Isthereanobligationtoobeythelaw?

Abstract. ThispapercriticallyassessesRonaldDworkinsargument
thatthereisageneralobligationtoobeythelaw,andthatitisan
associativeobligation,akintoobligationsoffamilyorfriendship.
I begin by drawing some distinctions between different ways laws
mightbethoughttoaffectthereasonsforactionwehave.Ithenset
outDworkinsargumentfortheclaimthatthedutytoobeythelawis
anassociativeobligation,andexplainthekindofreasonforactionthat
argument implies lawsgiveus. Dworkins argumententails thata
basicallyjustsocietyslawsalwaysprovidethosesubjecttothemwith
areasontoobey,thoughitmaybeoutweighedbyotherreasons.
Iargue,againstDworkin,thatpoliticalassociationsdonotrelevantly
resemble those associations, like families andfriendships,that give
risetogenuineassociativeobligations,andthatDworkinmisidentifies
thekindofreasonforactionanauthoritativedirectivegenerates.
Idefend,instead,aRazianaccountofthedutytoobey,andspellout
thecomplexkindofreasonthataccounttakeslawstoprovide.While
thisRazianargumentofferssupportforonlyaveryweakconception
of the obligation to obey the law, I argue that this conception is
nonethelessattractive.

InLawsEmpire,RonaldDworkinsetsupthefollowingproblem:apolitical
authority,orstate,isinthebusinessofensuringcompliancewithitsdictatesbymeans
oftheofficialuseofcoercivepower.Astateismorallylegitimateonlyifitis
justifiedinusingcoercionasameansofensuringcompliancewithitslaws.But,
Dworkininsists,theuseofsuchcoercionisjustifiedonlyifthereisageneralmoral
obligationtoobeythelaw.Thusanyargumentforthelegitimacyofthestatemust
demonstratetheexistenceofageneralobligationtoobeythelaw.1
Dworkinarguesthatthereareatleastpossiblelegitimatestates,becausethere
areattainablecircumstancesunderwhichsuchanobligationwouldobtain.The
obligationtoobeythelawis,accordingtoDworkin,anassociativeobligation.2He
definesassociativeobligationsasspecialresponsibilitiessocialpracticeattachesto
1

membershipinsomebiologicalorsocialgroup,liketheresponsibilitiesoffamilyor
friendsorneighbors.3Theyare,onDworkinsview,moralobligations:they
providemoralreasonsforaction.Partofthetaskofthispaperwillbetoidentify
exactlywhatkindofmoralreasonDworkintakeslawstogenerate.Iwillarguethat
Dworkin,bycategorizingtheobligationtoobeythelawasanassociative
obligation,misidentifiesthekindofmoralreasongiventousbylaws,andin
particular,therelationshipofthatreasontoourothermoralreasons.Iwilldefend,
instead,aversionofJosephRazsaccountofthekindofreasonsauthoritative
directivesgiveusforacting,andofferaRazianaccountofthedutytoobeythelaw.
RichardWasserstromidentifiesthreepositionsthatmightbeadopted
concerningthecharacteroftheobligationtoobeythelaw,whichIlltakeasa
jumpingoffpoint:
(1)Onehasanabsoluteobligationtoobeythelaw;disobedienceis
neverjustified.(2)Onehasanobligationtoobeythelawbutthis
obligationcanbeoverriddenbyconflictingobligations;disobedience
canbejustified,butonlybythepresenceofoutweighing
circumstances.(3)Onedoesnothaveaspecialobligationtoobeythe
law,butitisinfactusuallyobligatory,onothergrounds,todoso;
disobediencetothelawoftendoesturnouttobeunjustified.4
Therelationbetweenthesupposeddutytoobeyandourothermoralreasons
expressedby(1)isimprecise.(1)isclearlytoostrongifitimpliesthatobedienceto
thelawisalwaysobligatory,evenwhenthelawdemandsconductthatis
unquestionablyimmoral.Itcannotbethecasethatturninginarunawayslaveinthe
preCivilWarU.S.wasmorallyrequired,5orthatharboringaJewinNaziGermany
wasmorallyforbidden.Butif(1)ismerelyclaimingthatonehasanabsolutemoral
obligationtoobeythoselawsthatdemandactionswhichoneismorallyobligatedto

perform,itseemstautological:ofcoursewearemorallyobligatedtodowhatweare
morallyobligatedtodo.
(2)suggestsaclearerrelationbetweentheobligationtoobeythelawandour
othermoralobligations.Accordingto(2),theexistenceofalawalwaysprovidesa
moralreasontoactasthelawdemands,andthisreasonmustalwaysbetakenintothe
balanceofreasonswhendecidingwhattodo.Buttheobligationtoobeythelawneed
notgenerateawinningreasontoactasthelawdemands,becauseothermoralreasons
mightoutweighit.Onthisaccount,thelawrequiringtheturninginofrunaway
slavesprovidedamoralreasontoturninslaves,butareasonthatcould(andprobably
would)beoutweighedbyothermoralreasons(suchasreasonsnottoacton
prejudices,orreasonstohelpthoseinneed,orreasonstosaveliveswhenpossible).
(3)suggeststhatourobligationtoobeythelawridesonthebackofother
moralreasons,andthatwehavesuchanobligationonlyiftheseothermoralreasons
obtain.Theobligationtoobeythelaw,inotherwords,doesnotprovidean
independentmoralreasonofthesameorderasourothermoralreasons,tobeweighed
againstthem.Rather,itgainsitsweightonlyfromtheirweight.Eventhis
dependencerelationcantakeseveraldifferentforms.Theexistenceofalawmakes
leastdifferencetoourmoralobligationsifitsimplyreflectsobligationswehadbefore
thepassingofthelaw.Thelawagainstcommittingmurderisonesuchexample.It
wouldbeperversetosaythattheexistenceofalawagainstmurdermakesany
differencetowhatwe,whoaresubjecttoit,oughtmorallytodo.6
Manylawsmayhowevermakeadifferencetowhatweoughtmorallytodoby
meansofprovidingguidance.Safetyregulationsprovideanimportantandwide
rangingexampleofthis.Lawscontrollingdrugandhealthcarequality,settingsafety

standardsforcars,establishingtrafficregulations,andregulatingmanyotherareasof
ourlivesmakeuseofexpertknowledgenotavailabletomostpeople.Ofcourse,what
thebestcourseofactionisinaparticularcasehowfasttodriveonaparticularroad,
orwhichmedicinestogivetoasickchilddoesnotdependontheexistenceofthe
law;inthiscase,asinthemorestraightforwardcaseofmurder,thelawshouldreflect
thereasonsthatapplyanyway.Butitisarguablethatwesometimeshaveamoral
obligationtoobeylawsbasedonexpertise,insteadofactingdirectlyonour
evaluationofthereasonsthoselawsshouldreflect.Thismaybebecauseouractions
aremorelikelytocorrespondtothebalanceofmoralreasonsifwefollowthelaw
thanifwerelydirectlyonourownjudgment.Ifthisissometimesthecase,thenthe
lawhasmadeadifferencetowhatweoughttodo;fornowitissometimestruethat
weoughttoobeythelaw,regardlessofwhichcourseofactionweshouldhavetaken
intheabsenceofit.7,8
JosephRazhasdefendedsomethinglikethisaccountoftheobligationtoobey
thelaw.Thepreciserelationshipitsuggestsbetweenthemoralreasonsgeneratedby
lawsofthissortandourindependentmoralreasonsisacomplexone,andIwillhave
moretosayaboutitlateron.Forthetimebeing,Ishouldnotethatonthisaccount,it
willneverbethecasethatalawgeneratesanewmoralreasontodosomethingthat
obviouslyconflictswiththebalanceofourothermoralreasons.Thisisbecausealaw
cangenerateanewmoralreasononthisaccountonlyifwearemorelikelytoconform
tothebalanceofothermoralreasonsbyobeyingthelawthanbyactingonourown
judgment.Thisaccountwouldthereforecharacterizethecaseoftherunawayslaveor
theJewinNaziGermanydifferentlyfromaccount(2),discussedearlier.According
to(2),theexistenceofthelawprovidedareasontoconformouractionstothelaw

andthusareasonwithsomeweight,althoughitcouldbeoutweighedbyothermoral
reasons.OntheRazianaccount,alawthatclearlyrunscountertoourindependent
moralreasonsprovidesnomoralreasonatalltoconform.
IwillarguethatDworkinscharacterizationoftheobligationtoobeythelaw
asanassociativeobligationclassifiesthatobligationasofthekinddescribedby(2)
above.Thatis,Dworkinthinksthattheexistenceofalawinatruepolitical
community9givesusamoralreasontoperform(orrefrainfromperforming)theact
thelawprescribes(orprohibits)thatwedidnothavebeforetheexistenceofthelaw,
andthatshouldbebalancedagainstourothermoralreasons.Thisissuggestedbythe
wayinwhichDworkinsetsupthequestionofpoliticalobligationattheoutset.He
declareshimselftobeansweringthefollowingquestions:
Docitizenshavegenuinemoralobligationsjustinvirtueoflaw?Does
thefactthatalegislaturehasenactedsomerequirementinitselfgive
citizensamoralaswellasapracticalreasontoobey?Doesthatmoral
reasonholdevenforthosecitizenswhodisapproveofthelegislationor
thinkitwronginprinciple?10
Dworkinargues,negatively,thatotherleadingcandidatesforestablishingthe
obligationtoobeythelawfailtodoso,andpositively,thathisownconceptionofthat
obligationasanassociativeobligationsolvestheproblemsthattheothercandidates
encounter.
Dworkinconsidersthreealternativeexplanationsofthedutytoobeythelaw:
theargumentfromtacitconsent,thedutytosupportjustinstitutions,andthe
argumentfromfairplay.Heobjectstothefirstofthesethat
[c]onsentcannotbebindingonpeople,inthewaythisargument
requires,unlessitisgivenmorefreely,andwithmoregenuine
alternatechoice,thanjustbydecliningtobuildlifefromnothingunder
aforeignflag.11

Anydefenseofpoliticalobligationmustbeabletoexplainhowwecanbeboundeven
bylawstowhichwedidnotconsent,andwithwhichwedonotagree.Rawlsappeal
tothedutytosupportjustinstitutionsdoesnotdependonconsent,but,Dworkin
contends,
[thisduty]doesnottiepoliticalobligationsufficientlytightlytothe
particularcommunitytowhichthosewhohavetheobligationbelong;
itdoesnotshowwhyBritonshaveanyspecialdutytosupportthe
institutionsofBritain.12
Theargumentfromfairplayoffersapossibleexplanationofwhywehaveparticular
obligationstoourownpoliticalcommunities,withoutrelyingonanappealtothe
notionofconsent.Accordingtothatargument,
ifsomeonehasreceivedbenefitsunderastandingpolitical
organization,thenhehasanobligationtobeartheburdensofthat
organizationaswell,includinganobligationtoacceptitspolitical
decisions,whetherornothehassolicitedthesebenefitsorhasinany
moreactivewayconsentedtotheseburdens.13
But,Dworkinnotes,thefairplayargumentassumesthatpeoplecanincurobligations
simplybyreceivingwhattheydonotseekandwouldrejectiftheyhadthechance.
Andthis,takenasageneralprinciple,seemsunreasonable.
Dworkinsgoalsforhisconceptionofpoliticalobligationarenowclear:that
conceptionmust,firstly,explainthespecialdutyweowetoourownpolitical
communities,and,secondly,explainhowwecanhavesuchdutiesdespitethefactthat
wedonotconsenttothem.Hissuggestionthatpoliticalobligationisakindof
associativeobligationakintoobligationsoffamilyandfriendshipseems,then,a
naturalone.Afterall,thosekindsofassociativeobligationsseemneatlytosatisfy
Dworkinstwoconditions:theyrepresentspecialresponsibilitiesto(membersof)
particulargroupsofwhichwearemembers,andweareboundbythemdespitethe
factthatweusuallydonot(meaningfully)consenttothem.
6

However,thefactthatotherassociativeobligationsmeettheconditionswhich
theobligationtoobeythelawmustmeetinordertorepresentarealobligationdoes
notinitselfconstituteevidencefortheassociativenatureofpoliticalobligation.It
merelyestablishesthatifpoliticalobligationcanbeshowntobeaspeciesof
associativeobligation,itwillmeetDworkinstwoconditions.Dworkintherefore
seekstodescribepoliticalcommunitiesinsuchawayastopersuadehisreaderthat
theobligationtoobeythelawtowhichtheypurporttogiveriseisassociativein
nature.Ibelievethatpoliticalcommunitiesdonotgiverisetoanassociative
obligationtoobeythelaw,becausetheydifferinimportantrespectsfrommore
standardsourcesofassociativeobligations,likefamilyrelationsandfriendships.
Furthermore,Ithinkthataninvestigationofthesedifferenceswillshowthatthekind
ofreasonforactionalawgivesusisnotthesameasthatgiventousbydutiesof
familyandfriendship.
Dworkinsmethodofargumentisessentiallydescriptive.(Hecallshis
methodinterpretive,becauseitreliesonadescription,notofhowassociations
(politicalandotherwise)actuallydofunctioninourlives,buthowwethinkthey
shouldfunction.)Hefirstdescribesthosecharacteristicsthathethinksbelongtoany
trueassociationorcommunity:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

thegroupsobligationsmustberegardedasspecial,holdingdistinctly
withinthegroup;
theyarepersonalrunningbetweenindividualmembersofthegroup;
they[flow]fromamoregeneralresponsibilityofconcernforthewell
beingofothersinthegroup;and
thisconcernmustbeanequalconcernforallmembers.14

AccordingtoDworkin,acommunitythatexhibitsthesefourcharacteristicsgivesrise
toassociativeobligations.Hethendescribesapossible(hehopes,recognizable)type
ofpoliticalcommunitythathethinkssharesthesefourcharacteristics:atypeofstate
7

hecallsasocietyofprinciple.15Thereisthereforeatleastapossiblestate,he
argues,inwhichthereexistsageneralmoral(associative)obligationtoobeythelaw.
[T]hebestdefenseofpoliticallegitimacy,heconcludes,
istobefoundnotinthehardterrainofcontractsordutiesorjustice
orobligationsoffairplaythatmightholdamongstrangers,butin
themorefertilegroundoffraternity,community,andtheirattendant
obligations.Politicalassociation,likefamilyandfriendshipandother
formsofassociationmorelocalandintimate,isinitselfpregnantof
obligation.16
Perhapsbecauseofthedescriptivenatureofhisproject,Dworkindoesnot
provideargumentsinsupportofhisclaimthatatruecommunitymustdisplaythe
fourcharacteristicshegives.Perhapshethinksthatthesecharacteristicsareonesthat
everyonewillonreflectionrecognizeasbelongingtoanytruecommunityonethat
cangiverisetoassociativeobligations.Iamnotconvincedthatthisisthecase,but
whetheritiswillnotinterestmehere.OfgreaterconcernisthefactthatDworkin
givesnoaccountofhowitisthattruecommunitiesgiverisetothesespecialkindsof
obligations.MostpeoplewouldagreewithDworkinthat,atleastinthecaseof
familyandfriends,wedohavesuchspecialobligations.Inordertodetermine
whetherthemoredistantrelationshipsinherentinapoliticalcommunitygiveriseto
obligationsofthesametype,weshouldinvestigatewhywethinktherearesuch
obligationsinthemoreintimatecase,andwhetherthisreasoningcanaccountfor
politicalobligationsaswell.
Manymoralobligationsarenonconsensuallyincurred.Wehavemoral
obligationsnottokill,tohelpthoseinneed,totreatotherswithrespect,andsoon
whetherwewantthemornot.Somemoralobligationsarespecialinthesensethat
theyaredutieswehavetowardsparticularpeople:dutiesimposedonusbycontracts
orbypromisesrepresentprominentexamples.Theconceptuallystrangethingabout
8

associativeobligations,asDworkinsargumentrightlysuggests,isthattheyareboth
nonconsensualandspecial.Itisthiscombinationthatrequiresanexplanation.
Whydowethinkwehavespecialobligationsresultingfromourfamilyrelationships
andfriendships,obligationsthatwedonotchoosetoincur?
Asatisfactorydefenseofsuchobligationswouldrequireadifferentpaper
altogether,butIthinktheirintuitiveforcecanbeexplainedeasilyenough.Firstly,
familyassociationsandfriendshipsare,unlesstheyarerecurrentlyabusive,
intrinsicallyvaluable.Theyformanimportantpartofwhatmakesourlivesworth
living.Secondly,loyaltyisconstitutiveoftheserelations,andloyaltyisexpressed
throughthefulfillmentofspecialobligations.As.Scanlonnotes,thevalueof
friendship(andfamily)doesnot,primarily,giveusreasonstomakemoreofwhats
valuable;rather,itgivesusreasonstostructureourinteractionswithourfriends(and
family)inwaysthatareexpressiveofthevalueoftheseassociations:thatexpress
loyalty,attention,concern,andsoon.17
Severalthingsfollowfromthischaracterizationofsuchassociations.Firstly,
weareboundbytheobligationsofloyaltygeneratedbytheseassociationsevenwhen
failingtofulfillourobligationswillgoundetected.Thisisbecauseitisnotonlythe
consequencesofadisloyalactthatundermineafamilyorfriendship,butthedisloyal
actitself.Thisiswhatitmeanstosaythatloyaltyisconstitutiveofsuchrelations.
Secondly,wemight,forthesakeofthevalueoffamilyassociationorfriendship,
performanactionthatweknowwillbringsuchanassociationtoanend.For
example,ifmyfriendisinanabusiverelationship,Imightberequiredbythedutyof
loyaltytoreporttheabusetothepolice,becauseIknowthatmyfriendslifedepends

onmydoingso.Imayberequiredtodosoeveniftheinevitableresultisthatshe
feelsbetrayed,andnolongerwantstobemyfriend.
Thirdly,obligationsarisingfromfamilyassociationsorfriendshipsareoftype
(2)discussedabove:theygeneratemoralreasonsforactionthatareindependentof
ourothermoralreasons,andthatweighagainstthosereasonswhentheyconflict.
ThusifIamboundbytherequirementsoffriendshiptodosomethingwhichwould
otherwisebeimmoral(if,forexample,Ihavetotellalietoprotectmyfriends
interests),thisprovidesamoralreasontodoit,althoughitmaynotbeawinning
moralreason.Thisistruebecausethevalueofafriendshiporofafamilyrelationship
isindependentofitsinstrumentalroleinhelpingmecomplywiththosemoral
reasons.18
Dworkindiscussionindicatesthathewouldalsoclassifyassociative
obligationsasobligationsofthissort.Hetakesfamilyobligationsasanexample,and
exploreswhathappenstosuchobligationswhentheycomeintoconflictwiththe
requirementsofjustice.Heconsidersthefollowingexample:
Supposethatacultureacceptstheequalityofthesexesbutingood
faiththinksthatequalityofconcernrequirespaternalisticprotectionfor
womeninallaspectsoffamilylife,andthatparentalcontrolofa
daughter'smarriageisconsistentwiththerestoftheinstitutionof
family.19
AsIhave,Dworkinnotesthatthefamilyassociationmustdisplayaminimumlevelof
justicebeforeitistakentobeofvalueatall:
Ifthatinstitutionisotherwiseseriouslyunjust...wewillthinkitcannot
bejustifiedinanywaythatrecommendscontinuingit.Ourattitudeis
fullyskeptical,andagainwedenyanygenuineassociative
responsibilities.20

10

Butifthatthresholdismet,Dworkinargues,thentheobligationsoffamilygenerate
realmoralreasons,evenifthesereasonsconflictwiththeindependentdemandsof
morality.Hewrites:
Suppose,ontheotherhand,thattheinstitution'spaternalismistheonly
featurewearedisposedtoregardasunjust.Nowtheconflictis
genuine.Theotherresponsibilitiesoffamilymembershipthriveas
genuineresponsibilities.Sodoestheresponsibilityofadaughterto
defertoparentalchoiceinmarriage,butthismaybeoverriddenby
appealtofreedomorsomeothergroundofrights.Thedifferenceis
important:adaughterwhomarriesagainstherfather'swishes,inthis
versionofthestory,hassomethingtoregret.Sheoweshimatleastan
accounting,andperhapsanapology.21
Thefathersdirective,inthiscase,ischaracterizedbyDworkinasreasontobe
weighedintothebalancewithourothermoralreasons.
Dworkinconcludesthatourpoliticalobligationsshouldfunctioninour
processofmoralreasoninginthesameway.Evenhissocietyofprincipleisnot
necessarilyajustcommunity:itmayviolatetherightsofitscitizensorcitizensof
othernationsinthewaywejustsawanytrueassociativecommunitymight.22But
providedthatthepoliticalcommunityisnotthoroughlyandpervasivelyunjust,23its
lawgivesussomereasontoperformactswhichwewouldotherwiseconsider
immoralreasonswhichmaybeoutweighed,butwhichnonetheless,attheveryleast,
giveuscauseforregret.
Isthisright?Itseemsatleastcounterintuitive.ThefactthattheU.S.
governmentpassedalawrequiringthatallcitizensaidintheapprehensionof
runawayslaves24didnotinitselfprovideanymoralreasonfordoingso25notevena
moralreasonthatcouldbeoutweighedbyourothermoralreasons.26Thisintuition
can,Ithink,bemoresystematicallyexplained.Letsreconsiderthetwofeaturesof
familyrelationsandfriendshipsbymeansofwhichIexplainedtheirdispositionto

11

giverisetoassociativeobligations.Firstly,thesekindsofrelationsareintrinsically
valuable,andthusdonotderivetheirvaluefromanyinstrumentalroletheyplayin
helpingusconformtomoralreasons.Secondly,theserelationsareconstitutedbythe
requirementofloyaltywhichgivesrisetoassociativeobligations.Associative
obligationsarisingfromfamilyrelationsandfriendshipsareprimarilyreasonstoact
outofloyalty,regardlessofthebroaderconsequencesofthatactionforthe
association:thatis,evenwhentheactisonotheraccountsimmoral,evenwhena
disloyalactwouldhavenoextraneousbadconsequences,andsometimesevenwhena
loyalactmayresultinthedissolutionoftheassociation.Politicalassociations
displaynoneofthesecharacteristics.
Whatmakespoliticalassociationsvaluablesomethingwehavereasons,
includingmoralreasons,topromote?Itseemsunlikelythattheirvaluecanbe
explainedalongthesamelinesasthevalueoffamilyassociationsandfriendships.It
iscertainlyeasiertoimagineapersonlivingameaningfulandfulfillinglifethatis
apoliticalthantoimagineapersonlivingsuchalifewithoutanyclosepersonaltiesto
familyorfriends.Wetakepartinpoliticalassociationsnotchieflybecauseoftheir
intrinsicvaluebutbecausetheyareusefulinmakingourlivesmuchbetterthanthey
wouldotherwisebe.Itisanaturalthoughtthatgovernmentsandtheirlawsare
legitimateonlyiftheyinsomewayservetheinterestsofthegoverned.Political
associationsgiverisetoobligationsonlyiftheyareinstrumentallyvaluable.
Moreover,politicalobligationisnotprimarilyanobligationtoactoutof
loyalty;ratheritisadutythatderivesfromthedutytopursuethosegoodswhich
politicalassociationsareinstrumentalinattaining.Thewrongnessofaviolationofa
politicalobligationcannotthereforebeexplainedbyreferencetothedemandsof

12

loyalty,forthevalueofpoliticalassociationscansurviveundiscovereddisloyaltiesin
awaythatfamilyrelationsandfriendshipscannot.Thequestioniswhethertheycan
continuetofulfilltheirinstrumentalfunctionwhenpoliticalobligationsarenot
upheld.Becausetheinstrumentalvalueofapoliticalassociationisthesourceof
politicalobligations,wewouldneverberequiredbypoliticalobligationtoperforman
actthatwouldresultinthedissolutionoftheassociation.27
Letspausetotakestockofwherewestand.Ihaveargued,againstDworkin,
thattheobligationtoobeythelawcannotbeexplainedasanassociativeobligation,
becauseitlacksthosefeaturesthatexplainthedispositionoffamilyassociationsand
friendshipstogiverisetoassociativeobligations.Toreinforcethispoint,Ihave
traceddifferencesinthesourcesofassociativeobligationsandpoliticalobligations
throughtodifferencesinthekindsofactstheseobligationsmightrequireofus.I
havecitedasfurtherevidenceofthedissimilaritybetweentheobligationtoobeyand
associativeobligationstheintuitionthatalawrequiringanunjustactdoesnotinitself
giveusanymoralreasontoperformtheact,evenifthelawisissuedbyagovernment
thatisgenerallyspeakingjust.Themoralreasonsgeneratedbypoliticalobligation
arenot,likeassociativeobligations,oftype(2)describedearlier:moralreasonsthat
areindependentofourothermoralreasons,andaretobeweighedintothebalanceof
reasonswhenwedecidehowweoughttoact.Rather,moralreasonsgeneratedby
politicalobligationsareoftype(3):theyrideonthebackofourothermoralreasons.
Ananalysisofthekindofmoralreasonalawgivesusforactingwillexplainwhythis
isso.Inwhatfollows,IdrawontheworkofJosephRaz.
Razhasdefended,asIdoabove,aserviceconceptionoflegitimatepolitical
authority,accordingtowhichtheprimaryfunctionofpoliticalauthoritiesistoserve

13

theinterestsofthegoverned.Razwritesthatthefirstpreceptofalegaltheoryisthat
lawispractical,thatitsessentialfunctionistoplayaroleinitssubjectsreasoning
aboutwhattodo.28Thisfunctionisfulfilledwhenapoliticalauthorityhelps[its
subjects]actforthereasonsthatbind29them.30Razexplicatesthisplausibleclaimby
meansofthreenormativethesesaboutthelegitimacyofpoliticalauthorities.The
normaljustificationthesisrepresentsafairlystraightforwardstatementoftheservice
conceptionoflegitimateauthority.Accordingtoit,
thenormalwaytoestablishthatapersonhasauthorityoveranother
personinvolvesshowingthattheallegedsubjectislikelybetterto
complywithreasonswhichapplytohim(otherthanthealleged
authoritativedirectives)ifheacceptsthedirectivesofthealleged
authorityasauthoritativelybindingandtriestofollowthem,rather
thanbytryingtofollowthereasonswhichapplytohimdirectly.31
Thedependencethesisstates:
allauthoritativedirectivesshouldbebasedonreasonsthatalready
independentlyapplytothesubjectsofthedirectivesandarerelevantto
theiractioninthecircumstancescoveredbythedirective.32
Itseemsanaturalstepfromthenormaljustificationthesistothedependencethesis.
AsRazpointsout,
[i]fthenormalandprimarywayofjustifyingthelegitimacyofan
authorityisthatitismorelikelytoactsuccessfullyonthereasons
whichapplytoitssubjectsthenitishardtoresistthedependence
thesis.Itmerelyclaimsthatauthoritiesshoulddowhattheywere
appointedtodo.33
Razsfinalthesisisthepreemptionthesis,whichexplainsthepracticalrole
anauthoritativedirectiveistoplayinourreasoningprocess.Itstates:
thefactthatanauthorityrequiresperformanceofanactionisareason
foritsperformancewhichisnottobeaddedtoallotherrelevant
reasonswhenassessingwhattodo,butshouldexcludeandtakethe
placeofsomeofthem.34

14

ThepreemptionthesisrejectswhatDworkinasserts:namely,thatthereasonfor
actionprovidedbytheobligationtoobeythelawisareasontobeaddedintothe
balanceofourotherreasonswhenwedecidewhattodothatis,areasonoftype(2).
Iwillargue,followingRaz,thatthepreemptionthesisfollowsnecessarilyfromthe
dependencethesis,andthattheserviceconceptionoflegitimateauthority,whichI
endorsedabove,thereforeentailsthattheobligationtoobeythelawmustbeoftype
(3)discussedattheoutsetofthisessay,not,asDworkinsargumentsuggests,oftype
(2):itisareasonthatgainsitsweightfromourothermoralreasons.
Thequestionatissueisthis:whatkindofreasonforactiondoesalegitimate
authoritativedirectivegiveus?Howdoesitfitinwiththeotherreasonswhich
featureinourdecisionmakingprocess,andhowdoesitservetomakeusmorelikely
toconformwiththebalanceofreasonsasawhole?
Tounderstandandbegintoanswerthisquestion,wemustfirstunderstandthe
complexstructurethatRazthinksreasonshave.Hepointsoutthatwhenwearefaced
withadecisioninwhichwehavegoodreasonsfordoingeitheroftwo(ormore)
conflictingthingswetendtoresolvetheconflictbydeterminingtherelative
weightofthereasonspointingineachdirectionandoptingfortheweightier
choicethedirectioninwhichthebalanceofreasonstips.35Thissuggeststhatall
reasonshave,sotospeak,thesameunits,thattheymayallbeweighedagainsteach
other.Raz,however,arguesthatreasonsdonothavesuchasimple,onetiered
structurethatthisviewofreasoningfailstoexplainourresponsetoseveral
importantkindsofdecisionspeoplemake.
Razdriveshometheintuitiveneedforamorecomplexlystructured
understandingofthewayreasonsfunctioninourdecisionmakingprocessby

15

appealingtorecognizableexamples.Parents,hepointsout,feeltornwhentheir
childrenactagainsttheirinstructionsbutdotherightthingonthebalanceofreasons.
Thatis,theydonotfeelthattheirinstructionsaretobetakenassimplyanotherreason
againstperformingaforbiddenactionareasonwhichmaybeoutweighedintheend
bythereasonsinfavoroftheactionsothatintheendthechilddidnowrongin
doingashedid.Rathertheyfeelboththatthechildwasonsomelevelultimately
wrong(andthusdeservingofblame)nottohaveobeyedhisparentsorders,which
shouldhavebeentakenasthefinalwordonthematter,andonanotherlevel
ultimatelyright(andthusdeservingofpraise),becausehisactionwas,intheend,the
rightthingtodo.36
Thiseasilyrecognizableparentalresponseisevidence,Razmaintains,ofthe
needforamultitieredstructureofreasons.Razcallsordinaryreasonsforacting,
whichwebalanceagainstotherordinaryreasonsforactingwhenreachingadecision,
firstorderreasons.Theyare,quitesimply,reasonstoperformornottoperforma
certainaction.Heexplainsthatparents(intheroleofanauthorityoverachild),on
theotherhand,seetheirinstructionstothechildasasecondorderexclusionary
reasonforacting.Razdefinesasecondorderreasonasanyreasontoactfora
reasonortorefrainfromactingforareason.37Exclusionaryreasonsmakeupthe
secondhalfofthisgroup:theyarereasonsfornotactingforcertainotherreasons.
Unlikefirstorderreasons,exclusionaryreasonsarenottobeweighedintothe
balanceofreasonswhendeterminingwhattodo,butserverathertoreplaceallor
someofthefirstorderreasonsthatformthebalanceofreasons.Inthechildscase,
theparentswishhimtoaccepttheirinstructionsasthefinalwordonthequestionof
whetheranactionistobeperformed,replacinghisownconclusionsonthebalanceof

16

reasons,ratherthanasanadditionalreasonweighingagainsttheperformanceofthe
actioninquestion.Thereasonparentswanttheirdirectionstobeunderstoodas
reasonsofthissortisbecausetheythinktheirownassessmentofthebalanceof
reasonsconcerningaparticularactionoftheirchildsismorelikelytoberightonthe
meritsofthecasethantheirchildsassessmentoftheapplicablereasons.
ThisexampleillustratestheformofreasonRazthinksauthoritativedirectives
ingeneraltake,andisthereforeausefullensthroughwhichtoexaminehowhisthree
thesesareintendedtoestablishauthoritativelegitimacy.Accordingtothedependence
thesis,legitimateauthoritativedirectivesshouldbebasedonthesamereasonsthat
wouldhaveappliedtothesubjectsofthedirectiveindependently,intheabsenceof
theauthority.Inthecaseoftheparentsinstructionsthisissobecausetheparents
havebasedtheirinstructionstotheirsononanassessmentofthereasonsthatapplyto
hisactionsinanycase.Theirreasonsfor,say,tellinghimnottoopenthedoorfor
strangersarethesameashiswouldbeifhewereinapositiontojudgethem
accurately.Thisiswherethenormaljustificationthesiscomesin:thefactthat
justifiestheparentsinstructionsthatmakestheparentsalegitimateauthorityover
theirchildisthattheyaremorelikelytoreachacorrectconclusionabouthowthe
childshouldactbasedonthereasonsthatapplytohimthanheis.Heistherefore
morelikelytoconformwiththebalanceofreasonsbytakingtheirdirectiveasthe
onlyreasonforhisactionthanbyactingonthereasonsthatapplytohimdirectly.
Thus,accordingtothepreemptionthesis,thechildshouldtakehisparents
instructionsnotasanadditionalreasontobeaddedtothebalanceofreasons,butasa
reasonthatexcludesandreplacesthefirstorderreasonsonwhichitisbased.The
dependenceandnormaljustificationthesesshouldmakeclearwhythisisnecessarily

17

true.Sincetheconditionofthedependencethesisisthattheparentsinstructionsbe
basedonanevaluationofthebalanceofreasons,countingthemasanadditional
reasontobeaddedintothebalancewouldbetocountingthereasonsunderlyingthe
parentsinstructionstwice.Toavoiddoublecounting,considerationofthe
instructionsasareasonmustexcludethereasonsonwhichitisbasedfrom
considerationaltogether.Furthermore,theparentsauthorityisjustifiedbythe
normaljustificationthesispreciselybecausetheirchildismorelikelytoconform
correctlytothebalanceofreasonsbyfollowingtheirinstructionsthanbyactingon
hisownevaluationofthebalanceofreasons.Again,thismeansthatheshouldtreat
hisparentsinstructionsasreplacingthebalanceofreasonsinhisdecisionmaking
process.38
Razsthreethesesofferanaccountoftheprimafacieobligationtoobeythe
lawthatexplainswhysuchanobligationgivesusnoreasonatalltocomplywitha
lawthatisobviouslyunjust:thatis,thatobviouslyfailstocorrectlyrepresentthe
balanceofmoralreasonsitwasintendedtoreflect.Becauselawsarelegitimateonly
ifwearemorelikelytoconformtothebalanceofindependentreasonsbyfollowing
themthanbyactingonthosereasonsdirectly,lawswhichobviouslyfailtofulfillthis
functionforsomeonearenotthesourceofanyobligationatall.
IfindRazsaccountoftheobligationtoobeythelawpersuasive,buttakeitto
implythatthequestionofwhetheraparticularauthoritativedirectivegivesrisetoan
obligationtoobeymustbeaddressedonacasebycasebasis.Thisisafairlyweak
interpretationofauthoritativelegitimacy.Becausedifferentpeopleindifferent
situationshaveaccesstodifferentinformation,anauthorityfigureorauthoritative
institutionmayonthisviewbelegitimateforsomepeoplesubjecttoitspowerbutnot

18

all.Evenasinglepersonmayatcertaintimes,belegitimatelyboundbyanauthority
andatothertimes,notboundbyit.Worsethanthis,asingleauthoritativedirective
maysometimesbindandsometimesfailtobindanindividual,dependingonthe
particularsituation.
Doesthisvisionofauthoritativelegitimacyhavetojustifyachaoticstate,in
whichnooneconsistentlyobeysthelaws,andeveryonedecidesforhimselfwhether
thelawappliestohim?Probablynot.Foronething,asIarguedabove,wedorely
heavilyonthegovernmenttoguideourjudgmentonawholevarietyofpractical
questions.Governmentsensuretheirusefulnesstousnotonlybyprovidingexpertise,
butalso,andjustasimportantly,byplayinganessentialcoordinativerole.Moreover,
Idonotthinkitfollowsfromthecheckerboardnatureoftheobligationtoobeythat,
asDworkinfeared,nogovernmentisjustifiedinusingcoercivemeanstoensure
compliancewithitsdirectives.Itwouldbebetterifnopersonwhodidnothavea
moralobligationtoobeythelawwaspunishedfordisobedienceorcoercedinto
obedience.Butasystemoflawenforcementwhichtriedtoevaluateeachviolationof
thelawonacasebycasebasistoseewhetheranobligationtoobeyexistedornothas
foreseeablymuchgreatercoststhanageneralizedsystemoflawenforcement.Thisis
inpartbecauseoftheimperfectavailabilityofinformationaboutpeople'sknowledge
andsoundnessofjudgment,andinpartbecauseofthetendencyofofficialstobe
swayedintheirassessmentofviolatorsbybiasesandmorallyirrelevantfactors.
WhatdoesfollowfromtheRazianaccount,incontrasttoDworkins,isthatI
amneverjustifiedinobeyingthelawinaparticularcasewhenIknowthatindoingso
Iwillhavedonesomethingthatiswrongonthebalanceofindependentreasons.In
thisway,theRazianaccountoftheobligationtoobeyavoidsanothercriticalproblem

19

facingmanyaccountsofpoliticalobligation,includingDworkins:thatofthe
apparentconflictbetweenauthorityandautonomy.AnarchistR.P.Wolffwrites:
therecanbenoresolutiontotheconflictbetweentheautonomyofthe
individualandtheputativeauthorityofthestate.Insofarasaman
fulfillshisobligationtomakehimselftheauthorofhisdecisions,he
willresistthestatesclaimtohaveauthorityoverhim.Thatistosay,
hewilldenythathehasadutytoobeythelawsofthestatesimply
becausetheyarelaws.Inthatsense,itwouldseemthatanarchismis
theonlypoliticaldoctrineconsistentwiththevirtueofautonomy.39
Dworkindeclareshimselftobeansweringthequestion:Docitizenshavegenuine
moralobligationsjustinvirtueoflaw?,andheanswersitintheaffirmative.Raz,
moreconvincingly,answersitinthenegative.Butitdoesnotfollowfromthis
conclusion,asbothDworkinandWolffsuppose,thattherecanbenolegitimate
politicalauthority.

20

21

BibliographicalNotes

Dworkin,Ronald,LawsEmpire,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress(Belknap),1986,pp.190191.
2
Dworkinisonlyone(perhapsthemostprominent)amongseveralwriterswhohavetriedtoofferanassociativeor
communitarianaccountofthedutytoobeythelaw.OthersincludeT.H.Green,CharlesTaylor,HannaPitkinand,
inaqualifiedway,LeslieGreen.
3
Ibid.,p.196.
4
Wasserstrom,RichardA.TheObligationtoObeytheLaw,inTheDutytoObeytheLaw,editedbyWilliamA.
Edmundson,Lantham,MD:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers,Inc.,1999,p.21.
5
Asfugitiveslavelawsof1793and1850demanded.
6
Ofcourse,theexistenceofthelawmaymakeadifferenceinotherwaysitmay,forexample,justifypunishmentof
offendersbythestate.
7
Theexistenceofalawprescribingorprohibitingacertaincourseofactionmaywellmakeadifferencetowhatwe
oughtmorallytodoindependentlyofourothermoralreasonsforthesimplyreasonthatdisobediencetothelawcan
oftenhave(morally)undesirableconsequences(suchasincurringundeservedpunishments,orinfluencingothersto
disobeylawswhentheyshouldnot).Fortheremainderofthisessay,Iwilltakethisimportantqualificationas
understood.
8
Thereareothersignificantwaysinwhichtheexistenceofalawcanmakeadifferencetowhatweoughttodoeven
ifthereasongeneratedbythelawisdependentinasenseonourindependentmoralreasons(e.g.,insolving
coordinationproblems).
9
Atleast,atruepoliticalcommunitythatmeetscertainbasicstandardsofjustice,asIwilldiscusslateron.
10
Dworkin,p.190(myemphasis).
11
Ibid.,pp.192193.
12
Ibid.,p.193.
13
Ibid.,p.193194.
14
Ibid.,pp.199201.
15
Seeibid.,pp.211,213215.
16
Ibid.,p.206.
17
Scanlon,T.M.WhatWeOweToEachOther,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress(Belknapp),1998,pp.
8890.
18
Ofcourse,somerelationshipsofthissort,notably,theparentchildrelationship,servethisinstrumentalfunctionas
wellwhenaparenttellsachildhowtobehave,herinstructionscarryforcebecausetheywillhelpthechildcomply
withthereasonsthatappliedtoitanyway.Inthiscase,asIwillargue,thechildsobligationtoobeyisnotan
exampleofanassociativeobligation(ofthekindIvebeendiscussing)butmuchmorecloselyresemblesthe
obligationtoobeythelaw.
19
Dworkin,p.205.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.,pp.213214.
23
Ibid.,p.203.
24
SeetheCompromiseof1850.
25
Isetaside,asearlier,reasonsresultingfromthethreatofpunishmentandothernegativeconsequencesofthe
discoveryoftheactofdisobedience.
26
DworkincouldcharacterizetheprecivilwarUnitedStatespoliticalcommunityasthoroughlyandpervasively
unjust,butthen,onDworkinsaccount,itwouldfollowthattherewasnodutytoobeytheanyjustlawsissuedby
thatgovernment.(HemightbemoreinclinedtotakethisoptioninthecaseofNaziGermany.)
27
Wemaybemorallyrequiredtoperformsuchanactonothergrounds.
28
Raz,Joseph.FacingUp:AReply,(hereafter,FacingUp)SouthernCaliforniaLawReview,62(1989),pg.
1153.

29

IthinkRazemploystheformulationreasonswhichbindusinterchangeablywiththephrasereasonswhichapply
tous(seedependence,normaljustificationtheses,below).
30
Raz,Joseph.TheMoralityofFreedom,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986,pg.56.
31
Ibid.,pg.53.
32
Ibid.,pg.47.
33
Ibid.,pg.55.
34
Ibid.,pg.46.
35
SeeRaz,Joseph,PracticalReasonandNorms,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990,pg.35.
36
Ibid.,pg.43.Razmentionsthisexampleonlybriefly.
37
Ibid.,pg.39.
38
Ishouldnote(asRazdoes)thatnotallvalidexclusionaryreasonstaketheformdescribedbyRazsthreetheses.
(Promises,forexample,generateexclusionaryreasonsofadifferentsort.)
39
Wolff,R.P.TheConflictbetweenAuthorityandAutonomy,inAuthority,editedbyJosephRaz,NewYork:
NewYorkUniversityPress,1990,p.29.

[Theaboveendnotesare,forthemostpart,bibliographicalinnature.Withtheexceptionofahandfulof
them,whichImightmentionorsummarizebrieflywhenpresenting,theywouldnotbeincludedina
presentationofthepaper.]