PROGRESSIVE

DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD
MARKET, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 123555.
January 22, 1999.]
Angara Abello Concepcion Regala for petitioner. Tomas
Carmelo T. Araneta for private respondent.
FACTS:
Private respondent, Westin Seafood Market, Inc., failed
to pay its rentals amounting to P8,608,284.66.
Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach
of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express
authority granted petitioner under the lease
agreement,
petitioner
repossessed
the
leased
premises.
This prompted private respondent to file a complaint
against petitioner for forcible entry with damages
before the MTC of Quezon City. This case was still
pending before the MTC when private respondent
instituted before the RTC of Quezon City another action
for damages against petitioner, which the latter moved
to dismiss on the ground of litis pendencia and forum
shopping to no avail. The Court of Appeals also
dismissed his special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition due to the failure of petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration of the RTC order. Hence,
petitioner found its way to the Supreme Court on
petition for review oncertiorari. CaEATI
ISSUE:

May the lessee which instituted before the

Metropolitan Trial Court an action for forcible
entry with damages against its lessor file a
separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against
the same lessor for moral and exemplary
damages plus actual and compensatory damages
based on the same forcible entry?

HELD:
NO.
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
any person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, together with damages and costs. The
mandate under this rule is categorical: that all
cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall
be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which
shall include not only the plea for restoration of
possession but also all claims for damages and
costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no
claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer may be filed separately and
independently of the claim for restoration of
possession.
CAUSE OF ACTION; CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING
IN CASE AT BAR AROSE FROM ONLY ONE CAUSE
OF ACTION.

It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the

Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may
not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available
as a ground for the dismissal of the other or
others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2
as the act of omission by which a party violates a right
of another. These premises obtaining, there is no
question at all that private respondent's cause of
action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for
damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of
the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein,
from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the
restoration of possession and demand for actual
damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand
for damages with the RTC both arise from the same
cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner
into the leased premises.
The SC directed the RTC of Quezon City to dismiss the
complaint for damages filed before it by private
respondent on the ground of forum shopping and for
unduly splitting a single cause of action which run
counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits.
OTHERS:
RE: WON special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition must be dismissed due to the failure
of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration
of the RTC orde
YES. The Supreme Court found merit to the petition.
The Court held that while generally a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed before resorting
to certiorari in order to give the lower court an
opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it, this rule
admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances of the case. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing
of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when
the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the error
is patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions
raised
on certiorari are
those
already
squarely
presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
RE: FORUM SHOPPING
In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages
with the RTC, petitioner raised the ground that another
action for forcible entry was pending at the METC
between the same parties involving the same matter
and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the
same
issue
was
elevated
by
petitioner
on
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under
the
prevailing
circumstance,
any
motion
for
reconsideration of the trial court would have been a
pointless exercise.
The highest Court also directed the RTC of Quezon City
to dismiss the complaint for damages filed before it by
private respondent on the ground of forum shopping
and for unduly splitting a single cause of action
which run counter to the rule against multiplicity of
suits.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI;

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE FILED
BEFORE RESORTING THERETO; EXCEPTIONS. While
generally a motion for reconsideration first be filed
before resorting to certiorariin order to give the lower
court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it,
this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be
applied without considering the circumstances of the
case. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before
availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine que
non when the issue raised is one purely of law, or
where the error is patent or the disputed order is void
or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as
those already squarely presented to and passed upon
by the lower court. In its motion for dismissal of the
action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the
ground that another action for forcible entry was
pending at the MeTC between the same parties
involving the same matter and cause of action.
Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was
elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance,
any motion for reconsideration of the trial court would
have been a pointless exercise.
2. ID.; ID.; FORCIBLE ENTRY OR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER; NO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES ARISING
THERETO MAY BE FILED SEPARATELY AND
INDEPENDENTLY OF CLAIM FOR RESTORATION OF
POSSESSION. Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court provides that any person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
together with damages and costs. The mandate
under this rule is categorical: that all cases for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed
before the Municipal Trial Court which shall
include not only the plea for restoration of
possession but also all claims for damages and
costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no
claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer may be filed separately and
independently of the claim for restoration of
possession.
3. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES.
Res adjudicata requires that there must be between
the action sought to be dismissed and the other action
the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at
least such as representing the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c)
the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars should
be such that any judgment which may be rendered on
the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CIRCUMSTANCES
OBTAINING IN CASE AT BAR AROSE FROM ONLY
ONE CAUSE OF ACTION. It is likewise basic under
Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that a party may not institute more than one
suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the
same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the

basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a

judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the other or others. "Cause
of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of
omission by which a party violates a right of another.
These premises obtaining, there is no question at all
that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible
entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged
illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by
the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs
arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and
demand for actual damages in the case before the
MeTC and the demand for damages with the RTC
both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the
forcible entry by petitioner into the leased premises.
5. ID.; ID.; MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS; CASE AT BAR
RUNS COUNTER THERETO. A comparative study
of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent
against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows
that
not
only
are
the
elements
of res
adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for
actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but
also that the claim for damages moral and
exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory
constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this
runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits,
the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.
6. ID.; ID.; SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION;
PURPOSE IS TO PROTECT DEFENDANT FROM
UNNECESSARY VEXATION. A claim cannot be divided
in such a way that a part of the amount of damages
may be recovered in one case and the rest, in another.
In Bachrach v. Icarangal we explained that the rule was
aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the
same parties in regard to the same subject of the
controversy and to protect the defendant from
unnecessary vexation.Nemo debet bis vexari pro una
et eadem cause.
7. ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING COMMITTED IN CASE AT
BAR. The records ineluctably show that the
complaint lodged by private respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no
certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others
the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the
absence of the required certification. The amended
complaint, as well as the second and third amended
complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably
stating that there was no other action pending
between the parties involving the same cause of action
although there was actually a forcible entry case
pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its
admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious
that private respondent was indulging in forum
shopping. While private respondent conveniently failed
to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages
in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry, the
fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem
was being duplicated in the second case. This is a
compelling reason to dismiss the second case. IaHSCc
DBP v SPS CASTILLO, August 17, 2011
FACTS:

Corazon Zarate Romero and his brother Gonzalo Zarate coowned a property covered, located in Dagupan City,Province of Pangasinan.
It appears that sometime in 1975, Corazon and Gonzalo obtained
a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As
collateral, they executed a real estate mortgage [ over the subject property in
favor of DBP. On the alleged failure of the two borrowers to pay their
amortizations, DBP foreclosed the real estate mortgage on September 15,
1983. Purportedly, no redemption was made within one year, and thus, DBP
consolidated ownership over the subject property.

On June 23, 1999, DBP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
but was dismissed on procedural grounds (filed beyond the sixty (60)-day
reglementary period). e CA noted that as regards the third order, DBP was
notified of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the December 14,
1998 Order on March 18, 1999 and thus only had until May 17, 1999 to
question the same. The CA further stated that DBPs subsequent filing of its
Answer to the complaint rendered its motion to dismiss moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1.

In March 1993, when Corazon passed away, her sole heir, her
daughter respondent Cristina Trinidad Zarate Romero, asserted ownership
over the subject property to the extent of one-half. However, respondent
discovered that the property was already registered as early as June 13,
1989 in the name of DBP under TCT No. 54142, with TCT No 10070 in the
names of her mother and uncle already cancelled.

2.
HELD:
1.

Respondent filed before RTC a complaint for reconveyance,

quieting of title and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent DBP from conducting any
auction sale on the subject property during the pendency of the
case. Respondent claimed that her uncle and DBP conspired in committing
fraudulent acts relative to their true transaction and concealed the same from
her mother, thereby depriving her of her right of redemption.
The RTC, , issued TRO restraining DBP from proceeding with its
scheduled auction of the disputed property.
DBP moved to lift the TRO arguing that it violates Section 2 of PD
No. 385 which prohibits the issuance of a restraining order, temporary or
permanent, against government financing institutions like DBP to enjoin any
action taken pursuant to the mandatory foreclosure clause of the decree.
RTC denied DBPs motion to lift the TRO and granted
respondents plea for an injunctive writ.
DBP moved to reconsider the December 14, 1998 Order and at
the same time sought the dismissal of respondents complaint on the
sole ground that the same states no cause of action
RTC denied DBPs motion for reconsideration of the denial of its
motion for the lifting of the TRO. The RTC likewise denied in the same order
DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint, and ordered DBP to file an answer.

On April 20, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying DBPs motion
for reconsideration of its March 8, 1999 Order. The RTC in the same order
emphasized that DBP already filed an answer thereby rendering the motion
to dismiss moot and academic.
CAs RULING

NO. As to DBPs motion to dismiss the complaint, we agree with the RTC
and CA that the same should be denied, but not for the reason cited by
said courts that it has been rendered moot and academic by DBPs filing
of its answer but because the same lacks merit. Contrary to DBPs
submission, a perusal of the allegations of the complaint clearly
reveals respondents cause of action against DBP. The complaint
states.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates

a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the
right of the plaintiff. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.
Evidently, all the above elements of a cause of action are alleged
in the complaint: (1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject
property foreclosed premised on the fact that she is the sole heir of one of
the owners who is entitled to the right of redemption; (2) the correlative
obligation of defendant DBP, as the foreclosing entity, to respect such right of
redemption; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right, i.e., the act of DBP and its co-defendant Zarate to cause the
ostensible foreclosure of the subject property and the subsequent execution
of a deed of conditional sale between the defendants even prior to the lapse
of redemption period to deprive respondents mother of her right over the
property.
2.

DBP moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss. But

even before the RTC could resolve said motion, DBP filed its Answer on April
5, 1999. A manifestation was later filed by DBP indicating that the answer it
filed was a mere cautionary measure or what is known as an answer ad
cautelam and thus without prejudice to any right of action it may take and
without any waiver of any of the grounds for the dismissal of the complaint
and any favorable resolution or order that a superior court may issue
hereinafter.

WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a

cause of action
WON petition for certiorari was filed out of time

YES. The petition for certiorari assailing the orders pertaining to the
grant of the TRO and the writ of injunction were filed out of time. Notice
of the issuance of the TRO was received by DBP on the same day it was
granted, November 24, 1998; thus, the petition for certiorari should have
been filed not later than January 23, 1999. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the writ of injunction, on the other
hand, was received by DBP on March 18, 1999 and thus, it had only until
May 17, 1999 to file the petition for certiorari. DBP, however, filed its
petition only on June 23, 1999.

TACAY VS. RTC TAGUM

FACTS:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the
RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3
defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.
Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The

previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy
the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to use the
property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay
reasonable
rentals
therefore,
but
such
were
refused.

maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the

personal property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the
personal property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each

defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and
exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars
the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case.

WON Circular No. 7 can be invoked (Manchester Doctrine) - NO

The Motions to Dismiss were denied by Judge Matas but the claims for
damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts.
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209
were also denied in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial
Fernandez. Thus, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas
and Fernandez in the rendition of the Orders, the defendants filed a Joint
Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining
order against the RTC.
Petitioners Contention:
They re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to
state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the
Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in
question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted
the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to
expunge the claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of action for
"reivindicatoria"
remain
for
trial"
by
itself.
ISSUE:
WoN the Court has not acquired jurisdiction of the case for failure to state the
amounts being claimed as actual, moral, and nominal damages
RULING:
NO.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as
actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions
are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are principally for
recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion
publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of
actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly
arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and
regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for
recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de
possesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of, or the
foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property - in other words, a real
action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying
claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an
action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
LECTURE
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." 14 The rule
applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be
worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even where
the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the
amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's
jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g., actions simply for
recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or actions in admiralty and

Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked as authority
for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the
doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
appeals, has but limited application to said actions.. Moreover, the rules
therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court's
subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et
al.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit
from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the amount of
damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other purposes
than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the
docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee."
The following rules were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
SUN INSURANCE DOCTRINE
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,

answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not
been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent
"amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being
authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a
new rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the
pleading - i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading-as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.

action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the
action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims
for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each
item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the
relevant prescriptive period.

Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the
basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the property in
litigation or the value of the estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other words,
as already above intimated, actions or proceedings involving real property, in
which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction,
account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and
there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery
of money and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount
of the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside from being
the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees). 19

Facts:

CERVANTES V. CA

On March 27, 1989, private respondent PAL issued to herein petitioner

Nicholas Cervantes a round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los AngelesHonolulu-Manila, which is valid until March 27, 1990. On March 23, 1990,
petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles, he immediately booked a
flight to Manila, which was confirmed on April 2. Upon learning that the plane
would make a stop-over in San Francisco, and because he would be there
on April 2, petitioner made arrangements to board in San Francisco. On April
2, he was not allowed to board due to the expiration of his ticket.

TACAY DOCTRINE:
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the
docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."

He filed a complaint for damages, and for breach of contract of carriage with
the RTC but was dismissed for lack of merit. CA upheld the dismissal of the
case. Petitioner came to the SC via Petition for Review.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket
extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket

Two situations may arise.

(2) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper

One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely
for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts
being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although
as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint
and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become
time-barred.

Held:

The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim,
but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the
court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed
fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is
cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless
in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the
right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages
as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of
the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid
at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the
fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving
real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the

(1) From the facts, it can be gleaned that the petitioner was fully aware that
there was a need to send a letter to the legal counsel of PAL for the
extension of the period of validity of his ticket. Under Article 1898 11 of the
New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do
not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or
impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that
the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be
held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such
limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from
the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
(2) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that
PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to allow him to board its plane in San
Francisco. In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the
breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible
acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a
strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket, so much so that he
bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding of
bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What the
employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on
the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to
accommodate him with the use of subject ticket.
Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. Such kind of
damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,

and the existence of bad faith is established. The wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only
if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent
manner. Here, there is no showing that PAL acted in such a manner. An
award for attorney's fees is also improper.
May 4, 2010
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents.
Villarama, Jr. J

SUMMARY: Cordero was an exclusive distributor of a shipping company is

Brisbane. After incurring travel expenses and closing his first deal with a
Cordero, he found out that the latter was directly dealing with the shipping
company for the second transaction, cutting off his commissions. Worse, his
lawyers also connived with the client and the shipping company to take him
out of the picture. He sued them all for conspiring in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights. The SC held
that the existence of the contract and knowledge by the alleged interferers
was not disputed. As to the legal justification, it found that while the motive
was to reduce the price of the transaction, the bounds of permissible
financial interest was transgressed, since Go already incurred expenses in
closing the deal, and the lawyers still demanded their cut from him, despite
going behind his back in procuring another deal.
Doctrine: The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid
contract, (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract, and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
As to the third element, to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the
defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely
impure reasons to injure the plaintiff.
Notes: Without So Ping Bun v. CA and Lagon v. CA, this would have been a
case for tortious interference. The SC had to rely in Article 19, to uphold its
ruling that there was tortious interference. All of this when Article 1314 does
not in itself require malice.

CAST: (lol)
Mortimer F. Cordero Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana)
Tony Robinson an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is
the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Allan C. Go owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single
proprietorship
Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson lawyers of Go
FACTS:

1996, Cordero ventured into the business of marketing interisland passenger vessels
o After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to
meet Robinson.
June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents
appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA
catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Phils
o As exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to
prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminum Passenger
catamaran known as the SEACAT 25

After negotiations with Gos lawyers, Cordero was able to close a

deal for the purchase of 2 SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the MOA
(1997)
o They executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one
1 high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of
US$1,465,512.00
o Per agreement between, Cordero shall receive
commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of
the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel
Cordero made 2 trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Australia, and on 1
occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to
monitor the progress of the building of the vessel
o He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel
accommodations, transportation and entertainment
during these trips
o also spent for long distance telephone calls to
Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing
directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua
of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship
engine for the first SEACAT 25
o Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the
requested quotation of the second engine to the Park
Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying
o Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm
the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while
Robinson refused to answer his calls
o Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify
matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and
Landicho were already there in Brisbane
negotiating for the second sale

Despite repeated follow-up calls, no

explanation was given by Robinson, Go,
Landicho and Tecson who even made
Cordero believe there would be no further
sale between AFFA and ACG Express
Liner.
In a handwritten letter, Cordero informed Go that such act of
dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive
distributorship and demanded that they respect the same.
o Corderos lawyer, Atty. Tabujara, also wrote ACG
Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and
misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance
with his lawyers in breach of Corderos exclusive
distributorship appointment
o Having been apprised of Corderos demand letter, the
lawyers of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to
Corderos lawyers asserting that the appointment of
Cordero as AFFAs distributor was for the purpose
of 1 transaction only and that the offer of exclusive
distributorship was already being revoked for
failure of Cordero to return the draft agreement within
a reasonable time.
Cordero later testified that, on the same day, Landicho talked to
him over the telephone and offered to amicably settle the dispute
o Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor
his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to purchase
all vessels for ACG Express Liner through him for the
next three (3) years.
Landicho set up a meeting with Cordero at Mactan Island Resort
Hotel lobby.
o However, only Landicho and Tecson came
o lawyers proposed that they will convince Go to pay him
US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a
cut of 20%

so it was agreed that the lawyers will give Cordero a

weekly status report and that the matter will be settled
amicably within 3-4 wks
Cordero would give Landicho and Tecson their respective
commission, or cuts from his own commission
o Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses
shouldered by Cordero for Landichos airline tickets,
transportation, food and hotel accommodations for the
trip to Australia.
o However, no such weekly status report was made
as it turned out that they had no intention to do so
and were just buying time as the catamaran vessel
was due to arrive from Australia.
Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on
misdeclaration and undervaluation
o an Alert Order was issued by BOC for the vessel which
in fact arrived on July 17, 1998
o Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had conspired
to undervalue the vessel by around US$500,000.00
Cordero instituted a Civil Case seeking to hold Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for
conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his
rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of
unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount
of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the
second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him
actual, moral and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00
representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia,
telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFAs
untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement
o Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
Cordero presented documentary evidence including photographs
of the meeting with Landicho, Tecson and Atty. Tabujara at
Shangri-la, photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go
with his family, Robinson and Landicho, and also various
documents, communications, vouchers and bank transmittals.
o

Petitioner:

It was Cordero who stopped communicating.

o He was not doing his part in making progress status
reports that Go had to engage the services of
Landicho to fly to Australia to handle matters.

As to the inquiry for a Wartsila ship engine, Cordero

misinterpreted this as indication that Go was buying a second
vessel.

The lawyers had no transaction with Cordero.

o As to the supposed meeting, this was due to the
malicious demand of Cordero to be given
US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the
media the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the
BOC.

In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his

commission for the sale of the second vessel under the 1997
MOA considering the termination of his authority by AFFAs
lawyers on 1998.
RTC QC: in favor of Cordero. (P16,291,352.43) as actual damages with
legal interest from 25 June 1998 until fully paid; P1M as moral damages;
P1M as exemplary damages; P1M as attys fees.
CA: AFFIRMED TC, holding:

Cordero (not Pamana) was appointed by AFFA as the exclusive

distributor in the Phils. as evidenced by the Certification issued by
Robinson, that Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero, and
the commissions were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero.

That this distributorship was not limited to the sale of

one catamaran
He is entitled to a commission of 22.43%
o However, Cordero is entitled only to commission for
the sale of the first catamaran obtained through his
efforts.
Cordero is entitled to damages for the breach of his exclusive
distributorship agreement with AFFA.
o As to the P800,000.00 representing expenses incurred
(airfair, phonebills, entertainment, etc.) by Cordero: no
basis for such award, the same being the logical and
necessary consequences in the field of sales and
distribution.
CA reduced the awards to P500,000.00, P300,000.00 and
P50,000.00, respectively.
Appellants were held solidarily liable pursuant to the provisions of
Article 1207 in relation to Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22.
o

BOTH parties appealed

Petitioner:

Cordero is not the real party-in-interest, it should be Pamana

No breach in the alleged exclusive distributorship agreement.

They are not liable for unpaid commissions (and also damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses) for it was Robinson who
undertook to pay Cordero supposed commissions.

Even so, they should not be held solidarily liable with Robinson
and AFFA
Respondent:

CA should have sustained TCs award of actual damages for his

commission for the second vessel, since there is sufficient
evidence to prove that there was a second sale of a vessel.
o 1997 MOA provides that go was contractually bound to
buy two (2) vessels from AFFA.
o Gos position paper filed before BOC, admits under
oath that he had indeed purchased a second vessel
from AFFA.
o Go admitted in their pre-trial brief that they had
purchased a second vessel.

He is entitled to his commissions for the second vessel, since it

was his efforts which actually facilitated and set-up the transaction
for Go.

CA should have sustained original amount of consequential

damages awarded by TC considering gos bad faith and
fraudulent conduct
ISSUES:
1
WoN Cordero has a cause of action against Go et al (YES)
2
WoN Go can be held liable even if they are not parties to the
contract (YES)
3
WoN Go et als interference was unjustified (YES)
4
WoN Go et als liability with Robinson and AFFA is solidary (YES)
5
WoN awards justified (YES)
HELD: CA AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: moral and exemplary damages
are reduced to P300,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively
RATIO:
1

Cordero has cause of action

Cordero is the exclusive distributor and not Pamana (adopted
CAs ratio) AND Cordero has proprietary rights under the
agreement that he may protect.
Yu v. CA: the right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to
reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which
a party may protect.

rights granted not be rendered illusory by interposing a person to

obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was
conceptualized.
o Cordero was no longer informed and had clearly been
cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first
SEACAT 25
o was not paid the balance of his commission
o Go et al directly dealt with Robinson behind Corderos
back
o Worse, AFFA even terminated his exclusive dealership
insisting that his services were engaged for only 1
transaction.
GO et al: this case not similar to Yu v.CA

no conclusive proof that they actually purchased a second

SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA

hence there was no violation of the exclusive distributorship

agreement
SC: YES, there is NO sufficient evidence of second purchase. BUT this will
not absolve Go et al from liability.

They clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero.

Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid the balance of his

commission and his exclusive distributorship was revoked.
2. Go et al can still be held liable (despite Gos averments that it was
AFFAs obligation and not theirs)
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued
for breach of contract because only parties can breach
contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third
person not for breach but for inducing another to commit
such breach.
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall
be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

The elements of tort interference are:

(1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract;
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.

The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed

o Go et al were clearly aware of the contract between
Cordero and AFFA
o Landicho and Tecson aware of Corderos authority,
which can be gleaned from their act of immediately
furnishing him with copies of bank transmittals
everytime Go remits payment to Robinson
o (as to 3rd element, see below)
3. interference unjustified
as enunciated and reiterated in So Ping Bun v. CA:

A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the
enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may pertain to
a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or
violate his undertaking under a contract.

General rule: justified interference with the business relations

of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself
o It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives
o He acts in self-protection in this case

NOT necessary that the interferers interest

outweigh that of the party whose rights are
invaded

NOT necessary that an individual acts

under an economic interest that is
substantial, not merely de minimis

Unjustified interference: sole motive is to cause harm to the other

o induce refers to situations where a person causes
another to choose one course of conduct by
persuasion or intimidation
o Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in
response to duty

implies an intention to do ulterior and

unjustifiable harm

Malice is bad faith or bad motive

Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve a

person of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing
breach of existing ones.
o Gilchrist vs. Cuddy: Not a malicious interferer if there is
no malice and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in
a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives
o Lagon v. CA: to sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with
malice or must have been driven by purely impure
reasons to injure the plaintiff (unjustified interference)
In this case!

act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA

to enter into another contract to obtain a lower price for the
second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual
obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and
unceremonious termination of Corderos appointment as
exclusive distributor

such act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper

business interest rather than in wrongful motives (Gilchrist)
o however! it was demonstrated that Go et al
transgressed the bounds of permissible financial
interest to benefit themselves at the expense of
Cordero
o they furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero
had worked hard to close the deal for them
o worst, even as Go et al secretly negotiated with
Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel,
Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and
receive from Cordero their commission or cut from
Corderos own earned commission from the first sale

lawyers failed to refute the receipts signed

by them
o They clearly connived not only in ensuring that
Cordero would have no participation in the second
sale, but also that he would not be paid the balance of
his commission

This, despite their knowledge that it was

commission already earned by and due to
Cordero
o The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho
to act with fairness, honesty and good faith, to the
prejudice of Cordero, is further proscribed by CC
Art. 19 (complemented with 21)
Go et al: There was another contract superseding the 1997 MOA and that
Cordero merely misinterpreted the inquiry on engine price.
SC: allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought

It appears that the purported second contract stating a lower price

of US$1,150,000.00 (not US$1,465,512.00) was only presented
before the BOC to show that the vessel imported was not
undervalued by almost US$500,000.00
4. solidarily liable

Conformably with NCC 2194, the responsibility of two or more

persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary

Obligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary.

5. moral damages may be recovered (NCC 2219)

Go et al acted in bad faith

Exemplary damages is also in order

o However, RTC and CA awards excessive
o Awards reduced
VILLA V IBANEZ G.R. No. L-4313

March 20, 1951

FACTS:
In pursuance of his appointment by the then Secretary of Justice Ricardo
Nepomuceno , as special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the
cases of city government officials or employees he had investigated, Atty.
Abelardo Subido (chief of the division of investigation in the office of the
mayor of the City of Manila), subscribed, swore to and presented an
information against Pedro P. Villa for falsification of a payroll of the division of
veterinary service, Manila health department.
Attorney Subido's authority to file information was thereafter challenged by
the accused but was sustained by Judge Fidel Ibaez. Hence petitioner filed
a complaint for certiorari, which is in reality a petition for prohibition and will
be so regarded.
ISSUE:
WON Atty Subido is disqualified for appointment as special counsel
WON petitioner may question lack of jurisdiction even after he has pleaded
to the informatiom

information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the

pleading are concerned. But by clear implication it not by express provision
of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent's actuations goes
to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in
the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
The petition will therefore be granted and the respondent judge ordered to
desist from proceeding with criminal case No. 11963 upon the information
filed by Attorney Abelardo Subido, without costs.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION of THE RULES
LLAMAS v. CA
G.R. No. 149588/ AUG. 16, 2010 / NACHURA, J./CRIMPRO-Annulment of
Judgments by CA: Suspension of technical rules, pro hac vice /PSPAMBID
NATURE

Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari,

with Preliminary Injunction

PETITIONERS

Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas

RESPONDENTS

Court of Appeals, Branch 66 of the RTC in Makati

City and the People of the Philippines

HELD:
1

YES. Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, reads as follows:
SEC. 189. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of
Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from
his office or a competent person not in the public service,
temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the
discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as
might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in Lo Cham
vs. Ocampo et al.,1 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs.
Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092)2. But in those cases, the
appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or
offices under the Department of Justice, and were rightly considered
subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of
section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above
decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the
Department of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayor's office. For this
reason he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for appointment to the
post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be
either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so manifest
from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to
preclude construction. And the limitation of the range of choice in the
appointment or designation is not without reason.

YES
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to
quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the

SUMMARY. Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas were convicted of other fo

Petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the court after they have been convicted, and
proceedings be annulled.
DOCTRINE. The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cas

FACTS.
On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with
the crime of "other forms of swindling" penalized by Article 316, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
o Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas sold their
property in Paranaque to Conrado P. Avila, representing it
tobe free from all liens and encumbrances while it was
leased to the Rural Bank of Imus.
30 June 1994: RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
19 February 1999: CA affirmed decision of the trial court, and on 22
December 1999 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
11 February 2000: Petitioners filed a petition for review, rejected by the SC
for failure to state material dates
28 June 2000: SC denied subsequent motion for reconsideration; judgment
of conviction final and executory
On April 27, 2001, Petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas was arrested by the police
but they failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was
nowhere to be found
On July 16, 2001, Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of
arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the motion, petitioners
instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the
annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions

 The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the

September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for
reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.

The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
action because at the time of the filing of the information, its
jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not
more than P4,000.00.

ISSUES & RATIO.

DECISION.
1. Whether or not the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC
and CA since the courts did not take any action when they (the
petitioners) raised the issue of jurisdiction. NO.

Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there

being no basis in law or in the rules.

In People v. Bitanga the Court explained that the remedy of

annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases:
o Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court 1, limits the
scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment. The
remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment
being questioned was rendered in a criminal case.
o The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure2 itself
does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47
from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have
suppletory application to criminal cases.

2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal case. YES.

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the

established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of
the court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the
information, the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang
129, approved on August 14, 1981

the established rule is that the statute in force (in this case the
statute was BP 1293) at the time of the commencement of the
action determines the jurisdiction of the court

The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, which has a duration of 1
month and 1 day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the
value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value. Here, the imposable fine is P12,895.00

Petition DENIED.
SARMIENTO V. ZARATAN
Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against
respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. ( MeTC ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff monthly rentals and
to vacate the premises.)
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the
RTC of Quezon City.
In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her
memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days
from receipt.
Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had
until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3
June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his
failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for
the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to
storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because
the wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the
RTC dismissed the appeal for failure to submit the required memorandum
within the prescribed period.4

1 Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of

Appealed Case, through counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry
Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. 298).
Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, she had fifteen (15) days or until June 3, 2003
within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further
appears on record, however, the required Memorandum was
filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 (Record, p.
623), or six (6) days beyond the expiration of the aforesaid
fifteen day period.

2 Sec. 18. Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal ProcedureApplication of

certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to
46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts

shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter.x x x x
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of

Appeals, which was granted the petition of respondent. The appellate court
nullified and set aside Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of
respondents appeal. Consequently, respondents appeal memorandum was
admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence,
petioner filed a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.
Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of
Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion
is a worthless piece of paper.
Held:
NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a
Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on
Appeal in the RTC, the latters motion is a worthless piece of paper with no
legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with
the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of the required docket fees.
However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she filed
a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days
within which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of
Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice
requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a
Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to
resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand
that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The threeday notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to
avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study
and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand
that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity
to be heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to
have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the
grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the
present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially
complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the
Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the
merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or
circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in

question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks
to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to
respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm
and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim
likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears,
respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and
the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended
period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into
the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the
possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a
litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the
latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to
the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the
absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As
a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist
the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that
his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said
that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and
also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception
to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the resulting
delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
ASIAN SPIRIT AIRLINES v SPS BAUTISTA
Facts:
The Spouses Benjamin and Anna Marie Bautista filed a complaint, in behalf
of their son Karl Bautista and Gloria Pomera, against the Asian Spirit Airlines
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for breach of contract and damages.
After trial, the court rendered a decision on March 24, 2003 in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant. Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED
Defendants filed MR but was dismissed. Defendant appealed. The appellate
court directed the defendant-appellant to file its brief as appellant within fortyfive (45) days from notice thereof. The defendant-appellant received its copy
of the resolution on December 17, 2003. Thus, it had until January 31, 2004
within which to file its brief. However, the defendant-appellant failed to file its
appellants brief. On March 3, 2004, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a
Manifestation and Motion for the dismissal of the appeal of the defendantappellant for its failure to file its brief.
On March 10, 2004, the defendant-appellant filed an unverified Motion to
Admit Attached Appellants Brief. The plaintiffs-appellees opposed the
motion. On April 23, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the motion of
the defendant-appellant and granting the motion of the plaintiffs-appellees,
and ordered the appeal of the defendant-appellant dismissed. The
defendant-appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said
resolution but on July 16, 2004, the appellate court denied the said motion
for lack of merit.
The defendant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review
on certiorari with SC, asserting that the CA gravely erred in strictly
applying the provisions of the rules of court on dismissal of appeal to

petitioners appeal which is contrary to the mandated precept of liberal

construction.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

WoN the appeal must be dismissed

the rules must be relaxed

HELD:
1.

YES
Under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, an
appeal may be dismissed by the CA on its own motion or that of the appellee
for failure of the appellant to file its brief within the time provided by Section
7, Rule 44 of the said Rules. The petitioner had until January 31, 2004 within
which to file its brief but failed to do so. The only excuse of the petitioner for
its failure to file its brief was the claim of its counsel in the said Motion for
Leave to Admit, thus:
1. The filing of the Appellants Brief is due on January 31, 2004. The notice
from the Honorable Court was received on December 17, 2003 and because
of the holiday season at that time, the undersigned counsel gave instruction
to his Secretary to file the usual Motion for Time asking for forty-five (45)
days from January 31, 2004 or until March 16, 2004.
2. The undersigned started to prepare the Appellants Brief bearing in mind
the new deadline.
3. It was only when the undersigned received the Manifestation of plaintiffs
on March 5, 2004 that he inquired with his secretary if the Manifestation of
counsel is true and she readily admitted that she failed to prepare and file
the Motion for Time.
The excuse contrived by the petitioners counsel is totally
unacceptable. We note that the motion of the petitioner is unverified.
Neither did the petitioner bother appending to its motion an affidavit of its
counsels secretary containing his/her explanation why he/she failed to file
the said motion for extension if there was such a motion in the first place.
The petitioner did not even bother appending to its Motion to Admit its motion
for extension to file brief which its counsels secretary allegedly failed to file in
the CA. Blaming its counsels unidentified secretary for its abject failure
to file its brief is a common practice for negligent lawyers to cover up
for their own negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude.
Such excuse is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the
Rules of Court.[ It bears stressing that it is the duty of counsel to adopt and
strictly maintain a system that insures that all pleadings should be filed and
duly served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do so, the negligence
of his secretary or clerk to file such pleading is imputable to the said counsel.
2.

NO
We agree with the petitioners contention that the rules of procedure may
be relaxed for the most persuasive reasons. But as this Court held
in Galang v. Court of Appeals.

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their

non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.[16]
In an avuncular case, we emphasized that:

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.

Courts and litigants alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And
while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of
the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. The instant case is no exception to this rule.
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to exempt the petitioner
from the effects of its failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail
of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do
so, the right to appeal is lost. More so, as in this case, where petitioner not
only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek
an extension of time for a cogent ground before the expiration of the time
sought to be extended.[18]
In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the
rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their
cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases
should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their
causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus,
not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be
better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice. In this case, however, such liberality in the
application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in
the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the
administration of justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.[21]
PETITION DENIED
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The CA was evidently not satisfied with the explanation by the petitioner.
Its action in this regard is not subject to review, for the Supreme Court cannot
interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of
a strict compliance with the periods for performing certain acts incident
to the appeal and the transgressions thereof, as a rule, would not be
tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded by subterfuges and
manufactured excuses and would ultimately become inutile. (Don Lino
Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-39124, Nov. 15, 1974).
This Honorable Court will be setting a bad example if it accepts the excuse
of the Petitioners counsel that he instructed his secretary to file the motion
for extension who, in turn, forgot to file it. Logic dictates that the Secretary
cannot release the request without the lawyers signature but still the basic
and simple prudence to follow it up by counsel leaves much to be
desired. Every lawyer may soon adopt this reasoning to justify non-filing
of the brief on time.[11]
G.R.

No.

153366:

November

17,

2010

CEBU BIONIC BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC. and LYDIA SIA, Petitioners, v.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE TO CHIP, PATRICIO
YAP
and
ROGER
BALILA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Robles entered into a mortgage contract with the DBP to create the

State Theatre Building in Talisay, Cebu. Upon completion, Rudy Robles

executed a contract of lease in favour of Cebu Bionic Builders Supply.
However, the spouses defaulted on their obligation to pay and DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. DBP sent a letter to Cebu Bionic that
if they were interested in leasing the facilities, they would have to pay DBP.
However,
nothing
came
from
these
correspondences.

as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.

DBP then invited parties to bid on the property. Initially, Cebu Bionic
submitted their interest in bidding, but the price that they gave was
insufficient. DBP then awarded the auction to Respondents To Chip, Yap and
Balila. In response to several demand letters by the Respondents, Cebu
Bionic filed a petition for preliminary injunction, cancellation of deed of
sale and specific performance against DBP with the RTC. Petitioners
then related that, without their knowledge, DBP sold the subject properties to
respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila. The sale was claimed to be simulated
and fictitious, as DBP still received rentals from petitioners until March
1991.By acquiring the subject properties, petitioners contended that DBP
was deemed to have assumed the contract of lease executed between them
and Rudy Robles. They alleged that the original leases clause of the Right of
First
Option
to
Buy
should
be
upheld.

The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. As
will be discussed further, this exception is attendant in the case at bar.

The trial court granted their complaint. The Court of Appeals similarly
upheld the decision of the trial court. Cebu Bionic filed a motion for entry
of judgment, but Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that they relied on the friend of their lawyer to personally file the MR,
but apparently did not. The court granted their MR, and reversed their
judgment before. Thus, the petitioners file the case (petition for review on
certiorari)
before
the
Supreme
Court.

1.

NO.
Indeed, the appellate courts Decision dated February 14, 2001 would have
ordinarily attained finality for failure of respondents to seasonably file their
Motion for Reconsideration thereon. However, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the higher interest of substantial justice will be better
served if respondents procedural lapse will be excused.
Verily, we had occasion to apply this liberality in the application of procedural
rules in Barnes v. Padilla[59] where we aptly declared that
The failure of the petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration
within the period fixed by law renders the decision final and
executory. Such failure carries with it the result that no court can
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. Phrased
elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land.

ISSUES:
1. WON ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW AND NOT OF FACT CAN BE RAISED
IN THE INSTANT PETITION BEFORE THIS HON. SUPREME COURT.
Respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila next argue that the instant
petition raises questions of fact, which are not allowed in a
petition for review on certiorari. They, therefore, submit that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court.
3.

WON THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING

RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DESPITE ITS
BEING FILED OUT OF TIME
Petitioners fault the CA for admitting the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision dated February 14, 2001, which
was filed by respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila more than six
months after receipt of the said decision. The motion was
eventually granted and the Court of Appeals issued its assailed
Amended Decision, ruling in favor of respondents

HELD:
1.

NO.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition
filed thereunder shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve

substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.[60]
In this case, what are involved are the property rights of the parties given
that, ultimately, the fundamental issue to be determined is who among the
petitioners and respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila has the better right to
purchase the subject properties. More importantly, the merits of the case
sufficiently called for the suspension of the rules in order to settle
conclusively the rights and obligations of the parties herein.
In essence, the questions that must be resolved are: 1) whether or not there
was a contract of lease between petitioners and DBP; 2) if in the affirmative,
whether or not this contract contained a right of first refusal in favor of
petitioners; and 3) whether or not respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila are
likewise bound by such right of first refusal.