Reserva Troncal

Sumaya v. IAC (1991)

Raul Balantakbo inherited from 2 different ascendants the 2 sets of properties subject
of this case:
1)
2)

A 1/3 interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw),

Laguna from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945
A 1/7 interest pro-indiviso in 10 parcels of registered lands from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real
properties.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the said properties in an
Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo."
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda de. Balantakbo sold the property
inherited from Jose, Sr., to Mariquita H. Sumaya.
The same property was
subsequently sold by Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on
December 30, 1963.

On the question of registration of reserva troncal

Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of
Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his
father Jose, Sr., and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. Said affidavit
was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of
the reservable character of the properties.
In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone
ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties
previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in
the said affidavit.
Although the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they
were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale, the fact remains
however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source
of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, We held:

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the
properties inherited from Luisa Bautista, to Villa Honorio Development Corporation,
Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor
of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in
its possession.

"When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of
its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein

On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and

assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc. The properties are presently in the name of the Cooperative, 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object
of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.

The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties
do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores,
also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr.,
another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed suit to recover the properties
which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
Held:

"Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable.

Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the

record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of
the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation"

On the question of whose duty the annotation of the reserva troncal rests

Reserva Troncal

The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the
widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the
reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant
who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another
descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.

On the question of prescription of cause of action

The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the
propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor
Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have
no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of
the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter
acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the
third degree. The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
reivindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in
10 years under the old Code of Civil Procedure or in thirty years under Article 1141 of
the New Civil Code. The action for recovery of the reserved property was brought by the
respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the
reservor. Therefore, the respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.

Reserva Troncal

De Papa v. Camacho (1986)

In 1937, Faustino died intestate, single and without issue. Thus, Eustacio, his father,
inherited his 1/2 pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels of land, as he was the sole
intestate heir of Faustino. Eustacio received the said property subject to a reserva
troncal, which was annotated on the Certificates of Title.

X&
Y
Romana
Tioco

In 1939 Trinidad died intestate, and her rights and interests in the 7 parcels of land
were inherited by her only child, Dalisay, subject to the usufructuary right of her
surviving husband, Primo Tongko.

Balbino
Tioco

On June 14, 1965, Eustacio died intestate, and was survived by his only legitimate
descendant, Dalisay.

Eustacio
Dizon

Toribia
Tioco

Faustino
Dizon

Nicolas
Tioco

Manuel
Tioco

Francisc
a Tioco
de Papa

The parties agree that Dalisay now owns one-half (1/2) of all the 7 parcels of land as
her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad.
Issue:
Whether or not all relatives of the praepositus, within the third degree in the
appropriate line, succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death
of the reservista? Or, are the rights of said relatives subject to, and should be
determined by, the rules on intestate succession?

Trinidad
DizonTongko
Dalisay D.
TongkoCamacho

The late Balbino Tioco had 4 children: Toribia (deceased), Nicolas, Manuel and
Francisca. He also had a sister, Romana Tioco.
Toribia was married to Eustacio Dizon, and had 2 legitimate children: Faustino and
Trinidad. Trinidad is the mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
Thus, Dalisay is the great granddaughter of Balbino Tioco, and the granddaughter of
the plaintiffs.
Romana, during her lifetime, donated 4 parcels of land to her niece Toribia. The latter
died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband and their two children. Thus, these
lands were inherited by her children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
In 1928, Balbino died intestate. In the partition of his estate, 3 parcels of land were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, which devolved upon her
children Faustino and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.

Held:
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom
the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and
uncles of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by
his niece, Dalisay, although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter.
Under Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called
to the succession.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed
This conclusion is fortified by the observation in Padura v. Baldovino, that as to the
reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:

Reserva Troncal

" It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios
existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject
to the condition that they must survive the reservista"
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt
that the plaintiffs would have been excluded by the defendant under the rules of
intestate succession.
There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an ascendant ---- thereby giving rise to the reservation
---- before its transmission to the reservatario.

Reserva Troncal

Gonzales v. CFI (1981)

Benito Legarda y Tuason died on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow,
Filomena Roces, and their 7 children: 4 daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and
Filomena and 3 sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned
in 3 equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz, represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her
sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extra-judicially to
herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. These properties are in litigation in this case.
As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held pro-indiviso by her other
6 children.
On March 6, 1953, Mrs. Legarda executed 2 hand-written identical documents wherein
she disposed the properties she inherited from her daughter in favor of the children of
her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (16 grandchildren in all).
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959, Mrs. Legarda and her 6 surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the 1/3 share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her
mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should
be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was
opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed on June 20, 1968
an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her
mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to
her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons.

Issues:
1)

Whether or not the properties in litigation are reservable propeDid rties?

2)

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa the properties she
inherited from her daughter, to the reservees within the 3 rd degree and to
bypass the reservees in the 2nd degree? Or, should that inheritance
automatically go to the reservees in the 2 nd degree?

Held:
In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by
another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant,
and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, 3 transmissions are involved:
(1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an
ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant;
(2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions
precede the reservation, and
(3) a third transmission of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives
within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line
of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant.
If there are only two transmissions, there is no reserva.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title,
(2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property,
(3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law and
(4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from which the property came
and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

Reserva Troncal

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one
at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters. Fourth degree relatives are not
included. First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because representation is
confined to relatives within the third degree.
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the
rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donation and succession.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to
the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacto de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory
condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the
transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees
at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.
On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right.
His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become
absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee.
The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require
that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser.

The renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a
contract regarding future inheritance.
The reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally.
The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the reservor.
"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must
be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property."
"Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they
can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
reservista is alive"
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are
reservatarios existing.
"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista."
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus
becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property."
1)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable

properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor.
The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus were living.

2)

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor.

Reserva Troncal

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be

inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the
prepositus who, in this case, are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda. She could
not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be
allowed.
This case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, where it
was ruled:
"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of
ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of
his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance
from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,
within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest ( prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at
the same time the right of a reservatario" (reservee).
This means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death,
there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus, regardless of
whether those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable
character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor
cannot, by means of his will, choose the reservee to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.

Reserva Troncal

Cabardo v. Villanueva (1922)

The last owner of the property in question was Cornelia Abordo; she died on October
30, 1918, intestate and without issue. Her mother, Basilia Cabardo, died as far back
as in February, 1899; and as Cornelia had no brothers or sisters, her own father,
Lorenzo Abordo, succeeded to all of her properties.
The estate possessed by Cornelia at the time of her death was derived by inheritance
from two sources: in part, from her mother Basilia, and in part, from her grandmother
Isabel Macaraya (mother of Basilia Cabardo, who died in November, 1912).
Lorenzo, Cornelias father, died in December, 1920.
The present claimant, Rosa Cabardo, was a sister to Basilia in life, who had no
brothers or sisters living at the time of the death of her niece, Cornelia.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties are subject to reserva troncal?
Held:
The case falls precisely under Article 811 of the Civil Code. The property which
Cornelia Abordo acquired from her mother, Basilia Cabardo, upon the death of the
latter in 1899, became impressed with the character of reservable property in the
hands of Lorenzo Abordo when he succeeded to those properties by inheritance from
his daughter Cornelia.
The circumstance that said property originally pertained to the conjugal partnership
composed of Basilia Cabardo and Loranzo Abordo is immaterial. It is sufficient that
Cornelia acquired it by inheritance from her mother.
Also, the property acquired by Cornelia Abordo from her grandmother, Isabel
Macaraya, upon the death of the latter in 1912 - whether by testate or intestate
succession is immaterial - pertains to the reservable estate, notwithstanding the fact
that a division of Isabel Macaraya's estate was effected by a partition deed executed
by the persons in interest.
It is sufficient that the property descend to Cornelia Abordo from her grandmother by
gratuitous title (por titulo lucrativo):
"The transmission is by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return. It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any
prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by
an act of mere liberality of the person making, without imposing any obligation on the

part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property transmitted deliver,
give or do nothing in return.
"In a case where the question raised was as to the right of a minor to the inheritance
of his grandmother, and which question were settled by a compromise, the Court held
that it was not the document of compromise that determined the character of the title
by virtue of which the minor got the amounts awarded to him, but the thing which was
the subject-matter of the compromise, i.e., the hereditary rights, which import a
gratuitous title."
The person from whom the degrees are reckoned is Cornelia Abordo herself, since she
was at the end of the line from which the property came and the person upon whom
the property last devolved by descent. Lorenzo Abordo was a stranger to that line and
not related by blood to those for whom the property is reserved.
Thus, upon the death of Lorenzo Abordo, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed to the
aforementioned properties, she being the only living person within the limits of the
third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.

Reserva Troncal

Cano v. Director of Lands (1959)

The Certificate of Title of the land in question was registered

in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor
of Eustaquia Guerrero.
On September 8, 1955, the reservista Cano, died. Thus, in
October, 1955, the reservee (reservatorio) Eustaquia applied
for the cancellation of the original title and a new one issued
in her favor.
The motion was opposed by the sons of Cano: Jose and
Teotimo Fernandez.
They contended that the application
and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in
an ordinary proceeding, not in the Registration Court.
However, the lower court granted the petition on the basis of
the recorded reserve. It held that the issuance of a new
certificate is proper, for the reason that the death of the
reservista vested the ownership of the property in the
petitioner as the sole reservatario troncal.
The oppositors appealed and argued that the reversion in
favor of the reservatario requires the declaration of the
existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a ascendant by
gratuitous titled from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.
Held:
The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been
declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the

rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly

recognized.
The property was inherited by Cano from her deceased
daughter, Lourdes Guerrero, who inherited the same from her
father, Evaristo Guerrero. Hence, falls squarely within the
provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code.
The only requisites for the passing of title from the reservista
to the appellee are:
(1) the death of the reservista; and
(2) the fact that the reservatario has survived the
reservista.
Both facts are admitted, and their existence in nowhere
questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary
rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed
in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista.
This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis
causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's
estate; the reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservatarios
that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus
becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner
of the reservable property. Hence, its acquisition by the
reservatario may be entered in the property records without

Reserva Troncal

necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites

therefor appear of record.
It is equally well settled that the reservable property cannot
be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors
mortis causa, so long as a reservatario within the third
degree from the prepositus, and belonging to the line whence
the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the
reservable character of the property, without determining the
identity of the reservatario, or where several reservatarios
dispute the property among themselves, further proceedings
would be unavoidable. But this is not the case.
The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been
expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there
are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree.

10

Reserva Troncal

Carillo v. De Paz (1966)

On April 24, 1950, Agustina died. Subsequently, or on June 8, 1950, the

court decreed the properties inherited by Agustina subject to reserva troncal.

The property in question is Lot No. 221, originally owned by Severino Salak and Petra
Garcia (deceased, September 21, 1941).

Thus, on November 6, 1950, Ernesto filed a petition for the execution of the
said judgment. Acting on said petition, the court held:

On August 16, 1943, Severino sold to Honoria Salak his 1/2 portion of Lot 221. A
year later, or on December 5, 1944, Severino died.

" in view of the death of the reservista, Doa Agustina, the court declares
all her interest in the 3/4 share of the properties terminated, and that the
reservee, Ernesto, entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the said 3/4
share declared reserved to him "

Sometime in January 1945, Honoria and other members of her family died
massacred by the Japanese.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted:
(1) SP No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia
On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition adjudicated Lot No. 221 to
Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it, in her capacity as heir, the other 3/4 by
purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs: Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun
and Ernesto Bautista).
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action
against the Francisca to recover 1/2 of Lot No. 221.
(2) SP No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family

Parents: Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo

Children: Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya

The court held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were
Agustina (3/4 share) and Ernesto (1/4 share), applying the survivorship
presumption:
i.
ii.

iii.
iv.

Simeon died first his properties went to his children: Adolfo,

Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4, each);
Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died next Honoria's and
Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel; those of Ligaya
went to her son, Ernesto Bautista;
Isabel died next her properties went to her son Adolfo; and
Adolfo died last his properties went to his maternal grandmother,
Agustina.

Agustina, thereby, succeeded to the properties that came by intestate

succession from Honoria and Isabel, including 1/2 of Lot No. 221.

11

On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup, heirs of Agustina, filed suit for
the recovery of their share in Lot No. 221 against Francisca and Ernesto.
On June 20, 1963, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by prescription.
Held:
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as
it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can
bring a revindicatory suit therefor. However, this right, if not exercised within the time
for recovering real properties, prescribes.
Scaevola shares the view that prescription can apply against the reservatarios to cut
off their right to the reservable property.
Appellants, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property from the time when
the reservista, Agustina, died on April 24, 1950.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription
for actions to recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action
accrued.
Appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than 10
years from April 24, 1950, has prescribed.

Reserva Troncal

De los Reyes v. Paterno (1916)

This action was commenced on February 7, 1914, for the purpose of declaring the
plaintiff as owner of 1/2 of 2 parcels of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The defendant, in his special defense, alleged that the said Tomas G. del Rosario, at
the time of his death, was the sole and only owner of said lots or parcels of land.
The court a quo rendered a judgment ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff
one-half of one of said parcels of land.
From that conclusion the defendant appealed, and made this assignment of error: that
the lower court "erred in not holding that the decree of the Court of Land Registration
is res judicata against the plaintiff; and that the two certificates of title of the
properties that are the subject matter of the complaint, issued in behalf of Tomas G.
del Rosario by virtue of said decree, are conclusive and decisive proof against the
plaintiff."
Held:
If it is true that during the lifetime of Tomas G. del Rosario, he obtained a Torrens title
for the lots or parcels of land in question, and if that judgment or decree of the Court
of Land Registration became final, or if more than one year had elapsed after the
decree, then his title is unimpeachable and cannot be annulled or set aside, even for
fraud.
As was noted above, the present action was commenced on the 7th of February,
1914. During the trial, the defendant presented as proof Exhibit C which shows the
following facts:
First. That the said Tomas G. del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration on the 24th of April, 1909, for the registration under the Torrens system
of the two parcels of land in question.
Second. That on the 21st of September, 1909, the Court of Land Registration
rendered the following decree, ordering said parcels of land to be registered in the
name of Tomas G. del Rosario:
"The applicant has presented documentary evidence, from which a certified copy
issued by the register of deeds of Manila on July 17, 1907, of the entry made in the
old property registry, it was deduced that these properties have been the subject of
successive and legal conveyances since the year 1879, until they were acquired by
the applicant in August and September, 1891, by purchase, during his conjugal
partnership, now dissolved, with his wife, Juana Reyes y Reyes, and that the

12

ownership of both properties was recorded in the said property registry in the name of
Tomas G. del Rosario.
"Upon the death of Juana Reyes y Reyes, who died intestate, Concepcion Crispina
Dorotea Severina del Rosario y Reyes, a daughter of the marriage of the deceased
with the applicant, Tomas G. del Rosario, was declared to be the sole heir of decedent
on February 20, 1892.
"On June 3, 1900, the said Concepcion del Rosario y Reyes also died, at the age of 9
years, and was succeeded in all her rights and actions, and in respect to one-half of
the property, by the applicant Tomas G. del Rosario, who was already the owner of the
other half of the property."
From the 21st of September, 1909, until the 7th of February, 1914, much more than
one year elapsed. The title, therefore of Tomas G. del Rosario was absolute and
complete. The failure of the plaintiff, if he ever had any interest or title in said land, to
appear and oppose the registration of the same in the name of Tomas G. del Rosario
or to question the registration in his name during a period of one year after the
certificate of title had been issued, operates to exclude him forever from questioning
the title granted under the Torrens system.
The plaintiff having lost his right to claim any interest in the lots or parcels of land in
question, by virtue of his (a) failure to present any opposition to the registration of the
same under the Torrens system in favor of Tomas G. del Rosario, or (b) to question
the validity of such registration within a period of one year thereafter he has forever
lost his right therein, if he ever had any.

Reserva Troncal

Dizon v. Galang (1926)

Rufina Dizon was married to Vicente Galang, with whom she had a son named
Francisco. She inherited from her parents the 3 parcels of land in question.
On October 4, 1904, Rufina Dizon died. Francisco inherited from her the said lands.
On December 8, 1904, Francisco died and his father Vicente, by operation of law,
inherited from him the 3 parcels of land. These lands, under the law, are considered
as reservable property, although they do not appear as such in the registry of deeds.
In 1913, Vicente sold the 1st 2 parcels to Juan Medina; in 1909, the 3 rd to Teodoro
Jurado, without informing them that they were reservable property.
The plaintiffs: Pedro and Severina Dizon, brother and sister of the deceased Rufina,
being related to her within the third degree, brought this action against Vicente
Galang, Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado.
The complaint prays that the sales of this land by Vicente Galang to Juan Medina and
Teodoro Jurado be set aside; that Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado be ordered to
return the said parcels of land; that Vicente Galang be compelled to record in the
registry of deeds the reservable character of this land and to execute a mortgage to
secure its value. The complaint was dismissed.
Held:
The provisions regarding a reservation by the widowed spouse in Article 968 are also
applicable to the reservation known as troncal referred to in Article 811.
Article 975 permits the sale of reservable property by the widower, after contracting a
second marriage, subject, however, to the reservation as a resolutory condition, in
case, at the time of the death of the vendor bound to make the reservation, there
should be legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Mortgage Law.
According to the foregoing, the sales made by Vicente Galang (who was bound to
make the reservation) of the three parcels of land, which are reservable property, in
favor of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, cannot be set aside unless the resolutory
condition imposed by the reservation shall have occurred, which is not the case here.
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente
Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the registry of
deeds their reservable character; neither can he affect the fee simple, which does not
belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the
said land in good faith, free of all incumbrances.

13

As already intimated, the law relating to the reservation by the widowed spouse in
Article 968 is applicable to the reserva troncal in Article 811. However, in the reserva
troncal, the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so
until the reservation takes place or is extinguished.
In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages: one, when the
property goes to the widower without being reservable; two, when the widower
contracts a second marriage, the property becomes reservable. These two stages
affect differently transfers that may be made of the property.
If the property is sold during the 1 st stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely
free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during
the 2nd stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the
purchaser subject to the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law.
This is why the law provides that should the property be sold before it becomes
reservable, or before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to
secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so
that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for whom the
reservation is made may be assured.
This mortgage is not required by law when the sale is made after the reservation has
arisen because the reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to the
contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers.
Thus, the rules established for reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value
of the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable, are not applicable to
the reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in
character. A sale in the case of reserva troncal might be analogous to a sale made by
the widower after contracting a second marriage in the case of reservation by the
widowed spouse.

Reserva Troncal

Florentino v. Florentino (1919)

When Severina Faz died in 1908, she left in her will said property, together
with her own, to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes. However,
the reservable nature of such property was not lost.

Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, during his lifetime, married twice. The 1 st time, with
Antonia Faz de Leon, with whom he begot 9 children: Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion,
Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena.

The law so provides that ascendants do not inherit the reservable property,
but only its enjoyment, use or trust. The law imposes the obligation to
reserve and preserve the same for certain designated persons who, upon the
death of the said ascendants-reservists, (taking into consideration the nature
of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said
property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs.

On becoming a widower, he married the 2nd time with Severina Faz de Leon, with whom
he had 2 children: Mercedes and Apolonio III.
On January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio II executed a will instituting as his
universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina
Faz; he declared that all his property should be divided among all of his children of
both marriages.
Apolonio III died in 1891; his mother, Severina Faz, succeeded to all his property.
Severina Faz died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino. As such heir, said daughter
took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, among those is
that property inherited from Apolonio II.

14

These designated persons (reservatarios) are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable property came.
2.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of
the ascendant who inherits and receives the same from his descendant.
Therefore, it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitime
of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property, only, in case all the relatives
of his descendant shall have died (reservista), in which case said reservable
property losses such character.

Issues:
1.

Whether or not the properties inherited by Severina Faz from her son,
Apolonio III, constitute reservable properties?

2.

Whether or not the testator can dispose by will the properties subject to
reserva troncal?

3.

Whether or not the reservista can choose which reservatorio can inherit the
property subject to reserva troncal?

Held:
1.

At the death of Apolonio II, under a will, his 11 children succeeded to the
inheritance he left. In 1891, Apolonio III died; he was succeeded by his
mother Severina Faz (included in the inheritance is the property in question).
That Apolonio III acquired the property in question by a lucrative title or by
inheritance from his father is without any doubt. Thus, when, on the death of
Apolonio III, without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the
hands of his mother, it became reservable property, with the object that the
same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio
II, the source of said property.

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are
living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant die
or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law,
and the ascendant heir can transmit it at his death to his legitimate
successors or testamentary heirs.
If this property was clothed with the character and condition of reservable
property when Severina Faz inherited the same from her son Apolonio III, she
did not acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of
usufruct or of fiduciary, with the necessary obligation to preserve and to
deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's
relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes.
With full right, Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her
own property in favor of her only living daughter as forced heiress. But
whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property
received from her son Apolonio III, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own.

Reserva Troncal

3.

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there

are relatives of the descendant within the 3 rd degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the
one more remote.
There are then 7 "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property
left at the death of Apolonio III:
a.

the 3 children of the 1st marriage of Apolonio II - Encarnacion, Gabriel,

Magdalena;

b.

the other 3 children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro, represented by their own
12 children respectively; and

c.

Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by 2nd marriage.

All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the
3rd degree (4 of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining 12 being his
nephews as they are the children of his 3 half-brothers). As the first 4 are his
relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other 12 are such
by representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the
property.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista
Severina, took possession of the property in question, same did not pass
into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that Mercedes is not the
only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the
principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and
nephews, relatives within the third degree should be deprived of portions of
the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reservee, to
one-seventh of the properties. The other six-sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Obiter: On the question of right of representation

The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claming as a reservatario
of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which such property came.

15

Thus, there is a right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the
third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person
from whom the reservable property came. These reservatarios have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said
deceased person and relatives, within the third degree.

Reserva Troncal

Nieva v. Alcala (1920)

Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Juliana died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from
her ab intestate, the parcels of land in question.
Alfeo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thus, the lands passed to his
father, Francisco, by intestate succession. Thereafter, Francisco married Manuela
Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo.

16

succeed the natural child and vice versa, from which it must be deduced that natural
parents neither have the right to inherit from legitimate ones; the law in the article
cited establishes a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family
shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family."
Scaevola, arrives at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es
privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 i6 a privilege of the
legitimate family.)"
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

Francisco died on August 3, 1914, whereupon his widow and son took possession of
the lands in question.

"A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such
children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child."

On September 30, 1915, Segunda, as acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana,

instituted the present action for the purpose of recovering from the parcels of land in
question, invoking the article 811 of the Civil Code.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagrant violation of the express provisions
of the foregoing article (943).

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the 3 rd degree is entitled to the reserva
troncal?
Held:
Manresa, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established,
says:
"Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. - In the interpretation of
article 811 the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
"It treats of blood relationship It could not be otherwise, because relationship by
affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage,
and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of
one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
"It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve is a legitimate
ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same
legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from
which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that
line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to
protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents of the foral
law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to