. Policymakers have to use util. Goodin
Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], The Utilitarian Response,
pgs 141-142

there is something special

about the situation of public officials that makes
utilitarianism more probable for them than private
individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that
My larger argument turns on the proposition that

makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary

Consider,
first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are
obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and
uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices public and
private alike are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course . But in the
nature of things, private individuals will usually have more
complete information on the peculiarities of their own
circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative
possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in
contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects
that their choices will have on individuals, one by one.
What they typically do know are generalities: averages
and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most
people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to
allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus
and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism.

assuming they want to use it at all to choose general rules or conduct.

So the standard is minimizing suffering

First, we should preserve our future ability to find moral truths.
Bostrom 12
Nick Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority, 2012. NS

moral uncertainty suggest an alternative,

way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate.
Our present understanding of axiology might well be
These reflections on
complementary

confused. We may not now knowat least not in concrete detailwhat

outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we
might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of
our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our
ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a
great option value in preservingand ideally improvingour ability
to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly.
Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity
with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way
available to us to increase the probability that the future
will contain a lot of value.
Second, role-playing as the government is key to real world education
3 unique reasons. Joyner 99
Joyner 99 (Christopher, Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown
University, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW: VIEWS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLITICAL
SCIENTIST, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Spring, lexis)

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for

education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help
students understand different perspectives on a policy
issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student
participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy
alternatives and experiencing the consequences of
different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a
formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a
well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges
to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various
United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to
United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in
question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of:
"Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United
States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or
"Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill
Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of
international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the
United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States
foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good
law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the
average undergraduate. [*386] By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize
that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures
get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic
law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In

this way,

gives students the benefits ascribed to

simulations and other action learning techniques, in that
it makes them become actively engaged with their
subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators,
students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and
legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific
educational objectives. First, students on each team must
work together to refine a cogent argument that
compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign
policy issue confronting the United States. In this way,
they gain greater insight into the real-world legal
dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work
with other members of their team, they realize the
the debate format

complexities of applying and implementing international

law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between
United States policy and international legal principles,
either by reworking the former or creatively
reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates
forces students to become familiarized with
contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy
agenda and the role that international law plays in
formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate
thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students
beyond stale arguments over principles into the real
world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal
defense.

Plan
Plan Text: Countries ought to prohibit the production of Russian state
owned nuclear power. Blomme 15
Brian Blomme (Climate and energy communications manager for Greenpeace International), Count on the nuclear industry to have strange
things happen, 7/7/15, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/nuclear-reaction/Rosatom-Finnish-nuclear-project/blog/53456/
VC

There's more. Mikhail Zhukov heads up Inteco, which used to be owned by the richest woman in
Russia, Yelena Baturina. She happens to be married to Yuri Lukov, the former mayor of Moscow.
Baturina sold Inteco to 50% state-owned Sberbank and to billionaire Mihail Shishkanov. Sberbank

Greenpeace
warned the Finnish government to carefully examine the
license application by Fennovoima to ensure it meets
ownership criteria and is in best interests of the country.
But the concerns are bigger than Finland. As our Finnish program
manager, Sini Harkki, said: "This game that Fennovoima and Rosatom
appear to be playing should be a concern to any country
that is in discussions with Rosatom regarding building
nuclear reactors. If the state corporation is ready to play
a game with something as simple as ownership rules,
what else will it play games with in building a dangerous
reactor?" Rosatom is actively pursuing nuclear contracts
around the world. And this warning is something many
is an essential financier of Rosatom. Given these unsettling findings,

other countries should heed . In October 2014, Greenpeace released a report

on the problems with Rosatom and the Russian nuclear industry. This ownership
game appears to be consistent with the kinds of problems
that plague Rosatom and should be required reading for
politicians in any country thinking of cutting a deal with
Rosatom. Fennovoima and Rosatom looked for years for investors. Yet it only took a few
days to expose what appears to be a hoax, and a front for Russian capital. That's not the end of
nuclear problems in Finland. The country is suffering through a protracted mess with Areva, the
French nuclear company, over the building the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear plant. The project is years late
and billions over budget with no end to the problems in sight. With lessons like those from
Rosatom and Areva's Finnish nuclear projects, it is no wonder that in Finland the public majority is
against nuclear. In spite of the people's will, Finland's current energy strategy relies on nuclear.

it
is time to reconsider that strategy, listen to the will of the Finnish citizens,
But with ample renewable resources to be developed and the usual mess with nuclear projects,
and move into the nuclear-free clean-energy future.

Rosatoms nuclear empire is on the rise now. Kraev 16

Kamen Kraev. June 28, 2016. Russias nuclear energy expansion a geopolitical footprint? http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-andcommentary/2040-russia-s-nuclear-energy-expansion-a-geopolitical-footprint LM

Russia has currently 35 nuclear reactor units in

commercial operation, generating roughly 25 gigawatts
(GW) of power annually. This covered about 19 per cent
of Russias total electricity production in 2015, according to the
The background

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The bulk of Russias reactor fleet in operation has
been commissioned in the 1970s and 1980s and has already been through lifetime extensions

Russias traditional market for

nuclear technologies and nuclear fuel has been in Central
beyond the initial 30 years of service.

and Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. Bulgaria,

Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (at the time
Czechoslovakia) have all built and commissioned a
number of Soviet-designed pressurised water reactors of
the VVER type while they were virtual satellites of the Soviet Union (USSR).
Ukraine remains the second largest operator of Russiandesigned rectors in the world with its fleet of 15 VVERs.
Poland, Romania, and ex-Yugoslavia were the only non-Western European countries during the
Cold War which did not use Russian reactor technology for power generation. Beyond Europe ,

Russian-designed nuclear reactors are being operated in

India, Iran, and China. Nuclear ambitions Over the past decade
state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom and its network
of subsidiaries have made direct or indirect commitments
to build nuclear power plants in a number of countries
around the world. As stated by a Rosatom official in a recent interview, Russia
has signed intergovernmental agreements for the
possible construction of 36 nuclear reactors overseas and
is holding active and consistent tendering negotiations
about 21 others. It is apparent that Russia seems to be looking
away from Europe and its traditional markets in search of
new business opportunities for its nuclear industry. During the
Russia ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit held on 19 and 20 May in Sochi,
Russias president Vladimir Putin said his country is ready to provide a Generation III nuclear
reactor technology to countries in Southeast Asia. Another Rosatom official called for Africa to
invest in nuclear energy during an annual energy forum in Johannesburg in February 2016.

Rosatom is terrible safety issues, environmental degradation, prolif,

and massive corruption. Ulrich et al. 14
Kendra Ulrich, Jehki Harkonen and Brian Blomme, ROSATOM RISKS: EXPOSING THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF RUSSIAS STATE NUCLEAR
CORPORATION, October 2014, http://www.greenpeace.org/hungary/PageFiles/636986/rosatom_risks.pdf VC

As a Russian state-backed entity that oversees almost every aspect of Russias civil and military

Rosatom is one of the largest nuclear

vendors in the global market. Yet problems are rampant,
due to its very size and the scale of its operations, its
entrenchment within the Russian government and the
revolving door between government officials and
Rosatom top management, and the lack of truly
independent oversight over the company. One of Rosatoms
nuclear programmes,

predecessor entities oversaw the worlds worst nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. Although the

its more recent

safety record exposes that little has changed in terms of
its safety culture both within Russia and in other
countries to which it exports nuclear technology. Plagued with
safety violations and accidents, lacking an adequate skilled workforce,
using the equivalent of low-skilled, forced labour on
reactor sites, and having an absence of adequate quality
controls, Rosatoms reactors pose an unacceptable risk to
the public both within Russia and abroad. The pervasive
corporation now says that it has learned from the catastrophe,

corruption within the company that has come to light in

recent years not only reveals the inordinate potential for
the siphoning of public funds some of which were
intended to promote nuclear safety into wealthy private
accounts, but also casts serious doubts on the ability of
the Russian government to ensure such gross violations
do not occur again. Rosatom has enormous ambitions to expand its nuclear
programme globally. Fuelled by Russian federal money and income from oil and gas exports,

the state corporation aims to vastly expand its global

nuclear fleet via its Build-Own-Operate model. This ambition seems less focused on
investing in smart economic ventures than on other potentially motivating factors. Yet, even with

analysts have still

raised significant doubts as to whether it is possible for
any one operator to adequately finance so many nuclear
projects as the financial burden would be enormous if
not impossible to bear. Rosatoms claims are inflated but their
ambition remains unchecked. Further, both within Russia and in other
countries, Rosatoms nuclear construction projects have not
only been characterised by a lack of proper quality
control and safety concerns, but also by delays and cost
overruns like the nuclear industry everywhere else. In cases where investors have put in
their own funds, rather than leaving financing up to Rosatom, potential customers are
either waiting for energy they thought they would have
years earlier, or are left with an enormously growing
expense. Alternatively, as in the case of Bulgaria, they end up terminating the project after
realising that the bill had more than doubled.239 Finally, Rosatoms spent-fuel
reprocessing leads to large-scale releases of radioactivity
into the environment and increased health risks to the
general population, as well as to a major risk of accidents
and to an even greater spread of contamination. The proposal to
the funding of the Russian government behind Rosatom,

take back spent-fuel waste from reactors supplied by Rosatom but operated overseas not only
fails to remove the risk at a reactor site since spent fuel must be cooled onsite prior to transport
but significantly increases the risks to the public, including during transportation. At the same

Russias fast-breeder programme used to justify

continued reprocessing and plutonium stockpiling
experiences significant delays and other problems, as has
happened with other countries that have attempted to develop such reactors. The one
result has been a greater risk of nuclear weapons
proliferation, as stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium
have continued to increase in Russia. The on-going geopolitical crisis in
time,

Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of the nuclear industry to political developments. One
major current problem arising from recent developments is that Rosatom could be prevented from

Rosatom presents major

concerns as a business partner in every respect. From a
financial, safety, political and security perspective, the
companys nuclear expansion ambitions both within
Russia and abroad pose unnecessary and unacceptable
risks to communities and potential customers alike.
transporting nuclear fuel through Ukraine.

Accidents cause mass death and huge financial costs. Sovacool 08

Sovacool, Benjamin K. [director of the Danish Center for Energy Technology at the Department of Business
Technology and Development and a professor of social sciences at Aarhus University.] , and Christopher
Cooper. "Nuclear nonsense: Why nuclear power is no answer to climate change and the world's post-Kyoto
energy challenges." Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 33 (2008): 1.
While the Chair of the Public Information Committee of the American Nuclear Society has publicly stated that "the industry has
proven itself to be the safest major source of electricity in the Western world,"" 9 the history of nuclear power proves otherwise

The safety record of nuclear plants is lackluster at best.

For one salient example, consider that Ukraine still has a Ministry of Emergency, some twenty-two years after the Chernobyl

No less than seventy-six nuclear

accidents, defined as incidents that either resulted in the
loss of human life or more than $50,000 of property
damage, totaling more than $19 billion in damages have
occurred worldwide from 1947 to 2008."' See Table B. One
survey of major energy accidents from 1907 to 2007
found that nuclear plants ranked first in economic cost
among all energy accidents, accounting for 41% of all
accident related property damage, or $16.6 billion in
property loss, even though nuclear power plants did not
even begin commercial operation until the 1950s. 442 These
numbers translate to more than one incident and $332
million in damages every year for the past three
decades. Forty-three accidents have occurred since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, and almost two-thirds of all
nuclear disaster warranted its creation."'

nuclear accidents have occurred in the U.S., refuting the notion that severe accidents are relegated to the past or to countries

3 Even the most conservative

estimates find that nuclear power accidents have killed
4100 people,' or more people than have died in
commercial U.S. airline accidents since 1982."' "[N]uclear power
without America's modern technologies or industry oversight."

accidents have involved meltdowns, explosions, fires, and loss of coolant, and have occurred during both normal operation and
extreme, emergency conditions such as droughts and earthquakes."4 6 One index of nuclear power accidents that included
costs beyond death and property damage-such as injuring and irradiating workers and malfunctions that did not result in
shutdowns or leaks--documented 956 incidents from 1942 to 2007." 7 Using some of the most advanced probabilistic risk
assessment tools available, an interdisciplinary team at MIT identified possible reactor failures in the U.S. and predicted that the

In terms of the
expected growth scenario for nuclear power from 2005 to
2055, the MIT team estimated that at least four serious
core damage accidents will occur and concluded that
"both the historical and the PRA [probabilistic risk assessment] data show
an unacceptable accident frequency."" 9 Further, "[tihe potential impact on the
best estimate of core damage frequency was around one every 10,000 reactor years." 8

public from safety or waste management failure... make it impossible today to make a credible case for the immediate

Another assessment conducted by the

CEA in France tried to associate nuclear plant design
with human error such that technical innovation could
help eliminate the risk of human-induced accidents.45' Two
types of mistakes were deemed the most egregious: errors committed during field
operations, such as maintenance and testing, that can
cause an accident, and human errors made during small
accidents that cascade to complete failure.452 There may
be no feasible way to "design around" these risks. For example,
expanded use of nuclear power."4 51

the safety performance of

advanced French Pressurized Water Reactors, they
concluded that human factors would contribute to about
one-fourth (twenty-three percent) of the likelihood of a major
accident.453 Consider that the two most significant nuclear
power accidents, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, were
human caused and then exacerbated by more human
mistakes.
when another group of CEA researchers examined

US Heg
Russia and the US are breaking off ties in nuclear energy, each trying
to prove their dominance and get an edge over the other. Kelly 10/5
Lidia Kelly. Russia suspends nuclear agreement, ends uranium research pact with United States. Reuters. October 5, 2016.
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN12521J JJN

Russia further curtailed its cooperation with the United

States in nuclear energy on Wednesday, suspending a
research agreement and terminating one on uranium
conversion, two days after the Kremlin shelved a
plutonium pact with Washington. The Russian
government said that as counter-measures to the U.S.
sanctions imposed on Russia over Ukraine, it was putting
aside a nuclear and energy-related research pact with the
United States. It also said it was terminating for the same
reasons an agreement between its nuclear corporation
Rosatom and the U.S. Department of Energy on feasibility
studies into conversion of Russian research reactors to low-enriched uranium. On Monday, President
Vladimir Putin suspended a treaty with Washington on cleaning up weapons grade plutonium, signaling he is
willing to use nuclear disarmament as a new bargaining chip in disputes with the United States over Ukraine

renewal of sanctions against Russia, which include

the suspension of Russian-American cooperation in the field of nuclear energy demands the
adoption of countermeasures against the U.S. side," the Russian
and Syria. "

The

regular

government said on its website. In Washington, a State Department spokesman said the United States had not
received an official notification from Russia although he had seen media reports of the suspension of the
research agreement. "If they're accurate, we would regret the Russian decision to unilaterally suspend
cooperation on what we believe is a very important issue that's in the interest of both of our countries,"

The Russian Foreign

Ministry said the decisions were taken in response to "unfriendly acts" by Washington. They came
two days after Washington said it was suspending talks
with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria. The
spokesman Mark Toner said at a daily news briefing. "UNFRIENDLY ACTS"

agreement on co-operation in nuclear and energy-related scientific research, signed in 2013, provided the legal
framework necessary to expand work between U.S. and Russian nuclear research laboratories and institutes in
nuclear technology and nonproliferation, among others. The uranium agreement, signed in 2010, provided for
feasibility studies into the conversion of six Russian research reactors from dangerous highly enriched uranium

We can no longer trust Washington in

such a sensitive area as the modernization and security
of Russian nuclear facilities," the Russian Foreign
Ministry said. It said that should Russia decide on the feasibility of the conversion of any research
to more secure low enriched uranium. "

reactors to low-enriched uranium, it will carry the work itself. But it warned the conversion may not be "an end
in itself." "In some cases, including in the production of medical isotopes, highly enriched uranium is the most
effective and renouncing its would be technically and economically inexpedient," the ministry said. The West
imposed economic sanctions on Russia over its annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula in 2014, followed by a
pro-Russian insurrection in the east of the country. The breakdown of a ceasefire in Syria, where Russia backs
government forces and the West supports rebel groups, has added to tensions.

US and Russia fight for influence in the Middle East is highly unstable
with power capable of flipping for either side. Klapper 9/8
BRADLEY KLAPPER - Associated Press. Russian Mideast push could hurt US influence, if talks occur. US News. September 8, 2016.
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-09-08/russian-mideast-push-could-hurt-us-influence-if-talks-occur JJN

American influence over the Middle East could

slip a notch after Israel and the Palestinians agreed in principle
to Russian-organized talks in Moscow. That is, if the negotiations ever
WASHINGTON (AP)

happen. Russia has clamored unsuccessfully for years to host such a gathering and the Russian Foreign

Ministry's announcement on Thursday included no date or agenda for the future get-together. Making the
meeting even more uncertain: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' demands that Israel first halt all
settlement construction in east Jerusalem and the West Bank, and release about two dozen Palestinian

If the meeting
occurs, it would surely rattle the region's tumultuous
ground further. The United States has maintained a
stranglehold over all Mideast peace processes since the
Oslo Accords in the 1990s, seen by Israelis and Palestinians alike as the
indispensable mediator and only power that could guarantee a two-state solution. But
the Obama administration doesn't appear to enjoy that
recognition any longer. The degradation of America's
standing coincides with its difficulty projecting its vision
across the Middle East. On Syria, Washington has pleaded
with Russia for a ceasefire even as Moscow advances the
position of the Russian-backed government over U.S.supported rebels. In the war against the Islamic State,
the U.S. has been unable to secure a quick victory and is
challenged by fighting among allies such as Turkey and
the Kurds. In Yemen, the U.S. has lost hope of ally Saudi
Arabia pushing Iranian-backed Houthis out of the capital
by force. State Department spokesman Mark Toner on Thursday rejected the notion that the U.S. is
prisoners. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the preconditions.

losing primacy in the region. But he appeared skeptical that it was the right time for such a meeting in
Moscovow. "We need to make sure that any face-to-face talks have the right climate in which to succeed in,"
Toner told reporters. He specifically cited Israel's ongoing settlement activity and Palestinian glorification of
violence as hindrances to a peace settlement. Abbas has been fishing for the last couple of years for an
alternative peace process, frustrated with President Barack Obama's inability to make any progress on a peace
deal. He has welcomed a new French initiative that foresees a separate Israeli-Palestinian peace conference
before year-end, but involving more global powers like last year's Iran nuclear diplomacy. He also wants U.N.
Security Council action. Netanyahu, too, is making a statement by tentatively accepting the overture from
Russia, which has traditionally pitted itself as the strongest advocate of the Palestinians among the Quartet of
Mideast peace mediators. Washington is Israel's champion. The United Nations and European Union are

Netanyahu, whose relationship with Obama

has always been frosty, is fearful the U.S. president may
try to initiate a new process in his last days in office, or
seek to use his remaining clout to wring Israeli
concessions, Western officials with knowledge of the
private diplomatic discussions say. As a result, Netanyahu has
been trying to beat back any new American initiative he
might see as threatening by starting a separate process
first, according to the officials, who weren't authorized to speak publicly on the matter and demanded
somewhere in between.

anonymity. He has discussed a new track with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi and floated different
ideas to European leaders. None of these endeavors has been clearly defined. Netanyahu "likes the idea of a
counter-initiative," said David Makovsky at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, while Russian President
Vladimir Putin gets another opportunity to "poke the U.S. in the eye." The Palestinians seek to establish an
independent state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem territories Israel captured in the 1967
Mideast war. Netanyahu refuses to accept Israel's pre-1967 lines as a basis for border talks. There have been no
meaningful Israeli-Palestinian talks since Netanyahu took office in 2009. The last round broke down in 2014 after

If a
Moscow meeting takes place, the chances for substantial
progress would seem slim. And that also may explain why
American officials are tempering their comments. Aaron David
months of fruitless, primarily indirect negotiations brokered by Secretary of State John Kerry.

Miller, a former Mideast negotiator in Democratic and Republican administrations, questioned whether Putin's
peacemaking offer was serious. Nevertheless, he said in a recent opinion piece, the U.S. should let the Russian
leader try. "Putin would almost certainly fail, tarnishing his vaunted image and likely angering Israelis and
Palestinians," Miller wrote. But he said

if Russia can "insert itself in the

middle of the game, it would only reinforce the

impression that Moscow is a key player and has exploited
successfully the vacuum the Obama administration has
created through what its critics charge is an abdication of
leadership."
Rosatom acts in favor of increasing Russian influence over the Middle
East. Eran et al 15
ODED ERAN - senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, served as director of INSS. YOEL GUZANSKY - a doctoral
candidate in Internetional Relations. ZVI MAGEN - former deputy head of Nativ, Israeli ambassador to Ukraine in 1993, ambassador to Russia in
1998. Analysis: Russian nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East. The Jerusalem Post - This article originally appeared in INSS Insight No. 782.
December 30, 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Russian-Nuclear-Diplomacy-in-the-Middle-East-438838 JJN

Egypt and Russia

During a visit to Egypt by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2015,

signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in building the first nuclear power station in El Dabaa in

signed an agreement
that Russia would build four nuclear power plants in
Egypt with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts each. Indeed, the discovery of a substantial reservoir of natural
northwestern Egypt. On November 19, 2014, the two countries

gas in Egypts economic waters will diminish the incentive to switch to nuclear energy production, as will the
improved relations between Washington and Cairo; recently a rapprochement between the two countries
occurred, with the removal of some of the American restrictions on arms sales that had been imposed on the
regime of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. However, after the agreement with Russia was signed, Sisi
declared in a speech recorded on Egyptian television that, This was a long dream for Egypt, to have a peaceful
nuclear program to produce electricity. This dream was there for many years and today, God willing, we are
taking the first step to make it happen. The main stumbling block in the way of the project is the question of
financing. Egypts economic situation does not enable it to carry out a venture of this size, and it is doubtful that
Saudi Arabia, which economically supports the Sisi regime, can finance this ambitious project, given the
considerable budgetary pressures it is experiencing due to the drop in oil prices. Sisi declared that Egypt would
repay the loan by selling the electricity produced by the reactors after they begin operating in 2022.

Moscow is supposed to lend Egypt the money needed to

build the reactors as part of a comprehensive agreement,
which includes the supply of fuel for the reactors,
maintenance, training, and repairs. Against this background, and in addition to
Russias efforts to end the war in Syria, it is imperative to look at the other
Russian diplomatic track in the Middle East plans to
build civilian nuclear reactors. Russia is not a new player
in the civilian nuclear market in the Middle East, but the
desire of Moscow and countries in the region to
cooperate in this sphere clearly has become more acute,
as reflected in growing Russian involvement in the sale of
nuclear know-how and facilities in the region. This mode
of action fits in with the overall Russian efforts to
rehabilitate and strengthen its ties with countries in the
region, following the freeze in relations during the Arab
Spring. This effort is intended to serve Russias array of
objectives in the region as well as in the global theater as
they pertain to its rivalry with the United States. Russias military
intervention in Syria is conducted within the framework of a coalition with President Bashar Assads army and
Iran and its satellites, as part of its efforts to preempt the West in establishing diplomatic and economic
cooperation with Iran. Russias actions in Syria are designed to combat Islamic terrorism, especially the Islamic
State, in order to reduce the threat of extremist Islamic groups that are attempting to expand their influence

Russias major objective, however, is within the international

sphere, and this includes influencing the future of Syria and
taking a leading role in shaping the region. Indeed, Russia is
interested in engaging in dialogue with the West, inter
within Russias territory.

alia by obtaining bargaining chips for promoting a

comprehensive settlement in the Middle East (Syria first) and
eastern Europe. For Egypt, and for other countries as well, the Russian nuclear
option is attractive because it does not present the
demands and restrictions that are attached to the nuclear
cooperation with the West. Relations between the United States and several of its
traditional allies in the region have soured in the past five years; it appears that these allies are
signaling to the American administration that they have
other options, including nuclear ones. Egypts desire to develop a nuclear
program is also linked to its determination to find long-term solutions for growing energy needs, such as
building a civilian nuclear capacity like the one Iran is building, following its nuclear agreement with the major

Nuclear cooperation with these countries is a vital

interest for Russia, which seeks to use this cooperation to
overcome its budgetary distress, which has been
aggravated by plunging oil prices. Russia also may fear that
the nuclear agreement signed between the major powers and Iran is liable
to open up Iran for competition with other western
players with relevant capabilities and drive Russia out of the Iranian market. Turning to
alternative markets could be one of the Russian
responses to the new conditions that are liable to emerge
in the region with the ratification of the agreement with
Iran. Russia is therefore increasing its cooperation in this
area not only with Egypt, but also with Iran.
powers.

Every nuclear reactor that goes up further sinks US influence in the

region. Stratfor 15
Stratfor provides global awareness and guidance to individuals, governments and businesses around the world, We use a unique, intel-based
approach to analyze world affairs. Russia: Exporting Influence, One Nuclear Reactor at a Time. Stratfor. October 7, 2015.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-exporting-influence-one-nuclear-reactor-time JJN

Rosatom's stated, if not intangible, goals in 2010 have gained traction over
foreign orders totaled $74
billion. In September 2015, Rosatom estimated the value of export
orders reached $300 billion with 30 plants in 12 counties.
In addition, Russia has memorandums of cooperation and deals
at various stages of negotiation across the globe. From South
Africa to Argentina to Vietnam to Hungary to Saudi Arabia, there appears to be no
region where Russia does not seek to send its nuclear
exports. Russia is no novice when it comes to using energy exports for political gain see Russian
natural gas exports to Europe. But as the game of pipelines continues in
Europe, Russia is in a bitter standoff with the United
States. In Russia's political chess strategy, numerous
pieces are currently in motion. Economic pressure to lift sanctions seems to be
hastening de-escalation in the Ukraine conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow is strengthening
its presence in Syria through its more aggressive military
stance. With hydrocarbon exports vulnerable, especially
at times of low oil prices, exporting nuclear technology
can provide Russia with another means of exerting
influence. Nuclear power may never become as important
Russia's Nuclear Ambitions

the past several years. At the end of 2013, Rosatom's

as hydrocarbons, but it does provide a measure of

political insurance as Russia attempts to maintain its
global heft. Russia's nuclear sector did not face the same cutbacks that other energy sectors did
because of sanctions. And throughout 2014 and 2015, Rosatom blazed a path toward several agreements

Many of these areas of

possible expansion are in geopolitically important
countries, from Moscow's perspective. Middle East:
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran In March 2015, the Jordanian
government signed a $10 billion agreement that will
allow Russia to build two nuclear reactors in the country
by 2022. Unlike Syria, Jordan cannot provide Russia with a Mediterranean port. Still, a solid
relationship with Jordan through nuclear power
cooperation helps Russia keep a foothold in the Levant,
regardless of the outcome of the Syrian civil war. Furthermore,
as the world anticipates Iran's return to the global
community once Western sanctions are lifted, the region
is also preparing for the continued development of
Tehran's civilian nuclear program. Russia consequently
signed a framework deal in June 2015 with Saudi Arabia,
Tehran's regional rival. Riyadh is eager to grow its nuclear sector, which is now only in the
favorable to expanding its nuclear power interests.

early stages, to 16 reactors over the course of the next 20 years. And Russia, naturally, is more than willing to

Russia also wants

to maintain a presence in Iran. Iran signed a construction contract with Russia to
help meet this goal. Yet despite emerging cooperation with Saudi Arabia,

expand its Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in 2014, and Moscow will not eliminate nuclear cooperation it has
already established. Iran, however, could become the first battleground between China and Russia in terms of
nuclear exports because Beijing has agreed to construct two plants in the southern Iran. Europe: Hungary and
Finland One of Moscow's geopolitical imperatives is to have clout in Eastern Europe to ensure the security of the
Russian core, a strategy especially evident during the Cold War. Hungary, once behind the Iron Curtain, is now
part of the European Union. But growing anti-European sentiment in the country could provide Russia the
opportunity to gain a better foothold there. Rosatom was selected to expand Hungary's Paks Nuclear Power
Plant facility despite European objections. Finland, on Russia's northern border, also ignored EU objections and
agreed to have Rosatom come in to build a nuclear power plant in the north. Given last year's rumblings about
Sweden and Finland possibly joining NATO and how close Finland's borders are to St. Petersburg, Russia will
remain vigilant in maintaining its influence in Helsinki. Rest of the World Moscow's nuclear export campaign has
also touched the rest of the world. South Africa has a non-binding memorandum of understanding with Russia.
Rosatom is believed to be one of the leading candidates, along with China, to build a new nuclear plant in the
country, which has seen recent blackouts due to insufficient power. Elsewhere on the African continent, Ghana
and Nigeria are also potential sites for future Russian-built nuclear power plants. Russia's push east for energy
exports is not limited to hydrocarbons to China. Rather, several Southeast Asian countries Laos, Vietnam,
Myanmar and Indonesia have signed either agreements for construction of plants or at least memorandums
of cooperation for nuclear power. Finally, the export of nuclear power facilities follows Russia's broader plan of
investing in Latin America. Moscow could potentially cooperate with countries for the mutual goal of countering
U.S. influence in the region. Still, Russia and China could compete directly to bring nuclear power to the

Plans and ambitions are all

well and good, but as Russia moves from the planning
stages into actual construction and operation, we will see
the true success of the scheme. Russia's economic
downturn has made Western experts skeptical of
Moscow's ability to finance all of these contracts. But
Russia has beaten out Western firms because of more
attractive financing in the past. U.S.-based firms have been further disadvantaged
continent, undermining that goal. Russia's Secret Weapon

by the suspension of the Export-Import Bank's charter on June 30. While reinstating the Export-Import bank
could come to a vote later this month, Russia's financial flexibility should continue to give it an edge. Some
countries such as China and Iran pay for Russian power plants directly. Others such as Belarus, Bangladesh and
Hungary depend on favorable loans. Jordan brought in Chinese banks to finance roughly 30 percent of its project
in addition to the Rosatom's 35 percent share, and India has certainly benefited from Russian finance.

initial capital requirements are often a deterrent to

High

adopting nuclear power, but Rosatom and its subsidiaries

claim to have brought down development costs
substantially. Requirements of a nuclear facility are site
specific, meaning that each facility is unique. Repetitive production
could drive down cost and while Rosatom does not exactly construct identical nuclear power plants, they do
claim that the use of 3-D smart models has significantly increased speed of work, driving down their initial

Ultimately, it is a new business model that gives

Russia the edge, one in which Russia builds, owns and
operates the facility, as well as provides training and
education. This alone could see Rosatom winning more
bids, especially in countries with no previous nuclear
experience. Turkey, poised to be an important transit state for Russian natural gas, will serve as a
proving ground for the build, own, operate model. The geopolitical implications are obvious, as the
model gives Russia a more permanent foothold in the
country than just building the facility or importing the
material would. Russia's desire for a global nuclear presence, however, will have to overcome
several hurdles. Russian firms will continue to compete with
Western ones in the near future, as well as Chinese producers in the coming
costs.

years. South Africa is also an example of a country in which the build, own, operate model could fail, the big
question being who will pay. While the Russian model may be attractive for Pretoria, which is not able to
independently provide the capital for such facilities up front, it still requires the potential for a return on
investment for Rosatom. South Africa has a poor track record of having consumers pay and that could prove a
sticking point for its Russian partnership. Russia's own financial situation, while it has not yet hurt Rosatom,
could eventually limit Moscow's ability to offer attractive financing options. But even with these obstacles, much

nuclear power is only poised to augment

Russia's global influence.
like natural gas before it,

US leadership in the Middle East solidifies international peace loss of

influence causes war across the globe leads to extinction. Bresler 15
Robert J. Bresler, Obama-led US withdrawal has destabilized the world, 6/24/15,
http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-theworld/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html VC

American leadership need not mean involvement in

endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The Marshall Plan allowed
worn-torn allied governments to provide their people
with political stability and economic development. NATO was an
effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet
aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts
against disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent currency wars and assist
in economic development.

These initiatives prevented another great

power war , achieved a large degree of European

reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial
countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened
without strong and persistent American leadership. The
U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more
than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression, that also
eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them to
place more resources into the reconstruction of their
economies. In the Middle East, the Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as
an honest broker, assisting in the negotiation of peace

treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan.

During the Obama administration there has been a steady
American retreat from world leadership. NATO is far less effective. Allies
such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of

China, Russia and Iran are asserting

hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of
global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The United Nations stands
helpless against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria
and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the
Middle East and North Africa; the European Union is facing possible revolts and
American support. Hence,

threats of secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO
offers Ukraine no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putins military swallows the country
bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to
find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the
hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more
effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of
direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the strongest of our European allies, refuses

When the Obama

administration made concession after concession to the
Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating
partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious
steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear club. In the Middle East tribalism
to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine.

and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won
devices by Obamas withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent democracy, is
now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the Muslim

Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling

abandoned by Obamas rush to a nuclear agreement with
Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet.
Warlordism and radical Islam plague the economically
depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A combination of devolution
Brotherhood.

and chaos becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th

America provided that force with persuasion,

assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama
century,

administration allows the U.S. to slip into the shadows

world politics, the danger of war increases.

Belarus/Lithuania
Belarus-Lithuania relations rocky now time is running out before
Lithuania lashes out against the Russian built power plant. Sputnik
8/29
Sputnik News, Belarus's Russian-Built Nuclear Reactor Driving Lithuanian Officials Insane, 8/29/16,
https://sputniknews.com/europe/20160829/1044745037/belarus-lithuania-nuclear-plant-conflict.html VC

Hinting that physical security and environmental concerns aren't really the central issues on her

the Belarusian NPP "is

one of the tools which could be use used in an
unconventional method against the Baltic countries." Instead
mind, Grybauskaite noted in a separate interview that

of clarifying what she meant, the president vowed instead to discuss the issue in meetings with
Baltic leaders, and with US Vice President Joe Biden, who visited the region last Tuesday. Vytautas

the veteran Lithuanian politician who became

Lithuania's first head of state after the country declared its independence
from the USSR, is no less hostile to the Belarusians' efforts,
recently suggesting that the Belarusian NPP's
Landsbergis,

construction amounts to "nuclear terrorism ."

Emphasizing that the European Union "and perhaps even
NATO" must reach "a clear and tough position" against
the plant, the MEP also hinted the real reason for Vilnius's concerns, saying that the
Belarusian project harms Lithuania's prospects for economic development. Since Ignalina's
closure, Vilnius has been looking for investors for the creation a new plant (called the Visaginas
NPP), to be built using non-Russian technology and contractors. That project has since been
described as frozen, if not dead. In 2011, Vilnius reached an agreement with Japan's Hitachi
corporation to be a strategic investor in the plant; a year later, the project failed to garner the
necessary support in a non-binding referendum, and has been deemed economically non-viable.
Accordingly, as a commentary in Russia's Vzglyad online newspaper recently explained, Vilnius
officials' hysterical commentary about safety and environmental concerns, along with their
threats to bring Brussels and even NATO into the debate about the Belarusian NPP's construction,
really appears to be a cover for their own failed NPP venture. Meanwhile, neither the International
Atomic Energy Agency, nor the UN agency charged with observing trans-border environmental
impact assessments, have supported Lithuania's claims. Accordingly, independent journalist
Evgeny Radugin suggested that this combination of factors has to driven Lithuanian leaders into a
panic. Earlier this month, the country's foreign minister, Linas Linkevicius, warned that

Belarus "would not have the required trust, and should

not hope for the sale of electricity from their unsafe
nuclear power plant," presumably to Lithuania. "However, the
realization of this goal is problematic," the journalist noted. " The [Belarusian] NPP
will obviously go into operation before Visaginas." Russia has
even offered Minsk the option of bringing the plant online earlier than planned. What's more,
Radugin noted, the Lithuanian plant, if it's ever built, will not be able to compete with the
Belarusian plant's prices for electricity. The Russian plant being built in Belarus features
Generation 'Three Plus' power units. "Such stations are already operating around the world and
have proven to be reliable and cost-effective." For this reason, Vilnius is attempting to act
independently, introducing draft laws meant to prohibit Lithuania from purchasing
Belarusian electricity, or allowing its transit through Lithuanian territory.
Unfortunately, Radugin noted, having been outmaneuvered by Minsk and Moscow,

all that's left for Lithuanian officials is "to engage in

hysterics toward Russia and its partners."

Belarus is a critical country in Russias plans theyre a key security

asset in Eastern Europe. Lacroix 16.
Rejeanne Lacroix, Belarus Balancing Act, 7/28/16, http://natoassociation.ca/belarus-balancing-act/ VC

Belarus

is an example of a state developing its geopolitical distinctiveness into a position as

an important regional contributor. It

occupies a discernible midpoint

between ongoing fears of Russian aggression and

NATOs expanded involvement in Eastern Europe. Though
small and relatively underdeveloped, Belarus unique history, strategic
location and political leanings make it an indispensable
component in the European security framework. Greater
attention should be devoted to messages emerging out of Minsk as they offer a unique
perspective on the concerns of Russian aggression. Closer examination of these memos reveals
how a small state can relatively engage in both sides of a dispute and in doing so, increase their
political capital. A simple glance at a map of Central and Eastern Europe reveals that Belarus is
bordered by NATO members (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia), a conflict hotspot (Ukraine) and the
main aggressor to European insecurity (Russia). Anyone with a keen interest geopolitics
understands that such a strategic location offers both opportunity and danger. Official statements
from the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assert that the state does not feel threatened by
NATO expansion or the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. In a step further, Minsk
reaffirmed that it is willing to engage with the military partnership and hopes to act as a mediator.
There is a clear understanding in Belarus that an intensification of conflict between Western
powers and Russia is detrimental to its own stability. On the other hand,

Belarus is

vital to Russias national security strategy on its

Western frontiers . Shared histories, Russian installations on Belarusian territory and
the 1996 Union State agreement to harmonize relations
between the two former Soviet states translates into a
close relationship that Russia cannot bear to lose .
Consequently, it is indisputable that the Belarusian military is inherently
linked to the Russian Armed Forces. Belarus location and
the nearby Kaliningrad Oblast extend Russian reach
closer to their NATO adversaries and Europe in general.
Russian military bases and radar systems in Belarus are
even more important now to their security strategy as
Western forces rotate in and out of the region as part of
the Eastern Flank. As Belarus is a member of the Russian-organized Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it represents the proximity of Eurasian security to European
concerns as well. Dividing lines between the two adversaries have thus been blurred but this
obscurity offers Belarus the prospect to shift relations in their favour. The political games between
West and East extend into the economic realm as well. Belarus continues to seek and negotiate a
normalization of relations with the European Union. When the EU lifted most sanctions on the
post-Soviet republic in early 2016, President Alexander Lukashenko ordered that the
regularization of banking and investment procedures with the supranational organization take
precedence. A rapprochement between the two would result in a partnership agreement and a

Belarus is an important exporter of a

variety of agricultural goods, machinery and other
finished industrial products therefore their entrance into
European markets would result in enhanced domestic
economic stability. European Union member states, such as
Slovakia, have offered their support in favor of the Belarusian
lobby while Germany urges greater cooperation between
subsequent trade deal.

Belarus and Europe. Nevertheless, full membership in the EU is a seemingly

impractical pursuit. The democratization process inherent in the Copenhagen Criteria does not
align with Lukashenkos political principles. Besides this obstacle, it is apparent that Belarus is
open to courting Western interests just as the West has its attention on a possible new market.

Increased Belarus-Lithuania tensions and Russian owned reactor

completion both independently causes conflict and Russian annexation
of Belarus risks escalation into full scale war. Rekeda 16
Sergey Rekeda (Writer for Eurasian Chronicle), Lithuania Starts Nuclear Information War against Belarus, 8/1/16,
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/eurasian-chronicle/?id_4=2627 VC

Lithuania sees the Ostrovets NPP primarily as a geopolitical

rather than an environmental threat. Had this not been the case, why isnt Vilnius worried
about the critical safety situation at Ukrainian NPPs? Accordingly, the consequences
of the Lithuanian struggle against the Ostrovets NPP
could be geopolitical, rather than environmental. Of course, one could envision a positive scenario when
the attacks on the power plant cease simultaneously with the parliamentary elections in Belarus and Lithuania this autumn.
Implementation of the Ostrovets project will be depoliticised as much as possible and, after Grybauskait steps down as President,
Lithuania and other Baltic states could become interested in the power produced at the Ostrovets NPP (thus far, the Lithuanian

the negative scenario is

more likely. Lithuania will increasingly politicise the
Belorusian nuclear plant construction. Vilnius will
traditionally try to deliver a blow against Russia by
calling the construction unsafe and Rosatom
incompetent, and dubbing the project another of the
Kremlins tentacles squeezing Europe. In the very near future, we
might expect expert reports explaining that the Ostrovets NPP is intended to play a
role in the impending Russian annexation of Belarus .
There could be options, but the main goal will be to blame Moscow
for its attempts to use the NPP to embroil Belarus in
confrontation with the West, although the picture we see
so far is the direct opposite. But, in its attempts to teach a
lesson to Russia, Lithuania will inevitably tread on
Belarus toes. The thing is that, today, the Ostrovets NPP is one of Minsks top priority
leadership is seeking to organise a regional boycott of the project). Yet

economic projects. And Minsk is unlikely to look kindly at the attempts to interfere with its

the Belarus leadership has enough

instruments to retaliate against Vilnius, up to and including re-routing its transit
shipments from Klaipeda to Russian ports. Lithuanian attacks on the Ostrovets NPP
could result in failure of the engagement policy the
European Union has been attempting to pursue over recent
years toward Belarus; these attacks could also lead to
Lithuania losing another regional partner (following Poland and
Russia) and incurring economic losses owing to Minsks
retaliation. The Baltic politicians will hardly succeed in
pulling the plug on the Ostrovets project. As paradoxical
as it sounds, the Republic of Lithuania itself might suffer
the greatest losses in this story.
implementation. Moreover,

Conflict in the Baltics goes nuclear before NATO even gets involved and
spills over into the rest of Europe. Goldmanis 16
Maris Goldmanis (Masters Degree in History, currently getting PhD, Russian Invasion in the Baltic States: Nightmare or Reality? 7/09/16,
https://latvianhistory.com/2016/07/09/russian-invasion-in-the-baltic-states-nightmare-or-reality/ VC

There are two possible scenarios for invasion. First: full-scale invasion. Second: limited, non-direct
like its happening in Eastern Ukraine. Full scale invasion would require much use of land, sea and

The main Russian objectives would be securing

control over the air and blockade the Baltic Sea. Kaliningrad
air force.

region would be used to blockade the land route trough Suwalki, Poland to Vilnius and Riga.

Russia would not necessarily need to assault Suwalki itself, but rather secure
control over Lithuanian towns of Kybartai, Marijumpole, Kalvarija and

Druskinskai. First cities to fall would be Narva, Tartu, Balvi, Krsava, Rzekne, Krslava and

Vilnius is close to Belarusian border it would

be first Baltic capital to be attacked. The question of further advance will
determined in the skies over Baltic, in the sea and the Suwalki gap zone. If Russia
manages to secure access points to Baltic States it has
chance to overrun the NATO forces trapped in
encirclement. NATO forces in every way has technical and numeric advantage over Russia
Daugavpils. Since

and using it NATO would eventually break the blockade and force Russia to retreat. So NATO
objective is to prevent the Baltic blockade and cut off Russia from Kaliningrad. Air, Naval and
tactical superiority is in need. A logical question then arises what about nuclear weapons? First no
country has ever had experience of using nuclear weapon against country that also have them.
However, the common sense and most military doctrines is to use nuclear weapons after the
warring country has exceeded all conventional means. Their forces are defeated and are on rout
and country is on breakdown. That is one of the actions Russia would possibly choose. However,

Russia has far-fetched doctrine of using nuclear

detonation to prevent NATO for acting further . A
scenario in mind that Russia would use tactical nuke
against military unit or city and then in fear of nuclear war would try to impose
ceasefire advantageous for them. However, such strategy is a gamble. One country might
possibly not respond and seek solution while other fires tactical nuke in response, creating
response after response leading to ultimate nuclear annihilation. So using or not using nuclear
weapons its a question of common sense. Second scenario is limited invasion like the one that
takes place in Ukraine. Russia could try to form Russian peoples republics in Narva, Daugavpils
and Rzekne and try to instigate revolts in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. Same as in Ukraine Russia has
large Russian speaking population to use for their goals, many of them including some Latvians
would support pro-Russian revolt. Russia might still try to blockade Baltic sea and Suwalki gap,

Border areas would fall

for Russian control and there Russia would try to create
environment for frozen conflict that would bleed out
three Baltic States and NATO trying to help them. Such scenario
but it will refrain from taking all countries completely.

may avoid discussion of using nuclear weapons, however, Russia would have hard time to prove
that there are no Russian troops in Latgale. The Consequences In both case of full and limited
invasion Russia would fall under tougher sanctions and isolation. Russian populace at first would
support the invasion., however basing on military success or failures it would change drastically.
Victory if such is possible would lead to Russia as totalitarian fortress in opposition against
western block for times to come. Defeat would cause an unpredictable series of events, like state
breakdown, civil war and foreign intervention. Limited frozen conflict in Baltic states will lead to
same Russian totalitarianism and isolation only to hope find agreement over the conflict. Failure
and loss of national prestige will leave its regime vulnerable. For Baltic States its means great
loses of lives, destruction of infrastructure and economical breakdown. In some ways the limited

For
the world it would mean the danger of WW3. Not to
mention fear of use of nuclear weapon, the conflict might
spread to Poland, Caucasus, Moldovo everywhere where
invasion and frozen conflict would be more crucial as it would be a constant bleed out.

NATO and Russian troops might encounter each other.

This would be major political and economical disruption
for EU countries and US and UK that are already plagued
by social disturbances. By all means such conflict would be highly
disadvantageous for both sides.

Belarusian annexation leads to Russia cutting the Baltic States off from
the rest of Western Europe causes conflict with NATO. Goldmanis 16
Maris Goldmanis (Masters Degree in History, currently getting PhD, Russian Invasion in the Baltic States: Nightmare or Reality? 7/09/16,
https://latvianhistory.com/2016/07/09/russian-invasion-in-the-baltic-states-nightmare-or-reality/ VC

Another point of argument is Belarus.

Belarus is one of the most loyal

allied states to Russia, not to mention Armenia. It has force of 62,000 active men
and woman, sizable tank and air force. Whats more to add to importance is that Belarus
hosts Russian troops and probably will host more as
answer to NATO buildup. While Belarusian president Alexander
Lukashenko officially seeks a partnership with EU countries he has stated many
times that in case of Russian conflict with NATO Belarus
will side with Russia and take direct part . That means
Belarusian army is a threat to Latvian eastern region of Latgale and to
Lithuania particularly to Lazdijai and Druskinkai municipalities along the Polish border that
have Belarusian border on the east and Russian border on the east. Presumably both forces
could attempt to take the region to cut off Baltic States
from Poland and Western Europe.

So far there has been insignificant

opposition towards Russian military presence among Belarusian society. That could change if
economic difficulties deepen for Belarus. Two nearby Scandinavian countries Sweden and Finland
with sizable military, but are not NATO members are concerned over worsening security issues in
the region. There are many in both countries who advice to join NATO or at least expand the
cooperation with NATO. Sweden that has maintained long history of neutrality and now it as the
crossroads. Russia knows this and ha begun campaign of intimidation against Sweden to weaken
their will to join NATO. Finland has very long border with Russia and historical policy of keeping
neutrality with Russia, however that may change at some point and how Finland would react to
the assault against ethnically close Estonia? So involvement of these two countries remains a
question. Russias reasons for invasion. For and against. Baltic States provides almost no valuable
natural resources for Russia to plunder. Financial gains might be the worth, however Russia

Baltic States are

trying to shake off reliance on Russian energy export,
most successful in this matter is Lithuania. Thats way as
same in Ukraine, Russias goal is to prevent Baltic States
independence on energy sources and that can be done by
multiple means. One of the main reason for invasions are
political and emotional. Baltic States was possession of
Russian Empire and was under Soviet occupation for most
of XX century. Moscow highly regarded the European
cultured territory and invested much in their
industrialization and militarization. Now what is left is mostly empty
already gains from Baltic States by trade, transit and gas supplies.

carcasses of abandoned factories and war bases but what was left as inheritance was large
numbers of Russian speaking immigrants in Latvia and Estonia. Both countries in early nighties
did crucial and disputable actions to deny citizenship for most of these people creating a massive
disappointment towards Latvian and Estonian ethnic population. The creation of large non-citizen
community had political reason Latvian national parties feared that Russian speaking voters
could elect anti-western political force that would disrupt Latvian and Estonian path to NATO and

US. In last 20 years the naturalization laws have allowed non citizens to obtain citizenship and
indeed most of them vote for parties supporting Russia. While still significant size of non citizens
remain and they are material for Russian special foreign policy to support Russian speakers
outside Russia.

Russia-NATO war due to Baltic annexation is the most likely scenario

for extinction it spirals out of control and no one knows whats going
on. Thompson 16
Loren B. Thompson (Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit
consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and
taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard Universitys Kennedy
School of Government), Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin, 7/20/16, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044?page=2 VC

the possibility of nuclear war between America and

Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place
where it is most likely to begin is in a future military
confrontation over three small Baltic states -- Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in
However,

2004, the United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North

Because NATO from its inception was aimed at

containing the expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe
consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear
arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that
strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has
included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United
States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against
NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening
to use atomic weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that
Atlantic Treaty.

extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in
the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the
ability to deploy nuclear weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe. According to Hans Kristensen of the
Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American
or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for
decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called
"non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations .

While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any

number of future warfighting scenarios, there are
multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger
exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are
eight of those reasons. First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the
future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian
political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between
Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's
perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important
alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President
Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin
and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million)
is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to
the Russian heartland. Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical
situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the
topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year
that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within

for all of its talk about

reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will
defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence
the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of
conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in
the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led
a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond. Fourth,

battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers

each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning
it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not
be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military
objectives quickly. Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the
Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a
threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes
against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory,
and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance
system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war.
Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional

both
sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine
potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to
prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly
that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with
the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would
use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and
values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes
be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations
conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments. Sixth ,

have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments. Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in
theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclearcapable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have
not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be

Nuclear-capable NATO jets

could reach the area within hours. Eighth, new technologies
are gradually being incorporated into forces on both
sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a
local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will
replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be
tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and
deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict.

elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronicwarfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers.

The bottom line is that all

the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for

an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use.
Neither side understands what actions might provoke
nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides
would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was
happening.

The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic"

nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.