Islamophobia Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

ISLAMOPHOBIA AFF FILE
(PLAN)-----WAVE 1 FINAL
Analytics were deleted on several args
----1ac shells
1ac strict scrutiny

Plan: The United States federal government should establish a strict
scrutiny standard for domestic surveillance based on religion.
Contention 1: Islamophobia
The defining characteristic of 21st century American politics is Islamophobia. The
security sphere has been altered- political fears of Muslims determine and dictate
proposals and actions. This xenophobic politics justifies the worst of orientalist
violence racism, internment, and torture come to be seen as acceptable in
Bushs words, a domestic crusade against Islam is made possible.
Ali 12 (Yaser Ali, JD in law from UC Berkeley, Managing Attorney at Yaser Ali Law and was the Judicial Law Clerk in
the US Court of Appeals, Shariah and CitizenshipHow Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America,
August 1 2012, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4176&context=californialawreview) //mL
There was a clear discursive shift in Islamophobic discourse after 9/11. What was
previously considered unacceptable speech now permeated the discourse. During this
time, pundits and public officials construed the stereotypical Muslim male
personifying all the Orientalist tropes and characteristics Lewis and Huntington described in
the 1990sas the primary threat to American security.97 The discursive shift
transcended political affiliation. One prominent conservative columnist, Ann Coulter, wrote on
September 12, 2001, We should invade their countries, kill their leaders, and convert
them to Christianity. We werent punctilious about locating and punishing only
Hitler and his top officers. We carpet-bombed German cities; we killed civilians.
Thats war. And this is war.98 Richard Cohen, writing in the Washington Post one month after 9/11,
added: One hundred percent of the terrorists involved in the Sept. 11 mass murder
were Arabs. Their accomplices, if any, were probably Arabs too, or at least Muslims.
Ethnicity and religion are the very basis of their movement. It hardly makes sense,
therefore, to ignore that fact and, say, give Swedish au pair girls heading to the
United States the same scrutiny as Arab men coming from the Middle East.99
Politicians, too, appeared to be competing as to who could look strongest on national defense. Attorney General John
Ashcroft, one of the most vociferous critics of Islam in public office at the time, stated, Islam is a religion in which God
requires you to send your son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you.100 In a
speech to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, he stated: Let the terrorists among us be warned: if you overstay your visa
even by one daywe will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible.
We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage.101 Senator Saxby Chambliss, a
Republican Senator from Georgia, went even further, stating that homeland security would be improved by turning the
sheriff loose to arrest every Muslim that comes across the state line.102 Perhaps the most notorious and
destructive comment was President Bushs description of the War on Terror as a

crusade,103 a statement that outraged Muslims around the world and led to intense
damage control efforts on the part of the White House.104 Although it was conceivably just an ill
advised and unintentional statement by the President, the comment nonetheless suggested that the
collective enemy was Islam; and further, to some Muslims, it engendered strong
notions of the Middle Ages, when Christian armies embarked on numerous battles
with an expressed goal of conquering Muslim lands. 105 Professor Victor Romero describes how
the underlying rhetoric after 9/11 was reminiscent of that used toward the Japanese
Americans after the attack on Pearl Harbor.106 He cites a quote from General DeWitt, the chief
enforcer of the internment camps: Further evidence of the Commanding Generals attitude toward individuals of Japanese
ancestry is revealed in his voluntary testimony on April 13, 1943, in San Francisco before the House Naval Affairs
Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas: . . . I dont want any of them (persons of Japanese ancestry) here. They are
a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital installations
essential to the defense of the country to allow any Japanese on this coast . . . . The danger of the Japanese was, and is now
if they are permitted to come back espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen,
he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty . . . . But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed in
this area . . . . 107 As described above, the language employed by General DeWitt was indeed strikingly similar to that used
against American Muslims after 9/11. As a result of this framing, the average Muslim in
America was presumptively considered disloyal and a threat, irrespective of his or

her formal citizenship status. In fact, according to one poll, less than half of the
respondents during the period shortly after 9/11 believed that American Muslims
were loyal to the United States.108 In one particularly troubling Gallup Poll shortly
after 9/11, one-third of respondents supported such drastic measures as the
internment of Arab Americans or the special surveillance of Arabs living in the
United States.109 This biased public perception was no doubt a necessary precursor
to the large-scale encroachment on civil liberties that targeted American Muslims in
the following months and years. 2. Ramifications for the Muslim Community The repercussions of
such statements were severe in both the private and public spheres. Muslims were
cast as disloyal outsiders and noncitizens . Under the broad umbrella of national security policy,
the government institutionalized numerous civil liberties violations, including
intrusive airport inspections , increased FBI surveillance and warrantless
wiretapping , the use of agents provocateurs in mosques , and, in some cases, even
torture and suspension of habeas corpus rights .110 Within two months of 9/11, law
enforcement officials detained more than 1200 individuals in dragnet searches,
most of whom were from the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa .111 In 2004 alone,
the FBI initiated a campaign to interview 5000 Muslim men to obtain leads on
terrorist attacks.112 The government detained countless others as material witnesses, but neither the exact
number nor the names of such persons have been revealedagain for national security purposes.113 Similarly, whereas
before 9/11 President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft publicly denounced racial profiling tactics,114 their positions
quickly changed after 9/11.115 Public sentiment on the issue followed suit, with over half of
Americans polled approving racial profiling at airports nearly two weeks after the
attacks.116 The governmentseizing on the public endorsement of discriminatory
policies toward Muslims at the timeimplemented four distinct practices of
targeting people who appeared Muslim: profiling airline passengers, secret
arrests, the institution of new race-based immigration policies, and selective
enforcement of generally applicable immigration laws.117 Airlines frequently
removed Muslim passengers from flights without causeeven removing one of
President Bushs Secret Service agents because he looked Muslim .118 Professor Muneer
Ahmad cites two particularly egregious examples of profiling. The first involved a United Airlines pilot refusing to fly a
U.S. citizen of Egyptian origin out of Tampa, Florida, because his name was Mohammad, and the second was a situation
in Austin, Texas, where passengers applauded as two Pakistani men were removed from a flight.119
The modern security state is defined by the unlimited nature of its power-status quo
surveillance is directed at all but targeted at a specific, marginalized other- being
identified as Muslim guarantees total exclusion and authoritarian punishments.
Kundnani and Kumar 2015 [Arun (professor @ NYU, and author on domestic surveillance) and Deepa
(professor of Middle East Studies @ Rutgers), Spring 2015, Race, surveillance, and empire,
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, Accessed 7/14/15, AX]
Discussions of the surveillance of Muslim Americans usually begin with 9/11 and
make little attempt to locate them in the longer history of racial surveillance in the
United States. Yet the continuities are striking, particularly for Black Muslims, who have been seen
as extremists and subject to national security monitoring since the 1940s. Already in the
late 1960s, Arab American student groups involved in supporting the Palestinian national movement had come under
surveillance and, in 1972, the Nixon administration issued a set of directives known as Operation Boulder that enabled the
CIA and FBI to coordinate with the pro-Israel lobby in monitoring Arab activists. By the 1980s, but especially after
9/11, a process was under way in which Muslimness was racialized through
surveillanceanother scene of the states production of racial subjects . Since all
racisms are socially and politically constructed rather than resting on the reality of
any biological race, it is perfectly possible for cultural markers associated with
Muslimness (forms of dress, rituals, languages, etc.) to be turned into racial signifiers.58 This
signification then serves to indicate a people supposedly prone to violence and
terrorism, which, under the War on Terror, justifies a whole panoply of surveillance and
criminalization, from arbitrary arrests, to indefinite detention, deportation,
torture, solitary confinement, the use of secret evidence, and sentencing for crimes
that we would not be jailed for, such as speech, donations to charitable organizations, and
other such acts considered material support for terrorism. Significantly, the racial
underpinnings of the War on Terror sustain not just domestic repression but
foreign abusesthe wars vast death toll in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia,
Yemen, and elsewhere could not be sustained without the dehumanization of its
Muslim victims. As before, racism at home goes hand in hand with empire abroad.
Counterinsurgency thinking that informed the strategies used in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the face of popular insurrection are also brought home to be deployed in relation
to Muslim American populations. Winning hearts and minds, the counterinsurgency slogan first
introduced by British colonialists in Malaya, and then adopted by the US military in Vietnam, reappears as the phrase that
state planners invoke to prevent extremism among young Muslims in the United States. Counterinsurgency in
this context means
total surveillance of Muslim populations, and building law

enforcement agency partnerships with good Muslims, those who are willing to praise
US policy and become sources of information on dissenters , making life very difficult
for bad Muslims or those who refuse (in ways reminiscent of the good and bad Indians). It is a
way of ensuring that the knowledge Muslims tend to have of how US foreign policy
harms the Middle East, Africa, and Asia is not shared with others. The real fear of
the national security state is not the stereotypical Muslim fanatic but the possibility
that other groups within US society might build alliances with Muslims in
opposition to empire. The various measures that the US national security system
has adopted in recent years flow from an analysis of Muslim radicalization, which
assumes that certain law-abiding activities associated with religious ideology are
indicators of extremism and potential violence. Following the preventive logic discussed above, the
radicalization model claims to be able to predict which individuals are not terrorists
now but might be at some later date. Behavioral, cultural, and ideological signals are assumed to reveal
who is at risk of turning into a terrorist at some point in the future.59 For example, in the FBIs radicalization model, such
things as growing a beard, starting to wear traditional Islamic clothing, and becoming alienated from ones former life are
listed as indicators, as is increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or political cause.60 Thus, signifiers of
Muslimness such as facial hair, dress, and so on are turned into markers of
suspicion for a surveillance gaze that is also a racial (and gendered) gaze; it is through
such routine bureaucratic mechanisms that counterterrorism practices involve the
social construction of racial others. Official acceptance of the model of radicalization
implies a need for mass surveillance of Muslim populations and collection of as
much data as possible on every aspect of their lives in order to try to spot the
supposed warning signs that the models list. And this is exactly the approach that law enforcement
agencies introduced. At the New York Police Department, for instance, the instrumentalizing of
radicalization models led to the mass, warrantless surveillance of every aspect of
Muslim life. Dozens of mosques in New York and New Jersey and hundreds more hot spots, such as restaurants,
cafs, bookshops, community organizations, and student associations were listed as potential security risks. Undercover
officers and informants eavesdropped at these locations of interest to listen for radical political and religious opinions. A
NYPD Moroccan Initiative compiled a list of every known Moroccan taxi driver. Muslims who changed their names to
sound more traditionally American or who adopted Arabic names were investigated and catalogued in secret NYPD
none of this activity was based on investigating reasonable

suspicions of criminal activity. This surveillance produced no criminal leads
between 2006 and 2012, and probably did not before or after. 61 As of 2008, the FBI had a
intelligence files. It is clear that
roster of 15,000 paid informants and, according to Senator Dianne Feinstein of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the
bureau had 10,000 counterterrorism intelligence analysts in 2013.63 The proportion of these informants and analysts who
are assigned to Muslim populations in the United States is unknown but is likely to be substantial. The kinds of
infiltration and provocation tactics that had been practiced against Black radicals in
the 1960s are being repeated today. What has changed are the rationales used to
justify them: it is no longer the threat of Black nationalist subversion, but the threat of Muslim
radicalization that is invoked. With new provisions in the Clinton administrations 1996 Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the FBI can launch investigations of a suspected individual or
organization simply for providing material support to terrorisma vague term that
could include ideological activity unrelated to any actual plot to carry out
violence. While COINTELPRO violated federal laws, today similar kinds of investigation and
criminalization of political dissent can be carried out legitimately in the name of
countering terrorism. For Muslim populations on the receiving end of state
surveillance programs designed to prevent radicalization, everyday life increasingly
resembles the patterns described in classic accounts of authoritarianism . There is
the same sense of not knowing whom to trust and choosing ones words with special care when
discussing politics, and of the arbitrariness and unpredictability of state power. 64 With the 2011
leaking of some NYPD intelligence files, individual Muslims have had the disturbing experience of seeing their names
mentioned in government files, along with details of their private lives. Numerous businesses, cafs, restaurants, and
mosques in New York are aware that the NYPD considers them hotspots and deploys informants to monitor them. And the
recent outing of a small number of NYPD informants has meant some Muslims in New York have found
that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships were actually covert

attempts to gather intelligence.
Modern Islamophobic policies create a state of bare life and otherization, waging a
perpetual war on difference
Wise 1 (Tim Wise, Writer, lecturer, antiracism activist, author, and was an adjunct professor at the Smith College
School of Social Work and was an advisor to the Fisk University Race Relations Institute, Rationalizing Racism: Panic
and Profiling After 9/11, December 10 2001, http://www.alternet.org/story/12065/rationalizing_racism
%3A_panic_and_profiling_after_9_11?paging=off#bookmark) //mL
To many, complaints
about such measures may seem trivial. 'What's the big deal?' ask
security worth the mild inconvenience to those singled out? But as with all
other racial profiling, the present incarnation is every bit as unjust and irrational.
Despite calls from many quarters for more profiling, under the rubric of good "common sense," the fact remains
that it is not sensible at all. To single out persons of a particular nationality or
ethnicity, or to heighten one's suspicion of such a group is blatantly unjust. It is in
fact plainly racist, as such generalized suspicion, fear, and mistreatment never
seem to attach to white folks, no matter what profile we may fit. After the Oklahoma
City bombing, white men were not singled out, held incommunicado, rounded up
for questioning, nor quizzed when trying to rent moving vans. Indeed, I rented a Ryder truck
some. Isn't
shortly after McVeigh blew one of their fleet sky-high, along with the Murrah Building. And despite being a white guy,
with short hair, no one said a word to me, nor asked for a deposit up front, just in case I decided to load it up with fertilizer
and ammonium nitrate and take out a city block. Although white supremacist and militia groups most certainly came in
for additional scrutiny in the aftermath of McVeigh's act of mass murder, notice the difference between
that response and what is happening now: in the former instance, only very specific
kinds of white people became possible suspects. In the latter case, there is a general
response of fear towards all persons fitting the physical, ethnic, and religious
description of the terrorists. Even the bombing of Afghanistan can be viewed as
racially selective. After all, if the attackers of 9/11 had been members of the Irish
Republican Army, it is simply inconceivable that we would have ripped up the real
estate of Dublin as punishment. So despite the cavalier claims by many whites that
anti-Arab profiling is no big deal, and that they would be happy to be profiled if
white guys had been behind the attacks in September, the fact remains, whether
willing or not, they would never have had to worry about such a response. And
that's the point.
The modern Islamic body is racialized and defined by its differences, providing the
justifications for domestic subordination of Muslims- our educational opposition to
Islamophobic ideologies challenges the process of otherization.
Jamal 08 (Amaney Jamal, Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics at Princeton University and director of the
Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Civil Liberties and the Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans,
Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects, 2008,
https://books.google.com/books?
id=Qbgw2ZwvT8kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Race+and+Arab+Americans+Before+and+After+9/11:+From+Invisible+C
itizens+to+...&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMI07_Wn9ngxgIVSakeCh2caA2d#v=onepage&q=Race%20and
%20Arab%20Americans%20Before%20and%20After%209%2F11%3A%20From%20Invisible%20Citizens%20to
%20...&f=false, al)
Why is there so much support for policies that so apparently are anathema to basic American values? Several hypotheses
can plausibly explain support for taking away the civil rights and liberties of Muslim and Arab Americans. They range
from a general sense of vulnerability to more specific anti-Muslim attitudes and predispositions. While the former can be
explained away as general fear and worry in the aftermath of the attacks, the latter, I argue, is far more troubling. For if
the American population is willing to support infringements on civil liberties by reason of

misperceptions that characterize Arabs and Muslims as enemy Others, then we must also
address the larger phenomenon of racialization or otherization of Arabs and Muslims in
mainstream American culture. This racialization process essentially sees Muslims and Arabs as
different from and inferior to whites, potentially violent and threatening, and therefore deserving
of policies that target them as a distinct group of people and criminalize them without evidence of
criminal activity. The binary logic of us versus them, based on a constructed myth of racial
difference, permeates U.S. society and provides the lenses through which group differences are
organized, imagined, and understood. In the case of the denial of Muslim and Arab American civil
liberties, unequal access to civil liberties is justified through a racial logic that is not always based
on an association between phenotype and backwardness but still follows various historical
patterns of racism in the United States. U.S. history is rife with examples of immigrants being
targeted and denied the benefits of citizenship because of their appearance and cultural
backgrounds. Nadine Naber reminds us of this history, arguing that these non-immigrant groups, whether blacks,
Asians, or Mexicans, have been denied the benefits of citizenship based on the assumption that they are unassimilable and
foreign (2006, 241). The single most durable explanation of widespread support for ethnic civil liberty
infringement, I argue, rests on the racialization of Muslim and Arab Americans as the enemy
Other. Here, I use the term racialization to describe the perception and production of an
inherent threatening difference between us and them that provides a scaffold legitimating and
supporting the violation of the ethnic minoritys civil liberties. Although racialization has its roots
in domestic politics the findings of this chapter also demonstrate that geopolitical realities shape
the ways average Americans construct images of the Arab and Muslim Other in their midst.
Both domestic politics and existing geopolitical realities, especially when the homelands of those
othered populations are sites of U.S. military campaigns, combine to justify the domestic
subordination of less-tolerated populations.
Otherization allows for oppression, slavery, and other atrocities

Embrick 08 (David G. Embrick, Associate professor of sociology at Loyola University Chicago,
Us and Them,
Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society, 04/25/08, http://sage-ereference.com/view/ethnicity/n570.xml, al)
The phrase us and them refers to the tendency of marginalized

groups to be viewed as different from the dominant group. For the
most part, group relationships in society have involved assertions of
supremacy, specifically the belief that one group is superior to
another group or civilization. Early assimilation theorists and scholars specializing in world civilizations were quick
to point out how clashes between cultures typically began with ethnocentric judgments of one group against another
group. The
notion of viewing outsiders as others has historically been

used to justify the mistreatment and oppression of one group of
people by another. For instance, the notion of Manifest Destiny in
the middle 1800s was dependent on the view that the United States,
as the more civilized nation, had a right to expand westward and
assimilate or eliminate other less civilized or racially inferior
groups in the process. Similarly, slavery and the systematic theft of
resources and oppressive treatment of indigenous populations under
colonialism were deemed to be justifiable based on the idea that the
oppressed group represented a less civilized or subhuman
group of people. While severe forms of overt ethnocentrism and group discrimination such as slavery are no
longer an issue in the United States today, the notion of viewing outsiders with suspicion or as inferior remains.
Although these suspicions tend to have racial connotations, they

also extend to differences based on ethnicity, class, nationalism,
culture, and religion. This entry looks at some expressions of the us
versus them attitude in the United States.
Contention 2: Solvency
Islamophobia is cultivated and perpetuated at the policy level- extensive federal
surveillance mechanisms create justifications for widespread anti-Muslim
sentiments and fractures local communities
Khalek 2014 [Rania, "How NSA Spying Impacts Muslim Communities and Cultivates Islamophobia," Dispatches
from the Underclass, http://raniakhalek.com/2014/01/26/how-nsa-spying-impacts-muslim-communities-and-cultivatesislamophobia/, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
ABBAS: I agree wholeheartedly that the fear
of Islam, the fear of Muslims, is a notion I think has been

cultivated by policy choices at the federal level. The use of airport screenings, that inevitably
cultivates and reflects the bias that people have against Muslims, has I think created space for an
anti-Muslim movement to take root. Right after September 11, you didnt have your Act for Americas, your David
Yerushalmis, your Center for Security Policysthis well-organized, well-financed movement dedicated
towards marginalizing Muslims and that gave rise to essentially and engine of generating anti-Muslim
sentiment that creates this terrible and despicable cycle where now you have the overt argument
being made that Muslims are here in the United States to abrogate the US constitution, to
overthrow the US government and replace it with Sharia law, which couldnt be further from the
truth. As the facts would have it, the American Muslim community is a well-educated, well-integrated and looking to
continue to do so in the world. You cant identify an American Muslim radical voice in the United States, whereas if you go
to Europe, you can find people that have a platform that say despicable objectionable things. In the US, thats just not the
case. But we still have in the US, which is really exporting anti-Muslim sentiment to other parts of the
world especially Europe, we still have this fear of Islam that absolutely does give rise to justify
these surveillance policies. GOSZTOLA: So for people who are hearing this debate and they maybe think its kind of
abstract, weve been hearing people talk about collection of the information and then weve been hearing about how the
information is stored. And right now when were talking about the program under the Patriot Act, the
Section 215 program, which is the bulk records collection of the phone records, its all about whos going to
hold it, whos going to store it, and its kind of like were not talking about the collection. Id like you to
talk about why the collection would be really bad and I think a thing you could address is how the collection of peoples
information in Muslim communities in New York is a huge deal for them and collecting that information is the
beginning of the injustice. ABBAS: Absolutely. What we know a lot about now regarding the NSAs
surveillance programs is what is collected, some of the searching mechanisms that can be utilized to
sift through the collected information. But what we really get to see in more granular detail with the NYPDs
specifically designed Muslim surveillance program is how indiscriminately collected information
gets utilized and what people in positions of authority that can collect such information think is
an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars. And what we find is that the NYPD thought it was absolutely
worth taxpayer money to send their agents on camping trips of 19 and 20-year-old college students.
They thought it was absolutely critical for them to map the Muslim community in Newark, New Jersey, and
beyond, identifying every halal grocery store, every halal restaurant. These things are laughable when we see them
up close and in granular detail and just like the PCLOB board has determined itself, a board that was authorized by
Congress years ago, that the sifting through everybodys information on an ongoing basis actually is not only
objectionable in itself but its not productive by any criteria. So you have for instance James Clapper arguing
that theres the peace of mind quotients that is part of the benefit of their surveillance program because were
monitoring everything. At the very least we know that nothing is happening. But this mentality that gave rise
to the NSA program is really the objectionable thing that needs to end because it gives rise to not
only indiscriminate collection of information automatically through these telecommunications
companies, but its also given rise to a network of 15,000 FBI informants that have saturated the
Muslim community across the country, that are sent to mosques without any type of criminal
predicate just to collect information because theres a sense that thats where the problem. And
thats the inevitable result of indiscriminate collection. Its always going to be the case that indiscriminate
collectionin addition to not being productivewill lead to despicable consequences.
The strict scrutiny standard would immediately declare the most invasive and
abusive Islamophobic policies un-Constitutional and reduce the executional ability
of these agencies solves both federal and local discrimination
Love 2012 [Erik, (Assistant Professor of Sociology @ Dickinson College), "NYPD: Whose side
are you on?", Institute for Social Policy and Understanding,
http://www.ispu.org/GetArticles/48/2461/Publications.aspx, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
a federal investigation of the
NYPD's practices is sorely needed. It's likely that if the NYPD's crudely constructed policies of
religious and racial profiling were brought into the courts, the judicial principle of
strict scrutiny would definitively show that the NYPD had grossly violated the
constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Strict scrutiny is the standard
applied by the courts to determine whether the government can move beyond
constitutional limits due to extraordinary circumstances. It's called "strict" because the
government must rise to a tripartite standard: first, it must prove that it has a compelling
interest; second, that the policy is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and, finally, the
policy must use the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. Preventing terrorism is,
undoubtedly, a compelling state interest. But spying on anyone who happens to be in a mosque or
restaurant cannot possibly be "narrowly tailored ". Similarly, a programme so
paranoid that it spied on its own anti-terrorism partners and kept track of any
Muslim who changed their name clearly isn't the "least restrictive means" towards
achieving the goal of anti-terrorism. The case for proving that the NYPD has
violated the constitution appears easy to prove in a court. The inability of Muslim
American and civil liberties advocates to get these programmes into the courts, so
far, is another sign of political oppression. What might be even worse than the flagrant violation of
civil rights, however, is that the NYPD programme is likely to make New York and the rest of
the country less safe from terrorism. The best scholarship on terrorism suggests that devout Muslims are
Despite the recent outpouring of support of these discriminatory programmes,
very unlikely to join up with terrorists. A February 2012 report from the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland
Security concluded that terrorism from Muslim Americans was a "miniscule threat to
public safety". An earlier report from the same centre found that Muslim American "practices" effectively "prevent
radicalisation".
The strict scrutiny standard solves-it requires the government to demonstrate a

legitimate, non-targeted justification for surveillance- policies restricting the
expression of Islamic ideas fail to meet
Figueroa 12 [Tiffani, (associate @ Morrison Foersters Litigation Department), "ALL
MUSLIMS ARE LIKE THAT": HOW ISLAMOPHOBIA IS DIMINISHING AMERICANS' RIGHT
TO RECEIVE INFORMATION, Hofstra Law Review, Winter 2012, AX]
As in
the case of Islamophobia, it is easy to target a specific group because some

Americans automatically associated the 9/11 hijackers with all Muslims and those
perceived as Muslim. 3 1 Similarly, in the interest of national security, the government
at times partook in practices that people may view as discriminatory. The
government failed to protect the free speech rights of Muslims as a targeted group,
and these actions subsequently harmed the right to receive information for
Americans. Although the government's purpose in enforcing the laws discussed in
this Note was not to close off Muslim ideas, the effects may show otherwise. 352 Justice
Antonin Scalia stated, "[t]he vice of content based legislation- what renders it deserving of the high
standard of strict scrutiny-is not that it is always used for invidious, thought-
control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes. 353 "Unavoidable
targeting" stemming from a government regulation is included within this "vice of contentbased legislation." This phenomenon may shine light on what has occurred following the 9/11 attacks. By employing
an effects test in the First Amendment analysis, courts will more efficiently
investigate whether there is viewpoint discrimination affecting the right to receive
information since the courts must first establish if a government action falls
disproportionately on a specific group.354
We ought to use the debate round as a site to formulate counter-hegemonic
strategies of knowledge production- the plan offered a substantial challenge to the
Islamophobic tendencies guiding US federal policy- violence has manifested itself in
scholarship, and combatting that is a necessary precondition to breaking it down in
reality
Jones 99 (Richard, Professor International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical
Theory, p. 155-162, wcp)
The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a

counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and
interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony . This task is
accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, every
relationship of hegemony is necessarily a pedagogic relationship (Gramsci 1971: 350).
Discussing the relationship of the philosophy of praxis to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend
to leave the simple in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life.
If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and simple it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and
preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make
politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333).
According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative intellectual-moral bloc should take place under the
auspices of the Communist Party a body he described as the modern prince. Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a
prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern
price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971:
125-205). Gramscis relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in
emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose
emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual
loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities
of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the
kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the
1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the
deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very
important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other
forms of domination for example, in the case of gender to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To
recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion
within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory
politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory
theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the
European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party
organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990).
The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian
domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the infallible party has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in
this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive
behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so
often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but
their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive
developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals

operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of
these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security .
These examples may be considered as resources of hope for critical security
studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change
is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality . One clear
security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social
change is the experience of the
peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident

defense intellectuals (the alternative defense school) encouraged and drew strength from
peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the
dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the
long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential
influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common
security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term common security originated in the contribution of peace
researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by
the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially,
mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic ; it

certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common
security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the
liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the
center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet institutchiks members of the influential policy institutes in
the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994:
196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of
public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader

acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, in response to social movement pressure,
German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace
researchers and the SPD (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the
Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into
power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace
movement and what became known as the freeze campaign that revived the arms
control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993:
90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals
persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that
it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most
dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet
Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty
contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were
drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as nonoffensive defense (these links are
detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate
on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov,
Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western
peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachevs subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors.
It is clear, for example, that new
Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating

tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms
(the interaction of ideas and material reality). But what is significant is that the Soviets commitment to
common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in
turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over
Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory
of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s,
common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion
into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important
aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective
security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services,
they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual
meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially
progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides
critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation
to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical
intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role a significant one at that in making
the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for
critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular.
Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society . CRITICAL SECURITY
STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of
Gramscis theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the
guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example
of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic
relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements
that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994).
Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical
intellectuals are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing
experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless (Said
1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those
men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of
insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering
humanity rather than raison detat the prism through which problems are viewed .
Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition . If all theory is for someone and
for some purpose, then critical security studies is for the voiceless, the
unrepresented, the powerless, and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical
implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a
fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a
broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a
reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the
conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing even if they are self-consciously
aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the
survival of minority cultures can become a force for the direction of action. Again, Gramscis
work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a
vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramscis terminology, historic blocs (Gramsci
1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavellis view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and
coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the
status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for
Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm,
ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as
feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marxs well-worn phrase, All that is
solid melts into the air. Gramscis intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the
direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a war of position (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci
argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at
progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to
break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative

counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to
undermine the natural, commonsense, internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space
within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramscis
strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating
their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical
security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those
intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine
the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing
specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing
security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual
outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and
regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also
involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals , traditional or organic,
whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order .
This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined
assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the
normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security
behind its positivist faade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies
approximate to Foucaults notion of specific intellectuals who use their expert

knowledge to challenge the prevailing regime of truth (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical
theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of speaking truth to power (this
sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking truth against the world. Of course,
traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that
strategists must be prepared to speak truth to power (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and
proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions
without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security
studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the
presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that the need to lend suffering a voice
is the precondition of all truth (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in
attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, every relationship of
hegemony is necessarily a pedagogic relationship (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in
Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing
alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the

approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling
historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position .
There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As
teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom
and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly
unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views
onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: As teachers, we try to foster an emergent
pedagogical counterculture . As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our
perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to
(Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of
the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a
few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final
analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied
what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such unobtrusive yet insistent work does
not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers
of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their
educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide
support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change . By
providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views,
critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social
movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are
aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace
movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the
intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealands antinuclear stance in
the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as
Helen Caldicott
and Richard Falk in changing the countrys political climate and

encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993: 513). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and
succor from each others efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the
critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation
toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the
movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s.
Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually
taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the
1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a message in a bottle, but in this case, contra Adornos expectations, they
were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be nave to
understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of
these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that
many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing ]mphasized]ng]ation of academic life (Said 1994:
49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and
marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays in all senses to stick with
the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary
preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so
prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of
security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold
War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for new targets
for old weapons). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the
field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in
marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this
thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a force
for the direction of action. The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical
thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably
playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical
security studies.
1ac end racial profiling

The plan: The United States Congress should pass the End Racial Profiling
Act to remove all discriminatory policies.
Contention 1: Islamophobia
The defining characteristic of 21st century American politics is Islamophobia. The
security sphere has been altered- political fears of Muslims determine and dictate
proposals and actions. This xenophobic politics justifies the worst of orientalist
violence racism, internment, and torture come to be seen as acceptable in
Bushs words, a domestic crusade against Islam is made possible.
Ali 12 (Yaser Ali, JD in law from UC Berkeley, Managing Attorney at Yaser Ali Law and was the Judicial Law Clerk in
the US Court of Appeals, Shariah and CitizenshipHow Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America,
August 1 2012, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4176&context=californialawreview) //mL


The modern security state is defined by the unlimited nature of its power-status quo
surveillance is directed at all but targeted at a specific, marginalized other- being
identified as Muslim guarantees total exclusion and authoritarian punishments.
Kundnani and Kumar 2015 [Arun (professor @ NYU, and author on domestic surveillance) and Deepa
(professor of Middle East Studies @ Rutgers), Spring 2015, Race, surveillance, and empire,
http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, Accessed 7/14/15, AX]
this context means



To many, complaints
some. Isn't
that's the point.
The modern Islamic body is racialized and defined by its differences, providing the
justifications for domestic subordination of Muslims- our educational opposition to
Islamophobic ideologies challenges the process of otherization.
Jamal 08 (Amaney Jamal, Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics at Princeton University and director of the
Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Civil Liberties and the Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans,
Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects, 2008,
https://books.google.com/books?
id=Qbgw2ZwvT8kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Race+and+Arab+Americans+Before+and+After+9/11:+From+Invisible+C
itizens+to+...&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMI07_Wn9ngxgIVSakeCh2caA2d#v=onepage&q=Race%20and
%20Arab%20Americans%20Before%20and%20After%209%2F11%3A%20From%20Invisible%20Citizens%20to
%20...&f=false, al)
Why is there so much support for policies that so apparently are anathema to basic American values? Several hypotheses
can plausibly explain support for taking away the civil rights and liberties of Muslim and Arab Americans. They range
from a general sense of vulnerability to more specific anti-Muslim attitudes and predispositions. While the former can be
explained away as general fear and worry in the aftermath of the attacks, the latter, I argue, is far more troubling. For if
the American population is willing to support infringements on civil liberties by reason of

misperceptions that characterize Arabs and Muslims as enemy Others, then we must also
address the larger phenomenon of racialization or otherization of Arabs and Muslims in
mainstream American culture. This racialization process essentially sees Muslims and Arabs as
different from and inferior to whites, potentially violent and threatening, and therefore deserving
of policies that target them as a distinct group of people and criminalize them without evidence of
criminal activity. The binary logic of us versus them, based on a constructed myth of racial
difference, permeates U.S. society and provides the lenses through which group differences are
organized, imagined, and understood. In the case of the denial of Muslim and Arab American civil
liberties, unequal access to civil liberties is justified through a racial logic that is not always based
on an association between phenotype and backwardness but still follows various historical
patterns of racism in the United States. U.S. history is rife with examples of immigrants being
targeted and denied the benefits of citizenship because of their appearance and cultural
backgrounds. Nadine Naber reminds us of this history, arguing that these non-immigrant groups, whether blacks,
Asians, or Mexicans, have been denied the benefits of citizenship based on the assumption that they are unassimilable and
foreign (2006, 241). The single most durable explanation of widespread support for ethnic civil liberty
infringement, I argue, rests on the racialization of Muslim and Arab Americans as the enemy
Other. Here, I use the term racialization to describe the perception and production of an
inherent threatening difference between us and them that provides a scaffold legitimating and
supporting the violation of the ethnic minoritys civil liberties. Although racialization has its roots
in domestic politics the findings of this chapter also demonstrate that geopolitical realities shape
the ways average Americans construct images of the Arab and Muslim Other in their midst.
Both domestic politics and existing geopolitical realities, especially when the homelands of those
othered populations are sites of U.S. military campaigns, combine to justify the domestic
subordination of less-tolerated populations.
Otherization allows for oppression, slavery, and other atrocities

Embrick 08 (David G. Embrick, Associate professor of sociology at Loyola University Chicago,
Us and Them,
Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society, 04/25/08, http://sage-ereference.com/view/ethnicity/n570.xml, al)
The phrase us and them refers to the tendency of marginalized

groups to be viewed as different from the dominant group. For the
most part, group relationships in society have involved assertions of
supremacy, specifically the belief that one group is superior to
another group or civilization. Early assimilation theorists and scholars specializing in world civilizations were quick
to point out how clashes between cultures typically began with ethnocentric judgments of one group against another
group. The
notion of viewing outsiders as others has historically been

used to justify the mistreatment and oppression of one group of
people by another. For instance, the notion of Manifest Destiny in
the middle 1800s was dependent on the view that the United States,
as the more civilized nation, had a right to expand westward and
assimilate or eliminate other less civilized or racially inferior
groups in the process. Similarly, slavery and the systematic theft of
resources and oppressive treatment of indigenous populations under
colonialism were deemed to be justifiable based on the idea that the
oppressed group represented a less civilized or subhuman
group of people. While severe forms of overt ethnocentrism and group discrimination such as slavery are no
longer an issue in the United States today, the notion of viewing outsiders with suspicion or as inferior remains.
Although these suspicions tend to have racial connotations, they

also extend to differences based on ethnicity, class, nationalism,
culture, and religion. This entry looks at some expressions of the us
versus them attitude in the United States.
Contention 2: Solvency
Islamophobia is cultivated and perpetuated at the policy level- extensive federal
surveillance mechanisms create justifications for widespread anti-Muslim
sentiments and fractures local communities
Khalek 2014 [Rania, "How NSA Spying Impacts Muslim Communities and Cultivates Islamophobia," Dispatches
from the Underclass, http://raniakhalek.com/2014/01/26/how-nsa-spying-impacts-muslim-communities-and-cultivatesislamophobia/, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
ABBAS: I agree wholeheartedly that the fear
of Islam, the fear of Muslims, is a notion I think has been

cultivated by policy choices at the federal level. The use of airport screenings, that inevitably
cultivates and reflects the bias that people have against Muslims, has I think created space for an
anti-Muslim movement to take root. Right after September 11, you didnt have your Act for Americas, your David
Yerushalmis, your Center for Security Policysthis well-organized, well-financed movement dedicated
towards marginalizing Muslims and that gave rise to essentially and engine of generating anti-Muslim
sentiment that creates this terrible and despicable cycle where now you have the overt argument
being made that Muslims are here in the United States to abrogate the US constitution, to
overthrow the US government and replace it with Sharia law, which couldnt be further from the
truth. As the facts would have it, the American Muslim community is a well-educated, well-integrated and looking to
continue to do so in the world. You cant identify an American Muslim radical voice in the United States, whereas if you go
to Europe, you can find people that have a platform that say despicable objectionable things. In the US, thats just not the
case. But we still have in the US, which is really exporting anti-Muslim sentiment to other parts of the
world especially Europe, we still have this fear of Islam that absolutely does give rise to justify
these surveillance policies. GOSZTOLA: So for people who are hearing this debate and they maybe think its kind of
abstract, weve been hearing people talk about collection of the information and then weve been hearing about how the
information is stored. And right now when were talking about the program under the Patriot Act, the
Section 215 program, which is the bulk records collection of the phone records, its all about whos going to
hold it, whos going to store it, and its kind of like were not talking about the collection. Id like you to
talk about why the collection would be really bad and I think a thing you could address is how the collection of peoples
information in Muslim communities in New York is a huge deal for them and collecting that information is the
beginning of the injustice. ABBAS: Absolutely. What we know a lot about now regarding the NSAs
surveillance programs is what is collected, some of the searching mechanisms that can be utilized to
sift through the collected information. But what we really get to see in more granular detail with the NYPDs
specifically designed Muslim surveillance program is how indiscriminately collected information
gets utilized and what people in positions of authority that can collect such information think is
an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars. And what we find is that the NYPD thought it was absolutely
worth taxpayer money to send their agents on camping trips of 19 and 20-year-old college students.
They thought it was absolutely critical for them to map the Muslim community in Newark, New Jersey, and
beyond, identifying every halal grocery store, every halal restaurant. These things are laughable when we see them
up close and in granular detail and just like the PCLOB board has determined itself, a board that was authorized by
Congress years ago, that the sifting through everybodys information on an ongoing basis actually is not only
objectionable in itself but its not productive by any criteria. So you have for instance James Clapper arguing
that theres the peace of mind quotients that is part of the benefit of their surveillance program because were
monitoring everything. At the very least we know that nothing is happening. But this mentality that gave rise
to the NSA program is really the objectionable thing that needs to end because it gives rise to not
only indiscriminate collection of information automatically through these telecommunications
companies, but its also given rise to a network of 15,000 FBI informants that have saturated the
Muslim community across the country, that are sent to mosques without any type of criminal
predicate just to collect information because theres a sense that thats where the problem. And
thats the inevitable result of indiscriminate collection. Its always going to be the case that indiscriminate
collectionin addition to not being productivewill lead to despicable consequences.
Prohibiting racial profiling and passing surveillance reform can solve
discriminatory practices
Amnesty International 14 (Non-governmental organization focused on human rights with

over 7 million members and supporters around the world, Surveillance of American Muslims
Underscores Lack of Safeguards, Amnesty International USA, 7/9/14,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/surveillance-of-american-muslimsunderscores-lack-of-safeguards-0, al)
(WASHINGTON, D.C.) - Revelations today
in The Intercept about the apparently arbitrary

surveillance of several prominent American Muslims underscore the lack of safeguards to protect
the rights of persons targeted by U.S. surveillance operations, Amnesty International said today. If it is
true, as alleged, that the term "Mohammed Raghead" was used as a placeholder in a government
document about how to make surveillance requests, there is good reason to be concerned that
anti-Muslim bias tainted the process. Any surveillance conducted on the basis of religion, rather
than probable cause to believe that the defendant violated the law, would constitute
discriminatory interference with the right to privacy, prohibited by both the Constitution and
international human rights law. "The burden is on President Obama to demonstrate that the
surveillance was lawful, and specifically that the government had probable cause to monitor the
men, and was not motivated by racial or religious bias," said Steven W. Hawkins, executive director of
Amnesty International USA. "Given the indicators of discrimination, as well as the system's lack of
meaningful safeguards, we are very concerned that the monitoring was arbitrary and abusive. It is
simply unacceptable to discriminate against people on the basis of their religion or race." While the
story is not clear on this point, the government may have been granted warrants by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) to conduct surveillance of the men. The court operates almost entirely in secret, however, relying upon secret
interpretations of controversial laws, and lacking sufficient protections against abuse. In particular, the court hears only
one side of a request for surveillance: the government's side. In addition, the court's judges are chosen by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, an appointments process that damages its independence and impartiality. Amnesty International
believes that these flaws greatly erode the FISC's capacity to serve as a meaningful check on executive power and its
willingness to consider the right to privacy as well as the needs of legitimate law enforcement. Despite the system's
obvious problems, calls for legislative reform have stalled, with Congress failing to move forward on draft legislation.
Amnesty International believes that the concerns raised by these cases demonstrate the urgent need for reform. Under
international human rights law, any surveillance must be necessary and proportionate to a
legitimate aim, such as countering serious crime, and be the least intrusive means of achieving
that aim. Furthermore, the use of surveillance must be enshrined in law, be based on probable cause,
and be subject to independent review. Surveillance must be targeted at individuals and be based
on probable cause. It should not be conducted on the basis of religion, race, nationality, gender
or other discriminatory factors. As a step toward remedying the system's failures, President Obama should
publicly commit to following international human rights law in U.S. surveillance efforts at home
and abroad. He should ensure that his administration does not profile people on the basis of
religion or race, including by improving the Department of Justice's "Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies." Congress should pass the End Racial Profiling Act as well as
comprehensive surveillance reform legislation that upholds the human rights of all people
around the world and in the United States.
The End Racial Profiling Act would prohibit racial profiling, mandate training,
change current discriminatory policies, develop technology that discourages
profiling, and constantly ensure racial profiling is not occurring at the local, state,
and national levels
Congressional Research Service 15 (SUMMARY OF THE END RACIAL PROFILING ACT
OF 2015, Library of Congress, 4/22/15, http://conyers.house.gov/_cache/files/90655274-4cb845ff-aa6d-d680acb5574f/SUMMARY%20OF%20THE%20END%20RACIAL%20PROFILING
%20ACT%20OF%202015.pdf, al)
The End Racial Profiling Act is designed to enforce the constitutional right to equal protection of
the laws by eliminating racial profiling through changing the policies and procedures underlying
the practice. First, the bill provides a prohibition on racial profiling, enforceable by declaratory or
injunctive relief. Second, the bill mandates that training on racial profiling issues as part of
Federal law enforcement training, the collection of data on all routine or spontaneous
investigatory activities that is to be submitted through a standardized form to the Department of
Justice. Third, the receipt of federal law enforcement and other funds that go to state and local
governments is conditioned on their adoption of effective policies that prohibit racial profiling.
Fourth, the Justice Department is authorized to provide grants for the development and
implementation of best policing practices, such as early warning systems, technology integration,
and other management protocols that discourage profiling. Finally, the Attorney General is
required to provide periodic reports to assess the nature of any ongoing discriminatory profiling
practices. Title I: Prohibition on Racial Profiling This Title would ban racial profiling, defined
generally as the practice of a law enforcement agent relying, to any degree, on race, ethnicity,
religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender or gender identity in selecting which
individuals to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory activities, or in deciding upon the
scope and substance of law enforcement activity following the initial investigatory procedure,
except when there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality and time frame, that links
persons of a particular race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, or gender to an identified criminal
incident or scheme. The Department of Justice or individuals would be able to enforce this
prohibition by filing a suit for injunctive relief. Title II: Programs to Eliminate Racial Profiling by
Federal Law Enforcement This Title would require federal law enforcement agencies such as the
DEA, FBI, INS, and Customs Service to cease practices that encourage racial profiling and to
adopt policies and procedures to eliminate racial profiling, including the following: A
prohibition on racial profiling; Training on racial profiling issues as part of law enforcement
training; The collection of data on routine investigatory activities, in accordance with Title IV;
Procedures for receiving, investigating, and responding meaningfully to complaints alleging
racial profiling; and Policies requiring corrective action when law enforcement agents engage
in racial profiling. April 22, 2015 2 Title III: Programs to Eliminate Racial Profiling by State,
Local, and Indian Tribal Law Enforcement, Requirements for Continued Receipt of Federal Funds
This Title would require State, local, and Indian tribal law enforcement agencies to cease practices
that encourage racial profiling and adopt policies and procedures to eliminate racial profiling,
including the following: A prohibition on racial profiling; Training on racial profiling issues
as part of law enforcement training; The collection of data on routine investigatory activities, in
accordance with Title IV; Procedures for receiving, investigating, and responding meaningfully
to complaints alleging racial profiling; and Policies for corrective action when law enforcement
agents engage in racial profiling
We ought to use the debate round as a site to formulate counter-hegemonic
strategies of knowledge production- the plan offered a substantial challenge to the
Islamophobic tendencies guiding US federal policy- violence has manifested itself in
scholarship, and combatting that is a necessary precondition to breaking it down in
reality
Jones 99 (Richard, Professor International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical
Theory, p. 155-162, wcp)
The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a

counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and
interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony . This task is
accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, every
relationship of hegemony is necessarily a pedagogic relationship (Gramsci 1971: 350).
Discussing the relationship of the philosophy of praxis to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend
to leave the simple in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life.
If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and simple it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and
preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make
politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333).
According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative intellectual-moral bloc should take place under the
auspices of the Communist Party a body he described as the modern prince. Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a
prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern
price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971:
125-205). Gramscis relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in
emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose
emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual
loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities
of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the
kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the
1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the
deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very
important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other
forms of domination for example, in the case of gender to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To
recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion
within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory
politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory
theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the
European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party
organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990).
The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian
domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the infallible party has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in
this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive
behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so
often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but
their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive
developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals

operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of
these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security .
These examples may be considered as resources of hope for critical security
studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change
is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality . One clear
security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social
change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident
defense intellectuals (the alternative defense school) encouraged and drew strength from
peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the
dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the
long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential
influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common
security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term common security originated in the contribution of peace
researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by
the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially,
mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic ; it

certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common
security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the
liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the
center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet institutchiks members of the influential policy institutes in
the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994:
196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of
public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader

acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, in response to social movement pressure,
German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace
researchers and the SPD (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the
Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into
power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace
movement and what became known as the freeze campaign that revived the arms
control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993:
90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals
persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that
it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most
dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet
Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty
contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were
drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as nonoffensive defense (these links are
detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate
on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov,
Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western
peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachevs subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors.
It is clear, for example, that new
Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating

tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms
(the interaction of ideas and material reality). But what is significant is that the Soviets commitment to
common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in
turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over
Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory
of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s,
common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion
into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important
aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective
security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services,
they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual
meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially
progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides
critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation
to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical
intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role a significant one at that in making
the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for
critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular.
Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society . CRITICAL SECURITY
STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of
Gramscis theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the
guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example
of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic
relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements
that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994).
Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical
intellectuals are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing
experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless (Said
1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those
men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of
insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering
humanity rather than raison detat the prism through which problems are viewed .
Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition . If all theory is for someone and
for some purpose, then critical security studies is for the voiceless, the
unrepresented, the powerless, and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical
implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a
fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a
broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a
reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the
conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing even if they are self-consciously
aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the
survival of minority cultures can become a force for the direction of action. Again, Gramscis
work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a
vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramscis terminology, historic blocs (Gramsci
1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavellis view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and
coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the
status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for
Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm,
ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as
feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marxs well-worn phrase, All that is
solid melts into the air. Gramscis intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the
direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a war of position (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci
argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at
progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to
break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative

counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to
undermine the natural, commonsense, internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space
within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramscis
strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating
their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical
security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those
intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine
the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing
specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing
security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual
outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and
regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also
involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals , traditional or organic,
whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order .
This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined
assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the
normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security
behind its positivist faade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies
approximate to Foucaults notion of specific intellectuals who use their expert
knowledge to challenge the prevailing regime of truth (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical
theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of speaking truth to power (this
sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking truth against the world. Of course,
traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that
strategists must be prepared to speak truth to power (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and
proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions
without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security
studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the
presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that the need to lend suffering a voice
is the precondition of all truth (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in
attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, every relationship of
hegemony is necessarily a pedagogic relationship (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in
Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing
alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the

approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling
historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position .
There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As
teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom
and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly
unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views
onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: As teachers, we try to foster an emergent
pedagogical counterculture . As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our
perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to
(Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of
the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a
few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final
analysis, because
scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied

what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such unobtrusive yet insistent work does
not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers
of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their
educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide
support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change . By
providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views,
critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social
movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are
aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace
movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the
intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealands antinuclear stance in
the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as
Helen Caldicott
and Richard Falk in changing the countrys political climate and

encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993: 513). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and
succor from each others efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the
critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation
toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the
movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s.
Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually
taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the
1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a message in a bottle, but in this case, contra Adornos expectations, they
were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be nave to
understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of
these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that
many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing ]mphasized]ng]ation of academic life (Said 1994:
49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and
marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays in all senses to stick with
the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary
preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so
prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of
security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold
War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for new targets
for old weapons). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the
field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in
marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this
thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a force
for the direction of action. The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical
thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably
playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical
security studies.
1ac planless
The modern security state is defined by the unlimited
nature of its power-status quo surveillance is directed at
all but targeted at a specific few. We live in a world where
being identified as Muslim guarantees total exclusion
from the protective measures of government. There is no
state or legal protection for the Muslim to return to, only
the promise of criminalization.
Kundnani and Kumar 2015 [Arun (professor @ NYU, and author on domestic
surveillance) and Deepa (professor of Middle East Studies @ Rutgers), Spring 2015, Race, surveillance,
and empire, http://isreview.org/issue/96/race-surveillance-and-empire, Accessed 7/14/15, AX]
this context means



Islamophobia takes root at a level deeper than politicsthe systemic notion of Western superiority and Muslim
irrationality is generated by culture and media, dictates
policy, and creates broader militant sentiments that
violently oppresses those who dont fit the normalized
notion of an American- surveillance in the context of
counter-terrorism efforts is a mechanism influenced by
right wing fear mongering
Kumar 2013 [Deepa, (Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies @ Rutgers), "Twelve Years
Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High ," Truthout, http://www.truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelveyears-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high#, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Islamophobia is basically the term, the name given to anti-Muslim

racism. It is a form of prejudice. And it involves making generalizations about an
entire group based on the actions of a few through this mythical
understanding of what Islam is supposed to be. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And we
KUMAR:
should mention that there was a poll that was conducted by the Arab American Institute that found that
American attitudes towards Arab and Muslims, specifically for Republicans and Romney voters in this last
presidential election, were rated to be strongly negative. Does this mean that Islamophobia is only a
problem of right-wingers or conservative voters? KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger
numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs
and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated
But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to

say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that
actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the
political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S.
foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that
it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would
within those ranks.
be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay.
Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the
the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you

know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on
stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the
news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that
these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by
Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be
suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and
so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of
9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that
it's about justifying the building of a national security state and
justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also
mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically,
the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us
just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR:
Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the
idea of humanitarianism has a long

history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over
the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in
order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American
war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of
justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who
were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So
what
makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is
the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations,
which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational,
we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are
barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we
have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off
and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that
Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so
we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative,
which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations.
DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work
Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in
the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and
U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian
cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as
well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold
War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to
be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's
always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people
have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the
logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have
the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being
precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush
this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But
administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth.
the idea was to drum up this fear of this

menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in
order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region
in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a
reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so
what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even
Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of
them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that
is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the
legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite
detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the
infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so
forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim
Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized
It didn't work out that way. But
since 9/11 .
DESVARIEUX: How do you sort of categorize or interpret these votes by different states
This is actually the work of a far

right wing Islamophobic network. These people have been active for
the last two decades, and they get, you know, funding to the tune of
$45-$50 billion over the last seven, eight years. These people hold the view that
there are no moderate Muslims, all Muslims are somehow connected
to Islamist organizations--Hamas or the Muslim brotherhood and so on. And even though
to ban sharia law? What's your take on that? KUMAR: Yes.
they pretend to be moderate, right--this is the language some of these people use--in fact they are
involved in a conspiracy to take over the United States and to replace the Constitution with sharia law. Of
course, this is nonsense,
this is complete conspiracy theory. But these are the
people. They are lawyers, they are academics, they are people in the military, they are people in the
security establishment. They are responsible for this campaign where , you know,
about half a dozen to a dozen states across the U.S. have adopted these laws. It's a
process of fearmongering, and it enables the right wing to actually
grow in their ranks and promote this kind of hate.
To many, complaints
some. Isn't
that's the point.
We advocate a critical praxis centered on challenging

Islamophobic domestic surveillance policies.
A vote affirmative is an ethical stance taken by the judge
to refuse Islamophobia- every affirmation of our project is
key to the process of activism, awareness. There are no
policy solutions- the only productive start is challenging
the culture of the American security state
What brings together these different systems of racial oppression

mass incarceration, mass surveillance, and mass deportationis a
security logic that holds the imperial state as necessary to keeping
American families (coded white) safe from threats abroad and at
home. The ideological work of the last few decades has cultivated not only
racial security fears but also an assumption that the security state is
necessary to keep us safe. In this sense, security has become the new
psychological wage to aid the reallocation of the welfare states social
wage toward homeland security and to win support for empire in the
age of neoliberalism. Through the notion of security, social and
economic anxieties generated by the unraveling of the Keynesian
social compact have been channeled toward the Black or Brown
street criminal, welfare recipient, or terrorist. In addition, as Susan Faludi has
argued, since 9/11, this homeland in need of security has been
symbolized, above all, by the white domestic hearth of the prefeminist fifties, once
again threatened by mythical frontier enemies , hidden subversives,
and racial aggressors. That this idea of the homeland coincides culturally with the denigration
of capable women, the magnification of manly men, the heightened call for domesticity, the search for and
sanctification of helpless girls points to the ways it is gendered as well as racialized.67 The post-Snowden
debate The mechanisms of surveillance outlined in this essay were responses to political struggles of
various kindsfrom anticolonial insurgencies to slave rebellions, labor militancy to anti-imperialist
Surveillance practices themselves have also often been the

target of organized opposition. In the 1920s and 1970s, the
surveillance state was pressured to contract in the face of public
disapproval. The antiwar activists who broke into an FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania, in 1971
agitation.
and stole classified documents managed to expose COINTELPRO, for instance, leading to its shut down.
(But those responsible for this FBI program were never brought to justice for their activities and similar
techniques continued to be used later against, for example in the 1980s, the American Indian Movement,
and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador.68) Public concern about state surveillance
in the 1970s led to the Church committee report on government spying and the Handschu guidelines that
regulated the New York Police Departments spying on political activities .
Those concerns
began to be swept aside in the 1980s with the War on Drugs and,
especially, later with the War on Terror. While significant sections of
the public may have consented to the security state, those who have
been among its greatest victimsthe radical Left, antiwar activists,
racial justice and Black liberation campaigners, and opponents of US
foreign policy in Latin America and the Middle Eastunderstand its
workings. Today, we are once again in a period of revelation, concern,

and debate on national security surveillance. Yet if real change is to
be brought about, the racial history of surveillance will need to be
fully confrontedor opposition to surveillance will once again be
easily defeated by racial security narratives. The significance of the Snowden
leaks is that they have laid out the depth of the NSAs mass surveillance with the kind of proof that only an
The result has been a generalized level of alarm as people

but that alarm remains
constrained within a public debate that is highly abstract,
insider can have.
have become aware of how intrusive surveillance is in our society,
legalistic, and centered on the privacy rights of the white

middle class. On the one hand, most civil liberties advocates are
focused on the technical details of potential legal reforms and
new oversight mechanisms to safeguard privacy. Such
initiatives are likely to bring little change because they fail to
confront the racist and imperialist core of the surveillance
system. On the other hand, most technologists believe the problem of
government surveillance can be fixed simply by using better
encryption tools. While encryption tools are useful in increasing the resources
that a government agency would need to monitor an individual, they do nothing to unravel
the larger surveillance apparatus. Meanwhile, executives of US tech corporations
express concerns about loss of sales to foreign customers concerned about the privacy of data. In
what should be a debate about basic political

freedoms is simply a question of corporate profits.69 Another and perhaps
deeper problem is the use of images of state surveillance that do not
adequately fit the current situationsuch as George Orwells discussion of totalitarian
Washington and Silicon Valley,
surveillance. Edward Snowden himself remarked that Orwell warned us of the dangers of the type of
government surveillance we face today.70 Reference to Orwells 1984 has been widespread in the current
debate; indeed, sales of the book were said to have soared following Snowdens revelations.71 The
argument that digital surveillance is a new form of Big Brother is, on one level, supported by the evidence.
For those in certain targeted groupsMuslims, left-wing

campaigners, radical journalistsstate surveillance certainly looks
Orwellian. But this level of scrutiny is not faced by the general public.
The picture of surveillance today is therefore quite different from the classic images of surveillance that we
find in Orwells 1984, which assumes an undifferentiated mass population subject to government control.
What we have instead today in the United States is total

surveillance, not on everyone, but on very specific groups of
people, defined by their race, religion, or political ideology:
people that NSA officials refer to as the bad guys. In March 2014,
Rick Ledgett, deputy director of the NSA, told an audience: Contrary to some of the stuff thats been
printed, we dont sit there and grind out metadata profiles of average people. If youre not connected to
one of those valid intelligence targets, you are not of interest to us.72 In the national security world,
connected to can be the basis for targeting a whole racial or political community so, even assuming the
national security surveillance can

draw entire communities into its web, while reassuring average
people (code for the normative white middle class) that they are not to
be troubled. In the eyes of the national security state, this average
person must also express no political views critical of the status quo.
accuracy of this comment, it points to the ways that
Better oversight of the sprawling national security apparatus and greater

use of encryption in digital communication should be welcomed. But by themselves these are likely
to do little more than reassure technologists, while racialized
populations and political dissenters continue to experience massive
surveillance. This is why the most effective challenges to the
national security state have come not from legal reformers or

technologists but from grassroots campaigning by the
racialized groups most affected. In New York, the campaign against
the NYPDs surveillance of Muslims has drawn its strength from
building alliances with other groups affected by racial profiling :
Latinos and Blacks who suffer from hugely disproportionate rates of
stop and frisk. In Californias Bay Area, a campaign against a Department of
Homeland Security-funded Domain Awareness Center was successful because various
constituencies were able to unite on the issue, including homeless
people, the poor, Muslims, and Blacks. Similarly, a demographics unit planned by the
Los Angeles Police Department, which would have profiled communities on the basis of race and religion,
was shut down after a campaign that united various groups defined by race and class. The lesson here is
while the national security state aims to create fear and to

divide people, activists can organize and build alliances across
race lines to overcome that fear. To the extent that the national
that,
security state has targeted Occupy, the antiwar movement,

environmental rights activists, radical journalists and campaigners,
and whistleblowers, these groups have gravitated towards
opposition to the national security state. But understanding the
centrality of race and empire to national security surveillance means
finding a basis for unity across different groups who experience
similar kinds of policing: Muslim, Latino/a, Asian, Black, and white
dissidents and radicals. It is on such a basis that we can see the
beginnings of an effective multiracial opposition to the surveillance
state and empire.
Centering our praxis in this space is key ---interrogating

Islamophobia in educational settings is critical to
establishing a critical consciousness that enables larger
political projects
Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology
[Jan. 04 2012, Shirin Housee works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University
of Wolverhampton, UK Whats the point? Anti-racism and students voices against Islamophobia, Volume
15, Issue 1]
Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the

student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university
classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real.
Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially,
educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is

just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other
oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a
very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education.
There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As
educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students
engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class.
My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic
political/religions issues that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking
The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as

found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this
political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should
encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social
justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign
in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who
knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the
awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our
society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham
(cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom
practices and the curriculum, because: if we are not working for equity
in our teaching and learning environments, theneducators are
inadvertently maintaining the status quo. In conclusion I argue that a
classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is
a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed.
Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop
social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism
and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of
Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence , in
August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused
and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying
racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place
to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic
as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: Education can
enlighten students and promote positive attitudes. Education
settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against
Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be
directed. (162)
possible in class.
Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions

behind Islamophobia creates a transformative and
liberatory pedagogy that enables agency and challenges
racist dynamics
Zine 4, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies
[2004, Jasmin Zine is a researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora. She teaches graduate
courses in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies
in Education of the University of Toronto in the areas of race and ethnicity, anti-racism education and
critical ethnography., Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from the

Educational Front Lines, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3]
As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early
as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical
pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant

Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of
life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and
youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were
experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the
politically neutral arena of crisis management. Among the school districts that I was in contact with,
there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of

racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and
define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day
basis did not even exist within the educational discourse . While schools were
reluctant to name specific incidents as racism part of an all-too-common denial
the notion of
Islamophobia did not have any currency at all . In fact, it was not
a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by
educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist
pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological
and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for

addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational
frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to
address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism,
and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing
with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational
resources simply did not exist . Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved
Being able to name and define the
experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to
shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a
critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for
conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to
coining a new term: Anti-Islamophobia Education.
develop some discursive foundations , arrive at a definition of Islamophobia,

and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to
challenge and resist . From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is
often loosely translated as an attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents. However,
this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social,
structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted.
Islamophobic
attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination
that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of
discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on
race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from ignorance
allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a
space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially irrational fear, this conception
Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere ignorance,
denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social,
to capture the complex dimensions

through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the
definition from its limited conception as a fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims and
acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to
individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that
support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example,
ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore,
individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic
forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional
exclusionary
practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among
them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as
terrorists and impending threats to public safety. Understanding
the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia
operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key
practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These
component of developing educational tools that would help

build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these
dynamics . From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative
anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability,
and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on
this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia
education.6 This includes the need to reclaim the stage through which Islam is represented from the
specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. Reclaiming
the
stage requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the

popular media discourse away from the negative , essentialized
referents and tropes of abject Otherness ascribed to Muslims.
This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in
order to reframe the Manichean worldview and clash of
civilizations narratives typically being purveyed in order to present
a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global
sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are
confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect
of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the
systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is

reinforced , by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in
society that sustain social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on
the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues
are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire
communities. In schools, the practice of color-coded streaming, whereby a disproportionate
number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams,
Negative perceptions held by teachers

and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led
to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success , based on such false
is another example of institutionalized racism.
stereotypes as the notion that Islam doesnt value education for girls or Black students wont succeed.
These
negative attitudes are relayed to students through the
hidden curriculum of schooling and lead to lower expectations

being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing
critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these

systems of domination is part of building a transformative and
liberatory pedagogy , one geared toward achieving greater social

justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of antiIslamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes .
Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims
in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary
markers of the Muslim world.
Deconstructing and demystifying these
stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical
literacy of the politics of media and image-making . Critically

examining the destructive impact of how these images create the
social and ideological divide between us and them is important
to exposing how power operates through the politics of

representation.
----2ac blocks (plan)
***CASE
*2ac solvency
-End Racial Profiling Act

Solves racial profiling in all law enforcement
Devaney 15 (Tim Devaney, staff writer at TheHill, Dem bill targets racial profiling by police,
TheHill, 4-22-2015, http://thehill.com/regulation/legislation/239721-dem-bill-targets-racialprofiling-by-police, al)
New legislation in Congress would expand prohibitions against racial profiling. With tensions rising between police and
the black community over a recent killings of unarmed men, a group of Democrats is expected Wednesday to reintroduce
the End Racial Profiling Act in both the House and Senate. The End Racial Profiling Act backed by Sen. Ben
Cardin (D-Md.) and Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) would stop police officers from racially
profiling not only African Americans, but also Muslims, Sikhs, Arab Americans and other
minorities that other find themselves being confronted by police. Police can still mention race when
giving a description of a suspect, a Senate Democratic aide told The Hill, but they cant say, Theres an African American
driving a fancy car. Lets pull him over. The Department of Justice recently expanded a policy that protects minorities
from being racially profiled by federal agents, but the rules do not apply to state and local law enforcement. The End
Racial Profiling Act would encompass all law enforcement across the country. Civil rights
advocates cheered the legislation, pointing out that while African Americans may face unfair
street-level profiling, Hispanic people are often profiled as illegal immigrants and Arab
Americans and Muslims are often profiled as terrorists. "Racial profiling robs people of their
dignity, undermines the integrity of our criminal justice system, and instills fear and distrust
among members of targeted communities, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights said in a statement.
The End Racial Profiling Act and the removal of any discriminatory surveillance
policies solve
Arab American Institute 15 (non-profit membership organization based in Washington D.C.
that focuses on the issues and interests of Arab-Americans nationwide, Islamophobia, 5/16/15,
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/7669/attachments/original/1431630927/Isla
mophobia.pdf?1431630927, al)
Background Islamophobia
is a form of intolerance defined as prejudice against, hatred or irrational

fear of Islam and Muslims. The general conflation of the cultures and beliefs of Arabs and
Muslims has expanded the scope of Islamophobia to include prejudice against and fear of
individuals of Arab descent. Islamophobia challenges the diversity of American culture and
society, proliferates misinformation and stereotypes, and fosters hostility and potential violence.
The Problem Since 2001, Islamophobia has been on a steady rise, with a dramatic increase in hate
crimes against Arabs and Muslims or those perceived to be Arab or Muslim. It has resulted in
Arabbaiting in elections (bigoted rhetoric against candidates of Arab descent), has become a
political wedge issue, with candidates pandering to irrational fears of Arabs and Muslims, and has
created public hysteria in opposition to the building of mosques and Islamic schools and
community centers. Since 2010, several states have proposed legislation to ban Sharia, or Islamic law, as a means of
safeguarding the American legal system from a fictional threat of being overtaken by Sharia. In 2011, House Homeland
Security Committee Chairman Peter King (R-NY) held hearings specifically targeting the American Muslim community on
the threat of radicalization. While Arab Americans and American Muslims are the targets of
Islamophobia, this form of discrimination impacts everyone. Tolerance or progression of

Islamophobia heightens the risk of discrimination against other racial, religious, and ethnic
minorities. Current Status Congressional Actions Since January 2011, Congressman King has held three hearings on
radicalization within the American Muslim community. The political conversation following the 9/11 attacks was careful to
point out that a peaceful religion had been hijacked by a fringe group and used for violence Congressman Kings hearing,
however, reoriented the conversation around a tone in which all Arab Americans and American Muslims should be viewed
with suspicion. The hearings produced little to no evidence supporting his claims that the Muslim community is
particularly prone to radicalization. During the annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security, the
House Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee accepted language submitted by a committee member that
informs recipients that the use of homeland security grant funding for any training, programs, presentations, and
speakersthat include information about violent extremism, homegrown violent extremism or domestic violent
extremismmust be consistent with applicable laws with respect to racial, ethnic, and religious, profiling. 2012 Elections
Several of the 2012 presidential candidates have made Islamophobic remarks, including: Michele Bachmann, who was
the first GOP candidate to sign the FAMILY FIRST marriage vow, commits its signatories to rejection of Sharia Islam
and all other anti-woman, anti-human rights form of totalitarian control. Herman Cain: Based upon the little
knowledge that I have of the Muslim religion, you know, they have an objective to convert all infidels or kill them
[3/21/11] A reporter asked me, would I appoint a Muslim to my administration. I did say, No. And heres why. I
would have to have people totally committed to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United
States. And many of the Muslims, theyre not totally dedicated to this country. [03/28/11] Newt Gingrich: Nazis dont
have the right to put up a sign next to the Holocaust museum in Washington... We would never accept the Japanese
putting up a site next to Pearl Harbor. There is no reason for us to accept a mosque next to the World Trade Center.
[08/15/11] Rick Santorum: The Islamization of Europe that is already on the way and will visit these shores not too soon
is a concern for us and something that we need to identify and we need to talk about and we need to fight with every ounce
of our being. [2/28/2009] State Initiatives Early 2011 saw a wave of anti-Sharia campaigns and bills. To date, bills in 22
states have been proposed that promote an anti-Sharia and anti-Islam agenda. Most of those challenged in court have
been found unconstitutional, violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment by unfairly singling out
Muslims and Islam. Community Discrimination The Southern Poverty Law Center has recorded a tripling of anti-Arab
hate crimes between 2000 and 2008. Pastor Terry Jones, of Floridas Dove World Outreach Center, planned
International Burn the Quran Day for the ninth anniversary of 9/11. National outcry and appeals from military officials
convinced Jones to stop his plans. Earlier this year, on March 20, 2011, Jones held a trial of the Quran at Dove World
Outreach Center and found it guilty of crimes against humanity. He burned the Quran in the Center that day. The
Cordoba Initiatives Park 51 project, an Islamic community center planned for Manhattan, sparked anti-Muslim and antiArab outrage when it was first mentioned in the fall of 2010. Anti-Muslim activists, politicians, and some relatives of 9/11
victims claimed that the project was insensitive to victims of the attacks and to the American people. The debate brought
what was a local zoning issue into the national media spotlight, with politicians and candidates around the nation
weighing in on the issue prior to (and sometimes as a seeming platform of their) 2010 mid-term campaigns. Key
Recommendations Engage in a national public education campaign to refute Islamophobic myths including those driving
the hysteria about Sharia, and shed light on the true character of the Muslim community in America. Hold candidates
and public officials accountable for their rhetoric toward the American Muslim, Arab American, and South Asian
American (MASA) community. Alert the public of instances of Islamophobia through action alerts and media outreach.
Mount legal challenges to state and federal legislation targeting the MASA community. Advocate
for changes in federal and state policies that promote or sanction racial and ethnic profiling.
Support the End to Racial Profiling Act, which seeks to eliminate law enforcement policies that
single out individuals or groups for heightened scrutiny and security procedures based on their
national origin, ethnicity, race or religion.
-Strict Scrutiny Standard

Strict scrutiny standards are historically tough for governments to meet- extending
the standards to include religion solves extensive Islamophobic actions.
Parvaresh 2014 [ROMTIN, J.D., University of Southern California; B.A., B.S., University of
California, Berkeley, PRAYER FOR RELIEF: ANTI-MUSLIM DISCRIMINATION AS RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 2014,
http://lawreview.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/Parvaresh-Final-PDF.pdf, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
In late 2011, the New
York City Police Department (NYPD) made national and international

headlines when its secret surveillance of Muslims across the New York City area was discovered. 2
Under the guise of counterterrorism, the NYPD monitored the daily lives of thousands of Muslims
for about a decade, 3 using techniques such as taking photographs, collecting license plate numbers at
mosques, and utilizing informants known as mosque crawlers to infiltrate Muslim
organizations. 4 From recording sermons to monitoring businesses and grade schools, the NYPD targeted
individuals not because of a reasonable suspicion that they specifically were linked to terrorism,
but rather because of one common characteristic: they were or were believed to be Muslim. As one
might expect, the police surveillance program has come under fire, as it chills religious participation and casts
innocent Muslims as potential terror suspects. 5 In mid-2012, a group of Muslim plaintiffs filed suit
in federal court challenging the NYPDs program. 6 Though their complaint alleged First Amendment
violations, including violations of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, their likelihood
for success may be hampered: Recent findings indicate that Muslim plaintiffs as a class are less likely to
succeed on First Amendment challenges relative to other religious groups. 7 Indeed, in early 2014, the
case was dismissed on standing and pleading grounds,8 and it was under appeal in the Third Circuit as of August 2014. Of
greater interest, however, is the plaintiffs additional claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This claim, too, faces a doctrinal obstaclereligion is not a suspect classification and is thus not
subject to strict scrutiny. Only classifications based on race and national origin are suspect and
thus warrant strict scrutiny; 9 by contrast, religion, more so than race or national origin,
appears to be the primary, if not sole, basis for the NYPDs surveillance . This Note,
however, does not look to resolve the constitutionality of the NYPD surveillance program. Rather, it explores an idea
impliedly raised by the case: the intersection of race and religion in post-9/11 America. For instance, one way the NYPD
lawsuit plaintiffs might have bolstered their case would have been to frame the alleged equal protection
violations in the context of race, and thus have the NYPDs actions analyzed under strict scrutiny a
historically tough burden for the government to meet. 10 The question then becomes whether anti-Muslim
discrimination could be interpreted as a form of racial discrimination. This Note therefore seeks to place anti-Muslim
discrimination into current legal understandings of race. It argues that, in some instances, anti-Muslim
discrimination should be treated as racial discrimination.11 In short, because Muslims, along with Middle
Easterners and South Asians, have increasingly become racialized in both the immediate and prolonged
aftermath of 9/11, they now warrant additional legal protection given the various forms of
discrimination they experience in both private and public contexts. Opening racial discrimination claims
to them would be one way to provide such relief.
Solves- the government has to identify reasonable concern outside of religionprevents policies that infringe on religious practices such as mosque monitoring
Uddin 2012 [Asma, (attorney @ the Becket Fund for Religious Liberties), A First Amendment
Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, First Amendment Law Review, Winter 2012,
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/A-FIRST-AMENDMENT-ANALYSISOF-ANTI-SHARIA-INITIATIVES.pdf, Accessed 7/16/15, AX]
Further, in
determining whose interests are sufficient to warrant a departure from a common

legal scheme, when the government makes a value judgment in favor of secular motivations, but
not religious motivations, the governments actions must survive heightened scrutiny. 109 [I]f
the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is
justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that
interest. 110Notably, one significant interpretation of the First Amendment that has been
advanced gives a higher level of protection to individual behavior motivated by religious belief.111
This interpretation would demand strict scrutiny of any law burdening religious practice .
Strict scrutiny solves

Shahabuddin 15 (Madiha Shahabuddin, JD at Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of
Law and BA at University of California, Irvine, "The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You
Can Be: How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans Violates First Amendment Rights,
February 16 2015, http://www.chapman.edu/law/_files/publications/clr-18shahabuddin.pdf) //mL
B. Muslim American Associational Rights Infringed The jurisprudence
on associational rights discussed

above provides a few key methods of first assessing whether government conduct rises to the kind
of level that merits strict scrutiny, and then deciding whether the compelling interest and
narrowly tailored elements of the strict scrutiny test itself are met. As established by case law,
government conduct that may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate should be
subjected to strict scrutiny.108 Such effects have included economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility . 109 The Ninth
Circuit provided more relevant examples of suppression of religious expression , including (1) withdrawal
by congregants from actively participating, (2) decline in financial support or donations, (3)
congregants reluctance in seeking religious counseling or being open during prayer, (4) diversion
of clergies or religious leaders time from congregation duties to dealing with the effects of
surveillance, and (5) fear or apprehension of conversations being bugged (recorded), which
have a negative impact on congregants morale.110 Muslim American surveillance has exhibited
similarly chilling effects on mosque-goers, demonstrating the need for strict scrutiny
application of the government programs aimed at widespread Muslim surveillance .
Like the curtailment the Court found in Patterson, Muslim Americans in regions like the East Coast have
also suffered from the loss of business; diminished or affected employment opportunities ;111
other manifestations of public hostility such as stigma;112 and the enabling or furthering
justification of hate crimes against Muslims113 because of the specter left upon the Muslim community in the
wake of media reports of NYPD surveillance.114 Moreover, the surveillance of Muslims has placed a
particularly ominous mark on the community through the governments use of informants to
infiltrate mosques, Muslim Student Associations on college campuses, and the Muslim
community in general.
-Epistemology
Extend Jones 99
Individual epistemological interrogation is keyinternalized racist stereotypes and implicit biases require
active challenging
Feingold and Lorang 2012 [Jonathon (J.D. graduate of UCLA School of Law) and Karen
(J.D. graduate of UCLA School of Law), Defusing Implicit Bias, UCLA Law Review Discourse 2012,
LexisNexis, AX]
accusations of racial profiling often require or rely

on evidence of conscious intent. Though presumptively unconstitutional, racial [*220]
Like allegations of racism,
profiling is often justified on policy grounds as a rational form of racial discrimination. Racial profiling is
rational in the sense that it relies on perceived statistical correlations between a particular racial group and
For instance, when New York officials conduct

covert surveillance on Muslim communities, the decision is based on
a conscious belief that the targeted individuals are more likely to
engage in terrorism than the general population. Understood in this way, a
a corresponding trait or behavior.
successful claim of racial profiling requires proof of a conscious decision to discriminate against the
These examples of racism defenses and

racism allegations illustrate the central role that evidence of
conscious intent plays in our public dialogue. Even within the disparate treatment
targeted group because of their race.
however, such an approach fails to take into

account recent findings from the fields of psychology and
social cognition that complicate the way we may think about
racially motivated acts. These findings reveal that implicit biases, often
theory of racial discrimination,
undetectable through introspection [*221] and self-reporting, cause us to

treat others differently because of their race. To gain a more accurate sense of
the role played by implicit biases, we begin by disaggregating the concepts of explicit and implicit biases.
explicit and implicit biases are the result of social cognitions . n73
Cognitions are thoughts or feelings, and "[a] social cognition is a
thought or feeling about a person or a social group, such as a racial
group." n74 Explicit biases are thoughts or feelings that we are aware
of and are able to identify through introspection. n75 We commonly, though not always, "agree
with and endorse our explicit [biases]." n76 Racism allegations, and the corresponding
Both
racism defenses, often reflect our familiarity with explicit biases. Racism defenses regularly rely on the
type of evidence offered by Zimmerman's father, while those alleging racism correspondingly search for
the smoking-gun quote or document that will reveal racist intent. n77 The national focus on Zimmerman's
possible use of the pejorative term "coon" provides one such example of evidence common to a racism
Implicit bias research shows that traditional

understandings of conscious intent fail to tell the whole story .
allegation. n78
Implicit biases "pop[] into mind quickly and automatically without

conscious volition." n79 Unlike explicit biases, implicit biases are difficult to
identify because of introspective limitations and our own selfmonitoring. n80 In fact, we are usually unaware of, or mistaken about, the sources of
our implicit biases and the influence they have on our judgment and
behavior. n81 Implicit biases may actually include "thought[s] or
feeling[s] that we would reject as inaccurate or inappropriate

upon self-reflection." n82 This disassociation between implicit and explicit biases means
we may honestly believe we hold positive [*222] attitudes about a
particular racial group, yet we simultaneously hold negative
attitudes toward that same group at an implicit level . n83 This explains why
that
being Hispanic, growing up in a multiracial household, having Black friends, and honestly professing
antiracist ideals does not preclude the possibility that an individual might hold implicit negative attitudes
about Blacks. To circumvent challenges posed by our inability to access implicit biases, psy-chological tests
have been designed to measure our unconscious cognitions. These tests have relied on various linguistic
cues, physiological responses, microfacial movements, neurological activity, and "reaction times when
completing various tasks." n84 Perhaps the most well-known test is the Implicit Association Test (IAT),
which measures reaction times for sorting stimuli into categories. n85 The IAT consistently reveals "implicit
attitudes in favor of one social group over another." n86 For many Americans, implicit biases manifest "in
the form of negative beliefs (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) against racial minorities." n87 Because
many people hold implicit biases, the real question becomes whether these biases influence or predict
behavior. Jerry Kang summarizes the prevailing wisdom on this point: There is now persuasive evidence
implicit bias against a social category, as measured by instruments such as the

IAT, predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that
category. This occurs notwithstanding contrary explicit commitments in
favor of racial equality. In other words, even if our sincere self-reports
that
of bias score zero, we would still engage in disparate

treatment of individuals on the basis of race, consistent with
our racial schemas. Controlled, deliberative, rational processes
are not the only forces guiding our behavior. That we are not even aware
of, much less intending, such race-contingent behavior does not magically erase the harm. n88 [*223] In
fact, studies have shown that "[a]utomatic associations influence behavior by both professionals and
laypeople in employment, medical, voting, law enforcement, and countless other contexts." n89 Perhaps
most troubling, and especially relevant to Trayvon's death, evidence suggests that police
officers and private citizens unconsciously rely on race when making
decisions about whether or not to shoot. n90 Part III proceeds by detailing the potentially deadly
combination of implicit bias and guns.

political projects
15, Issue 1]



in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point . And who
to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions , optimistic
directed. (162)
possible in class.

racist dynamics


the notion of


Islamophobic

exclusionary

the

popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized


These



representation.
Epistemological interrogation solves the identity of the

Muslim as a terrorist is a social construct contingent on
the contemporary security State by questioning this
dominant paradigm the affirmative paves the road to a
more inclusive tomorrow
Bhambra and Margee 2010 [Gurminder K Bhambra* and Victoria Margee**,
*Professor of sociology at the University of Warwick, **School of Humanities at the University of Brighton,
Identity Politics and the Need for a Tomorrow, April 10 2010,
http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_, AX]
alternative models of identity and community are

required from those put forward by essentialist theories , and that these are
We suggest that
offered by the work of two theorists, Satya Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohantys ([1993]
2000)post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism,
while avoiding the excesses of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a proposed
identities must be understood

as theoretical constructions that enable subjects to read the world in
particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact,
implicit explanations of the social world and its constitutive relations
of power. Experience that from which identity is usually thought to derive is not something that
alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993]2000),
simply occurs, or announces its meaning and significance in a self-evident fashion: rather,
experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively

produced(Scott 1991).Mohantys work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who similarly insists upon
the communal nature of meaning or knowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge
and the postmodern alternative which announces the death of the subject and the impossibility of
it is not individuals who are the agents of

epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible for an individual to know
something that another individual could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability
to make sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual
frameworks and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the
generator and repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohantys work on identity as
epistemology, Nelson argues instead that,
theoretical construction together with Nelsons work on epistemological communities therefore suggests
that, identity
is one of the knowledges that is produced and

enabled for and by individuals in the context of the
communities within which they exist.
The post-positivist reformulation of
experience is necessary here as it privileges understandings that

emerge through the processing of experience in the context of
negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself
producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has had
the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the experience of, for example,
sexual discrimination that makes one a feminist, but rather, the
paradigm through which one attempts to understand acts of sexual
discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the
experience oneself in order to make the identification feminist . If
being a feminist is not a given fact of a particular social (and/or biological) location that is, being
designated female but is, in Mohantys terms, an achieve-ment that is, something worked towards
through a process of analysis and interpretation then two implications follow. First, that not all women are
feminists. Second, that feminism is some-thing that is achievable by men. 3 While it is accepted that
experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person
there is some-thing politically selfdefeating about insisting that one can only understand an
experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience
oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of
direct experience, or then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity
politics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or
organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to
understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there
in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise
privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones,
or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice
with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to
speak about the experience of others has led to an assumption on
the part of some white feminists that confronting racism is the sole
responsibility of black feminists, just as today issues of caste become the sole
to another with transparency, we think that
responsibility of the dalit womens organisations (Rege 1998).Her argument for a dalit feminist
a call for
others to educate themselves about the histories, the preferred
social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised
(Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows their cause to become our cause, not
standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather
as a form of appropriation of their struggle , but through the

transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that
their struggle is also our struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social
processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus
making those experiences the possible object of analysis and action
for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or
powerful for all subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and
essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which
accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of
particular, overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or
that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen
identifies as the postmodern excesses of post-racial theory, where in this world without
borders (rac-ism is real, but race is not) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can
be Croatian-American, if that is what he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be KoreanAmerican(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, as Nelson (1993) argues, the
concept of the epistemological com-munity requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in
relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that are social. Any claim to identity, then, would
have to be recognised by particular communities as valid in order to be success-ful. This further shifts the
discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the communities
that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily
the
epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as
feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm
for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that
is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the
same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or postcolonial feminism
by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence,
has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998,
it is the identification of injustice which calls

forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy
solidarities . 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences
2000).We believe that
between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while

being, in some respects, its beneficiary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those
who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities, dalits),
we
would privilege the importance of a shared political

commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such
differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims
from the basis of understanding them as epistemological
communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its associated
since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared
epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of fixed
characteristics the focus is on the activities individuals participate
in rather than the characteristics they are deemed to possess.
Identity is thus defined further as a function of activity located in
particular social locations (understood as the complex of objective forces that influence the
conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As
problems)
the communities that enable identity should not be

conceived of as imagined since they are produced by very
real actions, practices and projects.
such,
Islamophobia has built cultural barriers all around us

which manifest themselves in everyday discrimination
against Muslims. We have all become complicit in the
construction of misunderstanding and fear of Muslim
culture the only way out is to question our cultural and
educational practices
Samman 8 (Khaldoun Samman, Associate Professor of Sociology at Macalester College,
Strategies for Decentering Islamophobia, Spring 2008,
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~crg2/faultlines/FL08.pdf)
The case of the unflushed toilet demonstrates how even the seemingly innocuous subject of bathroom
When polarized
distinctionswhat Samman refers to as cultural-binariesare drawn between
two worlds, the results can be cultural isolation, misunderstanding,
and fear. A more sobering example of this is the criticism and
negative attention that has been directed at Muslim communities for
purportedly endorsing practices such as female honor killings.
This practice has been framed as a purely Islamic phenomenon, and
consequentially one that does not exist in the West . An analysis of U.S.
etiquette, calls into question the reflexive judgments we make about one another.
criminal statistics however, reveals that 1/3 of female murders were committed by a boyfriend, husband,
Viewed in this light, an honor killing loses its divisive power as

a uniquely Muslim atrocity. We are forced instead into questioning
our own cultural practices and identities. The victimization of young
women is no longer a uniquely Muslim crime, but rather, a human
one. Profesor Samman believes that it is only by discarding the epistemologies of
cultural binariesof us and them, Orient and Occidentwill we be
able to move beyond the politics of fear and diviseness that has
come to dominate our public and political discourse.
or lover.
Education in debate is critical to begin deconstructing

Islamophobia we need engaged dialogue on the question
of discrimination in order to challenge internal
stereotypes and ignorance
Esposito 11 (John L. Esposito, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies
and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Islamophobia and the Challenges of Pluralism
in the 21st Century, January 6 2011,
http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/docs/ACMCU_Islamophobia_txt_99.pdf)
9/11 made the international community more aware of the critical

importance of intercivilizational dialogue. Governments in Europe and America, the
Muslim world and beyond as well as international organizations like the United Nations and Organization of
the Islamic Conference have undertaken serious efforts to promote intercivilizational dialogue. The World
Economic Forum created the Council of 100 Leaders (political, religion, intellectual, and media) and the
Centers like Georgetown Universitys Prince

Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding,
promote a better understanding between the Muslim world and the
West, have been active in Washington and globally, speaking,
briefing, and writing for a broad audience of university, government,
media and corporate audiences. Education in our schools, universities and
seminaries (not just madrasas) as well as our churches and synagogues that train the next
generation of policymakers, religious leaders, educators, and
citizens is critical. Attempts to limit public discourse and debate,
silence alternative voices in America and Europe who speak out
against ignorance, stereotyping and demonization of Islam,
discrimination, hate crimes or threats to the civil liberties of Muslims
must be turned back. Some are attacked in the media and on Islamophobic websites. Would
U.N. the Alliance of Civilizations.
this discourse and these actions be tolerated if Christianity or Judaism were the targets?
Islamophobia can have serious consequences on foreign policy.
Americas policy in Iraq, from war to post-war reconstruction, was

affected by the extent to which Islam and Muslim religious leaders,
and Shii Islam in particular, were seen through the distorted lens of
Khomeini/Iranian revolutionary fundamentalism. Therefore, the potential
roles of Shii religious leaders and institutions were unforeseen or underestimated, and then feared; the
belief that Iranian Shii would control Iraqi Shii, leading to a Qom-Najaf axis, failed to appreciate and
understand the diversity of Shii leadership.
-Policy first
Extend Kumar 13
*2ac impact
-2ac impact framing
-Otherization General Impact

Otherization also causes genocide, slavery, segregation,
exploitation, and a multitude of unspeakable wrongs
Katz 97 (Katheryn D. Katz, prof. of law - Albany Law School, 1997, Albany Law Journal, |||edited
for g-lang|||)
It is undeniable that throughout
human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed

unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been
characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be
visited upon|||them||| him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired
to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them
as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery,
racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social
misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and
the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.
-Criminalization
Islamophobia is manifested in US federal policies,
criminalizing all Muslims
Chaudhry-Kravitz 13 (Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz, CAIR-Philadelphia Legal Director, Is
Brown the New Black?: American Muslims, Inherent Propensity for Violence, and Americas
Racial History, Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice Volume 20 Issue 1
Article 5, September 2013, http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1360&context=crsj, al)
So, beginning by speaking about where we are now, I'm going to assert an almost indisputable fact-that American
Muslim identity has been criminalized post-9/1 1. In other words, American Muslims have been socially
constructed to have a shared group identity, and persons associated with that socially constructed
group identity are presumed to have an inherent inclination toward violent behavior. As described
below, I assert that there have been a multitude of post-9/11 governmental policies enacted post-9/11 which appear to be
premised upon this presumption of criminality. We see examples of this apparent presumption of criminality everywhere.
We begin with FBI surveillance of mosques.'8 We have also seen federal prosecutorial targeting of
religious and civic organizations, such as CAIR' 9 and other national organizations, including Islamic
charities. 2 0 But the federal government is not the only one keeping its eye on the Muslim community. For example, we
know that the NYPD has conducted surveillance from Pennsylvania to Connecticut, and specifically it
has targeted both mosques and Muslim student associations at universities.2 1 We see the
criminalization of American Muslim identity at airports when DHS and TSA employees target
"Muslim-looking" individuals, or individuals with "Muslim-sounding" names for secondary
screenings based upon an unspoken presumption that American Muslims have an inherent
propensity to engage in acts of violence against the United States or its citizens. 22 We have also
seen anti-Muslim trainings by law enforcement in the United States military.24
-Otherization (Islamophobia)
The United States uses otherization and the concept of domination and
subordination to justify extreme domestic discrimination in surveillance and
foreign attacks
Jamal 08 (Amaney Jamal, Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics at Princeton University and
director of the Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Civil Liberties and the
Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans, Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11:
From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects, 2008, https://books.google.com/books?
id=Qbgw2ZwvT8kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Race+and+Arab+Americans+Before+and+After+
9/11:+From+Invisible+Citizens+to+...&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMI07_Wn9ngxg
IVSakeCh2caA2d#v=onepage&q=Race%20and%20Arab%20Americans%20Before%20and
%20After%209%2F11%3A%20From%20Invisible%20Citizens%20to%20...&f=false, al)
An alternative explanation focuses on racial motivations. According to this logic, Americans
in favor of infringing
on Muslim and Arab American civil liberties do so because they hold negative views about an
entire people. These negative views are fed by a variety of misperceptions and stereotypes. The
Muslim and Arab American had been popularly constructed as an irrational, terror-supporting,
and fanatical enemy Other long before 9/11. American foreign policy has consistently justified
intervention in the Muslim world along similar lines. When U.S. leaders characterize the Arab
and Muslim world as inherently undemocratic owing to fundamental value differences between
us and them, they promote an environment of intolerance at home. Thus, the racialization of Arab
and Muslim Americans, a process decades in the making, also explains the overwhelming support for the infringement of
Arab and Muslim civil liberties (Moallem 2005). In this chapter I move beyond the narrow phenotypical definition of
racialization, wherein race relations are strictly structured by biological differences. Rather, I adopt a larger definition of
racialization that incorporates the process of othering. More specifically here, I argue that the racialization of
Muslims and Arabs stems from the consistent deployment of an us versus them mentality,
excessively propped up for the justification of military campaigns in the Arab world. The
racialization of Arabs and Muslims is not simply contingent on phenotypical differences; rather,
this racialization of difference is driven by a perceived clash of values and exacerbated by cultural
ethnocentrism. This process of othering is based on assumptions about culture and religion
instead of phenotype. It is not based on assumptions about culture and religion instead of phenotype. It is not based
on racial divides; instead, it conforms to the process of racialization that has characterized the ways in
which the dominant elements in society have interacted with minority ethnic groups more
generally. The racialization of Arabs and Muslims stems from two intertwined processes. First, in a society that is
already constructed along racial lines, any perceived difference between the dominant
mainstream and a minority Other tends to conform to racisms framework. This othering
process lends itself to the already existing paradigm of defining oneself vis--vis other groups
along the lines of racial categories. This form of racism is not contingent on differences in appearance but on
differences in cultural attributes. These differences are exacerbated by popular and government
discourses that deem the group an enemy Other, especially after 9/11. The loyalties of the Arab and
Muslim communities have consistently been questioned since the attacks. Only 38 percent of Americans in the
Detroit metro area believe that Arabs and Muslims are doing all that they can to fight the war on
terror. Muslims and Arabs across the United States are consistently asked to apologize for 9/11, as
if they were behind the attacks. And yet, ironically, the numerous and countless condemnations emanating from
mosques and organizations in the United States that emphatically denounce the attacks have received little media
attention. Americans remain suspicious of Arabs and Muslims. When asked whether Arabs and Muslims could be trusted,
Americans in the Detroit metro area ranked them as the least trustworthy subpopulation. Twenty percent of Americans
have little or not trust for whites; 24 percent have little or no trust for blacks, and 30 percent little or no trust for
Muslims and Arabs. Not only are Arabs and Muslims different, they are also a threat treated with
great suspicion because they are assumed to originate from the Middle East. They are presumed
to be operating against us. The binary construction of us versus them is not new to American social relations
in the United States or abroad. Racial relations in the United States have been constructed through the
binary lens of the dominant and the subordinate , a legacy of the history of race relations in this
country. Likewise, the lens through which America sees the rest of the world is tinted with this dichotomy: we, whoever
and wherever we are, enjoy both cultural and moral superiority. Such interactions with Others abroad translate into a
racial logic in a U.S. home. The process of othering, be it based on phenotype or cultural difference,
therefore lends itself to racialization, particularly when it involves attributing essentializing

characteristics to the entire group. The racialization of Arabs and Muslims, however, draws on yet
another element of difference. Not only are they different at home, but their difference is
exacerbated by geopolitical realities where the United States has utilized the construction of the
Other as enemy-terrorist to justify its campaign abroad. The second process of racialization
involves the direct subordination of the minority Other. The very process of rendering the Other
inferior to white Americans, or some imagined group of acceptable Americans, is at the heart of
racialization. In the case of Muslim and Arab Americans, the way that Otherness is
determined is through a process by which the dominant social group claims moral
and cultural superiority in the process of producing an essentialized, homogenous image of
Muslim and Arab Americans as nonwhites who are naturally, morally, and culturally inferior to
real Americans. Terrorism, according to this logic, is not the modus operandi of a few radical individuals, but a byproduct of a larger cultural and civilizational heritage: the Arab and Islamic Other.
Muslim being a synonym for terrorist in the status

quo means that Muslims are categorized as the other
and excluded from society
Joshi 06 (Khyati Y. Joshi, Professor of Education at Fairleigh Dickinson University, The
Racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in the United States, Equity & Excellence in
Education, 11/23/06, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10665680600790327, al)
The racialization of religion occurs through multiple processes, involves multiple agents, and leads to multiple outcomes.
Ultimately, racialization results in essentialism; it reduces people to one aspect of their identity and
thereby presents a homogeneous, undifferentiated, and static view of an ethnoreligious

community. While Hinduism, Sikhism, and Islam are three different belief systems, they share some of the major
outcomes of racialization: they are rendered theologically, morally, and socially illegitimate. Despite this
similarity of processes and often of outcomes, racialization affects each religious group that is targeted differently. While
one could argue that Christianity has been racialized through its association with whitenesswith distinctive designations
for black, Korean, or Chinese Christian congregationsthe results of racialization are different because whiteness and
Christianity function as the United States racial and religious norms, respectively.3 The construction of identity
most often involves establishing both norms and opposites, who one is involves identifying
others who are not (Pharr, 1988; Said, 1978). The process of othering entails a dialectic of both
inclusion and exclusion. By attributing certain characteristics to a population in order to
categorize and differentiate it as an other, those who do so also establish criteria by which they
themselves are represented. Indeed, a norm and its other or others are, to a great extent, each
defined by reference to the other, by what each is not. For reasons that will become clear in the historical
section that follows, it is the normative power of whiteness and Christianity, separately and in tandem, that makes the
racialization of religion an essential problem for non-white non-Christians. Thus, in order to understand the
contemporary racialization of South Asian religions, we must begin by orienting ourselves historically and socially. In the
next two sections, I show how the United States has developed as a society where Christianity and whiteness are
intimately linked and where Christianity and whiteness generate social norms against which other religions and races are
measured.
The concept of the other justifies violence,

stereotyping, invisibility, distortion, isolation, and
internalized oppression
Racial meaning is extended to a religion, a religious group, or a belief system that had previously
been racially unclassified. Particular faiths come to be considered not for their worldwide practice
by diverse peoples, but rather in direct association with colors of skin, textures of hair, and other
phenotypical features that may characterize communities of believers. The process ultimately
goes beyond phenotype, and results in a group of people being identified, based on shared
ethnicity and nationality, as being of a particular religion. In the context of the historical moment, social values and political
presumptions are connected to the racialized religion. Within the unique context of their own time and place, human beings ascribe social meaning to
certain biological characteristics in order to differentiate, to exclude, and to dominate . This
process occurs not in a vacuum but in specific conditions that render the distinctions relevant in a particular historical moment. Because racial systems of
classification are intimately linked to systems of power and authority , these social categories take on
everyday importance in social, ideological, and economic contexts. Most obviously, they become fodder
for those who perpetuate physical violence based on race. But more subtly, these categories become a part of our cultural vocabulary: our
shared assumptions, our media buzz, and our humor. In the present day, for example, the racialization of Islam intersects with the
Wests encounters with enemies whose ideological identity is intimately linked to their
interpretation and use of Islam. As a result, brown-skinned, non-Christian Americans become
more (or less) than just an other within the society; they become an other who is associated with a
foreign enemy. They go from merely being a minority to being viewed as a potential fifth
column10 due to their presumed connection with and loyalty to this enemy. The impact of this process on South Asian
Americanson those unlucky adults who have been beaten or slain in post-September 11 backlash attacks and on those many children and adolescents who must laugh off or fight back against
racialization of religion locates

certain religious populations within the social strata of U.S. society by applying ideological forces
in conjunction with social and political relations of domination. The racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism has Orientalist
assumptions that they or their relatives are affiliated with terrorismare described in greater detail in the next section. The
underpinnings (Said, 1978).11 American society created an image of South Asiannessand of the South Asian religions before it even encountered them physically. The writings of the
Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, both of whose more philosophical works were influenced by the Bhagavad Gita, were the vehicle for this encounter (Eck,
2001). The West created the East as a site of difference. . . reified in the anthropological mode where strange tongues, other beliefs, [and] centuries old (read unchanging) religions. . . mark out the
community (Hutnyk, 1999, p. 132). In an early example of Americans conflating immigrants religions with their place of origin, 17th-century Sikh immigrants were known as Hindoos (Jensen,
The sense of danger that historically characterized Europes post-Crusade view of the Muslim
world was again projected onto Muslim immigrants. Meanwhile, Britains approach to Hindu-majority India, always characterized by
sentiments more proprietary than conflict-laden (Said, 1978), was transformed into the new American commodification of things Indian. Islam, Hinduism, and
Sikhism therefore become not merely non-Christian they become the villainous, anachronistic
religions of the East. Both Indians as a race and ethnicity and Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs as
religions were othered and thereby diminished in the American minds eye. This othering, in
turn, has consequences for these minority groups in the U.S. South Asian Americans face what
Pharr (1988) identifies as the common elements of oppression; In relation to a defined norm,
which both buttresses and is buttressed by institutional and economic power, out-group members
suffer violence and the threat of violence, stereotyping, invisibility, distortion, isolation, and
internalized oppression. In the act of defining Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism as deviant, and
thereby excluding them from society, white American Christians represent themselves as
benevolent. This in/out group phenomenon reinforces Christian hegemony at the institutional
and cultural levels, and enables individual members of the in group to rationalize (and to
perpetuate) the exclusion of religious others.
1988).
The governments perpetuation of the Muslim-terrorist

stereotype justifies violence against Muslims
In our current sociopolitical climate and historical moment, the most conspicuous example of how South Asian American
religions are racialized is not the Indian/Hindu connotation described above, but rather the association between
brown skin and Muslim beliefs. Since the oil shock of 1973 and the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979,
the United States has been confronting enemies in the developing world whose ideology is
expressed and explained by reference to their interpretations of Islam. This theology/ideology is
racialized via its association with Islam: Arab and Muslim are used interchangeably and the
politics and tactics of terrorist movements are described as Islamic by the popular media.
Stereotypes perpetuated by the government and media come to paint Islam and Muslim
as intrinsicallyperhaps organicallyviolent and evil in American public opinion (Afridi, 2001;
Haddad, 2000; Nimer, 2002). Said (1996) argued that Islam has been turned into Americas post-Soviet
devil (p. 28) thereby replacing godless Communism as its sinister global enemy of the present
historical moment. The mainstream news and entertainment mediamost Americans only source of information
about non-Whites and the religions and cultures of the non-Western worlddo little to educate and much to exacerbate
this othering of religions beyond the Jewish and Christian faiths. From
the attitudes of political leaders ,

is a small
step to the notion of all brown-skinned Muslims as the enemy (Shaheen, 1984, 2001). The
racial/religious othering of Muslims has been used as a dehumanizing tool by political leaders
who a generation ago were demonizing yellow reds (that is, the East and Southeast Asian communists
the unenlightened coverage by the news media, and the caricatures that are the filmmakers stock-in-trade, it
against whom the Korean and Vietnam Wars were fought). Like these enemies and like Japanese Americans in the 1940s,
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian Americans have faced negative representations in the media since the 1972 killing of
Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich and the Iran Hostage Crisis of 19791981, through the Intifada and First
Gulf War of the 1980s and 1990s, and even more since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Consider just one popular
manifestation of American thought: the editorial cartoon. Hundreds of cartoons have vilified Osama bin Laden and his
allies in ways that both draws upon and exacerbate hackneyed images of the Semitic, Muslim villain. Like the midcentury
cartoons of the Japanese emperor, the figures are exaggeratedusually with a large turban, protrusive nose, and
beady eyesall stereotypical Arabic features often found represented in the media. As a result, U.S.
society and culture tends to ascribe collective guilt on an entire ethnic group, just as it did half a
century ago with respect to Japanese Americans, by associating these stereotypically Arab features with the
acts committed by al-Qaeda.
Otherization means Muslims as bodies not worth

considering
While the causes and effects of racialization are different for each faith, they are most usefully considered as a group. This
is because they
face a common outcome, whether by exoticization, vilification, or

terrorization. The three faiths are rendered invisible, illegitimate, and unworthy of
attention beyond the level of novelty or stereotype. They suffer the same final fate: They
are rendered theologically, morally, and socially illegitimate . This illegitimacy is acted out in
ignorance of, contempt for, and mischaracterization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism by
the mass media, the government, and individuals. These phenomena function cyclically
to maintain a white, Christian hegemony in the United States. Their effect is felt
dramatically by children and adolescents, whose home belief systems are invalidated,
ignored, and even actively contested by educators and other adults (Joshi, 2006). In a research
study of secondgeneration Indian Americans, many research participants (including Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Indian
American Christians) reported feeling that the dominant white U.S. culture has shown disinterest in and disrespect for
fundamental pieces of their identity, particularly their religious identity (Joshi, 2006; Wingfield, this issue; Zine, 2001).
Othering in the context of specifically religion justifies mass violence

Sticulescu et al. 12 (Ana Rodica Sticulescu, Ovidius University, Alina Stan, Ovidius
University, Identity in Conflict: A Case Study of Violence, Contemporary Readings in Law and
Social Justice Volume 4(2), 2012, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
handle=hein.journals/conreadlsj4&div=145&g_sent=1&collection=journals, al)
Mass violence as genocides28 are common during the process of "othering" in which the
boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a previously
"included" group is ideologically recast (involving a large scale mechanism of hate propaganda
and incitement to genocide29 were used as a mechanism of dehumanization of the others) as
being outside the community, as a threatening and dangerous "other"-whether racial, political,
ethnic, religious , economic, and so on-that must be annihilated. From an anthropological perspective,
the reification of concepts such as race and ethnicity are not surprising, given the historical background of perceived
biological difference. It is said that in African societies a person is considered a human being precisely for being enveloped
in the community along with other human beings, or their philosophy is governed by the verb "to participate".
-Dehumanization
Dehumanization justified mass genocide empirics prove
Haslam 06 (Nick Haslam, Professor of Psychology at University of Melbourne,
Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, Personality and Social Psychology Review Vol. 10, No.
3, 252-264, 2006, http://psr.sagepub.com/content/10/3/252.full.pdf, al)
Dehumanization is arguably most often mentioned in relation to ethnicity, race, and related
topics such as immigration and genocide. It is in this paradigmatic context of intergroup conflict
that some groups are claimed to dehumanize others, and these dehumanizing images have been
widely investigated. A historical catalogue is offered by Jahoda (1999), who examined the many
ways in which ethnic and racial others have been represented, both in popular culture and in
scholarship, as barbarians who lack culture, self-restraint, moral sensibility, and cognitive
capacity. Excesses often accompany these deficiencies: The savage has brutish appetites for violence and
sex, is impulsive and prone to criminality, and can tolerate unusual amounts of pain. A consistent
theme in this work is the likening of people to animals. In racist descriptions Africans are compared to apes
and sometimes explicitly denied membership of the human species. Other groups are compared to dogs, pigs, rats,
parasites, or insects. Visual depictions caricature physical features to make ethnic others look animal-like. At other times,
they are likened to children, their lack of rationality, shame, and sophistication seen patronizingly as innocence rather
than bestiality. Dehumanization is frequently examined in connection with genocidal conflicts (Chalk
& Jonassohn, 1990; Kelman, 1976). A
primary focus is the ways in which Jews in the Holocaust,

Bosnians in the Balkan wars, and Tutsis in Rwanda were dehumanized both during the violence
by its perpetrators and beforehand through ideologies that likened the victims to vermin. Similar
animal metaphors are common in images of immigrants (O'Brien, 2003a), who are seen as polluting threats
to the social order.
Dehumanization enables genocides and massacres

because people disengage their own morals because the
inferior are inhuman
Haslam et al. 07 (Nick Haslam, Professor of Psychology at University of Melbourne, Stephen
Loughnan, Lecturer in Experimental & Social Psychology at the University of Edinburgh,
Catherine Reynolds, Vanderbilt University graduate, Samuel Wilson, Research Fellow at the
Swinburne Leadership Institute at Swinburne University, Dehumanization: A New Perspective,
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 11/15/07,
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Samuel_Wilson4/publication/227548001_Dehumanizatio
n_A_New_Perspective/links/00b49515e3a917f285000000.pdf, al)
Evidence of inhumanity is not hard to find in recent history. People are killed, tortured, abused, and exploited, and their
suffering is often ignored or even relished. The psychological basis of cruelty and indifference is complex,
of course, but one possible mechanism is that inhumane actions are easier to perpetrate when
their victims are seen as less than human. If they are barbarians, then we may act barbarously
toward them, and if they are just distant abstractions then we may inflict harm on them without
being troubled by pangs of conscience or fellow feeling. The idea that people are sometimes
denied their proper humanness is usually referred to as dehumanization . Sometimes it is starkly
and shockingly obvious, as when ethnic groups are explicitly likened to nonhumans such as vermin or apes, or when they
are accorded a lesser degree of humanity, as when African Americans were once officially declared to be worth three fifths
of a person. At other times dehumanization may be more implicit, as when people are represented in objectifying ways or
when the degrading behavior that is directed toward them implies that the actor does not consider them fully human. Over
the past three decades, social psychologists have made important contributions to the study of dehumanization. Their
analyses generally place the phenomenon in the context of intergroup violence and antagonism. Kelman (1976) argued
that dehumanization plays a key role in sanctioned mass violence, such as genocides and
massacres, because it weakens moral restraints on violent behavior. In a similar vein, Opotow (1990)
proposed that dehumanizing
others is one form of moral exclusion, a process that places others

outside the boundary in which moral vales, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (p. 1). BarTal (2000) examined the ideological supports of moral exclusion, describing dehumanization as
one of several forms of delegitimizing belief. These shared beliefs portray out-groups in an
extremely negative and often emotionally overheated manner, and serve to reinforce the ingroups superiority and justify its aggression . Bandura (2002) refined the analysis of moral
exclusion by presenting dehumanization as a process in which people disengage their moral selfsanctions, thereby relieving them of feelings of guilt over their aggressive actions and empathy for
their victims. Consistent with this view, Bandura and his colleagues found that people behave more harshly toward
others who are divested of human qualities (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975) and that moral disengagement
partially accounts for aggressive behavior among children (Bandura, Barbarelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001). Schwartz
and Struch (1989) noted how imputing different basic values to other groups leads them to be seen as less human and
promotes aggression toward them These classic works on the psychology of dehumanization have some obvious family
resemblances. All of them place aggression front and center in their analysis : dehumanization enables,
disinhibits, and justifies violent and otherwise aggressive behavior. All of them present
dehumanization as something that occurs primarily in extreme contexts of antagonism and
conflict, such as genocide and interethnic strife. Most of them, with the partial exception of Banduras work,
present dehumanization as an intergroup phenomenon in which groups are denied human attributes or labelled as
nonhumans. This view of dehumanization as an extreme phenomenon closely linked to intergroup violence has helped to
advance our understanding of human evil, but recent developments in the field have moved in a new direction. Their main
message is that subtle forms of dehumanization are also apparent in everyday social perception, can occur in the absence
of intense conflict or aggression, and can be observed outside of group contexts, in peoples understandings of the self and
its distinctiveness from others.
-Immigration Good- add on impacts

Immigrants significantly boost the economy multiple
empirical studies prove
Furchtgott-Roth 14 (Diana Furchtgott-Roth, former chief economist of the U.S. Department of
Labor, director of Economics21, and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research,
Does Immigration Increase Economic Growth?, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research,
December 2014, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/e21_02.htm#.VacC8RNVikp, al)
With different immigration paths available for workers based on type of work performed, the economic effects of
immigration need to be evaluated for both high- and low-skill workers. Numerous empirical studies have been published
on this issue (see Bibliography), with recent government data only reinforcing the overall academic consensus that
increased immigration leads to higher economic growth. Research by Giovanni Peri of the University of
California at Davis, for example, documents how expanding
legal immigration would create growth,

innovation, and labor market efficiency and flexibility, leading to a substantial economic
stimulus [for the U.S.].12 Peri, together with Gianmarco Ottaviano of the London School of Economics, has
published extensively on how the skills of immigrants often complement those displayed by the existing
U.S. labor force.13 Immigrants make the economy more efficient by increasing the supply of labor,
both in high- and low-skill areas, creating jobs for native-born Americans in the process : a 2010
research paper by Peri, with Chad Sparber of Colgate University, concluded thatcontrary to popular wisdom
immigrants do not, in fact, displace native workers.14 Statistically, the average skills of native-born American
workers are distributed in a bell-shaped curve: many Americans, as mentioned, hold high school diplomas and have
earned college credits, while relatively few adults lack high school diplomas and even fewer possess Ph.D.s in math and
science. Immigrants skills, in contrast, are distributed in a U-shaped curve: disproportionate numbers of adults without
high school diplomas seeking manual work are coupled with highly skilled workers holding math and science Ph.D.s.
(Research conducted in 2012 by Rutgers Universitys Jennifer Hunt found that immigration increases the
probability that natives will complete high school, reinforcing such skill complementarities .)15
Immigrants are especially vital in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)
fields. Since 1995, the majority of the net increase in Americas STEM workforce is attributable to
immigrants, according to a 2008 Harvard Business School paper.16 Indeed, the presence of foreign students in
U.S. science and engineering departments is responsible for a significant increase in research
productivity:17 a one-percentage-point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers raises the
number of patents per capita by 918 percent, concluded Hunt and Princeton Universitys Marjolaine
Gauthier-Loiselle.18
Immigrants increase wages for everyone

Hong et al. 2015 (Gihoon Hong, Assistant Professor of Economics at University of Virginia,
John McLaren, Professor of Economics at University of Virginia, ARE IMMIGRANTS A SHOT
IN THE ARM FOR THE LOCAL ECONOMY?, National Bureau of Economic Research, April
2015, http://www.nber.org/papers/w21123.pdf, al)
We have studied the effect of immigration on local labor markets, emphasizing the effect of immigration on local labor
demand as opposed to merely labor supply. We have first studied a stylized model of a local labor market that shows how
the arrival of immigrants increases local aggregate income and thus the labor demand by the non-traded services sector.
This effect, which we have labelled the shot-in-the-arm effect, dampens the downward pressure the
extra labor supply places on local wages, and also increases the variety of non-traded services
available, which confers a benefit on all local consumers, native-born and immigrant . Consequently,
even in a model in which immigration always lowers local wages in terms of tradeables, it raises real wages in terms
of non-tradables, and depending on how strong the shot-in-the-arm effect is, it may raise real wages in terms
of the overall consumer price index, raising utility for all local workers.
Immigrants are key to solve warming and environmental

destruction
Madrid 10 (Jorge Madrid, Coordinator of Partnerships and Alliances for Environmental Defense
Fund, From a Green Farce to a Green Future, Center for American Progress, October 2010,
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2010/10/pdf/immigration_climate_change.pdf, al)
This report strikes down many of the false arguments regarding immigrants and the environment, provides a clearer
picture of immigrants environmental contributions, and outlines real environmental solutions that can cut carbon and
curb climate change. Key findings include: The assumption that immigrant-driven population growth
alone drives the U.S. carbon footprint is false. The 10 highest carbon-emitting cities have an
average immigrant population below 5 percent, according to a 2008 Brookings Institution study. The cities
with the lowest carbon footprint, on the other hand, have an average immigrant population of 26
percent. Immigrants, especially recent immigrants, tend to lead greener lifestyles than the
native-born and are more likely to use public transportation and practice sustainable habits like
compact living, conservation, and recycling. Immigrants, who are largely low income, are also more likely to
have their lives disrupted by extreme weather events and other adverse effects of climate change. Addressing climate
change and poverty on a global scale will help stabilize immigration flows from undeveloped countries. Immigrants
are disproportionately hurt by the dirty energy economy and face unique environmental
challenges. Consequently, they fight for greener solutions, including challenging the use of
hazardous pesticides in the agricultural fields where many immigrants work. A successful
campaign by immigrant farm workers during the 1960s led to the banning of the dangerous
pesticide DDT. 2010 polls of key electoral states find that immigrant-rich communities
overwhelmingly favor policy that will create green jobs and tend to support congressional
candidates who back efforts to fight global warming. Immigrants are integral to driving clean
energy innovation. They accounted for 70 percent of men and women who entered the
engineering and science fields from 1995 to 2006 and 40 percent of all high-tech venture-backed
companies.
Removing the disqualification of Muslim immigration

applications would create at least 159,000 jobs a year and
the GDP would increase by $1.1 trillion after 10 years
Lynch et al. 13 (Robert G. Lynch, Everett E. Nuttle professor and chair of the Department of
Economics at Washington College, Patrick Oakford, Research Assistant at the Center for
American Progress, The Economic Effects of Granting Legal Status and Citizenship to
Undocumented Immigrants, Center for American Progress, 3/20/13,
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/EconomicEffectsCitizenship1.pdf, al)
Under the second scenarioin which undocumented immigrants are granted legal status in 2013
and citizenship five years thereafterthe 10-year cumulative increase in U.S. GDP would be $1.1
trillion, and the annual increases in the incomes of Americans would sum to $618 billion. On
average over the 10 years, this immigration reform would create 159,000 jobs per year. Given the delay
in acquiring citizenship relative to the first scenario, it would take 10 years instead of five for the incomes of
the unauthorized to increase 25.1 percent. Over the 10-year period, they would earn $515 billion
more and pay an additional $144 billion in taxes$91 billion to the federal government and $53
billion to state and local governments. Finally, under the third scenarioin which undocumented immigrants
are granted legal status starting in 2013 but are not eligible for citizenship within 10 yearsthe cumulative gain in U.S.
GDP between 2013 and 2022 would still be a significantbut comparatively more modest$832 billion. The annual
increases in the incomes of Americans would sum to $470 billion over the 10-year period, and the economy would add an
average of 121,000 more jobs per year. The income of the unauthorized would be 15.1 percent higher within five years.
Because of their increased earnings, undocumented immigrants would pay an additional $109 billion in taxes over the 10year period$69 billion to the federal government and $40 billion to state and local governments. These immigration
reform scenarios illustrate that unauthorized immigrants are currently earning far less than their
potential, paying much less in taxes, and contributing significantly less to the U.S. economy than
they potentially could. They also make clear that Americans stand to gain more from an immigration reform policy of
legalization and citizenship than they do from one of legalization aloneor from no reform at all. Finally, the magnitude of
potential economic gains depends significantly on how quickly reforms are implemented. The sooner that legal status and
citizenship are granted to the unauthorized, the greater the gains will be for the U.S. economy.
***AT: Topicality
--T Curtail
We meet strict scrutiny standard (or End Racial
Profiling) necessarily requires a prohibition of surveillance
which has no non-discriminatory justification
Curtail means impose restrictions
Oxford 15 See definition in Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail
curtail Syllabification: curtail Pronunciation: /krtl/
Definition of curtail in English: verb [with object]
1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed
Add your own standards
--T Domestic
We meet we specify domestic in the plan text the
monitoring of Islamic bodies happens at mosques in the
US
Domestic surveillance is intelligence gathering on US
persons
Small 8 MATTHEW L. SMALL. United States Air Force Academy 2008
Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, Presidential Fellows
Program paper "His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic Surveillance, Civil
Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis"
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term domestic surveillance. Domestic surveillance is a subset of
intelligence gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is

information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been
collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence,
domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being intelligence. The intelligence
community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of nonpublic
information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this
definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This papers analysis, in terms of
President Bushs policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone lines and
obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines
electronic surveillance as:
[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire
or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person
who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States
person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes.
--T Surveillance
Domestic surveillance is the collection of information
about individual activities within US borders
Avilez et al 14 Marie Avilez et al, Carnegie Mellon University December
10, 2014 Ethics, History, and Public Policy Senior Capstone Project
Security and Social Dimensions of City Surveillance Policy
http://www.cmu.edu/hss/ehpp/documents/2014-City-Surveillance-Policy.pdf
Domestic surveillance collection of information about the activities of private
individuals/organizations by a government entity within national borders; this can be
carried out by federal, state and/or local officials
***AT: CP
--XO CP
insert theory
--End Racial Profiling Act

No functional difference- they do basically the same thing
Permutation solves
No net benefit
--Strict Scrutiny Standard

No functional difference- they do basically the same thing
Permutation solves
No net benefit
***AT: DA
--Terror DA
AT: Terror DA
Greenwald 12 [Glenn, civil rights litigator and author of three New York Times Bestselling
books, The sham terrorism expert industry,
http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the_sham_terrorism_expert_industry/, Accessed 7/15/15, AX]
The key role played by this terrorism expert industry in sustaining

highly damaging hysteria was highlighted in an excellent and still-relevant
2007 Washington Post Op-Ed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In it, he described how
the War on Terror has created an all-consuming Climate of Fear in
the U.S. along with a systematic, multi-headed policy of
discrimination against Muslim Americans based on these severely
exaggerated threats, and described one of the key culprits this way: Such fearmongering, reinforced by security entrepreneurs, the mass media
and the entertainment industry, generates its own momentum. The
terror entrepreneurs, usually described as experts on terrorism, are necessarily
engaged in competition to justify their existence. Hence their task is to
convince the public that it faces new threats. That puts a premium
on the presentation of credible scenarios of ever-more-horrifying
acts of violence, sometimes even with blueprints for their
implementation. Its very similar to what Les Gelb, in expressing his regret for supporting the attack on Iraq,
described as the disposition and incentives [in America's Foreign Policy Community ] to
support wars to retain political and professional credibility . When I
interviewed Gelb in 2010 regarding that quote, he told me that D.C. experts know that they can
retain relevance in and access to key government circles only if they
lend theoretical support to U.S. militarism rather than oppose it. (Notably, people in
these insular, government-subservient D.C. enclaves try to suppress and
delegitimize any discussion of who funds them and what their careerist and cultural
incentives are by denouncing any such discussion as illegitimate ad
hominem; thats all a way of demanding that they be accepted at
face value as experts and that the financial and institutional pressures and groupthink precepts
shaping their world and their views never be assessed). Similarly to Brzezinskis Op-Ed, Ken Silverstein recently wrote an
excellent June, 2012 Harpers article examining the fraud known as Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., who heads the
Counterterrorism and Intelligence Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he tracks global
jihadist movements (as usual, terrorism experts fixate on Muslims). Levitt has been repeatedly used by the U.S.
Government as a terrorism expert witness in the prosecution of dozens of Muslims accused of Terrorism despite a
discredited claims and extremely dubious grounds for claiming

expertise. Silverstein writes: That is a description that applies generally to the
sham terrorism expert industry. Not all of these terror experts are driven primarily by
history of
careerist relevance. Some are actually vapid enough to be True Believers, addicted to the excitement and sense of
purpose that Terrorism provides. Fran Townsend Bushs former Homeland Security adviser, CNNs national security
expert, and a paid supporter of the Iranian Terror group MEK provided a small but telling example this morning. She
was apparently at New Yorks LaGuardia Airport when a very exciting episode happened which she reported on Twitter
as it unfolded. First was this: Code words! Security breaches! How scary! And exciting! Moments later: The mystery builds!
Then: Here, things start to palpably deflate. The depressing realization starts to set in that nothing of any significance has
happened, that its all just some routine, banal event of no consequence. Then: the inevitable, deeply disappointing
denouement: In other words, nothing all that breathless excitement over absolutely nothing: a perfect little microcosm
the most
pernicious attribute of this terror expert industry, the aspect that requires
much more attention, is its pretense to non-ideological, academic objectivity . In
reality, these terror experts, almost uniformly, have a deeply ideological view a
jingoistic, highly provincial understanding of what Terrorism is and is
of Americas Terrorism policies and its terror expert industry over the last decade. But
They generally fixate on Muslims to the exclusion of all other

forms of Terror. In particular, the idea that the U.S. or its allies now
commit Terrorism is taboo, unthinkable. Their views on what Terrorism
is track the U.S. Governments and, by design, justify U.S. government
actions. They are not experts as much as they are ideologues,
rank propagandists, and servants of Americas establishment power
centers. The reason the term terrorism experts deserves to be put in quotation marks is not as some ad hominem
not.
insult (something the mavens of the terror expert clique are incapable of understanding, as they demonstrated with
their ludicrously personalized outrage when I applied this critique to one of their industrys most cherished Patron Saints,
the very concept of

Terrorism is inherently empty, illegitimate, meaningless. Terrorism
itself is not an objective term or legitimate object of study, but was conceived of as a
highly politicized instrument and has been used that way ever since. The best scholarship on this
Will McCants). Rather, its because as Ive written about many times before
issue, in my view, comes from Remi Brulin, who teaches at NYU and wrote his PhD dissertation at the Sorbonne in Paris on
it was
pushed by Israel in the 1960s and early 1970s as a means of
universalizing its conflicts (this isnt our fight against our enemies over land; its the Entire Worlds
Fight against The Terrorists!). The term was then picked up by the neocons in the
Reagan administration to justify their covert wars in Central America (in a test run
the discourse of Terrorism. When I interviewed him in 2010, he described the history of the term
for what they did after 9/11, they continuously exclaimed: were fighting against The Terrorists in Central America, even as
the central
challenge was how to define the term so as to include the violence
used by the enemies of the U.S. and Israel, while excluding the
violence the U.S., Israel and their allies used, both historically and
presently. That still has not been figured out, which is why there is no fixed, accepted
definition of the term, and certainly no consistent application. Brulin
they themselves armed and funded classic Terror groups in El Salvador and Nicaragua). From the start,
details the well-known game-playing with the term: in the 1980s, Iraq was put on the U.S. list of Terror states when the
U.S. disliked Saddam for being aligned with the Soviets; then Iraq was taken off when the U.S. wanted to arm Saddam to
fight Iran; then they were put back on again when the U.S. wanted to attack Iraq. The same thing is happening now with
the ME K: now that theyre a pro-U.S. and pro-Israel Terror group rather than a Saddam-allied one, they are magically no
Terrorism is: a term of propaganda, a

means of justifying ones own state violence not some objective
field of discipline in which one develops expertise. This flaw in the concept of
longer going to be deemed Terrorists. That is what
terrorism expertise is not a discrete indictment of specific scholars, but is a fundamental flaw plaguing the entire field.
Even the most decorated and honored terrorism experts are little
more than ideological propagandists, because thats what the term necessarily entails. Today,
Brulin wrote the following to me regarding U.S. Reagan-era policy in Central America namely, supporting Terror groups
(death squads) while denouncing Terrorism and the specific terrorism expert often held up as the fields most
prestigious, Bruce Hoffman: One obvious question comes to mind: how do terrorism experts deal with US policies in
Salvador during the 1980s? A comprehensive analysis of the two major terrorism studies journals, Studies on Conflict
and Terrorism (simply titled Terrorism until 1992) and Terrorism and Political Violence shows that overall these
authors in fact absolutely

accept that the concept of state terrorism is a valid one, and that acts by death squads clearly
fall under that definition also. They simply never deal with this issue in the
context of the real world policies of the United States and of the Reagan years in
journals have dealt with this issue by being silent about it. More precisely, several
particular, a silence all the more surprising than Reagan was the first American President to develop a discourse on
terrorism. Reacting to Glenn Greenwald, Andrew Exum wrote: Greenwald makes it seem as if states are never
mentioned as terrorist actors, but there is a lot of literature on the use of coercive violence by states and state terrorism.
This is true of course, but at least when it comes to the conflict of El Salvador studied here, and to US policies in that
country, those who did write about this issue have never been published in the major terrorism studies journals. Exum
then adds: Bruce Hoffman published this book in 1999. Im pretty sure those two guys are terrorism experts without the
scare quotes. In Inside Terrorism, to his merit, Hoffman devotes a full chapter to the question of the definition of
terrorism. What follows in the rest of his book is naturally dependent on what he decides to include and not include in his
definition of terrorism. Here is, in full, how Hoffman deals with the issue of death squads (emphasis added): The
use of so-called death squads (often off-duty or plain-clothes security or police officers) in
conjunction with blatant intimidation of political opponents , human rights

and aid workers, student groups, labor organizers, journalists and others has been a prominent
feature of the right-wing military dictatorships that took power in
Argentina, Chile and Greece during the 1970s and even of elected
governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru since the mid1980s. But these state-sanctioned or explicitly ordered acts of internal
political violence directed mostly against domestic populations that is,
rule by violence and intimidation by those already in power against their own citizenry are generally
termed terror in order to distinguish that phenomenon from
terrorism, which is understood to be violence committed by non-state entities. (Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism,
27). Sadly, Hoffman does not tell his readers who at the time termed acts by death squads terror, or who wishes to do
so in order to distinguish this phenomenon from terrorism. Not only is this argument rather less than convincing, but
most crucially no one in Washington, at the time, ever used this argument, and this for obvious reasons. Indeed, as
Hoffman himself notes, the death squads, even in elected governments like El Salvador, were state-sanctioned,
precisely what the Reagan administration kept denying at the time. Furthermore, Hoffmans argument makes no sense in
the historical context: can one imagine the Reagan administration defending US aid to El Salvador as part of the fight
against terrorism while stating that the ties between that State and the death squad posed no problem because they
merely fell under the concept of terror? Thus, the role of terrorism
experts cannot simply

be described as blindly accepting of the official discourse on
terrorism, although this is already a strong critique. As the case of El Salvador demonstrates, what they
have done is to invent arguments aimed at excluding from
discussion specific issues, while hiding or being completely silent
about the actual debates that took place on this topic at the very
heart of Washington. In so doing, they have allowed a terrorism
discourse to developed and become hegemonic despite the many
internal inconsistencies that have been at its heart from the very
beginning. Finally, one will note that Hoffman, in Inside Terrorism, makes no mention of the Contras and their
support by the Reagan administration. This is a difficult decision to explain, since aid to the Contras falls under the
concept of state sponsored terrorism, the validity of which is accepted by all experts. Here, Hoffman uses the technique
used by so many other terrorism experts in this case: he simply decides to not write about it, with no explanation given.
The entire field is one huge effort to legitimize U.S. state violence
and delegitimize the violence by its enemies (along those lines: the court-martial of
accused Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan began today, and I asked earlier today on Twitter whether this attack constituted
Terrorism given that it targeted a military base and soldiers of a nation at war. My mere asking of this question sparked all
sorts of intense outrage from the predictable natsec D.C. mavens: Of course its Terrorism, as Hasan killed unarmed
people including one civilian, exclaimed people who would never, ever dare apply the Terrorism label to the civiliandevastating U.S. attack on Iraq or the use of American drones and cluster bombs to kill innocent civilians by the dozens;
that is the discourse of Terrorism: violence by Muslims against a U.S. military base during a time of war qualifies, but
violence by the U.S. Government against thousands of innocent Muslim civilians never could). Brulin is far from alone
among scholars in recognizing the true purpose of this sham discipline. Harvards Lisa Stampnitzky, whom I interviewed
several months ago, is also a leading scholar on the exploitation of Terrorism and the field that calls itself terrorism
experts. In a superb journal article in Qualitative Sociology, she documents that Terrorism has proved to be a highly
problematic object of expertise; in particular, Terrorism
studies fails to conform to the

most common sociological notions of what a field of intellectual
production ought to look like, and has been described by
participants and observers alike as a failure. She notes that the harshest
condemnations have come from those who work in this academic discipline: Terrorism researchers
have characterized their field as stagnant, poorly conceptualized,
lacking in rigor, and devoid of adequate theory, data, and methods.
That includes Bruce Hoffman himself, who, she notes, wrote: Fifteen years ago, the study of terrorism
was described by perhaps the worlds preeminent authority on
modern warfare as a huge and ill-defined subject [that] has
probably been responsible for more incompetent and unnecessary
books than any other outside the field of sociology. It attracts
phonies and amateursas a candle attracts moths [T]errorism research

arguably has failed miserably. Stampnitzky adds: More than 15 years after this assessment, descriptions of the field are
rife with similar claims. Indeed, her forthcoming book from Cambridge University Press is entitled Disciplining Terror:
How Experts Invented Terrorism and, in her words, it explains how political violence became terrorism, and how this
transformation led to the current war on terror. For that reason, she argues in her dissertation, those who would
address terrorism as a rational object, subject to scientific analysis and manipulation, produce a discourse which they are
unable to control, as attempts at scientific discourse are continually hybridized by the moral discourse of the public
sphere, in which terrorism is conceived as a problem of evil and pathology. Indeed, she explains in her journal article,
One of the most oft-noted difficulties has been the inability of researchers to establish a suitable definition of the concept
of terrorism itself. In a recently published journal article in International Security, entitled The Terrorism Delusion,
Professors John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart (cited by Walt) extensively document what a fraud the concept of Terrorism
has become over the last decade. Specifically, the
exaggerations of the threat

presented by terrorism and then on the distortions of perspective
these exaggerations have inspired distortions that have in turn
inspired a determined and expensive quest to ferret out, and even
to create, the nearly nonexistent. Richard Jackson is a Professor at the The National Centre for
Peace and Conflict Studies in New Zealand. He has written volumes on the fraud of terrorism expertise and the
propagandistic purpose of this field of discipline. He has documented that most self-proclaimed terrorism experts simply
ignore the primary cause of the violence they claim to study: most
terrorism scholars,
politicians and the media dont seem to know that terrorism is
most often caused by military intervention overseas, and not
religion, radicalization, insanity, ideology, poverty or such like even
though the Pentagon has known it for years. In one article entitled 10 Things More Likely to Kill You Than Terrorism, he
notes that The
chances of you dying in a terrorist attack are in the range

of 1 in 80,000, or about the same chance of being killed by a
meteor, and that bathtubs, vending machines, and lightning all pose a
greater risk of death. In a book critiquing the terrorism expert field, Jackson argued that most of what
is accepted as well-founded knowledge in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable. He therefore
scorns almost four decades of so-called Terrorism scholarship as based on a series of virulent myths, half-truths and
contested claims that are plainly biased towards Western state priorities. To Jackson, terrorism is a social fact rather
than a brute fact and does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of
the terrorism studies field. In sum, it means whatever the wielder of the term wants it to mean: something that cannot be
the subject of legitimate expertise. * * * * * There is no term more potent in our political discourse and legal landscape
than Terrorism.
It shuts down every rational thought process and

political debate the minute it is uttered. It justifies torture (we have to get
information from the Terrorists); due-process-free-assassinations even of our own
citizens (Obama has to kill the Terrorists); and rampant secrecy (the Government cant disclose what
its doing or have courts rule on its legality because the Terrorists will learn of it), and it sends people to prison for decades
(material supporters of Terrorism). It is a telling paradox indeed that this central, all-justifying word is simultaneously the
most meaningless and therefore the most manipulated. It is, as I have noted before, a word that simultaneously means
nothing yet justifies everything. Indeed, thats the point: it is such a useful concept precisely because its so malleable,
it means whatever those with power to shape discourse want it

to mean. And no faction has helped this process along as much as the group of self-proclaimed terrorism
experts that has attached itself to think tanks, academia, and media outlets. They enable pure
political propaganda to masquerade as objective fact, shining
brightly with the veneer of scholarly rigor. The industry itself is a
fraud, as are those who profit from and within it.
because
***AT: KRITIK
--Capitalism
2AC perm
Edward Snowdens
collection of documents from the National Security Agency (NSA) took the
world by storm. Over the course of a year, the Snowden material provided a detailed account of
the massive extent of NSAs warrantless data collection. What became clear was that the NSA was
involved in the mass collection of online material . Less apparent was how this
Beginning in June 2013, a series of news articles based on whistle-blower
data was actually used by the NSA and other national security agencies. Part of the answer came in July
that identified specific

targets of NSA surveillance and showed how individuals were being
placed under surveillance despite there being no reasonable
suspicion of their involvement in criminal activity .1 All of those
2014 when Glenn Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain published an article
named as targets were prominent Muslim Americans. The following

month, Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux published another story for The Intercept, which revealed that
under the Obama administration the number of people on the National Counterterrorism Centers no-fly list
had increased tenfold to 47,000. Leaked classified documents showed that
the NCC maintains a
database of terrorism suspects worldwidethe Terrorist Identities Datamart

Environmentwhich contained a million names by 2013, double the number four
years earlier, and increasingly includes biometric data. This database includes 20,800
persons within the United States who are disproportionately
concentrated in Dearborn, Michigan, with its significant Arab American
population.2 By any objective standard, these were major news stories that ought to have attracted
as much attention as the earlier revelations. Yet the stories barely registered in the corporate media
The tech community, which had earlier expressed outrage

at the NSAs mass digital surveillance, seemed to be indifferent when
details emerged of the targeted surveillance of Muslims. The explanation
for this reaction is not hard to find. While many object to the US government
collecting private data on ordinary people, Muslims tend to be
seen as reasonable targets of suspicion. A July 2014 poll for the Arab American
Institute found that 42 percent of Americans think it is justifiable for law
enforcement agencies to profile Arab Americans or American
Muslims.3 In what follows, we argue that the debate on national security
surveillance that has emerged in the United States since the summer of 2013 is woefully
inadequate, due to its failure to place questions of race and empire
at the center of its analysis. It is racist ideas that form the basis for
the ways national security surveillance is organized and deployed,
racist fears that are whipped up to legitimize this surveillance to the
American public, and the disproportionately targeted racialized groups
that have been most effective in making sense of it and organizing
opposition. This is as true today as it has been historically: race and state surveillance
are intertwined in the history of US capitalism. Likewise, we argue that the
history of national security surveillance in the United States is
inseparable from the history of US colonialism and empire. The argument
landscape.
is divided into two parts. The first identifies a number of moments in the history of national security
surveillance in North America, tracing its imbrication with race, empire, and capital, from the settler-
race as a sociopolitical
category is produced and reproduced historically in the United
States through systems of surveillance . We show how throughout the history of the
United States the systematic collection of information has been
interwoven with mechanisms of racial oppression. From Anglo settlercolonialism, the establishment of the plantation system, the postCivil
War reconstruction era, the US conquest of the Philippines, and the
emergence of the national security state in the post-World War II
era, to neoliberalism in the post-Civil Rights era, racialized
surveillance has enabled the consolidation of capital and empire. It
is, however, important to note that the production of the racial other
at these various moments is conjunctural and heterogenous. That is, the
colonial period through to the neoliberal era. Our focus here is on how
racialization of Native Americans, for instance, during the settler-colonial period took different forms from
the dominant construction of

Blackness under slavery is different from the construction of
Blackness in the neoliberal era; these ideological shifts are the
product of specific historic conditions. In short, empire and capital, at
various moments, determine who will be targeted by state surveillance, in
what ways, and for how long. In the second part, we turn our attention to the current
conjuncture in which the politics of the War on Terror shape national security surveillance practices. The
intensive surveillance of Muslim Americans has been carried out by a
vast security apparatus that has also been used against dissident
movements such as Occupy Wall Street and environmental rights
activists, who represent a threat to the neoliberal order. This is not new;
the process of targeting dissenters has been a constant feature of
American history. For instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 1790s were passed by the
the racialization of African Americans. Further,
Federalist government against the Jeffersonian sympathizers of the French Revolution. The British hanged
State
surveillance regimes have always sought to monitor and penalize a
wide range of dissenters, radicals, and revolutionaries. Race was a
factor in some but by no means all of these cases. Our focus here is on
the production of racialized others as security threats and the
ways this helps to stabilize capitalist social relations. Further, the
current system of mass surveillance of Muslims is analogous to and
overlaps with other systems of racialized security surveillance that feed
the mass deportation of immigrants under the Obama administration
and that disproportionately target African Americans, contributing to
their mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander refers to as the New Jim Crow.4 We
argue that racialized groupings are produced in the very act of collecting
information about certain groups deemed as threats by the
national security statethe Brown terrorist, the Black and Brown
drug dealer and user, and the immigrant who threatens to steal jobs.
We conclude that security has become one of the primary means
through which racism is ideologically reproduced in the postracial, neoliberal era. Drawing on W. E. B. Duboiss notion of the psychological wage, we
argue that neoliberalism has been legitimized in part through racialized
notions of security that offer a new psychological wage as
Nathan Hale because he spied for Washingtons army in the American Revolution.
compensation for the decline of the social wage and its reallocation
to homeland security.
2AC perm- coalitions

The permutation is a necessary strategy- coalitions
oriented around common axes of oppression have the
ability to create concrete change
Kane 2013 [Alex, (Graduate in Near East Studies @ NYU and editor @ Mondoweiss), "From
Islamophobic surveillance to 'stop and frisk': Organizers decry criminalization of their communities in NYC,"
Mondoweiss, http://mondoweiss.net/2013/01/islamophobic-surveillancecriminalization#sthash.cNmuKe8z.dpuf, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Islamophobic subway ads, stop and frisk and the New York Police
Departments (NYPD) surveillance programwhats the connection?
Activists and experts spoke out last night to make explicit the links
between all of these seemingly separate strands of discrimination in
the city. A packed house of some 125 people gathered in an Upper West Side church January 29
to hear about Islamophobia and stop and frisk in New York City. The event
was organized by the Jews Against Islamophobia Coalition (JAIC), a grassroots group dedicated to being a
Jewish voice against the scourge of anti-Muslim sentiment that has found a home in some Jewish
establishment organizations. The event, titled Making
Connections and Organizing

for Change: Anti-Muslim Hate Speech, Police Surveillance and Stop
and Frisk, reinforced the burgeoning coalition between Black and
Latino groups working on stop and frisk, Muslim activists working
on Islamophobia and Jewish activists supporting that work. The
diverse crowd who showed up spoke to that coalition. The panel was moderated by
Marjorie Dove Kent, the dynamic head of Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (JREJ), a member group of
JAIC. Other speakers included: Muneer Awad, the head of the Council on American Islamic Relations of New
York (CAIR-NY); civil rights lawyer Alan Levine; community organizer Frank Lopez; and Linda Sarsour, the
director of the Arab American Association of New York. You can watch the whole panel here, courtesy of
Joe Friendly: None
of these acts of Islamophobia, like Pamela Gellers anti-Muslim

subway advertisements, are isolated, said Levine. The civil rights lawyer who authored a National
Law Journal article on why NYPD surveillance was unconstitutional said that acts like Geller putting up
hateful subway ads are encouraged by the NYPDs assumption that Muslims are a suspect class of people.
The defense of the surveillance program by the police chief and the mayor gives force to Pam Gellers
bigotry, said Levine. CAIR-NYs Awad made a similar point in a brief interview with me after the panel (I
showed up a little late and missed his talk). Its
not just anti-Muslim hate crimes,

said Awadits the entire culture of Islamophobia that has developed and
institutionalized in the city. Lopez, a poet and filmmaker affiliated with the organization
Brotherhood/Sister Sol, detailed how stop and frisk practices by the NYPD have criminalized whole
communities in the city. Stop and frisk refers to the police practice of stopping and patting down city
residents suspected of a crime. But it is a policy that has overwhelmingly fallen on the Black and Latino
communities in the city, and is now being challenged by a series of civil rights lawsuits aimed at radically
The NYPDs wholesale surveillance of Muslim

communities was perhaps the main focus throughout the night, but links
between stop and frisk and the surveillance program were made
explicit. For me, whether youre spying on the Muslim community, or
stopping and frisking Blacks and Latinos, its the same thing , said
changing the NYPD practice.
Sarsour, a Palestinian-American Muslim who is a prominent figure in the fight against Islamophobia in New
York. Lets
stop separating the issues, she said, noting that both

surveillance and stop and frisk amounts to criminalizing
communities of color. Sarsour also noted that a significant chunk of the New
York Muslim community is Black. Those connections have already
been taken up by activists in a concrete way. Much of the question and

answer session was dedicated to discussing and advocating for a set of bills to reform NYPD practices that
are currently pending in the City Council. Known as the Community Safety Act, the bills would create an
Inspector General for the NYPD; ban profiling by the police department; protect against unlawful searches;
and require officers to identify and explain themselves to the public. It is meant as a corrective to what
many see as an out of control NYPD that is unaccountable to the city residents they serve.
The
coalition working on pushing through these bills, which has considerable support in
the City Council, is called Communities United for Police Reform, and it includes civil
liberties organizations, Black and Latino groups, Muslim groups and
Jewish groups.
Short 2ac at cap

Targeted surveillance doesnt care about socioeconomicsstrictly matter of Islamophobia
Khalek 2014 [Rania, "How NSA Spying Impacts Muslim Communities and Cultivates
Islamophobia," Dispatches from the Underclass, http://raniakhalek.com/2014/01/26/how-nsa-spyingimpacts-muslim-communities-and-cultivates-islamophobia/, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
GOSZTOLA: I have two questions I want to ask and these are the last ones I really have for you. Specifically
weve had these reports that show that the spying on Muslims is not
necessarily indiscriminate in some cases. Weve seen that the NSA analysts are
willing to pick out leaders who are maybe Muslim clerics and go after
them and see if they can find any promiscuities so that they could maybe
manipulate them and turn them into informants that could work for
the governments. So Id like your comment on that. Im also wondering if you want to speak to
this larger issue that these issues that were having with the NSA surveillance and its targeting of Muslims
Americans are
conditioned to vilify and hate the populations in these foreign
countries where weve said there are terrorist groups that our US
military forces or some other forces have to go after. ABBAS: Regarding your first
really stem from the ongoing war on terrorism on a larger scale and how
question about law enforcements practices of targeting Muslim leadership. Thats absolutely been the
experience I think of many if not most American Muslim communities throughout the United States. And
the targeted discriminatory surveillance and

coercion thats imposed on American Muslims really does not
discriminate based on socioeconomic status. It covers all your gamut from Bill the
blonde convert to Abdullah from Somalia. It is the case that the leadership of mosques
does experience the watch listing consequences that deprive people
from the ability to fly to funerals to visit family abroad and even in
many cases ends careers. Thats the experience right now of our community. In order to
here is a unique situation where
justify this posture it requires there to be a lot of fear. In the 1950s for instance Congress passed the
Subversive Activities Act where they essentially identified that theres a communist movement thats
worldwide, its purpose is toby treachery and deceit infiltration and terrorismto establish a communist
this fear of this movement that is trying to

parallels very closely the
global war on terrorism where there is no way to end a war on
terrorism and it doesnt have any type of geographic limitation . When
you structure a conflict in that way, inevitably what youre doing is youre giving
yourself as a government the justification to impose extraordinary
measures on everyone all the time even domestically. But I think what really has been
dictatorship globally. We can see the parallels between
subvert our way of life that we cant quite see but is always hiding. It
promising and encouraging for us is that with the Snowden revelations we might look back in a decade on
this as a turning point, a watershed moment where the American public stopped taking the government at
its word and was less willing to attribute 9/11 as a catch all defense of any and all measures.
--Global/Local
--Pain narratives/SFO

We suggest that



that, identity

communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of

a call for

the


we

problems)

such,
--Rights K
--Wilderson
2AC perm
Edward Snowdens


the NCC maintains a


landscape.

State


Joe Friendly: None



York. Lets


The
Jewish groups.
-----2ac blocks (planless)
***CASE
*2ac solvency
*2ac impact
-2ac impact frame
-Depoliticization/Otherization
The defining characteristic of 21st century American life is
Islamophobia. The political sphere has been emptied
fear of Muslims now transcends political affiliation. This
xenophobic politics justifies the worst of orientalist
violence racism, internment, and torture come to be
seen as acceptable in Bushs words, a crusade against
Islam is made possible- outweighs all other impacts
Ali 12 (Yaser Ali, JD in law from UC Berkeley, Managing Attorney at Yaser Ali Law and was the Judicial
Law Clerk in the US Court of Appeals, Shariah and CitizenshipHow Islamophobia Is Creating a SecondClass Citizenry in America, August 1 2012, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4176&context=californialawreview) //mL


-Otherization General Impact

Otherization also causes genocide, slavery, segregation,
exploitation, and a multitude of unspeakable wrongs
Katz 97 (Katheryn D. Katz, prof. of law - Albany Law School, 1997, Albany Law Journal, |||edited
for g-lang|||)
It is undeniable that throughout
human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed

unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been
characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be
visited upon|||them||| him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired
to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them
as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery,
racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social
misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and
the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.
-Otherization (Islamophobia)
The United States uses otherization and the concept of domination and
subordination to justify extreme domestic discrimination in surveillance and
foreign attacks
Jamal 08 (Amaney Jamal, Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics at Princeton University and
director of the Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Civil Liberties and the
Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans, Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11:
From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects, 2008, https://books.google.com/books?
id=Qbgw2ZwvT8kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Race+and+Arab+Americans+Before+and+After+
9/11:+From+Invisible+Citizens+to+...&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMI07_Wn9ngxg
IVSakeCh2caA2d#v=onepage&q=Race%20and%20Arab%20Americans%20Before%20and
%20After%209%2F11%3A%20From%20Invisible%20Citizens%20to%20...&f=false, al)
An alternative explanation focuses on racial motivations. According to this logic, Americans
in favor of infringing
on Muslim and Arab American civil liberties do so because they hold negative views about an
entire people. These negative views are fed by a variety of misperceptions and stereotypes. The
Muslim and Arab American had been popularly constructed as an irrational, terror-supporting,
and fanatical enemy Other long before 9/11. American foreign policy has consistently justified
intervention in the Muslim world along similar lines. When U.S. leaders characterize the Arab
and Muslim world as inherently undemocratic owing to fundamental value differences between
us and them, they promote an environment of intolerance at home. Thus, the racialization of Arab
and Muslim Americans, a process decades in the making, also explains the overwhelming support for the infringement of
Arab and Muslim civil liberties (Moallem 2005). In this chapter I move beyond the narrow phenotypical definition of
racialization, wherein race relations are strictly structured by biological differences. Rather, I adopt a larger definition of
racialization that incorporates the process of othering. More specifically here, I argue that the racialization of
Muslims and Arabs stems from the consistent deployment of an us versus them mentality,
excessively propped up for the justification of military campaigns in the Arab world. The
racialization of Arabs and Muslims is not simply contingent on phenotypical differences; rather,
this racialization of difference is driven by a perceived clash of values and exacerbated by cultural
ethnocentrism. This process of othering is based on assumptions about culture and religion
instead of phenotype. It is not based on assumptions about culture and religion instead of phenotype. It is not based
on racial divides; instead, it conforms to the process of racialization that has characterized the ways in
which the dominant elements in society have interacted with minority ethnic groups more
generally. The racialization of Arabs and Muslims stems from two intertwined processes. First, in a society that is
already constructed along racial lines, any perceived difference between the dominant
mainstream and a minority Other tends to conform to racisms framework. This othering
process lends itself to the already existing paradigm of defining oneself vis--vis other groups
along the lines of racial categories. This form of racism is not contingent on differences in appearance but on
differences in cultural attributes. These differences are exacerbated by popular and government
discourses that deem the group an enemy Other, especially after 9/11. The loyalties of the Arab and
Muslim communities have consistently been questioned since the attacks. Only 38 percent of Americans in the
Detroit metro area believe that Arabs and Muslims are doing all that they can to fight the war on
terror. Muslims and Arabs across the United States are consistently asked to apologize for 9/11, as
if they were behind the attacks. And yet, ironically, the numerous and countless condemnations emanating from
mosques and organizations in the United States that emphatically denounce the attacks have received little media
attention. Americans remain suspicious of Arabs and Muslims. When asked whether Arabs and Muslims could be trusted,
Americans in the Detroit metro area ranked them as the least trustworthy subpopulation. Twenty percent of Americans
have little or not trust for whites; 24 percent have little or no trust for blacks, and 30 percent little or no trust for
Muslims and Arabs. Not only are Arabs and Muslims different, they are also a threat treated with
great suspicion because they are assumed to originate from the Middle East. They are presumed
to be operating against us. The binary construction of us versus them is not new to American social relations
in the United States or abroad. Racial relations in the United States have been constructed through the
binary lens of the dominant and the subordinate , a legacy of the history of race relations in this
country. Likewise, the lens through which America sees the rest of the world is tinted with this dichotomy: we, whoever
and wherever we are, enjoy both cultural and moral superiority. Such interactions with Others abroad translate into a
racial logic in a U.S. home. The process of othering, be it based on phenotype or cultural difference,
therefore lends itself to racialization, particularly when it involves attributing essentializing

characteristics to the entire group. The racialization of Arabs and Muslims, however, draws on yet
another element of difference. Not only are they different at home, but their difference is
exacerbated by geopolitical realities where the United States has utilized the construction of the
Other as enemy-terrorist to justify its campaign abroad. The second process of racialization
involves the direct subordination of the minority Other. The very process of rendering the Other
inferior to white Americans, or some imagined group of acceptable Americans, is at the heart of
racialization. In the case of Muslim and Arab Americans, the way that Otherness is
determined is through a process by which the dominant social group claims moral
and cultural superiority in the process of producing an essentialized, homogenous image of
Muslim and Arab Americans as nonwhites who are naturally, morally, and culturally inferior to
real Americans. Terrorism, according to this logic, is not the modus operandi of a few radical individuals, but a byproduct of a larger cultural and civilizational heritage: the Arab and Islamic Other.
Muslim being a synonym for terrorist in the status

quo means that Muslims are categorized as the other
and excluded from society
The racialization of religion occurs through multiple processes, involves multiple agents, and leads to multiple outcomes.
Ultimately, racialization results in essentialism; it reduces people to one aspect of their identity and
thereby presents a homogeneous, undifferentiated, and static view of an ethnoreligious

community. While Hinduism, Sikhism, and Islam are three different belief systems, they share some of the major
outcomes of racialization: they are rendered theologically, morally, and socially illegitimate. Despite this
similarity of processes and often of outcomes, racialization affects each religious group that is targeted differently. While
one could argue that Christianity has been racialized through its association with whitenesswith distinctive designations
for black, Korean, or Chinese Christian congregationsthe results of racialization are different because whiteness and
Christianity function as the United States racial and religious norms, respectively.3 The construction of identity
most often involves establishing both norms and opposites, who one is involves identifying
others who are not (Pharr, 1988; Said, 1978). The process of othering entails a dialectic of both
inclusion and exclusion. By attributing certain characteristics to a population in order to
categorize and differentiate it as an other, those who do so also establish criteria by which they
themselves are represented. Indeed, a norm and its other or others are, to a great extent, each
defined by reference to the other, by what each is not. For reasons that will become clear in the historical
section that follows, it is the normative power of whiteness and Christianity, separately and in tandem, that makes the
racialization of religion an essential problem for non-white non-Christians. Thus, in order to understand the
contemporary racialization of South Asian religions, we must begin by orienting ourselves historically and socially. In the
next two sections, I show how the United States has developed as a society where Christianity and whiteness are
intimately linked and where Christianity and whiteness generate social norms against which other religions and races are
measured.
The concept of the other justifies violence,

stereotyping, invisibility, distortion, isolation, and
internalized oppression
Racial meaning is extended to a religion, a religious group, or a belief system that had previously
been racially unclassified. Particular faiths come to be considered not for their worldwide practice
by diverse peoples, but rather in direct association with colors of skin, textures of hair, and other
phenotypical features that may characterize communities of believers. The process ultimately
goes beyond phenotype, and results in a group of people being identified, based on shared
ethnicity and nationality, as being of a particular religion. In the context of the historical moment, social values and political
presumptions are connected to the racialized religion. Within the unique context of their own time and place, human beings ascribe social meaning to
certain biological characteristics in order to differentiate, to exclude, and to dominate . This
process occurs not in a vacuum but in specific conditions that render the distinctions relevant in a particular historical moment. Because racial systems of
classification are intimately linked to systems of power and authority , these social categories take on
everyday importance in social, ideological, and economic contexts. Most obviously, they become fodder
for those who perpetuate physical violence based on race. But more subtly, these categories become a part of our cultural vocabulary: our
shared assumptions, our media buzz, and our humor. In the present day, for example, the racialization of Islam intersects with the
Wests encounters with enemies whose ideological identity is intimately linked to their
interpretation and use of Islam. As a result, brown-skinned, non-Christian Americans become
more (or less) than just an other within the society; they become an other who is associated with a
foreign enemy. They go from merely being a minority to being viewed as a potential fifth
column10 due to their presumed connection with and loyalty to this enemy. The impact of this process on South Asian
Americanson those unlucky adults who have been beaten or slain in post-September 11 backlash attacks and on those many children and adolescents who must laugh off or fight back against
racialization of religion locates

certain religious populations within the social strata of U.S. society by applying ideological forces
in conjunction with social and political relations of domination. The racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism has Orientalist
assumptions that they or their relatives are affiliated with terrorismare described in greater detail in the next section. The
underpinnings (Said, 1978).11 American society created an image of South Asiannessand of the South Asian religions before it even encountered them physically. The writings of the
Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, both of whose more philosophical works were influenced by the Bhagavad Gita, were the vehicle for this encounter (Eck,
2001). The West created the East as a site of difference. . . reified in the anthropological mode where strange tongues, other beliefs, [and] centuries old (read unchanging) religions. . . mark out the
community (Hutnyk, 1999, p. 132). In an early example of Americans conflating immigrants religions with their place of origin, 17th-century Sikh immigrants were known as Hindoos (Jensen,
The sense of danger that historically characterized Europes post-Crusade view of the Muslim
world was again projected onto Muslim immigrants. Meanwhile, Britains approach to Hindu-majority India, always characterized by
sentiments more proprietary than conflict-laden (Said, 1978), was transformed into the new American commodification of things Indian. Islam, Hinduism, and
Sikhism therefore become not merely non-Christian they become the villainous, anachronistic
religions of the East. Both Indians as a race and ethnicity and Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs as
religions were othered and thereby diminished in the American minds eye. This othering, in
turn, has consequences for these minority groups in the U.S. South Asian Americans face what
Pharr (1988) identifies as the common elements of oppression; In relation to a defined norm,
which both buttresses and is buttressed by institutional and economic power, out-group members
suffer violence and the threat of violence, stereotyping, invisibility, distortion, isolation, and
internalized oppression. In the act of defining Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism as deviant, and
thereby excluding them from society, white American Christians represent themselves as
benevolent. This in/out group phenomenon reinforces Christian hegemony at the institutional
and cultural levels, and enables individual members of the in group to rationalize (and to
perpetuate) the exclusion of religious others.
1988).
The governments perpetuation of the Muslim-terrorist

stereotype justifies violence against Muslims
In our current sociopolitical climate and historical moment, the most conspicuous example of how South Asian American
religions are racialized is not the Indian/Hindu connotation described above, but rather the association between
brown skin and Muslim beliefs. Since the oil shock of 1973 and the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979,
the United States has been confronting enemies in the developing world whose ideology is
expressed and explained by reference to their interpretations of Islam. This theology/ideology is
racialized via its association with Islam: Arab and Muslim are used interchangeably and the
politics and tactics of terrorist movements are described as Islamic by the popular media.
Stereotypes perpetuated by the government and media come to paint Islam and Muslim
as intrinsicallyperhaps organicallyviolent and evil in American public opinion (Afridi, 2001;
Haddad, 2000; Nimer, 2002). Said (1996) argued that Islam has been turned into Americas post-Soviet
devil (p. 28) thereby replacing godless Communism as its sinister global enemy of the present
historical moment. The mainstream news and entertainment mediamost Americans only source of information
about non-Whites and the religions and cultures of the non-Western worlddo little to educate and much to exacerbate
this othering of religions beyond the Jewish and Christian faiths. From
the attitudes of political leaders ,

is a small
step to the notion of all brown-skinned Muslims as the enemy (Shaheen, 1984, 2001). The
racial/religious othering of Muslims has been used as a dehumanizing tool by political leaders
who a generation ago were demonizing yellow reds (that is, the East and Southeast Asian communists
the unenlightened coverage by the news media, and the caricatures that are the filmmakers stock-in-trade, it
against whom the Korean and Vietnam Wars were fought). Like these enemies and like Japanese Americans in the 1940s,
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian Americans have faced negative representations in the media since the 1972 killing of
Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich and the Iran Hostage Crisis of 19791981, through the Intifada and First
Gulf War of the 1980s and 1990s, and even more since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Consider just one popular
manifestation of American thought: the editorial cartoon. Hundreds of cartoons have vilified Osama bin Laden and his
allies in ways that both draws upon and exacerbate hackneyed images of the Semitic, Muslim villain. Like the midcentury
cartoons of the Japanese emperor, the figures are exaggeratedusually with a large turban, protrusive nose, and
beady eyesall stereotypical Arabic features often found represented in the media. As a result, U.S.
society and culture tends to ascribe collective guilt on an entire ethnic group, just as it did half a
century ago with respect to Japanese Americans, by associating these stereotypically Arab features with the
acts committed by al-Qaeda.
Otherization means Muslims as bodies not worth

considering
While the causes and effects of racialization are different for each faith, they are most usefully considered as a group. This
is because they
face a common outcome, whether by exoticization, vilification, or

terrorization. The three faiths are rendered invisible, illegitimate, and unworthy of
attention beyond the level of novelty or stereotype. They suffer the same final fate: They
are rendered theologically, morally, and socially illegitimate . This illegitimacy is acted out in
ignorance of, contempt for, and mischaracterization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism by
the mass media, the government, and individuals. These phenomena function cyclically
to maintain a white, Christian hegemony in the United States. Their effect is felt
dramatically by children and adolescents, whose home belief systems are invalidated,
ignored, and even actively contested by educators and other adults (Joshi, 2006). In a research
study of secondgeneration Indian Americans, many research participants (including Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Indian
American Christians) reported feeling that the dominant white U.S. culture has shown disinterest in and disrespect for
fundamental pieces of their identity, particularly their religious identity (Joshi, 2006; Wingfield, this issue; Zine, 2001).
Othering in the context of specifically religion justifies mass violence

Sticulescu et al. 12 (Ana Rodica Sticulescu, Ovidius University, Alina Stan, Ovidius
University, Identity in Conflict: A Case Study of Violence, Contemporary Readings in Law and
Social Justice Volume 4(2), 2012, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
handle=hein.journals/conreadlsj4&div=145&g_sent=1&collection=journals, al)
Mass violence as genocides28 are common during the process of "othering" in which the
boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a previously
"included" group is ideologically recast (involving a large scale mechanism of hate propaganda
and incitement to genocide29 were used as a mechanism of dehumanization of the others) as
being outside the community, as a threatening and dangerous "other"-whether racial, political,
ethnic, religious , economic, and so on-that must be annihilated. From an anthropological perspective,
the reification of concepts such as race and ethnicity are not surprising, given the historical background of perceived
biological difference. It is said that in African societies a person is considered a human being precisely for being enveloped
in the community along with other human beings, or their philosophy is governed by the verb "to participate".
-Dehumanization
Dehumanization justified mass genocide empirics prove
Haslam 06 (Nick Haslam, Professor of Psychology at University of Melbourne,
Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, Personality and Social Psychology Review Vol. 10, No.
3, 252-264, 2006, http://psr.sagepub.com/content/10/3/252.full.pdf, al)
Dehumanization is arguably most often mentioned in relation to ethnicity, race, and related
topics such as immigration and genocide. It is in this paradigmatic context of intergroup conflict
that some groups are claimed to dehumanize others, and these dehumanizing images have been
widely investigated. A historical catalogue is offered by Jahoda (1999), who examined the many
ways in which ethnic and racial others have been represented, both in popular culture and in
scholarship, as barbarians who lack culture, self-restraint, moral sensibility, and cognitive
capacity. Excesses often accompany these deficiencies: The savage has brutish appetites for violence and
sex, is impulsive and prone to criminality, and can tolerate unusual amounts of pain. A consistent
theme in this work is the likening of people to animals. In racist descriptions Africans are compared to apes
and sometimes explicitly denied membership of the human species. Other groups are compared to dogs, pigs, rats,
parasites, or insects. Visual depictions caricature physical features to make ethnic others look animal-like. At other times,
they are likened to children, their lack of rationality, shame, and sophistication seen patronizingly as innocence rather
than bestiality. Dehumanization is frequently examined in connection with genocidal conflicts (Chalk
& Jonassohn, 1990; Kelman, 1976). A
primary focus is the ways in which Jews in the Holocaust,

Bosnians in the Balkan wars, and Tutsis in Rwanda were dehumanized both during the violence
by its perpetrators and beforehand through ideologies that likened the victims to vermin. Similar
animal metaphors are common in images of immigrants (O'Brien, 2003a), who are seen as polluting threats
to the social order.
Dehumanization enables genocides and massacres

because people disengage their own morals because the
inferior are inhuman
Haslam et al. 07 (Nick Haslam, Professor of Psychology at University of Melbourne, Stephen
Loughnan, Lecturer in Experimental & Social Psychology at the University of Edinburgh,
Catherine Reynolds, Vanderbilt University graduate, Samuel Wilson, Research Fellow at the
Swinburne Leadership Institute at Swinburne University, Dehumanization: A New Perspective,
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 11/15/07,
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Samuel_Wilson4/publication/227548001_Dehumanizatio
n_A_New_Perspective/links/00b49515e3a917f285000000.pdf, al)
Evidence of inhumanity is not hard to find in recent history. People are killed, tortured, abused, and exploited, and their
suffering is often ignored or even relished. The psychological basis of cruelty and indifference is complex,
of course, but one possible mechanism is that inhumane actions are easier to perpetrate when
their victims are seen as less than human. If they are barbarians, then we may act barbarously
toward them, and if they are just distant abstractions then we may inflict harm on them without
being troubled by pangs of conscience or fellow feeling. The idea that people are sometimes
denied their proper humanness is usually referred to as dehumanization . Sometimes it is starkly
and shockingly obvious, as when ethnic groups are explicitly likened to nonhumans such as vermin or apes, or when they
are accorded a lesser degree of humanity, as when African Americans were once officially declared to be worth three fifths
of a person. At other times dehumanization may be more implicit, as when people are represented in objectifying ways or
when the degrading behavior that is directed toward them implies that the actor does not consider them fully human. Over
the past three decades, social psychologists have made important contributions to the study of dehumanization. Their
analyses generally place the phenomenon in the context of intergroup violence and antagonism. Kelman (1976) argued
that dehumanization plays a key role in sanctioned mass violence, such as genocides and
massacres, because it weakens moral restraints on violent behavior. In a similar vein, Opotow (1990)
proposed that dehumanizing
others is one form of moral exclusion, a process that places others

outside the boundary in which moral vales, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (p. 1). BarTal (2000) examined the ideological supports of moral exclusion, describing dehumanization as
one of several forms of delegitimizing belief. These shared beliefs portray out-groups in an
extremely negative and often emotionally overheated manner, and serve to reinforce the ingroups superiority and justify its aggression . Bandura (2002) refined the analysis of moral
exclusion by presenting dehumanization as a process in which people disengage their moral selfsanctions, thereby relieving them of feelings of guilt over their aggressive actions and empathy for
their victims. Consistent with this view, Bandura and his colleagues found that people behave more harshly toward
others who are divested of human qualities (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975) and that moral disengagement
partially accounts for aggressive behavior among children (Bandura, Barbarelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 2001). Schwartz
and Struch (1989) noted how imputing different basic values to other groups leads them to be seen as less human and
promotes aggression toward them These classic works on the psychology of dehumanization have some obvious family
resemblances. All of them place aggression front and center in their analysis : dehumanization enables,
disinhibits, and justifies violent and otherwise aggressive behavior. All of them present
dehumanization as something that occurs primarily in extreme contexts of antagonism and
conflict, such as genocide and interethnic strife. Most of them, with the partial exception of Banduras work,
present dehumanization as an intergroup phenomenon in which groups are denied human attributes or labelled as
nonhumans. This view of dehumanization as an extreme phenomenon closely linked to intergroup violence has helped to
advance our understanding of human evil, but recent developments in the field have moved in a new direction. Their main
message is that subtle forms of dehumanization are also apparent in everyday social perception, can occur in the absence
of intense conflict or aggression, and can be observed outside of group contexts, in peoples understandings of the self and
its distinctiveness from others.
***2ac framework
Some analytics were deleted from framework- contextual
to every team
theory top
1. Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis
Random House 11 -
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve
to reduce by mental analysis
2. USFG = the people

Howard, 5 (Adam, Jeffersonian Democracy: Of the People, By the People,
For the People,
http://www.byzantinecommunications.com/adamhoward/homework/highscho
ol/jeffersonian.html, 5/27)
the government is the people, and
people is the government. Therefore, if a particular government ceases
to work for the good of the people, the people may and ought to
change that government or replace it. Governments are established to
protect the people's rights using the power they get from the people.
Ideally, then, under Jeffersonian Democracy,
2ac wrong forum
2ac dialogue
2ac topical version

No topical version- One step reforms such as curtailing
bulk data collection are just drops in the bucketIslamophobia is a persistent ideology infecting American
politics making our pedagogical performance the prerequisite
Kundnani 2014 [Arun, (Professor of Terror Studies and Media @ NYU), "No NSA reform can fix
the American Islamophobic surveillance complex," The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillancecomplex, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Better oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus

may finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this
week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened up by
Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and
These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those

living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim Americans, left-wing
campaigners, "radical" journalists the days of living on the receiving end of
excessive spying wont end there. How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about
the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been rightly outraged at
the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less
interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for those most
affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing my book on Islamophobia and the
War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia.
Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under
surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the
congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at
colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim. All of
them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives
abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by
government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who
described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents
for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been
placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised
its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on
Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students
at the City University of New York who discovered that fellow students they had
befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's
Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no
stores and metadata.
reasonable suspicion of any crime ; it was enough that the

targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association.
And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American
imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009
raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The
government had no evidence of any terrorist plot ; the sole
pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US

government. These are the types of people whom the National Security
Agency can suspect of being two "hops" away from targets. These are the
types of "bad guys" referred to by outgoing NSA director Keith
Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America
had some sort of national security file compiled on them. Today, that
number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the Muslim American Civil
Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass
surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture of enforced selfcensorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break down.
As one interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they
informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not
knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking
politics in public, the unpredictability of state power. Snowden has
rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals
intelligence" the surveillance of our digital communications but equally
important is "human intelligence", the result of informants and
undercover agents operating within communities. Underpinning all
the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption that

Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more
people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists
than by Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge
numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but lawabiding people, some of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by
the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who
are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one. So
let's reform the NSA and its countless collections. But let's not
forget the FBI's reported 10,000 intelligence analysts working on
counter-terrorism and the 15,000 paid informants helping them do
it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence
and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000 officers, $100m budget
and vast program of surveillance. Let's not forget the especially
subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe
your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but there's a
multitude of other ways you're always being watched.
Topical version of the aff doesnt solve- state reform at

best positions Islam as benign- makes Islam apoliticalKundanani 14- instead of a radical form of dissent the
result is assimilation of radical politics and dissent
Doesnt solve- Kumar says Islamophobia is formed at the
site of culture, media, and education- Zine says only
epistemological interrogation begins the process towards
transforming the foundation of Islamophobia
2ac limits
2ac skills
2ac stasis
We start with the resolution as a prompt-we are not an
anti-resolutional team-no offense
2ac usfg
National security surveillance is as old as the bourgeois nation state,

which from its very inception sets out to define the people associated with a
particular territory, and by extension the non-peoples, i.e., populations to
be excluded from that territory and seen as threats to the nation.
Race, in modern times, becomes the main way that such threatsboth internal and external
are mediated; modern mechanisms of racial oppression and the
modern state are born together. This is particularly true of settlercolonial projects, such as the United States, in which the goal was to
territorially dispossess Indigenous nations and pacify the resistance
that inevitably sprang up. In this section, we describe how the drive for territorial
expansion and the formation of the early American state depended
on an effective ideological erasure of those who peopled the land.
Elaborate racial profiles, based on empirical observation the precursor to
more sophisticated surveillance mechanismswere thus devised to justify the dispossession of
native peoples and the obliteration of those who resisted. The idea
of the American nation as the land of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants
enabled and justified the colonial-settler mission.5 Thus, when the US state was formed
after the Revolutionary War, white supremacy was codified in the Constitution ; the logical
outcome of earlier settler-colonial systems of racial discrimination against African slaves and Indigenous populations.6 But the leaders of the
newly formed state were not satisfied with the thirteen original colonies and set their sights on further expansion. In 1811, John Quincy Adams
gave expression to this goal in the following way: The whole continent of North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be
peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political principles, and accustomed to one
general tenor of social usages and customs.7 This doctrine, which would later come to be known as manifest destiny animated the project
of establishing the American nation across the continent. European settlers were the chosen people who would bring development through
scientific knowledge, including state-organized ethnographic knowledge of the very people they were colonizing.8 John Comaroffs description
of this process in southern Africa serves equally to summarize the colonial states of North America: The discovery of dark, unknown lands,
which were conceptually emptied of their peoples and cultures so that their wilderness might be brought properly to orderi.e., fixed and
named and mappedby an officializing white gaze.9 Through, for example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the United States sought to develop
methods of identification, categorization, and enumeration that made the Indigenous population visible to the surveillance gaze as racial
. Surveillance that defined and demarcated according to

officially constructed racial typologies enabled the colonial state to
sort tribes according to whether they accepted the priorities of
the settler-colonial mission (the good Indians) or resisted it (the
bad Indians).10 In turn, an idea of the US nation itself was produced as
a homeland of white, propertied men to be secured against racial
others. No wonder, then, that the founding texts of the modern state invoke the
Indigenous populations of America as bearers of the state of
nature, to which the modern state is counterposedwitness Hobbess references to
the the Savage people of America.11 The earliest process of gathering systematic
knowledge about the other by colonizers often began with trade
and religious missionary work. In the early seventeenth century, trade in furs with the Native population of
Quebec was accompanied by the missionary project. Jesuit Paul Le Jeune worked extensively with the MontagnaisNaskapi and maintained a detailed record of the people he hoped to convert and
civilize.12 By studying and documenting where and how the savages lived, the nature of their relationships, their child-rearing
others
habits, and the like, Le Juene derived a four-point program to change the behaviors of the Naskapi in order to bring them into line with French
Jesuit morality. In addition to sedentarization, the establishment of chiefly authority, and the training and punishment of children, Le Juene
sought to curtail the independence of Naskapi women and to impose a European family structure based on male authority and female
subservience.13
The net result of such missionary work was to pave the way for the racial
projects of colonization and/or integration into a colonial settler

nation. By the nineteenth century, such informal techniques of surveillance began to
be absorbed into government bureaucracy. In 1824, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
established the Office of Indian Affairs (later Bureau), which had as one of its tasks the mapping and counting of Native Americans. The
key security question was whether to forcibly displace Native
Americans beyond the colonial territory or incorporate them as colonized subjects; the
former policy was implemented in 1830 when Congress passed the Indian Removal Act and President Jackson began to drive Indians to the
west of the Mississippi River. Systematic surveillance became even more important after 1848, when Indian Affairs responsibility transferred
the Bureau of Indian Affairs sought

to comprehensively map the Indigenous population as part of a
civilizing project to change the savage into a civilized man, as a
congressional committee put it. By the 1870s, Indians were the quantified objects of governmental intervention; resistance
was subdued as much through rational techniques of racialized
surveillance and a professional bureaucracy as through war.14 The
assimilation of Indians became a comprehensive policy through the Code of Indian
from the Department of War to the Department of the Interior, and
Offenses, which included bans on Indigenous cultural practices that had earlier been catalogued by ethnographic surveillance. Tim Rowse
For the U.S. government to extinguish Indian sovereignty, it

had to be confident in its own. There is no doubting the strength of the sense of manifest destiny in the
United States during the nineteenth-century, but as the new nation conquered and purchased,
and filled the new territories with colonists, it had also to develop its
administrative capacity to govern the added territories and peoples.
U.S. sovereign power was not just a legal doctrine and a popular
conviction; it was an administrative challenge and achievement that
included acquiring, by the 1870s, the ability to conceive and measure an object called the Indian
population.15 The use of surveillance to produce a census of a colonized population was the first step to controlling it. Mahmood
writes that
Mamdani refers to this as define and rule, a process in which, before managing a heterogeneous population, a colonial power must first set
about defining it; to do so, the colonial state wielded the census not only as a way of acknowledging difference but also as a way of shaping,
The ethnic mapping and demographics unit programs practiced by

US law enforcement agencies today in the name of counterterrorism
are the inheritors of these colonial practices. Both then and now, state
agencies use of demographic information to identify
concentrations of ethnically defined populations in order to target
surveillance resources and to identify kinship networks can be
utilized for the purposes of political policing. Likewise, todays principles
of counterinsurgency warfarewinning hearts and minds by dividing the insurgent from the nonresistant
echo similar techniques applied in the nineteenth century at the
settler frontier.
sometimes even creating, difference.16
2ac democracy
revolt and dissent is critical to democracy by definition
the tenants of a free speaking society last Kundnani ev
2ac read on negative

Our argument is about disrupting traditional forms of surveillance
and the necessity of freeing up political spaces for excluded voicesthats impossible in a world of surveillance and we cant do that on
the negative
2ac policy making good

No tradeoff
Not in context of Islamophobia- always another excuse
the USFG has for monitoring
2ac kill policy debate

Helps policy debate- makes it more inclusive
Doesnt kill policy thinking- we identify a multitude of
messed up policies that need to be resolved- only
difference is we dont engage state- too high a risk of
cooption and mindset comes first
2ac roleplaying
They cant assess role-playing fiat is a nave conception
of real politics that reduces the actual process by which
legislation is passed thats what their evidence is
referring to
Forcing people to defend USFG action forces minority
students to play as colonizer that killed their ancestors
leads to violence through desensitization
2ac fairness
They dont ask the question of fairness for whom-fairness
is always legislated from the position of the dominant
that tries to maintain the world as familiar-disruption of
the squo is necessary to reveal the violent underpinning
of that concept of fairness which excludes our
relationships to the topic
2ac education
Our education is net better
political projects
15, Issue 1]


in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point . And who
possible in class.
to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions , optimistic

directed. (162)

racist dynamics


the notion of




Islamophobic

exclusionary

the

popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized


These



representation.
2ac switch sides

No link-we defend a decrease in domestic surveillance on
aff and dont on the neg-no unique reason we need to
switch sides on the USFG or pretend to be it-Their
understanding of switchsides forces us to switch roles
with an institution we necessarily criticize in the 1ac
We dont have to prove switch side debate is bad, we
have to defend surveillance should be curtailed, and we
did it in a clear and predictable way. Its not our fault that
they cant prove surveillance is good without the politics
DA
2ac ctp
The reading of the 1AC refuses political attempts to
silence dissent our focus on challenging the culture of
Islamophobia and the foundation of the surveillance state
must come first- its the prerequisite to opening up sites
of political possibilities
Kundnani 2014 [Arun, (Professor of Terror Studies and Media @ NYU), The Muslims are
Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, AX]
It is the race principle that enables the separation of Muslims from

the usual liberal norms of rights and citizenship . And it is on the
basis of race thinking that Muslim dissent is read only as the
intrusion of alien, illiberal cultural values into the public sphere and
rarely as an attempt to use the political process to hold states
accountable to their own liberal standards. From this perspective, the
totalitarianism of the war on terror intersects with other racialized regimes, such as the war on drugs and
the militarized policing of immigration, in which similar patterns of discriminatory surveillance, brutality,
and incarceration are central.34 So long as the unspoken assumption that these measures will only be
directed at racialized subjectsMuslims, African Americans, undesired immigrants, asylum seekers
remains valid, then the consent of the majority can be secured. And if this racialized totalitarianism begins
to overreach and step on the freedoms of othersthrough, for example, overbearing screening at airports
or by trying to introduce universal identity cardssuch excesses can be quickly corrected while preserving
the essential structure of the system. Moreover, since a transformative politics is more likely to emerge
from racialized sections of society, the special measures the state reserves for these populations prove
The analysis of totalitarianism today

therefore requires a critical understanding of the centrality of race
but in a more radical way than managed by Hannah Arendt, who
ultimately saw it as merely one of various possible precursors . But as
even the Stasi eventually discovered, no system of surveillance can ever produce
total knowledge. Indeed, the greater the amount of information
collected, the harder it is to interpret its meaning. The relevant
information in the majority of recent US terrorist attacks was
somewhere in the governments systems, but its significance was
lost amid a morass of useless data. More significantly, what is obscured by the
useful tools for maintaining the status quo.
demands for ever greater surveillance and information processing is that security is best established
A society that has blocked a

section of its population from shaping a process of political
transformation is one that has hollowed out its democracy
until whats left is an empty, technocratic consensus in which
real politics is disavowed. When radical political contestation is
through relationships of trust and political empowerment.
suffocated, the processes by which societies reinvent themselves

and resolve their social tensions are neutered, and in the absence of
a genuinely emancipatory alternative, the only possible outlet for
the impulses generated by social and economic marginalization is
the fake radicalism of armored identity politics, conspiracy theories,
and apocalyptic fantasies. Ending the War on Terror Among the youth workers participating
in the British governments program to tackle extremism, the more independently minded have realized
the real problem is the absence of any alternative to the

managerial politics of mainstream liberalism . The young people they work with
that
have not been radicalized by Anwar al-Awlaki or Nick Griffin. Their accounts of the world are more likely to
involve conspiracy theories about Tupac or the Illuminati. Among those from Muslim backgrounds, there is
no knowledge or interest in the content of Islamic ideology, only a pulp millenarianism and what one youth
worker refers to as a pseudo-Islamism that reduces Islam to a set of cliches. He adds that they share
with young people supportive of the far Right a totally uncritical way of looking at the world that is
apolitical, conspiratorial, and narrowly identitarian. The underlying principle of this worldview, reflecting
the wider culturalist prejudices of our age, is that all societal problems are to be blamed on the fixed
culture of the other. Such attitudes are common and can, of course, connect with racist violence of
To tackle it
requires understanding its roots in the current context of
depoliticization. Javaad Alipoor, a youth worker in Bradford who deals with issues of extremism
various kinds, though youth workers say the risk of it leading to terrorism is negligible.
among young people from a variety of backgrounds, points out: It is not a political way of thinking.
When daily political discourse is completely shorn of any emotion

and its just a tedious administrative question of Ed Miliband versus David
Cameron, then, of course, this repressed emotional core politics is going to
come out in these crazy ways. I think theres a wider problem, which is, theres no
politics. As radical as young peoples worldviews are supposed to
seem, in their racism, or their crazy religious millenarianism, in reality they are all built
on the understanding that nothing about the fundamental
socioeconomic constellation can actually change, that no one ever
talks about class, no one ever talks about capitalism, no one ever
talks about working-class access to the world and the good things in
life. The problem is that we dont have any politics. And so
peoples revulsion at the existing state of things manifests itself in
all these crazy ways.35 In contrast to this political analysis, official thinking on extremism
assumes that flawed structures of identity are the problem. A void is imagined to exist among white,
working-class young people where a positive sense of national identity ought to be; a lack of identification
The
absence of an appropriate sense of identity creates an opening for
an extremist mind-set to fill the void. Part of the blame lies in excessive
with Britishness is supposed to be equally destructive of the proper integration of young Muslims.
multiculturalism, which supposedly encourages the value of different cultures while not endorsing the
The answer, accordingly, is to revive national belonging by

defining it in terms of the shared liberal values from which both
Muslims and the white, working class are currently seen as
alienated. On this view, the liberal state positions itself as a neutral
mediator between the various forms of extremism that confront it,
and sees its role as developing forms of identity politics that can
draw marginal populations into accepting its values. In the latest iteration of
majority identity.
this thinking, far Right extremism and Islamist extremism are seen as mutually reinforcing threats to the
liberal order; extremism in one community provokes support for extremism in an opposing group, in a
spiral of demonizationa process of cumulative radicalization.36 The response, liberals argue, should be
a generic antiextremism that treats all forms of it as rooted in the same psychology of blocked identity
formation that creates an opening for ideological mind-sets (a view that renders irrelevant the twentiethcentury tradition of Left antifascism, which treated extremism as a political problem of class societies).
Among the groups adopting this depoliticized model of extremism is the think tank Google Ideas, which
has developed counterradicalization programs in which former radicals speak of their struggles to
construct a positive sense of identity. The limitation of this approach is that the liberal state is absolved of
its role in creating an environment in which identitarian political violence occurs. Liberalisms promise
(latterly in the form of multiculturalism) is that it provides the best means of enabling the coexistence of
different ways of life within a single polity. But liberalism always had a different meaning too: not just a
way of reconciling many ways of life but a way of life itself into which lesser peoples needed to be
civilized.37 The more the war on terror has emphasized this view of liberalism, in which it becomes a
transcendent identity politics of its own rather than a space where various identities come together, the
less liberalism has been able to play the role of neutral mediator. Instead it appears to its interlocutors as a
one-sided demand that they simply substitute one form of identity politics for another, giving up their
current ethnic, racial, or religious affiliations in favor of a progressive nationalism.38 This is unlikely to be
very appealing to would-be extremists, who are characterized by their rejection of the liberal political game
while the extremist is

positioned as an outsider, as a force alien and disruptive of liberal
democratic capitalism, he is in fact a symptom of the very system he
despises. The al-Qaeda wannabe is no more than the mirror image of
the official discourse of the war on terror, simply inverting the terms
in the culturalist clash of civilizations rhetoric. Equally, the far Right
activist gets the idea that he is at war with Islamic extremism from
the very governments he rejects as hopelessly co-opted by an empty
cosmopolitanism. This suggests that, in the end, liberals will be unable to
solve their problems with extremism unless they can construct forms
of political identification that reach beyond questions of cultural
identity and speak to the wider context of neocolonialism, social and
economic inequality, and the collapse of working-class
representation. For these reasons, programs that emphasize intense
scrutiny of, and limitations on, radical opinion and religious behavior
in the name of tackling radicalization are counterproductive. In the case
and a belief in the complete bankruptcy of the mainstream. But
of the Boston bombings, for example, the real missed opportunity to intervene before the attack was not
some piece of intelligence that might have been picked up had the government been given greater
surveillance powers. Rather, it came three months earlier, when bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev stood
up during a Friday prayer service at his mosquethe Islamic Society of Boston, in Cambridgeto angrily
protest the imams sermon. The imam had been celebrating the life of Martin Luther King Jr., which
Tsarnaev thought was selling out. According to one report, Tsarnaev was then kicked out of the prayer
service for his outburst.39 Since 9/11, mosque leaders have been under pressure to eject anyone
expressing radical views rather than to engage with them and seek to challenge their religious
interpretations, address their political frustrations, or meet their emotional needs. That policy has been
forced on mosques by the wider climate of excessive surveillance. It has made mosque leaders wary of
even having conversations with those perceived to be radicals for fear of attracting official attention. They
fear that every mosque has a government informant listening for radical talk. Unsurprisingly, this means
most people are reluctant to engage with young people expressing radical views. The Tsarnaev brothers
were said to be angry about US foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, possibly drawing parallels with their
own experiences as refugees from Russias brutal wars of counterinsurgency in the Caucasus. But because
discussions of foreign policy have been off-limits in mosques since 9/11, they were unlikely to have had
The
heavy surveillance of Muslims has meant there is no room for
mosques to engage with someone like Tamerlan Tsarnaev , listen to
him, challenge those of his ideas that might be violent, or offer him
emotional support. Instead, Muslims have felt pressured to
demonstrate their loyalty to America by steering clear of dissident
conversations on foreign policy. Flawed models of the radicalization
process have assumed that the best way to stop terrorist violence is
to prevent radical ideas from circulating. Attempting to reconstruct
the motivation for the bombings is fraught with difficulty; there can
be little certainty in such matters. But pathological outcomes are
more likely when space for the free exchange of feelings and
opinions is squeezed. No one could have predicted from Tsarnaevs outburst that a few months
their anger acknowledged, engaged, challenged, or channeled into nonviolent political activism.
later he would be suspected of carrying out an act of mass murder on the streets of Boston. And we do not
know what would have made a difference in the end. But
a community able to express
itself openly, without fear, whether in the mosque or elsewhere,

should be a key element in efforts to prevent terrorism. What is
needed is less state surveillance and enforced conformity and

more critical thinking and political empowerment. The role of
communities in countering terrorism is not to institute selfcensorship but to confidently construct political spaces where young
people can politicize their disaffection into visions of how the world
might be better organized, so that radical alternatives to terrorist
vanguardism can emerge. Radicalizationin the true political sense
of the wordis the solution, not the problem. Genuine emancipatory
movements eschew the tactic of terrorism, because they locate
themselves among the people; violence has only a defensive role in
such movements.40 Terrorism is not the product of radical
politics but a symptom of political impotence. The very fact of individual

acts of terror, wrote Leon Trotsky, is an infallible token of the political backwardness of a country and the
feebleness of the progressive forces there.41 Anyone who seeks to extinguish the lives of civilians in acts
to condemn terrorism without
hypocrisy today requires also a questioning of the normalized
violence of the war on terror. The question of terrorist violence
carried out by extremist or ideological nonstate actors is inseparable
from the wider background of state violence that is defined as
normal, necessary, and rational. They feed each other in a savage
of terrorism deserves universal contempt. But
cycle of war and murder. Martin Luther King Jr. well understood how individual
violence at home is intricately linked to state violence abroad although
this part of his message is downplayed in official celebrations of his life. Speaking in 1967, he told an
audience at Riverside Church in New York: As I have walked among the desperate, rejected, and angry
young men, I have told them that Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems. I have tried
social change
comes most meaningfully through nonviolent action. But they asked, and
to offer them my deepest compassion while maintaining my conviction that
rightly so, What about Vietnam? They asked if our own nation wasnt using massive doses of violence to
I
could never again raise my voice against the violence of the
oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the
greatest purveyor of violence in the world today: my own
government. His efforts at what might now be called preventing
violent extremism among young Americans depended on first
opposing the violence of US foreign policy, a point that remains as valid
today in the era of the terror wars global battlefield. Equally relevant today
is Kings understanding that the giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism,
and militarism are interwoven in societies that place profit
motives and property rights above human beings.42 It is time once
again to heed Kings message of peace by ending the war on terror,
and unraveling the racisms and totalitarianisms it fostered.
solve its problems, to bring about the changes it wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that
***AT: Topicality
***AT: Countermethodology
***AT: KRITIK
--Anthro
--Baudrillard
--Capitalism
2AC perm
Edward Snowdens


the NCC maintains a


landscape.

State


Joe Friendly: None



York. Lets


The
Jewish groups.
Short 2ac at cap

Targeted surveillance doesnt care about socioeconomicsstrictly matter of Islamophobia
Khalek 2014 [Rania, "How NSA Spying Impacts Muslim Communities and Cultivates
Islamophobia," Dispatches from the Underclass, http://raniakhalek.com/2014/01/26/how-nsa-spyingimpacts-muslim-communities-and-cultivates-islamophobia/, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
GOSZTOLA: I have two questions I want to ask and these are the last ones I really have for you. Specifically
weve had these reports that show that the spying on Muslims is not
necessarily indiscriminate in some cases. Weve seen that the NSA analysts are
willing to pick out leaders who are maybe Muslim clerics and go after
them and see if they can find any promiscuities so that they could maybe
manipulate them and turn them into informants that could work for
the governments. So Id like your comment on that. Im also wondering if you want to speak to
this larger issue that these issues that were having with the NSA surveillance and its targeting of Muslims
Americans are
conditioned to vilify and hate the populations in these foreign
countries where weve said there are terrorist groups that our US
military forces or some other forces have to go after. ABBAS: Regarding your first
really stem from the ongoing war on terrorism on a larger scale and how
question about law enforcements practices of targeting Muslim leadership. Thats absolutely been the
experience I think of many if not most American Muslim communities throughout the United States. And
the targeted discriminatory surveillance and

coercion thats imposed on American Muslims really does not
discriminate based on socioeconomic status. It covers all your gamut from Bill the
blonde convert to Abdullah from Somalia. It is the case that the leadership of mosques
does experience the watch listing consequences that deprive people
from the ability to fly to funerals to visit family abroad and even in
many cases ends careers. Thats the experience right now of our community. In order to
here is a unique situation where
justify this posture it requires there to be a lot of fear. In the 1950s for instance Congress passed the
Subversive Activities Act where they essentially identified that theres a communist movement thats
worldwide, its purpose is toby treachery and deceit infiltration and terrorismto establish a communist
this fear of this movement that is trying to

parallels very closely the
global war on terrorism where there is no way to end a war on
terrorism and it doesnt have any type of geographic limitation . When
you structure a conflict in that way, inevitably what youre doing is youre giving
yourself as a government the justification to impose extraordinary
measures on everyone all the time even domestically. But I think what really has been
dictatorship globally. We can see the parallels between
subvert our way of life that we cant quite see but is always hiding. It
promising and encouraging for us is that with the Snowden revelations we might look back in a decade on
this as a turning point, a watershed moment where the American public stopped taking the government at
its word and was less willing to attribute 9/11 as a catch all defense of any and all measures.
--Pain narratives/SFO

We suggest that



that, identity

communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of

a call for

the


we

problems)

such,
--GBTL
--Wilderson
2AC perm
Edward Snowdens


the NCC maintains a


landscape.

State


Joe Friendly: None



York. Lets


The
Jewish groups.
--Random unused
mosques
FBIs behavioral and lifestyle mapping discriminates against Muslims they are
invasively surveilled based on their religion
ACLU 10 (American Civil Liberties Union, national organization advocating individual rights, by litigating, legislating,
and educating the public on a broad array of issues affecting individual freedom in the United States, Claimed FBI power
to track and map behaviors and lifestyle characteristics of American communities in Massachusetts and nationwide
raises alarm, 7/27/10, https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-and-other-organizations-demand-records-fbi-collection-racialand-ethnic-data?redirect=national-security/aclu-and-other-organizations-demand-records-fbi-collection-racial-andethnic-data, al
BOSTON -- The American
Civil Liberties Union and other civil rights and community groups today
demanded that local FBI officials reveal the extent to which they are using newly revealed powers
that they claim to collect and store information on the ordinary and everyday behaviors of
innocent Massachusetts residents, including mapping of people's lifestyles, religious practices,
cultural traditions, and even eating habits. New guidelines, distributed to local FBI offices in 2008
but made public this year, give local agents the authority to secretly map so-called "ethnicoriented" businesses, behaviors, lifestyle characteristics, and cultural traditions , according to a
recently released FBI operations guide. In one reported instance of the FBI using a similar authority, FBI
agents in California collected data on falafel sales in a failed effort to pinpoint Iranian terrorists.
"FBI surveillance and mapping based on people's religion, cultural practices, race or ethnic
backgrounds raise profound civil liberties concerns," said Carol Rose, executive director of the ACLU of
Massachusetts. "Targeting ordinary people based on their race and religion raises the risk of the
worst sort of guilt by association. Rather than keep us safe, this kind of profiling undermines
public safety by creating rifts between communities and the officials whose job it is to protect and
serve all residents of the Commonwealth." In 29 states plus the District of Columbia, the American Civil
Liberties Union today filed "Freedom of Information Act" (FOIA) requests with local FBI offices, seeking records related to
the agency's collection and use of data on race and ethnicity in local communities. In Massachusetts, the ACLU request
was joined by the Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee Advocacy (MIRA) Coalition; the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights; Public Research Associates; the Muslim American Society of Boston chapter (MAS Boston); the New England
Muslim Bar Association; the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Massachusetts Chapter; and JALSA, the
Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action. Muslim-American and Arab-American communities expressed
particular concern that they will be targeted because of the number of mosques and cultural
centers each community has. "We share concerns over the FBI's use of information on race and
ethnicity in conducting investigations, because of its potential for use as a pretext for racial
profiling," said Hinna Mushtaque, vice president of the New England Muslim Bar Association.
TSA
3. Airport security
TSAs policies discriminate against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians
Leadership Conference no date (Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,
coalition of more than 200 national organizations to promote and protect the civil and human
rights of all persons in the United States, The Reality of Racial Profiling,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling2011/the-reality-of-racial.html,
al)
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Arabs from Muslim countries.
In response to the attacks, the federal government immediately engaged in a sweeping
counterterrorism campaign focused on Arabs and Muslims, and in some cases on

persons who were perceived to be, but in fact were not, Arabs or Muslims, such as Sikhs
and other South Asians. That focus continues to this day. The federal government claims that its
anti-terrorism efforts do not amount to racial profiling, but the singling out for questioning and detention of Arabs and
Muslims in the United States, as well as selective application of the immigration laws to nationals of Arab and Muslim
countries, belie this claim. A prime example of a federal program that encourages racial profiling is the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), implemented in 2002.44 NSEERS requires certain individuals from
predominantly Muslim countries to register with the federal government, as well as to be fingerprinted, photographed,
and interrogated. A report issued in 2009 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Rights Working Group
had this to say about NSEERS: More than seven years after its implementation, NSEERS continues to impact the lives of
those individuals and communities subjected to it. It has led to the prevention of naturalization and to the deportation of
individuals who failed to register, either because they were unaware of the registration requirement or because they were
afraid to register after hearing stories of interrogations, detentions and deportations of friends, family and community
members. As a result, well-intentioned individuals who failed to comply with NSEERS due to a lack of knowledge or fear
have been denied "adjustment of status" (green cards), and in some cases have been placed in removal proceedings for
willfully" failing to register."45 Despite NSEERS' near explicit profiling based on religion and national origin, federal
courts have held that the program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and that those forced
to participate in the program have not suffered violations of their rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, which protect against unreasonable search and seizure and guarantee due process, respectively.46 Another
example of a federal program that involves racial profiling is Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47
which was instituted just prior to the November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt terror
operations."48 OFL is a covert program, the existence of which was discovered through a Freedom of Information Act
lawsuit filed by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Yale Law School National Litigation
Project.49 According to the 2009 ACLU/Rights Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department
of Homeland Security show that: an astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from
Muslim majority countries. Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries were 1,280 times more likely to
be targeted than similarly situated individuals from other countries. Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction
resulted from the interviews conducted under this program. What did result, however, was an intense chilling effect on the
free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities targeted in advance of an already
contentious presidential election.50 Lists of individuals who registered under NSEERS were apparently used to select
candidates for investigation in OFL.51 Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of those selected were Muslims, OFL is a
clear example of a federal program that involves racial profiling. Moreover, because OFL has resulted in no terror-related
convictions, the program is also a clear example of how racial profiling uses up valuable law enforcement resources yet
fails to make our nation safer.52 Although Arabs and Muslims, and those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims based
on their appearance, have since 9/11 been
targeted by law enforcement authorities in their homes,
at work, and while driving or walking,53 airports and border crossings have become especially daunting.
One reason for this is a wide-ranging and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that
states, "in the course of a border search, and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review and analyze the
information transported by any individual attempting to enter . the United States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the
standard to copy documents belonging to a person seeking to enter the U.S. was lowered from a "probable cause" to a
"reasonable suspicion" standard.55 Operating under such a broad and subjective guidance, border agents frequently stop
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians for extensive questioning about their families, faith, political opinions, and other
private matters, and subject them to intrusive searches. Often, their cell phones, laptops, personal papers and books are
taken and reviewed. The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of every person who, according to the U.S.
government, has "any nexus" to terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e., mistaking non-listed persons for listed
persons) and over-classification (i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that makes them appear dangerous when
they are not), this defective "watch-list" causes many problems for Muslims, Arabs, and
South Asians seeking to enter the United States , including those who are U.S. citizens. The case of
Zabaria Reed, a U.S. citizen, Gulf War veteran, 20-year member of the National Guard, and firefighter, illustrates the
problem. Trying to reenter the U.S. from Canada where he travels to visit family, Reed is frequently detained, searched,
and interrogated about his friends, politics, and reasons for converting to Islam. Officials have handcuffed Reed in front of
his children, pointed weapons at him, and denied him counsel.57 In 2005, a lawsuitRahman v. Chertoffwas filed in
federal district court in Illinois by nine U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, none of whom had any connection
to terrorist activity.58 The plaintiffsall of whom are of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent alleged that they were
repeatedly detained, interrogated, and humiliated when attempting to re-enter the U.S. because their names were wrongly
on the watch-list, despite the fact that they were law abiding citizens who were always cleared for re-entry into the U.S.
after these recurring and punitive detentions.59 In May 2010, the court dismissed the case, finding that almost all of the
disputed detentions were "routine," meaning that border guards needed no suspicion at all to undertake various intrusions
such as pat-down frisks and handcuffing for a brief time.60 Further, the court held that where the stops were not routine,
the detentions, frisks, and handcuffings were justified by the placement of the individuals on the TSC's databaseeven
when the listing may have been a mistake.61 Notwithstanding the adverse decision in the Rahman case, and the
continuation of these practices on a national level, it is important to note that there have been certain positive changes in
government policy since 2005. Specifically, a standard of "reasonable suspicion" is now used before a name can be added
to the TSCs database, which marks a sharp departure from the essentially "standardless" policy previously in effect.62
Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim head coverings are also profiled for
higher scrutiny at airports. In response to criticism from Sikh organizations, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) recently revised its operating procedure for screening head coverings at
airports. The current procedure provides that: All members of the traveling public are permitted to wear head coverings
(whether religious or not) through the security checkpoints. The new standard procedures subject all
persons wearing head coverings to the possibility of additional security screening,

which may include a patdown search of the head covering. Individuals may be referred for additional
screening if the security officer cannot reasonably determine that the head area is
free of a detectable threat item. If the issue cannot be resolved through a pat-down
search, the individual will be offered the opportunity to remove the head covering
in a private screening area.63 Despite this new procedure, and TSA's assurance that in implementing it "TSA
does not conduct ethnic or religious profiling, and employs multiple checks and balances to ensure profiling does not
happen,"64 Sikh travelers report that they continue to be profiled and subject to abuse
at airports.65 Amardeep Singh, director of programs for the Sikh Coalition and a second-generation
American, recounted the following experience in his June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee: Two months ago, my family and I
were coming back to the United States from a family vacation in Playa Del Carmen, Mexico. At
Fort Lauderdale Airport, not only was I subjected to extra screening, but so was [my 18 monthold son Azaad]. I was sadly forced to take my son, Azaad, into the infamous glass box so
that he could [be] patted down. He cried while I held him. He did not know who that
stranger was who was patting him down. His bag was also thoroughly searched. His Elmo book number
one was searched. His Elmo book number two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The time spent waiting for
me to grab him was wasted time. The time spent going through his baby books was wasted time. I am not sure
what I am going to tell him when he is old enough and asks why his father and
grandfather and soon himAmericans all threeare constantly stopped by the TSA
100% of the time at some airports.66
TSAs policies discriminate against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians
Leadership Conference no date (Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,
coalition of more than 200 national organizations to promote and protect the civil and human
rights of all persons in the United States, The Reality of Racial Profiling,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling2011/the-reality-of-racial.html,
al)
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Arabs from Muslim countries.
In response to the attacks, the federal government immediately engaged in a sweeping
counterterrorism campaign focused on Arabs and Muslims, and in some cases on persons who
were perceived to be, but in fact were not, Arabs or Muslims, such as Sikhs and other South Asians.
That focus continues to this day. The federal government claims that its anti-terrorism efforts do not amount to
racial profiling, but the singling out for questioning and detention of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, as well as
selective application of the immigration laws to nationals of Arab and Muslim countries, belie this claim. A prime example
of a federal program that encourages racial profiling is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS),
implemented in 2002.44 NSEERS requires certain individuals from predominantly Muslim countries to register with the
federal government, as well as to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated. A report issued in 2009 by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Rights Working Group had this to say about NSEERS: More than seven
years after its implementation, NSEERS continues to impact the lives of those individuals and communities subjected to
it. It has led to the prevention of naturalization and to the deportation of individuals who failed to register, either because
they were unaware of the registration requirement or because they were afraid to register after hearing stories of
interrogations, detentions and deportations of friends, family and community members. As a result, well-intentioned
individuals who failed to comply with NSEERS due to a lack of knowledge or fear have been denied "adjustment of status"
(green cards), and in some cases have been placed in removal proceedings for willfully" failing to register."45 Despite
NSEERS' near explicit profiling based on religion and national origin, federal courts have held that the program does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and that those forced to participate in the program have not
suffered violations of their rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which protect against
unreasonable search and seizure and guarantee due process, respectively.46 Another example of a federal program that
involves racial profiling is Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47 which was instituted just prior to the
November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt terror operations."48 OFL is a covert program, the
existence of which was discovered through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee and the Yale Law School National Litigation Project.49 According to the 2009 ACLU/Rights
Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department of Homeland Security show that: an
astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from Muslim majority countries. Moreover,
foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted than similarly situated
individuals from other countries. Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from the interviews
conducted under this program. What did result, however, was an intense chilling effect on the free speech and association
rights of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities targeted in advance of an already contentious presidential
election.50 Lists of individuals who registered under NSEERS were apparently used to select candidates for investigation
in OFL.51 Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of those selected were Muslims, OFL is a clear example of a federal
program that involves racial profiling. Moreover, because OFL has resulted in no terror-related convictions, the program
is also a clear example of how racial profiling uses up valuable law enforcement resources yet fails to make our nation
safer.52 Although Arabs and Muslims, and those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims based on their appearance, have
since 9/11 been
targeted by law enforcement authorities in their homes, at work, and while driving or
walking,53 airports and border crossings have become especially daunting. One reason for this is a wide-ranging
and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that states, "in the course of a border search,
and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review and analyze the information transported by any individual
attempting to enter . the United States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the standard to copy documents belonging to a
person seeking to enter the U.S. was lowered from a "probable cause" to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.55 Operating
under such a broad and subjective guidance, border agents frequently stop Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians for
extensive questioning about their families, faith, political opinions, and other private matters, and subject them to
intrusive searches. Often, their cell phones, laptops, personal papers and books are taken and reviewed. The FBI's
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of every person who, according to the U.S. government, has "any nexus"
to terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e., mistaking non-listed persons for listed persons) and over-classification
(i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that makes them appear dangerous when they are not), this defective
"watch-list" causes many
problems for Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians seeking to enter the
United States, including those who are U.S. citizens. The case of Zabaria Reed, a U.S. citizen, Gulf War veteran, 20-year
member of the National Guard, and firefighter, illustrates the problem. Trying to reenter the U.S. from Canada where he
travels to visit family, Reed is frequently detained, searched, and interrogated about his friends, politics, and reasons for
converting to Islam. Officials have handcuffed Reed in front of his children, pointed weapons at him, and denied him
counsel.57 In 2005, a lawsuitRahman v. Chertoffwas filed in federal district court in Illinois by nine U.S. citizens and
one lawful permanent resident, none of whom had any connection to terrorist activity.58 The plaintiffsall of whom are of
South Asian or Middle Eastern descent alleged that they were repeatedly detained, interrogated, and humiliated when
attempting to re-enter the U.S. because their names were wrongly on the watch-list, despite the fact that they were law
abiding citizens who were always cleared for re-entry into the U.S. after these recurring and punitive detentions.59 In May
2010, the court dismissed the case, finding that almost all of the disputed detentions were "routine," meaning that border
guards needed no suspicion at all to undertake various intrusions such as pat-down frisks and handcuffing for a brief
time.60 Further, the court held that where the stops were not routine, the detentions, frisks, and handcuffings were
justified by the placement of the individuals on the TSC's databaseeven when the listing may have been a mistake.61
Notwithstanding the adverse decision in the Rahman case, and the continuation of these practices on a national level, it is
important to note that there have been certain positive changes in government policy since 2005. Specifically, a standard
of "reasonable suspicion" is now used before a name can be added to the TSCs database, which marks a sharp departure
from the essentially "standardless" policy previously in effect.62 Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim
head coverings are also profiled for higher scrutiny at airports. In response to criticism from Sikh
organizations, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently revised its operating procedure for
screening head coverings at airports. The current procedure provides that: All members of the traveling public are
permitted to wear head coverings (whether religious or not) through the security checkpoints. The new standard
procedures subject all persons wearing head coverings to the possibility of additional security
screening, which may include a patdown search of the head covering. Individuals may be referred for
additional screening if the security officer cannot reasonably determine that the head area is free
of a detectable threat item. If the issue cannot be resolved through a pat-down search, the
individual will be offered the opportunity to remove the head covering in a private screening
area.63 Despite this new procedure, and TSA's assurance that in implementing it "TSA does not conduct ethnic or
religious profiling, and employs multiple checks and balances to ensure profiling does not happen,"64 Sikh travelers
report that they continue to be profiled and subject to abuse at airports .65 Amardeep Singh, director
of programs for the Sikh Coalition and a second-generation American, recounted the following experience in his
June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary
Committee: Two months ago, my family and I were coming back to the United States from a family
vacation in Playa Del Carmen, Mexico. At Fort Lauderdale Airport, not only was I subjected to extra
screening, but so was [my 18 month-old son Azaad]. I was sadly forced to take my son, Azaad, into the
infamous glass box so that he could [be] patted down. He cried while I held him. He did not know who
that stranger was who was patting him down. His bag was also thoroughly searched. His Elmo book number
one was searched. His Elmo book number two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The time spent waiting for
me to grab him was wasted time. The time spent going through his baby books was wasted time. I am not sure what I
am going to tell him when he is old enough and asks why his father and grandfather and soon him
Americans all threeare constantly stopped by the TSA 100% of the time at some airports. 66
immigration
The FBI categorizes people based on race and religion to exclude them their
Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program disproportionately
prevents Muslims from immigrating
Pasquarella 13 (Jennie Pasquarella, ACLU staff attorney, Muslims Need Not Apply: How
USCIS Secretly Mandates the Discriminatory Delay and Denial of Citizenship and Immigration
Benefits to Aspiring Americans, American Civil Liberties Union, August 2013,
http://www.lccr.com/wpcontent/uploads/MUSLIMS_NEED_NOT_APPLY_LCCR_ACLU_SoCal_Report.pdf, al)
Findings Misidentifies national security concerns
CARRP disproportionately impacts immigrants from

Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian communities. It does so by relying on
extraordinarily overbroad criteria that treat religious practices, national origin, and innocuous
associations and activities as national security concerns, and through reliance on a faulty watchlist system and FBI surveillance data that sweeps in people who do not present any actual threat.
CARRP broadly defines a national security concern as an individual with a link to prior, current, or planned
involvement in, or association with, an activity, individual or organization described in [the security and terrorism
sections] of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but then further expands the breadth and vagueness of that definition
by explicitly instructing officers to ignore the legal standards of proof set forth in those sections of the Act. CARRP
automatically deems applicants whose names appear on the Terrorist Watch List as national
security concerns, thereby imposing an even more severe harm than the travel-related harms
normally associated with inclusion on the Watch List. Under CARRP, USCIS will delay (and
likely deny) the application of an individual labeled a national security concern. The Terrorist
Watch List is a faulty, over-inclusive list containing hundreds of thousands of names of
individuals, including U.S. residents, who are never told they are on the Watch List or given a
meaningful opportunity to dispute their inclusion on it. CARRP instructs USCIS officers to label
applicants national security concerns if they gave lawful donations to several large MuslimAmerican charities, even if those donations were made long before any accusations that the
charities were providing material support to terrorist organizations. CARRP encourages such labeling
despite the fact that the U.S. government portrayed the very same donors as innocent, misled victims of these charities
when it shut them down. CARRP instructs officers to label applicants national security concerns
based on national origin and other overbroad criteria, such as if they have travel[ed] through or
resid[ed] in areas of known terrorist activity (effectively singling applicants out as concerns
based on the country they are from); if they wire money back to their families in their home
countries; or if they speak a foreign language or have certain professions. CARRP instructs
officers to label applicants national security concerns if their names are contained in an FBI file
related to a national security investigation, even if they were not the subject of the investigation
and even if, for example, their names appear in the file only because they attended a mosque that
the FBI subjected to surveillance, or they once gave a voluntary interview to the FBI, as many
Muslim immigrants have in the last decade. Authorizes inordinate delays CARRP mandates that USCIS officers
delay adjudication of applications in direct contravention of statutory time limitations. It provides that USCIS may hold
cases in abeyance for periods of 180 days to provide for investigations of the national security concern whether by the
FBI or USCIS and that the Field Office Director may extend those abeyance periods indefinitely so long as the
investigation remains open. Because CARRP prohibits an applicant considered a national security concern from being
approved for the benefit even if they are statutorily eligible, it requires USCIS officers to delay adjudication until or unless
they can find a reason to deny the application or otherwise decide that the concern has been resolved. Encourages FBI
interference and harassment CARRP effectively turns over the immigration benefits application process to the FBI,
allowing them to dictate to USCIS when or whether an application should be granted, denied, or held in abeyance. It also
provides the FBI an opportunity to comment on USCISs proposed decisions in immigration cases, to submit questions for
USCIS to ask in interviews, and to suggest Requests for Evidence that USCIS should make. CARRP requires USCIS
officers to inform the FBI or other relevant law enforcement agencies as soon as an applicant it has labeled a national
security concern has applied for an immigration benefit. As a result, far too often, the FBI exploits this
information to blackmail applicants to work for them as informants, telling applicants that the
FBI can help them get their long-delayed immigration application adjudicated and approved if
they agree to snitch on their communities.
Mandates pretextual denials CARRP creates new, secret eligibility

criteria for immigration benefits by preventing the approval of any application for an immigration benefit that the agency
labels a national security concern. USCIS is not authorized to make rules, beyond those set forth by Congress, for
granting naturalization or other immigration benefits. CARRP prohibits USCIS officers from approving any application
for immigration benefits belonging to a person whose name appears on the Terrorist Watch List. CARRP also prohibits
USCIS officers from approving any application belonging to a person it deems a national security concern for any other
reason, unless they have supervisory approval. CARRP mandates that USCIS find a pretextual, statutory basis to deny any
application blacklisted as a national security concern, even where the applicant is statutorily eligible for the benefit. Such
denials are often facially implausible or otherwise unfounded. As a result of CARRPs requirement that officers invent a
reason to deny otherwise eligible applicants, USCIS often misuses the false testimony grounds as a basis to deny
naturalization applications. Deprives applicants of any fair process Under CARRP, USCIS will neither tell
applicants that they have been deemed a national security concern, nor give them an
opportunity to contest that designation. USCIS violates Constitutional due process protections
and its own regulations by relying on derogatory information (that creates the alleged national
security concern) in deciding to deny an application, and never disclosing that information or
allowing the applicant to confront it.
Muslim rights are abused by the FBI in the status quo the
mosque outreach program violates the first amendment
ACLU 2012 (American Civil Liberties Union, national organization advocating individual rights,
by litigating, legislating, and educating the public on a broad array of issues affecting individual
freedom in the United States, ACLU EYE on the FBI, 3/27/12,
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/Huus/aclu_eye_on_the_f
bi_-_mosque_outreach_03272012_0[1].pdf, al)
FBI documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act reveal that from 2004 through
at least 2008, the San Francisco FBI conducted a mosque outreach program through which it
compiled intelligence on American Muslim religious organizations and their leaders and
congregants constitutionally-protected beliefs and activities, without any suspicion of
wrongdoing. The ACLU previously disclosed that the FBI turned its community outreach programs into a secret and
systematic domestic intelligence-gathering initiative. Now, FBI documents obtained by the ACLU of Northern California,
the Asian Law Caucus, and the San Francisco Bay Guardian show that the FBI used the similar guise of mosque outreach
to gather intelligence on mosques and Muslim religious organizations. The documents also show that the FBI
categorized information about Muslims First Amendment-protected and other entirely

innocuous activities, as well as mosque locations, as positive intelligence and disseminated it to
agencies outside the FBI. As a result, the agency wrongly and unfairly cast a cloud of suspicion
over innocent groups and individuals based on their religious beliefs and associations, and placed
them at risk of greater law enforcement scrutiny as potential national security threats. None of
the documents indicate that the FBI told individuals interviewed that their information and views
were being collected as intelligence, and would be recorded and disseminated. The FBIs targeting
of American Muslim religious organizations for secret intelligence gathering raises grave
constitutional concerns because it is an affront to religious liberty and equal protection of the law .
The bureaus use of outreach meetings to gather intelligence also undermines the trust and
mutual understanding necessary to effective law enforcement. Additionally, the FBIs retention of
information gathered through mosque outreach in its intelligence files violates federal Privacy
Act prohibitions against the maintenance of records about individuals First Amendmentprotected activity. THE ACLU DOCUMENTS: The FBI visited the Seaside Mosque five times in 2005 for mosque
outreach, and documented congregants innocuous discussions regarding frustrations over delays in airline travel, a
property purchase of a new mosque, where men and women would pray at the new mosque, and even the sale of date
fruits after services. It also documented the subject of a particular sermon, raising First Amendment concerns. Despite an
apparent lack of information related to crime or terrorism, the FBIs records of discussions with mosque leaders and
congregants were all classified as secret, marked positive intelligence, and disseminated outside the FBI. The FBI met
with members of the South Bay Islamic Association four times (1, 2, 3, & 4) from 2004 to 2007. FBI agents documented as
positive intelligence and disseminated outside the FBI an individuals complaint of travel delays during the Hajj
pilgrimage caused by the No Fly list, as well an individuals conversation about the Hajj, Islam in general, Muslims
safety in the U.S., and community fears regarding an FBI investigation of imams in Lodi, California. Two memoranda
from 2006 and 2007 contain no descriptive information apart from the name and location of mosques contacted by the
FBI, which might be appropriate to record in a normal community outreach context, but these documents were instead
classified as secret, labeled positive intelligence, and disseminated outside the FBI. A 2005 FBI memorandum
described contacts with a representative of the South Bay Afghan Community Center and failed attempts to set up an
outreach meeting with the Afghan Cultural Center. The document identifies the representatives of each organization, and
lists the address and phone number of the Afghan Cultural Center. This information was described as positive
intelligence and disseminated outside the FBI. A 2006 FBI memorandum documented a contact with a named
representative of the Islamic Network Group to discuss a recently written article, the name of which was redacted. This
information was labeled positive intelligence and disseminated outside the FBI. A 2005 FBI memorandum contained a
detailed description of the Islamic Center of Santa Cruz, and documented a meeting with a congregant, including his name
and religious affiliation, and his discussion of congregants financial contributions to the Center and community support
for Islam. The document was classified as secret, marked positive intelligence, and disseminated outside the FBI. A
2005 FBI memorandum described a meeting with a representative of the Granada Islamic School at the Santa Clara
Muslim Community Association. The document detailed the schools facilities and summarized a conversation regarding
the schools structure and its relationship with its parent organization. This information was described as positive
intelligence and disseminated outside the FBI. A 2007 FBI memorandum entitled Mosque Liaison Contacts reports FBI
contacts with 20 northern California mosques. The name, address, and contact information for each mosque was
described as positive intelligence and disseminated outside the FBI. A 2007 FBI memorandum documented two visits to
the Anjuman-e-Najmi mosque in Fremont, California, identified congregants by name, described their conversations,
associated them with the Dawoodi Bohra community of Shia Muslims, and reproduced the contents of a lengthy e-mail
describing the communitys religious beliefs and history. This information was labeled positive intelligence and
disseminated outside the FBI. Two 2008 FBI memoranda described contacts with representatives of the Bay Area Cultural
Connections (BAYCC), which was formerly the Turkish Center Musalla. The first describes the history, mission, and
activities of the BAYCC, the ethnicity of its members and its affiliation with another organization. The second
memorandum indicates the FBI used a named meeting participants cell phone number to search LexisNexis and
Department of Motor Vehicle records, and obtained and recorded detailed information about him, including his date of
birth, social security number, address and home telephone number. Both memoranda were classified as secret. THE
PROBLEM: The San Francisco FBI documents described above bear titles such as, Mosque Outreach Liaison, Mosque
Outreach Contacts, or Mosque Liaison Contacts. Some of these documents indicate that the FBI begins its outreach
with questions about possible hate crimes against the Muslim community, but none of the documents appear connected to
a mosque protection effort initiated after 9/11 by the FBI Civil Rights Unit to guard against anti-Muslim hate crimes. That
effort operated under a 44 FBI case file number (see for example, this 2007 San Francisco FBI memorandum). In
contrast, the file numbers on the mosque outreach documents were redacted, and many were classified secret, which
indicates this effort was conducted under the FBIs national security-related investigative and intelligence authorities.
Although sometimes heavily redacted, all of the documents make clear that the FBI used its outreach meetings to
document religious leaders and congregants identities, personal information (1 & 2), and religious views, practices (1 &
2), affiliations, and travel, as well as the physical locations and layouts of mosques. Almost every FBI
memorandum described above was labeled positive intelligence, which means the information
in it would be uploaded and retained in FBI intelligence files. Categorizing information about
religious beliefs, practices, and otherwise innocent activities as positive intelligence could have
very serious negative consequences for Muslim groups and their congregants. FBI agents
accessing this information in intelligence files would assume it was relevant to the FBIs
investigative and intelligence mission, casting a cloud of suspicion over the group or individual
mentioned and potentially leading to more intensive scrutiny or investigation. The dissemination
of this positive intelligence outside the FBI would only increase the likelihood that other law
enforcement or intelligence agencies would investigate innocent groups or individuals based
solely on their religion. Freedom of religion is a foundational element of American democracy,
guaranteed by the First Amendment to our Constitution. In order to protect Americans religious
freedom and other First Amendment rights, Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, which
prohibits the government from collecting or retaining information about individuals First
Amendment activities in all but very limited circumstances. The FBIs documents demonstrate
that it is ignoring these mandates and is misusing outreach to mosques and religious
organizations to collect intelligence on American Muslims religious beliefs and activities. The
FBIs conduct, exposed in its own documents, threatens to chill American Muslims religious
rights, exploits the good faith of Muslim groups and their members, and undermines community
support for the governments legitimate community outreach efforts.
NEGATIVE CASE CARDS
Strict Scrutiny Bad

Strict standards wont solve courts will affirm government actions in the name of
national security
Meyler 08 (Bernadette Meyler, scholar of British and American constitutional law and of law
and the humanities, Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights, Religious Expression in
the Balance: A Response to Murad Hussain's Defending the Faithful, The Yale Law Journal,
3/21/08, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/religious-expression-in-the-balance-a-responseto-murad-hussains-defending-the-faithful, al)
Courts have, however, in the aftermath of September 11, been notoriously willing to affirm
government actions taken in the name of national security even when they deploy a strict scrutiny
standard. The district and circuit court opinions in Tabbaa v. Chertoffa case Hussain discusses that involved
American citizens re-entering the United States from a Muslim conference in Canadaprovide striking examples of this
tendency. The district court, in a move that the Second Circuit affirmed, did, in fact, apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the
plaintiffs claims under RFRAbut still ruled in favor of the government. Granting substantial deference to the
government with regard to its role in policing the countrys boundaries, the district court maintained that the IDSO
[Intelligence Driven Special Operation] inspections were the least restrictive means of furthering the governments
[compelling] interest in protecting its borders. Similarly, according to the Second Circuits opinion, given the intelligence
the government received, subjecting . . . [c]onference attendees to enhanced processing at the borderincluding
fingerprinting and photographingwas a narrowly tailored means of achieving the governments compelling interest in
protecting against terrorism. If strict scrutiny itself does not entail more rigorous examination of the explanations that
the government provides for its actions in this and similar situations , the prospect of outcomes favoring civil
liberties appears rather bleak. National security, guarding against terrorism, and the protection of
the borders may be construed as compelling state interests even if plaintiffs construct hybrid claims, and
tailoring that is narrow in name alone may be accepted by the courts. Let us not forget that one of the most reviled
results in Supreme Court jurisprudencethat in Korematsu v. United Statesemerged out of an
application of strict scrutiny.
Case
The 1ACs approach to criticizing Western governments
only re-creates the problem it attempts to solve
Berger 14 (Lars Berger, Associate Professor in International Security with a
PhD in Political Science from the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena in
Germany, The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the
Domestic War on Terror, by Arun Kundnani, March 27 2014,
https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/books/the-muslims-are-comingislamophobia-extremism-and-the-domestic-war-on-terror-by-arunkundnani/2012227.article) //mL
One of the central themes in Arun Kundnanis critique of what he describes as the domestic war on terror
in the UK and the US is the apparent neglect of, or even taboo against, discussing the role played by the
foreign policies of Western governments in bringing about the horrific acts of violence witnessed on the
Kundnani, a US-based scholar of terrorism, is

adamant that what governments call extremism is to a large
degree a product of their own wars. However, there are a number
of theoretical and methodological problems with his account. Kundnani is
streets of London in July 2005 and May 2013.
right to highlight methodological concerns about existing studies of Islamist radicalisation, many of which
rely on a small number of cases and fail to include control groups of people who share radical ideologies
but nevertheless choose not to engage in political violence. But this is not a new insight. Indeed,
researchers across Europe have already published plenty of insightful critiques of the theoretical
Worse, Kundnani
commits the same mistakes when he presents no theoretical
justification for his choice of case studies, and fails to explain why
the vast majority of Muslims who disagree with the Western foreign
policies he sees as potential root causes have not become engaged
in political violence. If we look at public opinion polls from across the
Muslim world, including Muslim communities in the West, support for violence
against Western civilians stands, on average, at between 5 and 10
per cent. But if Kundnanis assertions are correct, this number should
be much higher, given that in some Muslim countries, overwhelming
majorities of up to 90 per cent criticise the policies of the US and the
West. In fact, it is not perceptions of US foreign policies with respect to
Israel or Middle Eastern petroleum resources that shape approval of terrorist
violence against US civilians, but the rejection of US culture and
some of its most prominent manifestations, such as freedom of
expression. This finding may go against the conventional wisdom that Kundnani seems to wish to
repackage here as his own insights, but it is quite comprehensible in light of the
groundbreaking analysis of anti-Americanisms by scholars Peter
Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, in which they differentiate between a view that
assesses US foreign policies on their own terms and a view that
regards those same policies as reflecting the fundamentally evil
nature of US society.
But there is a danger that Western
governments, in an attempt to address the cacophony of voices
assumptions and methodological approaches of the radicalisation literature.
typical of the decentralised, pluralistic religious discourses in many

(Sunni) Muslim communities around the world, can end up telling
Muslims what the correct interpretation of Islam is. But once again,
these are issues that have also already received considerable
academic attention, with plenty of excellent analysis ranging from
peer-reviewed publications to countless undergraduate essays . In short,
Kundnanis critique of hostility towards Muslims by some Western media and politicians and of Western
governments interaction with their Muslim communities is convincing, although not wholly original. His
highly ideological insistence on the link between Western foreign policies and Islamist terrorism is neither.
Attempts to combat islamophobia through law inevitably

fails
Schriefer 10 (Paula Schriefer, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the BUREAU
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, The Wrong Way to Combat
'Islamophobia', November 9 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/opinion/10iht-edschriefer.html) //mL
Such a campaign is deeply flawed from a human rights perspective,
both in its equation of religious discrimination (a legitimate human rights
violation) with the vague concept of defamation, as well as in the
proposed remedy of imposing legal limits on freedom of expression . A
recent Freedom House report looking at blasphemy laws in seven countries documents the negative
how such laws

actually contribute to greater interfaith strife and conflict. Because
no one can agree on what constitutes blasphemy, laws that attempt
to ban it are themselves vague, highly prone to arbitrary
enforcement and are used to stifle everything from political
opposition to religious inquiry. Particularly when applied in countries with weak
impact of such laws on a range of fundamental human rights, while noting
democratic safeguards e.g., strong executives, subservient judiciaries, corrupt law enforcement
laws do nothing to achieve their supposed goals of

promoting religious tolerance and harmony and instead are
disproportionally used to suppress the freedom of religious
minorities or members of the majority religion that hold views
considered unorthodox. In Pakistan, for example, Christians and Ahmadiyya (Muslims who do
blasphemy
not believe Muhammad was the final prophet) make up only 2 percent of the population, but have been
the target of nearly half of the more than 900 prosecutions for blasphemy in the past two decades. The
remaining prosecutions have been made against Muslims themselves, often simply as an easy way to
settle personal scores that have nothing to do with religion. Mere accusations of blasphemy have led to
mob violence in which people have been maimed or killed and whole communities devastated. The
governments of countries that already have such problematic laws on the books are precisely those
countries leading the charge to create an international blasphemy law through the United Nations. The
motivations of states like Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia countries with appalling records on religious
freedom and broader human rights are unquestionably hypocritical and have more to do with their
desire to score points with unhappy domestic populations and religious extremists than the desire to foster
religious tolerance. Support for blasphemy laws is high among the general public in the Islamic world. Even
the staunchest advocates of human rights in the Middle East, individuals who are openly critical of their
corrupt and authoritarian leaders, balk at the idea that the publication of the Danish cartoons or the
burning of a Koran should be protected forms of freedom of expression. In a part of the world where ones
religion is as key to ones identity as nationality and race, most people simply view such forms of
expression as a bigoted attack on their very existence. Such views are bolstered by the need to better
address the real issues of discrimination and violence against individuals because of their religious beliefs,
even in established democracies. It is a fact that political parties espousing xenophobic and anti-Islamic
views in Europe have gained in both popularity and representation, and that legal policies have been
enacted that most human rights organizations rightly see as restricting the fundamental rights of Muslims
to practice their religious beliefs. It is also a fact that many of the same people who defended the Danish
cartoons as an important form of free expression somehow feel perfectly justified in criticizing the plans to
Yet
hypocrisy in Europe and the United States does not justify attempts
to bring governmental oversight into what constitutes offensive
expression. Even with the best intentions, which are often lacking,
governments should never be in the business of policing speech. The
tools of defeating intolerance, including religious intolerance, start
with a legislative environment that protects peoples fundamental
political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of expression .
build an Islamic Center near the site of the World Trade Center because it offends them.
Blasphemy laws dont work in any context and U.N. member states should reject them unconditionally.
Surveillance doesnt affect the majority of Muslim

populations poll data backs us up
Sidhu 7 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Associate Professor of Law, B.A. 2000 from
University of Pennsylvania, M.A. 2003 from Johns Hopkins University, J.D.
2004 from The George Washington University, Member of the Maryland Bar,
served as a fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States, received a
Distinguished Service Award, taught at the Georgetown University Law Center
and University of Baltimore School of Law, held visiting research posts at the
Oxford University Faculty of Law and Georgetown University Law Center, held
fellowships at Harvard University and Stanford University research centers,
presented at various law schools, including the University of Pennsylvania
Law School and Stanford Law School, participated in programs at leading
think tanks, such as the Aspen Institute and Council on Foreign Relations,
served as a legal observer of the military commissions at Guantanamo, cited
by the Solicitor General of the United States and U.S. Department of Justice,
cited in briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, 2007
(The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the
Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class,
Available online at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?
handle=hein.journals/margin7&collection=journals&page=375, Accessed on
6/21/15)
Identity: Of the 311 respondents, all identified themselves as Muslims.83 General
Internet Usage: A vast majority of respondents (80.1%) used the Internet prior to 9/11, while the rest did
After 9/11, the Internet usage of the respondents increased

7.7 %, with 87.8% stating that they have used the Internet after the
not.
terrorist attacks, while only 11.9% reporting that they have not. The trend towards greater
Internet usage continued, as 90.4% of respondents note that they "currently
use" the Internet, and only 9.3% state that they do not. Views Regarding Government
Surveillance: 71.7% of respondents believe (48.9% strongly, 22.8% somewhat) that the government is
only 4.2% (1.6%

somewhat and 2.6% strongly) disbelieve that such monitoring is
taking place. Similarly, 70.7% of respondents believe (45.0% strongly,
25.7% somewhat) that the government is currently monitoring the
Internet activities of Muslims in the United States. Only 4.8% disbelieve (2.9%
currently monitoring the activities of Muslims in the United States. By contrast,
somewhat, 1.9% strongly) that such monitoring is taking place. Alterations in Behavior--Generally:
86.8% of respondents said they have not changed at all their

general activities after 9/11 due to a concern that the
government may be monitoring their activities. Only 11.6% of
respondents changed their general activities
(6.1% made slight changes, 2.3%

made moderate changes, 1.6% made many changes, 1.6% made significant changes) due to this concern.
65.9% of respondents stated that they were not personally aware of

any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way,
their general activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the
government may be monitoring their activities. 25.4% of respondents stated
they were personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their
general activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their activities.
89.1% of respondents said they have

not changed their Internet usage at all -the sites they visit or the
Alterations in Behavior-Internet Usage:
amount of time they spend on the Internet-after 9/11 due to a

concern that the government may be monitoring their activities.
Only 8.4% of respondents changed their Internet usage (3.9% made slight
changes, 1.6% made moderate changes, 1.9% made many changes, 1.0% made significant changes) due
to this concern. Of those who stated that they have made changes in their Internet usage, 57.6% noted
that they did not visit websites after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring
77.2% of respondents stated that they were not

personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who
changed, in any way, their Internet usage after 9/11, because of a
concern that the government may be monitoring their activities. 11.9%
their online activities.
of respondents stated they were personally aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed,
in any way, their Internet usage after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring
their activities. Of these respondents, 45.6% stated that they are personally aware of other MuslimAmericans who have not visited certain web sites after 9/11, because of a concern that the government
may be monitoring their online activities.
The thesis of the aff is wrong

McMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, Eye on Islam:
Judicial Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance
Spectrum, [http://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1107&context=ustlj]
after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Attorney General John
in
those early hours," said Ashcroft in a 2002 press conference
announcing the Bureau's reorientation, "the prevention of terrorist
acts became the central goal of the law enforcement and national
security mission of the FBI."l But, while Ashcroft may have properly
redirected the FBI toward confronting the primary threat to United
States safety and security, his identification of our enemy was not as
particular as it could have been. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission aimed
for further clarity: [T]he enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic
evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at
this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by
Immediately
Ashcroft converted the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a counterterrorism agency: "That day,
Islamist terrorism -especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology. 2 Indeed,
no characteristic unites the perpetrators of recent terrorist acts so
much as their Muslim identity. Middle Eastern nationality may be

thought to provide the link, but this trait proves to be
underinclusive: to name just a few examples, Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," is a Muslim who
was born and educated in the United Kingdom,3 as were the four July 7th London Underground bombers.4
Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person to be charged and convicted by United States courts in connection
with the September 11th terrorist attacks, is a French Muslim.5 Earnest James Ujaama, an indicted alQaeda associate, is a Muslim convert who was born in Denver and raised in Seattle.6 Furthermore ,
of
the twenty-six terrorists currently on the FBI's Most Wanted List,
three are from the Philippines; two are from Kenya; one, Abdul Rahman
Yasin, is from Indiana-all are Muslims.7 Nor does Arab ethnicity serve as a
reliably accurate terrorist-identifying characteristic: on December
5th, 2005, a white woman who was raised as a Catholic in Belgium
became the first European Muslim suicide bomber when she
detonated herself in Baquba.8 Indeed, the use of stereotype-defying
terrorist operatives is entirely consistent with al-Qaeda's expressed
intent to employ deceptive tactics in carrying out its attacks.9 Of
course, the one characteristic that Islamist radicals cannot obscure
by selective conscription is Islamic identity. Accordingly, Muslim
identity should be considered the attribute that correlates most
positively with terrorist involvement; or, in the words of Abdel Rahman aI-Rashed, the
general manager of Al-Arabiya, a top pan-Arab television station in the Middle East,10 " It is a
certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists. but it is equally
certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are
Muslims."11 Our question then becomes, what is the proper role for
Muslim identity in our law-enforcement offIcials' preventive
counterterrorism efforts? It is a question that calls for a survey of
our Constitution as well as our conscience, as the answer may
compel us to contemplate taking permissible but regrettable
measures against a particular religious group. In 1785, James Madison
wrote: "[A just government] will be best supported by protecting every citizen
in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his
person and his property."12 But what shall be done when those two
ideals are incompatible, when protecting persons and their property
requires the government to take action that may infringe on others'
religious enjoyment? We are faced with bad (ostracizing Muslims)
and worse (suffering another terrorist attack) choices, a predicament
expressed in the dour words of the reliably relevant Winston Churchill, who,
speaking in a different context, said, "We seem to be very near the bleak
choice between War and Shame. My feeling is that we shall choose Shame,
and then have War thrown in a little later on even more adverse terms than
at present." 13 To assist legal and law enforcement authorities in avoiding
both Shame and War, this Article will aim to provide a legal framework
allowing law enforcement officials greater flexibility in targeting
religious groups. In doing so, it will focus exclusively on religiousgroup targeting and will not address the related issues of racial and
ethnic profiling, which have been adequately covered by other
commentators. I will begin by discussing the difference between acts
of religious profiling and acts of suspect description reliance, and

then discuss how most acts of religious-group targeting can be
plausibly characterized as either. Finally, I will recommend that
courts adopt a view toward religious-group targeting that allows
law-enforcement officials greater flexibility in countering the
Islamist terrorist threat .
Solvency is impossibleMuslims will always be unsure of

whether they are being surveyed and any policy will be
circumvented
Kundani 14 [Arun Kundani, The Guardian, March 28, 2014, No NSA Reform can
fix the American Islamophobic Surveillance Complex,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-americanislamophobic-surveillance-complex ]
Friday 28 March 2014 11.02 EDTLast modified on Friday 3 October 201409.03 EDT Share on Facebook
Better
oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus may finally
be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled
plans this week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened
Share on Twitter Share via Email Share on LinkedIn Share on Google+ Shares 1,972
up by Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops
and stores and metadata. These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those
living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim Americans, left-wing campaigners, "radical" journalists
How come when we

talk about spying we don't talk about the lives of ordinary people being spied
upon? While we have been rightly outraged at the government's warehousing of troves of data, we
have been less interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for those
most affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing my book on Islamophobia
and the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and
Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under surveillance
the days of living on the receiving end of excessive spying wont end there.
only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the congregation. Others spoke about federal agents
All of them said

they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives abroad
were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by
government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in
Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI
agents for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been
placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised its
spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on
Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students at the City University of
turning up at colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim.
New York who discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been informants all along, working
for the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them.
There was
no reasonable suspicion of any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active
in the Muslim Students Association. And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based AfricanAmerican imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and
killed by federal agents. The government had no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that
These are the types of people

whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two "hops" away
from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred toby outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander.
Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US government.
Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort of national security file
compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the
Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In
targeted communities, a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to
break down. As one interviewee said: "You
look at your closest friends and ask: are they

informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not knowing
whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking politics in public,
the unpredictability of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention
to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals intelligence" the
surveillance of our digital communications but equally important is "human
intelligence", the result of informants and undercover agents operating within
communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption that Islamic
ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of
violence by right-wing extremists than by Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge
numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some of whom have
"radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just
the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists
So let's reform the NSA and its

countless collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000
intelligence analysts working on counter-terrorism and the15,000 paid
informants helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police
Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000
officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance. Let's not forget the
especially subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America, where,
sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but there's a
but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one.
Aff cant solve Anti-Arab sentiment is entrenched in

mainstream media and history
Salaita 6 Steven George Salaita, scholar, author and public speaker,
received his B.A. in political science from Radford University in 1997, his M.A.
in English from Radford in 1999, and completed his Ph.D. at the University of
Oklahoma in Native American studies with a literature emphasis, became an
assistant professor of English at University of Wisconsin in Whitewater, where
he taught American and ethnic American literature until 2006, associate
professor of English at Virginia Tech, won a 2007 Gustavus Myers Outstanding
Book Award for writing the book Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where It
Comes from and What it Means for Politics Today, 2006 (9/11, Anti-Arab
Racism, and the Mythos of National Pride, Beyond Orientalism and
Islamophobia, Fall, Available online at
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_centennial_review/v006/6.2salaita.pdf)
anti-Arab racism is not confined to the political
right also is worth analysis. Racism, as writers from Elizabeth Cook-Lynn to bell hooks have
illustrated, is never limited to particular social or discursive movements,
nor is it ever rooted in consistent sites of cultural or linguistic
production. Any comprehensive survey of popular opinion in the
United States over the past decade (a time frame that purposely straddles 9/11) will
demonstrate that the blatant anti-Arab racism of the political
My second observation that
right is, using a vocabulary appropriate to specific political agendas, reinscribed
continually in the discourse , or at least the ethos, of

mainstream and progressive media . For instance, leftist liberal
publications such as Dissent, Tikkun, and MoveOn.org have been guilty of
expressing racist attitudes either in the form of support for Palestinian dispossession or by
totalizing all Arabs and Muslims as potential terrorists; or the racism arrives subtly by precluding Arabs
A similar guilt is shared by mainstream

(supposedly liberal) publications such as the New York Times, Newsweek, Los Angeles
Times, and Slate.com, which, given their corporate obligations, cannot
realistically be expected to attack anti-Arab racism when it is so
fundamental to the interests of American capitalism (and to the survival of
from speaking on their own behalf.
the publications). Of major concern to this essay is the recognition that, in keeping with the seminal work
we cannot seriously interrogate racism by

attributing it solely to one political ideology without analyzing how
the racism is interpolated through a multitude of discourses at the
benefit of various ideologies. Beyond this intercultural observation, we can say that
anti-Arab racism has specific historical dimensions that render it
unique even as it has been an inheritor of countless tensions and
anxieties. Some of those dimensionstravel narratology, Orientalist scholarship, imperialismhave
been discussed by others in some detail; the dimension I invariably find most
interesting is the relationship of anti-Arab racism with settler
colonization, both in the New World and Holy Land. This relationship
indicates that a centuries-old Holy Land mania in the United States
not only facilitated what Cook-Lynn (2001) calls anti-Indianism,
but has allowed the antiIndianism to evolve into support for a new
Messianic conquest that positions todays Arabs in a fascinating
theological continuum. If Natives were the first victims of racism in North America, then
of Louis Althusser and Terry Eagleton,
Arabs, the new schematic evildoers, are merely the latest to

be the first
Solvency
One step reforms such as curtailing bulk data collection
are just drops in the bucket- Islamophobia is a persistent
ideology infecting American politics making our
pedagogical performance the pre-requisite
Kundnani 2014 [Arun, (Professor of Terror Studies and Media @ NYU), "No NSA reform can fix
the American Islamophobic surveillance complex," The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/nsa-reform-american-islamophobic-surveillancecomplex, Accessed 7/13/15, AX]
Better oversight of the sprawling American national security apparatus

may finally be coming: President Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this
week to reduce bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened up by
Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and
These reforms may be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those

living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim Americans, left-wing
campaigners, "radical" journalists the days of living on the receiving end of
excessive spying wont end there. How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about
the lives of ordinary people being spied upon? While we have been rightly outraged at
the government's warehousing of troves of data, we have been less
interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for those most
affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing my book on Islamophobia and the
War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia.
Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under
surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the
congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at
colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim. All of
them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives
abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by
government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in Minnesota who
described how they and their friends were questioned by FBI agents
for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been
placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised
its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on
Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students
at the City University of New York who discovered that fellow students they had
befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York Police Department's
Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them. There was no
stores and metadata.
reasonable suspicion of any crime ; it was enough that the

targeted students were active in the Muslim Students Association.
And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American
imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009
raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The
government had no evidence of any terrorist plot ; the sole

pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US
government. These are the types of people whom the National Security
Agency can suspect of being two "hops" away from targets. These are the
types of "bad guys" referred to by outgoing NSA director Keith
Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America
had some sort of national security file compiled on them. Today, that
number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the Muslim American Civil
Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass
surveillance. In targeted communities, a culture of enforced selfcensorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break down.
As one interviewee said: "You look at your closest friends and ask: are they
informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not
knowing whom to trust, choosing your words with care when talking
politics in public, the unpredictability of state power. Snowden has
rightly drawn our attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals
intelligence" the surveillance of our digital communications but equally
important is "human intelligence", the result of informants and
undercover agents operating within communities. Underpinning all
the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption that
Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more
people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists
than by Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge
numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but lawabiding people, some of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by
the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who
are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one. So
let's reform the NSA and its countless collections. But let's not
forget the FBI's reported 10,000 intelligence analysts working on
counter-terrorism and the 15,000 paid informants helping them do
it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence
and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000 officers, $100m budget
and vast program of surveillance. Let's not forget the especially
subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe
your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but there's a

Islamophobia Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Islamophobia Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

ISLAMOPHOBIA AFF FILE

Analytics were deleted on several args

1ac strict scrutiny

destructive comment was President Bushs description of the War on Terror as a

America was presumptively considered disloyal and a threat, irrespective of his or

total surveillance of Muslim populations, and building law

none of this activity was based on investigating reasonable

intelligence files. It is clear that

that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships were actually covert

the American population is willing to support infringements on civil liberties by reason of

Otherization allows for oppression, slavery, and other atrocities

The phrase us and them refers to the tendency of marginalized

notion of viewing outsiders as others has historically been

Although these suspicions tend to have racial connotations, they

of Islam, the fear of Muslims, is a notion I think has been

The strict scrutiny standard solves-it requires the government to demonstrate a

the case of Islamophobia, it is easy to target a specific group because some

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a

developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals

peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident

mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic ; it

public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader

Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating

break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative

approximate to Foucaults notion of specific intellectuals who use their expert

alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the

and Richard Falk in changing the countrys political climate and

1ac end racial profiling

destructive comment was President Bushs description of the War on Terror as a

America was presumptively considered disloyal and a threat, irrespective of his or

total surveillance of Muslim populations, and building law

none of this activity was based on investigating reasonable

intelligence files. It is clear that

that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships were actually covert

the American population is willing to support infringements on civil liberties by reason of

Otherization allows for oppression, slavery, and other atrocities

The phrase us and them refers to the tendency of marginalized

notion of viewing outsiders as others has historically been

Although these suspicions tend to have racial connotations, they

of Islam, the fear of Muslims, is a notion I think has been

Amnesty International 14 (Non-governmental organization focused on human rights with

in The Intercept about the apparently arbitrary

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a

developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals

mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic ; it

public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader

Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating

break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative

alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the

scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied

and Richard Falk in changing the countrys political climate and

total surveillance of Muslim populations, and building law

none of this activity was based on investigating reasonable

intelligence files. It is clear that

that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships were actually covert

Islamophobia is basically the term, the name given to anti-Muslim

But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to

the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you

idea of humanitarianism has a long

the idea was to drum up this fear of this

This is actually the work of a far

this is complete conspiracy theory. But these are the

We advocate a critical praxis centered on challenging