\JNlVERSilY OF GEORGIA ltBRARIU

/~OTES

ON BOOKS

ETA AND THETA

OF
ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

being the record

by

MYLES BURNYEAT and others

of a seminar held in London, 1979-1982

i.

PREFACE

This

monograph

is

sequel

to Notes on Zeta,

by the Oxford Philosophy sub-Faculty.

published

The London Group,

in

1979

started by

G.E.L. Owen in 1976, and described by Christopher Kirwan in the preface

to Notes on Zeta,

has continued its discussions

totle's

Metaphysics

in

the

Institute

Square,

and we were encouraged,

of

of the text of Aris-

Classical

Studies

in Gordon

by reviewers of Notes on Zeta among

others, to publish the record of our discussions of Books Eta and Theta.
The

form

before.
some
a

in which the material

No major

of

revisions

the material

given

passage

of

so as to bring
the

text

(and

the dates on which the sessions

consistency

of

is

presentation;

presented is much the same as

have been made;

but

together all

accordingly

occurred),

but

some

have rearranged

the discussions of

deleted

and

tried

references

to

to achieve some

inconsistencies

remain

for

example in the transliteration of Greek words.

The

majority

of

the

minutes

of

sessions

are

the work of Myles

Burnyeat, and a substantial number of others are by Bob Sharplesi others

Apart from those per-

were recorded by Lesley Brown and Alan Lacey.

sons,

the meetings were

Heinaman,
Lloyd,

Gerald

Malcolm

attended

Hughes,

fairly regularly by Julia Annas, Bob

Christopher

Scholfield,

Richard

Kirwan,

Jonathan

Sorabji,

Julius

Lear,

Geoffrey

Tomin,

Kathleen

Wilkes, and Michael Woodsi and most of them were presided over by Gwilym
Owen.
A

focus

incisive
circulated
this
by

to our discussions was given by some characteristically

and

challenging

or

tabled

Monograph

Bob

the

Heinaman,

included
course,

in

paper

the

full

by

Introductory

appropriate

Richard
read

Notes

Gwilym Owen.

Sorabji

to

one

place,
and

session

on

individual

chapters

These have been included

as

Bob Sharples.
by

in

have been contributions

There

Sarah Waterlow,

is

also

though,

of

development of her ideas on the subject of the paper

can now be found in her Passage and Possibility (Oxford, 1982).

The meetings of
Metaphysics
our
died

took

discussions

the Group that

place
of

in July 1982.

Book

between
Theta

discussed

May

1979

and

were

almost

these

two books of the

November

1982.

Thus,

complete when Gwilym Owen

We should like to dedicate this Monograph to his

memory.

The debt

to him,

Group and

presided over

it

as
for

the

person who established

seven years

is

only one

the London

of many that

we, like so many other Aristotelian scholars, owe to him.

clay 1984

MICHAEL WOODS

ii.
111.

ABBREVIATIONS

D.K.

Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed.

H. Diels and W. Kranz, Berlin.
1903.

Jaeger

Aristotelis Metaphysica, W.Jaeger,

Oxford Classical Texts, 1957.

Kirwan

Aristotle, Metaphysics
translated with notes by Christopher Kirwan, Oxford 1970.

Oxford translation

Volume VIII (Metaphysica, translated W.D. Ross) in The Works of

Aristotle translated into English,
Oxford 1928.

Ps. Alexander

Commentary on Z (in fact by a

later hand) in Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck,
Berlin 1891.

Reale

Aristotelis, la Metafisica, traduzione, introduzione e commento,

Giovanni Reale, Loffredo 1968.

Ross

Aristotle's Metaphysics, text and

commentary, W.D. Ross, Oxford 1924.

The works of Aristotle are sometimes referred to by the following

abbreviations:
Posterior Analytics

An. Post. or A. PQ.

An. Prior

Prior Analytics

Cat.

Categories

De Gen. An. or GA

De Generatione Animalium

De Gen. et Corr. or G&C

De Generatione et Corruptione

De Int.

De Interpretatione

DMA

De Motu Animalium

De Mem.

De Memoria

E.E.

Eudemian Ethics

E.N.

Nicomachean Ethics

Met.

Metaphysics

neteor.

Meteorologic a

PA

De Partibus Animalium

Parv. Nat.

Parva Naturalia

Phys.

Physics

Rhet.

Rhetoric

So ph. El. or SE

De Sophisticis Elenchis

Top.

Topics

Capital Greek

letters

refer

to

books

of

the

Metaphysics

The convention has usually been

Greek words without inverted commas.

unless

otherwise specified.
Unprefixed page numbers, as in 'l019a 10' refer to the Metaphysics.

Other references:
Ackrill

Aristotle's Categories and DeInterpretatione, translated with

notes by J.L. Ackrill, Oxford,
1963.

Apostle

Aristotle's Metaphysics, translated with commentaries by Hippocrates G. Apostle, Indiana, 1966.

Bonitz

Index Aristotelicus, H. Bonitz,

Berlin 1870.
lr

Aristotelis netaphysica, H. Bonitz, Bonn 1848-9.

followed

of

writing

mentioned

CHAPTER

l042a 3-24

The

first

to have a summary of
was it e[pT'J'ta.l.

seeks

as

placed

strongly

suggests

we

but the next jolts our expectations.

are

Where

that the object of enquiry is the causes and principles

and elements of
which

sentence

Z,

substance?

(~

Not Zl

Ross).

Not El (Apostle),

and causes of 'tciiv Ov-rwv as

principles

substances but everything.

l-2

(cf.

including not

l003b 18)?

just

A 1-2 fits better

still, offering several parallels to what is to come in Hl.

Further difficulties:

and

the

elements

(1)

1C42a 6-10 goes against Zl6 on parts

('agreed by all'

might mean

'agreed by all but

the

speaker'

but l042a 24 resumes talk of agr~ed substances as if the list

had

contained

not

stance

controversial

items).

(2)

It

seems

remarkably

fiv eTvcu. and b1toxeC~evov side by side as cases of sub-

bland to set 'tC

which

are

consideration

of

established
what

people

by

argument

will

say

which

under

are arrived at

dialectical

by

pressure.

It is going back to where we started out at the beginning of Z3, before

the hard work of Z was done.
genus and universal.
blished

by

even by

his

genus

is

argument

( a:x:~.wQ'

opponents

more

( 1038b 7 is

it

is

not

arguments

in

Z.

substance

the

nearest

15

to

take

advance

cases

are

can yield

xa.e6Xou

just

one

intended,
both:

plus Forms (1.

than roo,,
parallel

have to go back to B for

sible

Still worse (3)

to conjoin these with

If the latter also are cases of substance estaI

For

arguments

universal
~ood

not

more

there

is

not

problem as

definability

z,

nor

particular
You really

[It was thought pos-

c!6wv

two.
to

than

enough).

yfvo,, 1:Wv xa.e'~,QC"'t'a.

substance,

in

these do not urge that

that line of argument.

"=

case of

e.g.

but

by Ar

If,

how a

so

that

14-

however,

two

single

argument

selects universal over particular,

16), but not genus over eT6o<;.

Further,

the two case

reading would break with the narrower use of x.ae6Aou as found in Zl3.]
More generally, (4)

nothing is said to recall the challenge to Uxox(-

f..l.vov as

substance

(27-8

in

of

terms

the

in Z corresponds).

blandly

actual/potential

accepts UXn
distinction

Nothing recalls Z 7-9.

h"as disappeared from memory.

with
to

justification

which again

nothing

The hard work on essence

The conclusion of Zl7 has gone for nought.

! 042a

I 042a

But

now,

having

got

to

point

tile

of being ready

to consider

chat

posed

1042a 3-24 may not be a summary of Z (we even tried, without plausible
to

success,

make

1042a

J-4

look

ahead

rather

than

back),

one

meets

the unmistakable backreferences L!.WpL<T't"aL (1. 18), 7!;Ept )J.lpout;; ?iv

!6etv

(l. 20 ) .

else

the

in

Again,

The

corpus

21-2,

second

is

denying

there

that

is

especially

anything

universal

So what we seem to have is

like

or

(a)

telling

the

genus

because

discussion

is

substance,

fits

a summary of Z which (b)

(1)

conclusions:
nicus

is

to

than

our

to

the

the

indulged

'keep

predominates

merely
of

have

such).

next

in

all

H1

candidates

(cp.

candidate

the

on

but

Hay 24

list

of

proto-Z
the

to

-wrong

(3)

C'1ntain?
order,

put

the

equals,

overemphasizing

done

leads

Ar

off

= H:

'NBS

is not

as

in

play'

essence was

without

positive

hand,

recognition

and

note,

not

so much

Note

that

l042a

some

3-24

of

is

to all candidates'

no

these
longer

suggestions
available

would

as

have

evidence

consequence
'be

fair

interpretation of Z.

fits

there

via H (e)
then be due

ther

evidence

that

within
23-4)

refers

as shown by a

~l!.z..:!.

cause tiXXoCu.x:r1.<;
which

is

concentrates

the
on

~).T]

model,
the

not

is

as

but

such

not

redundant:

Ar's

continuity

existential worries pressed by Elea.)

<./>tE'p11(Y~v

is olxYCa. because it is ~1toXeCJ.1evov

(Phys.

alternative

of xCvT')CTt.~
Note that

and

model
is

of

free

broxEC~evov

Wt;;

type bemotion,
of

vUv -

~dALv

thesis

looked

be

to

wl}ile

concern with

substance as actuality

z.

On the other

(which itself refers forward

while HI in turn looks back to ~.

The

matter

Rose~

difficulty we

had

in

(1042b 8).

from (some of)

relating

Hl

that

Hl

is

patched

space

of

given the
are
to

to

to Z having been grafted on to H, with the help of

few

information

together
lines we

that

substances.)

Z7-9

was

met

are

some

The
with

might

people

reply

seen

in effect

objection

the

be

hold

that

(a)

in

(Fur-

the

twice

fact

(a

11-

that Forms and

H3

that

1043b
the

16-18

reference

parenthetical,

(b)

that Z 1-9 are anyway to be regarded as having been pressed into

another

raised

context

(see Notes on Zeta p.54). The

whether the fact

vocabulary

raise
be

that
of

question was

'substance as actuality'

Z would

prevent

Ar

using

is not
it

to

also

from

part of the wor-

refer

to

his dis-

z.

suggestion was

interesting

conceived.

noted rather

questions
For

the

about

more

than accepted,

but

how an Aristotelian

patching

together

of

it

seemed

'course'

material

we

to

should
find,

the stronger the presumption that Ar is his own tailor.

the

in 1042b 2-3 switch

r"heir previous roles.

fhe thesis at

entails

xn~a

the subject in question is not the bronze

the bronze as unshaped.

but

occurs in a passage usually thought to be highly

king

type examination of change.

this

it is conspicuously not a mark of

to M?

the

back

The

The argument is:

perhaps,

well as looking back to Hl

~-

cussions in

l042a 31-b 8

that it

have been at some time a course which went

mathematicals

and that

the

ZH9,

to

would

12,

summarizing

the

for

but

the one bit of decent Z-summary provided in Hl, viz. 1042a 17-22.

as reformulating the position he wants to start from after Z.

that

Surprisingly

to M at 1042a 22-3),

spliced

essentially designed to remove

later

Ml

Could

'.Yhat is then left

soft,

5-6,

substance as actuality later ( OOn:pov ).

is the mark of H,

line

if

the

of

the Physics,

refers

Possible

of various candidates for substance,

again on a

in

the editor got H and Z

hard work before

( 4)

in the patchwork connection.

onesided

universal

Problem:

Proto-Z

213.

There was a proto-

starts

change.

types

contradict

Attention was called to M 1076a 8-10, where Ar says that the sub-

connecting work (Andro(2)

which would

any substance which comes to be is liable to the other

stance of perceptible things has been explained in two stages:

which adhered more closely

Z3's elimination of b1toxECI-1VOv/\SAT')).

for

in

the critique of b~toxeC~evov,

without e.g.

'../hich

in

known

~ditor's

the summary is an

others,

true.

Zl0-11.

the sort of summary that a careful reader of Z would expect.

the

i.e.

nowhere

in

by

the others,

1042b 5
follow

6uot'v :
it?

None

what other change is such that yEverrL<:;;/tpBopci. tloes not

in Ar's

scheme

of

things,

but

the

rarefaction and

condensation of Anaximenes' air would serve.

1042 b 3-4 is not that substantial change is presupb

7-8

The

reference

to ~

V.

I may

be

editorial,

but

perhaps

Jl

;!OfES )N ETA

1!)42b 7

<:HAPTER 2
linking

to

f._!!.~.

the

might

alleviate

some

of

the

pro h) ems of linking

Ht to Z.

analyzing what
some water

it means

that

it

1042b 25

to say of a stone that it is a threshold,

is

ice,

etc.,

he would

not

need

of

a different

in each case ('Snares' p. 81).

Owen's story requires not only singular subjects but also a tens,ed
CHAPTER

II

e~~,

(for
l042b

9-25

The

long

list

of

differentiae at
under

follows:

which

,,, J<).dcx:n 'to6'twv (concluding the subsection)

~ore

than

(b) et<rEL,

(c)

xp6v<Jl

last

therefore

excess defect)

refers

in qualities

to
(cf.

the

note

and

the

open-ended

This

aroms).
These

list

(unlike

the

illustrated

dS

distinguish kinds

by
of

Ar

the

Ar 1 s

if

discussion

he

Democritus 1

makes

letters

three

no mention of
of

the

~1t

alphabet

~auld

this

geometrical

the weight

atom and atomic .:trrangments,

in

Met.

~ow,

rype

of

one

another

definition is

to make
indeed

to

If

roll?
the

A4.

he entirely relevant
to

real

not,

a more

logical

the atomic constitution which makes stone, or which makes something

and lintel, breakfast and dinner, nor presumably between other, scienti'lll y more significant, examples.

perfect

hy
~he

)..;en

in

passage

Is a6't6

'Aristotle on
is

giving an

in l7
the

Snares

of

if, oU66c;;
r he \)).11 .

being

masculine,

But r:t6~6

can

to

Ontology',

the
to

account

offered

r;he effect that

explanation of existence claims for specimen

.ingular subjects (a particular threshold.

o6't6 introduces
pick up

etc.)?
a

masculine

or

Ar

the

is

no

longer

solidified'

is

not

self-

for

'The

ice

on

the

pond

exists').

Some qualms

of

his

relying

on

is generalizing over

pond

exists',

the

present

tense.

However,

the

etc., goes some way to ease both difficul-

not

singular

analyzing

the

statements such as
general

statement

'The ice
'Some

ice

Thus ~xa.crtov at l043a 3 is specimen particulars, not species.

At the generalizing level there remains the problem that 'no ice exists 1
should be contingent,
contradictory

in a

while

'No ice

logic which has

is

ice

would appear to be self-

'All A is

A'

as a theorem.

But

NB it was a main thesis of 'Snares' that in the present context neither

'The

ice

on

the

pond exists'

nor

the

generalization

'Ice exists'

is

to be rendered, tenselessly, by the existential quantifier.

l043a

2-7

It is an objection

different
subject,

subject,
and

if

These

lines

encapsulate

the difficulties

of

the

chapter,

difficulties which come to a head when one inquires into the reference
of ~v ~o6'toL~ (a

3), 1:o61:wv (a 3), o66~v 'tOU'tWV (a 4).

Ross translated:

'We must seek in these differentiae

(lv

what is the cause of the being of each of these things (-rol>-roov

hold,

an objection

pond

tense 7t1tuxvUxr6a.L

ties.
on

to
25-l043a

analyzans

singularity

etc.).

stance 1
l'l42b

the

were felt about Ar giving no explicit indications either of his subjects'

soft enough to eat, but his story cannot differentiate hetween threshold

~-ic

on

'The ice on the pond is {now] solidified' is not a tau to-

p~pyrus

theoretical

Democritus can tell you

point.

ice

is it part of the ordi-

nary speaker's notion of a book that it is constituted by gluing

to

of

so only indi-

is concerned with something closer

rhan to nominal (linguistic) definition.

sheets

'The

contradictory,

exists'.

compares with

Plutarch,

rectly microscopic types of thing,

of

less

differentiation by

and the less in Ar 1 s biology).

d.tfferentiae

to

subsumed xp~ L

are

the last section on xae'Tl 21-s summed up by Ohulc; b-xe:p-

(e)

ox;;'!/ lA.\e:C+L,which
(rather

is structured as

O""l>v6e:cn.c; - see Ross' note), 6e:cr)..liil

(rhough xpC<rLc; usually contrasts ..Jith

(d) 't6"'J'

15 ff.

to avoid the charge that the analysis makes 'X Err~~ tautological
if

In the

'llake

Now none of these differentiae ( ob5v "tol>-rwv

all

three

end we

~ol>~oLc;;)
=

thresis sub-

preferred this to the alternative of trying

references

to be to the threshold

of things differentiated by the differentiae.

and

other

examples

For on the latter rea-

ding abo-Ca. (a 4) means substance in the Cat. sense of primary substance.

and

it

is

hard

then

to

make

sense

of <Juv6ua1:,61J,vov or -tO &.vtiXoyov

lv tx60""'ttp.

viz.

The attempt to_ find an alternative reading to Ross' had been moti-

Ar ~'aS

vated by a worry about its being implausible to have Ar recommend that

we

look for substance tbc;; lvtpye:La lv ~oU~o&.c;;

= among the type of dif-

CHAPTER 2

l04Ja 2
~ny
~crentiae

' 1hat

~arlier.

listed

-~ven

11..1s

c11ance

a tarted-up version

of Democritus of explaining real Aristotelian substances (living organic

things),

not merely artefacts and such thin;s as the ice on the pond?

(~ate that at

l042b 31 hand and foot, which hut for their incompleteness

would be proper substances, only get ln on an abstract promise of 'other

What

differentiae'.)

1 in terms of

ll-43a

would

proper

it

take

to

redo

the

For

substances?

argument

of

1042b

Ar to turn round in a

4 and say that o66Ev -to6-rwv is substance only seemed to make matters
What,

worse.
must

appear

admission

that

c:,,

o~o-Ca

standing

the

Ross

case,

is

the

point

of

1042b

can

be

sequence

alleviated

of

thought
The

translation.

(tv 't'OU-tat.C:) seek

course

finding
sense

conjointly

l043a

tn

examples
It

5).

(for

is

substances,

is

finding

laying

bare

will

put

these

proper

is at-eCa. 1'oU eTvaL

substance

'>Jhich
lame

of

closer

under-

us

(a

what
a

on

examples

substances).

2),
in

them

is

track,

not

type

although

in

the

i.s

an

on <ipx11l ~oil o!vC1L

essay

(b

be

(on

the

closely

importance

relevant

to

of
the

nnmbers,

see

to

substance

(a

to real

these illustrative dif-

one

of

its

theme-question

of

f)Ua-Co &>c;; tvtpye:Ln of sens~ble things?', when

rhat substance ~s a('tCa. 't'OU e:lva.t. (cf. Zl7).
it is clear from the earlier remarks
!_hat

we

must

look:

to

these

(a 2)

the
we

chapter,

~ext

(a

4)

the

saving

properly substance.

qualification:

0~;6 tJ'1lv6~6j.!vov

that

for

are reminded (a 2)
!';ranted that (e;Lx.e:p),

the crJ1:1.

OV

'tOU erva.L

1030b

16,

(with

might

would
in a

involve
denial

tinuing then with (b)

(ii)

water

look

thickened

does

be

switching mid-sentence
that

improve

to

the

Against (b) (i) is the conside-

the

to

concrete whole is

another

sense

o60""Ca..

Con-

(which could, if necessary, bear 'nor even':

than

thickening

by itself), how do we construe ~b <ivdXoyov !v hdo-~'1' (a 5)?

somewhat

more

The sub-

is

This

is

not

analogous

to

substance

substance

tempting Jaeger to write 1:1.

but

substantial

the differentia in some specimen

it

(weakened

is

nevertheless,

by

Bonitz

to

for 1:6, but Ale enforces

says Ar,

'etwas

what

ana loges',

't6- see Jaeger's

apparatus).

Next

(a

itself,

fact

in

5-7)

that

all

actuality'.

out

of

the analogy is spelled out (no need to be disturbed

that the case of proper substances is placed first):

which

other
So

is

predicated

definitions

Ross,

but

also

of

the matter

it

is what

most resembles full

how does he get the idea of approximation

(not W~ eLd'XL<r'tC1 but) .-1'XL<r'tC1?

actuality

'as

is the actuality

It

won't

do

leave j.jd.'A..L<T"t'a

to

for then Ar would be saying that you get the best cases

in

the

examples

which

are

not

proper

substances.

So

in the other definitions (that which is predi-

cated of the matter is) J,!d:Ac.crta. (the actuality itself) ,i.e. as compared
with

other

elements

matter which
that

the

without

is

item

most
in

the

idea

sum

up:

in the definition it is what is predicated of the

of

all

question
of

the
is

actuality.

the

In context

closest

approximation having

you

to

will

come

get

into

this implies
to

actuality

the meaning of

eLd'XLcrra..
To

'"e

won't

dignify

every

differentia

with

the

title

0f substance or actuality (the et'?tep clause of a 2 is not convertible),

none of these differentiae

(a)

it
get

of

Jf these examples, to others for that of other examples.

are

ration

of o~uCa. to

supplement as follows:

that it is to differentiae

differentiae

differentiae

chance of achieving substance proper.

l042b

is

ZS

is hard to see how cou-

chief

'What

at

Against (a}

thought

unsupplemented,

This turns out to

7-11.

for 'T60e l.v 'tii>Oe

'even') is the consideration that it

substance

below).

term

illustrative

the

in

lessons being that there are a good deal more of these than Dernocritus'
three

technical

pling

the a.r-e1.ov 'toU e:!va.L of

32-3),

but it also applies to coupling generally.

the

The steps towards this general interpretation go as follows.

as

or without

other

ferentiae, but of the differentiae which are the object of our search.

l1-43a

3la 6,

by

when transferred
of

function

given that

anaJogous

structure which,
the

not

Nevertheless,

finding

into the definitions of Zl0-11 and those here at

does

case.

threshold

in terms of a particu-

in terms of a sort of matter such as gets

the

examples,

are

this latter to be understood either (i)

lar bit of matter, or (11)

ject is easily got from o()Otv 't'OU't'oov:

in these differentiae

these

(Ross),

l04Ja

'nor/nor even when coupled ~ith matter'

or (b)

read in accordance

the ~t'tt.ov 'ton eTv~L of these examples is not

proper

'substance'

of

by

2-7,

limitations

the a.f'tt.OV 'tOU erva.c.

finding

substance

nf

these

4)

(a

l,

still a good way off our goal of discovering the

of example are already acknowledged by1:~6~wy a 3:

of

ll-43a

a digression if all it leads to is a

of

of sensible things (1042b 10-11)?

worries

of

the

that

we're

lvtpyELC1

These

with

in

something

coupling of them',

'nor /nor even is

:N t.TA

Jl'C::-J

but since

the

are

the

the a.ruov tuU el'.la.L ,

threshold type of

We; lvE'pyeLa.

as is shown suffi-

example,

a.l"tCa. "taU eTva.L we

is

must

in the differentia which a definition dis-

plays as predicate of the matter.

1043a 7-11
tions,
of

of

which

13-14
and

serve

the

to

recap

grounds

are

the

grounds

indeed

of the illustrative examples.

6l

~wv

to

for

be

(threshold,

house,

ice)

reaffirm

the

relevance

but

the

Proper

General
side

points

one

( 1)

takes

on

All

substances

whereby

to

are

this

can be said without prejudice to which

ll-43a

that

the

1 is about existence or the copula.

shift

to

the

notion

not to say homely,

We noted, however,

of what something is at 7-11 need be no

what we want to understand,

understand

them

is

more

accessible

to

examples like the threshold of our

house and the ice on the road outside.

it

is

for

is

is

explicitly drawn at

of

ice

what
1043a 12-14

... 'tWv 6' ..

question whether the essay on d.pxa.C "tOU eTva.Lat

the

embarrassment to Owen's existence story.

structure

familiar,

~wv ~tv

We can suppose that

gives a summary coverage of all the illustrative examples without

l042b

is an example of Ar progressing from things yvWpqJ.a. +n.itV to things

in

in the preceding analysis

That being so, methodologically no doubt the chap-

1042b 11-lda 1.

ter

us

12-

the main conclusion of

found

having to suppose that it thereby covers all the examples there are.

This doctrine is then exemplified in some specimen defini-

three

that

1tJ43a l2

and since the of>crCa.

13,

vtz. o6aCa. We;, S.vtpye:~a.,

seeking,

for of>o-Ca.

look

is

differentia

ciently clearly by

C:HAPTER l

There

So we come to the main conclusion of the chapter.

is

precisely

it

is

The conn2:ction between what

patch of ice to exist and what sort of

for

2:

patch of

a substantive thesis,

ice

to

thing ice as such

olxTC displayed in a definition

the

the o('tCa. -ro1'S e!va.L,

is

exist

and moreover

what
(so

it

is

you

get

when you

'Snares',

p. 82).

that

thesis

has

say
This

to be

understood, as Ar would understand it, with some appropriate restriction

is

no

one

answer

to

the

question

'What

is

substance

as

actuality?'
on

(nor

mere

the

the
differentiae

which

our

definitions

connect

with

the

equally

case

that

of

terms

On

matter.

the

variety

of

the

types

of matter,

the

for

which

it

definition of

is

claimed true.

bachelor

tells

For it

you what

it

is

is not
for a

various
bachelor

types

of

range

three answers as Democritus supposed), but as many as the

to

exist;

bachelor

does

not

cease

to exist when he ceases

note that
to be an unmarried man.

a lO-ll includes the high-low range of sound as matter in the definition

But

of <J"U~<pWV Ca.
connecting
either
0f

different

threshold

5,),.'X.n<;;: at

do

not

want

to

as

e.g.

(cf.

12

systematic

or

differentiae,

stop

lintel

(l042b

19).

the same matter

stone

Likewise,

can

is

10-11: .'te?tuxv~tvov ~- 1-1n;t.c; ~

thus

vague,

classification

but

of

1042b

31-6

differentiae

shows

under

Ar

given ~

liA.AT1

).

interested

their most

in

general

on

the

~\\n <i.").hll<: is

8.
Z,

If
or

defended

vague

Lmplyin~

<Jill
modes

rely
11f

that
on

would

in
not

another
like

every definition,
a

differentia

arran~ement,

tWv e:lon1Jtvwv (a

14)

etc.,
imply

Ar

,o~ay

to

The

again.
state

including

drawn

from

the

his

interpretation

those

conclusion

of

sensible

that?

[t

need

not.

in

contrarieties

by

throwing

that

is

to

make

if it

its

distinction to do some work in H2.

the

start

recipe
make

picking

up

the

emphasis

on H1

1042a 27-

an

off

promisingly

for honey-water,
actual

book,

or

is in terms of potentiality and

contribution,

one might

expect

thoughts

focussed

the

But does it?

enough,

with

out

on

or what you have to do to bits of papyrus

such

natural

processes

as

the

formation

terms

proper substances,

\Ve have been working with.

began

this is to be the route whereby we will make some advance on

at least, more neutrally,

actuality

to
far

chapter

potentiality-actuality distinction,

We
'(~VT1.

so

The

become

such as o-6v9cnc; or 1-1t~t.' (a 13), will admit of different

actuality,

realizations

presumably we

(2)
with

Does 5.\A.o

and

of ice.

We seem to be thinking, by and large, in

t~rms

of the physical

affections or operations which are needed to make matter into a determinate something.

Which both makes it reasonable to start from Demo-

'tl.

l3's yd.p shows

critus

and

holds out the promise that we shall find work for

the con-

ll)41a 12

lU43a 21
r:ept

of

actuality which

could

not

be

done just as well by the notion

But it was not clear to us, at the end of the day,

of form or shape.
that

he

couldn't

have

said

it

The

more

dynamic

aspect

of

the

all

with

the

matter-form distinction.

potentiality-actual! ty distinction has

not - as yet - come into play.

l043a
a

14-26

A coda

definition,

side

of

one

actuality,

one

at

for

both.

That there are two elements is

the

side

of

potentiality and

illustrated

is

by

the

way

the

some

other

people

on

the

emphasize

66 which is why:
that

people

it

is

because

as they do (cf.

define

there

are

these

l043a

21-2

(an early

Archytas
theory

surely

of

have

He

is

not

credited

definition which

featured

with a

theory of

recognized

(so Ross, Commentary p.

thing

in Ar' s

prominently

surveys

of

and

due

is

6~-taA.6-rTJs 1043a 24 Hith -rO d.v~hov

<)tiginal

to

interest

st lllness

~n Eudemus),

and

d<.:!fining

lO

evenness

(cp.

then conversely uneven-

ness or indefiniteness of shape will '0xplain' motion - and the explanaof

motion

was

embarrassingly

little

suggestion,

any

guishing

be

matter

subject
to

need

and

say

<~hich

nn
(990a

earlier

8-12).

for Archytas himself

form

(contra

Pythagoreans

had

fhere would not,

Burkart,

had

on this

to have aimed at distin47),

even

embryonically.

It would even suit Ar's context better to have a pair of theory-innocent

definitions which ~~ theory of definition can explain.

more

his

prede-

Or should we think of some-

229 and DK 47A2)?

mathematical

such

as

'a

line

is

Pythagorean
to

believe

interest

to

some wider
another

him

habit

of

defining

that.

if

the

for

their

Aristotelian

Jf

writing E!Oo~

in

the

own sake

( .;,pe:~Ca. as

thesis.

casualness,

twoness

of

1043a

and

olxrCa.

not
(a

though

2-3

by numbers

definitions

in

length'

(cf.

for
24)

sort

It

alone?

are his,

is

they were of

their connection with

is

Ps.-Alex.

A different

instead.

duplicated ~'tL

things

cited

l043a 26-8

of

no worse
took the

1043a 29-b 4

Ar records that an a1nbiguity may lurk in words like

and

:r"rl!-la.CvEL

'line':

evidence
of

adduced

bricks

and

'A line is

precaution

casualness

is

seen

if we leave both in, with Ross,

cerned,
(cp.
is

it

Zll

two'),

reports

that

Archytas

XLvfp-eu.u;: which

was

Pythagoreanism,

47

n.

106) where

made 'tO &.6pLO"''t'ov, 'tb &_v~a:~oy 9

better

than

Plato's

and

is

(29-30)
alternative

stones

like

thusly

l037a

r:teaning,

not

definitions

arranged'

reference,

'A

'A

vs.

house

house

is

is

'house'

since
a

the

shelter

shelter'.

and

the

discussion

in 211 of the definition

'A line

but where it does, something needs to be said about the rela-

that

36)

On the supposition (possibly counter'animal'

ambiguous

is

between

'soul'

dnd 'soul in a body', the two kinds of thing ~alled animal are so called
not

in

virtue

of

single

definition but Ws "'tpbc;;

are so called in relation to a single thing.

was

best

construed

':tnimal'.

without

(A)

be

'Soul'

is

included in

thought to imply that

importing

~v.

~ost

third

The two kinds

of us agreed that
thing

besides

the

Rather, one of the two definitions presupposes

ur makes reference to the other.

Eudemus

the

is

tion between the two meanings.

this

Attent1on was called to DK 23A 23 (sequel in 58B 32 - cf. Burkart,

in Ancient

etc.,

two in length' vs. 'A line is two'.

So far dS H3 is conis a question whether in a given case this ambiguity lurks

two kinds of

Science

ox11 ,

(a 27) corresponds to We;

CHAPTER [Il

than many

tather than excise the second with Jaeger.)

dnd

AWe;;

The search is over.

form

1043a 34), which might be represented as an improvement on the traditio-

J.l'tCa.

Archyta.s

calm

definition

both matter

Are subsequent examples of still weather and a calm Archytan

in them.

Lore

If

meaning 'in how many senses/ways it exists'.

cessors). but with accepting certain definitions which had both elements

hard

indicate

two

The conclusion

19-21).

at 12-13 explains this, and is thereby confirmed.

nal

might

the expense of the other when defining and others find a place

elements

would

This

VTJVE~-tCa. and yaA.fJvn.

tion

to the chapter.

on

these.

;.~hich

is which?

'soul in a body' , and 1043b 3-4 might

the use of

identifying xCv"'")'"Lc; with

l0

ll

'::lan'

to mean just 'soul'

is some-

it

,,-iir:ary

use

of

nan'

to

h-'3

r:".t:!d.n

as

this

secondary

to

der i'.''-~d

<t,l,j

~oubtrdClion)

(by

::.o mean 'soul in a body'. -whiCll las~ ;__;;, t.her:!iore che ~v

(B)
dlld

The claim that

bnnes

in

animate

certaln ..Jay',

r)bjection:

stand

'.Hay'

the prtJr

that

'man'

un1';3S

man

'man'

is

'flesh

'animate

'soul'.

just

l.Jirn t~vn yuu .lo not undecstand composite

unless

nonct)mposite

as

'man',

th011gh

IOU

,;,~ed

th1.t

..;orr:l..

F1\L-ther

give

'..lith

~qual

validity,

'flesh

dnd

us,

bqnes'?

Well,

Reply:

'man'.

look

1'l_~

dt

not

of

co;1rse
~vtll

tJroblem:
third

..1

J2lh

nut thi.i line

:-:teaning

ff.:

20

understand

';nan'

of

flesh

and

bones

we

Can

:-;tato2ment

decide

fact

lS

tetween

l~)43a

"l.t

37-b

irreif':vant

reason t;tven is

because
C{~rned

J.re

<Yith

.1sklng

',,.ri~h

are

we

'man'

to

the

il.i\l

Lhe

about

8)

by

-Lnquiry

neanin~

as

:.>Ubstance

mt!aning

form

tne
as

or

,_,,e

lhere

was

actuality

~o

settle

for

1.:1 tdCt

J.!Ubi~UOUS

~in~

.,nd

that
'-:an'

'..Je
for

')resent

have

purposes

l_fl

l3

tne r,tarmer

!Jerfectly

the composite,

'C~.nimal'

,;<etcned.

~~ad

..;ccd

ts

r,(h,;'S

Ar himself

1~1ly

Lhin:t r-ilar

"'

he

some

because we
concerned

Lnclination to

Uo

for

r:he

0r

not

'leed

any oLher Hord

LU~Jb

form,

;o :Lc dnes :lot r:~att':r ~-=-

'house'

that

hat 1hat W'e

that

C:(,JTL!-'1;:-,i~e definltion of

only be con-

decision here.

.;her:. her

.J,OIJd

indicate (a) that

shall

we

with

rnal

2-4 as explai\'iZ..

',:;oul',

.Jn occasion 'man'

1C: 1db 6 presupposes

L> ,l.'lbi guous

this

">oul

but

supposj

inn

(NB xa.(,

1.7

on

principles)

Zll.

the

face

what

of

it

the .1mbiguity thesis

from

term

ambiguity

is

the

H3

or

is

thesis
is

of

type

these

(But

Yet

the

is

.1nother

4-ways ambiguous

sentential context ~t:l_ect~ one of

the

t::"NO

would

not

it

36-7?)

'There's a man

it can happen that a

meanings

be

whether

point of

to ~he view Lha.t

ttnless

the

is

questions about

reading

definition,

then what would be

would commit one

Or

(on Aris-

definition discussed

,,..,e face

right

is simply

another?

Platonist

in the chapter,

which

int~re"itingly

!Jy Ar

ZlO-ll.

and

ambiguous.

house'

'vhether

elsewhere

doubtful

is

the

the

believed,

between

The
in

as

Here,

relation

that

it

the

thesis actually espoused than a consequence deducible

totelian

At

'dnimal'

The ~ passage remains to be considered, together

problem:
is

hypothetical

dS

less

import

,md

Wuxf)again, l. 6).

so

1~43b

4-14

eluded

La L.ll

given

of the term.

This

'2xploitell in a p!lper by ~1.J. Lolx in !'!_ind,

approached

perhaps

its

this

with

some

bark was uorse

dismdy,

but eventually con-

than its bite.

Ar's general

purpose seemed reasonably clear; the ctifftculties were those of detailed

lnterpretation.

::r6v8EO'"I.C,: nor
cerned;

Ar

iJ,tl;1.<;

when we

of

have

seems
is

11ake

to

simply a

a cr6v8e:rrt!;

or )J.t'f;i.c;

sort

(b)

fhe crUv8crLt; or tJ.L~"c; ;nust

either

in

mixture

the mh:tt:re ,,rhicb

whose in~redients are

ingredients.

7he

two

main

points:

r:onjunction

of

the

(a)

Neither a

ingredients

con-

listed the ingredients, ,..re have still to specify

..;hat

point

is

is

itself

it

tntended,

e.g,

in

~.;hat

ratio.

not he treated as itself an ingredient,

the

i~ 1

a sort of

second-order

first-order mixture and

the original

s:lmildr

or

i.s

~o

;:hal '1lade 'lear the end of Z1.7

(l041.b 11 ff.), though ~e did not 9urs1te this in detatl, nor ~sk whether
it bore on the relations between L.

<~nd

H.

The ;Ttain questions of r!etail that puzzled us were these:

che

1 ,-, 3 ?a 7

We

that

([)
~

_::~

is Ar himself wno 2ntertai~s the thought that

(A)).

v.hy

(~B

his

is

SJLH\.'!S

false,

':;ht:lr-,er nf bricl<.s'.
1n 1

support

1 h,Jt

'Socr:tces'

37)

The

,.,r\uch :rtusc. here ;;1ean

that

shall

\ ; hird no~sibility not ;:,)nsLiered is

is

r:hink

puzzling

(ta:n'ta.,

substance?

Or (b)

:Jmposite?

narry (d) r~ith (.-\),(b) with (B).

LO

to',

Does

substance

soul?

ambi~uity

~;ensible

into

~)clongs

~ensiole

about

in.}ependently

the

~henv~.nenon of

form and actuality.

asking

'man'

as

bat

that essence or 'tr,c:

identical \.J'ith 1

'is

(,\)

;vho

.Jan. 1979.

n ~cnoUv.

J, \))._., \.ty't"O.\. XC'... ~ tO Er(sos lrd.p~

.J.mbiguous,

possiiJility is

1nd ,~ach ,;!.' snch parts i.s 6vt-c0Y, :;ATlt:Ep 't,l.L tiUv O':f...\w\1 rWv tv bf..~ eT6o~
f:xOv-rwv xa.l yO.p

is

not che ..:ldim that you do nut under-

the meaning of

thought

ZlO l036a 16-17 lt

in

~tnd~cstand compos it!..'!

you

~leople'

Sf)!Tie

xa.~'s

in '0t; 1tpbc ~v.

understand

_/Otl

:1.eantng of

its use

must understand 'soul'. chat precisely shows that you must under-

stand
it

cerLain

that claim is the

composite

fiJU

11f

so

from

you do nJt ttnderstdnd c0mposite

J.

unless you understand 'sou~,

:tan

if

in

if ,.,-e under-

'soul'

j'}St

c-an only understand

-;tand

is

an ambiguity into the name

~loes

it

Does l:x
first

'"'lean

have

the

sdme

'crHlsist 0f'

meaning
(h

c3

5)

Jnd

throughout
then

'h~

the

passage,

0r

adequately defined

1 041b

1043b 4

in

terms

of

'fhis

(b 1 )?

Litter

view enables

Again at

a reason for the one before i t .

that

,10 t

either

that

but

threshold

reference

to

or

position

than reference to a

threshold
(104lb 23,

incidentally,

is

more

so for
say

at

any

so

far

refers

as

to

o!,O!: Ot}

1043a 7-12).

that

~ith

all

the

the

Other

cases

brou~ht

in;

~ases

understanding

bl0-4

(Christ

bl2

at

that

fail

b14,

also

as

J,

readings

we

wondered

misprint.

was
Ross

follows

(and

in

to

the

with

some

threshold

example

to x;

is

first

at

1042b

15

f f

n olxrCo.

drops

thinks

Alexander s

text

in his

as

the

(with

seems

conjunction

at

oU'te: clause

to

Bonitz),

support

translation.

revised

the

for

was

the

preceding -11 o6o-Ca.

thinks

it

to

Jaeger

mss.,

. .mulct
is

to

need ot

before

man animal

~wuld

find

footed)
element,
unly

the

new group

that]

are
but

something
-

substance,

people,
We

it.

two-footed,

matter

matter.

of

as

else

somethin~

and

his

commentary
he returns

in

of iS

referring

back to

takes l:l;a~opoUv'te::c;

br1ng

in

Alexander's

view

[if
Ls

people
needed,

which

3hould

with

reference

if

neither

these
1s

nor

suggests,

follows:

think

this (additional element:.)

in

be

stating the substance

think of animal + two-footed as

the sentence,

indicative 6e:t;

the

forced

on

anyone

The

ground

for

23

related

to

from AX\.d.

who

the

1'1.

solution

onwards,

coun-

thought

given would

man was

dnimal

be

... two-

justified such an interpreta-

to

he

it
'nor

is,

they

(animal and

two-

consists

of

an

is responsible for

treating
4-14

these

(so

lines

as parenthetical is

Ross ad 23-5);

but there may be

questions to raise about this in due course.

R. Heina-

The context of the passage was discussed in the light of

man' s

of

paper

Aristotle s

taken up:

artefacts

( 1)

and

Tenth Aporia'.
E !Oo,

If the

Two main theses of that paper

is perishable,

other cases not excluded,

at

then it

least

in the case

is not

the species

but the substantial form which is referred to; for Aristotelian species
eternal.

(2)

the

If

el6o~

is

pecishable,

it

is

not

individual,

11niversal (general, shareable, etc.),

There was
passage

does

some

question,

actually

What

assert

Heinaman
the destruction of
grounds
that
a

are

(i)

strictly

consequence

cp.

not

be

esp.

l033b

yet'

(1.

(ii)

19)

was

'{Uestion
reference

Platonic
and

to

whether

Platonism
Platonism

agnosticim on whether
l)f

perishing.

If

-::-0. 'Uvd.,

as

the

facts

is

clear

it

that

there

are

wholly

could
forms

forms

be

are

are

that

this

they do

in the
forms

present
of

arte-

not survive
His chief

says

means

to which it can be objected

only

that

(ii)

could not
Platonic
to

eternal

hence

15

say it
forms

HI,

settled.
quite

not

is

that

the

the claim that the target here

(existing apart)

not

perishability

or 'M.p& -rb CJ6voXou

eternal,

Platonist Hants,

Ar
the

they do

by reference
as

of

i.e. they are perishable.

the same;

Ar

whether

these forms are not xwpLCT"t'a.( and not

passage

Zl3-16

to

l060b 23-8;

separation

challenged

of

that

as

perishability

being xwp~crt"a.C

not

20-1)

K2

with

speaking
of

argues

the composite,

two things are one and

could

first,
the

he asserts is that

less clear.)

which such peonle would be ignoring, mentioning

So if

14-23

Wo"te

apparatus

volume)

therefore interpreted as

but

not

thought e:( 'taU6'\SXTJ perhaps

We

facts.
the

people who ignore the matter; we agreed, and thought that if tt;nt.poUv't'e:c;
referred

one

and

in Jaeger 1 s favour, apart

Alexander

two
in

hut

l-::cKeon

awkwardness

irrelevant

of

'-x'

of

E's position is

All '"'e could find

support,

Ross

bl3

nccurrence

J has ob unambiguously;

Jaeger's

but

Jaeger

Alexander

mss.;

the

translation

immediate

but

Jaeger

abo-Ca.,, "tOU'to at

thoughx

traditional text.

-rt)v \5\:nv,

1043b
that

goes.

(Jaeger's apparatus seems to attribute contra-

whether

from
an

his

r..;ell,

reads

they would not

does

to do

this sentence and the next

issues.

despite

but

footed.

are
he

in the last two cases.

dietary

Ar' s

were

textual

&xx

dropped

requires ~XX');

drops o6

raises

not

!:.x ( = consist

need a section to themselves.

(3)

himself

the matter, we wanted to make

terfactual,

( 1) we can presumably

mentioned

but

511bstance,

introduces yet a not her kind of case, where

a genus and differentia are

is

Since Ar

it.)

the

ensuing

this

tion.

If we are right under

rate

't'Wv O:XN..uv presumably

(cf.

imply

the same reason?

yes,

for

the

Eor understanding position.

says that something could:1.'t be

Does 6~oCw' (b8)

in

COt1515tS

and

itself'.

presumably saying

is

important

threshold is

in?) jt1st one thing without being identical

(2)

iJOSition

b~ing,

to g~ve

che yd.p c2lause

Ar

b~

of

perishable
not

could

keeping

ZB

(cf.

'not at all clear

...;hich does
One

in

since after
is

suggest

with

things.

regard

the

that

Ar 's

present

or perishable without

process

they can ~xist

separately ~ap~

(contraposition)

exist

if ~vith arte-

separately Jtnp6. "tt\ 't'Lvd.,

in

10

l 'J4Jh

Lhose
as

cases

they must

perishab1,_!,
in

~tecnal

lOt

cannot

exist

besides

the

(the

specifies

20

l.

same

which

inference

forms

cannot

those forms cannot be sepa-

it looks to be tautological:

be xwpLcr-"ta.(,

rate '~hich

be

the ~= clause

([f

K2).

Better.

particulars.

therefore,

to construe 15ou not as specifying lvCwv but as epexegetical to xwp ~crt"a.C:

'except that it is clear that
be

separate,

that

is

to

the substance of some perishables cannot

say,

cannot

exist

besides

the

particulars,

there

were

being

and

the

to

But

the

proposition

of

the

forms

would

view

connection

with

( 1)

an Aristotelian species
succeeds
of

another

eternity

other

(l)

and

the

perishable

Ar

was

that

emphasized

the

eternity

is Heraclitean rather than Platonic:

without

which

it

any

here

single entity enduring.

denies
It

things?

for

artefacts

may be doubted,

and

of

one man

Is this the kind

leaves

yet to doubt

open

passages

other
and

of

are

looked

not
at

(e.g.

or

one

ZlS

come
of

us

forms

to

the

be
key

two

i.n

f .lnd

1039b 20-7, A3

the

above

l070a

for

that

have

can the
this

of

that

and

Second, we
on behalf

of individual forms.
As

to

the

first,

some at

least of the opponents were anxious not

to be stuck with defending, on Ar's behalf, a tame version of Platonism.

The Aristotelian principle 'A universal exists if something instantiates
should not be taken to assert a mysterious biconditional connection

it'

two

universal
is

its

indistinguishable

and

From this

particular

of course,
nf

instantiation.

instantiation,

somewhere.
in a

its

thing

it

forms

its

of

affairs,

the existence of

The existence

exists

point

still exist as

individual

states

of

just

insofar

view its

ceasing

as

ceasing

of

just

is

instantiated

to

be

instantiated

to exist there -

say that

except

as

is

not
(in

difficulty

that

they

for

are

realized

those

who

predicable of

but belongs with a committed Aristotelian

If

the

instance is perishable,

that is

and the form is nothing 7ta.pd.

This, of course, is compatible with

perhaps

it

be thought an objection to

will

'The

causes

lhe opponents

be required to explain how Ar can both

(universal) forms are and are not -as t:hou~h

of

different

indi victuals

[ sc.

of

~~n, while in their universal definition they are the same'.

press

hard the objection that you and I

same x LvT')a'ov

and

insist

that

Ar

does

of the various causes (as opposed to

rent,

so as

he

the

a-ft,

l)J.ft

that
as

to

leave

themselves

:: different x~vi;cm.v to

all

same

not

Opponents

may be siblings from the

actually assert

that

~ach

the total causal story) is diffe-

room

to

insinuate

that

the

form may

it

is

supply

construed as

of

it.

'the

To

to explain coming

that

is

the

required causal difference.

talk of your form and mine may be admitted on condition

form of you as a composite being',

identificationally posterior

needed

the

same so long as there is a different matter (note the feminine

Alternatively,

required,

the
to

to

the

composite,

objection that

be,

since

i.e.

not as prior to and

form as universal is not

another

concrete

individual

is

the reply was made that the same argument would

apply to form as individual.

Another

though it may,

propound the above principle for the existence of nni.versals and, compar_ibly with that,

exist

different, ~ ~ ~ ~~~ x~\ ~o e!oo~ xa\ ~ 0 x<o~~ xa\

are

the

it

instantiated somewhere else.

should not

a universal

not

Consequently, the perishability

universal

view.

but

the

allows for eternity and being/not being to hold of

it

forms:

explanatory
between

that

Talk of

As to the second, AS 107la 27-29 is a favourable text for indivi-

15-17) where forms are

been adduced

do

things

as

reconcile.

the same thing.

must
sense

perish in a 5pecial way?

and

passages

forms

its realizations here and there.

it is not

First,

directions.

satisfactory

:1

perishable

Heraclitean eternity,

dual

took

(2)

individual

universals

to

and parcel with Ar s dedication

part

for

than kinds of species.

of

difficult
is

end of that realization of the form,

3pecies]
Discussion

that

parcels of matter),

to dispute the truth of (1) but to agree that Ar's topic is forms rather

opponents

tasks
forms

can stand as Ar's own Hithout

(2)

So what of the theses themselves?

this passage.
In

of

of

these

understanding
antecedent

being of

in this particular individual or that.

multiple
e.g. house'.)

two separate
not

,Jn

whether

passage considered was A 3

the

items

such

as

'house

l070a

13-17,

without

but we deadlocked

matter',

;tre not, were to be taken as individual or as universal.

here
~np~

on

the

which are

and

So no help

preceding statement that the form of ho115e does not exist

the composite.

[7

-----------------------l(ll!!i'Ol:;-------:--------:---------------.. .-..

h:S.otJ#'!I_.,.!;;'e~Z!fit:.~~,"'

l04lb 23

'.-\t- ft:;R

l0_43~2_l_~~----~r~tisthenes

28-32,

which

theory

on

was

to

once

Ant.,

In

23-32

commonly

is

to

Aristotelian

in

>.:~ertaln

2.J -d

qnly

used

father
language

r_o

,\ntlSthenes.

L~a_t3tetus

the
and

content

(A)

Dream

and

for

its

"lpplies.

allowing definition for composites could not be the consequence (ilx;-r',

of

28)

an d.JtopCa. about

Burnyeat 's paper

to

think

defining

necessary

it

to

follow

against

'point'

Ross'

Jaeger's

from

the

accepted

from

a disinclination

emending

or

translation

'plausibility',

so

of

26-l [xa.C]

of xotov ~lv ~c x~X.

as

Socratic -r(-Jto'tov contrast),

for xaLp6v,

that

Ar

'timeliness'

should

not

part
not

the ~~opCa.

of

concession

of

himself

sort.

The objection here was that 'Silver is like tin'seems a striking example
which
any

should

have

some

non-definitional

like tin'

part

tifully

in Cyprus',
to

play.

descriptive

it

whereas

statement

(m

would

8urnyeat 's

serve.

reading

'Silver

could

be an (imperfect)

applied
is

the

'silver'

H3.

The

next

question

which

specifically

'the

Antisthenians
enough of a

sistent
problems
from
can

said

out

at

definition
be

and

how

Ant.

l043b

where

similarly

of

of

the

once:
being

it,

two

(1)

23-8

fits

with tJ.29

persons'.

Perhaps Ant.

passages,

but

if

one

does

try,

A 29 can be read as saying that

impossible)

nothing else;

either that "X.6yo< is

'It is

32-4,

there to be no call to make a con-

only
(ii)

a
even

thing's

proper

if X6yoc:;

is

definition, only one X6yo.; is admitted for each thing, so:

case,

l024h

H3 has the more diffuse reference

uneducated

paradox-monger for

position
arise

was

names

like tin',

two

(so far

definition

broader

than

the very thing that H3 allows.

'Nhy

impossibility
0f

falsehood

in
of

consequence

Any solution must be such as to explain

of

contradicting

( 1024b

33-4).

his

thesis

Ant.

and

practically

was
to

the

to

the

~v

Socrates,

thesis

is

8:

that

the context

roughly, su bj ec t s
one description

only

f.<P' lv6<; ( 1024b

t~here

in 629,

'double'

is

2.

so that

And

if

is

or because e.g.

is the

'treble'

'not double'/'treble' cannot be meaningfully

not

meaningfully,

coherence with

'Silver

the ).6yo~ of 2 (would negative de-

is not

anything?)

the

silverish'
silver

by

nor

of .629

rest

falsely.
spells

The

(or something of

the sort)

(A)

is

and

'Silver

trouble

incoherence

with

should be

like tin'

should

fail to say anything about silver.

(B)
e.g.

The

units

are

states

silver's being like tin.

not

even

like tin, which fails

falsely.

to A29,

of

(cf.

affairs

dv-rLXyEav

nho 1t1tove6~,

10),

would involve saying silver

to describe that state of affairs at all,

This makes the remarks about Ant.

somehwat digressive

cued by the thought (31-2, where perhaps the parentheses should

be removed)

that a false

X6yo~ is not the '\6yo<; of anything. Ar 's point

that if you take that thought the wrong way, Ant's olxet'oc;; A6yo~ the-

is

sis results.

Consistency between !129 and H3 is achieved because while

~29 excludes all false statements, leaving true ones intact, H3 excludes
a

subclass

is

that

of

the

latter,

allows

(B)

an

viz.

definitional

truths.

acceptable otxe'to~ X6yot; to

One

be

as

objection

long

as

tv6;~

(C)
there

The units are essences

is

thing

113,

no
as

fits

room
a

H3

definition.

This

(A)

with 629,

rival

is

definitions,

outr_ight

nor

such

inconsistent

with

and does not yield the general

Av~LAtyeLvand falsehood indicated prima facie in the text.

Note that
-vith

between

than

t<p'

l024b 29) and the thesis is that

for ~vnX..tyELV

false

less well

rlenial of

(cf.

you

ev

',.Jish, which was thought not to be a natural reading of the rubric

impossibility

The suggested solutions we discussed can

be distinguished by what they take to be the 11nit in

J 3).

committed

silver,
the

into

double'

not 2,

this

For

in the silver

which would mean excluding

a.ll other comparisons, or it is not, which would mean that &29 disallows

further,

'not

an acceptable Myo~ of

instrument for getting

to the right thing (note 6 Liidl;a.L,

In this sense it might be the nearest one can get to definition.

27).

was

name

Ant.

the X6yot; of

be

3,
to

that

i.s

attach

fits

e.g.
loihich

is

l:cru, but unlike, say, 'Silver is found plen-

does not say -r(

someone

to

because

X..6yo~ of

(deriving
some

are

about

This

scriptions

Less dpproved was Burnyeat' s

endorse the d.xopCa. or the grounds for it.

understanding

This 1vas

together with (i)

units

I ~"1.:0 Jh 2 3

2's own \6yo;, hence something else's X..6yo<; \vhen you say '8 is double'
(b 35-a l).
Thus understood, Ant. allows '2 is double' and rejects
'8 is double'.
The impossibility of &.v-n.).tyeLv would then follow
either

<6p(<TCl.CT6CLL 6' o6), (ii)

as

anything.

in ?hronesis 1970,

The

description,

at

it would be compatible with (A),

all

(see

above),

\. .5yo<; longer

than

one

word,

:-teaning

Ross

ad

109la

(cf.

to

rather
7,

supposing

take \6yov ua.xp6v

than

(l043b

(A) ran cope

26)

as

any

in the specialized proverbial

Burnyeat p.

113,

115)

'evasive verbiage

such as slaves tell to cover up failure to rio the job assigned to them'.

' 9

l.Ydb L8

l04Jb 32

l043b

28's

28-32

Wo--te:

Uxrt.'

has

ted:

the

trick

clause

Bxe:L

't~v& xat.p6v,

for

which

reason

after ~ in

in

is

relate ii.xrt'

to

not

30)

Burnyeat

to

in

conjunction -..;ith

to

the

preceding sentence's

subordinate d.Jtop'a.

the

the

the

Burnyeat's account was accep-

and

main

to

see

We--t'

comma rather than a colon

punctuates with

clarifies

Just

definiens.
puzzles

the

the

Thus:

connection.

ture

Ar wishes

this

complexity

Antisthenians

to

and

~~opCB

Their

achieve 1ts goal.

moral

of .4-14

predicative

structure

is

makes them say a definition cannot

is timely as focussing the very struc-

The

affirm.

or

consequence

the

consequence,

that

( r7!:e:p X'tX., 30-3), of this predicative structure in which one ele-

ment

stands

to another as matter to form -

right.

only

is

difficulty

the

chapter,

refers

9_tg_y to

so

remains

it

is that only complex items

that

1044a
14-23
that

The

it confirms that 14-23 is parenthetical.

14-23

is

mentioned
But

11-14.

the

in

the

summary

and

to

104 3b

14-23

is

parenthetical

32ff.,

not

to

to

the

terminal

p.

1043b 4-14,
chunk of

23-32,

the

text

(44a

and

'If

substances

as

not

as

(numbered

collections

or

abstract

is

not

(cf.

of &pL9J..1,6.:;

sense

is

this

complexes

it is in this

Keep J..i.Ovdbwv and

units'.

of

it

translate:

is in this way,

elements,

not

as

viz.

some say as

units.

are what we call numbers,

sence

of

certain way 6.pL61J.oC,

in a

numerable)

of

in what

'If numbers are substances,

assemblages
are

1):

Jaeger worries about the text of 34. Ross

231 mistranslates 33-4 as

way

(~

and this

8).

But

the Platonists) substance/es-

substance/essence

is,

as

has

been

seen

(~avtp6v and o~~w' referring back) in a certain way a number of elements

which

is

with

one

the

5).

common

same

So we
nor

to

use

phrase
are

the Greek <tpL8~6~ (cp. <tpL9~6~ 'tL~

of

famously

not

to

ask

seek analogies

in

'Is

the

definition of

one of the substances,

for

between substance/essence and

in

time,

34

219b

instance,

e.g.

8,

but

to appreciate that one may, with some justice, say that o~Ca is &pL9~6~

summary

(puzzlingly enough)

or ~b 't( ~Y e!vnL

(l0-1)

being compared to ~pL9J..~,6.:;?

8?'

can be defined.
I f this is

to

understood

that we must recognize a certain complexity or predicative structure

what

is

be

the e:r~ep clause 30-3 (which shares the same consequent with

that

is

to

of 23 and its reference to 4-14.

provided

one

takes it in the right sense of &.pc.6~6,,

Platonists' sense of '(abstract) number'.

has

made

it

clear

(q>a.vEpov 6~ xn\ OLo'tL

why

not

in the

For the preceding discussion

32-3)

substance

is

in

a certain way a number of elements.

into which it is sandwiched.

We

further

discussed Burnyeat 's contention that Aristotle is here

maintaining that substance is a numbered collection of elements, rather

than

What

are

the Kpoi't<t

can say (as with Wittgenstein)

comes

6.

to

Perhaps

(cf. <tOLCl(pE'<<t, 35)?

all we

Definition

is that there must be some.

an end somewhere (and not usually with a category)

cf.

35-

Of this we can be certain even if we cannot give examples of inde-

finables.

concerned

to

draw

an

(i)

analogy

between

substance

and

number

Of the four analogies he states (ibid. p. 4), (3), that a principle

of unity is required (1044a 1-9)

l!

something which he asserts elsewhere

of !!umber, not in the sense of a numbered collection (Metaph. A 9 992a

l;

l043b 32-44a 11

The points of analogy between ob<rC<tL and d.pL8~oC are:

(1)

Both are divisible

will

suffer

Both

stand
it

is

as that by which we number.

is

until

subtraction
in

need

of

or
a

you

come

addition

principle

to indivisibles;

without
of

unity,

loss

of

(2)

Neither

identity;

something

in

(3)

virtue

of

Ev l.-x. -n:oA.XWv (text of 1044a 3 hard hut sense clear); (4)

:ieither admit of more/less.

We are speakin~ of +J xa"t'i\ -rO

eTboc; abo-Ca.

he

low);

should

but

he

assert

this

apparently did,

We agreed that we found it paradoxical

even of number-by-which-we-number
and,

it was maintained,

(see be-

there is no evi-

dence that he asserted it of numbered collections (where also we found

it

difficult

to

see

in .1hat

way

principle of unity could plausibly

he required).
(ii)

Analogies (2)

elsewhere
t.27

20

1082a 15 ff., 20 ff.).

that

which

Against this it was argued that Aris-

that by which we number.

totle

to

number

1024a 12 ff.

(l043b 3ft.1044a l) and (4)

rather

and Cat.

than

to

6a 21 ff,

2l

numbered

(l044a 9-11) are applied

collections.

respectively.

at

Metaph.

It was agreed that

l043b 32

.e;TES ON ETA

this

point

numbered

was

weaker,

collections

in

(and

that

these

indeed

analogies

of which one is no more three than another

But

(iii)

dicussion

context

of

the

'.vould

apply

the point was raised:

collections, what are they?).

in the

l!l44a 2

(C~t.

in

also

to

present

if the threes

6a 22) are not numbered

H3

as

whole,

the

point

the

distinction between numbers

important

point

about

the

analogy

and

coll~ctions.

numbered

between

substances

not the ~ber of elements in a given essence,

but

and

Difficulties

to

awkward

numbered

were

that

first

collections

is

against

this

the fact that there

interpretation.

It

was

nc:.

and

in

e:r-xep

33

not

felt

to

l5ff.

the

)nly

<:lllswers

possible

from

could

the

not

operation

could

do

principle
counting

the

if

exist

of

were

(as numbered

counting

counting;

there

(Hhether

of

unity

is

presupposes

needed

the

for

Aristotle

souls,

110

not

unities

pointed

out

question

express much of

that,

..rhat

virtue
since

unifies

~auld

as

in

of

ever
But

numbers

numbers

.::tre,

them co11ld

[s

count

is no help
as

outside

The first

be

t hemse 1 ves.

case,

discussed

the

the number seven

for Aristotelian forms,

i.n any

not

may

other

actually

this

themselves,

number-series.

anything

so

things) unless there tvere

they

of numbered things 0r not).

these alternatives is not paradoxical,

are

the

none of '.>~hich

a unity in virtue of itself or in virtue of something else?

The analogies between sub-

was

derived
time

particuJ ar set

oi

of

that substances ~ numbers in 1043b 33-34, even though this is quali-

by i'l'.oH;

be
as

that

\.Jhere

analogy (1043b 34-36) applies "!!re easily

than to numbers.

l 1 V~2a

!17

help.

that,

this

stance and number were felt to be rather weak to justify the assertion

fied

could

act

r<'lised

the

11uch

souls

is something that unifies them.

felt

At

numbered things could not exist

The

numbers

;eems
unity
hold

that a principle of unity is needed for substances is of more importance

than

passage.

Platonists are allowed are ~.J.~8E;~c;. -'rpf], uC~LS and ?to-Le;,

too,

lt

was

,1bstractions,

the

in

the

same

terms

more

and

less,

apply to concrete things.

a qualification, especially as it is followed up by the non-hypothetical

statement in 34.
1044a -~-=-!.1.
1043b ~
forward

it was argued that q>a.ve:p6v in 32 and oU~wc; in 33 referred

rather

than back,

l044a 7 being advanced as a parallel in the

case of the latter.

1044a 2-9

The

(e.g.)

sense

given by the various corrections in a 3 is conIt would in any case be odd to say that the number

was

Ihe Platonists

principle of
referred

to

and so can't,

for

unity

have
his

principle
an

own

l045a 7f.

answer
in

of
to

order

this

(cf.

demand,

to make

the

unity
in

standing of number,
a

ff.,

33

more

of

composite

substance

may

admit

and

,,....hich

less.

si.mply

fhe

This

:t.sserts

that

the

nf

appears

to contradict

~ubs~-~~-~ does

suggestion was made that

not

admit

the present passage

might be explained by the doctrine of tl1e 1mperfect mastering of matter

firmed by 1044a 7.
seven

3b

':'a...'::...

The

substance xa~& ~b El&o~ cannot.

although

M7

among

l043b

34

the
have

l082a

20

ff.);

but

it

numbered.

different

in Aristotle's view,

under-

meet his demand

does

he himself

and does he have to have an answer of

objection against

refers to the problem again,

but

might

even

22

be

the

Platonists?

H6

the discussion that follows

is concerned with substances rather than numbers,

that xa.t .~~:e:pt ~oi;c; dpL8uo6<;;

things

and it was suggested

gloss

inspired

by

the

hy

form

is

no

It

was

(de

objected

constitutes
1\ristotle
form

Gen.

4.

168

f.

that

the

767b 8ff.);

cit.)

.;hat

suggestion

that

woman

though less so as a o-UvoAov.

distinction between male and female scarcely

lesser

is ~nimal,

argues

the

i..s

but IJ.aXXov ".<a.t 11't-rov

scale;

(lac.

produces

tissa

An.

less Clv8pW7to<; in form than man is,

'that

degree

but

'llale

need

still

of

not

imply

mastery

not J]uman at

all.

[Alex.

female

not

differ

and

1o

that.

of

For

matter
Aphr.

by

man-

in e!Ooc;

which means species, but also form, since it is contrasted with accidental

differences

o:;uggested
d

3b

passing
33

here.

ff .

due

to

matter,

that e:r:rte:p should

reference

to

snme

not

168.
be

minor

33

f.l

pressed,
obiection

an objection which Aristotle

fe-t

Alternatively,
and
to

this

tnat

the

need

doctribe

not

be

it was

clause
of

spelled

was
~

out

~OTES

l044a 13

1044a 13

E(t; 'tbv &.p~e!-J.,~>V d.vayUJYi'lc: refers to the view of Aristotle's

l"fi(,;

opponents

ON ETA

(1043a

33

cf.

f.,

Zll

1036b

12);

Aristotle

Reservations

is not claiming

meaning

that he himself has achieved, or even proposed, such an d.vny~.

both

and

usages

in meaning

6,

Meta.

definitions:
l043a

14-18,

l064a

l033a

l-5,

b24-26,

19-28;

194a

lO-ll,

1-7,

l025b

De Caelo

277b

30-278a

usages
that

in

whether

De

the

et

Corr.

l076a

321b

13-25,

19-22;

l037a

!1eta.

7-10,

I035a

l033b

6-9,

17-18,

1035b

l035a

l-3,

l0-17

l043a

29-

(cru:l.:l.aj)-f)

);

De Caelo 278a 13-15.

18,

9,

l033a

l032a 18, 23,

10 (<rV:I.).apf)),

33,

l037a

l036a

l034b

7-8,

ll,

l035a

l033a

(x61tl>.o~),

De

ll

27-28,
Caelo

(cf.

l036a

9 (>.hl>.ou),

l035a

278a

14-16),

this

13-15;

cf.

De

1035a
Gen.

et

indicate

the

either

issue

the

form

of

the

or

the

ambiguity of
composite

certain

terms

and Heinaman' s

that

can

contention

that this is parallel to Aristotle's usage elsewhere and not in itself

anything
this
of

It

unusual.

position

through

predication,

and

Aristotle's point at
tinguishing
is

not,

many

but

cases

the

where

suggested

concern

that

difficulty

the beginning of

cases

rather

was

the

where

the

it

that

Aristotle

substance
of

should

applying

this

'snub'.

not arise

But

in

the

had

arrived

at

be

the

subject

to

the

form.

H3 is not the difficulty of dis-

sharp

the

referring

distinction

grounds

to

the

that.

house,

between

even

the

if

in

difference

what

is

house

form

the

to

1043a

understanding

it

soul)

was

the

two

its

form,

involve understanding

contended,

saying that the term

-

that

(though there were problems as to

But,

composite

37

was conceded on all sides

included

for

below).

in

It

in some cases (e.g.

see

opposed

claim

it

even in

as

the

primary.

(e.g.)

not,

too;

on

is

which he

this

'house'

scarecly

can mean the

certainly does

say,

and

took him to be expressing his own view; still less, therefore, would

Is Aristotle

saying

(I)

that a shelter made of bricks and stones

is a house because a shelter (a permanent shelter,

is;

or (II)

and

stones

to exclude cloaks?)

that a shelter is a house because a shelter made of bricks

is?

(1)

any

seemed

suggestion

excessively

of

Platonist

transcendent

forms

to

some,

The point was made that in ordinary usage

tainly applies to the composite,

rather than to the form;

totle

order

necessarily

usage?
that

It was

'shelter'

composite,
form

of

exist

bound

suggested

appears

house

in

in

the
that

the

of

priority

point

apart

from

'house'

cer-

but is Aris-

implied

of 7tp0<;; Ev might

by

normal

simply be

in the definitions both of the form and of

the matter appears o~ly in that of the latter.

while

only

by

though not

existing

any case differs

one

sort

from

of matter,

the

soul

in

that

former

in

several

the

latter
-

the

The
can

though we

is ambiguity from those where there

debated how far

this ~as Aristotle's view; does xaC in l043a 32 express

an alternative,

or does a house generally, for Aristotle, involve stone

the

only counter-examples

to us being 'soul' and, in a non-substance category,

to

on

not to be misled by the ambiguity in the

there

need

exists

which

case,

individuals.

Further discussion of beginning of H3

to

~v

this did

involving

returned

concentrated

~Ot;

matter

17,

Corr. 32lb 22-23, 33.

We

about

ff.,

it justify his regarding this meaning as the primary one.

A term refers to form alone:

29,

is

justifies Aristotle

we

l033a

29

by concern with definitions does involve a refe-

indicated

are

A term can refer to form or composite.

Gen.

(e.g.)

understanding

i.e.,

4,

'house'

Discussion

30-l026a

6, 23-25, De Anima 403a 29-b 16.

expressed
in

rence in the one case to the form, in the other to the composite.

List of passages supplied by R. Heinaman

fwo

were

reference

that

occurred

'hollow' as opposed

context of first philosophy the problem does

( l043a 37) as we are clearly concerned with form rather than

with the composite (i.e. (b) on p.l2).

(for

the

foundations)

and

bricks

(for

made entirely of wood a house for him?

in

several

<me

alternative

could ~efine

brick house

~he

form

or

the
a

sorts

of

composite

stone

housei

the walls)?

matter,

'house'
such

it

15

seemed

at all,

structure
c~

doubtful

exist

whether

as opposed to defining

a definition would perhaps

'a shelter made of suitable matter',

24

Is

If the form of house

but

'suitable'

take

is redun-

:JOIES iJN

l044a 29

~TA

ctant as otherwise it wouldn't be a shelter, so we're left with

a shel-

ter made of matter'.

might indeed speak of the specific form 0r

~SS:!nce

(henceforth:

speaking

universal*),

individual*

in

the

.:Is

sense

opposed

uf

to

including

peculiar

hence differing not only numerically).

The

difficulty

was

raised

that,

in

the

case

of

soul,

the

form

individual*

contrast

that

will

of man as

It

be

of

'l!niversal'

forms

that

1.<1ere

characteristics

(and

is not with the universal*

concerned.

The question must

(not only had to exist in a particular sort of matter, flesh and bones,

remain open for

but) could not be defined without reference to matter;

that can also be given to the universal -individual contrast.

the definitions

the moment whether there

is any other meaningful sense

of perception and most of the other soul-faculties would involve refe-

rence to matter,
403a

to resist

undue

vice-versa.
for

not

to

etc.

have

(I)
be

(de Anima 1. 1

it was maintained, was concerned not only

emphasis on matter to the exclusion of form,

We differed

this was
have

as for example in the case of anger

Aristotle,

ff.).

l6

above;
the

in

the

matter

formal

our

view as

reference
of

the

as well as

to

same

to

but also

how great a difficulty

matter is indirect, it does

individual,

material

element

and

flesh,

(de Gen.

bone,

3.

In view of

(2),

while

the

view for

which I

shall be arguing may

derive support from the identification of the form of a living creature

with its

soul

of

number

and

the

creatures

problematic

support

fact
is

that

we

concerned,

for

any

speak of

it

not seem to provide un-

doctrine

would
of

the

number of souls where

survival

of

individual

souls when their bodies have perished.

et Corr.

32lb 20 f.).

4.

Individual forms (which are however universal* rather than indivi-

dual*, since they differ only numerically) will, it is argued, be posteForms in Aristotle - Universal or Individual?

(Note by R.W. Sharples)

What follows is an attempt to clarify some points relating to the

l.

claim

that

we

may

Aristotle 1 s

represent

speaking not of form as universal,

thought

more

accurately

by

possessed by all members of a given

natural kind, but rather of individual forms in each member of a natural

kind

forms

may appear

identical
from what

in

kind

and

follows that

differing

only

numerically.

the difference between this and the

opposed view is one of terminology rather than of substance;

case

the

question

becomes one of

Aristotle,

of

rather

than

with

of the view which I

nominalism,

for

which

terminology is

in which

the more

true

My primary concern is with the interpretation

to Aristotle's thought.
of

It

the

philosophical

am attributing to him;

example,

may well

be

more

merits or demerits
~

a Stoic type

satisfactory than Aris-

rior
to

to

matter,

in

that

they can only

be

individuated

the matter in which they are embodied.

here,

however,

seems

misleading.

precisely themselves

principles

The

of

by

reference

To refer to individuation
forms

of

individuation;

concrete
it

things

are

is only by refe-

rence to the form of man that we can say that a certain amount of matter
here

constitutes

three,

course,

Aristotle's

unities

that

are

to

substances

and

viduals:

so

two

it

or

should

have

four
be

essences

men

things
in

(and

hence,

of

which are

real

primary

sense

the

The role of matter is not so much to individuate

pluralize.

However,

to universal form,

than

that

- Metaph. Z4, Zl6).

as

rather

concern

it may be argued that it is by reference

rather than to individual forms, that we count indi-

that,

while universal form will be prior to the concrete

individuals, individual forms will be posterior to them and to matter.

totle's position however interpreted.

2.

~othing

in what

follows

is

intended to suggest that

individual men (for example) differ other than

liar

characteristics,

rather
and

than

outside

such as Socrates'

essential,
the

scope of

attributable
(scienti.fic)

numer~cally;

snub-nosedness,

to

matter

knowledge.

the forms of
their pecu-

5.

I his

however

else

over

and

and

individual

rather

than

r.~ore

Aristotelian

Ln

t_!!_i_~

form,

sense one

to

suggest

and simply

say

forms;
to

that

that

the

dispense
there

We do not

question

form

are

tYith
three

whether

universal

(not

men

'7

is

something

which is cer-

need both universal forms

remains

instances of the form 'man' in Lhis matter.

26

universal

the collection of individual f0rms,

tainly not Aristotle's posit ion.

are accidental
to

seems

above

it

would

universal*)

not

be

forms,

here because there are three

NOTES UN C:TA

1044a 29

6.

forms

Specific

universal*,

are

or

not

The definition of
sesses,

and

existed.
the

form is

essences,

themselves

in

would

It

is

argued,

universal

while

rather

admittedly

than

rally

speaking) numerically different

duals

(even

individual.

be any

exemplified
least

the

less

accidental,
in more
one

if

and

than one
is

it

if

applicable
dependent

only one man

on matter,

wheter

the

have

case of

existed

the

instance (though it must be

to

at

exist

past

for

this

individual

all.

Of

to exist;

course.

for

by

define

Alexander

of

Aphrodisias

to represent Aristotle 1 s

accurately

individuals

as

such is

exemplified on one or

many

(Quaest o lo

thoughts;

but

this

is

This is the position

still a dodo even if it is the only one left.)

argued

and

3),

it

seems

one reason why we cannot

a definition may equally well

that

occasions

(Zl5

l040a

ff.).

33

be

But this

state of affairs seems best represented, not by speaking of a universal

form 1
or

but

may

by saying that there is an individual form of man which may

not

Aristotle

be

repeated

ever

refer

in an

to

indefinite

forms,

in his

number

of

own view,

instances

Does

as 'universal' (rather

Knowledge,

always

mind

of
the

an

builder,

house,

form of

of

Aristotle 1

individual

is

if

house -

he

the

(Metapho

of

MID

is

the

l087a

already actually

universal,

15

but

ff o) o

This

form of house in the

planning the building

form of house,

but an instance of

not indeed brought to actuality by being embodied

but

that

considering at

is

potentially

universal

in matter,
he

is

even before a house is built 1 the

that,
the

of

the

for

actually

suggests

individual nonetheless in that it is the form of house

this

time.

Universal

form,

this

line of

8.
At Z7 l032a 24 Aristotle speaks of the efficient cause,
case of begetting, as -/i <'L'tll. 'tb eTboc; l>.eyO!JlVT] <p(xnc; -IJ ~IJOELOf)<;o

t0r

must
he

to the

continues a.\S-rn

reference
spring;

refer

to a

but

to

form,

Ot lv

rather
~"''Mf

form which is
refer

to

it

as

than

to

identical

this

seems

to

be

in kind with that of the off-

This suggests

l071a 27 should be taken in a strnng sense,

rts

the

same

of

single

species

are

two

indivi-

individuals ~.

lt certainly seems more

different

(numerically

though not

But will the individual forms not be posterior to matter,

their being (above [4])?

the

sense

of

was

Parmenides

being:
1

existence,

rather

individual

form in

for

its

talk about

to

(~.

mistake
than of
this

dependent

Here it seems necessary to examine

1.

being,

simply,

186a

24

being-something,

is misleading and

ff.),

talk of

mere

may be anachronistic.

and

The

man certainly will not be dependent on matter

being an instance of the form man,

rather than horse;

nor yet

for its being the form of Socrates in the sense of including his individual

peculiarities,

pends

on matter

that,

though

identical

instance of

rather
were

than

no

more

the

that,

matter

of man here;

it,

it is not individual* in that sense.

in kind;

form man

is

here

this

but

that

to

it

is

the
It

form a man,

It de-

purely accidental to

form of

this individual

is

that,

true

there

would

be

if

there

no

form

this is to speak as if spatial distinctions were

characterisations

which I

since
it

problematic?

suitable

but (i)

fundamental

occupy

for

for its being the form in this individual rather than

take

is

not

of

matter

Aristotle's

than are
position;

the

forms

and

(ii)

that
it

is

equally true,

on any view, that if there were ~~ matter anywhere suit-

able

a man,

to

form

the

form man would

not

exist

at all,

which does

not seem to be felt as problematic.

In

conclusion,

it

should

be

stressed

that

nothing

in what

has

preceded implies any form of nominalism; the distinction between essence

(form)

and

accident

is

a real one~

of a species with only one member.

Quaest.

l.

3,

and

is

present

even

in the case

This is Alexander's position (cf.

already cited) and Aristotle's too (cf. ;-1etaph. 215 1040a

29-320
Tony Long
of

suggested I

individuation',

Mind

79

consult A.C.
( 1970)

Lloyd's

519 ff.,

indi-

eating that all the causes - material, formal and efficient - are (gene-

28

of

individual).

on it for

(only) in kind suggests that

it is different in another respect, namely, numerically.

that ~~Epa in AS

the

<j>(xnc;

the concrete individual,

Consequently

identical

in

and

i.n the <:ase qf different

causes

even though the third, the form, is the same'.

!Oo

thought would suggest, exists only potentially, not actually.

here

members

any

than 'universal*')?
7.

one

efficient

in kind), in that one and possibly two of them are different numerically

perishable individuals others of the same species must

in

be

the

natural to read 107ta 27 in this way, rather than as saying 'the causes
of

9
in

though

states the essence that an individual man pos-

not

purely

exemplified in at

be

accidens,

'man'

it

may

it

29

'Aristotle's principle

which I did not previously

Professor

know.

in individuals of
numerically holds

!lnd

27

ff.

as

not

Lloyd

expresses

that

Aristotle

strictly

are

which case

indeed

jg

accurate

in

it

is

is

with the form,

speaking

firstly,

(522):

either

always

and,

the

the

the particular matter of

dual

speaking

of

the

forms

this way at AS 107la

ln

But he brings two nbjections against this approach

()21-523).

forms

of

'it L; a useful as well as a plausible way of speaking'-

form and the ~~ universal,

rent

approval

involves

secondly,

matter

same

it

of

flesh

confusing

the

the matter that J.iffe-

man
and

taken
bones

universally,

or

else

in

it

is

as

to

bones

Gen.

et

after

Carr.

even

if

above

universal*

if we assert that the distinc-

the

and

universal

accidents

(t:J.Ot

the

are d~e to

which

universal*)

is

post

between

form

the

all
321b

with

the

have

20

h_as

soul,

::~ay

,1nd

cf.

as

well

above),

',..:hich is

earlier
than

in

the

dS

and

the

not

mav

form,

rather

and

frwm.

in a certain t.vpe

be

universal*

former

xo~v6v

the

to

spoken Clbove

formal

f.,

note,

latter.

they

of

the

the being
this

material

though

he

Flesh
(~

eLement
are

material

by contrast with the purpose they serve, they can stiLl be distinguished

the

actual
we

form,

material

think of

may

must?

and earlier in this

embodiment,

'man'
-

the

involving

concept

include

material flesh and bone.

think be met

of which I've

identified

and

where

case with human

cf.

is

their

is

the

the individual,

when

form which

is

of

be

distinguishes

ff.

in cases

case with house,

all,

.!__!!_~,

is

the distinction between form and mdtter in ~~~ indivi-

'3oth objections can I

matter

matter

31

that

from

being secondary to the existence of this individual as a composite

between

suspect

each individual, in whtch case it is identical

and the result of abstraction.

tion

l043a

HJ

the same species as the same in species but differing

the

,;hich

flesh

And if the

and

'form'

accidents.

enters

our

bone,

After
intellect,

but

not

actual

of which I've spoken here

note is equated with Aristotle's

~ot.v6v

here,

this

leaves me free to support (II) of the alternatives stated in the minutes,

rather

than

for

(I)

which

actually

argued,

in

cases

where

thing

1.=._~!!!_; accidents which differentiate this matter, ~~~_!lence this instance

necessarily

of

the formal and the material element in the xot.v6v (which still excludes

the

(This

form man

stances

of

rem.es;

but

~.g.,

If

of

or

the

that

your

vther,

is

Jre

Aristotle

3pecific
not

essence,

you

even

the

to

to

be

the

contrasted with

the form.

indiscernibility o

form without

even any

perhaps so implausible,

above

p.

two in-

accidental

diffe-

if accidents include,

it

the

is

hr

i'lnother

~tccidents,

..Jhich

realise.

from

chc

168.

24 ff.;
--De

of
the

(Alex.

same

your

not

is

being what you are, does not

do

your being,

so

either;

simply human,

or

female

essential

not

in the sense

in other

words,

snub-nosed

same

characteristics,

species,

individual':;
Aphr.

seed to argue

human,

not

the

and

growth

it

and

is

the

development

the argument

that

they do r..ot difier 1.-n form,

:6/b 24 ff.)

of

not

the

endeavours

uses

characteristics

matter

for

to

be

this
for

of

purposes
type

this

of

an
of

individual,
analysis

matter

purpose.

if
That

this
the

and

the

accidents)

will

particularly for showing

purpose

is

importance

to
of

be

still

w~__y

fulfilled

soul,

as

be

1t has
-

but

opposed to

universal* man, should be reduced to this ls not perhaps very surprising

in the context of Aristotle's view of it.

accidental

form,

that mar1 and woman come

though Aristotle's doctrine of heredity does

ueculiar

actual
use

the distinction between

This may not be so

human.

in the doctrine of the production of one indi-

the

the
of

only

to matter,

does

male

2)

of

due

Aristotle,

which are involved

'lidual

cause

presumably

for

(cf.

the

accidents

are,

~re,

you

Lmplausible:

,f

same

any of

what

nnes,

to

any

commitG

spatial and temporal relations.)

include

what

from

presumably

involves a certain type of matter,

individuals,

too,

~n._antiss~

take account

~~~~

4,

l044a

15-25

We were dis inc 1 ined to follow Ross

to prime matter,
( 16)

have

Second,

Ar

be

excised

( 2 3) .

for

the

First, lan :rtpW-tTJ U\11

reason

to mean olxE(a., the neclrest

leaves

in seeing a

reference

traditionally cc,ncelved , 1n tx 't'oU a.O't'o\3 . :rtpW-rou

or Tf!V <pW"tTJV ~\Tjv

undoubtedly
here

as

.LH~ger

not

~ives,

the furthest

it open whether what you would

point in the series is one or several (several

in

should

1.-n the series.

find at

h~cause

18

that 1tptirtT) would

the

furtl1est

the disjunction

'>

14-l

10 Lt:S

0
)

.:cttdd he

rhtts
t'ut

tdutological

there cannot be

LLall!

if

16 ~tpW'tou must

in

~:pt:O'ta.

rhe

have

:TA

()l'J

CHAPTER 4

could

several prime matters

conceived.

is

Ar

be

saying:

many

as

as

you

il.kc):

in '!Wv a.b'tWv We: n;;t:nU'twV.

L:te same sense as

prime matter is traditio-

dS

suppose

evBrything derives

in

the

end frr1m some one originative 'first' stuff, e.g. water, or from several

such,

~arth

e.g.

explanation (cf.

the

Lmportant

32 ff.) is the oCxe(a.. UAn ~xtio-rou.

air

He does

himself

to

either

cr,ncern

is

to

fire

version of

insist

that

xo":ri

1n Presocratic

style

~tc.

give

but

should

;'ht>

of Jtptlrnw \J\.nv

sense

rnU-ra.

lx

l(~vel

\!.1~2)

.. uJ{d

in
:\

',)n

u1e

1',\n,

one

il:'Vel

and
as

that

.vlnch

should

not

answer

for

since his

the question 't( lcJ'tL

'Like everything else,

it's earth, ,.;rater,

specific

matter

the

be

bile

or

proximate

(cf.

and

properly

maker
is

of

due

~ell,

to'

level

X -

d'.Jwn

sweet

\Ve

off

l~-19)

the

in

because

box

and

of

efficient

the

sphere

course

bed.)

In

cause.

of

the

(3)

carpenter

(29-32)

searched

We

natural

same

case

things.

could

he

the

the sameness also

in vain for a

type

( l)

Natural things would seem

all to come under case (2) (27-9), where some specific matter is necessary for the product in question, as e.g. metal for a saw, and so limits
what

the

cases

efficient

(1)

and

cause

can do.

Even

the olxe:Ca. \S).Tl

(3),

is

here,

not

but

most

sufficient

evidently in

on

its

own

to

determine (explain) the product.

1044b

Ly

16,

as

Low<:

Ls

l13tter.

15

!.t

whether

(the

the

.~<;reasy

immedi.ately

in

the

case

elements,

!5-Jl.

nor

15

having

on

the

for

are two sense

Th~re

the

its

no lower

exampl:::s,

despite the suggestion

ts

into

whole

parallel

which

of

preceding olxt:Ca.

phlegm),

In the seco11d
are

lower

s~nse

1)r

Y. has

then reconstituted as X.

the xpUn11 UXTJ or

&pxTi

here than the

cf. 18-20.)

three

l044b

resolved

back

into

Lhem

(1075a

and con23-5).

(!mphasized

the

need

to

f<~r

g;o

5-8

earlier
earth,
of

( 1)

same :llatter

~ase

~1)

illustrated.

man,

but

The XO.'ta.f.J."f!vl.a. are

given as

no help is offered with the problem

The

at

etc.,

course

(.25-7)

(.J)

the differencA
<lue

to

the

'kinetic'

Hl

l042b

6,

in

the

as

still

matter

cf.

of

also

cases

(special)

the

heavenly bodies

l069b

26,

It

talking

we

have

been

kind

of

stuff

ob

is

about,

(not

for change), with properties such as visibility.

has

come

up

-roL0.6'tT!V, not

but

it

is

potentiality

Perhaps the heavenly

change

is

to

be

restricted

just

to

local

movement.

Powers

do

not define or determine a kind of stuff (since we all possess the capacity

for

local movement),

but

they

limit

what

it

can

be,

as

tn case

( 2) above.
This led to a digression on what Ar means by saying that Socrates
and

Cal lias

the

same

differ

in

the

potentialities

matter.

for

change

For
just

surely
as

they

~b

initio

have

the

they

have

same

form.

single

the 0CxCa. Ut..TJ, Ar

ciitferent

1:tr-rent l'li:ttter necessitating different products;

ln

of

bodies have to be made of a special kind of stuff if their potentiality

!<now talking practical chemistry.

cases:

Explanation
cause

bones composing the final product.

Admittedly,
L<dnparcs

of how that can be the same as or continue as a part of the flesh and

for
Can anything be got from anything?

from the four elements on Ar's scheme,

when

32-b

material

in

ln the ftrst sense Y is situaled

this a promise of alchemy?

to

as

23-5.

case of phlegm).

>?;O

l044a

from bile, becdU3e that 1s Lube under-

the

n~ed

no Jl)uht he

:, 44a

determined

in

cveryth1ng comes

, rihutes

then

uf CaxWt:; yO.p x-rA..,

light

resolved

I3

is

And they remain such,

derive from Y

sw~~t-anJ-che-~itter-

,lJ\o.'

so,

both

to

example

the

start

it were.

rudd

(the

in 23

phlegm might Jerive

m,JV

r t-'lJssibly

:ut

thing

not commit

'taU cd.noU 19-2(1.

Phlt~gm

>fl.m>-.

to

the

still

the ultimate derivation story,

you
by

water,

does, for as 31 shows he is thinking of the form as the efficient cause,

The Presocratic style of reply is not sufficiently explanatory.

)-]),

and

:044a 25

products;

(2)

different matter-

is due to the effitor:n'!

thing,
But

here

proposed
has

to

not

all

which means
the

the

potentialities

unavoidable

reference

explanation circular.
explain

is

can

be

realized

by

Socrates and Callias must realize them differently.

how Socrates

to

What

'by

and Callias

13

single

thing'

'difference in matter'
are

two

rather

:nakes

the

precisely
than

one.

: .44b )

U'44b R
So the problem is not solved by taking matter as potentiality for change,
:1ence

Is

difference

it

solved

in matter

by

taking

two parcels of matter,

this

[f

r.wo

if

if

one.

have

'.i'~ere
:1 f

are

trick,

knows

Partial

in

potentiality

matter

distinct.

why

fixate

French and
reply:

as

the

for

that

already

we

left

one

os

picked

it,

but

Objection:

on material

that doesn't,

difference

composition?

they

are

two

E.g.

persons,

this is red-haired/ snubnosed/ 5'

not)

out
NB

presuppose

the
this

subject
whole

for

as

their

tall/

ascription

one whole

discussion

that

efficient

human

wondering whether

8-20

We

an eclipse.

the

they

are

one man or

:3uffers

the

us \JXT} to

move

to

(what

There

is

no matter

eclipse.

the

rawc; (Ross:

So

it

we would call)
which

i.s

(Elsehwere Ar

attributes.)

natural

the

events,

presumably)

there

is

prefers

to

let

such as

substance

no

final

cause

analyze ob<JCa. We; lvlpye::l.a.

presumably

to

be

i~fining

(an important

where

the

'hy

the

subject

but

it

must

is

interposition of

be

specified but

unclear
the

unless

Earth'.

you
Why

not
add

put into the

the

unclear?

efficient
That i t

sufficiently illuminating for explanatory purposes seemed more

thanthatit issimplyincomplete.

With sleep

he dispelled concerns which is the first

~leep.

Or rather, which is the first

under~o

something

what?

the

unclarity

to

bit of the animal to undergo

bit of

the animal (perhaps the

( 't'C 't'O xd.8oc;

18-19),

H2

began

by

why

So

go

back

saying
so

that

that

to \5ATJ

it
in

there was
remained
H4?

duce a PS, which in the case of H3 is explicitly said not to be relevant

to the main project ( l043a 38-b l).

Perhaps some relevant connections

thing

to

could

have

alert

us

be

done,

to

them.

the

that

the

but it cannot be said that Ar does anyE.g.

he

fails

matter we are

specified ol"XeCa \SAT).

correctly

that Ar
context.

is

patching
also

We

in material
thought

it

to

Bonitz only in

say,

as

he so easily

We

had

the

now familiar

originally put
noteworthy

express.ion va.( dX\6. occurs

otherwise according

to

comparing with actuality has

twice

the

together

that

here

for

the

brightly

(16-17,

19) but

~gna Moralia three times,

and that such examples of va.C as Bonitz 1 ists are all from early works
plus Z9 10J4a 17.

text

You can say 'An eclipse is a deprivation of light'

formula?),

H3
and H4 both begin by telling us not to forget something, as if to intro-

CHAPTER FIVE

With the formal cause there

by the moon - did Ar notice that this is an instance of the 'snub'

likely

as well,

count

( sc.

not

sought

the Earth.

complication.

phenomenon,

chap,

to

feeling
another

matter of 3.n eclipse.

is an efficient cause,

There

the limits ofAristotelian teleology).

cause

be

is

is a

4as

to

about :Jfxr-(a. J>~ 'b1toxe::C1-1.E\1Tl xa.t ill<:;. \S),:n.

dispute

to

two.

contribution of

no

use

There is a ~~O'XEC!-1.Vov, but it is a full substance, viz. the moon which

for

has

will emerge by the end of H6,

being.

presupposes

9eneral

conversational
.!._Q_~b

cause

that

questi..on of matter deciding what is a man and what is not.

the

incorporated into the formal.

distinctness of

criteria on the side of form to identify the parcels of matter dbout

.;hich we are
1 nt

But

change.

many distinguishing characteristics

think to cite (e.g.

carpenter,

we

difference

in

given that each of them is living a human life?

parcels

that

parcel

one might
a

the

perform

this

not

difference

parcel here is human and that parcel there is human, you have

humans

~vould

as

heart)

to

~~rtain

stillness - in virtue of which the whole animal undergoes sleep?

perhaps

l044b

are

21-29

not

'Since

without

some

genesis

things,
and

such as

phthora ... '.

points

and

forms,

Comparison

are

and

with

earlier
passages, especially 85 1002a 32-5 Tn~ b~ ~~y~O~ xat ~nc; ypa~c; xat

<IL~ {~<pO.vdet~ obx lvl>f')(Het OU'<E y(yvwBa OU'rE q>8E!pEcr8a. o<e ~l:v
OWn~

O<e Oe

obx OUOU.<;.

EJ l027a 29-30 ~,.

o'

d<rtv &pxaC xal OLHCt YEYT]'riL xa.l <j>8etp'riL CtVEU '<OU

yCyvEcr8et xal q>8E(pE<T8a, q>etVEp6v.

H3

l043b

14-16 dvd.yxT] 07) <ahT]v [sc.

tTlY oroCa.vj

<:Lt0.ov Elva

i\

,p8a.p-rt]v tlve:u -ro'U !J16E Cpe:rr8a.L xa.t ye::yov~va" 5:veu -roU yCyve:ai3a.L
'Tiakes it
time ...

clear
at

that

dnother

wjth
time'.

'are and are not' we must understand

Aristotle

l4
l5

is

not denying that

the

'at nne
rhings

1'\fl',-1

..., c '!

d''

t ..

>11'.1!

D[0

f'SS

l:;trlier r IH;

has

no douht

!d'
') "'"T ~ ' ' '

about
.Jl

~~
;

tho

~ ..\m<i.:

"

1 <111'

1_<;

,.hC'm

,, ..,

.nade

ln

135

Ar.

held

matter

Ls

it

to he

1,

, "

' - ' i.

Implication.

two-',<ty

as

cornll3cl,

ct

i.:~ :>urclv :tn

it

lnt"gra.l

part of the posHion sketched in ~h!': prect;riin)'!; linPS.

f\[

'f

1_

"''

,' i_

t !) (~ ~-

l ,

~ '

fl I

t'

K. t ~

ntr

t..'Il'.itlc.:s v..itt

tt

~<lt1::er,

'

upposites.

The

theme of

!..::~!::___~~.~

X ht1dy, A healthy,

v ~ ,-

r,

, lL

':\'/0

.'

-1 ._ t

1::\,)':~~hr

<~ll''''t

ot~''''

:d~ns.

e . .,.

the

~lattt=!T

('l:~rl

ot

une
half

dnd

pruvidcs

ttt<Jt'ber

the chapter.

<lf

l'>

'{

there-

:;ic k

wine.

vi

1~e~a

r.

l'he

12~4 whcrn a dist.inction is dr<Jwn i.n

li.ne:s

IJotentiality

rnalrer,

as well as 5uvd.fJ-E4 A?

:..JZJ.ter,

1
' ' 1 1 ' '

about

Ou\IO.j..LE~ A, and B L_; the kva.v1:Cov ot -\,

If X is

&uvn~E"

2 examples:
Hl\1\

dp11ri.1i

oppnsitcschauging into

- s.Jmewhat tenuous- cor.nection wit~ the first

the

foro

i.ntr(Jduced

..

l I ! '\

-, ' r

(_()1\'.<::rse

been

therefor.~

~~Lv xut xntU 'tO

E[&oc,

So X is potenti.ally B,

dso Ouvfi~EI.)

' l t i 1.'Il

the

/\

wa)._,
l)

and

and ::ta.'tO. O"'tEprl(nv v.at

ln

in

.hiLh

t<.:-;pe( tLvely:

1s

he

x.a.8'

~enpCtv riw nnpO. ~6crt.v.

but onlv with rhe quaL.fi.ctr ion given.

:r.
i,

l..:r

l.n?~ap~J_r_~'!_

'\

~lC"<'l.lth

i._.

because

this,

The

'l'-1'1

;rl<ii:--; fn: .-pAopd).

he

lnt

tl-tl

.111

,m,__,

;f regress

apori.a

L \.ally,

B,

\e

nol

1c;

do

stri.ctl;
ich

C'Jntinues

tJi,:-

i.s:

wine~vinegcir but

like

process,

f!TSihle

; r in

v .. -4~a

1()44b

with

the

point

to

be

Why do we not say

ke

tl

made,

hut

'3Clll!!ne,

hPalthy sick.

V.'i.th<ut

that A

X-A-R

thita~-c,npse

example ts dropp!d i.n f::1vnur of X--li;i.JJW:

is

an

qudllficatton,
'Jf,

Lrre-

later).

r;r

potcn-

(fUu(:h:~nxOc, nl ~tlopnC.

Th;~

i:.;

the md.tter

the

(presumably

given that
Sdy

this

spedking

en

vU

.1 rpBor)n

:~:inc ()Ui--J.SE~T1XE,

rJ36)

nDr

l'

1,t

xa.-ta.

-IS)

tioe

'.-,'lll<',

'Ill

tht~

water

h~n-

\_\'

. ..
.

t-

,-,

nt
t h<"lt

rhe

L_'i.lnilr1

,(Jn is

!Jt"Psum-

NOTES ON ETA

:045a 2

night is potentially day?

And what is the

UAT} (X) here?

O.f}p

presumably).

_1~)-~~a

We

3-6

took

changes A-B and

the

point

here

require

B-A,

to

not,

be,

as per Ross,

'return to \SA:n',

that both

but that only the B-

A change does (i.e. vinegar to wine, corpse to living thing).

o~ o~~w ~e~~~XXeL eC~ ~XXnX~:

Bou

XQ\

mean

'one

back

to

refer
A's

104~::11.
implying

into

the

other'

the day-night

back

change

since

changes,

B is Xa.'t'& ,eopd.v

that

and

B' s

It

can't

.!:._! symmetrical.

the

change

point would be
to A,

refer

It

must

that

when

if at all possible,

must be via the \f~'TJ.

bodies

(Apostle),

or

are

particularly

an

~045a

12-14

unitary.

its

Does

tr.,

(Ross Ox.

unity),

unity

of

the

now

general

in

'in bodies

bodies

thesis.

something unified

cf. ~

is

e.g.

Honeywater

by stickiness.

For

227a 1517.

enters

as a species of

unitary

thing,

the

being that it is the definition Q_f something

unity

Ar

cause of

the

instance

Definition

explanation of

examples of

Perhaps better is thdt it should emphasize

example of

~ ~d6o~ ~~epov ~oLou~ov,

even in hodies'

wedkest

simply that

evident

offered as

say

11

the

contact (Ross ed., p. 237)?

was

does oU-tw mean?

what

example,

to Xa."tlz. cp6opd.Y
to

but

we agreed that eC~ [XXnX~ could

too'

Does the xa.C in l.

that

always

run

the explanation this way round or does

he sometimes explain the unity of the definiendum by that of the definiGeneral comments on HS
no
;:o

A bitty and unstatifactory chapter containing

new material of any great interest.

continue H4' s

the

of>c--ea.

discussion of bXLx-t,

discussion of

things

are

which

tion?

Zll l037a 18-20 is indeterminate on the issue.

Z12

The first half could be said

and

looks
or to connect with H3 via

are not without genesis.

whether :i.t presupposed Z, we thought yes; at

On

least that it presupposed

more

threatening,

but

can be

read

as

stating that

1037b 24-7

the unity of

the definiendum is a necessary requirement for the unity of the definition

(cf.

Notes on

Zeta

ad

loc.),

lvhich would

not

reverse

the

order

of explanation.

28 on form not being generated.

Ar then asks for the explanation of the unity of ~bv !vBpw-

l045a 14-20
CHAPTER SIX

Is

1tov.

Ross

1045a 7-8

The backreference:

of

and

numbers

However,

(Ross).

llllity
:wt

that

of

of
Zl2

definition

because

the

first

HJ l044a 3-6 suffices for both the unity

l038a

problem,

34-5 concludes a
implying

responses:
Z17

~econd

(1)

answer

will

be

Notes on Zeta ad lac.).

34,

on

the

puzzles

of

Zl3

1039a

answer and ZH are after all a unity;

impugning

:1ote

l042a

on

'first'

there

to

the

second:

Possible

look for the second answer within Z (e.g. second half

following

,;ithout

if

that

is tentative but because it deals only with de-

finition by division ( l037b 28,

,,f

No need to bring in 212 as well

definition.

the

31-b 8

H pre-existed

chronological
ad

and Ar

the problem outstanding at

fin.:

thought

H6

(3)

3-23);

(2)

H6

is

H6 can have this role

hypothesis discussed earlier

could
a

18

(cf.

be written with an eye to H

satisfactory enough

the end of Zl2.

the

solution to

has

thing

this
(a),

man

(the
(b).

in question will

Animal

that

and

the

Twofooted

Theory

man + animal,
that

(a)

Apostle

on

si~nify

the

of

but

be

form)

or

(b)

~L

especially i f

especially

( 15-20).

Forms makes

jeopardized

Admittedly

xa\

~v~

(15-16),

t..m

things

single

B6

thing

Man,

generalizes this:

one

posits

9-12

things,

Forms

does

viz.

argue

himself

and Twofooted,
that

'man'

and

'animal'

in

17:

each

someone decided that

17-19 makes better sense with (a):

individual men are

Animal

if

1003a

Socrates many

individual)?

the unity of the

Whereas the H6 problem is supposed to arise

not only if, there are Forms.
c.Jote also the

the right answer is (a).

that

(the

that consequence is drawn from the explicit premise

reading a.6'tod.vSpW7t.oc; for a!>'tb. 0' &:v6puntoc;

thing

man

Theory of Forms the general terms

't'66E

the

The first clue is that

supposed
it

will

be

to

participate

these

two

individual men participate in.

in,

things,
19-20

Man will not be one thing but more than one.

if Man,
is the
not

simply

Perhaps

U~'5a

J ,

1.

\ '

l(J 1~5a

(as

hoped

>lme

man a

nakes

both

here

l.1cer J

dr,.J

dtL::>wer

r::ne

co

quc::.t1on Hhat

Lhe

case of things that come to he' (so Ross Ox. tr., Apostle).
It is
only in the case of generable individuals that there is a moving cause
to be set aside.
This case is then illustrated (31-3):
there is

unity will also -;hm; ,,;hat makes ..1n individual man a unity,

but that aspiration

~eed

~hu:.sing

not rely on

o~er

lb)

la) here.

I,.Jhy is it so nnfortunate that man should fall fipart into a conjunct

l._Vfi?

~lo

This

doubt

into

Ar's

that

the

chapter

full

belh:fs

about

essential

another?

assumes

the

j'lstificdtion

unity
the

of

essence.

predicates

of

~~~a

-~0-9
1 ~ss

3 eems

[he

ul

criticism

;.;auld
might

~eai.t,

way

the

he

bt::co,~e

:-\ll

we,ll

i.s

~.:l~del

~enus

so

.Jef1-ned
on

)f

each

Ze~

(~~specially

hat

cJr

as

one

.-\r

we

~tick,

by

nf

c...o\e

rl.eleting

nur

he.

At

first

-with

Gut

H2

4'Jallt~es.

?or

sight

choice

to

be,

~nove

earlier

the

Continu1ty

comma

original

uf

But does everything

distinction

fhe

is

made?

to the simple

28-9,

four

envisaged

'dements

more discussion see

are

Note~

~xplanation

'ell
1on

"lS

to

an1

lS

of what

as

to

the
~n

in

however,

3l.

l~iven

aext question
the

cdu.se

of

by

foregoing,
individuals

playing down

tne potentiality/
is,

L:nity

becomes,

What

pair

is

required
the

than

moral,

the

potential-actual

though

the

Alexander),

to

which

he

objects

that

the

example

sphere

just

is

to

be

the

actualization

of

just

another way

of

putting Ar 's

point

to

say

that

';()

the

to

actual.

.nonng cause

Which
in

Lhe

Should
it is perhaps

in

the

end there

The above treatment of 31-3 as slightly digressive was challenged

by reference to 1075b 34-7.
There the unity of the compound of matter
and

form

and

the

not

want

is

as

much

efficient

in

an efficient

7 can be read:

the

cause may
cause

centre
seem
of

of

focus

less

the

as

the unity of numbers,

detachable.

unity

of

But we

still do

numbers.

So I075b 36nor is it possible to say (sc. what makes these one),

unless you say, as

the moving cause.

we

do

(sc.

in

the

There ~ nothing

appropriate
to

say

in

cases),

that

it

the other cases,

is
and

nothing more to say in the case of examples with a moving cause.

Still,
It

might

be

perhaps
better

'digressive'
to regard

the

is

the

wrong

ball/sphere

label
as

for

l045a

31-3.

a nicely perspicuous

concrete illustration from which to extract (by setting aside the moving

rela7:.ed

potent1al

33

is really only one essence, that of ball.

pose

f!'nm

1.

potential one.

cause) a general answer to the general question of

as

relation
of

of man occurs

we have qualms about both these items having an essence,

applying to the components of definition

'a,ide

construing

far back (in any case the example was man, not a potential man);
the potential ball and the
actual ball, i.e. to be a potential
sphere
just is to be potentially an actual sphere and to be an actual

0r better per-

is potentially something be1.ng so actually?

~uestion,

other

rescued,

the
to

~b))

in a definition but

unity

-ro'ih' seems to pick up a.L't'I.0\1:

no cause is needed for the cause
(explanatory factor)
is just the essence of each.
Ross offers two
references for 'each':
( 1)
the potential ball and the potential man
(so

~b

of

This is clearly
presented problems:-

too
( 2)

t042b 24,

over

(d)

explanation
itself.

bt

...

a 1uestion '..ltlich is irrelevant

to

arter Jtod'taa.v

question

JlPrfectly general

1'.l..:st

idea

viz. the i5A.,

this chapter does,

cdses.

lctuality .1 nalysis of rtefinit:ion,

; 5

the

definitions

~b ~tv

6u~.Hij.J.L,

the

sor1e

potentiality und actuality not

ltaps,

Jo

tl$Ually

The second

unce

as

differentia.

f)3ir

'l

c laj_ms

tor

deep

separate (bttt of course equivalent)

:\s

differentiae

of

us

ad Zl2.

l o4 5 a -.lQ::J_

,lbnul

long

plus

plural1.ty

clear

dS

J;,tike

no other cause (sc. than moving cause) of a potential sphere/ball being

an actual one.
Sc. and not even a moving cause in the sort of case
we are interested in.
Cp. I045b 22 '<l..Tjv e[ "tL <h~ XLvT\<mv.
No further

for it.

take

independent one of

be

d.Lstinction or t"..JO cutllpon::!nts WLtlli.n a definition.

1,::oally

account

did not?

people

')ne vf these is

is Suvd1-1E1. ', marking a

co

would

absurdly, that one essen-

anoth~r

H2 1041a 14 tf.

charitable than

23-4 <auld be read either

,_,f

What

~hile

tlal predicate would cease to huld

louks

thing

uld he wonder whether that

1,.,1 0

dnd

'lssun-.ption

ball

or

bronze

sphere

(suggested

would be better than a mathematical sphere.

30.
For this purby 0 O'tpoyyul,.o~ xacl..x6~of 26)

3U

1045a o3
L\P l'FR A

iG~'5~

moral

the

UX.n a.la6Tl't'ft

the

definition.

other

~he

If lJATJ von't'Tt is

the

just mentioned,
in

the

generable
\S'~:n

Each

component.

genus

There

Ross)

(S(J

transferring

the

these

role

compound

to

of

the

lines spell out

potentiality
generic

from

element

in

plays potentiality to the actuality of the

is

an

analogy between genus

and

matter,

hut so far no more.

is

'VOT)'t'fJ

mathematical

dimensionality

(as

at

1036a 9).

o!ov 6 X1ix).o<; <TXiiiJCL t?<CJ<&Oov, i f Jaeger is right in deleting

it,

gloss

stronger

thesis

finition

is

by

someone who

kind

of

vo~~~

bronze).

:larjorie
Rorty)

H2

that

The

Grene

really
14-16

come

to

Ar

genus

(a

reads

of the definiendum

(as a circle is such and such a plane

question

kind

this

Biological

Messrs

not

view,

just

but

Balme,

A.C.

analogous

will

all

Lloyd

that

embryo

horses

generic

equine

matter,

the

and embryo donkeys

but

can we

and

<S1tep lv

one.

is

as

opposed

is one,
cundum).

is
the

to

accidentally,

these

items?

from

all

one

that

thing

just

(cf.

the

categories

categories are 0-xEp Ov u

the

categories if b 1 reads

the

The
sequel

maintains

chat
:~ny

just

5 is

option
a

'none

close
of

the

l86b
if

~-xep

so

to

17,

31-4).

b 1 reads

the

~enera

fact

that

Zl2

What

considers

and

seems

to

parallel

be

required

between

~v

by
and

The only
This

to defining the categories (Ross says really they

the

case

of

two-footed

participation, a'UvoucrCa. and

categorie-s

nre

It could be, rather,

immediately v and

animal.
the

rest

Similarly,
come

up

we

Ov

explains

thought,

in H6

not initially as answers

to Ar's question about the unity of definition, but as answers to ques'What is it for there to be a 0 (a case of knowledge/

tions of the form

health/a

bronze

triangle,

etc.)?'.

Thus the question to which Lyco-

phren answers <:ruvoU<TCa. 'to\5 l1tCc:rra.oea.L. xa.\

Cp.

question,

is "<O l:;'i'jv

'what

tuxi'lt; is 'What is l7tL.CJ"tftiJ.TJ ? '

I byLa.(v&Lv?

Especially revealing formulations are ~( ~b Tbv

'What is it

for

and TC "<o 'euTo

(14-17).

there to be something white?'

tion of something in white is recognisably an answer,

the

the participa-

using participa-

tion in the ordinary Platonic way, as earlier at 1045a 18, as a relation

between

particular and

because

people

is

that

don't

their

universal.

answer

it simply raises,

Ar 's

point

is diagnostic:

to

the

stated

question

to the question it

is

participation.

is intended for

(8-9).

is

It

because

and the Platonists cannot solve, the further questions

'Well, but what is the explanation of participation?

tion?'

it

think about the unity of definition in the right

an unsatifactory answer

responses

'each

just as it

categories'.

latter are not part of any definititln:

you ca11 extend it to the pro-

to explain how a white man is one thing,

blematic

As at

confirms

his

the end of H2,

own.

lcrt'a.L.

What is participa-

Ar 's diagnosis of other people's

at

13 shows he

is elucidating not

reporting.)

(no comma after a se'each is one,

no definitions, but cf. Notes on Zeta, p. 6).

tnese

lv u

essentially,

where the scope ~i!Y broaden is the 0L6 sentence in b 2-3.

refer

in

second

1,

~lace

not

definition.

xov eTva.q - ~6v6e~L<; hL'I><:wda..; xa.l ).eux6"tTJ"to<;

S0 o(,ee:v\. -t06'twV

~ave

of

answer?

in

r'Sv .
need

participation

examples

start

Perhaps also:

the

that

does

xa.).xov eTva.L -<p(ywvov;- ~vee~L<; xa.).xon xa.l "<p<ywuov

It may be

suppose

number

as

also !'5xep Ov n
fact

one

Not

the

Just

iust

beginning of the chapter and

unity

H2

There is even less of a problem about the unity of items

immediately

are

the
the

7-8)

it.

to

examples are another issue.

'exactly what some unitary thing is'.

-~bich

at

an d.xopCn about

unity

xa.l 6yLdn.; (11-14).

after

matter,

is

about

is

1974,

of)

which do not have a material component to be unified with an actuality.

are

29

rejects participation by genus in differentia as an answer to the unity

way

They

25,

(9-11).

lie behind the present text?

1045a 36-U

The <hopCa. (cf.

7-17

1045a

this view (christened the B-1-R thesis by

nicely on

heel?

same

on

Synthes~

in
is

thought

the

;;md

instances

or a.[aihJ'tfJ (as ice is frozen water or a ball a spherical piece

figure)

1043a

In that case a

view.

the generic element in a de-

0 which

matter

are composed, whether it be

of

took this

could be in the offing:

the

1045b
at

of definition, but the issue there is whether, having used participation

Alternatively, \SXTl

may be

l 1J45b 7

Thus what people don't see is that you do not need an explanation
for

the. unity of

this,

they

potentiality and

postulate,

for

the

actuality

cases

hold the two together (participation,

of

their

answers

potentiality
firms

that

and

confirms
actuality

no explanation

case Ar is asking about),

the
needs
is

they

(b

are

rruvo~C~

Aristotelian

16-17).

, etc.).
thesis

no explanation.

needed

for

the

not

asking about,

unity

that

seeing
bond to

The inadequacy
the

unity

of

Which in turn conof definition (the

once definition is seen in terms of actuality

and potentiality.

they are not ultimate

heynnd the categories (1.6).

43

l(l45b 1

, 1

Whereas
nents

problem

to

explain

nothing

ts

said

issue,

6e:O).I.oc;, cruvoiJO"Ca.

~o

eLc,
!~B

own inadequacy.

doubt

tiality.

is

Lycophr0n
eliminate

further

the

between subject

and

just

one

~nd

actuality.

debate
, oi>v-

r.o display their

they are thou,sht

discussed
in

th~rnsclves

f~

at

differen-

l85b 25 ff.:

his

favour of e.g. 0 ~v6pwxoc; ).e~as

idea that his worry

whjch

the ~eneral

case of

ts

philo~ophical

of critici.sm of rrUvde::cn.c;

implying

copula lcrt&.

predicate,

that its propo-

and

actuality

is
a

one.
thing

the

are

has

one

answer

No

to

be

explanation

of

fF.R r,

with asking
is

added
the

for

no

to

account

the

thing

is

at

from Ar's

issue about

textual problems

signal
rus

suffered

about the bond

present

point

the unity of

of

view

potentiality

~~onclusion

that
n.

H6

2,

Our
This

as

We
a

apparatus

feeling was
is

the

concluded with a

whole

is

brief

criticus ad

Met.

1037a

E 2 Ab).

Suggestions

differentia',

in

fact

this

satisfy

Hho

'tl.

Ja~ger

in the

Much more

included:

their

search

where

the

gives in his appara-

is A.6you tvoxo1.bv

puzzling

xal I>Laq>op6.

(i)

means

'i.e.

the

for

way of

potentiality and

unifying

The words were added in text or margin by someone

lv1:Xtxe1.a.

(17)

is no problem, as it occurs already H3 i044a 9.

l(J!~Sb

<m

17-23:

l04'5i1

C"0ntent

dpTJ1:ClL

established.
used

and

hi?re

pt<)X.imate

h~s

it

i,een

said~

same

11atter

and

the

in

Ross

ad

(see

compares

thing,

sens~

lac.)

note

on

asklng

'proximate

l069b 36,
1044a

t1Jr

i.e.

an

the chapter has

but not in the terms

understand 'ta.6"tb ~al. ~v

view of

1'.:1-20

([8):
we

occurs

,:ere.

l!J45a 30-3; on 25 <5ee note

the

~<.r'(<i'tl1 ~'XT'I

the

note (ln

one

are

in

see

provided

-'l.nd matter

21 ~z,

On

[hese are straight summa:ry of Hhrtt

30-b 7.

time

the

unity

itself,

an

of

because

explanation of

to

mattert

at

while H4 115ed

15-2~).

mean

that

thC'Y constitute a

So

explanation

no

1035b

serious

of 'Nhy

form

unity.
30

:!:pW't'Tt for

discussion of Jaeger's thesis

20;

distinction

special brackets which

that X.6you tvcnto(ov si~nifies the genus.

thought

same

of

thing

(cf.

Aristotle

p.

cp. Notes on Zeta p.

199
95).

between

potentiality

and

the work we have been expecting it to do since H2 (See

being what Ar hi.rnself uses in H2 and so Hhat would

(ii)

actuality.

account
the

that without chapter 6 H would amount to very little.

chapter

cf. 'I<OLE! ~. 1045a 14ha,\ 6 Lo.cpopd. (/>Lo.cpo~ ~.

but

the

of

a later addition by Ar

no more than that the end of the papy-

tattering.

a tl_~ in Ar

~how

'added by Aristotle'

roll

The grounds

for enclosing <J"'ts.. ~v

crit.icus

separate

its being one.

actuality does

i045b 17-23:

an explanation of why anything

needed,

note on 1043a 12-14 ad fin.).

tus

l045b l/

not hands betT~~~~en actuality and poten-

fits well enough the

'X.e:6xurra.1.

~rounds

crUv9e:cYI. c; and 6lO).I.oc; in t2 were

1045a 13),

to

it.

by "t-Jay

tiae/actualities (cp.

proposal

'.~lAP

(:TA

tii~

participation is u1;missed on the

have

the

)TI

r::s

and
non-

problem

pot~ntiality

45

'\L

,,

300K THETA
'r.'~lil..Ldl

- \J!Sh/desire for

~0~ 2

wish/desire
pleasant?

CHAPTER

the 50uJ ,;:>d tile j.Jl!:dsant \1Zr1b lrl-19)

the ~60d E_,:~r the ,t.:,ent

for

l235b 25-26,

l'_hl.~g 3 - wish/desire

for

(.:~.nd

conditionally

30

i2 -15)
the_il_8_~ (and so seemingly

the pleasunt for

/lOOd, 1235b 26 -29)

by G.E.L. Owen

Note

The formula of r._hilia

e_as~~

Metaphysics

~).

6uva:r6vt56va;n~ in

As

in

some

1022a

1-3),

appearance

5 uva/t6v,

other
so

6 12

late

and

of 6

(4.

1015a 13-17,

(l019b 35-20a 6)

almost

as a

and here too does not

11.

1019a 11-14,

16.

focal meaning makes an express

postscript in the account

of 06vet~Lt;/

provide complete coverage of uses mar-

shalled in 1019a 32-b 14 (cf. Kirwan ad locc.). But the model seems clear:
Dunamis

- source of change in another or (in the same thing) qua other

(l019a

15-16: ll-tal>oA-t'i

includes

stopping

something,

1019a

34-35)

sion

'having ~unamis ' i

1
2 3

phra~;e as

tn ~naton _

ries.)

Wi.thout

understood

(implied at

l020a

2;

cf.

1019a 33-35,

to

something

else

having

dunamis

over

and

or
( 1020a 3,
1
2
1019b 5-10, 10-11,

b 6-10 if

theias
8-10

developed
where

earlier

homonymy is

of

- source

1046a

13;

1046a

introduction

- having dunamis
inspire

us,

of

31-35

on

stereseis,

in

1019a

stereseis;
apophaseis

1
but

in

some

only

special

on

way

Fridays?

(1020a
No,

the

in

Rather,

in

or

hexis apa-

and

1003b
~

and

3-4.

not

dunaton-definitions

in dunaton

'llodifications.

where

Dun<:~mis

But

in

another

of

change

or

the

(in

patient
other

( 1046a

are to be

appear

in

the

!J.

12,

same

thing)

qua

effected by another or

11-13.

wh~re

Hut

the

tn EE VII, esp. 1236a 7-33:

case

is

(by

is

(by it-

riunamis

in

parallel

is subject
to

the

14-15),

by

another

~unamis

or

itself)
13-15:

of

4_6

another

the worse or dest-

other,
the

viz.

last

by

what

complement

As in dunamis _ bllt adding 'well'

(in some grammatically
1 3
1ppropr1ate form) to exPresslon5 of acting/being acted on

viz.

philia

qua
here

'These dunameis'

precedin~

the

Lo

.dl

;,e

introduced

three:

in 1046a 16 seems to refer

but

to unspecified

analysis

vther' .

'by

supply 'viz. by a source of change

(by

(1046a

qua

after

(something which is/has dunamis )'.)

1
state of not being affected for

( l046a 16-19.
not,

or( ... itself)

(1046a

ts >!xplicit)
~unamis

in

dunamis

3
itself) qua other'

Ls/has

can

intact

change ... another

in

as

-settled

example

see below on 9 1)

(or its formula) turns up

1
when spelt out, dunat~
does

the having of dunamis

He

prime

It may seem that, while dunamis

the

not

2 4 corresponding to dunaton 2 ._ 4 in
91 builds its account (l046a 4-19).

that

'source ... of

26-

royed

is 'well', 1019b 13, 1046a 16-19:

all

'pleasant'

does

change

qua

first

threatened

a steresis cannot be a positive hexis;

at
for

and

other (l046a 10-11)

in focal analysis of onta)

Dunaton

phili~

'good'

'h.~LO's'

but

We are not to extract, monkeying with an inflection,

- not dunaton
33

7-10),

There is no sequence of ~namis _

1046a

the

to

66v;H<;(Ouvo.-t6v in 9 1

P.t!.~~

- subject

expressions,

to the whole expres-

in neither cas~ js it an cxtenlal governing

but

(1236a

recurring formula of

is

or the definitions of ~ in subordinate catego-

such 'lUalifications

haplOs

1 4

- having dunamis

..::omponent

(TfJ

the qualification in ~naton

( 1020a 2-3)
Dunaton

qualifications.

dlrect

;ource

r-e..tppears tn the other (1..;'0 (l236a 20-21, reading

1
et omn. post.; cf. l046a 15-16, 18-19, 1077b 3-

hut it is on ~-namis _

20-21)
punaton

Sus.

t<~hereas

Hence

Dunaton

Bz.

..;ith

but

be ..;ure,

chapters

in 612

with

.1tfected
l<:stnJyed
~~

refers

,,)vBrs

wtthotlt

for

well
by

back

~!2~.1,c1mis _

the

,o\lrc~

to

1 3.

:J.bsurdity

l046a

v,o0d

can

the

riunamis ?
-"---3
affected for

worse',
or

h1)W

qualification

tn

:hange'?

15-16.

1.Jhere

Perhaps rewrjte

'Not

The
the

being

the

worse

k.1i

in

1_~_!_

or

l046a

ev1dently

~~.; 'taU l(a,).c]c:;

IJ.il 1td.cr-

:(ELV 'X""t\.r0 mark a SpP.cial1y ;;<lmirilble rr.!SJ3!ance to harm.)

104'Sb

l>jOT r:S UN

~I

fH ETA
~I)~

fl~namisl~4 (5, 6) correspond

of 1::.12.

1046a

primary cases

6-9

is

(Contrast

nymy.

J,

which

insists

more

meaning without

that

tn

the

~un~ton 1 _ 4

:.,horthand

the relation between derivative and

EE

VII

l236a

'.~hich

7-33

similarity

and

similarity without

EN

explains
\'Ill

using

focal

p_~ilia

by

1156b 19-21,
meaning;

focal

35-1157a

and

explain

What is the str0nger relation bP.tween primary and deri-

as you will.)

A case

(1)
~~

of

sense

1,
of

in

(e.g.

in a

ousia.

h.')

derivative sense coincides directly with

A case

(ii)

requires

(iii)

servative
others

of

viz.

seemingly

viz. iatros.

but

of

iatrikon

in

derivative

not coincide wi.th one of !~ 1 '

need

A case of hugieinvn in one derivative sense ('pre-

requires

and

h.')

'sign of

coincide

may

rloubtful.

with

(iv)

one

hugieinon 1 ,

of

A case of

philia_ in
(v)

a derivative sense does not expressly require one of philia 1 .

cases
.\~d

of

may

if

the

is

no

dunaton
coincide

and

dunamis

qualification
regular

some

with

in

of

'partly'

requirement,

derivative

senses

logical

priority

does

rz

did

not

here at

into

Notes

46a

( i.s

something,
24-8,

I+Sb
becoming)

and

that

b 29-34a 5;

on Zeta,
of

lv
271

not

that

something

(ii)

6)

p.

the

ZH

in

asserted

entail

natural

the

back in

general, lv "tott;
( 1028a

35-6),

as

that the account of substance

derivative

cases,

-rO.~ 1tp\ -ri'\~ o!xrCn.; }.t\yoL~

l..s

everything

that

from

~omethlng

same

in

form',

as

implied

is

to ZH in 8:

(i)

[cf. ep\ -roil

do,

In

in

becomes

{is

becoming)

and

the

agency

by

referring to ZB

ni.ng

32

16.

in

the

first

34,

taken

from

H6,

esp.

until
with

6.
Zl

1 i045b 35-46a 1, "'hat is most useful

l045a

that

20-33:

All this suggests that

(tv

"tat'~

~s

what

we

expect to

1(p!j.rto~c;

A6yo~Q,

ZH

l7-9

existed as a unit, "ueginbe in~

already

proper

part of Z; which is compa(ible Y-'ith the hypothesis of H's pre-existence,

us discussed earlier.

the

10,

17.

the

same

contrast
and

14,

21,

in

b 6,

uses

chapters

(2),

11.

27,

26-7

general

9.

Llrsl

of

49b

'!2:1namei
in 87

2).

connection

In

with

94

he

by

the

later

at

the

both

dunamis,

scope

at

i.n ~16

(thus

49a

37,

in

the

dunamei
1,

second

l050a 3,

0,

5,

at
8-

6,

occurs:

(e.g.
In '.:18

9).

to

of dunamis

sections dunaton

~~_naton

of

is about

dominance

l048b

l047a 24-47b 2 (note 0-~namei

enlarges

l<inesi~;

r. o be m<1de about ener-

16, 49a 4) in connection with ~E~~-~-

14,

section at 93

sequent

to

expression for '"hat he

mar-kerl

and

16,

2 l,

is

riu~"!_mis

di::;cnss

'I)

reference

l,as

!046a 2-4 promises, secondly,

r akes over as a general ter-m ( 1049b 5,

first

1048a

~'._lnamts

But in the

1047b l) and the con-

in

anticipation

nf

the

second section.

We

li 12 is fairly straight~

had before us Owen's comparison of 6 12 and 91.

offers a

It

focal analysis of dunaton,

in each derivative

case.

on

the basis of ~l..ln~-~!!2-4

he

had

distinguished

the

chapter

(33

ff.).

allowing

(1019a

In 8t,

to

all

of

6 12 1020a 3-4.
He are

rme

may

calk ll\12

the

corresponding

15-33)
by

with dunamis

One could p;o on to define

occur-

?~amis?_

but Ar does not actually do so, even though

senses

0f

dunamis

earlier

in

had defined senses of Q~naton therefrom

and

contrast,

verb ~unasthai

the

A new development

of

l033a

have discussed, which is why Ar warns us the discussion is to be posttJ<JOed

1048a

earlier

the

applies

for the business ~ in hand is evidently the notion of dunamis - patentiality

j)!"\ T'llses

which

seemingly require

Other backreferences

15-16).

this

z1

particular.

account

'It was said

l'l:p<irt(o' Ov-toc:.
becomes

in

the

(cp.

31-2

1049b 27--9

Zl

to

(pace

enter

to

backreference: e:tpma.r.

The

.-\["

~""hat

viz.

to treat nther sorts of dt1n_~~-t!.!~ in distinctions

geia;

forward.

1045b 27-32

~E..:.~"l_!"!!~

sense,

25-6 he says he has done this.

l048a

ring

xpcirtor.c;; "X.6yor.t;

<.+:

strictest

dunar:on , dunamis
~save with dunaton 4
1
1
or inadequately is allowed).
So here

priority.

will

34-1~6a

the

l048a

vative?

one

~045b

in

than m:J:re similarity, which '.-muld produce homo-

invoking

invokes

.., 11 ffi,:ic;ntly

he

( l046a 5)

proceeds

from

the

noun dunamis,

and the adjective to tag along.

the suggestion ( 16-17) that the xa\Wc;; modification

is

~unami~i-~ and

is

not

j11st a case on its own as at

fh..i.s gave rise to some discussion:-

first

deny

that

introduced to the case as the sense of 'can' in which

lrunk

1019a 24-6),

man

Ihe

staggering

rhoHght

lS

that

and

slurring can wa~k

and

ther-e is a sense in which

it may be said that he can do these thin!<;s (for there he is doing them)
therefore,

<tnd

Ln
the

different
sort.

i..f

it

sense

rhus

the

is

of

also

correct

can ,

adverbial

viz.

to denv that
'can

h8 can,

properly'

nr

lt must be

something of

aodifier xa.AWc;, xa.-tl\ ~poaCpEO"'Lv, etc.

)h 14

,~OILS

1046a 4

occur

in

analyzanst

in

not

1:N THETA

ordinary language analyzandum.

the

The

drunk's walking and talking is an example of a denial of dunamis

/J.

fied.

12

e.g.

level

success I'.

on

it

'This

16

example

before,
that

it

thus

in

and

be

with

of
a

land

But

can be

'"'heredS 1:!.12

1019a

91

26,

deals

with
the

reverses

this

before

going

order in such a way

to think that ~~1.c; &.xa.BeCao::; is included among these

is hard not

buvd.J..!1.<.; at
an

perhaps

~.; .. , &.xa.eeCa.c; at

to

that

1
can be similarly
2
cultivated [sc. with a fair

1019a 26 .already indicates that dl1namis

modified,

of

modi-

covered
an

ll.Od'}OU.I. f} 1ta.8e!v at

by

17.

What

modified ~~"c; O.m6e;(a.~?

adverbially

and imposslble
not

being

'Tletry

'this

plant

is dead in the morning but

can't

stand

feast'

it

is

(it

does

not

die),

but

that

between

it

can

stand

'combustible'

(can

We

be

also

burned)

thought

and

of

the

'tnflammable'

the

mathematical

is

question

(dunamis _ ), an adverb in
4 6
distinct sense of 'can'.

the

for

and

you

[ sc.

real

man]'

whether,

paraphr.:tse

Perhaps

they

should

be

for

is

any

not

in

distinction
(can

easily

of

these

cases

sufficient

proof

of

belong with
explained

'There's

in

terms

in virtue ot

but

being or

22-33.

But

the

~-----!:.2..

Kirwan

On

discussion
(a),

note

itself

that

the

full

of

likeness

is

in

sense

is

not

derived

via

likeness

or

metaphor

from

19-29

of

On

question tvhether the

dunamis

of

poiein

and

cor-

tion whether the kinesis in teaching-being taught is the same or diffeThe

latter,

after

familiar

paradoxes,

is

solved

by

arguing

~hat the change is the same but under different descriptions appropriate
to

the

two

parties

change

involved (202b 19-22:

however,

is

located

in

the

i..e.

not

identical kuriO's).

patient,

whereas

the

active

dunamis 0f our present chapter remains in the agent.

\S\11

man

the

related paschein is the same or different, cf. ~ III 3 on the ques-

This
it

capacity

as

be burned).
Nevertheless,

a non-mathematical one.

plant which still looks fresh and bloo-

frost.

of

terms of which it is explained rests on the ~thematical use of 6Uva.crea.,;

rent.
ming

virtue

the manner discussed - with an example from geo-

l019b

see

not

that it does not look at all happy;

one sense it can stand frost

the sense in which we say of a

1n

would

Start,
-

at t::. 12

difficulty:

1046a

denial:

not

the case in

as O.px-ri 't'~C::

(23)

does

not

mean

it

is

an

agent

but

that

it

is a passivity.

what

a speaker can do with the ordinary sense.

Another

doubt

reference to dunamis

abnut

Ar' s

or,

if

present

need be.

1
helped to elucidate dunamis

project

or dunamis

whether
dunami~t

adding

put

that into the definition

fhe cases 'Which are excluded to avoid homonymy can scarcely

be understood except by reference to 4 12,

(a)

seem to be envisaged.
explained 0!-10<6-rmC nv<
[Alex.

~n

in Plat.
"<.'l.t

liet.

Theaet.

394,
27,

the geometer's

(46a

34-6:
31

ff .}.

it

just alluded

is
(b)

a.OUva.'ta. 'tif e:Tva.t ?tWc; 11 ).Jh e:Tva.l.,

to.

Two cases

:se of 66vau~c; for

or xa.-riJ. L<ETO.q>op<iv

7)

66va.'fal.

1612

f1 11::\.eupd.,

'square',

10l9b

33-4)

similarly

Anon.

certain things we say are Ouvo't&

which

l:.l2 1019b 14 calls Ouva:tl'L o6 xn'tO. 06vn.~Hv:

we

first

thought

it

better

to

l040b

seems

Lo

refer

t0

what

C<o!tt.::lin thjn~s ar"} possible

15,

in

view ofA 3

transpose~ O""Uf.1q>6<n:~

1070a

afterq>6a'et.

10-11,
,

as

heLonging to natural formations (Aquinas supplies complantatio, grafting,

which seems neutral);

but editors recur toGA 773a 2, where 0"1.)J.!~Eq>1JX 'ta

are connected with 't'tpa.'ta (773a 3-4)

of the capacity to undergo or to resist change?

1046a 6-9

216

at

actually

Being changed is of neces-

3
but why

2
sity being changed by some agent,

was

the account of

JS

evident <iv<b:11pa.

ilt

l040b

moved
of

to

( 77 3a

13).

15-16 ailuq>IJO"'I.c; could

excise )Jl]

malformation,

at

and

1070a
this

and with some non-evident as well

This
be

10).

with A

would

lead

us

taken as xT!poxnt:.
Here
may

make

ln 8

there

the

to

believe

is

no suggestion

transposition at

15 (nnt recorded in the Notes on Zeta) persuasive.

!G46a 19-35

Incapacity.

that

(But we were not

To be compared with i.\ 12 l019b 15-21.

l0 4 0b

i l

'tL-\i'iER

in its power to do or not

l046a

36-46b

them will

of
h

Ross

introduce

logvs/ logon
14-15,

17,

.!..Q_g_~

with

(1102a

the

l102b

the

annotate

Cumpare

chapter.

13

EN

(a)

echon:

24-28)

not

also

marion

14-15)

familiar

on

0ccurrences

~~

contrasts

pages

(1102a 30,

with

another

element

in

the

soul,

to

of

(lt02b

soul

the

28-31)

(1102a

34,

of

which

1-3),

is

considered

dunamis

enkrates

terms

of

is

but

tOn

enantiOn,
akrats

provides

as

are

the

there

equally

praised

for

h~xis

of

in ~let. 8 2

is

l~

(l.OI16b

and

a rete

as providing

4-24).

~~gos

the it:

~~~~.

opposition is

both in its

~r-~ktikon ( 1103a

the obedient

gunamis

and

( 1102h

(b)

It may lJe

that

prompts EN VI

of

of opposites);

(or at

to

one

of

course

the !..0~

,:1

If this
~2

is

types

health.
or

for

the

This does

doctor).

parts of a logos,

dunam.:i_~

of

the

first

can

be

any more than the

channelled

into

wtth orthos

oi

J:l~xeis;

C?Sis
t '.~o

as

factors

dunamis

13

later

logos which is embodied in

EN

tOn

phronesis

and

VI

!._g~

tmchannel1~d

ll44b

in 95

which

direct ions.

t!"lat

the

in r:N VI
but

logou

This

recalls

the

insistence

of

:~3-21~,

the

determine
LJ

che

by

but

ethik!

arete

rational

earlier

contrast

proposes qrexis or prohai~~~amis

on the other hand does n("_

enantion;

meta logou

the

9 2 does not indeed speak

27-28.

1048a 13-15 Ar.

c!_~nameis

implied

in VI

respectively

12

1144a

make

the

in

one

of

"'-peak of
6-11
means

its
h_1_2_8.Q_

Ar

says

and

EN

VI

13

that

l.OJ>.211 (ll44b 26-27,

30).

It does

not merely conform to, it C!mbodies,

the right logos.

So in 8 2 rational dunameis have logos as an essential

component.

subsequently

logon;

But

and

this

in AS

similarly

at

he

A2

uses

l046b

kata

22-23

logon

Ar

as

reverts

well

not

mark

the

greater sophistication of

Ln both 02

and Rs Ar is careful to use ~eta logou of

as

to

meta

kata
logou

i_.;_ata

of

logon

the

dunata

possessed

of

EN VI

the

13.

For

the dunameis but

such dunameis.

The

logos is

a defining component of the rational dunamis but not so, or not directly
so,

of what has

:nay

subsequently

versa

('by

qf

~unamis.

the

l<)Se

This may be because .-Jhat is now dunaton

the_dunamis

forgetting,

or

some

and

therewith

accident,

the ~unamis cannot

a man

'...rhich

:>usia:
32);

ps.

that

or

the

the

logos,

lapse

is

is

Alex.

supplies handier examples,

of

colour,

the

surface.

dunaton enantiOn

the

dunamis

the

primary_ dunaton,

16
'lre
.q5

this

may

be

tOn

met

Thus

is the logos or

is
But

enantiOn.

themselves

_logon

vice

Alternatively, conthat in virtue

statue and man,

414.

31-

by

5-10,

echon,

described
or

the

(c)

it

(a) referring

in

or

language

recalling

that

in

virtue

the

Ls
to

of

which

logon echon which primarily

It may he objected

since

(property an<! prime possessor?),

1048a

or

time', 93

is the good itself (here called the eidos and

good

houses
not

lose the logos.

of

in virtue of which a thing is coloured is the natural primary

possessor
thing

unrestricted

both are

a ~xis not merely kat a ton orthon logon but meta tou or thou

is

1); but

two

so,

ts

the

<1~

the examples of kath' ho given in 6 18 1022a 14-17:

(e.g.

and

But at one point 82 may seem less sophisticated than EN VI 13:

l047a

hexis of the second.

(;:)

scheme,

->ider

13 insists on the orthos which turns the

opposite

the

same

~ogos

imply

healer:

the

13; l048a 3) in discussing the operation of rational dunameis.

:;kill in hurting-or-healing is a different sk.ill from that of the dependable

imply

least a well-directed piece of rPasoning) confined

so EN VI

into a hexis

and

does

V 1 ll29a

in Met. 9 2 1046b 7-14 ~pisteme is

as

compatible

(l048a 2,

reflection on this lumping of all logos under good logos

opposites (just

producing

are

sophisticated in their account of ~~ than EN I 13.

But

ll-13 has already pointed out that ~~name is and ~pistemai, unlike hexeis,

not

Net. 8 2

14-

t.he horma.!_ which

13 to stress orLhos log(JS (1144b 23-28).

The other three parts in this con-

The

defeat prohairesis (1102b 16-21).

are

and
more

alogon

a dunamis

To logon echon,

4-5).

not

first

So there is no consideration here of

and

what

in

the

to Jo.

- epistemonikon, 12..s.ist iko_!! and o~~~ikon - are therefore by cont rast

rational dunameis in the sense given in 92.
So EN VI 12-13
text

meta

orektiko~

(!lOla 9-10).

16);

some

two

and to logon echJn (1102a 28, apparently identified

prime sense and in its derivative use of

Lut

lines,

26-28).

and

11)

does

the

the dunamis.

good-itself

in

to

agents,

interchangeability

latter

hein.g

evidently a

_1~~

Ln EN

possessor

1022a 14-

the ~unameis

(b) observing that

appropriate

the l_~

that

rather than has

0f

e.g.

at

\~ and

of
the

relevant

(~namis.

dim (}rtha, and then says that of the fo'J.rth part of the soul. the tJ1rep-

-:_!--ls:_O_f.!.

there

iS

!10

such

a._!"~-~.

for

this

part has nothing Which it

iS

_!:__Q_~6b 1-2.,

':-"ltional

:2

etc.:

princlple',

doubt

13 Ross consistently translates ~ogos

dVotding

o3

'reason'

<:~s

part

of

the

old

l\J46b 1

'10TES ON THETA

debate

he

cites

VI

he

translates

13

in his

logos

and orthos

note

it

on

'rule

'right

the
or

rule'

tr.

Jf

(l141b

23,

plural,

(1144b 29),

keeps to Lhe singular

but Ar.

tr.

logos

'rational

29-30),

logos

in EN I
it

is

'about ... '

or
for

exhibit

mark it

the

off

of)

g~nitive,

saying A.Oyoc; never

it

does

mean

formula

doesn't

here

(b

e.g. in identifying
~let.

In

lr.

loe>on

9 2 and 95 Ross

echon

at

1046b

not

it is natural

with

the

possible

in 92

e.g.

to translate
addition of

1046b 8-13.

It is

though

different

Alexander

reads 1tOLll'Hxa.t xa.l

does X6yo~

Thert?:

are

thought

We

main

views,

that

On

be

in the

main with Owen's

simply

the

one

note,

about Xct-rd,

subject

(see

end of Owen's

specified
We

note).

as

being

preferred

about

the

certain

1 at ter.

might ask how a power of reasoning about something could &TJA.oiiv

(1046b 8,

14):

doesn't Ross have the advantage here,

One
things

not

without

to oppose doing

(b 2: j..l-rd,

though we

unlike 1-lE'td.,

1920]) that Nic. Eth. says not that

[CQ,

sometimes

(xat

22: xa-cd )

thought
not

the

point

applying

to

We noted noncommittally

the view of Hardie (Ar's Eth. Theory, pp. 236-9, preceded by J.A. Smith

than x.a.-cd.,

reasoning,

it

0:\Ao lv U\Xql cases, and also the 7tpax-r~xcd. txc.<Tt-r,-

xa.-rn \.Oyov I ~e-rO. A6you question

the

or

of

t'tLO"'ti';~<H

11t

are concerned to oppose doing to not doing,

it means rational principle or rule (Ross), and that it means reasoning

power

which

distinction

Ar didn't bring in 7tpax-rc.xat l7tLO"'t"-r,)..la.c. here because

he was concerned with

health must remain

two

formula,

significant

it

but ..;hen

being epexege-

tic.

agreed

mean?

where

the standard 7t:Jt..TJTLxat l:7tc.cr"t1;~a.L, with the preceding xnC

defining component, so that 618 wasn't needed.

What

no

2-6,
form);

We preferred

mj_ght

36-b}_

mean

a!: recc.), which separates the crafts from the sciences.

the basic idea (92 l046b 10-15).

l046a

1032b

to

17

Of course

'XLVa

between t:7t6q:Kl.O'LC: and d.1tocpopd.).

something to doing its opposite.

its enantion or ~teres is,

(at

seems

saw

opposite;

from

formula
it

incidentally we

f.lO..L

health which must

means

an 61t6(pcunc; gives

13:

(or 'rule' or 'principle') which uses denial and removal

it is reasoning about e.g.

\.Jith \6yov Exov,

interchangeable

are

13,

reasoning',

a dependent

not a 'formula'
to

'(power

often

again associated with opposites,

a footing with threptikon-phutikon-orektikon

on

is

i D4fla

--rijl \6yot:; Eiva.c. as easily as -rq, A6yov

had

is

At

put

13 and with phronesis in EN VI

'reason'

have

we

as simply 'rational'.
If

since A.Oyo~

In fact,

could

13 logos is

In VI

hims~lf,

he

In EN

(l144b

in reporting Socrates' views

1144b 27-2&.
though

1U95a 10.

'3

principle'

26-28).

1 i.ke episteme,

formula',

EN

r<J.tional

indeed put into the

phronesis with ortho~ at

llAPTF:R 1.

one

which

but
is

the

reverse,

and

that

both -.:a.'td and iJ.E"td ,

and

j..J.E't"d..

gives a stronger condition

there

are

one

which

two
i.s

types

of

virtue,

merely ;...i't<i,

the

\l_rthos logos.

since a formula

could already 'exhibit' something, without needing to be put into words?

But

to

exhibit

and

tt

seems

such

and

to

seems

say

the

to

need

disease,

which

single

rather

of

power

Similarly reasoning

bunch.

health

opposites

better

about

by

the

thought
to

sound odd:
about

formula

an

with \.6yot; as

formulas,

exhibits

couldn't,

as

them

exhibit
it

via
both

have

etiolated

i.e.

power
sense)

specific

like rpp6vry:nc; 1'1 a.b't""ft

of

reasoning
powers

of

(b

of

17)?

reasonin~

1046b

13:

'PO~ov

knowledge of,

''va

X~,& rru~e~~x6,

signifies

the

way

in

which

say, health also involves knowledge of diseases.

rioesn't,

'reasoning'. A6yoc; 6 a.i>'"r6t;;

exercise

1046b 3-24

Nor need we be troubled

at

b 8

which would

b 7-8 shows a shift from reasoning as a power to reasoning

something,

knowledge
(in

that,

be replaceable by something

bunch of

health could

so to speak, carry its negation in its pocket.

ought

reasoning

the

power.

Well,
about

it
a

How could
could

giv~n

'have'

subject.

1046b
this

15

The

chapter.

premise
But

introduced

it

is

by lxe:( doesn't

relevant

in 9 5,

where

seem

to

be

used

in

the thread is taken

again from
after a diversion in 93 and A4, and it is effectively
repeated at 1048a 9.
The point there is that somet.hing is needed

up

to decide which way the rational potencies act. and 5p;;L c; and JtpoaCpe::are offered.

This could have been said in q 2, and could per-

'5

------------------~----------------------~~~--~~~

36

lQip')b

1aps have
just

deny

and

17

been

11sed

against

that

any

deciding

doesn't

21

tl)e

if <ipx1'! at

doesn't

analogous

,;hat

raise

the

triggers

external,
{Indeed

~,.:hen

as
the

per

produces

heat.
both

the

to

elaborating

the

in

too

rational

the

the

opposites

seems

that

the

of

simply

A" 2 also

nonrational potencies:

trigger

may be

something

can be

potencies

of

opposites,

rather

unfair example of hot gas

especially Greek healing,

the

heating 5'6vn)JLC:: is

triggered

it

a cational potency when triggered should

opposites,

which,

which doesn't
potenci~s

are

united

by

the l:xsC

clause

potencies

too,

if

nonrational
cold

to be

reference.

at

as

15

ff.

20

says,

till 95,

come

One

single A6'(oc::

which

for opposites are pvssible despite the l1teC clause.

out

might

as when healing,

Anyway when

needed,

same

about

here

and

they

C.pxh x L v'licrf;wc;;

is absurd.

as well

as

hot,

is
in

relevant
so

far

at

all
the

as

albeit per accidens.

shows

should

how

powers

affect

heating 66vnf. Hc;

b 15 f f.

involve taking o~x ~1-1oCwc:: as obx t'f!-la, which would seem to require something
how

l:v )JfpEL rather than o-uv<i+aou.

like
the

even granting

that

between 'the
also

( o~x 6jJ.oCwc;

asymmetry

lot

Also
to

(i)

doesn't

explain

itself

(b

the A.6yoc;

themselves

into 7tp6<;;,

(t~ n6't~ for 1tp0c; -,;0 a~-r6).

(blackening

and
We

one

would

therefore

and

whitening).

expect

rather

inclined

( i)

the

towards

dative

(ii),

for o6x 6~oCw<; to b 9-10 (f.'ll"l-"l.ov) and b 12-3 (~p61<ov

ferring

20),

there is an asymmetry in the sense of a difference

processes

reads

applies

re-

HVIL );

the asymmetry there will be that, whatever it may be, which is involved
in cr>tlpr~nc;;.

( (ii) might read more easily if CL)J<PUJ is taken only with

a-uvd.+-a..aa., xLvf,o-eL
the clause

having

an awkward

no

expressed

structure.)

object;

but

this

would

give

We noted en passant that at b 22

EJAb read 'pb<; 0-6~6 for "Pb <; ~b 0-6~6.

suggestion was

But it was pointed

it

l046b 2l

while 82 turns

itself provides a role for the l1teC clause by answering it:

b 20

the

has

Lhough

The

is heated by being pushed towards a fire.

as

relevant

is

b 24

quest1on

Analogously

Something more

in 9 3,

rl.one.
trlck,

though

or

be

the

potencies

accidens,

refrigerator,
hurting.)

that

something

involves

produce

off?

nonrational

though only
working

them

to

do

L')

the A.6yoc; itself,

cHAPTER 2

'1egarians

had

seem

THETA

IJ~

'WTES

l:)

the

covers

would anyway be

awkwardly expressed if the above suggestion lay behind it.

l046b 22-3

similarly evoked

above,

the

says

(a),

two views.

rational Ouva.'td. do

opposite

in

the spirit of (i)

things to the nonrational

Ouva:td. (taking 'totc; Ouva:totc; with 1tOLEt'), while (b) says the rational
6uva't0. do the opposite to what the nonrational 5uva'td. do (taking 'tote;; ...
(a)

Ouva:toi:'t:; with 'td.vav'tCa.).

as

passive Ouva'td.

nonrational
that

(if

passive

and

not

powers

seems

indeed
that

treats

committed

vice-versa);

seem to be

the

object

of rational action

to calling all
it

passive Ouva'td.

deals with this

rational

(e.g.

by

saying

the ability to be

taught by one method in preference to another) are really active powers.

What
1\n

object

are

The soul,

starting from one and the same ~px-fJ,

\6yoc;, sets

the

processes

in

of

suggestions:

black or white.

opposite

piece

Two

on,

both

e.g.

to?

operating

ro~ether

we

does 1tpbc; 'tO nb't6 refer

paper we

motion,

with a view to putting now one now another

are making

connecting
(or:

( i)

i.e.
them

putting one

or the 0ther) of the alternatives (black and white) into the same piece
,1f

':he

paper.

(ii)

equivalence

The same thing as

of 1tp0c; ttv

aJ<o

and d~'tvdc;

,onnections between 1tp6' and &~6).

~i'io <Lb-rijc; <ipxn<: refers to (cf.

in

focal

~t

nne

:Jlternative

other

-:::onnecting them with

only not symmetri~ally (o6x 6J....l.o(wc;:

to that same d.p):'..,C, or )..6yot;

c\1oo<>es

and

The soul, starting from the \6yoc;

(.as above) sets the opposite processes in motion,

r~spect

meaning,

rathr!r

than

the

other).

( i)

seems

to

(a)

perhaps

naturally,

has

the

the

subject

advantage

that

the fJL9-

of 1tEpLfxe:'tac.

being

clause
the

follows

on more

nonrational Ouva.'td.,

if we can think of them as being encompassed in their capacity as passive 5uva.'t({

by

rational,

different

are

united

whiten

or

by
to

phrase for

(b)

differently'.

the ).6yoc; (the

power

being both
blacken).
-

power

from

subject

of being whitened is, being non-

that

of

being

blackened,

but

they

to a A.6yoc; which decides whether to

Also 1tO~Ei: 'td.vnv't'Ca seems

rather

strong

though perhaps it is just a stock phrase meaning 'acts

For (b) the subject

of 1{pLtXE'tal.

is

the

rational

Ouva'tci, which is awkward unless one can taken the 6 L6 clause as parenthetical

with

the yd.p referring

back across

it.

On

the

other

hand

(b) fits the chapter as a whole better for the nonrational powers must
~urely

be being thought of as active because of uta

)6

57

tv6'

at b 6:

this

:;JTES ON THETA

l_l)'t6b 22

won't
as

apply

to the

whitened,
y~

,...Cn

passive

(We

d.pxt].)

We

did
all

not

24-28

In

thE:

however,

can be

blackened

nominative
that

Ar

reading of

is

showing

64,

as well
AbJ:

that

106.

13-14 sub

But Diodorus may rear a head on one interpretation elf 1047a

infra,

in

<ipxf! of opposites.

first

clause

(24-26) d.xo)...ov8E! can be

obx &.e:C, 26) this seems difficult -

in most cases it isn't

l046b 29-30

f.

For values of verb

(i)

can F only when

that

the

it

ability

well;

to do
doesn't

it

accompanied by it.
a) .:ixo~ou8!

something doesn't
~

it

at

always

all,

We considered four

imply

though

it

when

F;

cf.

kinesis

kai

genesis at

l047a 14.

In other words

just
seeing)

not F X cannot

they include not

although 93 begins

of ~/energeia

in R 1-2, as a whole it covers all forms

belongs with A4.
As takes up from 92.

sometimes be

that would suit the account of dunamis

the ability to

may

does

1047a 28-29:

and these were introduced at l047a 11~13 together with the quite general

with examples (building,

do

does

'F'

only kineseis and staseis but einai and gignesthai and their negations,

taken

'is implied by' , but in the following clause ('ta.U't";J 6'

in the sense of
~xe:Cvn

the

paper

if

discuss

agreed,

s()me sense there is the same

l046b

powers

11)46b 29

and

so

possibilities:

= 'accompanies' throughout, and ri C is

Notice

(ii)

to be understood

that Ar is interested only in the form

'cal>'jdoes',

not in 'does"'*-an', which is not in question.

in the first clause.

b) &.xaA.ouBe:;t

""

'is implied by'

in the first clause,

(iii)

but is understood
a

possible

X can F at time t ...... X does F at

ambiguity,

between can

jump-at-t

time t:

this brings out

and can-at-t

jump.

(a)

only as meaning 'accompanies' in the second.

(c)
at

Aristotle
all does

is

thinking of

imply being able

The

cases where to be able to do something

to do

it

well.

arguments

seem

But in such cases the

to

because

need
he

in

l046b

only

the

33-47a

10 about

second

formula:

cannot-now house build.

qualification 'well' is redundant.

(d)

with

It was pointed out that, in ordinary speech, 'isn't always implied'

might

be

natural

enough,

though inexact,

for

against

sometimes is the case'.

But what are these remarks doing at this point in any case?
to

relate

in 92.

to

e1

pephukenai

formula,

'isn't ever implied, but

l046a 16-19, but not, apparently,

the

They seem

to anything earlier

X can

an answer to a point

at

idea

the

of

The

seems

F-at-t.

not

now a

housebuilder
construction

rather

(c)

etc.

comparable
At

to want

l047a

the

first

12-17 Ar

can-now F-in-the-future;

when X has the power,

time.
Confusing the

that

thesis,

and

at

time'

that

that

given

uses
the

time',

the confusion
to

is

not

met

it

is

threatens

power

by amending

'doing what X could do (sc.

which

the

of doing what

two may be one source of their

circularity or

'doing what

X does

has the power to do) at

regress,

So concurrent

activity is entailed by capacity .

I)

Note by G.E.L. Owen

l046b

34-36

~i~s~a~h~o~u~s~e~b~u=i=ld~e~r~--~X~ca~n~~ho~u~s~e~b2u~i~l~d (and so for all

~)

l046b33-34,
The Megarians:
~hich

below)

Megarians

F-at-t:

X does

CHAPTER THREE

(to

!.

under

to

made by one of Aristotle's audience?

from

!'.

and

g:

X is a housebuilder only when X is house-

building

school

Sedley, Proc.

(see

naturally apt

X is

(b)

seeing

choice between ~ and can-now F, this is more naturally an application of the second,
But the Megarians can surely not allow the
distinction:
for them X can-at-t F stands in mutual implication with

We concluded that they are a note which had been placed here

for want of a more appropriate place; or, perhaps

is

house building and

Camb.

it

now appears
Philol.

Soc.

that
cciii

Diodorus Cronus
(1977)

74-120;

I N_~cessi!:._y_,

did

not

belong:

so Sorabji,

l046b 36-47a 2:

(i)

X has an a r t ; X has learnt and acquired that art

Cause and=-__t

58
59

l '::tob

\f)

not ~2'~~~-t

X does

(ll)

~ X has

lost

the art,

(sc.

pathos ~~.l.9J~..:~. .~---2.!_ time,

bi:!caus~~s

'..'hat

ubject?

t:-:ey

if

The

The
form

ot

Alex.

the

art

g_!..

concede

6-11

of

but

will

proposes

are

upon

us.

but

these

he

(re)acquire

l,:arning occur?

unl.-~ss

implies

35.

(and

\.Jith

not

( i),

g_,

jib at

(i)

where

only present

eternal

does

~QI13I~ton

has

ment

Ar

does

menon

the

1.vill presumably

22,

ur

or

( i)
e.g.

Jnless

either?

;.lot

Perhaps

(b)

1047a ll~l2,

from~:

wholly

in

perceptibles,

e.g.

(A)-~thesis echein e.g. ~.!!_=can perceive, e.g.

10~7~-~:

X Joes not have sight,

.1nd Nhen it

it,

ht?.~weet,

cold,

then

(Presumably accepted by the Megarians.)

is naturallY apt

1046b 36.

taking '!_

as

Or

either

and

~.

his

for

tdunaton genes-

in !J. 12

r 81

But,

l046a 29-

(c)

two-way

of

it

that adunaton :

is

16~17;

and

Q.'.:!.

far the argu-

50

~.

apart

is that ~unato~

it

implication:

cf.

from

12

estere-

-==

1019b15-

Cut neither (b) nor (c) is important to the argu~

s_tere"sis

or

a"?.:!!!amia is

1;1hich ~legarians

any

:Jill

illicit 1 v

event

reject

1 mported

\.Jhere

on

will

grounds

as

im-

Aristotle

given

under

(an
_!_047a ll=J_?_.L_ll_J._?_, from~ and\'!:

see)

thol~S natu~gy_ apt_to have

to have it,

tird

be

seems sufficient.

then

terms

In

There_~e

'..Jill

is that

l047a

cf.

.~i-~t_!:letr-m = what can be perceivr.>d)

L!}_!~J_~.

nor

non-performance to have Logical connections

adunaton?

1 l046a 29-35.
1

intcnd~d

1s

said

conducted

duname'Os,

is

( i i)

gives us Dindorus;

implied at

Leen

nclt:her

why should the Hegarians accept either, when they Hant

different ~ at

,..1here

Perhaps ..;hat

performance or

<J_u_~~r:_~.9_!!,

not

has

Secondlyt

ment,

only when perceiving is going on.

[][)

they

(a)

either

'the

housebuildi~ he

from

Viz.,

it?

~1egarians,

and where?

Ps.-

are

udunaton genesthai

\~hat

Ross proposes
theory?

is

thai

the

~_.)

reiect
[[)

(The

'adunaton' ;neant

( ii)

1~a_v_~.:_-~h8 art; whenever he starts ;:,gair~ he (~~il

How Lhen does

What

firstly,

'st~ll survive' v.:ithout reduplication)

',Jheneve.._~ stops

l~~L:ia 12-14
this is what

even

The !!cuse in house-

l1egarians accept

brick~~.

the

surviving

obJeCt

i;r the Hegarians this,

But

particular.

7-9
the

a_<:_~~ cannot be reduced to

~~~.:_.-~ from ~ and ?._:

and

the

eternal_

building?

troubles

house',

571.

of

temporary

aheady a.v{uir<::d)

bv forgetfulne"?_~_::>r some

112_":?_~

What -~-S____!2_?_':_~~1.~~!__!)__~?.!~

!ien~ __ there is no__ chan~.

in th~~~~

tut ~X is blind.
(i)

For

CJ.i.>;ht

have

hon

t r~

Lited

in

1022b

104 7a
JO,

1046

J.1egera

cites

13-34.

104 7b

l048a

29,

Othepvise

the

1,

'and

fnr

Li)

\1~31;

:t.

pephuke

cf. [llZ

10l9b 17-18,

rhe second passage explains

c:ery

1t

hate

d~e,

tiere

though

tht!

in

general

r~mporal

'~-e~':!~~n-~~~- belongs

that
l.t

<lt

12

l012b Zl-29, 9[

to lack 3ight

is natural

qualification

I"~~ t:han to the !)_~2.:..~.-t~ (cf.

seems

the ~J.e at

to

for

is

the dnimal

attach

l046a

not blindness

rather

to have
r,o

:l.~y.

L01.9h 18); the .mqualified

C.~~

from

and

U:

The

same

man will__ .S:_ill_,~d

rnany

times

~ack:!-ng capacity ( P.ster;menon dUl}-ameOs) -) adunaton

1 l046a 29-10.

in
at

valent),

w;~s

1047a

the

We had before us Owen's notes; '"hat follows should

conjunction

if*

\.Jhether

29

with

f.:

is

not

them.

The

thesis

x can only 1p if* he

<p-ing

cannot

'P.

(The

position of )..L6vov in 30 was not

under

is .:p-ing,

discussion
and

quest ion was

rather odd,

is

(the equi-

hut

raised

the sense

in any case clear.)

Six possible interpretations of this thesis were distinguished:

l.

X dnesn't

the

have

ability

to

not

(I{) while

r.p-ing),

<The Law of

Contradiction.)

all (Jges; what does not belong is e_<::2__hukenai

lThe Xegarians may re1ect 1_: as ill-formed or false.)

l~J_::J.G!__lg__::J.J_:

read

the

;)c~!"_1...~~.:rephos-on.

:~~7_-:~ 1

be

stated

: still ~xists'.

Hegarians.

The

and

banal

2.

If

,)f

~-ing

'1e

Interpretatione

n0t,

is
at

not '-ing
t.

at

(the

at t, able to

9
i.p

19a

time

he

has

'irrevocability
23.

Perhaps:

thrown
of

the
Lf

away

the

l'r8~>ent';

11pportunity
,_f,

x does not 4' at

perhaps
t,

x is

at t.)

?erhaps needlec;s, but see 1,n LJ47a 13-14 below.

~,\rlstotle
')!1

11)4/a

has

10~14.

not

'tf'

hut

'..Jhenever:

ct.

f"Jrther

h~low,

und

'\ l a

,;!-'fA

1-'

L
:

'.PS

at

xis

4.

ff

the

ability-

h..1ild a

r_he

he ~":.~_ held

in

..Jhich

learns

But

abillty to

ttw

d~t::rr:unism.)

he 1ar_ks r:he al)11i.:--y

way

he

abl J it) Lo .;> n 0ther times.

:-h~

tir'les,

<-o

'.~'h:;

someo!le

b:Jild,

(u~:il

s~e

not tp-i.ng

sitting

rhJ:.,

he

h:o.

can't

now,

W'~aker

intend

until

[':'his

now),

It

s~mt:~lY

chan :., C11t is d-::rually stronger.

has

'if

the

also

foisted

former

whoever

it

(1-3),

remarked

are

you

'you

themselves -

Aristotle

it

on

cannot

that

sitting,

in stating

cannot

be-standing-if-you-are-sitting'

infers

bility,

or

that

it

derives

from

particular

guity

;_mplies

ledves

1-Jut

that

the

1nr:ac.:t

5 hrJ'iev<:!r

lo.::;t.

get 1.1p

can't

t:l~~n

rhe

rlivi~ibiL.ty

infinite

moments',

mi~ht

one

th~

c.Jn't p;et up dt

cf

ar~ue

Lndeed

abilitif:'s

tf];;1t

'lldY

._ht:!n'

he

simply

shows

that

the

( L. e.:

)[

these,

many

~r'.tel

now

he

1:1.

fhe

does

;1:-mselves
lorced

on

vit h
olOr-,

lntend

to

l:Je

~:;o

Rtter tilat, ,:nd

the sonsequenL
6

i3

'h~re

not

av0ided

rrn.

Given

absence ot
hecduse,

th,em

lll!tidl

">'-"t\Se

sLdlement

and
in

this

!,,

ts

'next

there

lack that

sEems

<1

_st

th~n

a thesis
of

all

l047a

10)

first

(fr,Jm

<.!ith

,:cm.r':F.lble

is

a11y

c)[

131.

rs,

tf

or

in

order

is

it
to

'1n

i.ntecpr, :A.ru:n

d~..:mol.L.h

i.-?

(1-i above).

at t, not-p:nsible-at.t not-ltl (4-6 above),

Lts

or

you

24

ff.,

Diog.

LliJ:-

h':' Hegarians

Arisrotle

tmplic.dti.on:; are ,,.-Jt

SJ:'Pll~d

o2

states

aren't.
of
with

Laert.

of

one

the

above;

latter

for

to

here

is

it

formulation,

1-2

leaving

suggested, was that at any one moment

affairs

that

may obtain; either you are

So no room is left for

the

'Reaper'

no

statement

25,

7.

44

paradox,
as

to

(interest

given

its
of

'possibility'.

by Ammonius

origin,

Zeno

and

and

also

Stoics

This

in de Int.
mentioned

generally

in

Sedley links it with Diodorus' Dialectical

school; PCPS no. 23 (1977) 98 and n. 135).

are

most

naturally

stated

in

terms

of

possibility,

rather

than of potentiality or ability, unlike 4; cf. further below.

It was remarked that,
or

2,

this

could

have

if

3 was intended in the

been made

explicit

thesis rather than

had 5uvT)8~va.c.

if

we

had

of senses

1-5

(though it may be

rather than 6uva.m><tL in 1046b 29-31.

1046b 29-33

DFi

4,

by

point, it was

two

it; also Lucian, SvF 2. 287.

felt

has

4,

the

has

that

because

of

Aristotle

thesis?

can

be

taken

in

any

the example at b 30-32 is already tilting the balance towards

Or

the

most

added
is

the

his

natural way
own,

sense

of

of

loaded,

taking

'cannot

example to the

ability,

rather

build a

initial

shift

to

sense

4 comes at

33

ff.,

builder is being able to build'

house';
Me gar ian

than possibility,

leads towards 4, already implied by 66va.m>cu in b 29-30?).

only

reminiscent

'',

that

:f 'Plitt, not-p05Sible not-tp-;:;!;t-r

'D

are

<p-ing,

further

r:--er wil.l

chapter

and

lmbiguit? Jf t!le r:hesis may reflect confusion Llett...'een

; f

ll~

that

dl_~Y.2_~~..!..!_

and

l_q T,

tr.uLsms,

i_:l

the

from

covered

alive

[This ambi-

stand/be standing.]

The Megarians'

starting

~~equires

and now'

ncJssible

\ri.'-itotle

thesls

different

naturally

is

3 as well as 4-6 to be covered by the formulation 'if you are sitting,

l-3

to

most

he

a.

you cannot

th:;,.',_

1.<::

slightly

are

school;

12 281 b

'f!G:nent',

one

ahility

maintaj ned.
;-.tegrtrian

ror-

h'Jt

the

':tppe-'l.r

the

lmulying

'if'

1--2

have

pr.et

, t

lacks

it

the
166a

moment',

expression

now,

'11<.~Xt

C E t)e 1 ow on 1U ~ 14 )

1.bili ty.

':.hat

notf.P--ing

js

and

at ~

'rwxt

by

x:

distinction

standing'

in Ll.e

(?

ana 1 ys is .
fi.

is

that

But

this

\vhich leaves

the

be sitting at- the,

c~.nd

time

;iew

(bel o.,.J';

'th(o!re ,1nrt

1...f there were such a thing) I musL

U' ..Jhich case I

aor'Tlal

implies

this

as an example of the fallacy of composition (and cf. ibid. 20 177b

at

(jf

make

22 ff ) without suggesting that it makes a special point about possi-

the ambiguity both there and in ~ 1.

present.

them;

discusses

stand/be

U1e absence of the ability at present from !"rqrperformance of the .:1cti8n

d'.:qu 1 red

If they did only

noted that 1 and
are so

Aristotle

you

they were

them?

was

there seems little interest

was

between

seems

Megarians

themselves

24,
~nd

here

up

the

or

truism

~et

did

confusion,

obvious that

builder can't

i:H1 t

'ne recr)verq

blind man c,m't

.1:

r)r

:'l

t-J se:: is restorer!),

is

is

'='at

The tlwsis nC

in

first sight

at

certa1n

house until

lf x

man

times, :"" L1cks

not

nr)C ,;.-jng nmv,

ab~l1ty

lns

cerca~n

does
~imes.

those

dL

IJ)

if

[f

~Or

..,ith the additional premiss

("'

'l'lt 1

b3

which

A definite
'being

'if one is not able to build one

104 7a 4

where
lltl"t

34

(ur

Cl:l.Swer;d in

be

,""j

..

builder')
b

,1't

'ability'

foas

force

the

it

preferred oUO'

as

has

~~.

in

N. B.

doesn't

ou't

seem

follows).

.o~hat

perceived as hot is hot, or

is

perceived as

converse

of

Howevert,

\f!Ehl , which

)f

also

may

characteristic

,'IS

"t

time

loss

of

(in

.1i.

hy the

some

capacities

1f 3.n art by failure

Greek'!)

nJtural

immediate;

to

disasters

with

old

to practise
refer

but

age;

not

is

species

to

an

inrerval

forgotten;

(iv) xp6v!f refers

(iil.)

to

loss

t, where i t ,,1ight not always be natu-

to .f.9..E_gett.l!!ai
this

refers

expected to l!avR

tr~

'i

forgetfulness

)..flAT)

<_ii)

individuals, xp6vql

which anyone mi'Sht

'lfter

vo6v~

of

he

refers to

xp6v~

(,)

tbe loss of arts thrClugh

her~,

relevant

where

it

loss

is

individual that is in questl.on.

~4_?.2__

?:

point

The

of

this

~xclude

to

some

other way

in

,.1hich one might no longer have an drt: but '.vhat is the ;n;piiyua.?
~ ~)

The

form of

house

(quite generally).

Aristotle introducing his o...,-n

forms

which

Hfficultv nf

r 1.)
.r.
!

No

probl~m

wRs felt over

the

-1rt

ts

mind

nf

it,
1

'l)t

r!i.s:~sters

ts

in

of existence;

(:f.

natural

dint

to

tn

(ii)

But

disasters

else)?
of

The

general,

t:here wo11ld be

tnr~

ri-te

builders.

eternal.

anywhere

1ther

of

building

tnr a. t.ime.
'r.

n"tl~ral

in and out

but there

is also the

below).

the art nf building; the form of house ln the mind of this builder,
in

he

pass

what
and
n~

as
of

Me~ar'ians

opposed

mtght
~'!!_!.._

to

Aristotle's

their

\..rel 1
man's

belief

subsequ0nt

A.ccept that
possession

in the

rediscovery.

loss
so

hei.ng

fnrm of h0use in the mind of nnv builder

'Need-for-shelter'

might

still

'shelter-made-of-stonec;-and bricks'.

nnly

to

contrast

of

that,

exist, even

the

relative

permanence

if

But we inclined

the v1.ew that such loss of the art:=.; is irrelevant here.

ilL.~ "lao's

argument

!he

P.Xtra

premiss

' 11r' hIe

ct.

!>S~w:

1n

is

hot,

it

is

hot,

and

'not

perceiving

follows

from

(II)

cold.

that,

as

it

is

hot'

if a thing

(IV)

We noted, though, that

hot.
'per-

~_!lis

reduc-

the refe-

and we

contrasted

a 7-10.

at

it

in this respect with the subsequent

2 426a 20 Aristotle argues that

At de Anima 3.

it is not correct to say that a thing is not perceptible if it is not

being perceived; but that turns on the distinction between potentiality
and

actuality,

~047a

which is what is being denied in the Megarian position

nf

required

'if

-=ometh.i.ng

7-10

Why

so

blind many

times

day?

whenever

one

blinks,

we

But there is no analogous process in the case of deafness;

one will

be deaf,

perhaps

whenever

there

are

no

sounds

to

hear.

We agreed in preferring Ov <1:p6'xov> in a 9.

How would

ded

either

the

first

the Megarians reply?

(i)

by

claiming

place

(cf.

above),

Their position can only be defen-

that
or

they

(ii)

never

intended

by defining

pnsition

'blind'

in

in

such a

way that not all 'incapacity' to see involves blindness (and analogously,
in a 33 ff.,
to build
ready

(f.22

defining

involves

ruled out,

'..Jho wouldn't
l022b

'builder' in such a way that not all 'incapacity'

not being a builder).

however,

in a 9.

see even if ...

26),

etc.

etc.'.

and if ...
We

Some qualifications are al-

A blind person will be

and if ....

agreed

that

it

'a person

but .o~ho isn't a mole

would

be

legitimate

for people who maintained position 3 to employ counterfactuals in this

way, and even for those who maintained position 6.

the art with

L047a 10-14

be
being perre1ved dS

is

perceived as

thing

it

thing

the

loss of it; d.C is cl.n exa,Q;~eration for 81:~.

1naoie nf

it

'not-hot',
then

if

position seems to require the

rence to Protagoras apparently being thought sufficient without further

explanation,

0
1 .~~-~~~_!_

not-hot',

(II)

Prot agoras'

tic-argument does not have its conclusion spelt out clearly,

:1tere t:tight be difficulties if the only forms that there are are indivihal

if

(III)

'cold'=

is perceived as cold,

decided.

in argument l'!.gatnst the t1egarians.

b~liefs

equivalently

But

as represented here.

clearly

is

(II),

if

ceiving as
(i)

hot.

is

ho-c

Lt

above).
blind;

This introduces a new point, the denial of change (position

It

wasn't

and N.B.

envisaged

l:S'ta.v in

1046b

in a

7-10

29-JJ.

not'.

').

65

that

the men would always

6 is implausible if stated

NOTES ON THETA

:, 10

\.:i 11

in

!:erms

of

ability

1 ng

now doesn't

why

not?

bility;

it

have

would

the

be

ability

required

that

to and 'Hill

isn't <P-

man who

never

recover

but

it;

But it is implausible enough tf stated in terms of impossitf p is

ahility,
ll.

or

impossible,

rather

Aristotle's

its

it ,.jill never happen.

absence,

to

And the shift from

impossibility

conclusion here,

is expressed at

it was suggested,

10-

results from his

illegitimately importing a tenseless type of impossibility (it is impos-

I H~ ' ?

but,

lt

l i ngerlL

false

is

to

say

that

the

interpretation of ~

one

Sl'u-hattle that

it >von't

diagonal

it

')

isn't

will

lle

measured,

true ro say of a C<.)n-

occur tomorrow.

But this won't work,

pr~cisel:v because, with such a view of truth-v.'llues, 'not true' doesn't

irlply 'LJlse'.
(Boethius, in d~. 2 215. 6 ff., refers to people
tr,uk Aristotle

\.Jhn

tnnorruw'

and

to be saying that both

'there

be

won't

'there will be a sea-battle

sea-battle

tomorrow'

-1re

false,

but

r<-:J<:>.cts this interpretation.)

sible,

11,

In

to be

statement

x does not

we

in

(now)

c0me

tensed

~'

not -ing

not

that x will

tenselessly,

negan with a

potentiality or

isn't

is

the

argument

of coming to he'.

In

obviously false ~

now come to be because it

ability

already.

requiring

12-13,

'what

is

that what cannot

it might be that it cannot

'is'

is therefore being taken

'has come to be' (eternal existents not being in ques-

The reference to
rence to the past,
There

are

three

'being or being-about-to-be', excluding any refe-

in 13 recalls Diodorus'

possibilites:

(i)

nccepted

tlly

at

this

Diodorus'

in

unlikely on grounds

of

chronology,

though not,

be

entirely excluded on those grounds alone.

t0

identify Diodorus as a Megarian ( c f. Owen's notes).

had

this

passage

of Aristotle

in mind

in

we thought,

formulating

( i i)

Diodorus

his definition.

(iii) The similarity is not a matter of influence in either direction,

but

simply

reflects

.1nd unchangeable.
say

the

fact

that

the

past

is

in a

sense

necessary

It would be implausible, in some contexts at least,

that a thing was possible because it had happened in the past,

is
Rut

to

But there is no reason

\ei:ld5

Compare

the

the

hy

Aristotle
of d:.06va."t'ov

were

not,

that

had

premiss

of

than a

tram

~v

of

1~ronus'

Diodorus

Master

the sense of rixo'A'Jt7e:tv

lQ,_, and

S'o""'tUL

temporal future.

Aristotle

has

is

the latter being

Having stressed that

ind1cate what ::.u.;u':6v

to

to

the

need

for

definition

of

'impossible',

and

tor this we are in danger of being forced down a Hintikka-

type

road,

chapter

the

proved

to

(104/b

9-12;

impossible being what never happens.

we

be

have

an example

impossible

cf.

of

because

of
it

ps.-Alexander 575.

what never happens.

;:enerality

1f it '.Jas certain it would never happen again.

if

this meant as a definition of 'possible'? If so, it simply

immediately

next

\lt

second

combination

rather

different
ls

looking

u1

easier

implication

dO

6uva."!~ d.OUva/tOY IJ.i-1 &xo\:.lu9c:t'v;

expressed

t -;\.

mind

been

introducing

definition of the possible

Aristotle has

have

question in what preceded.

infr~tential,

.JH

the imperfect lmiJJnLvt:v indicating a gene-

that

would

point,

1~4_7~

:\t gument,

L:.,.

here

truth

very

~~ been in

here

tion), and 'cannot come to be' means 'cannot come to be at any time'

was pointed out

lr

(if x is

have the ability to q>)

preferred "(Lyv6)J\IOV

process

as equivalent to

at any time) into an argument which

about

1047a

the

impossible,

leads

to

4 ff.).

However.

logical
Not

in the

that which can be

contradiction

there

just a matter

Anxiety was never expressed about the extreme

25-26;

but

we decided

that

this was

quite

right

the possible cannot have ~..!!.}:'_ impossible consequences, hm.;ever remote.

The
_'c::)4'-'7'-'a'-=.c13,_--'1c:.4
renee back,

The

tense of lofu.;.a.LYEV we felt,

doesn't indicate a refe-

but is analogous to that of "tO "t'C ~v erva.L.

'implies', rather than expressing an equivalence,

if

1:ve

It must mean
are

to

escape

tr.e position that whatever doesn't and won't happen is ipso facto impos~Lhle.

~tll

be',

Could
but

this be

rather

avoided

'that

if "t'OU'to = not

'what

neither

is

nor

of which it is false to say that it is or

against

,r

J''

general

question

'.vas

raised,

far

Aristotle's

protests

in l046b 29) were motivated by anxiety about possible deterministic

Lmplications

of

his

own

position;

cf.

'necessary'

in

l01~8a

6,

14.

n:; separates the possible from the actual by introducing qualifications

(a fJ-7,
.1nd

14-21);

the actual

there is a similar concern to separate the potential

in A3,

[s (he Megarian thesis

07

66

how

the !1egarians in this chapter (and N.B. that it is only a vague

interpreted in the ex-

!)4/a 1 J

llAPTER 3

)4

(/-~.)

lorms

ttme

and

Ls

distinct

(cf. p.hL <Wove

(6)

~ristotle

.e.'

tram

~ake

LO

easier to dis-

it

may relnforce his own view that potentiality

actuality,

t)y

implying

(in

(6))

that

denial of this

preme
take

of ~vEpyet.n

example
care

of

this

last

(Ross

l04/b 2

thinks Coxe:t

point )

in

The argument,

32

is

intended

in any case,

to

turns on

popular usage; N B. the 3rd person plural &~o6~&6nrr~ in a 33.

1n.0lves the denial of all change.

1~~
l~~?a 20-h2

Explanatiun

.nth lv-re:)..lx_~=:~a.,
.c;1l.

o~lso)

(=

in

nf

term tvfpye~a. connected

how

ur1_ginates;

link

hetween

3li

that

there

implies

({)UV't't6E!llv'Tl)

tv!.I)YELa. and xCvwtc;.

are

other

N.B.

examples of XLv1)crE.tc:

,_hat are 8vpye: ~a.L (perhaps in non-technical sense?) but not lv'te:)..txe: La.t

~rine

ln

example
of

If
it as

Lhe 6~7>

carried

is

nver

predicated

r-o

::~ccept

this

'

~nts

in

rather

'~..nked

hut

~-:onfined

the

If
line

that

2-33

in

man
of

is

32,

now
is

to

be

on

that

it

is

linked

so,
of

there

the

thought
not

but not

more

admissible for

not
part

that it

many

more

other

And

like

those

that

follow

in 30-35 as a whole seems

to Ov""tu,

awkward

predicates,

and

recognised

the

here;

in

the

Principle

things

previous

of

that

sentence.

Plenitude,

are

not

and

that
cannot

only
be,

explai-

(But

note,

two

cases

and

things

that can be and will be - in this case, or in some case?)

THIE AND MODALITY IN DE CAELO I 12

by Sarah Waterlow

be

well

as

is

'What always is cannot not be'

ger

positions,

that

is

not

is

is

actual

demonstrate
he

as

the

the

at

first

some
of

entirely satisfied with

to doubt

its

ludicrously

fallacy.
I

am

right,

the

12

he purports to

that

there

can be

no doubt

proof.

He

unfolds

it

that

there with

To modern

eyes

this

is

incomprehensible,

The reasoning seems not merely inconclusive

inept.

shall

In !_Je Caelo
and

and there is no sign elsewhere that he ever

force.

not to say embarrassing.

but

time.

these,

an air of total assurance,

came

This is one of Aristotle's stran-

associated doctrine that nothing is possible

it appears to turn on one or another puerile

argue here

that

this

is

a false impression.

If

the De Caelo argument is more subtle and also more cogent

than is generally supposed.

Ov'tct to l:v-re-

'in particular'

would
as

the term

because SvtpyELo

lv-c.s\EXEta

necessary v.e suppose

the

with

to

non-exis-

just the origin of

{~~icular?)

argument,
are

to

actuality'

being

but he isn't blind.

predicates,

(Is J0-31 explaining,

~

are

motion _h!!

Aristotle's

picture is brown,

of

connection

building~

intended

~.particular

should motion

is walking,

mental

in

the doc-

things; 1.16\LO"'t'a.

Readiness

this

connection

to xCvr~nr,, x(vT)(Tt.t;

r his

why

non-existent?

Centaur

this

non-existent

But

Brentano

be

if the force of yO.p in 32 extends

are the predicates that

so,

loose.

\,~r;yELa,

32-33.

house

implication might

on

given

But the implications for other art-forms will be diffe-

fact
If

the

have

in Aristotle than does

consequence

i.e.

playing Oedipus

in 33;

1'd

31 -

well-

the

~.... fluld

34

'the

givLng

predicated

the

man

"1 B. "tt.\lat;

of

galloping?

:1-:nt;

aS

not

that

1047a
objects

also

by

reason for

from

l>e

cf.

32-33,

that

intensional

cla11se

r'd~_~cular

is.

of

perception;

Z7-9.

~upport

r~marked

'..tas

Tt

hetter

in

Only some of the things that are not, are potentially:

~ill

ning

to be

concession
motion,

in

Comment

has

mostly

centred

cular

criticism directed

cused

of

at

on the passage 28lb 2-32, with parti-

lines 18-23.

Aristotle is regularly ac-

that
a

fallacy

here of division,

to wit of illicitly transferring

so

'It

.to not apply to non-existents.)

the
it

~ds

pu1nted out

that

modal

operator

as

to

always be and ever not be'

l!an of perceiving, only real objects being perceptible.
de
an

not
t

the

', han~o~;e,

only

things

that

convert

is

impossible

that

X should

the examples in 34 are of thinking, rather

c3.n 't

move

(change):

find nor can the !:nmoved Hover,

Hon-existents

points

and

which is in fact

forms

X should
is

true

ever
(as

not

be'.

shall

into

'If X always is, it is impossible that

This simple diagnosis is unconvincing.

argue)

that

he

does

here

perform

It

a move that is

the :;ueasy to misconstrue as a fallacy of the above pattern; but it can hardly

69

te tne fallacy
in

17),

of

ttseif.

ror in the

w~Lh

connection

pr::::cisely this lype of mistake

be

ring

standing,

L'Tlpossible
this

that

part

an

he

the

of

difference

but

this

should
text

is

between

the

time'

(here

infinite

example,

,\ristotle's

avoidance

.o~.mount

Is so deliberate as to

almost

is impossible that a man should ,.;hen sit-

It

to an explicit warning.

lillmeuiately preceding passage ( 15-

different

rioes

be

not

entail

standing.

clear,

it

that

he

Fttrthermore,

sits

it

is

if anything in

is that for Aristotle the crucial

two cases turns on the

treated

'..Jhen

terms

'always'

and

'for

as equivalent), whose absence somehow

leaves rofJm for an assertion of possibility which their presence seems

The
of

~ffairs

:.ite
1

is

that

for

him

the

presents a special bar against

left

unexplained

the

by

omnitemporality ..1f

state

the possibility of 1ts oppo-

hypothesis

that

the

trouble

here

is

To

speak,

here;

to

as

have

although

is

'~

trouble'

inappropriate

perhaps

to whether Aristotle

not

here

is

one

hope

j_n

with the argument will

the view to be proposed

on

altogether
the

(:.:~s

He for one

1f his critics.

of

just did,

been rtui.te

it

It will be clear later that 6uva:t6v is more suitable

context,

the

inapproprtately ambiguous
trouble,

rather than some

to make plausible) knows what

and

ls

dning,

And

the

he

is

che

'~l0<>c;

oassage

seems

knowingly

by

however

much

to discern.

engaged

principles
the

the only lapse of that sort

not

smoothness

us from attending to them singly.

~ntitled

is

this
qu1te

governed

Lndependent.
\.u:!ep

at

here

performance

formal nr analytic

r 11 1~

...,Mch

hy

1 hl e':

Lhe

_l c<:>.s) assume to

rurP"nt
b~

is

r::eaning

115

of

Hy point

somewhat

only

different

of

Ar.istotle 1 s

he

applies

but

logically

'.;hlch

(for

one

24-28

important

c>equences'.
l1:vov,

tn

and
but

J,

iVhich

properly

but

because

of

it

Analytics

is

as

it

figures.

De Caelo I

12)

are

the

criterion

be

useless

for

criterion that

end

to be

The

is required in the context.

have

to

be

able

to

able

straightaway

in

something

else.

tell
from

touchstone
explicit
the

of

at

(cf.

(whatever
it

were

that

is merely

might look like)

also

28lb

impossibilities
criterion.

least

some

criterion,
still do

impossibility
the

same

22-23) .

thing

(the

impossible

is

whether

12
the

both

the

something

self-evident

entailment
is

Whether Aristotle

and

is

means

(or

leave

aside.

Nor

shall

of

an

not

dt

his

even ideally) to take just this form is a question I

always

and
what

We also have to be

cases

In De Caelo

non-self-evident

time

is concerned to distinguish and

some

off without

self-contradiction:

same

in a number

However, for the criterion to be effective,

straight

than

then matter,

include Metaph. 9 3 and

proper definition will

recognise

consequences)
to

rather

not

is impossible and what

unless

criterion

(which

he

possibility

that

fails

that Aristotle needs it

These

passages where

A definition of

as

circularity does

the distinction between what

false.

we

statement

only because

passages where

support

not

formal rule for

rule
shall

here consider what sort of modalities are

blished

by use

overall

account

of

of Aristotelain modality,

the

rule).

present

task of

identifying

This is an important question for any

principle,
the

term

L1ck of other

f11Jalification,

this

rule

is

the

nne

but

it

will

not

affect

the man ingredients in the proof of

the

'What

always is, cannot not be'.

34a
104/h

25

ff.,

which

l0-11.

reappears

at

e.g.

!1etaph. 9 3,

'The possible is that '.Vhich is not

if we supp0se

it

the case has

12

)f

special

feature

of

the

rule

no impossible con-

-r'> 6uvr:t"t6v, and in 93 he uses the terms

proof

is

an

That

cf.
is

standing,

it

true

at

is

explicit

is, a

false

possible

another

time.

reference

to

statement,

iff nothing

'possible'
'another

as

it appears in

that

time'

(281b

17-19;

X (actually sitting)

impossible follows

We may find

from supposing

this addition perplexing;

but

this, I suggest, is because we are accustomed to thinking of possibility

and

its modal

fellows as absolute.

71
70

for

frlmiliat

(In the An. Fr. passage Aristotle '3peaks of 't'O lv6sx6~_aelo

logic.

ftxei by its use in accordance with the rule.

13,

nrus-;ary,

Prior

definition,

that
i~47a

of

involved in the statement of the rule itself (as opposed to those esta-

withholds

T shall

reasons

It is more useful

the

execution may

met~physical)

nnd

is that

for

simply facilitates

regard

the

elaborate

Of these, the one most

(as opposed t0 a

tells

he

in

that

not

'posssible'

to

wording of

The
With

although

12 depends on a mataphysical principle concerning 5uv~L<;,

at least to the extent 0f avotrling any text-book fallacy

the fallacy of division is not

quick glance

..;hat

Caelo

the assembly of these two elements of the argument.)

'follows
he

De

proof in I

would

simple fallacy of division.

turn out

15

fact

interchangeably.
for

The

contrast is with

'relative',

CHAPTER 3

t.-:(1

::i~fcrence

'rh-

is

just tiy

,;; 1 hili r y*.

But what
There

truth

'r~

of

Lrue

at

t:vely
.Jny

(false

.Jere

and

in

the

r;xa1n1ne
~ether

the

Nith

passiblP..

p0int

is,

follow

case one

if)

we

consequences

not

we

9.',

proving

are

,:~>nsequences

sumpt1on.

take
of

".Jhtch

another

test

is

:tlsn he
:-hat
r.he

pUt

E
actual

1le

'.e.'

(For if nothing
supposing

'E'

time

rather than

~s

not

otiose

if

Aristotle

is

telling us

to

but

of

'E'

is false:

co sidered to-

in other words,

of

'g' describes the state of af-

'e_' is possible or im-

is false (or taken to be so),

need

to ask that question.

mentioned
may

are

would

that

it

is

test

false)

that

alone but of

assigned

inevitably

The

be.

assuming,

'.e.'

the supposed

possible just as effec-

time-references

time:

impos-

is,

to

entail

has

no

unless

relevant

Rut

at

state of

SiVen that

what

E_

(impossible,

things

at

we

want

the essential
1

iS

that
That

!:_).

is

real

~~

an

any

qo':ern

rhe

first

'is not',

and

is

phrase

relativelyto,

is

not

is

'What-

~~Am,

-e/~.

it

the consequences

are at !_,

when

'_e'

is false

false at ~ that some absurdity fol-

'E'

present,

it

tense)

possible

that

is

(present

at

some other time.

at

some other time,

(not

with the supposition

When there is no absurdity, it is pos-

the

!_ is

that E.l~.*.

Hence if,

is possible now that E./!.*.

X (now sitting)

E.g.,

says at

for

it

should be standing

But i f there is the possibility of his standing

there

is the

possibility of his standing as such

only of his realizing that general possibility now).

281b 15-16 that X

h.

torical state of affairs.

to,

says

or at,

'tt)v 66v<J.I.LLV of standing,

Aristotle

and according

quite literally.

Moreover, what is possible/impossible rela-

one time may not be so at another.

that

Thus at !_ is is

the man in our example be standing at !_ (though not

that he be standing or at some time or another).

Thus at !_ it is im-

possible that the man in our example be standing at !. (though not that
he be standing at

some time or other); but at some other time !_+ (it

is most natural to think of it as prior to !_) it may have been possible

that he should stand at !_ (whether or not he actually does so then).
There is more to be said about the concept of possibility as relato

the

fact and temporalized.

light

immediately

thrown

But here I
on the

shall only call attention

accusation that

of De Caelo I 12 rests on the fallacy of division.

sort

of

modality
a

case

We have Sl:
Sl

Sl

a move

of

'It

entails S2:

possibility
Fnr

if

the state of affairs relative-to-which.

to the way things are at

sembles

'!lhen it

of

instance,

could

it is not'.

the

that

sible relative

impossible

and

time:

'E.i!.*' ,provided that !* ~

'E.'

criterion

'.e_'.

given that

(or the impossibility of 'e/~') is rela-

lows from conjoining a description of things at

to

for

'-e/~'

Now it is not the case for all

is,

holds

is:
sense

tive to that state of affairs, it is reasonable to assign to the necessity itself a

tive

or

says how things

For i f the necessity of

false at _.r:., it iS impOSSible

given,

have

This makes

vetted in the suppositional test are deduced from a conjunction

tive

rn rhe last quotation I take (claiming no originality) 'necessarily'

~}

be

in which one conjunct

chance

point

...nat o\ristotle has in mind when he says at De Int. 9, 19a 23-24:

r.>ver ts not. !wcessarily is not

to

What we

-E./!.

to this interpretation he means the present tensed

On that as-

logical

necessary at !_ that

The literal sense is appropriate if the modality is relative to a his-

That is one way of putting the matter,

when

necessity obtains

is

'.e.'

that the relevant

~.

when the

The

is not a test (the game is lost in advance) unless

foll.Ol..IS:

true

~refer

ask whether

(given

and

reference

alone,

'E'

possibilities.
<lS

3-

the case for this

mention any

that

'E'

to

just
what

those of

especially

!01Jbtful

f<)r

it

don't

times at"e differentiated.

~he

not

is when 'E.'

we

possible

are not

the

need

different

~atter

'e.'

at

~"rue

::;JJnonsPct

true

conjunction
no

full

'e'

'other-time'

prompted

unless

any

and

at

believe, a relativized

in

counterfactually

'g' with 'g_', where

rhink it

rhe

from

situation in which

that

distinction

possibility

this ts the argument:

only

iiJlpossibility,
0f

to develop

That, of course,

if

,J.nd

justified is,

The

in which we

since

of

surely that would prove

conjHnct.ion of

fairs

assertions

thus

to

that

the

latter

soace

Answer:

think,

'categorically asserted'
the

.r:_) to a time other than !]_

at

found

othet".)

1..and,

not

Briefly,

:_ itself,
-

(ci~\Wc:)

is

is

lnterpretation.

impossible

!Tlakes

Lt clear 1.n 9 ff. that his rule i.s primarily intended

categorical

rnrJdality.

i.Jetween

Aristotle

IJI3' -1ls0 makes

lO

~.hat

not

',,n-,ln-hypothesis'.

that
is

'If
also

is in general
fallacy,

but

impossible that

E./.!.

then not

entails

what

dS such used in another relevant contrast, see below.

'2

73

argument

admissible which verbally re-

which in

those

E.l!. and -E_/!_'.

-E./!'
we

the

In terms of this

cannot

But
get

terms

in terms
in

is valid.

In any system

jllSt

of

relative

any system,

 ~TT~:)

is

;_n

S3

exactly

modality

'If e/t then it is impossible at !:_that -e.J~'.

namely S3:
ranee

THETA

(}N

of

an

impossibility-operator

what

..... e

should

to

generate

expect

from

the

the

as

part

logic

of

Sl.

premiss

of

the

The appea-

may be the operator

consequent

proposition

temporalized

But

what

relative

the

one which appears

resembling
S1

says simply

in

It

operator.

'impossible',

Aristotelian

context

as

or

timeless

as

it

middle

53

is

at

!:. ', while the one in

different though

9,

De Int.

better

omnitemporal

to

think

shan't

of

this

consider

strong

S1 we should have not S3 but S4:

-e/~'

Lhat

there

is

no

at~

not nnly impossible

Aristotle

warns

is

possible.

Thus,

ness

to
not

fallacy

always

Nhat

we

the

commit

it

is,

in

in

confusing S3 with S4

at

De

Int.

it

harmonizes

(see

below).

confident

in

allowing

ro

the

there
us

ahd

from

51

falls

as

to

that

the

However,

in

say

who

reveals

'Nhen he

under

the

is

from
One

term).
occurs

L.e.

when

This

temporal

its

is

case

of
who

he

it

X' s

the

are

Caelo I

the

can

standing

(sc.

at

some

the difference

to 53,

for
is

failure

instance,

guilty of

to

some

other

time).

between S3
inferring
an error

distinguish
restriction

the

and

with'a'
various

non-restriction

is

without

temporal

possible

that
at

in

the

of

'e'

the
is

awareness

S3,

that

way,

which is

can be

temporal

read

seen

to

be)

the move is not

replaced

'If e./~_.

restriction

'X is sitting'

on

modality.

'it is impossible

wrongly

then it

from

by

S4.

is im-

impossible

(or:

'-.e.',

and for

'X is

12 Aristotle is denying

parallel

mistake

od moving

parallel only when we

work here,

Aristotle's

same way
as

what would
ference

as

It

from

realize

Sl

that

to

S4.

relative

is not parallel if regarded simply as

as

him

inference
by S3

to

the

the Megarians in Met~. 9 3 re-

inference

from

S1

(innocuously

presenting

from

to

Sl

the

54

(and

never

has

reached

analytically

from

temporally
Sl

been)

aspects

is

impossible.

the

Megarian

fact

is wrong
When both

51),

distinguishable

of

(via

possible
this.

restricted

S3)

yields

that
Thus,

and

S6:

then

they

effects

--e_ ever'.
e.g.,

unrestricted.
'If

if

e./!:_,

S4

of

is

This
view

which has

that

whatever

fact

of

that
often

happens

change.

But

is

one

only
seemed
has

to

of

Under
it

never

sitting now,

it is

Hence change

the paradoxes Aristotle derives from

the

actual

puzzling;
be

then

and SS are merely

for ever excluded that he should ever do other than sit.

54

to SS would be.

in fact have been a block refusal to bother about the dif-

between

different

objections
for

an

mediated

viewed

'a,'

e.g.

Seen

via

without

For

the view that

restriction'.

instances:

-.e.

it

refusal,

~emporal,

that

awareness

relative

Hence I conclude that he is unlikely, in the same

block

of

particular

'it is impossible at ; ' with

goes

made

this

(where'a.' is

are

but

and

that

use

given

no

temporalized

a fallacy of division, as is usually done.)

be

consistent

(and

of

it is clear that in De Caelo I

have

see

modality

One

(although still quite general) case of this

turn has

(We

inforces

!_ is

such requires
logic

restriction'.

that

and

to

seen

use qualified by

restriction

chapter,

passages
if he

as

the

-.E_ ever).

standing';

are

sitting at

_t.

at

!:. that

reasons why
two

also

direct,

possible

can

overlooks

heading:

of

is

move

S4

12, he could have been

actually

his

independent

of

temporal

to

that logic supports common sense

carelessness by,

confused
in

trying to demonstrate that

thinking

it

part

that Sl yields S5.

19a

His alert-

is difficult to see how,

t2e

is

only l!ntitled

special

when

'a.'/!:.

his

general

~ simeliciter

fact

that

A person

any

"':rror

There

he.

granted

possibility at

explain.

S4,

12 while

in a mood to commit it in

so

.;ith

not

for

9,

that

at

is

passage does not of course prove that he

Caelo I

cannot

take

had been

that

De

cannot

it

in another in the same con-

Another wrong substitute for 53 would be SS:

(given that /l), but always was impossible.

against

26 (except that there he makes the point with 'necessary').

did

then from

e.g.,

But

S1

'If .E_/!_ then it i.s impossible without

'-.e./!.'

diagnose

critic's

without

point

This entails (if it does not actually mean)

time when

To

the

an example of confusing

operator
The

here.

to avoid it

Now the wrong move from 51 to S4 is not only a fallacy of clivi-

sion.

Whether in the

19a 26).

i.s that if by fallacious division it were being transferred,

restriction that

text.

'impossible without temporal restric-

(cf.

is

of

'impossible

i.e.

or 'impossible cbtA.Wc:;'

tion',

the

says

and it may be a non-modal

I make the asumption that someone who avoids

(although not of course bound)

generated is the transference of the operator that introduces Sl itself.

For

'it is impossible that',

'E' or '-E'.

the temporal restricted/unrestricted confusion in one instance is likely

not thereby

is

-\PTF.R

as

Aristotle's

75

it

10

ff.),

the modern determinist

is

holds

is,

criticism

possible

but

he

is apt

( l047a

does
if

not

deny

the

the Megarians,

. \F fER 3

like n 1 m,

are think.tng

1n

inference

tram

the

ab0ut
to

temporal

terms of

must

return to

that

e!~.

from

'q/~ & -E./!:_*'

have

is

it

is

argued

unlikely

any

more

tr..te

at

r.

be

always.

tanding

(')

then get

straight
it seems

with

!:_

Aristotle's rule is:

'q'

this

Given

-.e_ iff nothing impossible follows

that

represents the facts at

governing

his

~and!.=!_*).
that

reasoning,

reasoning

it

'-E'

entails

that

Lime.

In fact,

answered
is

it

by means

possible

of

that

is

concerned

g~ven

or

another

to

is
it

possible

the

at

extend

Jne
it

to

if

it

only

100

to

the

'Here

absent

have

been

extending

lor;!;ical
in

complexities

the original

little

the

rule

more
to

the

crj.terion

Given

is:

But the criterion as

poss~bilities

with

relative

seems that Aristotle is

given

is

(and

cover

this

term

',.Je may ..1ell feel

example.

t~mpor.:-~1
tt

may

sttting man's

explanatory
apparently

on

'(l'

that

it

talse

~J')fl

'Ji

'-p_'

the

-~)

~ffect

of

tacts

is

given as)

'always'

that

legitimacy

different

very

standing

which

relative
as

Lhev

also

possibility
are

the conjunct1on of

is

referred

shows

sort

if

it

'q ah1a.ys'

is

not

sian

works.

For

the supposition

a time not included

thus

referred,

This

not

This

feeling

has

treat

to

to

the relativity entails that

~~en

shape

as

the modalities are

is wrong.

-e.

(given

The answer

has

That is to say, to reach his conclu-

the

given all

take

is it impossible that

The question shows what

actually

begins

omnitemporal

at

blow.

fact

For

as

only

if
so

it

were,

can

he

so

argue

that there is no time beyond the time of the given to which the supposition of
token,

its

opposite

there

is

true
-E

result
given

totally

is

that

the

When all

referred.

But,

omnitemporal

time

is

over,

to

be

always

to

by

given,
then

the same

considered

it

is

given,

But it is only when it is given that the impos-

that

it

is

never

is

the

Hence that logic's

(no-when)

What he wants,

justify,

but

relative

impossible

that

(as it now appears)

is

'-.e'

at

impossibility of

Qi time, as distinct from its pseudo-impossibility

relative).

'-.e'

which

which his logic seeks to prove,

each and every moment

absurd,

coherently be

time at

given.

seems

unable

(likewise

may

not

sibility obtains

In any case,

could be

shown

if

possible

such a pseudo-moment were not

now by coherently

referring

its

truth to the pseudo-moment.

Even

!:_,

at

pseudo-moments
these

it

is

entails

case

that

show that

the

.e.

anq

to

that

-pJ'-*

cannot

be

Aristotle
or,

(b)

with a

there

is

that

-E

t*

here.

we

prefer,

'the given'

such that
the

facts

it is always the

Aristotle's

One

-= t

description of

That is to say:

true.

if

For every moment or period

E/!:. and

possible

not

help

only moments,

together

impossible.

always

might

successive bit,
times'

case

that

nothing

this

time

considering

Q.f time, we can say this:

supposition
t

beyond

now and

periods,

(a)

the

logic

cannot

is taken bit by

there can be seen to be an infinite abundance of 'other

which

to

refer

the

negative

supposition without

incurring

contradiction or any other apparent absurdity.

then

which case the

the modality here is relative to fact,

trick.

that

:e)?

Aristotle

speak,

finite

omni-

any

when the given is given.

of

with the supposiIf

r-1me within "J.Lways",

7()

the

contradiciton.

at

We are entitled to ask:

to be:

to

recall

always

Forgetting

For a moment

this

this can lmly mean

absurd;
to a

that

of

..;hich ~othesi

facts

implies an i:npossibility.

'another time',

''allvays"'.
1n

terms

the

c~rtainly

referred to

:nrl.er

in

'->tates

'llilke

i~;

of

dated.

that he might

the

being's !..._fi!.pOssibility uf not heing (or ceasing).

seem

(-...-rhere

possibility

we

en bloc,

above

straightforward

allow that

sense

no-when at all.

introduced by the

helpfully

as

we

we

thus

Hut without demur he declares that the suppositional test which

;-he

.r.ows

Even if
ahsolute,

i.e.

It

time.

case ..1here

entails

rate is Aristotle's argument (2Blb 18-25).

The ques-

is interested

It also seems that in proceeding thus he pays no attent

conjunction

is not at all clear how it

(ever)?

-E_

~ only

at

on the basis of Aristotle's treatment of the sitting/

illustration,

facts

hoping

By itself the rule certainly does not entail

to the case in which Aristotle

1 t1dve stated it.

3

they

care

be marred by the so-called fallacy of division usually

some other

to

now

LOTI

that

case

to

soon

3t

(where

than

even ilpplies
t

that

like him,

refuse

t1im,

is <iCt'_.~allv hnw they proceeded,

the main argument.

his desired conclusion.

i~

unlike

lt is, however, another ~uestion whether the rule can sustain

alleged.

it.

but,

~as.

pos.:>ible

that

to

relatlve modality (hence,

S2)

ln

thls

that Aristotle thought it

I

to

rcstr .tctiuns.

l<.'hether or not

S6.

Sl

Thus
,;ays'

none

the
but

argument of I
a

collective,

12 proceeds as if the author sees in 'alor

perhaps

77

should

say holistic sense.

'!!APTER 1

But
of

how could anyone

which

the

be oblivinus of

proof

gets

chose to ignore this,

che
Or

nowhere?

rlJ:stribut ive

if

for

his

sense in terms

(Remem-

how could he expect readers to connive?

ber that his immediate audience would have come to this passage undistracted

by morages

to develop
I

that

of

the

aspect

fallacy of division.)

of

Soon I

~.;hich

Aristotle's position

shall begin

answer

with a

to

this

general

question.

But let me first

less
the

equivocation over
muddle

alleged

been mentioned.

by

Prof.

Briefly,

would

fall

Hintikka,

under

the

fallacy

criterion for

possibility as
Hintikka does

time.

this

not

yet

Hintikka is rightly dissatis-

he sees it

used

not

It is not that he denies

as

in

the

symptomatic of

metaphysical

pressure

'-E.'

supposing

context

say with any

view gives rise to difficulty.

from

as would

whose explanation has

it is this.*

but

head,

something

The underlying problem, he suggests, lies in the suppositional

else.

of

occurs,

Sheer thought-

this

emanating

of

Aristotle's

precision what

from

of

criterion proves

rationallY. frame
reconstruct
in

the

he

himself

if

it

the

the
sort

of

thinking

is

eventually

For

true,

asserting the possibility;

lows

that

position of denying himself

recommends.

is

a waste of

time:

if

be

Thus inhibited, Aris-

false.

but because he cannot

sha 11

tested.
might

conceivably

not

land someone

the use of the very criterion that

wait

to

'-e'

know of

is possible only
the

truth before

thus supposing it true and seeing what fol-

it

is

to

this

position

which i t holds.
interpretation of
tr.)

and

Stocks

graphs,

is

open

thought

faces

of
a

Aristotle's

inference

from

common difficulty.

difference
it

between

to be so; or,

supposing

something to

for that matter

right~
on

be

the varying
to draw his

the

field

for

Thus,

for instance, we should reject the existential

'what

is,

cannot
since

not be',

this

is

to

serious

favoured by Guthrie (Loeb

far

too

difficulty.

-.e.

if it is possible that

q.

narrow.

We

need:

The

proposition entails

then -eat some time.

But this conflicts with one of Aristotle's plainest

(e.g. ~ 9, 19a 9 ff.), to the o::!ffect

it

is

also

logic,

since

This is not only

in some cases

if one of a set

of contraries is true no other member of the set can ever be.

for instance. it is possible that this coat be cut to pieces,
fact

mean to

Thus,

that g) then --9. (or g) at some

that some possibilities may go for ever unrealized.

common sense,

keep

it

until

it

wears

out:

and even if I

Thus,
but

in

don't,

it

1s still possible that I shall.

Hintikka hopes to resolve the conflict

(inevitable

the

on

his

account

of

modal-temporal

connections)

with

the idea that it is only general possibilities that have to be realized

in

one. or

another

instance,

but

not

in any particular.

Thus,

possibility of my being murdered fortunately requires not that

only

cannot

that

clearly arguing
e g
is

78

the

(Oxford),

that for all _E,

but

views

Aristotle's

But this formulation,

which for convenience I have several times used in the preceding para-

this

publicly expressed

that

if always E. then not possibly -_e'.

'For all E_,

But

Aristotle's

intended as an objection to

forces of the word 'all' - then Aristotle ought by

crazy conclusion universally, without restriction

be,

from

or

asserting

However,

enough to say here that only a very confused thinker could have
Lerl

'possible' i
case and

it is an insufficient guide to possibility

before the truth is known, and an unnecessary one afterwards.

heen

try to

not

account

expressed elsewhere

one holds that

one must

Hintikka 's

possibly not'

for any

it impossible,

supposition to

'not

time,

totle cannot even entertain as possible what he takes to be never true,

because his

rate'

to

views

(Hintikka's phrase) when he knows or believes that the actual

not

any

inhibits Aristotle

quarter

that

'-.e.'

is

maintaining

'in the actual history of the

this

facts

moment would render

from

if it is possible that --9. (i.e.

an obscure

universe'
at

This

far

e.g.,

He holds simply that

true at some moment

view

aspect

time.

very

If it is
due to confusion about such topic-neutral matters as his own criterion
for

field with the 'fallacy of division' verdict.

that

At
'always'

the

'always'

ts

Perhaps indeed
we should expect from him rather more than Hintikka seems to,

to any diagnosis that locates the

the passage we have so far considered, namely 28lb 2-25.

nature of
who

about time and modality are wholly clear and coherent.

in some fallacy or confusion occurring within

observation relevant

mechanism of the argument

prepare the ground

the

Hintikka,

provides him (so

shall argue) with a respectable, even if to us not particularly agree-

able,

about

reasons Aristotle

28lb

be
that

32-33):

poss1ble,

the

some

creature

somewhere

meets

reconciled with pJ':._ Caelo

if any

individual

which entails
possibility

is

that

always
if

realized

79

the
in

with

the

I shall

sticky end.

12. since Aristotle is

is,

g_ cannot be (see,

individual's

that

\'ery

not-being

same case.

Til ETA

<~r~ne

Jhall

:s

that

below

r~striction

P'Ji.nc

of

chat

D~.

i.n

""

(see

the

inmediate

c~nsidered

this

not

l3

also

qr.ope

of

the

tmportance

,Jf

JHt

is

proof
that

wlch

ltne

3),

Metaph
in

in

statements

s1nce

there

De Caelo I

the

passage

have

if

nothing

else,

justifies

ns

in

steptJin)l;

has

~~e

have

lot

to

only
.say

r.he ~arne terms,

may be,

it

:1ny

to

the

this

v,enerable'

in the hope

because

that

he

is

is

at

Here Aristotle

entirely

the

same

ignored

time,

and

talking about what we should call'capacities':

are at present

rate,

preceding Lhapter.

possibillty

is

from what

Aristotle

and

turn he

being
-lnd

and

not

of no great

stJrt'3

by

'imperishable',

:::ubject

being,

being,

and

again

'1eanwhile,

p< 1 int

"immediately
then

ment toned

.Suvriu.~<;,

various

and

the

until

vjc~

versa

senses

of

possibility and
the

'in-

These

impossibility of not
After this,

(28la 16).

beginning

impossibility thereof,

of

Chapter

12

as

for

lifting

is

an

far

as

Aristotle

inherent

and

for

limit

to

is

.;alking,
thP.

concerned,

( 28la

where

28

for
fhe

exercise.
is

that

being

fullest

realization

"O

much concept1al
hy

(28la

analysis

cnmmon

8;
as

10-12;

11+-15;

such

,'hen

they

the

each

man

lift

who

the

can

lift

unly a

same '.Jei.ght.

hundred

We might

any

given

essent tal

This

although

is

not

not un-

and

fifty

even

say that the millie-

aire's rlonation of a mite is indeed a c;pecifically different act from

r-

hat

'lOt

nf

'iepend

nig~t
t

the
on

pauper
a

.Yidow,

and

i.t

is

worth observing

difference in the agents'

he the same.

Jt1e :-o nrrJcPed,

intentions,

that

this

does

tn

ipply his

mances?'

he

is

concerned with is

and whatever the agent,

namely for

'being'

but in

and 'not

seeing that he is engaged in a general discussion of possi-

bility or

capacity,

and

for many capacities the question of a maximum

logically cannot arise.

with this point.
in

the

Aristotle, however, has no reason to disagree

For he says here not that all capacities, but capa-

principal

with reference

('tO xuplws 6uva.'t6v. 28la 19), must be de-

sense
to

the maximal

principal sense is for him,

is

also being

tp falling

of

in the

exercise.

12

of

he

principal

resumes

being

possibilities or

and

sense,

i.e.

complement

,.,)nstrurtion to cases \>Jhere

as

being,

he

(and

takes

their

copulative

functioning

being q:>

for

some value of

the discussion of possibilities and impossi-

not

capacities

understood

capacity in the

Accordingly, when at the start

care

to

opposites)

'!' for some categorizable '!' (28la 30-33).

be

Now,

presumably, capacity for being, where being

under one of the Categories.

Chapter

bilities

say
for

that

he means

being

1l or

not

Nor does he signal any diverHence

'is' and

'is not'

throughout, with the omission of the

positively

as

the existential translation is wrong;

complement-variable

Thus

but so also is the propositional

translation which equates 'being' with 'being the case' or 'being true',
since not everything that is the case can be expressed by a predication
in an Aristotelian Category.
earlier
be;

on the

and

it

possibility

E 3).

scope

with

never

realized

(and

Possibilities

(or

being not),
be

for

and

Here,

the doctrine

perfectly

up

to

of

fits

cut

coat)
but

for

the

then,

De

to be

the

and

presuppose

possibilities

are

be

not

to

the restriction sought

what always is,

Interpretatione

also with

coming

is

that

remarks

ceasing
of

cannot not

example of

in Metaphysics
be

(as

being

being and

to

not

being

classed amongst them,

since coming

ceasing are themselves not ways of categorizable heing (al-

though, again, they presuppose them).

which after all

So it is not on that account unreasonable of Arisas he does,

What

kind

must

ired pounds is tu be thought of :ts exercising a specifically different

from

part.

gence from this in the rest of the chapter.

The man who can lift up to two hun-

intuit~uns.

no

whatever

are not

possibilities

18-19).

concept-cr.nstruction,

of

ff.).

1r caiJacities ought to be defined with reference to the limit or maximum

)r

power,

being'.

fined

ending up with a pair of master-senses

as :neaning the

of

particular with one general sort of power,

city

interest to the formal l\)gician.

introducing

spells out

there

apacity

extent

by

Aristotle takes an apvarently sideways look at certain other

such

as

~'lpportPd

the

in

which,

iefined in terms of the impossibilitY of beginning and ceasing.

t.n

far

to this and other problems is near at

go to the

about

Perhaps

iHnt ikka.

:\t

The answer

v~ew.

hetter

hand:

so

intention and volition play

Now one might well ask 'Why this sudden interest in maximal perfor-

aside

. 1ne
.
might call the logical nucleus nf Aristotle's argument
a

But the

12.
.,e

such

indeed

(28lb 2 ff,) no grounds for restriction appear.

This,

of

is

Thus
and
to

it

central
be

is
for

specified

those

capacities

Aristotle's
Ln

terms

of

or

logic
a

possibilities

and

maximal

his

that

metaphysics

exercise.

The

are

primary

that

require

plausibility

_____ ______________________________________
81

-.;

___

..

.,.,_

.IOTES ON THETA
CHAPTER J

of

this

as

a Category,

~laJ:"t

position depends 1n
and

so often) with

(Jn wh.-1t

this we are not

'etcetera'

is

nere prepared to count

At

Jl-33 he tails off (as

he

.:.old.

after mentioning che traditicnal first three.

able

for

it

to

be

fully

displayed.

In most

pe~:haps

though

not all

cases such natural patterns develop through series or cycles of empiri-

At any rate, by now the discussion has moved to a high level of abstrac-

cally distinguishable stages.

tion

with the overall unity precisely because it is more than mei"ely consis-

where

logical

these

primary

pattern.

cases

are

'..Je

are

no

gathered

longer

to

together

under

single

concerned with different

be

types of limit such as he was at pains to point out in the preliminary

7-27,

illustrative passage 28la

in some cases

(e.g.

that

the magnitude

measures

and

only

where,

categorizable

of

for

instance, he explains that

being q>

for

If,

capacity,

being,

the

now,

only dimension so

apply in every case is, of course,

ties are

for

vis.i.on) it is the degree of minuteness of objects

we

consider all

universal as

to

Thus his primary possibili-

time.

In other words,

some maximum duration.

it

belongs to the very essence of what it is for a given thing to be categorizably q>
at

least

<.p-ness
be

that

it

should

in principle be

is

what

it

possibility

duration

terms

is

be

so for

specified:

the

essence of
(For

~-

to qualify

the

some definite
and
the

this

not Ouva.'t6v but

viability of

tts

taking

complement,

the

refer

to

C.J.F. Williams, Religious Studies I, 1965, pp. 95 ff. and 203 ff.).
shall

not

dwell

on

the

'Iletaphysical

Aristotle make this a solid starting-point.

despite

his

sometimes

almost

obsessive

the universe and of natural kinds,

ties

and

be

from

we

may

processes,

Aristotle

is

considerations

far

removed

'metaphysical

\.Jhate"er

inertia'.

on

by

an

lnternal

princtple

3ameness

whose

Indeed

one

continuity
might

unity

that

finds

is

than simply

expression not

freedom

in :1ny

suppressed or

from

interruption.

say that the absence of interruption is not even its

~~

interrupted

identity was

unless

bounded

as

to

its

duration.

condition is its contribution to

then that
to

condition must

its successor

be

so

to

after whatever

The actual mount of time, whether for stages

will depend

on

the

object

sets

the

scene;

but

for

his

prop which even the most

is

indeed

kind

of

premiss claims

(28la

positives,

that

and

concerned

current

arrantly

not

being ~
would

it

is

(cf. De Gen.

purpose Aristotle

teleological metaphysics

totally schematic

them.

For what

lifting?

by

the

requires,

negatives

nothing more

its

as

for

to a maximum.

treated as

sophistry of

and

as well

by reference

being not-cp are

symmetry.

the

identical.)

argument.

In

than the verbal appeal of

The original analogies of walking and

help here:

indeed,

it

is

best

to forget

about

on earth could be the limit of my capacity for not-

What does

distinct

and

argument

for

be defined

locate

secured

His

capacities

both alike

weight-lifting cannot

as

logical mime.
28-31),

anywhere

(Throughout,

from

it

the

is excluded when I

even mean to speak of ?___ capacity

various capacities

for

am engaged in lifting?

only paper-concept-construction.

positives whose

for

this,

exercise

This, we have to say,

is

Teleology will not make intelligible

the proposition that ~omething is intrinsically times as to the duration

of

its

not-tp-ness

irrespective

of

what

that

positive

might be from which it eventually returns to being

characteristic

not-not-~.

But it is on just this eventual return either way from one limited

there

has already emerged some project whose

contradictory to

~he

sudden removal of the conditions suit-

sumed,

intact despite

consistent

cannot really provide, and all he can do is mime it into being by what

necessary condition either, since there is nothing of a definite nature

to

this

one

respect

but in an inherently hounded pattern of actimore

All
needs

this

is

is

et Corr., II 10, 336b 9 ff).

the eternity of

going on .Jnd on indefinitely until

redirected from without,

vity

of

sequences,

these

pattern, whatever it may be,

inherently
any one

to bow out

is the appropriate time.

or whole

of

It follows that each stage, no less

necessarily successive whole,

if

substantially is,

is

speak spontaneously ready

Here

as it is possible to

sequence,

raison d etre of

for

for J1im governed throughout its spatial and temporal beings and doings

repetitive

some

whole

the

that

those who would explain these and any other phenomena by what
call

the

$3Y

as well as of s0me particular entias

than

For if

diversity

is actually necessary, if that

that

It is enough r.o

insistence

it

is to succeed in being produced.

period which can

temporally determinate

corresponding possibility to

linguistic

tent:

The

also

of

it

the

follows

other

that

being not-11 will

that Aristotle's proof depends.

whatever

has

the

inevitably realize

83

possibility
whichever

of
of

That asbeing

tp and

these is cur-

i{ \fTI':R 3

That

rently unrealized.
bilities,

but

this

is

Aristotle

has

nothing

that it ~2tains oorh its possi-

presupposes

never
to

Another

questioned.

say

here

concerns

the

question

status

of

on which
the

'it'.

cease

or

ot" the subject of change as an individual substance, and the alternation

has

be

supposed

locus
be

of

the

endless,

since

where ~

is

must

thought

be

q>-thing

as

continue

to

contradictory
not

all

for

as

long as

substantial

such-

the

to

the

(so

man

that

the

individual man would

as

But

possibilities for being (sc. categorizable)

are

not

eternal,

it

The

matter.

reason

perish simpliciter)

only if

it can not-be a man (or be a not-man); but the possibility of not being
man here means a capacity, and actually not being a man means exerci-

il

sing

that

sense

to

other

than

is

not

We

capacity.
say that
a

such a

it

man;

therefore

wi 11

and

the

thing

subject

eventually exercise

Where

subject.

the

as

of

which it makes

its capacity for being

distinct

from

substance concerned

his matter

is a portion

's0mething'

the

capacity to be first

would

be

no

empirically

fire,

knowable

then not-fire, etc.

Thus

stuff.

it

-:.eems that the position of pe Caelo I 12 commits Aristotle to the postulate

of

rtny

rate

'prime matter'
the

cyclic

in

However,

somethin~

like

transformations

of

the
the

scholastic
four

At

sense.

2mpirical

elements

it

object must

be

that

true

for

him

that

<tll.otted period:
elements

the

dut

-1s

tt

now what

stands.

theJ.r contradictories.
is

not-fire ..mulct

>~lm

of

presumably
be

roughly

not-fire

for

an

its periods of being the other

But even so r-he negative period is only timed ~

in turn.

s1m of positives, not

':annot not be?

'something'

this being the

it

per-~.'-

about

the

aimed-for conclusion that what alHays is,

It may seem that this does not fallow from the position
For

'llthou~h

e_~hY..P?_1J.:.~si

something al-wavs

(I)

rines not

far uncovered.

are, he says, essentially

something is always q>,

then it is tp:

that

hence

Hence in its case too there must

But it cannot be a finite period, since then

become not-cp,

exercises

tp

anything

which contradicts the

assumption.

It

'greater than any that might

(28la 33-b 1).

Since time is inSince anything

capacity for a temporally determinate exercise,

~

is always q> is

temporally determinate.

The

in a mode both temporally infinite and

exercise fills a period, whose peculiar

property is that neither the whole nor any part of it can be repeated.
It is not merely that Aristotle's argument will require this amazing concept;
inferred its
10-12
283a

and

the very
presence

18-19.

ff.

proves

But

is
of

for

it

indisputably

present.

even more decisive evidence occurs

be

<P

or

not-<P for

(in which case even if

infinite
stage

text

have

from 28la 33-b 2 taken in conjunction with 28la

later,

at

Here Aristotle is arguing against the possible view that

something might
only

moment

regular~

contained in that position is

'for always' entails 'for an infinity of time'.

is

as

parallel wi.th

if

suggested and lesser than none'

finite,

the

is

notice as

must then be an infinite maximal period -

-:..1.nce

ln

But

be a temporal maximum.
the

'-;tates

sequence

now to

has and exercises a ,-capacity.

there

mutational

have

more extraordinary than anything so

a maximum.

for

provides him with a rare example where lt Ls not absurd to :iew negative
intrinsically timed

what we

claim yet

then since these are subject to transfor-

corresponding substance-predicate pr~sumably holds of some-

possessed of

That

evidently Callias

of one of the four elements,

mation

need

The question of interference is one that Aristotle

handled as effectively as he might from his present position.

not

are eternal.

to cease within

Nothing has been said to rule out interruption ab extra,

seems.

need

is that, by Aristotle's construction, the subject can cease to be e.g.

a

not

intrinsically geared

exists

instances

therefore,

it

being

substance

as applying to something other than the individual

presumably,

so

of

this hardly entails that it might not cease through some

alternation

individuals

substance-predicate whose
of

the

Thus

phases.

be on account

other cause,

Where ~ is a predicate 1n a Category uther than substance we may think

may

to

a given time,

at

least

time).
in

one

the

time

infinite

in one direction

always

been and

always will be

possibility of

Aristotle
direction

anything's

it has

is

<P-ness

rejects
not
to

its

not

this

on

rleterminate,

occupy,

since

being so as
the

ground

hence
t.n

not

from

that
a

every case

is for a determinate time.

'Each thing has the capacity to do or
to suffer, to be or not be, for a determinate time, either infinite or of a specifiable amount.
In the case of infinite
[in the strict sense,
i.e.
both ways]
time there is such a capacity because
infinite time is in a sense determinate,
'lS
being that than which none is greater.
But the nne-way infinite is neither infinite nor determinate.'

!p

some

a time

suitable
being

'TOTES ON THETA

\P fi:R

The last
calling

the

even more
shows

sentence
infinite

unwilling

why:

if

and meaningful,

shows

that

he

'determinate';
to withhold

the

first

is

this

true,

is
the

not

altogether happy

second

to

last,

title altogether;

then the second

since otherwise nothing

he

the

too must

could be said

about

that

and

provides

an

be

to

the

question

'For a minute',

'For how long?'

that

'For a decade', etc.

no

less

By contrast,

is

'For

on lJToceses

c.J.nd

true

'Always'

happen afterwards,

although of

course

they

do.

Some things.

~ut perhaps not all things, depend causally on pre-existing conditions

to be or to do

what supports Aristotle here is the fact that

answer

definite that

chln~s

is

first

etc. for always.

Logically,

bound

to

outlast

them.

But where

there is no such

causal dependence, so that what occurs requires no temporal environment,

the absence of such an environment would not in itself affect the inner
determinacy of the temporally uncontained condition,
whose time can
therefore be seen as the time it takes to ~_f?_!!lplete itself,
This is
.1 time which, when compared against the periods of transient conditions,

a time infinite in one direction' covers any number of different lengths

can nnly be said to be 'greater than any and lesser than none'.

of

it

time,

inasmuch as more time will elapse counting, say,

ever

from

the

less

time

stretches

the latter.

Battle of Marathon than from the death of Socrates,

from

the

infinite past

to

the

battle of Marathon onwards'

1.ndefinite length, and

phrases
than

cannot

'the

former

event

and
than

If it were not so, how could one happening to be earlier

or later than another in the infinity of time?

the

forward for

begin

week

(It is true that 'from

unambiguously specifies one particular

'from the death of Socrates' another:

to be considered as

beginning

last

Thursday'

names
names

of

any more

(as distinct

from

'a week').
His

totle's
(which
for

metaphysics

too

allows

foothold

for

the

notion of Always

The basis of this lies,

as a period of totality in time.

suspect,

argument

t:oherent or not,

by

the

maximum,

certain time,

thus,
for

govern

he

says,

not

clear

about

the distinction,

significance here.
if

in

general

the

But
period

and

something that
of

with the

time

of

some-

Aristotle is certainly

shall not

try to

explore

its

can be briefly said is this:

state's duration is

prescribed by an

'/ariable

is

Sllggests that

temporal

it

'external'

include

consisting of

states

is

that

it

is

not

independent
the

of

temporal

external

circumstances.

'environment'

of

state,

long'
time.

something else comes after

an inherently bounded state finishes when it finishes.

is

The point

finite

that precede and states that follow.

simply because

Under

it

that

After a given

logically
and

'Finitely'
(the

sentences

the

on

maximum

necessary
(Cf,

281a

hEpoxT)v TTjv 56v"'J.i'v;

We may now spell

is '4>

(or not--<+') for

or for-that-time-not-,,

and

'always'

complement

of

constructed

qualify

'possible'),

with

first

and

and only deri-

unqualified

predicates.

(But

this

is

a misleading comparison if it

functions like a universal quantifier.

the

same

rest.)

Throughout,

Now,

leve]
for

as
to

variable-fillers
be

ltke

al..1ays. -r.p takes

the same capacity is heing exercised,

Rather,
'month-

time:

all

just as the

man lifting a hundred pounds exercises his one limited capacity on every
pound

he

lifts,

things.

it

is

not because other

'tTJV

~.;re should not say simply that

'always'

every moment,

because !_! finishes,

quantitative maximum
the

capacity concerned.

but that X is for-that-time-r.p,

incomplete,

J.t

finishes

this is Aristotle's position.

predicate

stretch its time is up, whether or not the time is not yet up for other
A symphony

the

not
still

It might even be better to say that the duration-adverbs occur in the

first instances as parts of predicates or complements otherwise incomplete, thus in the sense in which an expression containing an unbound

inner principle, an Aristotleian 'nature', then that state has a certain

bounded ness

is
is

Since capacities and their exercises are specified

units).

vatively

as

it
it

e.g., it is always -r.p or finitely-r.p (I use 'finite' as a variable

specific

abstract 9

but,

realizat.ion of

it (;Ut as follows.

the

time,

but

Mov 6p(~w1la.< ~pbc; ~ xctl

see also 18-19.)

ioremost

'universal'

True,

meaningless);

complete

in the fact that he is not in this context concerned with time in the

thing's doing or suffering, being or not being.

requires,

be

11~12:

This,

be objected, does not make it a ~, which is what Aris-

would

the

but these

periods,

one

might

always-(fl,

Hence
it

ls

It

throughout
true

is

of

always

t._:eding the whole of time to do.

e'Jer:y

X not

finite

merely

engaged

that

period
it

in doing what

of

time,

is <p,
is

but

and
that

defined

as

fhis is a v~ry Jpecial kind of always

:_;t~~S

:!ling

the

same

,\ristotle' s

thing,

refusal

then how could

Formally,
part

of

its

it

it

be

is

true

put

predicate

'~')

that

scopes of
However,
re

theory

'all' which the word

entitled to

X is always

in

the

say that

legitimize
'always'

3ny one short time that X is

from a

'always'

temporal quantifier

on

one cannot bring to bear the apparaportrays

so beautifully the varying

does also have a place, since

'always'

at .!:n,

and

~n+l,

at

and indeed at every

~ole

Thus even if

omnitemporal.

take it bit by bit,

..._a._~ is thus successively given is a truth that covers in a sweep the

'..Jhole

of

;_hat
to

whatever

reason,

it,

Hence

time.

uutside

an

finite

the

it

covers

bit we

situation

absurdity

at

follows

take

This
case

the

arises
which
be

those

parts of

every

from

moment

supposing

is

such

that

when
this

the mainspring of

we

consider

in

reasoning was
to

the

exercised at

all.

concrete

launched.

full,

time

as

that

given.

that

what

Aristotle's

walking

, hat
its

X is
state

a
for

from which

terms

the

is

it would

ten miles

can do.

Why

After

all 9

not

even

~eem

(It

~1e cone lusion of

first

but

is generally agreed

that

from

it

is

finitely-cp

not want

the

even

possibility of

as

Aristotle meeting

precisely this

objection:

but

think

capacity

fifteen

having

to

miles

the

exercise

in full,

somehow meant

capacity

for

that

thirty,

on another.
we

then

could

If

no

his walking

longer

regard

him

if capacities are assumed to

be constant we should have to admit that thirty was never his maximum.
Now

suppose

to

be

for

that

X is

interrupted

q> altogether.

determinate

for always,

while

It becomes not-~;

time,

either

finite

or

always-q>

so

that

it

ceases

but this being not-q> must be

for

always.

It

because nothing could begin to be always-11:

cannot be

if it begins,

exercise.

Hence we

cannot

say that

it has or ever did have

the capacity for being always-not-cp.

For

capacity

in

the

abstract

sense

does

not

really exist

if

if

X becomes
will

capacities are constant,

exist

are

not-<p,

return

grounds

this must

again

to

preceding argument.
then

to

have

the

for
be

by

grounds

that

it

for

never

saying
did.

finitely determined.

being <p .
Nor 9

our

saying

But
the

capacity for

not

that

it

Hence if

In that case it

to being always

-cp,

by

the

same argument. could it be thought

always

-q>.

Hence

it

never did

have

or exercise it, even for a short time; which contradicts the assumption.
The
Ci!_elo
into

coherence
l2

relief

mentioned.
.-:onfl let
Hm

in

some

with Aristotle's
one

important

respects

statements

extraordinary

of

elsewhere

discrepancy

position

in ~

only serves to

throw

the

which has

not

His account of the infinite in Physics III

with

resistance

the
to

idea governing the De Caelo argument.

the

to Aristotle's classic

notion of

the

infinite

so

far

been

is in direct
Indeed, our

as a totality owes much

disposal of it in the Physics.

to depend on implicit special considerations concer-

the physical objects which he in fact believes are eternally doing

_..;hat

they

i.e.

the

only

suppose
then has

~ing

do,

always-q:~,

being

with

the circumstances are such as to entail that 1t cannot be fully reali-

I 12, which is presen~ed as an ar8ument from universal

principles,

that

the

Logically, .it .Jould

Aris cot le would

seems

is too late to exercise to the full the capacity of which that would

can walk

not

"-"

it

inconsistent

A man who does not walk to his limit on one occasion still

and

that

So

not

that the longer the natural span, the mere vulnerable to premature

'-'xtinction.

has

find

not

everything

is actually permitted to reach its natural limit.

can.

,~ed;

a while always -q> in the sense explained,

interrupted?

he

does

when he

then should

to

in which

follow

is

be

a capacity need not

not

always,

have not been able in the densely packed later pages of Chapter
12

given then

basis

for

becoming not-q>.

But a challenge

analogical

As we know,

A man who walks

thirty-miler

fact

lie

thirty ~s still, we may suppose, doing (so far as he does it) the kind
nf

in

For

relatively

proof,

formal charges against it must be dropped.

realized

:<ot

to be

also

momentarily consider

Hence 'what always is, cannot not be'.

ls not given at some other.

puts them beyond disruption.*)

if

with this to suppose X ever not-

The omnitemporally given is itself (although not

-~.

same way)

what

sense of

'distributive' warns us not to confuse.

the temporal quantifier

we

for

(as distinct

tus

quantification

distributive

the point by saying that since

a sentence with the variable

of

'riAPTER J

properties are

the

consistent

one might

the

special

acknowledge

if

For

n'.ned earlier.

is

and

to

nN THETA

the

heavenly

spheres whose

position and

substdnce

*Thus Aquinas' appeal (Comm. ad lac.) to '.omnia natura appetunt esse'

is inadequate.
He derives from it 'unumquodque tantum est quantum
f2.2Sest esse', but this depends on non-interference, which in general
is a contingent matter.
He does not, I think. show how the terms
.,f the current argument alone (as distinct from cosmological require::ents) exclude interference in the case of 'what al~~ ts'.
89

:luTES UN 1HETA
:HAPTcR

'It turns out that the infinte is the opposite

of what people say, for it is not that which has
nothing beyond it.
No, the infinite is that which
has always something of itself beyond it ... that
of which, in taking a specific amount (l(O."t<i ?too-Ov
~n~duo~Lv)
we leave always something more to
take.
Whereas that of which there is nothing
beyond is complete and whole.' (206b 33 ff.)
is as much as to say that any infinity of time,

This

determinate
of

more considered vtew, then we should expect to find no mention of

nite

the

Is

exercise.

first

sentence?

Aristotle's

This

past

self

with a

belongs

bag

of

De Caelo.

of

reconciliation;

But

conclusion of
6

,yas

on any view of
for

Aristotle

the

'people'

questions about

Caelo

De

composed

later,

12.

how

the chronology there is a problem

appears
If,

could

never

to

have withdrawn

the

Physic~

III

as seems more likely,

the

earlier

findings

still

stand?

If Physics III 6 came first, how in De Caelo I 12 could he have failed

to

defend

would

explicitly

the

conception of

determinate

infinite

(which

And if he could

have made things easier for the interpreter)?

not defend it, how give the argument we have?

Perhaps,

a reversion to

however,

'what people say' needs no public

And as for a change from that holistic notion of the

justification.

infinite, this too perhaps would have left Aristotle still in possession
of
For

adequate

grounds

argument

the

holds

between what
provided

needs,
Jf

and

time'

sumption

i.s

to

also

for

need

to

he

position of
in

couched

De

the

naive

this

contrast,

equivalence

of

course

To

call
the

still
this

of

he

terms

has

all

in

of

the

'always', with

not,
that

stand

think,

sense

that

'infinite'

impossibility

impossibility was

does

Caelo

of

in

'always'

it

assigning

infinite.

absurd
Only

it

he

infinity

~vas.

The assome

k.ind

the sense of ~~~ III 6

never in question.
make

an

denotes

to
is

specific

However,
regard
not

as

quantity;

the impossia

whole what

whole

that

infinte, nor

infinite a whole.

338a

II

(cf.

ibid.

III

9,

335a

6,

6;

33-14

and

ll,

1048b 9 ff.

for

N 2,

Metaph.

To conclude.

always

is

we

at

any

t.;ord

conveys

extraneous
it

is a

fact

not

rate

is,

to

find,

203b 30 (where the

far

the present point);

statement

1088b 23-25;

so

Metaph.

for

De Gen.

l050b 7 ff.

!18,

conclusions

of

and,

as

reached

in

E 2,

good measure,

l9a 9 and 35-36.)

Aristotle has not shown or tried to show that what

cp might

that

we do
Ill 4,

l-3;

l026b 27-28; K 8, l064b 32; and De Int. 9,

so

the

have

been otherwise

seem to
to

understand.

speak,

entire

of

the

in

some

sense

of

'm1ght'

The possibility which this

unavailable

history

except

actual

from

standpoint

universe,

of that universe that X is always <.p.

given

that

The contradictory

is an option perhaps for God, although not even for him on some conceptions of divinity, but certainly not for anything embedded in the actual
order of nature.

So if X's not betng cp is in some sense a possibility,

it

sense

is

regard

not

in

any

it

as

representing

capacity of
a

divine

an actual

subject:

capacity.

But

in

unless

that

case

we
it

would hardly make sense to test it by referring the corresponding sup-

In

it

If this represents Aristotle's

itself,

Aristotle's

time-relative

idea

of

possibility

seems

perfectly coherent, especially since in itself it does not entail

possibilities (particular or general) are in fact realized.

that

For that

he needs the additional notion of properttes defined by inherent temporal

us

spans.
as

treatment of
time,
enter
tion

His

strained

though,

handling of

to

the

'always'

point

this
of

in

De Caelo

absurdity.

is an obvious target

The

12 may well
consequent

of suspicion.

strike

holistic

At the same

a clear understanding of the way in which temporal maxima

into the argument certainly helps to salvage Aristotle's reputafor

logical

sanity.

Hintikka has maintained that in connecting

as he does the omnitemporal with the necessary, Aristotle is dominated

hy

'statistical

model

The difference,

of

modality'

then,

he simply the difference of

'JO

exactly what

affect

)).

is

is

(See e.g.

reference to infinite body does not

'infinite

premisses

'for

thts

'infi-

but 1mly

position to 'another time'.

12

a measurable period and what holds for always

retains

emphasize

bil1ty
is

he

must

a whole.

that

not

essential

can be quietly dropped - as indeed perhaps it

Jf

but

does

the

The phrase is a natural one to use to point the contrast

time' at all.

~ut

for

And

the De Cae~ position,

~Carr.

relative datings of different parts of the Physics and different parts

of

in his later statements of

~d and <i(o,ov.

one-way or both-

among

time'

have been able to verify.

is as such incapable of functioning as the field of a temporally

ways,

between

(Time

and

'necessary'

Necessity,
and

'always' from 'at some time'.

)[

pp.

'possible'

102-

would

Thus 'neces-

CHAPTER 3

sary'

:.lairns

no more

than

the

continuance

ad

iHfinitum of some state

of affairs which had it been interrupted would properly have been called
'contingent'.
neccr,sary,

.;r~at

It is not

the

but

fact

that

it

is

tesque

position

as

any

of

,,..,hate';er

his

of integers.

that makes whatevr:-r is necessary

it

is,

it

But pe Caelo 1 12 :.>hmJS Aristotle as far

on.

elusion of the infinite series of t->rime numbers in the infinite series

simply

goes

on

and

from holding this gro-

admirers could hope

The

to find him.

Would time exist

(that

of

As

is,

it

the

fixed

time

is

if

there was simply one rotating heavenly sphere

stars),

and

no

indicated

by

the

in terms of the motion of the first

otherwise

frame of spatial reference,

of

The

being <;>

longer

(much

limit

of

longer)

the suggestion that

<1re

difference

between

duration

To suggest that

the genus.

s~mply

and

the

is

specifically different
the

differentia.

they are

occui"rt:!nces

of

ways

being Ill

the

same

attribute

matches

the lion dUd the mouse, being both of them animals,

No

essentially larger and smaller versions of the same creature.

doubt
ever

the
it

his

De Caelo

did;

but

argument

perhaps
not

metaphysics,

is

to each other as shorter

will

by

the

to

cCJnt inue

now we

failure

can see

of

his

a lien to

seem as

that it is the

logic,

that

takes

seems
But

Aristotle

to

an

the

centre?

at

least

frame

being at

of

two

motions

reference

the

.!.!

heaven.

there is no absolute

the existence of motion, and hence of time,

centre

of

differing

is

suggested

the

universe;

from
by

one

the

for

the centre would be

there (de Caelo 2.

the centre even if the earth was not

another.

argument

14 296b 6 ff.,

cf. 297a 9 ff.).

It was

suggested

bility be realised
gories,
being

beyond our company in this chaptei".

require

absolute

the earth's

us as

thrust of

earth at

relative motions of the different

spheres, in any case; but the main argument of Physics VIII is conducted

difference (in the central cases) between the necessary and the possibly
reflects

stationary

in

the paper that

the requirement that a possi-

at some time applies to being in the various cate-

but not to the case of the cloak which can be cut up,

cut

up

is

not

itself

case

of

being

that

falls

under

because
one

or

another of the categories; rather it is a ~ of passing from categorial

being (in this case,
not -being.

Discussion of paper by Sarah Waterlow

In

connection

out that

with

the

argument

that

infinity

in a sense defin-Lt~ (de Caelo I

directions is

unbounded

in both

12 283a 9) it was pointed

at

al.l;

!:ined

on the othet: hand a

as

to

its

length

nly at

the

beginning starts,

was

one inf 1 n1ty in another

tion that
~as

_:-tat
e~ng

-.ust
, md,

.-as

(e.g.)

the

five

starting

provided t:hat it

under

1.nfinite;
oe

(~.

reluctdnt

point

and

is

not

is infinite thereafter?
to accept the inclusion

lll. 5 204a 20 ff.; where t.he assump-

indivisible,

Ji.nce

available

the

proof
in

infinite

characterised precisely by

as

in

of

n1e

i\ristotle's

the

pos.~._tivn

infinity

t1.me,

of

:-ali_.-~'iS.)

the

~erics

of

in

the
it

prime

numbers
tl 1 e

any

not

case

relates

so

much

must

be

that

any

more

'whatever

expression

is

to

to

at

unexercised

directly

'Principle

more

concerned

actualised

of

is

and

is

logical
as

will

with

necessary'.

Plenitude'

metaphysical

here

the

time',

capacity

concerned

always

make

some

the

be

corresponding

Hintikka 's

issues

the

exercised;

doubly misleading;

theological

point,

to make

than

use

of

for

(a)

to

the

purely logical ones in terms of which Hintikka tends to interpret Aristotle;

and

(b)

Aristotle's

concern

too

is

metaphysical

rather

than

logical, ~ Hintikka.
There
that

has

them.

he :-;hnuld 1:':i''e aJlcno1ed fn

is

point

implication,

its

It follows that an act1al infinite substance

204a 26.

but there might be problems with the category of e.g.,

possibility

metaphysical

from the fact that lt is the infinite as a substance

discussion,

Aristotle
'every

years is de-

the parts of an infinite must themselves be infinite results,

t!bserved,

is

even if

pointed out that Aristotl~ is

L..

l\~ast,

at

')f

:t

finite period of

But does it :nake any difference uhen an infinite period bounded

known.

few categories;

paschein, and certainly with that of time.

in the case of an infinity bounded in one direction only (the

starting (or [in1shing) point has to be specified if it is to be defined

being a cloak - a substance?) to the corresponding

It was observed that this applied well enough to the first

but

is
the

difficulty

potential

for

in
two

finding
opposed

plausible examples of something

states

and

alternates

between

Possible cases include the changes connected with the seasons;

there

is

then

the problem of identifying the subject

i.n

93

(which will,

 iiAP fER

::QTES ON THETA

a
moreover,
being

it

was

it

is

the

between

15 ff.

hot

general

problem in all

earth

that

is

alternately hot

and

cold

cf.

Boethius,

notion of

cases

of

alternating

on

the

formation
their

19

and

cf.

possibilities,

of

forms

the

but

has

elements

this water
Int.

in
1

ed.

'this water'.

2.

also

15

summer

alterna-

sec.

thought

different

again,

in

that

potentialities

life; cf. ~ VIII.

1 252a 11 -

in what is natural.

It was also felt

to

suppose

that

from

not

at

Alexander

those
any

(ii)

to

the

elements,

and

higher

level.)

of which a man

different

stages

of

his

and

it

was

pointed

sitting do

discussion of maximal

in

families

of

incompatibles;

not

out
fit

potentialities like

very well

capacities in ch.

11,

into

the

which

those

framework

it

of

for

amples

the

lb excludes

having

the

capacity

to

lift

500

that

time?

each such
no,

capacity

except

in

So

lb.

he is not exercising a capacity to lift

lb, but partially exercising his capacity to lift 500 lb.

sary

Interest
to

talk

the

maximal

in

about

the

should

case

maximally

be

of

claim that

has

capacity to

the

being who

if

he

in

real

note

thing

capacity

to

400

Is it neces-

exercised

at

always~,

that

of

an

infinite

was

argued,

but

in ch.

that

has

bounded

capacity

would

immortal

immortality would

or

in nature-

story

only

at

such

the

(What

possessed

this

life-

too

it

to always-q~,

always-cp.

principle

transgressed,

that,
But

in

capacities,

capacity

further

some

which

is

he

things

inevitably

one end;

Aristotle

he

makes

to always-cp,

make

life,
be

leads
12

of a myth about

but

was told that,

taken away?
don't

Probably

happen like

involves

at the end,

the

always

the

that.

possibility

if the being had

ning has not always existed, but retained immortality.)

28lb

impossible

or

With

Aristotle

true

on the other.
are

16;

the argument,

and in the course of this he

distinguishes

false,

between

what

is

possible

or

hypothetically on the one hand and haplos

The examples given for what is hypothetically impossible

things which,
the

or

example

on usual
of

assumptions,

are mathematically necessary.

the triangle compare,

possibility without

concerning himself

unduly as to whether

perhaps, Physics II.

9 200a

flUestion

for-all-future-time

was

raised,

why

is

there
The

not-<Ping?

to do that for a finite time).

not

the

answer,

third

possibility of

that Aristotle simply

with

such-and-such.

the

about

angles will

The

Euclidean

parallels.
not

add

So,

proof

if

we

of

the

point

make differing

up to two right angles.

What

Perhaps,

that the same number can be both odd and even.

'maximal

i.t

was

asked

whether

then,

haps,

the

being

commensurable;

ply',
capacities''

what,

will

be

examples

of

things

which are

impossible

~aplos, if even mathematical examples are related to assumptions?

tively',

does not allow such capacities.

connection

is

assumptions

suppositions,

But

and (by the same argument),

its

on

i.t must either always-not- cp (which is already

to~.

The

line

triangle is two right angles since the

is the corresponding supposition in the case of the diagonal?

e.xcluded) or not-cp for a finite time (in which case it would then have
to h again,

straight
depends

It had been argued in the paper that, if a thing with the capacity
to-always-cp ceases

the sum of the angles of a

employs stock ex-

they are suited to the context of the argument as a whole.

In

lift

In answer to this it was suggested that the basic argument

12.

of

400

had been argued

has already been stated by 28lb 2; what follows is Aristotle's explanation of

this man lifts 400 lb,

At
that

lift 500 lb also has the capacity to

always existed but lost its immortality; at the beginning, if the begin-

was the context that should be borne in mind in assessing the argument
of ch.

lifting

if

a very appropriate one?

Further,
standing

of

that it would be rather implau-

come

is a picture of men spending their lives in alternating between standing

and sitting

to

the

there is always order and proportion

predicates

capacity

238.

discusses

and

the matter
at

the

Answer, on this doctrine, no; for to have a (maximal) c~pacity

exercised in full the only time (i.e. all time) that it is exercised.

succession,

but

is rather

man w.th

400 lb?

with a marked absence of ex-

bodies

compound

dissolution

Perhaps Aristotle's
composed

of

homoeomerous

subsequent

sible

cold,

In ibid. 2. 20 he suggests that it applies (i) to prime matter

amples.
taking

1.

Quaest

and

in de

Meiser _ except for difficulties over

Aphrodisias,

is

be

(Another possible example would be

and winter?

of

out,

something and not-being something in the category of substance).

Perhaps

t ing

pointed

_I

things which

but

so

to

in

that

fact

impossible

'hypothetically'

such as

will

mean.

be

true' .

but

Per-

the diagonal
not

'cteriva-

'on an unreal assumption', and hapl;s will mean, not

'underivatively',

assumed

are

'sim-

'relative to something else which is itself

Does

Aristotle

then

recognise

a.E_I

underived

necessities? The principles of the sciences? - hut perhaps they are only

94

~;_"rES

Hll1l ~r1

lilt..

'''dY

dence

lAnd, it was n0ted,

relative to our assumptions about space

inability to form intuitions which do not correspond

., 1 t~Lotle our

,,

ON THETA

really are would not be a limitation; the correspun-

LILI.ngs

between our

cognitive

capacit Les

and

the

way

things

really

Translation by R.W. Sharples of part of Ps.-Alex:ander's comments on

are

2.
l

a.n arbitrary matter.)

tlJt

l'he motive suggested in the paper for the relativisation of possi-

[AlexanderJ

574. 6

11iUty 1.;a 5

of whdt
vf

whdt

the

~possitle?

rhey

,_onl Ladictory

1.he

test

the present.

supposition must

by

presumably do,
is

apply

to

are not, but

impossible;

if
it

the
is

necessary
taking

by

is

that

something

that

is

true, and of which the contradictory is therefore false, and considering

what
~e
,1

the

implications

P~t~hlish

r 11 r

be

is

the

contradictory

whether a thing is necessary or not.

impos.<>ible,

ro ;"tlways

tr

would

so,

Aristotle)

presumably,

always

~ere

true

that

10

that

some

Just as some things

'dlways'

Ts

annot

the

modal

capacity

possessed

he

by

notion,

for-

to-always-cp is

something

,_ilcularity here.

1f

iJ.nl'!;tt

It

Aristotle?
a

sort

accidentally;

of

is

capacity

thp whole

1eal

of

there

is

true

11

1 ~as

hP

111 any

f 'll

inni S
l.

I.;HO
f"<>S

observed

true

to

but

will

not

For

possible

is

15

'IS

that

'!lume

rnatter;

FIT~

"irnnlv
f)

on

it

this

interpretation of Aristotle,

Existence

was

and

emphasised

would no~ accept

he

l~r:ause

it

is

always,

modal

as

notions

for instance.

Possibility',

that

this

is

there

matter
may

w<\Jld have shared this view of

seem

of

fact,

weak;

able

does

them or regarded them,

in cnn-

to

be,

is

possible

follows

1047b

[Aristotle}

something

for

it to come
it 294 - it is

for
is

not

possible,

be

able

indeed,

to

come

to

to the actuality of that for

possibility.

something

us

not

but

is

results;

and

it

is

is

and
a

if

But

possible, indeed,

posited
a

but

results.
is

it

is

unclear

is

possible

thing

[that
not

what

For

example,

log

to be

someone

but

as

is

is

But

if

possible,

it

not

is.

when it

[if},

nothing

is]

posited

295

indeed

being,

thing

what

impossible

impossible

as

being,

someone
but

[if],

something
says

will

not

20

is

possible

and

what

is

that
be

or

impossible?

when

it

is

burned,

if

someone says that it

for
and

it
the

possible

to

be

same
for

said to be possible for

burned,
person

the

but
says

diagonal

but it will not he measured -

it
also
to

will
that
he

the

is indeed
not

be

it

is

measured,

how will this differ

from that, when both are said to be possible [though}

they will

96

come

and will

the

that

indeed
[QlllW

it

to come

say

possible

ne~...essary

not

have

escapes

burned,

true.
it

9 4

things are possible which

to

actual
that

be

we

between

(But

how A.ristrotle

a thing being

(on

result in actuality, how are we to know the difference

A~Snc.

Proc.

not

say

they

something

the suggestion that modal state"-

simply functions of assertoric ones,

.hist\Jtles
he

on

there are no golden mountains,

But

17~37).

rhe

that,

17

For those things are said to be possible

that

when

hims~lf

things that are necessary for him but nnly universal au.. i-

'mithl!t'H,

:nf>nt~

t.tt

being

impossible
!L

those

able

in that

and

not

sible

tn some cases, the impossibility of some-

time - which is the only time he concerns

6-575.

able to come to be and result in actuality, the impos-

'.'i\!1.

,,., 1

be

which are

whlch

lhing derives, fur Aristotle, from things which themselves cannot change,
irl

possible,

says

itself

him,

[.,r

be
to

which

human being or other

>hnultl be standing.

1 !lut.

are

actuality.

some things are always possible;

possible

5 74.

'if what has been said is possible in that

293
follows
-that is, if something is said to

it

the

which

of

metaph.

says that

situation

Do similar motives apply in the case of

in

Having said that

so that

possible,

is false is the only interesting one, and in the ca3e

false

ts

tho~n

ut_!wL

that what is true is ipso facto

the fact

292

M. Hayduck, CAG 1, Berlin 1891.

not

be

[the

case]?

J7

Accordingly,

the

log

3);

4.

ed.

'Hl!'ES UN THEtA

is

combustible

and

the

if this is so,

but
lS,

Hhether

the

log's

it

is

being

dL.tgonal

.neasurable

it escapes us what
diagonal's

the

So,

burned.

equally;

is

the impossible

being

measured

[Aristotle]

or

says,

25

sible

is,

and

[what]

it and the possible,

prevents
to

it

the

difference

{is)

that man would say that

that something,

for which it

the

as

it

is

10

he

and

[both

in

the

log,

readily,

So

it

not

have

said

the

case

ofJ

the

other

and

it

that

is

cLear
laid

it

be),

hut

is

able

sitting,

walk

that

IJOsit

be

burned

former
by

this

pair

the

man

however

one

Suppose,

says

that

that

what

is the case,

you

are

however,
this

->dred,

but

latter

case

.Js

in

the

so

ne~ther

that

we

is

not
not

former
(will

15

is

the

the

false,
false

around,

and

measured.

the

that
case.

if something is poscase. 300

And this

of

not

being contrary

'let it be granted that

the

cant-

impossible would

man who

is

sitting

[But] there the conclu-

impossible,

impossible.

between

that

be

For if it were

impossible were

difference

impossible

not

something

case

but
and

which supposes that

not,

the

the

while

So,
same,

two

if

here

the

there

it

false

would

suppositions,

be

that

the man who is sitting is walking

which

But since

says

that

the

diagonal

}the false and the

is

impossible

are different, the suppositions are different too.

when you

around,

nothing

Oe

who

t..;ill

is

sitting,

too

is

from

nothing

'icl

indeed

lf,
the

then,

former,

impossible

latter.

_!3ut,

the
just

resulted,
if

1
1

The commentary on books E-N of the Metaphysics attributed

its

to

Alexander

present

form,

is

certainly

although

it

is

not

authentic

uncertain

in

how much

material from the original commentary is incorporated.

able to be mea-

measured.

the

is

not walk around, and,

different

i.n

292.

that this is true, but some-

man.

case
it J

is

both

and
no

nothing im-

suppose,

walking

the diagonal

will

in

the

and
and,

For jf, when you are sitting

around,

.1ble tn ..Jalk around, but

similarly,

is

is

impossible will result from the supposition.

5 75.

also

of
will

measured'.

supposition,

sian

to

laid down (and it has been

come to be,

to

follow

is

the

impossible
possible,

[a matter of)

it

said

be

to

is not

but is said to walk around.

[the

impossible;

if we

possible will result.

Jre

for

But

diagonal

}in the case of}

is able to come to be will come

that

to

are

:!_')7

been

what

namely,

but

possible

the

has

that

able

rary

proclaimed

is

of

from what

to

the

J are what would

ignorant

down

the
and

one

one,

results

mean an even number being equal

po5sible

odd

this

the

the

the supposition that says

for

burned.

be

will

statements

who

have

I -

be

And

follows

even

the

this that,

indeed

to

the other to be burned and it will not be burned.

he would

from

will

impossibility

it will not be measured,

is

clear

it

but

it

an

of

saying

the diagonal and

for

Rather,

it

this,

possible,

an

that

and

of

it

to

and

nature

to

to

measured

10

the

between

indeed
is

is

uncautiously

[in

be

that

so

0ne

of

35

of]

would

seeing

result

sible,

equivalent
impossible. 299

utterly

not

between

is possible

number

difference

'nothing

or come to be, should not be, now or in the

296
future'.
But if he knew the nature of what is

odd

is

from
the

be

i.mposssible,

an

which

person who does not reck,1n or discern what the i!Tlpos-

that the diagonal !.~ measured,

granted

that

it

Cf.

Hayduck's preface to CAG 1;

tingen Gelehrte Anzeiger

Alexandre
toteles,

d Aphrodise
der

AGPh 49 (1967),

Lehrer

168

(1942)

99

Praechter in GOt-

14-19,

Alexanders

181 f.

K.

( 1906) 882-896;

von

and

id.

Meraux,
'Aris-

Aphrodisias',

.Jetd~.

9 4

l047b

in

that',

ead

burned,

J.

with Al~xander;

howe,,er

11,

has

be

below,

rurther A'u has -rh .Juva."tbV 'if the impJSSible

',,r

'..Jhat

is

has

Zeller quggested buvn-rbv

been said'.

~~&.6uva.d'JvtJ.)i"\d.xoXouOet,

has

[a::.j

'if,

been

even

thought

is

ii

to

is

not' .

was

simply

33

('it

has

been

come

to

be

might

It.

this

574.

able

it

that

a
laid

..:orne

will

therefore

3lip.

But

down

to

be

c f.

that

what

and

),

nn.

294, 300.

said,

l that [ i.:3 possible un which nothing impossible folLn..'s';

below n.

cf.

Ross

2Y5,

(above n.

264) ad lac.

298.

<0~>

seems

('that,

as

be

required

one

might

this

after

61-JoCw~

in

575.

2;

add O'tt. before W~; in 575. l

man . ,

so

similarly

the

diagonal,

too .
0::94.

to

alternatively,

and Hintikka, Time and Necessity 107.

).

seems very unlikely that this interpretation accu-

It

iately

teflects

- whatever
~rgues
~s

the

exactly

intention

they were

that ~ 4xoAou6t

can

of

last note.

0nly

mean

it is convertible',~ dxo~oueet

.;ith

itj,

~Jupts

dues

commit

that

him
the

every

32a

words

299.

'in

so

Hintikka

to what

lf

possibility

must

be

Greek

the

l.

23

41a

Hathematics,

case
and

the

2
Zb

b and
even,

the

f.;

26

T.

Oxford

diagonal

2
2b ,

so

is

in its

But,

if

b are

which
to

2
4c ,

::::1

ratio

odd.

impossible

911bsequent discussion.

ratio of

terms,

If

Then a

his

of

is

therefore

realised;

ind this has a bearing on certain features

of

lowest

even.

the principle

eventually

a/b

its

107

would appear to be a strong

principle of plenitude,

History

Heath,

1921,

91.

The proof is given by Euclid 10 app. 27; summarising,

far

'or is convertible
24;

~~

Aristotle

CE.

Ross

But [Alexander's} interpretation

the latter).

... ersion of

comparing

Arislotle's

(cf.

is
2

the

the side in
2

and

terms,

let
2

= 2c

are
b

is

= 2c.

But in that

b is therefore both odd

impossible.

is

express

lowest

even,

so that b
even,

to

that

Therefore

ratio of

the

it

is

diagonal

to

the side on its lowest terms.

i'.l

s.

Fct

this

A_!!.:___!'_r_,_

definition
l.

ot

the

possible

13 32a 19 ff., l:i_etaph.

l047b

Cf.

ff.

Hintikka,

cf.

;\ristotle

9 3 1047 a 23 Ef.,
ib1.d.

30

E.,

154

300.

This
is

does

that

is

12, 22 ff.

indeed

possible

one of
297,
:.J()'

:leta ph.

94 1047b 8 E.

this

Llearl:; asserts

(575.

01ppl1es
;'he

to

c.Jntrast

llJateiy

individual
with

expressed

the
by

that

Lhe principle of plenitude

cases

(cf.

diagonal
'it

is

above

would

possib.ie

nn.

have
for

13

course
the

for

type

that

is

clear

The present statement

of thing will happen to

but cf.

above,

nn.

some
294,

and the summary of this discussion in the sequel

20)

'having

will

also

shown
come

has the potentiality .. '.

f.).

to

all

be interpreted only as saying that what

been adeit

follow;

things, which will never be the

the type in question;

something
"!7.

of

case, are not possible either.

could

ii.

not

some of

be

I'll

that
to

what

be

can come

that

for

to

be

'..Jhich

it

inP rr:R 4

i 04 7b 10

l047b l

12-14 which
~ate

i'1etaphysics

G.~.L.

by

uwen

potentiality and actuality. with not

84:

Intra.

l047b
~ E & A;

3:

('earliest extant ms. of

the Metaphysics',

'appears to preserve the true reading',

clv)

~ dxo\ou6EL

11

viz.

Ross

JxoA.ouBe!,
seems

which

far

negating

is

we

less

find

shows

due disregard
if

likelier:
what

the

for

the accenting of

impossibility

constitutes

the

of

possibility

apparently circular

tvep-

some

of

that

they are

possible

but

will

not occur,

TJ in r: A .

consequence

'possible')

if

of

follows

the

intent

oracles

that',

Lt

won't

it)

it

be

run

with

requests

but

be;

verbs

and

(since we

upset'.

of

that'

is

speaking-to-a-purpose,

persuadings.

The

'to

(but):

e.g.

inter locutor

has

He

proof'.

entertain

the

possibility

is

even in denying

'After all,

arguments can

'not taking into account' and not

'not accepting

he does

but

not:

simple,

He

from any suggested case.

to be

non-realization never entails

-on not'.

EN

VI

1139b

vs.

hin.Q,;S

that

are

5-11,

.nth Y-v6ueva.

and

the

where

(b)

(?)

De

have

YEVo~J.tvwv

universals);
as

signify

what

cannot

Int.

l8a

present and future cf.

be

deliberated

28-34,

v,

the

come

one

(c)

about

might

..;nich

Rhet.

future,

1418a 2-5:

thlnk

Ov'ta.

and as r.ecessary;

lCZ

past

of

time-connectives

which exercised

' . can

conjunction

'The

write-when-not-writing'
The

argument

of

non-writing
or

l047b

' ... when

8-14

can
not

requires

'There is nothing to prevent its not being capable of being' .

(A~ B)

On

II:

(poss. A

~poss.

about

of

f1

B)

~(A -+B)

(poss. A_,poss. B)

II

There are two parliamentary seats in Kilmarnock.

If a Conser-

vative is allowed to stand for one,

there must be a Socialist standing

for the other.

But if the Conservative is elected

to

the

one

other.

Pass. A .... pass. B.

this
More

entails

the
the

does

not

entail

generally,

possibility

of

of

the election of

two

alternatives

the other;

realization of

the

my car

out

because

of

is

direct

cannot imply impossibles;

is

alternatives
with

'not

and

actual

'exactly when and how'

application

Scotch

voting
Int.

De

you

of
can

this depends on

of the axiom that possibles

(A~ B).

it relies on the assumption

alternatives?

always

one

I.

driving - opening, but this is

The defence

The

What has Aristotle in mind?

can open the garage door;

to the

possibility of

but the realization of one pre-

other.

1047b 29-30 do not affect this.

the Socialist

the

find

are

19a

what

ruled
9-22:

can be

out.
In

and

Here,

How would Ar
general,

not-be

(not

in what
cannot),

is
consequently what can come to be or not come to be;

and there are

distinguishes

from future cases

still

the

possibility which is not realized; the present has not become

104 7b 17:

plenty

for
11 nquantified

future;

agalnst

Dunaton einai has gone together in e.g. 1047b 15.

and
past

as

necessary.

then,
past,

allocation

can write'.

a present

deal
:a)

may

writing,

drive
to eliminate them

is perhaps invented as the extreme anti-

On the necessity of

the

81.a.cpe\rye:Lv: escape,

inv<-'nted.

to kill them but

'can never entails realization,

3lmply

on

In
write'

eludes

his prime object is not

away:

result

He might have continued

could be'.

(le~arian,

(intended)

in any case of alleged impossibility he insists 'No doubt

which standardly means

the

the

standard

votes,

and

his motive:

13-14:

104/b 26-30:

'!.f

future

us in 9 3 cf. SE 166a 24-32 on fallacies of rrUvBEuL' (here distinguished

1047b 14-26:

Not

5:

the

this is a general

move vs. tmpossibles.

!04/h

with

Our 1047b 13-14 belong with (d).

or at least (if

p,

definition of

iJ.>TJ

from the definition, we must presernve Lnpossibles against the suggestion

present

(Ross ib.).

suggests a lacuna, and ps. Alex (57~. 8) supplied ~o

'Nhich is not to be had from 8 3; Zeller supplied <~ d.E>Uva't'OV

yT)c"a.L.

Ti

.J

the

a hlnt of power

or potency
!U4lb

couples

as the field of dunamis.

(and if it

quantified
~lh Ov'ta.

of

into bits;

plain cases

of

and it won't;

this.

For

instance,

this

it will wear out first.

vs.
it

was

capable

of

not

being

cut

into

bits;

for

coat can be cut

On these same terms

there

would

not have

coupled

(d) De 1:nelo 283b

been
~q!

the

possibility

of

its wearing

to be cut into hits ...

103

out

first

if it hadn't been able

lJ47b

l047h 4

1_~

.Y,.

the

reading

rr.e

!)f

oldest

MS

seemed

J,

ril;:ra.L (574.

n could
nis

8i

but not

indicate

'definition'

possibility

be

will

'JQV

of

'lf

be had

(.0

that

Aristotle

possibility

worried

in 9

understood

as

3,

if

better definition,

vEp-

subject

dnd

about
so

the

circularity of

keeping

TNas

one could be

found.

or

of Axo-x.au6e't:

if

open

rlecause of

supposition

is possible?

d 1) or Zeller's <..~ &.E>6va.'tOV f-L)i,.

frcm

. . as

to ~

preferable

'.,Thich was felt to require a :-;upplement - eith.cr lAlexander j 's 'tO

the

position to

reduce

that

(what

is

and

own
the

actual

not

happen;

e:Iva.a. in

on

Aristotle

would

this

was

felt

to

be

S()mewhat

elliptical.

the actuality of which entails no impossibility'

'that,

(cf. 9 3 L047a

he

to

is

~~_!:__:..

Werre::

Hintikka

(and

that'.

On

'if

Owen and Kneale ""

pseudo-Alexanaet,

the

latter

view.

and

the

the (intended) result is that';

the

Loeb),

argument

is

'the
that

result

'i.Wuld

absurdity

happening',

of

l047a

21

is present;

an

extension

'slip through',

sible'?

The

'get away with it

latter,

be

of

the

word

better,

anyone who denies

at

any

rate

implied.

one

thing

that

won't

But

possibilities.

possible

from

happen is

Aristotle does

the

i.mpossible;

possible,
provide

once

you

allow

there can't be any im-

such a

criterion in what

the

the Owen view,

supposed

to

be

it

was

asserting

suggested
that

'this

1s not

true in any case,

:) with

the intended result that q'.

(p and q)'.

or

Ls

possible

but

Lt

was

'it

~"tt.

not

meaning

to say

be'.

isn't,

might

'beca,tse'

':"e.cause

someone
rather

added
than

it

be

so such a
of

his

.:Jut

they
the

failed

by

'this

in every case.

an accusative
but

the

and

'AxrtE

to

see that Ota. meant

cor!"uption would

have

to

be

Ahy,

in any case,

should anyone suppose that

~auld

as

he

had

sense
felt

e:Yvcu.

seemed

that

the

to suit the general sense

former,

stronger

on d.OGva:ta..

depends

It

assert that a thing is possible,

what

we

have

attempt

of

an actual or

here

sense is

may seem odd

but will not be,

'should get away with it'; less

is Aristotle's

report

of,

fictional opponent

to

and

react ion

to,

reduce his (Aris-

i1ansion
means

that

the

it

suggests
the

that

the

Owen

passage doesn't

opposes

only things

impossible.
than that

it.

interpretation

support

Plenitude,

of
but

We

that

never

felt

that

happen

this

was

(in any

Ox.Tte

questionable;

case?)

not

only

actually means

be

are

it

isn't

the case that

those

that

are

(Hintikka himself elsewhere does not seem to assert more

what is possible will happen in some case,

not that it will

happen in this case; Time and Necessity 100.)

It

was

also

suggested

say (in some sense,

be

that

it

is

that

the

point

of

the denial that one can

at least?) .'this is possible but will not be' might

contradiction in

terms.

denial

of

the

very notion

,,f the possible; note that it is 'this is possible but will not happen',

arlier rnan ps.-Algxander.

t,le but will not be'

should

we

that

'therefore';

this

'disappear altogether',

actually ruled out that it might as a matter of fact

For p,

Megarian attack

position,

'it isn't true to say

false

followed

Wc:rte:

the

Perhaps t'Ix:rte ~..ras not in the original

b~cause

'that'?

itself,

though

'this is possible and will

'it isn't true to say

(p implies q)'.

.1ud

:.>P.emed odd, and duplicated -roU1:-r;1.

but

possible but will not be'

rather than

true

that EC1tetv

suggested

infinitive,

is

if

so

~~

since Aristotle i.s

it is odd that we have

isn't

will

that,

(Note

possibility of

totle's) position to absurdity.

Eollows; the fact that something impossible is implied (l047b 9-12).

On

i'legarian attempt to

'successfully masquerade as pas-

that

the

someone

weaker,
but

with the intention that the impossible

~ext,

for

involve

for

ow

by exaggeration?

not

stated

a difference between the pas-

only argued

plenitt1de, who says 'this is possible but will not be', has no criterion
distinguishing

significantly

reduced the Megarian

resisting

What is the sense of &t.a.cpe:Uye:Lv in l047b 5;

or

11

be

exaggerated theirs.)

<4-26).

chat

can

there ~

that

had

~ not

been stated) (at any rate) follows (from the definition of the possible)'
though

in

and

whatever

so here

position -

Aristotle

possible

that

is it that, as Aristotle in 9

absurdity,

his

sible

'tb e:Cp11~has

Or,

i:nply that

sayin~

'this is pos-

there are no impossibilities?

t'n the Hintikka view of (':(J"te. this is a belief Aristotle himself holds;
1n the Owen v1~w, it is an imputation he is concerned to ~uard a~ainst.)

')4

not

'this is possible ~ven if it doesn't happen'.

(l047b

3.

Zeller's CuvCL't"ov <~ M6v<11:ov ;~>n cho;>.ou6et is attrac-

tive at first sight,

as the consequences of postulating the occurrence

of '..rhat

seem more

ls

possible

to the point.

LOS

in view of

l047a 24 ff.,

tf.,

may

be

than

the

(o,ercautious?)

implication of

an

than being identical with it.

But

tikka).

this context,

cf.

statemeilt

above

not Aristotle's;

,.;hat

has

been

satd

any

(So Ross r)n the MSS readings, and Hin-

(?

since

be co;1vertible with it.

A."X.o\,)1Jdetv is

Diodorus'

term

in

has Zeller been led .1st ray by the appa-

i1ight the point not be,

the

form

impossible,
~

the

i.n

that

namely,

this,

..;hich

Aristotle
possible

but

cannot
(ii)

sees

will

it

the

that

"1ut

be

this

seems

\.Jhile

1 ike

the

on

the Owen

we

assert

assert
be,

and
~hat

(ii)

of

cut

in

the

rather

the

and

the

flut the trouble

rather

assertion

view.

Aristotle's

of

thing

because

(rather

from

this

than

from

'this

uf

some

is

assertions

(i)

point

might

that

involves

it
a

be

is

that

possible

we
and

contradiction;

to

implies - cf. the Sea-Battle - that

Pickwickian)

the

tortuous.

it

might

can't

say

any
up

as

And this might be felt to lead to the disappearance

commensurability

it

be

regards

impossible

Him:ikka

the

be

of

possible

is

in d~~

everything

hut

that

Aristotle's

posJ.tion

we

can

:Jince

Jt

is

say
he,

stilJ

in

is

of cases
general

though we can't
0pen whether

it

0n r-he other hand (i) we do ha'Je -ro6C here;

l9a

14 Aristotle actual.J.~,

. . ays

'i.t

is

possible

that,

we

'not

entertain

the

isn't

he

accepting the proof'.

The opponent asserts

if it may well never happen,

even

possibility

making

the

even

in

it

is

denying

sophisticated

claim

possible

that
that

it

will

arguments

prove impossibility can always be upset, but simply doesn't consider

arguments

at

all;

simple-minded character,

didn't

happen was

possible.

(Or

invented

perhaps

he

is

the

perhaps

as

not_~ that

93 who held that

the extreme oppos1te to the Megarian of

Megarian of

going to the other extremes to show that, even if Aristotle can ridicule
his position,

he can ridicule Aristotle's as well.)

can be construed in three ways:

as

the

'what

concept)

is

unable

~66vo:ra. e!va.s.,
diagonal)

is

to

1047b

with

5;

the

the

point

about

the

opponent,

or

that

(c)

clause

and

(b)

is ;}t

has

doesn't

in

an

force

against
by

the

the

~uclidean

But

it

was

point

in

~ontext

shows

method

of

that

which

that

issue

the

surability

of

that

the

not

of

elva'- ,

ca.::;e

to

after

it

salvage

the argument

there

even

opponent
little

between

the diagonal.
does

complement

while in (c)

is

the

redundant,

it

is a specific

our

respect

'the fact

isn't

though
will

for

that vou

rational

value'

it

Aristotle
not

doesn't

the

against

then be disregarding.

evidence

CC)!JCerned with impossibilities in general,

wn-occurrence

of

for

however -rO &.E>6va.'t'ov elva.L

and,

"tO.

commensurability

proof of the incommensurability of

was

context;

(b)

cf.

2 by the method of successive approxi-

exhaustion,

there

on &.E>6va:rov -

indicate that it is a general point

attempt

prove

an attempted

reductio,

felt

the

itself

as

of Elva.&.;

subject

which

(in

was pointed out that

in

the impossible (in general,

(the

issue,

~ever reach a rational value for

mations

'that

with d.66va:tov

whole

diagonal;

it

'that

with e:lva.L depending

(a)

impossible

(a)

with 'tO ci66va."tov as

exist',

pointed out).

as was

about

the

exists',

impossible',

going

Jiagonal

counterfactual.

possible but will not be'

the diagonal,

,e_articula:r:_ coat,

or not.

that

ro take acco,Jnt nf the point about

suggested

'this

sense

so that the impossible could

cases llke coats which can be cut up but won't

..;i.ll

opponent

the

to

rather than

case

happen);

111d 'tO

that

distinguished

Sea-Battle,

in

from

happen would be impossible,

lonlil;er

that,

of

not

thing will not be

impossible

did

the

be'

not

it is impossible.
0f

taking Uxrte

following

suggested

will

say truly that a

between

assertion

away with the

assertion.

simultaneously

that

to

as

not

also

does

Aristotle's

distinguishing

~.!!Y

to allow

be',

is that the conseqnence in 5-6 is clearly one which

from_~

was

what

that
nnt

the non-nccurreuce of the former?

himself

of it, not

but 1vill

removes

amounts

in the Owen sense,

It

it

.::~.sked,

it was

possible,

criterion for

possible ~vith

is

'this

ever

Lhe

rent parallel with the Master Argument'q formulation here?)

of

account',
of

9 3

on

that

rather

the possible,

and

such a
is
his

the

opponent

is

just with the

The

opponent

is

itself

lndtcate

impossibility;

right

to

specific

taken,

tncommen-

real1se
but

that
he

is

wrong to refuse to allow any other criterion.

t.his coat will he cut up, and ("" .<ind yet; hut he uses xa.C, simply)
'_f_1_47b 9~

1.t won'r he'.

:.dsses
'not

106

trtking

it

into

-;hich

is

the

In de Int.
present

still open

':1

with
(Eth.

18a 28-34 and ~het. 3. 17 1418a 2-5 Aristotle

the

past,

Nic.

VI.

~.07

distinguishing
2

ll39b

5-ll

it

from

doesn't

the

future

mention

the

41b 4

<'JlAPTF;R

~o'resent

in

this

connect1.on

<Ill,

dt

In st_e Caelo I

future.)

the

simply

contrasting

the

::tnd

past

t2 2d3b 12-14, on the oLher hand, he seems

tu regard the present as Jell as the future as the fielJ of possibllity,

the

unlike

not

past;

and

case

not

now the

dmbiguous;
get

up

the

here

ynu re

and

..:hat

and

now'?

could

now,

he

but

now,

grounds

here

r_herefore

point

standing

on

13-14

:-toreover,

be1.ng

you

'it

{i)
1

impossible
could

say

'it

Sl.tggest

LO

have

is

is in question;

too

1t

realisation of

possi~ility

the
and

l047b 8-9,

present

'it's
But,

of

present

too,

possibility

false

that

get

(i),

&t,

suggests

counterfactuals

(ii)

indicates that it ts the non-

that

is

Ln

question,

as well

as

that of a future one.

l$

fhere
Q~

Cae~

on

the

thus

12

on

an

apparent

of

oue

the

discrepancy

between

and ~e~E_!..

hand,

possibility

of

and

the

this

Rhet.

passage

on the
(It

present

and

other,

was

noted

that Diodorus Cronus relates possibility to the present and the fut\lre~
and

that

was

pointed

d~sappear

have
at

the

be

matter

the

either

the

on

which

in

present

P:l~~

that

influenced

different

the

been

out

into

been

sense

have

he may

that

is

drawn

''"',

some

qualified

l4

here

should
have
It

C() 0

that

h2

ro

of

the

this

and

is

more
not

0f

ways

to

the

here

may

is necessary (and

9 (cf.

L9

just

a 24)

and

though not in 9-ll itself, the con-

spelled

was

out

f1'.Jinted

counterfactual
present

ones:

wna~~sort

out,

too,

should

past

so,

1.t ..;as

have contrasted

that

extend

~vents

of

<iS

felt

'false'

and 6.7tXWc; impossi--

that Aristotle in 13and

i:npossl.Ollity
the
to

'impossihle
he

possilnlity,
past

was
in

1
,

but

reierring

some sense,

counterfactuals

rather

than

however,

were

tense

y')vvcu was

not

intended

permanent,

it

was

rather

and

those

nP.cessary.
10

indicr~te

could

that

the

past

and

that

the

pairing

to

truths

relating

as

1047b

felt

clear,

omnitemporal

di.agonal)

in

accommodate
(like

to

the

things

the

possihil ity

implications

distinction

to

the

between

incommensurability

subject

of

and ye:-

of ETvcu

change.

of

the

(But

are

there any omnitemporal unrealised possibilities?)

We also disc,lssed the relation of this discussion to tlte 1ilstinct:ion

heU-leP.n

r"'!~"tuired

powers

for

the

and

possibi1ities.

It

a present

assertion of

was

f":'lt

possi.bi1ity

that

than

more

was

[or that of

a power; one might have the power of standing without its being possible
f0r

nne

But

in

to

be

standing

if,

the present passage,

fact

that

for instance one was tied to the chair.

at least,

is clearly n_~!- held that

it

the

the opposite of one 1 s standing is the ~asp removes the

poc;.qibility of one's standing.

The contrast

hili tv thus did not seem relevant

sage and ~-~.!.

and Rhet.;

between powP.r and possi-

to the discrepancy betw>en

and there was no need to

1 hi.s

pas-

nt roduce powers,

as opposed to possibilities, here or anywhere else in q 4.

[t

in

further

W<'\S

terms

of

the

noted

that

positioning

the

of

point

temporal

at

l047b

adverbs,

IJ-14

and

of

trP.ated

th-=-

fall<Hy

0f composition, at Soph. El. l66a 24-32.

looking

convincingly,

impossible

dctual

ln de int.

tends

that Aristotle may

hetween d:Jt.\W<; falsehood

[f

sense.

not

p~rfect

lt

chapter.)

closely,

natural

But,

present

imposs.Lble)

one

by

past,

equally

occasions.

12 28lb 8-9,

is

the

counterfactual

in which

counter factual

this

when considered

different,

present

in

which leaves it ooen that what is j~~W< false may be impossible

hi l i.ty;

>hOlild

future

by

ln ~~-~~lo I

trast

present,

different

the

from

influenced

accidental

perfect yeyovtvnL

past;

the

~ere

the

question

in

as

the

here

up

12 28lb 9-11,

d6uv~~ov

obx

is
is

against

will

you

fuller version in de Cae!~ I

the

is

here

that

( ii)

that

what

false that you will

been'.

false

same,

Admittedly

1.s

or

~ 0 yap ~E ~h l~w~~ ~v~ t~dv~ fEUCo4 ~tv,

that

rhe

impossible.

either

not

but

can ..;re

seems

~cribed

th'lt

as

'1ell

well as present ones could be de-

l_0_47b l_l~::~

Aristotle here argues that

(A~B) ~(~A "*B)

(I)

ThP argument

sihle,

it

is

impossihle
snmethin~

possi.hl e
sible

takes the form of a !'_eductio; assuming that

deduced

follows

from

i.mposstble
either.

what

follows

hetnp;

somewhat

awkward.

hA

So

is
ls

possible'
itc;elf

repetitive;
it

viz.,

impossible'

was

20
but

suggested

should
the
that

he

'nothing

from

'that

that

is the suggestion th~t

in

B is_!!?_.!:. pos-

of the converse of

as if referring back?

-tO B)

(sc.

by means

in 20,

put in the past tense,

indePd

t hr-:-n

this,

Bnt why,

!-hat lrrrw Or, &.6Uva:'tov

)!l

from

8 is

which
is

not

tmpos-

It was suggested

tr~nsferred to

double f(J"'tw in

lc;-r;o Erh tO A

17

17,

would

E>~va:tov in

17 IR might be a corruption (in capitals) of an original lc:rr:,,l OT,

~E>6vc:tov

and that

EcJ'tw 01, &.56va:tov in 20 mtght be an Intended correc-

109

~~

7b 1.:0
i il4 7h 16

tion of 17-18 that had been misplaced.

Even so, it was
of

proof

a direct

fromO A and
is already
a

~11

by 20,

'nothing

'what

without

needing

impossible

implied).

of

2roof

o:::ither

pointed out. that Aristotle has all the ingredients

And

to

follows

the whole

is

is
of

(for,

possible',<> B

little

value as

follows from the possible is itself possible',

it does is to derive the truth of this

yllp in l047b 16 indicates

the

of

J l047a 24-26).

the proof.

b.

e.g.

since

dlso
for

In bl7,

the

A.

the

converse of

(I),

namely (II)

..-(A~)

-l'CB)

(C,A

here asserts

An attempt

i.Jhat

then are

that

house,

<TntJ,a.!ue:L

was

that &.ud.yxn

in 27 introduces
protasis of

the

felt

not

that

che

this

protasis

conditional which,

was
of

as

grammatically

the

entire

a whole,

impossible.

sentence,

forms

sidering cases

(like

that

in de

where

the

9)

of

may

elected

at

imply
the

the

the

coat

one

same election,

but

of
it

"l

is

is

time

matter

and

that

possibility of

would
in

be

which

if

it

being

that

the

only way

in .-;hich a

happens,

t>,1

hich

Furthermore,

-1lternative
the

very

with

possibilities,
next

chapter

regard
it

was

refers

to

the

pointed out

be cut

to

llO

potencies

at

least, also im-

It was sug-

to

that

~A_,- B)

(OoA ~<>B)

has itself

saying

hardly surprising.

And indeed

= 'this is how I got to it'?

that &.vd.yxT} appears

corresponding clause

throughout

14-30

in 22-23.

applies

up or burned

the

elected

being

case

that

in

the same

thing were possible

created

that

out

which is

to

the

in 26,

while

However,
relation of

it does not
it

t.;as

felt

implication,

rather than qualifying the terms involved (unlike 6uva-r6v and d66va:tov);

involves

problem

pointed

Aristotle has in mind precisely such

and the only way in which the qualification

actually

,...,as

healing

but Aristotle clearly holds

amounts

is

which

In the case of the election

each

It
for

3nd it was not clear that any contrast was intended between implications

identifying

possible and the actual and saves (II) only by making it a

logy.

in

the

in the same way;

could help,
..;ere

of

10).

potency

but the

Conservative candidate

Nor do the qualifications in 29-30 help.

the

indicate

possible alternative pre-

certainly not

those cases where

actual election of the one implies the actual election of the other.

~he

it

(A ... B);

pointed out

in the

This

precisely

The possibility of a Labour candidate being

possibility

be

in which (II) does apply?

as can be seen by con-

which can

realisation of

eludes that of the other.

elected

cases

qualified by <ivd.yxn and those not.

The trouble is that (II) is plainly false,

1048a

the apodosis of

the entire sentence.

Int.

in

from

CT'r'jj.J.aCvE&.

(t

but

generally

the

= foundation.

in 29 may

appear

was

they are those in which B is a necessary prerequisite for

(A ..... B)

27, as in 22-24, the (complex) apodosis precedes the (complex) protasis;

it

can

A, and in which that is the reason for asserting() A~ B; if for example

cases;

was made to save him from this by suggesting that in 26-

there

plies that for harming in a similar way.

implies

Aristotle

results

that

potency for healing by the use of reason,

been derived

l047b 26-30

opposed
fact

potency for harming does not of itself entail that ~ potency

the

.;;ested

In b 22, -rO 1tpW-tou =

15.

two

healing implies a potency for harming;

that

from the principle 'nothing

(cf.

start

third E ua.l. depends on Ouva-tbv ; cf.

what

argument

impossible follows from what is possible'

B, ~o 6E~~Epov

~!-luctio

employ a

from

of

the mere

that

for

Aristotle

which may

tau to(II)

by

himself

bring

about

I[]

~s

2.

thing

vis.1ble

dt

c. Litle~

n~hen

there

dre

not

beings

who

can

;ee?
8 1 & 5

5 PHILOSOPHICAL I SSUZS _ ARIS_ING FROM METAPH.

,\nother
perhaps

l.

~l]l_ng

wonder
nature

of

that

r1r.

if

l0413a

are

It

against

is

relevant

t.:,

Hill

its 6Gva.J.H'

has

or.ly

i.f

at

prev~nts

r.:o

it

is

times

it__ being seen?

'.:ertain debate
to

when

Le

on

as

rearl

external

then

Philo

Aristotle

1n

the

\:ill

ensuing

in

effect

saying

be

to

siding with

of the 'bare fitness'

disagreed,
,-1e

hcve

in

eff~cr-

[n

said

allows
2

second

the

Philo's

view,

The

possibility
according

to

of

'"hile

Al8xand~r

nhstacles.

external

in effect

before

tible

than

answer

of
the

~rong,

can vary

being q> 'd

context

removing

On the other

visible.

for

there is

according

to

or q>-abi..lity,
of

no one answer to the

whether
according

we

are

L.

t~and,

possibilities

piece

least

(i)

Cat.

7b

33-Sa

6:

or

interested
first

Aristotle,

one.

counting?

discussi.ons,

there

YBs,

might

Would !:here be

(The

in

would

perc~ptlbles

(ii)

IV

14,

22

3a

21-9:

absence

of

such

probable

chronological

<>till

be

knowables

and

without animals.

Reverse

ccuntable

verdict:

nothing

there'd

(so

be

no

would

be

time),

if

rhere were no souls.

(iii)

~etaph.

0. 5, l010b l0-10lla 2:

of

it

was

called

s~~cing

Agrees:

!_:h,eta,

if

no

,;oulr!

3till

perhaps (i:aw<;) no

ensouled

be

the

on

beings,

but

a isthere

substrata, '.-Jhich give

.)
,\~::I_t:l:..:!:.!:3_~_e

18, p.
12 ff.
1j l

n,

III

2,

:1'..l!lcU:_ (Rabe) 146, 10-13;

ll r.--:.cknowl<:."dg;ements t:.o

15--26:

426a

:-lore

complex:

their

active

-1ctual

perceptlon,

qtate

perceptibles

exist

but

only

insofar

as

in

during
merely

exist \.Jhen perception

is not actually going on .

People

have

been

so amazed hy the claim about

ti.me in (ii), that

1
But Ar's

they have sought to put other constructions on Ar's words.

mistake here becomes more intelligible when the difficulty of the issue
about possibility is recalled.

If the context

i.11~isible.

r>.ridence in Necessity, Cause dnd Blame 78-9.

Philonian examples:
)hiloponus ~n An. Pr. i69, 20 f.; Alexander in An. Pr. 184, 12
:~f.;
::~mpLicius i~~
196, 1.
~:Q1.tedei_?tes, a~; u:3ed in later
mti1uity, is interpreted by Gwil Owen in an a1T!lost oppoaite sense
1:s t:ne absence of interfering ccnditions.
I should be interested
~)
~ee
whether it could not be interpreted as still having the
")hilon:i.an sense.
(A.C. Crombie, ~d., ~_.::__~nti.f~~'!!_~ N.Y. 1963,

l'1urus .2..E Philoponum, De

\lPxander (?) Quaest1.ones
,:,arnLos and ~.!!~.:.... tar~,

Anima

pntent:Lally active,

it and

visible would depend

visible.

!Je

of

Lf the context were distlngui.;hing between

it .wuld rank as

(iv)

is,

it ,.,rould more often be called combus-

one of a slght-seeing holiday, it would rank a:;

)]

at

talking

to what

F.xample:

discussion.

equally

'..Thether

_1tell Lglbles and visibles,

~.

much

rise to perception.

!:he context of discussion.

~~re

has

sides with

lhe

Uu.rning it.

very

perceiving,

Taurus

the intervening earth would normally

as

knowing,

it

.;ood hundreds of feet underground:

of

the

Aristotle

the

.,_Je

thought

do

Most Stoics

fulfilled

be

condition must

absence

..rhich

1.

special case of the

sea is perceptible, in virtue

(psile epitedeiotes) of the subject.

that

both sides are

fact,

qne-:;tion,

,\nd

and

a possibility:

r:he Stoics.

0f

~he

similarly a shell at the bottom of

order:

is possibLe for a piece of wood at the bottom of the ocean to be burned,

n~d

as

beings mi~ht be seen as a special case of an external obstacle.)

preventing

:\<;cording to Philo,

debate.

crmtroversy,
seen

knowables, perceptibles, or countables, 1f there were no ensouled beings

the

If this is 3pplied to 6uvd.J..LE~c; like visibility,

absent.

ccmbustibilLty,

Stoics

15-20

possibility.

thing

factors

sum~thing

'Jisible at times ..;hQn

be

His successors could not agree on the issue.

(a)

Roethus Jisagrees ,.,ith (ii) and (iii) on countable and perceptiblJ

(b)

Alexander agrees with (ii)

(c)

Slmplic.1us agrees with (ii) +

3
1

dnd disagrees with the rival view in (i)

1.
2.
1.
4.
5.

Details in P.F. Conen, Die leittheorie des Aristoteles, Munich

1964. 156-69.
Boethus, a__E. Si.mplicium t!!.._f..~~- 766, 17-19 (= Ihemistius, i!!..__!'_b_y__.
163, S-7), and 759, 18-20.
Alexander, ~. Simplicium in Phys. 759, 20-760, J.
:;Lrnplicius in Ph....Y2. 760, 33-"161, 5.
:JimolicilJS (acknowled~ements to R.W. Sharples) i__!!_J~ii..!:. 196, 12
and
27-l).
llJ

n~J

"l()TF:S

3.

If so,

Ti-iETA

visibility (the passive power)

CJn

able,

not

or

so,

it

Juspect,
in suitable contexts, be r~garded as a count-

something,

quantifiable,

permanently

lost

the

constitutes

makes in

visible

or

power

of

about

power

even

entity,

counting,

warning

1 between the

thOltgh

quantifying,

Aquinas

suffer

For he

is unable

change

hand

he

both

before

is
'NhO
of

had

the

and a

the
and

after

lost

of

to
the

prevent
loss

the

Once again,

power.
a

power

to

has

prevent

and

is

prevention.

impossible,
view,

that

there

the

change

does

about God has changed:

is a

God

Admittedly,

lt.

not

take

place

:!:_.!! God,

when the virginity

but

still

something

take place !.!!_ the virus,

the change does not

the virus has changed:

because we have

lost our power

it has

to he killed.

lost

In this example, unlike

9 1 leads us to expect.

(the vulnerable humans),

'Ve

the

~_ctive

don't

know,

(the

there

(the active parties)

nbstacle,
2lo

parties
but

the

plex.

that

obstacle

question

whereas

when

>1y point is:

are

in

the earlier PXamples it

counting,

quantifying.,

examples of

permanently lose
(the

fhomas Aqninas,

that

argument

be

for

some

lwP,inning.

where

tht=:>re are

i.s

PlUch

exdmple,

other

5.

,q '5 rrn\'ed

At

the fir:n

'.iny T'Jte,

there are .JlternJtive possibilitor

location of the physical

rhP

discussed

by

fslamic

scholars.

Is

Where there is a capacity to produce

the

factor

ctoctor 's capacity to

which

(~..inai

dec1des

kill or cure,

to kurion),

and

5 L~El:Y determin!_~..:~

Does
~ 5

has

been,

dnd

the analysts r>f

ltlS

cited

q 5 along

may

'can'

easily

be,

taken

ta

imply

determtnlsm.

'ls 'will, if .. ' i1as been reinvented by modt.:rn

,\ga:in,
.Jith 0ther

Jadkko Hintikka has,

that 'in one of his

least he rAr1 thus comes fatrly close o Diodorean cteterminism.' 2

Finally,

Elizabeth Anscombe Clt'2S

p.-1ssages,

for different reasons,

moods ar

-;hall

'lerely

,~J9,

136-1.

t_alking

to

about

He ls not,

summarise

show

that

c.;pecial

for

here

when

.;ho1ving

to . how that

,\ristot:le beli.eves

3
the

determi ni ;m

cases,

example,

.JS

a 5,

lhat what lS caused is necessitatect.

or

the npposite
the

e_assive party)

took place

s~eing

sort.

humans)?

E.g.

if

power

of surmounting some

ceas>2s

to be surmountable.

active and passive powers are correlated is

com-

tikka
In

h~

, '3

arguments
not

u_~ed

implied

in
~

by

says AvO.yxn ( HH8a

NCB

52-3;

5.

Ar

and a

is

14).

talking about e.rerything ~.;e should call action,

certainly allows

97,

1048b

37-1049a

that

Aristotle

18,

,\r

Ls

talklng dhout

dist-inguishes

the

soecial cases.

-1bility

of

seed,

'lnce implanted in t_h0 'VOmb, to f)ecume a !luman r.etng from the mere possibility

!:hat

::>orne

bronze statue.
o:arth does

pJece
Surely

indeed

of

elt:mental

85 does

t11rn into

CJ:

rtnt.

SLitU,

"arth

..;ill

one

day

turn

into

:0_l~~.

1;nply that,

ever:;

in the process will

">t"li!e

if

that

IJe necessitdted?

not always.
l.

l.

~hich

but dbout actions springing from a rational <.::apacity like medicine. Hin-

D0es it help that the last change took place in the passive parties

in

of

results,

mu~t

but

its power to kill,

the first ones, we have the close correlation between active and passive
powers that

in

this factn is desire or choice.

being

would compare a lethal

he has lost a power.

something ~bout

pattern

lack

Surely, it does not remain lethal, if we have all become immune

virus.
to

Admittedly,

think this can be right.

'<-~Y

-.: c

It

not

possibility of

that,

it not very close to l048a 10-11 '?

there

is

1~!'1pural

is

is ~~ed

it

dS

argument

.3oft determinists.

don't

lost,

ties,

it; yet beforereply

that

'-'orld, there must be a ~_Ul whil..h decidP.S wh1ch possibility is realised.

opposite

become

on Thomas'

that

lost

Thomas'

loss.

Does God

correction,

the w-0rld with a

nf

Thi.s

prevented.
I

';tep

loses her virginity?

God has the power of

which

1.

example.

to prevent her having

virginity

hetween

correlation

anaLogous

loss of power when somerme

power

<reated

If

tne close connexion that Aristotle

an

pending

influent1al was in inspiri.n~ a cc:rtutn TsL1 mic ':lrgument for 1-;nd's having

had

seeing?

1> dnd the power to be cp'd, although

to

off~r

to

thereafter

retention

has

tries

everyone

or

doubt if it actually contradicts anything he says in 8

rhomas

LtlS~_Eing~-~--~~~~~~:_:r:_~~_:::__~.::reat~l_t'~~t_____:__:~J"~-J:....!!

(-~~-

(]Ctive power).
Might

c.~s

L2

0:..

exist without sight (the

~l!_n:!~f_~_E.l.Q.g__~~ I, q.

25, a. 4.

,:

L,wayni a..E_. >~aimonidem, ,-;.\!_~-~-~~t~-:~fplex~. I /4, 5th argument

-1nd ae_ . .\verroem 0:a:>~ (' r. H.:\.
Lfson, The Philosophy ')f rhe
~~. .:i~ -U7-8).
-----"
~~~kko Hintikka,
~.E.

:t .-\nsc0mbe.

r1L;C!

t )_4

r"cme and Ne~~sitz, Oxford t973, 2Gl-2; A_jat~ l957,

l'Jll,

fnJ..t~ural

2.
15

l.>2cture, C:tm-

.;n fES u:.--.1 THETA

are
a

expect

that

Aristotle

determinism inter

,__)f

~o

right'.

oart

alia

doubt,

would

because
he

have

of

would

his

imagined
clause

think that

tn whether conditions are right,

he

was

well

'when the

clear

conditions

coincidences often play

and in Meta ph. E 3 he believes

he can prove that coincidences are not necessitated.

To
together

get

Ar

with

looking

some

of

more
his

deterministic

other

we would
Thus

ideas.

need

to

an efficient

put

9 5

cause is

that whence comes the origin of a change (~. II 3 and 7), and change
is defined (~.

l) as involving the activation of a O~VCLf!L~.

III

If

1Q_47b_l_l-_-35

Jl-33 dtstinguishes rt'rr~e t_-;pr~s 1 t

(uuyyvt'Ov),

\b)

frl)rn

learni.Dg.

.JS

the

result

or

to

rasstve

assert

31-15

previous

of

powers

34

picks

too,

not

\Oytf in

3mples

[lJLenl.y,

tnose resulr.ing fro.n habir.uatil1n,

up u.aef]m._

ther~

(c),

1_t1e

em ()nlv he
doc!S

possessed

(a)

classification).
he

110t

-.~here

tnnate

apply to

not

i.r~itial

the

:1ay

or

(b)

(c)

this

in

13.

in

under

ind

\.Jhile

mentioned

(not

falling

(b)

t:1..1t

activity,

(a)

r_hnse resulting

(c)

other ex-

':J()TUe

previous activity is

required? -those under (a) indeed are innate, hut 15 the classification

we put all rhese ideas together, it looks as if all efficient causation

in

involves the activation of a &Gva.~L' while ( 95) &uv~eL~ are activated

ample, the power of begetting is natural, but is not possessed ~t birth,

we

are

closer
But

necessitated.

to Anscombe 's

formula,

aot
it

an

logically

implied

And,

that whatever

1s not ruled out that

effect

before

the

that what

Ou~L'

conditions

even if he had, it is still

is caused

is

necessitated.

For

may sometimes be activated and produce

have

actually

become

The effect would then be caused, but not necessitated.

Further, what

is caused is

am sure from his other remarks that Ar had not

put all these other ideas together.

exhaustive

as

far

as

active

powers are cc>ncerned?

if C""l)YYE:'JWV has that strong sense.

of necessity, once the conditions are right.

~ow

11-33

necessitating.

it

previo'JS

resulting

potency
~_!:!

nf t.:;Et.S in
33);

on

the previous activity ref~rred

is

occurrence
is

the

2dme

potency,

1 would

II.

the other h,1nd,

lity su~gests

Pf

or

activity as

not?

Anall~Y

that

su~gest:

is

it

Alternatively,

we

the

cf_

lU49b

l').gical c~latinn of 1ctualtty co potentia-

the

actual:Lv ~-ing presupposes th1:;> power to t.p,

that

Is

which

for

cvith the treatment

(and

case r:he activity that pr\3cedes the power ro c.p must be

Vity.

in JJ-34?

t0

that

dppeal

m1ght

something and doing it :. . ell;

it

1...s

to

5( 1 me

in wnich

other acti-

contrast h~tween doing

the

:,y _;i_ngin~ that we d<:!J~lup the power

t:o sing well.

l047b l5-l048a

The

if

the

suggest1on that

is

in a

Ul

7),

J:

or

this

15

rer

is

does

it

the

expression

1c- t ng -or -not- qr ing?

:1ave

used.

correspomHn\S

potencies

nckness

or

r3tional

potencies cannot.

L-,n .;nuld result.

ll6

are

B) 1t

Btlt what is

'lll
rwo

n.Jo

~'oposit~._.

\lecause.

are
those

t0

~or

rational

health,

cover

'there

Ln

which

relevant

cl

vay,

contradict11ries,
dr14uments
'-.lays
CIS

>Jf

t:h(lt
r -~~in~

~joctoring-

all

0f

1046b

cases

Ar~stotle

_r1r()duce

<'!S

hothi

nf

could

tva.v-rCwv.

can

une ~-~~yoc; -:,~:ers

an ;bserved f~ature

to

tvav~Cwv

the force of

ne a....:tualised aut;matically,
lS

is

L 11 terruption.

like health J.nd ~>ickness (A

'opposites;

:;imply

A z

i.n some st~nse dn

are

A 3-4

ilnd is of opposites.

soul

is

point of t~e reference to soul at 5-6 ls clea-

in conjunction w1th

rE>ad

(A)

either
and so

a contradic-

rational behaviour

1 r',,~

/h

:!'rES

j5

1L. o

t:he

has

the

power

argument

in 8.

Worries

rational

potencies;

1nd

7-8

here

rational
i.n

uses

were

suggest

rva.C

it

is

that

was

cf.

is

potencies,

EN

the contrast with tvOc; ltOLT'J't't.XT)

"'tpoa.Cpe:cn<;

seems to play a similar part

claimed

the

In
xa.t ). n;

't'E

It

here;

senerally agreed

expressed over the ddequacy of

but

potencies.
by

(B)

not-to-cp.

Aristotle

~HETA

;N

that

conclusion
Aristotle

rather

is

would

(B)

determinism

involve

though

5,

1046b

contradictories,

as

though Ev6.v't'La. could

(It might also be remarked

a more obvious begging of the question against

for

Aristotle,

presupposing

that

human

actions

are not predetermined, there would be no question here to be begged.)

Rather
. . . hould

stmilarly,

not

ioctoring
'...rhether

be
or

to

drawn between,
not

use

Lt

at

all

one's

(corresponding
_;peak of

11-12,

in

to

e.g.,

was

(i)

asked

tvhether

skill

But

not

it

to
was

cure

and (ii)

the

observed

the decision

patient
that,

or

For

kil

(ii),

l-by-doctorin~.

~ristotle's

corresponding to (A),

these

in

at

in

turn

rerhaps

e
the

'in

has the advantage

picks

picking

us

up

the

Does

this

Sorabj i 's

necessitas

9 4

1047b

29-30

in

(which

1047b

manner

in

accordance

which

with

they

the

possess

We;; OUva.-

6 we should

So in
the

35-1048a

has a bearing on

94); tc W~ 66va.v-ra.~ in a 6 corresponds

5 to

extra

lised

the

ar-"!ument;

discussion

premisses

have

It

notes)?

consequentiae

~);so

,,f

in

the

more

the deterministic

escape

route;

given

from

existence

ut

setti..t:d

general an'!;ument cuncerning

implications J.le realised,

the

condition a,

fact

that

b and c,

that

a and b;

So

are

far,

'only

concerned,
however,

what

below.

that

we

happens
It

potency

was

is

case it follows
it

only
(at

each

observed

be

it may

given merely

q:l

from 5-7, where irrational patenas

soon as

13-15,
must

too,
be

and b (only) apply.

happens

given moment)

there

will

follow that

the capacity to

'whatever

that

actualized,

its actualization.

must

have

to <p

Against this it might he Stig-

this only shows that X had

and in that

Sorabji sug-

capacity

X's

it does not

not <p sooner, when only a and b apply.

gested

nece~sary',

is

is

possible';

do

suggest

something

see

that,

that

not

further
whenever

necessitates

For otherwise, if we could suppose that an irratio-

was

potentialities',

qualification which

sometimes

apply

co

the

min ism
'Nhich

deterministic

implications

(cf.

(5)

than

required,

consequentis

(cf. dvd.yxT)

in

and Aristotle might not have reaSorabji

outlines

it can be further strengthened by an appeal

One :-n.Jy compare.

positive

to the necessity

in the case of rational

arbitrarily

be

he

generally,
Aristotle

it

actualized

seems

had

probably did not

(i.n

'Aristotle

~scape

by

on

Modality

deterministic

pointing

out

in

the

one

1c.;ay

rather

than

the

Heak

and

objection

deterministic
that

to

deter-

implications,

things may sometimes

one may compare Hintikka's suggestion

Determinism')

of

the

realization

that

possible
nf

some

and

Aristotle
the

tries

actual

possibilities

is

to

merely
inter-

(in a predetermined way, for all that the argume11t says?) before

it is completed.

,(upCwc; in

('Aristotle on Modality and Determinism', 59-79.)

1048a

12

refers

rautologously,

that

which

in

x6p~ov

to

problem of whether the strongest

'',,lit hout

rather

just to suggest

equation

that

realised

happen sooner than they have to;

impulse

fact

any misapprehension about

in

10

(1.;hich

raises

the

old

is that most strongly feltor,

prevails)..

xupCw<;

night

the circumstances (etc.)',

iesires accompanied by misapprehension lead to action.

in Eudemian Ethics II.
cr:~s

1] 8

more
if

rupted

implications.

the past as Irrevocable.

may

zation in one particular way?

agreed that d.vO.yxT'J in a 6 must express

rather

are

deterministic

too

dnother, even without the presence of desire to 11ecessitate its acttiali-

-\nd,

qualifications

!1ot::o:ntialities which they possess'.

'Jr

if

an

actualized

does (i}.

a 12, and this in turn is expanded in a 14.

'in

decision

argument that it throws greater emphasis on the decisive

66vnv-ra.~

ranslate
lr

past

the

to that which ~ight be played

tion is necessitated, why should we not suppose that a rational potency

the relation of
ca.~

the

there

was doubtful whether we could speak of a decision to do some docto-

cO<;

Even
gests

him

while we might

of

25-28;

nal potency may somtimes arbitrarily be actualized before its actualiza-

role of ope~'' and ~po~Cpe~'' than

2,

kill

necessity

1147a

to do any doctoring at all on this occasion,

ring independent of a decision to cure-by-doctoring or else a

lo

the

cies

distinction

the decision whther to do some

(corresponding to (B)),

medical

(A)).

decision

it

hy

VII.

irrational potencies too.

intended to apply to all

by lvd.v"t~a.

than

(A)

to cover all

(A)

in 9

does

expresses

rover (B) in the sense of 'incompatibles'.

that

it

that

suggest
but even

fhe reference

6 1222b 21 to )(()p~at. d.px_aC which are fi.rst sour-

of motion was compared.

li9

\:-',

-':2~~_____!._2_~

L1tv
oy

(I)

lS
,15

the

different
assert

does

way

from

the
in

thing

We

possibility

Jldt

the

commentators

CAlexander

Lf.
' f

also
at

in

least

nasaive

is

interpreted by Aristotle,

An.

of

who

have

de

10-18,
Gen.

like

type

Philoponus

passage

present

and

rather
as

does

long

not mean

This means

(I)

in An.

302.

in mind;

the

Philo

removed.

view of

Gorr.

of
that

since

thesis,

these lines

that

to

Pr.

Aristotle

169.

21-23,

ti.) are in error -

JO
they

are

passage

is

speaking

about

concerned with

1ctive poLencies.

__;o

that

his
LS

uly

Jr

of

the

only

power

of

is

being

of

fire

to

burn wood

happens

to

be

wood

present

if

the

restricted

wood

is

should Aristotle make such a

imagined,
and

rr~nts,

who
so

try

to

wet,
not

'power
is

Hot

rather

wet.

of

removed

than that
The

point?

burning dry stuff',

just
(I)

question was

Answer,

in

the

extreme

case,

to

raised,

toresist those,

to argue away possibility by pointing

tend,

because

the power

restrict

to

real

impedi-

possibility

to

vhat actually happens when it happens, like the Megarians.

This,
nd

;,.~

indeed,

against
LO-'I~a

t5,

t.Je

~un,

tl

have

all
tn

tend

1nl.:>:r

"llpiwls

to
1. wo

was
the

that

and,

r1ng about
vl

(I);

.ondltions

the

second

the
the

main

combination of

possjbilities

for

their

argument

(I) with the

are

realisation

of

support

of

implication of

(II)

are

rational

fulfilled-

that,

as

(including absence of

potencies,

presence

of

soon

preven-

desire

to

the particular result),

we also have sufficient conditionsthe

push

push

Aristotle

him

premisses;

into
\a)

orever,ted

into

it,

Megarian

Hintlkka,

possibilities
from

doing

so

(Time

position.
and

realize
(dcri'Jed

Necessity
lhemselves
from

':) 5

(Indeed,
201

f.)

~~

l048a

6-

l049a 5-9,
must

(so far

-~~12.

13-1'5),

be

some

(b)

f.1Ctnrs

(a))

to

tt . 1 ~,u->stDll.L'? i.::> ,,,Jt rea-

that

external

equivalent

:.-sa ')

'

preventing

~s ~e

'or,

making it impossible for it to be realised'.

On

the

not',

it at

must

be

other

other

~!

hand,

once follows

something

'whatever

than what

preventing

could

factors

potency

necessitates

its

happen',

possibly

is possible'.

clarifies

does

not

his

(above)
that

(b)~

on

J~-~rti.al

the

18

are

actualised

ff.

which

is

relevant

In de Motu Animalium 4 699b

c;ay

that

see

the

1.t

is

men

on

impossible
the

moon,

(in
even

one

hut

to

the

issue

of

it

of
is

than those

determinism;

ff. Aristotle is prepared to

17

sense

of

'impossible')

though they are not

<Jf

for

us

tn

nrcessity invi-

which might seem to suggest (l) rather than (II).

f<>.ren

with

(I)

\le

might

find

an escape Loute

fnr Aristotle

sisting that the absence of

any dctual

pr~~enting

'Jalent

sufficient

conditions

(and

that

'nothing

presence

possibilities,

the question Nhther there are any total possibilities other

that

possibly

'Aristotle on Modality and

to

the

pointed

the

presence

Stoics
out

may

that,

of

well

even

fnr

there

are

certainly

a builder is prevented by something from builrti11g; so

t:he

implication

not

actually

and

lose

that

he

building,

his capacity

loses

his

<::1pacity

are

still

forced

we

the

m1ny

to
t)

hn1cl

to build many times a Jay

Bnt

'..Ja"i

it

.Jhen

if we escape

whenever

that

(whever

in-

realisation

occastons

,~veT!

build

by

is not equi-

used some Sl\Ch nr~ument).

have
so,

tact~rs

he
it

he

is

may

gain

rains,

for

example).
furning
'~xpressed

if
xot

it

WOt

Ouvfroe;'ta.L

capacity'.

--;crce
~.ent

r he

then,

it was pointed cut thdt Lhis requires Jt0t'i:v

in

15-l6i

of
-

i.t

is

l:HleP.d

by

(One
external

other
rioes;

absence

in 16 as

of

might

necessary
but

la)

'he w1.ll
try

factors

e.xternal

to

is

the

~1SS.

( Hor..Jever,

not

;,y

U:i.s

remov~

~.g

'!l

lll) requires

fact<Jrs

is

lb)

that,

:.-tyc11g

rne

those

implausible and

preventing

Further,

he~ able, altho11gh he retains

110(

~scape

does

conditions-

this

in

dw 6Uva{JLv) 't'oU '11"a.p6v-roc; -rr1U ~a.fu]HxoU

lx6v'toc:;: 1tOLELv might have been clearer.)

ob

prevention

(II)

understood

is retained, Exet &e <~~c.

caking
the

to

or

'~ilpacltV,

1.nternal

to

i:1cJudcd

L!t

while

the ahthe

18-20 snggests

1'lalifications, rather \han being cr1nrraJted '>Jith tbtm.)

' '0

'not

and hence

position

remove

being

ls actualized, there

actualization'

In

frnm

italics throughout).

'necessary'

'whenever a

it

m~~~~~~~

(;-tv

th;:lt

not

happens

Hintikka

>?;rant

'..Je

from

that

happens

Determinism'

1047b

actualised when and only when all

necessary conditions
case

in

to

:1nt

realised

it was a~g~ed that 18 dues suggest that (e.g.)

(11),

burning'

piece

g 7

there

~1hle;

In support of
'\)ower

; and
lised

Stoics will

the

explicit

but

~s

too,

et

whereas

an

by

interpret

happen,

so,

attribute

this

possibilities,

not

doing

184.

in

as

to

possibility
does

its

Pr.

they

determinism
ho,.,ever,

it

of

Philophonus

removed.

is

in whi..:h it

view

the

c,ccurrence

inteLpLeted

prevented,

hat

its

uf

is prevented

Ls

causal

~~LHnething

if

this

inclined,

(II)

is

Sloic.s~

possibility

which

that

universal

not.)

expressing
-1

Lhis expre;:.ses a vLew of possibi-

to tnat held by the

factors,

cJlHSe,

'.hey
'e

sLmilar

~!xternal

nf
1e

Sorabji (.l) :ju5gests Ln.tt

.L.I.

1he

pathat

other

~048a

.-1

15

[Alexander}
Philonian

in Metaph.

way:

~~;civ-cwc; ob JtOLfJaEL.

fn

however,

06voi-!LY,

577.

ya.p 'xe: ~
;

he

16

33

l.ifl

expands EC Ot

and he does

icns on which even the

f . .1eLt.nitely

takes

16-21

6UvafJ.~V -roU 1tod')01U, xwA.UE'ta.~ Ot

interpret

e;t

as

in

the

~t, Exet. 'ti)v

15-16 as expressing condi-

potency is no longer present;

presumably

applies

to

rational

potencies

too,

though

things
It

(2))

if

visible

was

doubted

there

it

whether

~ in

Lhis

fact

special case of the

like

lost,

(paras.

(2)

in

is

not

he

ever

or,
the

strictly,

that

:o regard

Hhich power he retains.

The discus-

must now be talking of passive powers.)

(We

,lne

1flight

si.on in (iii) is in terms of a.Ccr&rr":6v rather than of &uva.'t6v; the con-

as

nection may

and

God

the

tains

not

as strongly felt

be

'possible'

in

English,

systematic

ambiguity

Might a.Cafhyt6v

in

and

of

the

words

(iii)

not

as that

point
in

be

between 'perceptible'

(iii)

in

-'t6v rather

taken

as

may

than

be

one

about

'perceived

about

possibility.

rather

than

as

If
b~:

no

(iii)

is

not

perceptibles

therefore

without

only assertion of

this -

ments

on

We

,rJeans

'r.ounted'

this.

str3ight

perceivers,

and

cannot

!"ather

(b)

and

argue

than

we

assertion
are

left

that

with

the

'countable',

case

(ii)

of

because

of

not

t ion?

1 re

no

we

may

men

to

'Ji

trP.:Ps

be

claimed,

'lr

<10

HI

'weed'

men,

be

special one about

'counting'

have

as

say

t.he
if

there

~'hades

'has

of

the

trees,

there

of

were

are

no

anything

that

than this;

nothing

meaning

last

rational

capability

of

we

beings

exactly one

if

even

just as,

ii

"tb
the

If
But

there

quintet
it might

nothing could be

year?

'late'

there were
Aristotle's

it is not just that notlling would be counbe.

'has

belng

the

We

observed

that

possibility of

counted

may

enable

the

contrast

being counted'
English

doesn't

he

brown

have

table

evermore,

L.O

in
and

express

Against

but

that

at

nity?

God will

ginity,

but

What

about

he

no

he

3 pe-

hi:"inging

to have

losing her vir~

it

<Jbout

that

she

power of

the

lla$n't

it

But did
preventing

already

so''?-

done

tinte

of

virginity

her

(he

that

table alwdys

chv;

n~edn't

t~~~_!_cise

re-

the power,

ct different coloc1r, but that doesn't

he

lost

-"!HV

power

lf,

tFJs

the

fli~w.er

ld

(1Jhich ile ,:ltJn't

that,

that 1ve

Loss of
his
the

pmo~er

too

l1.1Vf!

paint

it

brown

herJie)

to _k_eep

Late, we do feel

rnissed an opportu-

the case of X's vir-

in

df

opportunity
vlrus?

once we
keep

h.'!Ve

if ...,e are

rather

missed

example

losin~

either e'luivalent or tantologous.)

lon5er

or is it

have

Sorabji 's

is supposed
from

lnses i1er virginity'.

to ~nsure

Has

then suffer no
will

ilf

only have

Ls

that

only the power

power

he

this it was objected

we have lost a

pm;er i~(d

'the power to prevent

but

it).

green,

it ~~ for evermore?

may

be

(To avoid the t0mporalqualiftcarton 'already'

has

the

that d.p~8f.!T'}'t"6v

pnwer

Hhich is :.;hy .,;e can paint a table

mean

Lhe

provided

at each time,

it

as

(11)

..:annat have a

them,

all happy with this).

for

could

between

but

power.

colour

for

rather than about percep-

to .:aunt

the

the

or did

rather

can

the contrast

a matter of fact,

five,

someLone

(though we were not

'.olould

but

that

absence

rlaim is stronger
ted,

five

suggest

'the

virginity,

there

But
point

has

the first passage in (c) are com-

in

her

long as she has it'i

~he

'perceptible'?

different

\li

nL~ht

'(nuntctble'

preventi:I~

of

(tenselessly)

have this power,

losing

is

pn~Ver

'The

more
case

What

2-3).

3?

para.

X from

the absence of anyone who can see as a hindrance to a thing's

~hat

the suggestion dbove

first issue about possibility in Sorabji' s notes; is it entirely natural

heing seen?

ctlso not-:'d that there

Je

Can an active power exist Hith~~__r:_~2E'::..?_E~!~.~~~~ii_P_~~tve __ E.'~~~I

ginity';

no beings who can see? (Sorabji

are

tile Greek Cdllnot.

cial case, in our discussion about !Jossibiljty 1n l04Ha 15-21.

Sorabji

is in the context of the rational ones that it is introduced.

Are

predicates,

one doesn t have

the power to cure a man if he isn't ill (577. 27 f.).

16-21

subtle distinctions which

is no suggestion of a distinctiGJlbctween rhe 3ppl~c~bi1itv

tl?t6 'tt.vo<;

Can

preserving

'-'e

::1rgue

it.

that

the

0nly power it ever had was the power t') kill peopie \,"hO 1.vere susceptible
1

1)

it

(which

need

of .vhat made
thou~h,

change

our

in

the

tautologous,

fact,

be,

may

in

any

retain

1:ase

denotes

the

capacity

lo

power to kill rnany ar most

'!~thal'

it

n:>taius

heen a

the

~.ill

olr

f.Jct

tJ'-"!nple,

":f

r-hat

power, even.

(rlecisive .-tnd permrPJent)

1s

it!

a u::ndencv,
to

..;e c.Jn ;;i.'e a speci.fication

th<-It

susceptible

in such a case,

if

tlnd that

thece has

make-upwhich :rreans

future

rather directed,

:ir:s

be

as a matter of

fvreseeable

l1;ls

not

people susceptible),

rhat

and

Ln

t ~1e

dttentlon

not

,Jr

Ultr

Hill

t1te .,iJns previously

nmv rlo"'s

r1.ther
rvrr:-

llJW,
;S

nut?

~'Prhaps

: !mn a capacity;
1:;

person

who

 } ~I) a

l J

HAi'IER VI

_;usceptible to
is

it,

iethal.

Out

True,

we

:night

if

even

the

not

rilercfore

make-up

of

be

prepared

to

say

it

all changes so that it

us

l048a 25-JO
no

:an

lcmo;;er

kill

any

of

us,

we

say

might

that

has

it

the

as

potencies,
o

kill

i.n

soo as

1gain

virus

sense

the

might

to make

be

that

it

could

killus

if

our

us susceptible to it again;

lethal,

if

we

rould

specify

structure

9 t-2

and

is lve:pye:Ccr.

what

in that case any

the change in us

is conce-rned not wi rh C)l.JvdLLEI.c; to i.'S x1.vry::ra.1. and simildr

in

9 5,

changed
to

but

86

potency

(however

1048a

28-30

This

apologise,

as

but

it

were,

is btJv6.ue:l.

with \-Jhat

passt1ge

picks

for

llp

the

l045b

rhgression.

upposed

as

35-l046a

4;

't'l.v<i

-rp6xov

in 1048a 29 takes up the 'lC.a.N]c; of 8 1 1046a 17, rather than the qual if!-

improbable) that '..Jould give it the power to kill.

cation of A 5 1048a 17-18.

i048a

middle
~dsy

1048a

(cf.

33);

in Aristotle,

there

Lut

not

are

genitive

absolute?

passive?

One would expect the

for cicpa,l.pe'toiKu

parallels

in

the

Nor is the use of ~vLa.

in such a use.

But

the

general

sense is not affected in

argument

is

power

This,

.!..2-24

(II),

is

rather

')toic;

see

there

is

power,

ad.

concerned

may

than(l),

notes
a

being

provide

of

l04Ra

Un

how we

limitations

further

15-21

lac.).

problem over

with

(the

either

can

support

of

for

'Philonian'
(I)

know what

or

(II),

that of which
interpretation

rather than the

it was argued,

a man's capacity is

ot the potential and actual.

Aristotle gives examples

one by analogy (36-37;

in Aristotle

\:H:B:C).
l.:_)_~~~

is

read

-r.q;

in 37,

der

r-eference

must

to

be

a proportional relation, A:B:C:D (or

always

l -

but it might be from the genuine Alexan-

6~.a~E'tpq.J; this

supplies

the

is

In 13 [Alexander

seems

right

ypa.~l-'li

line,

(the

feminine

t:hou~h

),

,~hat

'le

;r(!,

Megarian

actually

is

can

position

have

dnd

can

9 3

happening.

t,eneral

thus

of

know

csLapes

579.

by

limiting capacity

of

~;.Jhat

the

relevant

We;

l~t ~o ,~~;o~U

C_IA.G

from

text

diffC>ring

from

( lAlexr~.nder}

rJurs.

i!'

~letaph.

6).

conditions

or not particular men have particular

apacities ~n particular circumstances.

that

the

th~t

!Jetween matter

to

But Aristotle would no doubt reply that

understandin~S
~o.'hether

this

shows

ilayduck,

editor of Alexander, was Hrong to print 6~rxue-.:p~ as it it ;ere an actual

quotation

One case of the potential-actual disti11ction is

the

comparing l048b

but not all l,~~;a.y(JJ"'('fl

a matter of analogy - not that from species to genus. for example.

'Analogy'

case.

~1y

1048a 30-1048b 3
The

7, with Jaeger), which is a type of l1ta.ywy-ti (35-36);

So delete 'v1.n, and take "t'Wv - 1tp00"6v-

to parallel in Aristotle.

twv as
J.

Is &.<pa.LpEi''tnl. middle or

20-ll

,Jassive

and

the

torm-matter compound

distinction

is

in 23, of

there is
leaving

here

only

only

(a 32-.33,

'prime

matter'.

The

',!hat

is it,

then,

that

i1ll

but

P~rhaps,

is

c.

hat

in

lS

is

each

but

t:he

point

no

lS

to

the

th examples have

the

as

j\lggestion,

of the substrate,

1'\.Va.

\S\11v

in

potential

way

the

it

cnn1rl

cc,me

(in

way),

i'l

in

be

l048b

fhe '.mod

potent idlly a half.

the '-"Or:ld potentially,

~jay

that the actual

thou~h

potentially,

one

might

:;ay

So perhaps the cu:nrnon feature is that

A

is

f)

;nust

he

B (cf. Ci.v Ouva.'tO<;

that whole has a half

has knowledge (in a wav).

~-r:!.

l3ut one can hardly

knower

which

tu

in cu1nmont

not

is

Lhat the Hermes ts

the Hho1e?

case

H~-rmes

reference

the whole line

the actual knowledge was.

'V)W,

~an

then,

the halfllne

knower

Lhere

with this.

is r;otentially a Hermes,

dnd

It '"'as noted that

det~rminations

the removal of a_"!:._l_

at anv rate.
9, too, fits

one;

relative

b2-3).

.:.

l(J48h 12--13.

-lUaiified:

ry,
in

a
it

isn't

rhar_

..mod

(in a way),

that

34).

.l~b

'tlTES ON THETA

l048a 30

were

Worries

expressed

about

really

exampl~

the

of knowledge (a 34-35);

loeavin~~;

appropriate,

"tCO<; "'t'oiJ'to to <:uver

the other alternative,

the rest.

is Aristotle right to suggest that a man who knows something, but isn't
considering

at

was

present,

remarked

knows

that

it

with

a different way from one who

is

'know'

we

don't

use

the

l048b 9-17

'I

like

am knowing',

while with

for example, we can say

'hate'

w~s hating her from ten till ten-thirty'

Thatcher, and I

hate Mrs.

if that is when I saw her on the television so that my hate was fully
actualised.
l1tCO'"'fa.aea.~

r.ot

Would
by

understand

True,

but

Aristotle's point be more acceptable if we render

'understand'?
a

One

particular

may

understand

something,

of

one

exposition

a man is asleep and we expound

if

we wouldn't say
that

is

it

if

is

Pythagoras'

but

yet

distracted.

theorem to him,

'he understands it, but he isn't understanding it now';

because,

when

he

is

so

obviously

not

listening,

to

say

an

anacolouthon,

l048b

Jaeger

4-9

guished,

as

argues

one member

require 6 ~wpHllJ.lliTl),
refer

from

to

the

1.,rhat
0

of

this.

rather

is

wanted

than

l048a

an

here;

actualization

<+!>

d.qxup~CJ}..1lvn and

restriction

explanation

and
are

33, and B 5 l002a 24).

(ii).
cases

it
of

of

to

in'

tity

mean

distin-

takes the term

But,

<-/)>

(i),

particular

type

ding on Cl.AM.oc;

in

(cf.

the

knower

in a

Jistinguished

in

division 1

the

but

the actual, in general,

here is a reference to actua-

So c:Lpwp~outvT} without<+!>

general.

marked

must
off

mean,
in

not

the

indeed

division'.

the

nominative ed:tEpov J..16pLOV ; .even

the alternative interpretation the

nominative seems much more natu-

interpretation

required

What would the sense of the dative

ral.

oe:

'~ one

part

1
,

'in the

Jther'?)

rather

,_aken

in

construction

sense

is

in

one

hand,

cases

any case
like

clear;

those

by l)~~!...!!.Lbeen.

this

way

it

can be

If

the

switching

Lhere

ll-12,

in

first

restricted

supplement

avoids

is

contrast

and,
v.;rhich

of

the

infinite

and

void

the

ra\ha. in 12 = ~pWv,0a.OCl;wv,

between,

on the

vhere what is said to be poten-

those

to

on the other, cases like

this

does

not

apply.

etc.

the

in

but tc:rt't. ;
second

13-l4

in

first

that

sense

for

cL1use,

the

former

i.n

13-14,
nther

It

is,

in

is

the

operative

as well

as

the

to

alternative, lv 't'06't~,
those

cases

Nhere

'in

is

.:~J so

would
~hat

and

t.wrds,

one

second

the
is

have

be

to

not

an

tirst

(d

the

case

nf

~vhat

is

the

in

rme;

understood
of d.11:AWc;

example

,wa1lable,

but

two

clauses

is seen the
in

the case

the

lnfinite

of the infinite and the void this is not .'>o.

What is

the

force

of

exists

potentially yv1.&oe:1.?

always

be

possible;

not

divisions,

for
11p

better
to

then

the
is

there

reasons
point

we

we

know

but rather

(at

heyond

the point

perfect

least

in

in

14-15

that

knc'w

that

further division will

that

'there is a possibility of

that we know that

always a possibility Jf more'

than

that

have

'~e

have

now reached

theory)

reduce

always
rhe

i.n

the corresponding claim about

always

.Je

is

statement

That

that

..my number of divisions',

of

the

found

the

it

amount

and presumably
so

tn

practice

process.

What

Perhaps that

we can

dividing

the \'uid?

'for any number

-

of

air

in

container

to c~hich He have ii.lready reduced it, but never produce

void.

It

t.Jas

remarked

tha.t

A,ristotle

rejects

the

void,

in P..bYJ:_~~ IV, on physical grounds, whereas the point c1hnut the infinite

types

of

reasons

in

the

way ~.;e

but, does Aristotle distinguish these

do,

and

is

the

infinite

of ~atter not a physical AS well 38 a C11nceptual pol11tl

is

'U

l26

from 'tb d:u ~poll \~y,:;-ra.~

tially is at some time unqualifiedly so,

livisibility is a mathematic une;

Trt h 7 Hermes ts not said to be in actuality by being in the wood,

but

the

involves

the following datives could he explained by attraction.

The

of

in general which

is indeed the case that not all

separation

but ..,hat we want

the potential),

Jaeger Is

on

one

actuality

tion to stretch the language so as to say that

1

cannot

production of the actuality by its being separated off

(cf.

'tL 6~

e.g.

former

If ~o~~or~ with no addition were tolerable as a dative depen-

8a.t. 7tO'tE

with ~cProo (that would rather

the division'

and hence reads

in

though it was pointed out that there might always be the tempta-

34-5;

is

Jaeger a whole clause,

In 13 understand, with 6p~evov 1 not lv6~xe--ra.~ xa.t d1tAW<; d.A:r,8e:6e:o--

that d.l.fiWpLO'}.llvTJ

that &q>wp~O'}.ltVll is

'3uggests

cases

the

potential

actuality,
is

ll,

in

Jaeger's

he isn 1 t understanding is superfluous.

to

11

Ross supplies

continuous
rhe

tenses

'I

it

It

is?

divisibility

'

on~

With 14-15

may

compare

contrast between what is separable

tite

In 15-17 'tO 6 xwpC~a6a.~oo9 is

SpYtp and what is separable only A.6Y<tJ

to be

rJEULv;

rut

::;econd ~ect, p.Jrallel to -tO i.J.TJ {llto"-.E:CJte::Lv 'ti"jv Ot.aC-

taken as a

the

structure

in way

in

B,

is

chiastic,

in

14-15

15-17 (the .,explanation)

'potential

not

in way A

'warranted (Hope's transla-

tion) as potential by B, not by A'.

are
totle,

18-35

These

lines

than

reason

the

to

for

this

between

himself

recensions

second

supposing

relation

Aristotle

the

going

of

later

the

and

But,

purely mechanical

(due

chapter

addition,

theory

their

the

that

and we

EJ;

in

the

if

himself,

loss

of

we

to

us

as

weren't

happy about

addition

later

there

were really two

would

expect

signs

a page,

for example) it is odd

that it corresponds so exactly with a section of the argument.

one must

the

winning

of'

is

the

J ae~er

end',

though one

reads -cb (O""X.va.C vE . v

it

would

be

in

29 Ca"';(vCl.()Ca.

in force.

implied

example

cTlCludeS
.:nl~h

'l

.1rt~

rotle.
vtth
~c

J.

compared
of

There

21

as

end

xlvT)c:n.c;.

Jv
is

things

concerned
than 1te:pt.

because

otherwise

of lcrxva.Cve.v,

[IJ""'X.va.!vE!.v

tOWards

(with a

E'rr'tL ~tpa.; in
a

shift

is

transitive

qualification

qualification).

18, a.i,..ra. in

in the

20

being

of "Jtpa.;u;, which

use

This

u3e

of

but
the

see
same

below)
term

and

both

in
for

and for one of its species, however, 1s characteristic of Aris~ore

~~:Epnc

::nd.

in

action

the

the

though
Stoic

another,

being desired
I.

21-?.2?

ft

was

noted.

7.

bo~

for

that one end may

itself

not

realise

<>ake

between the skopos

it?

-the gcJal

'for

this

at

value

the

sake

here.

We

(aim or goal)

action, and the telos which is the action itself (Long,

Phronesis 12 ( 196 7) 78 f.).

Does Aristotle
remarks

on the

11)?

have

the

squaring

of

notion of

mathematical

circle

the

in Physics

I.

limit
2

(cf.

his

.9~.

and

Yes, he does, but the limit is not part of the sequence.

0f

we cdn still reach B;

infinite

repeated

A1-

B is not any point in the series

but

divisions

of

the

remaini.ng

intervening

that the idea that

space,

and similarly a circle is not any rectilinear figure, however many sides
the rectilinear figure might have.

23-35

l048b
the

Jdeger's

perfect

have

an

end

place.

not

once

supplements
compatible

it

had

in

23-24 are not needed.

with the present,

taken

place

X!.vfp-e:Lc;, unlike lvtpye:La.L,

(Ethics)
just

were

that

they can be
the

done

present

or that the present

is

~mplie~

culties over the fact

quickly or
<;;ompatible

a change,

too

it

can

could

not

be

done

slowly.

Is

with

the

lvtp-

26:

st i 11

be

Aristotle's

perfect

time),
.Ja lk.

with

hut we can't

32-J/.j.:
Penner,

...;e

r,lther

and
point

for tvtpyELa.L,

The former would avoid diffi-

the perfect?

that one cdn assert xe::xCvrrtoL at the first moment

(~ysics

doesn't

taking

incompletely;

VI. 6 ); but

'has moved'

(simply) is different

'has built a house'.

'is

fr\lm A trJ B'

lf

the actuality would

and for the

Is this, rather than a worry

1r.:pli.!;u; the reason for the qualifi-

though,

the

if one plays chess

In other words,

distinction

from 'has walked from A to B' or

to

most valuable;

playing.

is

in Nicomachean Ethics

for

here would not allow it

Aristotle does

of

contrast the argument

rather than to that

but that does not mean that one must

difficulty was felt over the claim in 18-19 that no action

itself an end;

Does

whereas

ends in 18, but iS limited tO those

. bout t ~e shift in the application to

--uon

the

win,

than

later

virtuous

in Aris-

Ethics X.

the sense of what is most valuable about

always

to

more

the

elsewhere

though we cJ.nnot reach B by completing an infinite number of intervening

[<TX.vCl.()(a.; but that seemed to us too obvious.

-rWv ~tpti.!;e:wv

directed

in

~nds

subordinate

1Jrther

==

these.

actions

(without
~enus

21

of

i1

deletes f) lo-xvCl.()Ca.

and

<J"Xya.crCa.is

described

is

Bywater reads

-r:a.U'ta. in
-1n

that

among

have expected 7tp0c; rather

might

the

in

not

play

ambiguous,

~ivisions,

'are
with

done,

an action is

all

of

if the omission in EJ were

on the other hand,

to

seemed weak

18-35 were

umission

back to Aristotle

elsewhere.

by Jaeger as a later addition

bracketed

half

is

found

in racomachean

')E:I,L,lp(a.

For - although Aristotle's argument

Jaeger's Qrgument that 35-36 refer to the first,

by Aristotle himself.
rather

are

it

of

the sense of 1LX.oc;. or is there a distinction, 1(tpa.<;

the ~ of

to

which

; li.:OHh

Lhan x~ vi)O"E Lt; is

valuaole
treatment

18 have

referring
of

more

in the

,-,:lpa.c; in

of

1048b

as

~.R

t'

',:4Sb g

rule out

'has '...Jalked

infer this,
preferred
t:han

as

from A to

B'

(at

walking

some other

and he certainly hasn't completed this

to

take l'ttpov

subjects;

1L9

Clnother

and

't,_, a.U't6 as

possibilitY,

objects,
'are

not/

!A

'10 l'ES ON THETA

l048b 23

that nothing can be unless it will be!,

are

the

same

thing'

would

are the same thing'

object

in

easier

is weak. for

is not reciprocal, for

as

be

32-33

with

infinitives

'one implies the other'

'has seen' doesn't imply

answers

in

the

objection

33-34,

(the relation
~"t'Epov

'is seeing').

that

you

and

can't

be walking

(from B to C) and have walked (lrom A to B).

Second

thoughts

is

attached

of

having

is

not

suggested,

the wrong

a SUva.IJ.I.c; to

'When does

''..Jhen

is

to

is

be

F but

something

something

however.

question.

a distinction between

of

have

potentially

these

that

The

the

talk in

capactty

F.

The

is

it

not

quest ion

to he(come) a man?',

potential

questions,

exposition

chapter

being 6uv<i1-1e:L

man/a

above

this

man?'.

lf

but

there

t:ould presumably be true

0f earth that it has the capacity to be(come) a man (Ar is not denying
CHAPTER VII

that

the

earth has the capacity it has),

r!vBpw~o<;.

1048b 37-49a 18

It was thought that

7 Is discussion of when one thing

is potentially another might shed light on the issue we debated earlier

(see on
the

1048a

as

15-21)

actualization of

to whether

not the circumstances on which

or

capacity depends

belong

inside

or

outside

issue of how much goes into the specification of a 66va.!-LI.t;

that

the

Thus, is a piece of wood at the bottom

of the sea (a) visible (because 'visible' means 'can be seen if circum-

stances
be

seen'

If

this

obtain')

if

so

the

earth nor

'can be(come)

18 as

not

visible

87's answer

question,

circumstances

(come)

'b)

(because

'visible'

means

'can

and at the bottom of the sea circumstances C do not obtain)?

is

quantity of
1 _ 3 ),

or

man',

seed
a

man'

obtain'

'in

with

but

seems

to be

(b).

Neither

must mean not

(b)

present

'can

(a)

'can be(come)

in present

circumstances'

a man

circumstances be-

elucidated

in 49a

5-

nal in the case of artistic production, internal in the case of natural

cause

(the

Given these circumstances, nothing prevents the efficient

artist's

wish,

if

he

has

it,

initiating the process of actualization,

the

seed's

inherent

nature)

in the way it would be preven-

ted if some further change was required before that process could start,
as e.g.

earth must be changed to bronze before it

is ready to be(come)

a statue.
Note
bronze
even

being made
in

wish

interferes
to

it

to

exclude by

could be true in this way that nothing prevents the

into a

fact

it

or

it

statue

won't

because

prevent

it.

it

that the artist wishes.

set

up

events.

will

be

pr.Qvided

to

proceed

that

things

go

Even if we

common

sense

Ar assumes that we can say that things

to a

certain

outcome

cannot spell out

way

what

sorts

of

Ln

normal

the

course

of

the proviso in detail, we know

thing would

as an abnormal interference with the normal ~,urse

18-b 2

l049a

one

(in

11f

count

legitimately

events.

lhis

chapter

if

the

artist wishes (all is ready).

be

- won't be either because the artist

some

outside agency (earthquake, sabotage)

The

!at ter

'nothing prevents i t ' ,

ilO

is

not

what

Aristotle means

is a lexical device for picking out the tE; o~

lxe:Cv1.vov

sense

of

that

term:

(cp.Z l033a

ff,)

identifies

subject \ve describe as lxe:Cv1.vov.

y.
of

then

for

that

there

is

x which is the matter of y.

matter

(49a

24-7):

earth-wood-box,

down.

is

not

all.

first

last

what

is potentially the

in

the

in

not

the

Nor

do

the

conditions

The

an

same

is

reducible

ascending
(purely

traditional
given

to anything else,

series

'traditional'

such

illustrative)

prime matter
require

it does not

that

nr
y

fr;J1,Jw

the terminus of one <;eries nef.:d

only

for any value

no x which is potentially y,

i.e.

no

In that precise sense y is prime or first

This

is reducible to y;
nf

as

Thus y is x-en if x is potentially

It follows that if there is a y which is not x-en,

x,

stuff.
that

though

doesn't

also
are

in

is 6uvd.tJ,e:1.

something

from here as normal and (in the case of artistic production) provided

is such that it can be(come) a man (49a

the obtaining of all the required bar the efficient cause (exter-

production).

if

The thesis

thing is Suv~e:" F only if it T..Ji!l he F, but rather

is still not that a

r)n

specification of the capacity.

false that it is 6uv~EI.

tmt

In which case the chapter offers no guidance on the general

as

fire-air-

series

tntally

going

neutral

he unique:

if y

that everything

not he the terminus

use of iS\T] in ,\r is tvhen he <;peaks

of Plato's xWpa. as \)\.,.

Accordingly,

to say that prime matter, e.g. fire,

or else he lapses into the thesis

131

is not 't66e: -n is

~!,_rTES

J:i

l'HETA

CHAPTER VII I
not

to

that

it

the
at

say

that

is

not

talk at

it
a

is

stuff without qualities

the first

is

but
Note by G.E.L. Owen

Is this compatible with

reidentifiable something.

longer have ~6be ~L?

Priority in 9 8

i.Je pre-

1049b 4:

49a 27-36 is a quite general contrast

alternative.

which are 't66e: n

between subjects
4 offers

attributes,

24 of 'toOt 'f0 >;6Aov or does Ar mean that it is only

49a

the terminus of a series that you no

ferred

or

and subject

as

What 23-

matter.

this wood is to this box as wood ~xhW~ to

proportion:

We took ~~XW~ here to mean:

such

refs.

are

generally

is not in Bz. Ind. 626b 30-31).

Qualified priorities

taken

as

pointing

1018b 29-31),

(cf.

1018b 9-29,

is stressed, b 15-19),

(c) in change (nearer to

stood

of e.g. ~

242b 72, cf. Met.

that

place of

is ~UA1.vov

a box

x-en'

'wood';

this

mover

of

(which

Now, this box is not 't6Se:.

is

reidientifiable

as

this

were "t60e:. tL,

it

would

because it was
is 't60e

~L

because

it

is

this;

again.
have

rather,

~L,

because

Correspondingly,
to

be so because

reidentifiable
it

is a box it

then,

it was wood,

because it is wood - that is the point of 49a 27-36.

is

not -t60e:

it

it

the wood of

other words,

It

"tl.

this

this
not

can only

be called this wood

Therebecause

II

by logos,

of

but

(a) in place

'prime mover' in sense

1050 b 4-6, not the proximate

(d)

in dunamis

not

generalised to cover

is

(more

powerful),
the

(e)

in

preceding

1018b 30-1019a 2,

for knowledge, viz.

(a)

universals over particulars or a sumbebekos over

Z 1030b 12-13), (a.2) for perception;

such prior things

(pathe,

corrected

to

(b) as proper-

intrinsic

properties,

1019a 1).
III

(not

expressly connected with the

1019a

11-14):

without

box'.

be

e.g.

the composite (cf.

ties

'this wood' is derivative from that of 'this

its own right.

1049b 26),

could

Unqualified priorities,

(a.l)

but

in

ours

cases as III is in 1019a 11-12).

tion,

which is ~60E "t'-

242a 53,

243a 32,

In

box,

the notion of

if

But it is certainly not the case that it

this wood.

fore,
is

information

order

the

wood

the

a statement of the form

given that

as

box,

from

'y is

laid down for the latter.

same

directly

'x is potentially y' and the conditions already

(22L

is equivalent to

results

(but

(nearer), (b) in time (earlier, where the contrast with spatial priority

without the sort of qualifica-

tion (concerning intermediate changes) that ~auld be required is 'earth'

in

to 6

6 11 distinguishes

apparently

B but

given

focal

qualified-unqualified distinc-

application

Priority by nature and ousia,

not

B without

A.

to

as well

viz.

as II

in

where A can exist

(Ross,Jaeger, Reale take 1019a 4-11

as parenthesis.)
In
fire
,-:;orr.

connection

is described

as

with

the most

tnis

it

form-like

was
of

remarked

the

Z 1 l028a 31-b2 distinguishes priority in logos,

that elsewhere

elements

(De

Ge~

2. 8 335a 19; Meteor. 4. 1 379a 16, the other elements are matter

but

apparently

it

third

(I

(b)

dnnounces

the

completion

beginning of the chapter.

of

the

topic

introduced at

the

knowledge,

above)

with

time;

III;

and

although it prima facie distinguishes II (a) from II (a.1), it is effect

and not taken up in

2-.3

the

conflates them by connecting II (a) with ti esti.

fur fire).

liJ49b

identifies

argues that energeia is prior to dunamis

In

logos

Not a neat r~sume',

e.

(1049b

10-17)

recognizing connection in II
ignorning (II) (a.2) and (b).

and
(a)

hence

for

-(a .1)

as

knowledge
formally

(1049b

17),

1 did not,

thus
and

Examples are the logoi of oikodomikon,

horatikon, horaton, though at ~ III 1 20la 9-b 15 oikodomein-oikodomesis

is

a kinesis

requiring definition by dunamis

(as even horan is

in such causal explanations as De Sensu 438b 2-5); no doubt Ar is thinking

l 32

here

of

building as

an achievement,

133

not

the

process whose

com-

llQTES nN THETA

'd7a :SO~b 16 by R. i!elnJrn.1n

Analysis of De Anima II.

pletion

cancels

the

oikodometo'!_

C.~Y!

20lb

Contrast

ll-12).

on B

(ii)-(iii) below.

After

In time (1049b 17-IOSOa J), sophisticating on I (b) by distinguishing

hetween numerical and specific identity in the temporal items:
actual

(i)
but

this

by

indtvidual
(other,

is

but

preceded

by

specifically

(same)

same)

potential

actual

level

~ (

'hence'

individual

417a 30

which

31

First,

32

and must be an independent

Secondly is building an achievement here (implying

application of B.

between

second

the

level

first

level

actuality

of

potentiality.
knowledge,

first

Aristotle

Both of the first are potentially knowing

but

the

one

<becomes

actually

knowing) by

(a]

being changed

through learning and often

'x can build' entails 'x has built'.

l049b 29)

has nothing to do with B (i) or A,

and

says:
individual

is the proximate agent of change (ctr. I (b) on proton);

(ii)

distinguishing

actuality

changing from a contrary state [Ot.c\ ua&ftm;wc; d.~~ot.w8e:L<; xcrt

.~to':\Mxu;; l~ ~vav't(at:;; p.E't~o~Wv it~e:w~] but the other
< becomes
actually knowirig) [b] from possession of sensation

that when building his first house the builder does not have the abi-

or grammatical knowledge, .~tt tve:pye:tv &e:t<: 'tO ~ve:pye:tv 0\~ov

'tp6nov

lity) or an ongoing activity any part of which is building (as kithari-

Being affected (-rb "Jtd.cry_et.v) is

~!!!.

nne is the destruction

the preservation of the

and

the

proximity of

B (iii) would suggest)?

i-J.l7b

Neither exactly

suits ~ III 1;

been

completed,

building

is

an

e.g.

if

analogue,

is learning x
this

takes

has

learnt

(something):

the second option under

if

by

having

form

which

through

coming

later

in

time

is

So it is not right to say that what thinks is altered

thinks

prior

(1. b)

viz.

the

form,

l050a 7) the

even

when

the

~E..1)~

end

~~esis

of

is

10

(I]

11

~povonv is not correctly called teaching but something else.

12

But {II] that whlch from potentiality is learning and taking

knowledge (TO 6 'lx Oui.IOIJ.e: L Ov'toc; IJ.ai.l8d.vov xa.t f..<J+lad.vov l"Jtc.O'T'ft
f.LTW)

(eti) matter is potentially the form to which it tens (conjunc-

tion or generalization of (i.a) and (i.b)?).

(ii)

this
for

'more strictly (lOSOb 6), in

either

being or

possibility.
opposites,

ctr.

not-being,
(On
e.g.

that

and what

5,

see

the

'../'hat

ts

possible

is capable

is ecernal must exist without

the extension of

all dunameis

to a

capacity

half-defence at

1050b 33-34:

does an irrational power include the power to be absent?).

By applica-

l~ading

into actuality from potentiality xaTa 'tO voaUv xat

13

by the agency of the actual and the capable of teaching

14

either should not be called affected (;td.cJxe:~v). as was said,

or there should be said to be two kinds of alter-

15

ation [A] ~qv << l~\ ~~~ JTEp~<Lx~' &<a8lrr<L~ f.LE<apo)..~v

\6

xal[B] TT]v h:\ <~~ e~;E' xa\

thv 'p(xnv.

tion of III there cannot be potentiality/ contingency without actuality,

hut this need not entail Plenitude; merely that there cannot be contin,;;ent beings without non-contingent heings.

lJ4

it

realized some kinesis/ergon or

Nothing yet which specifically takes up A III; but now

of

when

is its end or purpose,

some product (cf. (i.e));

(i.e)

[l] the

just as
(it is not right to say that) the house builder< is
,1ltered >when he house builds.
Now

to the potential (no more than a conjunction of A and B (i)?),

( ~!!i hoti,

but

the other rather

and into actuality), or it is another kind of alteration (<iA.Ao L Wcr.:w~).

'less strictly' (cf. 1050b 6):

(La)

either,
[2]

the l?tt.<r't'fJ!-J.TJ becomes 8e:wpoUv, which either is not 0\A.ot.o'ikrea.c.

(for the advance is into itself

B (ii),

In ousia (l050a 4-b 34)

(i)

simple

potentiality is related to actuality; for what has

conflicting with~~ 201b 11-13.

C

not

the contrary,

potential by the actual and the like, in the way

further (alla) if a process is going on some process must have

(iii)

by

: l)

Dlscussion

began

rreatment
4l7a

of

30-b 16.

Owen's

Hein~Hnan

with

transitions

nntes

from

introducing
potential

(His r~nalysi.s nf

on

8 which

t-~~

had

He

his

!-'assa~e

hefort:!

,Janer

actual

to

analysing

in

the

Anima

De

L:; attached.

I.

as are also

realises his nature most fully when he has understanding.

with

'preservation'

(2)

important word in (l).

tible

US,)

in

with

as

(a)

shows that

it is

The cant rast

'destruction'

that is the

The point is not so much that ( 1) is incompa-

it

stands;

rather

( 1)

warns

against

particular

misinterpretation of (a).
After

much discussion

following
as

that

the

views.
between

fam1liar

first
The

The
(a)

and

contrast

actuality

contrast

(a)

!..~e

the

That

from

(1)

and

(2)

and

(l)

(mtrast

~:.ransition

first

passage we

Anima

between

(b).

between

and

betwen

of

contrast

(2)

hetween

frvm

first

then makes

the

l1f

sensation

we

and (b) is

{a)

have

to

understand

point,

to

which

that in the context

'being

affected'

not

in the sense of being destroyed by the contrary (1) but rather ln terms

-1f

preset"vation

That

(2)

rtoes

(2);

both

t"elate

to

l:.ty

that

(B),

at

used

is

14-16,

to

ctre

as

(b)

of the force of <i~~oCux:r~<;;

in

acquisition of
'1llb
IH 1e

2-1

the

knowledge
contrast

',.J!_l_y
itself

in

affected'

riifficulty.

is

is

( L)

not
is

between

~trict

central

lt

roint

destroye~

an

a.pt

is

at S-7,

and

that

as

for

t,:.:1tT'JCt1.ve
Out

in

the

ts

as

is the

Or is Aristotle claiming that the general potential for lear-

ning is enhanced by each particular act of learning?

learning a

for

it

but

Is it preserved by being actua-

particular

actualisation;
no

longer

it

seems

on

have

the

the

rather

piece

of

contrary,

potential

odd to

once

for

refer

knowledge

to

have

learning
the

is

For the potential

not

preserved by its

learned

it.

this

On

the

actualisation of

theorem
other

hand,

(particular)

potential as destroying it.

not

between l((VTl<H~

contrast

The
is

directly

3.

43la

5-7 i

the

5-7.

Housebuilding

fact

and ~vtpye\a.

that

it

is

not

in

relevant to the present passage,

1048b

18

ff.

in spite of De Anima

and contemplating
an alteration of

are
the

linked

in

house builder

417b
(9)

simultaneously be happening and have happened.

VII.

247b 14.

two

of

H<ly<;

the

the

to

become 6e:wpo;sv

It is true that at

it

becomes,

remarks

'being

about

affected',

while at

but

:ither;

{a)

of

(a)?

frum

:-t

this

only

a real

not

The

:-.hat

ul

the

~r~en

...:han~e

trom

all,

in

state;

(a)

and at

tv -n:oA."\6.XLt;.
noth~ng

colour

Ls

from water

'.nne

t_,l

tf)

vinegar

an even more positi'Je chans.!;e

precisely,

6)

does

knowing

There is,
in

De

this

the

(H

i.s

case

ls not

wine

5 1044b

than that,

For what has knowledge

involve
the

an

fact

alteration,
that

it

because

contemplates

passage

and

where
to

thing's

shown

that

a parallel between Aristotle's concern

own

in

the

beginning

'alteration'

nature

is

'potentiality'

fulfilled,

also

covers

of

9 8,

in

that

here

in a sense also covers cases

and
what

there

he

changes

is

concerned

itself

( 1049b

5-10).

But

actual

in

not

through

it was suggested,

Anima

he is concerned to show that

Arter

learning

(417b

(Hicks).

14 it is not

is

cuntrary

qualified

ls

case

exampole,

same way

learning

en.::

is destroyed in (1),

'into

c.h2nge

that

ln

that

c.nange to ~omethi~~ (cf.

descriptio:1

true

is

lised?

potential

does not mean that the building of a house is not a xCvT)CTLf.: which cannot

3ense

1iescribed as

,f a change from green to red.

29-35);

fact

learning Ls ,i_escri.bed as the rl0str~tction of ignorance

465a 22

knowledge.

b~ing

the

the

the

is preserved in (2).

sense

in

Compare Aristotle's
~~

at

by

(II) picks up (a), and (I) presumably (b).

le.Jrning

P~~--~~!_.

t:he

16).

shown

not
that

strict

not

of .;hich is alteration in the strict ~;~nR~.

'being

~;y

also

is

that hnth (2),

a1terat~on

as

l t self'

3.nd

note

(2);

t~ecause

6,

(a)

from first actuality to second actua-

lllustrate

descrLbed

to

is

potential

falt under (2) rather than (1).

as

well

tr~nsition

5-7 it is the

that at

and

(a)

(b)

It

the

the same

potentiality

further

the central concern of the rest of the passage,

thought

not

.1c.tuality to second actuality (b).

ts

and

arrived at
is

since

l049b

txEt

4-12

presupposed.
tiality
X?

The initial reference is to 6

11

(cf. Owen's notes).

The

clause in 4 serves to indicate that a previous discussion is being

for

1049b

examples

of

Is there a problem over the contrast between (i) patenchanging

4-12
(ii)

in

or

being

changed and (ii) potentiality for being

isolation suggests we

appear

at

l049b

19 ff.

l37

are dealing

with

(i),

but

On the other hand, ylvEcn.'

L\nc'R H

l049b 17-lOSOa 3

The priority of

Again,

potential

is a type of xCv'T)Cf"l.t;; and is there any difference between the capacity

of

a house doesn't have the capacity r:o become

do~!':~

is true that

It

becoming a man a'1d thP.: capacity of being a man?

than

is

it

the

potentiality

The priority of the actual to the potential in ~!~f~nitio~.

7tp<i.l'tc.u<;; &uv11:t6v
Ross);

10491)

of

here replaced by -rb C uva:t6v.

is

The

13-14?

in

p(Jwer

cause

to

the power to change something else

other types of potentiality in b 16;

't6v

for

example

visible

things

(1(J49b 6-7),

:\,,jyoc; Q!_

the A6yot; 0f

'seeing',

reference

to

ion

nr

'seeing',

tov l\Oyov

cf.

1 l04Sb 35;

contrasted with

invisible

( 1 5),

qua dogs

not

or

tn b

:an

not

the-y

actual

of

the

be

the

rity,
'Nith
13)

latter,

i.s

actual
point

l:e

of

r.eed

linked

in

there

seeing

and

to

the

~n

be

the

former

rather

but this does not seem to be the case for the individual.

distinct

1049b

arguments,

29-lOSOa

subdivided

at

(cf.

least,

lOSOa

(see below);

are

2-3),

advanced,

though

the

at

18-29

l049b

latter may

in

and

turn

be

only the first argument, at 1049b 18-29, really

fits I049b 11-12.

18-29

I049b

illustrate d.pL8fl(j> 0'0~

19-23

apparently

acq,J::._ring

potential

in

Knowled~e

17 ff.
tiMe.

that

If 1tpo"MpxE~v

here.)

dc:es not

,~xpress

(13-16),

the

therefore

structure
p

of

(16-17),

the

the

actual
the

is

a sub(cf.

that

the knowledge
which would

re.mporal

prio-

is

an ARA structure,

in

19;

things

the

same

the individual;
certainly;

and

contr~st

to which does 12-17 'loply?

to

tndividuals,

indivi!]11-'lls as such at all.

llB

in

90

far

bet~een

To ..;pecific

1s

the

embryo;

the

first

seeing;

but

also

activity should not

actuality

6 6pWv
the

is

eye

itself when

need

for a cause the same in species is stated twice,

Does

it rule out the evolution of species?

:writes;
that
it

so

from 'the

that

'every ancestor

is

another

of

this

peculiarity of
substance

to o~crCa

in

28

of

any

goat

goat

substance

existing

here.

seeing

the
The

at 24-7 and 27-

Not if

'goat', e.g.,

problem will essentially be that of

the

parent

present

be distinguished too sharply.

9.

1s a vague term,

already

in 20 is the second actua-

is

was

that

goat'

it

goat'.

it

in actuality

Whiteness,

has

to

need

the

not follow

In Z 9 l034b 16-19
be

brought

cf.

beforehand;

on the other hand,

about

by

the reference

can be produced

without the pre-existence of something else white as its cause.

Health

in Z 7 1032b 23 ff. can be produced spontaneously because of heat which

is, or produces, a part of it.

Health is not a substance; what about

the spontaneous generation of grubs?

Z 7 unfortunately doesn't say.

(12-

thrmgh

fs tJbscured by .Jaeger's and ~'lSs's pareucheses.

The next section. trom b 1/, draws a

of

and

visibility

section

eye

lity,

course argues

of

not

the

thing

conflated

of

is

at birth (and for some time before).

former;

any temporal priority between ac-

is prior to the J<nowledge of the potential,

addition of yvWcn.t;;

because

ties,

Two

'defini-

16-17 is not a new point but the repetjtion nf what has preceded,
the

t-1-)i.s

1nd

includes

The

in 17 indicate temporal

6 tl

they are

( lf)!.9b

9imultaneous?

prior

'visible'

'seeing'?

~poU~dpx~V

And does

"'tnd

But

knowledge

A.6yor; of

term

logical dependence ot one thing on another in fact;

the

notes).

quiring

the

the

0f

cl"'..ss

the

the

in which we come to Know things may not he the

here X.6yo<; and yviilO"'-<: are

Owen's

that

Jhould t...Oyo<; then be translated by

16.

The order

same as that of

just

'visible', for exa1aple, presupposes

includes

or more loosely?

priority?

hut

are discussed,

in species (l8) are not illustrated until 23 ff.

Is the point that

~-h-e

that

Aristotle is concerned by the fact

equivalent to -rb xup(wt; &uva-

or,

qua

is TO

What

(~

change

houses.

actual

actuality.

that the priority of actuality in substance would seem to imply priority

in time too,

The &\ivC!lJ.L c;

the actual to the potential in time.

the

hn11se; but that difference

not seem relevant here.

l049b 12-17

and

and

'!)49h 17

the specific
not~ntiali

there -1re ~.6yoc. of

i049b

29

'<~here

the

ability

actuality
but
does

1050a 1

does

not

that

first

act

the

previous

only

precede

in a way not'

the

A new argument,

is

of

(cf.
in

by

potentiality

some

sense

but

the

the

the

in

1049b 11-12).

housebuilding,

argument,

from examples. involving learning,

produced

and

so

not

We might object

in

only
~but

this
'in

general

&~.-b in

point

that

29
the

case
a

way

Aristotle

ability to housebuild must

though.)

139

activityi

time,

picks

precede
up not

actuality

is

'lOTES

pr 1.or

in

time;

we

have

now

lises the claim of 24-7,

previous

the

&o-.:et

1lleged

in

po.tnt

illustrating

does plc.k this up, the

hl"~"'"ebJtld.i:1g

of

tn

?.7--9,

29;

or

general

fur

reason

.1.cc

~arne

the

what

the

analysis

princi!Jle

follows,

of

of

in

~oiat

being

species

real

32.

236b

Clearly

not

1..11 Z

coming-to-be

priority

of

12-Xplanation

With
._,;__

~~-

though the

this,

Or ls it that 27-9 genera-

but

This however doeq rnt fit the reference to prodt!Ction

~ctr:.ethi.ng

from

new

1Ht::TA

and 29 ff.

acts

.. ~ ;umet i .al 1_y?

~.B.

JN

11-12 has been dropped.

qualification of

that

the
in

is

31

only
fore~

ff.;

of JS-6 compare

~rinciple

'anyone who

7-9.

actual

building

house

must already have compl~ted a house'; activity of housebuilding, rather

than of building
of

_f?~.

\4

.;J.ys

VI.

(complete) houses?

6 not

to

<:::~.n' t.

you

be

built sumethlng; 35 ff.

vr.

housebuilding,
builder

th~n

Or,

rather,

but

to :

(capable

of

~ar

35 ff. a}:lplles point

t.hat

:~ome

'i'}Jeoremi

without

having

gtlpports this by applying theory of Physics

6 not to building, or to being a btlilder, but explicitly to learning

the

the

l2-t4

seems

to

make

J[Z.

B (iii).

ot

.,_~

is

t~mporal

against

the

and

actuality

Suggestions:

this
is

(a)

the argument was

r)'[

the E6va~1.c; is

wrJuld

the

1lready

.),-)vt'LIJ.~c;

some

pret:..eding

1t

reduced
l049b

sense:

29-50a

2,

ti1e

~:mtcum~

IJresent r:laim,

of

which

process.

Lite

on one reading on 4'JO 29-50a J

to the effect that what

a

bit

was

present

an

of

at

the

The

corresponding

stage

elit..itB:.t

uf
l.r;

the
the

tl1E:-

mai.J. th;ust

precedr:s J.ctual possession

activity,

which ..loes requiTe

any

aberrat1..or

Even so,

not

bit of

process

of

.:Hr:histj_c

bit

of

the 66vrq.u.c

uc..;.uiLLng

ar'il;ument

even with 1049b 35-50a 2 set aside,

"icatlon

Lo

the

earlier

in

the

activity.

ngag1ng

if this

do

the

"'a1

you

have

Pytndgoras'

Uut

as

the

!:Jast~r

the

to have

on

not

items n:~der control'

having svme

in

14:

,;xercise

l1.1.s

the

master

is havlnl2;

whole

of

it.

the whole remains a neces~ary condition for Bwptv

sense.

Consequently,

the 8wp'Cv

might

to

3eem

tu

be

to

and

thi.s is the main point Ar has

of ~!'X.E:'tWv'te:<;

thes1s

the

ls

not

counter-example

the

'Jt BEo;poOO'lY Lva Bt:wprruxflv

that

:E-xux::nv but the uther way round.

This :;nggestion

,-,n t:1e

relies

thought

that

:1aving some and having the whole of a :>ubject

Ln how much is l.::n0vm but invr)lves
:'he

thought

sur~ly

ls

the

c-latr:l

t~rior

t.hat

(1CJ!+9b

prior

1)

and

not explicitly announced

ls

14 remains in a state of tension

proc:~.s.:,

in the

it

hut

l1)!~9h ?9-';0a

2Q-50a

the difference heu.;een

is not just a difference

lii [terence in the manner of knowing,

Aristnt_elian,

wirh ':he tesult lh-3.t

rellly

nf

l1:;..;.rning actuality is tempo-

t::e clalrn that

1s

temporally

that

Alex.' s

it

pos-

because prior in o6rrCa (1050a 4 ~ .trld ff.).

of

claim
':?n

that
now

in turn implies

r,e 6~ivauLc;
it
~"hat

~s

he

must

<m1; ,L6C
":~:;

\Ve

face a

r- i_r,n

viz.

be
~hat

.1;_r

,,

the

embedded

P~rhdps

228h.

the

in

nearest

But

this

comment.

the

L~cause

'.1r

lemma

the quota-

don't

they

this use lS lhe practisin~ of

tn

is

irrelevant

r_rnposal to treat

to

the

claim ..;hic.h

none

required

.,uuld

lwlp

for
if

it

neorize,

,_he'.'

do

; hat

.,;ont radicts

"p"ul,,-

lrHi,

rn~y

:Jo

't"~t

Rc.>s

\.laS

to',

need

R0ss'

,wd

being met,

(JH

st:nnd

'.lld

:r.ean

't.h;:o,r

do

and

third

!.nt.!rpn~tattuns,

secrmd
~->ince

'>O
:~atn

(reallv)

jo

11p.

the

~ase

1s

~va. AF'~')PTJ'tc.xhv

,Jf

l_hesis

l,heorl.?.e

;.~e

(1)

not

ft

to

c1ave

to

think that
theorize',

nor
be

that

one

Sxwcnv,

but

not

in

lJ-l L

\ ii)

if,

on

the

LI-'C,tuse

th0y dn
1

L'.;{)

did not

'lupposed

J ii)

not
The

that

to Diels'

Hhat?

tl1at

could,

rhe

speeches at Phdr.
1::>

sympathetic

thjs clattse ac; a r~loss, hut a ~loss

33-

uv

t.his is misleading:

t::X.e:-rtOv-ce:c; theori.ze to get knowledge?

1 ::arner

f!cquired.
th,__,.

i.s

but

because this :1'X..E-rdv is the mere mechanical practice of the expert?

the

~uali-

says

Ross

1us B't~ but not his interpr~tation,

-JS
' 0l)

not

29-50a

theretore tiE:wpe:t:v,
1

and likewise

~astery of

t ull

1s

control

(an "ffer Ar t! 18 following

'.../f!

tr}49b

The woLd does not typically

cmoarrass

intended

l049b 35-SOa 3,

he

immediately

in

Pliority argued for in B (ii) and B (iii) ts not in play here.

nf

except

geometry Hr;der
exercise

then

,Jf

.vhule

mean that at any ~tage of acquiring knowledge

WOC

May

in Ar.;

~he

that

not '3EWfH::tv

pari:. of X is a1 ready atr ainP.d?

back

rcfeL

do

l-lX'tciY'tE:'

the

~st:1blish,

tn

l>etwf~en

1050a

:lour

on

tT;.; lJtLJ'tf1U11S but

11,..,1"':;,

to build.

from

do it,

1:c~plcte
1.

gloss

icerns

t.;ould
n

nnly in a reduv'ri '.-.'ay,

tuo

rccunciling

29-

nlng to build.

building)

hut

:1,::~:::d

tr1,

it

where
a

way

other
they

'";ilme ohjection

'Jnn:s

'0 ';Oa 14

applies

if

there

are

particular

do not need to theorize,

r)f subjects such that

of

riucing

group

Exoxnv because

'They

Oewpet'v,

or

for

We

also

thought,

wet,

&:u'i\

tvithout

(sc.

at

~~' o6

enthusiasm,

all)

intro-

dunce ,ue).e'TWv,;ec;

who oU Ber..opv\Xn.v ~va 8EwprrnxTw

to

not

not

even up

theorizing,

the

sake

theorizing

of

the truth),
the

in

doing

except

the

exercises.

There

(O~L] obOEv &tov~aL

in a quaified sense of

(sc.

t'va. 6Ewp11~Lxt]v Exux:nv,

it).

For

discussion.*
even an

could

not

some
And

because

since

unintelligent
find

sense)

reasons

a spot

en -" '

'otherwise

proper

have

be

the student needing

Apelt suggested

(v)

first suggestion: ~xxn WOe,

are

about which they

that

(theorizing in the proper sense being for the sake nf theorizing

word'

are

~or O't~

are

of

r~mains (vii) Ross'

c~

(iv) if there are 3Ubjects or parts

6Uvav'ta.~ Bewpet'v

ob

0'tL.

they

CJ

10\lla 16

they can be acquired without

(sc. d7t:\Wc;).

&:x.A'T; W&e Yl

(vi)

[upi.cs

~gain

and

to practice in the activity.

6Uva.v'taL Aewpetv

ON THr.TA

in

el 6 j...rr;, i.e. if they

have

they

that

no

case

need
they

to
must

already

we

could
on

not

r,

believe

woe, or

11

that

B'tL

on anything

x'tA..

could

else,

and we

from which the words could have been displaced,

we remained in a state of dissatisfied &.1top a..

16-19

Ihe

argument is extended to cases where the potentiality

form.

'(a.e

in 17 should be explicative.

for

motion

(19;

cf.

n. eo,

15

the

l97b

treatment

32,

'may

come'

For the optative as

(Apostle).
cf.

not

O:v:

l98a

of

tuche

'what

6:

place and collecting,

(Ross,

1050a

19-21

Inside/outside:

would

'might

come'

usually

at

be

196b 22,

e.g.

purposed',

197a

going

some

strate the telos:

the inside po-

The teacher

forward:

surely outside.

if the pupils cannot be seen in action, it is unclear whether

the knowledge you are teaching them has been successfully internalized.
But

what

do

the

inside/outside

words

mean

on

comparison?

the

alternative

Perhaps this:

understanding

of

the

if you do not distinguish

6Uva.j.JLc; and l.vlpyeLq.

between inside and outside,

when giving the 't~'X.o<;

it will be unclear in which sense of l?tLO""r-fu.i.TJ t7tL<T"t"'fliJTl is

the

text

sounds

more

concerned

with

question

of

fact than a question of meaning.

35,

lOSOa 21 Epyov,
(34),

At 197b 26 the phrase is equated with TO ~epuxbc;

'work'

and

as

between

on the Ross reading el y&p ~~ oU~w yeyv~~aLis straight-

Objection:

priate

dispute

contrast

or (Ross) between the absorbed know-

ledge inside and the still unattained knowledge without?

18,

was

the

wants to show the pupils' knowledge in overt practice and thereby demon-

to a

---lA.).ou ~vexa..
There

is

'would normally except in odd cases',

~utomat~

and

nor

both of which are &uv~eL' needing

tential and the oputside activity,

of teaching,
Reale),

lOSOb 29-30)

no external agent.

But
1050a

The cases envisaged include

both 8uvU~eLc; that come from teaching (17-19) and the natural tendencies

theorize'

this interpretation was left out .in our

gloss

1050a

is a potentiality for a certain x(vry:nc; instead of for having a certain

to whether

the

Physi~

parallels

were

covering both characteristic activity and, where appro-

the

end

'job'.

which also

product.
See,

No attempt to connect the uses:

for a fuller version of

uses x.piicnc;:; (popular

in~

23~27,

in this use:

EE

cf.

1219a 13-

cf.

here

30,

24).

1arallcl, but the use of ~X9LV (implying no need of an external agent)

.1nd

of -r6 confirms

table

b11t

which

rather

turn red.
acq11ire,
,-ense

'-,--1.n

so

(might)

reading

be

painted

that

one

stronger
be

is

a
can

say
that

green.

green,

definite

than

The

the

here:

'~hich

that of the apple

There

much

the

could

that

will

or

case

the U\11 is

pntential

stron~er

n0t
any

of

e.g.

colour,

is

programmed to

..;hat

it

is

in a

one says Jf the table that it

sense

is

..;hat

the argument to show that actuality is prior obrrCa., not

*save for the credentials of

that
other

tn che Hormal course of events

form which

in which

is
or

r~d.

is

required

just A6Ytp.

for

lOSOa 28
plained
duct,

Why f'il.l\l\ov?

by

the

the house,

house

(29)?

Ross says,

and directly

c,Jmes

into

being

obv~ously

ex-

in the pro-

(only) more the 't~'X.oc; than

But then how is the housebuilding simultaneous with

perly

is

in such cases:

the lvpyELa. must be found

so that the oxo06j.Jry:TLc; is

the 66v<J.f'<~ is.

the

Rather than the activity,

following ydp:

resides
with

it

'that in which it

(the ~oer11:nc;:;) most

is that which exactly answers to it,

and

exists

simultaneously with

the house rather than the builder'.

[o~~J

143

it.

This does not

prowhich
This
face

i.J()h 15

\.<ihen ,,,e

cf.

32,

clue

b.1illiing.
31,

33,

be

the

34:

But what

..

being-bu~lt

have

may

the

house

the

we

present

~anger

10

building coincides with

house

tr,e

r.uHk'-

the

house-that-is-

The troubles of Z 7-9 are

this?

is

have

Elsewhere

participles olxoOoiJ.OUfJlVq.J 29,

alive

is

upon us, and seem to be ignored.

variant

p0ses.
the
seeing man;
in 30,

not

'eternal'

better

This

therefore

taking

of

the changes/ activities,

up

the Oawv

e.g.

the

in 34 answering to that

'in

removes

each

the

according to Alexander,

See

case'.

supposedreference

l049b
to

for the exact parallel.

26

the

Ross, Reale, Apostle,

Prime Mover, whose activity

( 23):

why,

in

clear

We

could

advance

that

of

not

find

satisfactory answer

the xvp!.w'tlpwc;

actuality

ts

prior

argument

Tfl o6o-C9-

to

of

to

ff.,

the
it

question

is

as

is

that

'tl:\.oc; is

; ssue

ff.

the

prior

the

in explanation,

viz.

emphasis of

that

X must

already

potentiality.

The

section is on ways in which form

not

exist

is

the

beings.

but

some

eternal

include

prior ~ ofx:rCq. in
if Y is

to exist

seen

that,

in a

unchangeable

ones,

Aristotelian of>pn.v6~

the

he

locomotion

Aristotelian
we

is

system the
are

el~e

the

But '.vhy?

tailored to present pur-

true

changeable

of

the

universe

unswer

to

things,

would

the

stop

fears

of

1.19 is assertion, not argument.

sun

asking '..Jhy

things.

dS

universe

One

is
the

might

needed

for

the

system must
argue:

genesis of

be

such as

suppose

there

to
was

noLhing eternal, why should anything have come into being or why should
not

tst

all

the

~very

stop?

Rut

equally,

why

shouldn't

sequence of non-eternal ones?

the

eternal

thing

be

One could ngree with Ar that

event must have a sequel and yet deny that this entails the exis-

r0nce of any 8ternal, continuously

~xisting

thing.

No doubt,

as Ross says, what makes it clear is the whole section a 4-b 2.

trouble

some

finite

) 1

2-4

be

:nthin

Lt

should in any case not be temporally prior.

lOSOb

must

3llm.;oing

not

llf

but here he ~JJr\ts to admlt some not being for dC6La;

argument

l'he

there

advantages

classification '3hnuld be

earlier physicists (22-4).

'in those actualizings of a 6Uva1-1"c;'.

105Gb 6 <iE (
but

subjects

a.nti-Eleatic

the

1s ~Bopd,

to count

Lhe

to

the
but

sense
not

at

vice-

l ()SOb
are

'if

f-l~~J.t:t'ta.l.

not 5r.p8a.p'ta.
337a

1-l),

in the properly Pldtonic sense that

(immortal
not

.'iS

by

':onstantly

an explanation

of

changing
t:heir

into

they ure and

one

heha'liour,

another

'Nhich stems

fr11m their own nature (30).

versa (SOb i9, Ross ad loc.)

lOSOb

L050h 8-l.Q

Is this out of style with Ar' s usual thesis that only ra-

tional 6nvd.~e1.c:; are 'ti'Ov lva.v'tCwv, i.e.

between
i.t

2-track and

r.ne.s

not

1.nntrartes,
;nm8thing
J.pplies

be

An argument for

that d.v'tC~I.c:;

refers

to

thinking that

contradictories,

not

and the point is simply that a possibility is by definition

that

to

:hwqever,

would

does it retract the distinction

1-track &uvd.j.let.<:?

any
30-4

can

be

(realized)

and

potentiality,

rational

both

on

insists

the

also
or

not

be

(realized),

irrational (cf. esp.

which
ll-i2).

1 track/2-track distinction

and

:;haws how to reconcile it with the claim that every &6vnf..1Lt; is "ti')t; civ'tt.prio-e::wc;:
':JJ

~~.eir

. dl }b

li

;1resence

irrational 6uv<4tet.c; produce the opposite of their proper effect

absence.

Parallels to this point at

16 with the presence or absence of

of absence of the

&Uva.u~c;

here.

144

195a 11-14, Het .

the pilot in place of

Cf. Ross ad l05la 3.

the

34-Sla

l?latonic

distinction,
which

is

applies

forms~

the

1-~rinciple

of

tlte

preceding argument

to

The Piatonists do not 1aake the actuality-potentiality

so the arguments which are s1pposed to give them something

e.g.

;. hE. txLrr'tlif..l0\.1
'han t'JVd.fJ.E!.c;,

~XLD"'tl\.twv in the

be
1

exercising

Vith

the

best

possible way do

knowledge.

result

that

~TtL<Y"'rf!!J.OV than uU'tO l7tL(J"tfl~TJ. '/iz.

there

The

forms

ou)<',ht

not
are

insist
thus

that

no more

robe something more

the corrl'!spondin~ activity.

lOJla Ll

l05la 17-19:
8, esp.
~late

see

notes

of

misplaced
lOSla 5-10:

dunamis ton enantiOn dgain.

not

zation:

enantion to

bring

effect

by

its

own

irrational

absence.

dunameis

under

the

dnd

~...ompare

is responsible for
~

At

l95a

l050a

3?

or

from

e.g.

l050b

fresh argument

2-3?

or

for

l05la 4-5?

P~.

e,g,

II

su~gests)

Ross

(as

fhe

capacity of

If the last,

generaliis

~unamis

an irrational

session,

Tn l050b 30-34 Ar uses antifrom

phasis

last

1 Q9a 33-b 7.

by G.E.L. Owen

the

good

dunamis

involved?

being

\.,!hat

'divided'

in

the absence of some

11-14 and

mathematical

1'1"!

constructions

(21-24)?

But

mathematical

I013b IInot

susceptible

of

change

698a

(DMA

25-26,

19Jb

objects

34,

Met.

are
989b

16 he uses enantia for such cases, and in the second passage (repeating
32-33,
the

example

of

the

steersman)

adds

that

the

presence

etc.),

though this is suggested by 23, 29-30,

and absence are

must rather be the inquirer's capacity for noesis

equally

aitia

h6s

kinounta,

which

would

need

to

The potentiality

be

reconciled

(30), with the deri-

with
vative

(kata sumbebekos) capacity in the objects for being discovered:

Ross's explanation that our present passage uses looser language because
'.lith dunamei
in

l046b

5 and

l048a 8

'he was thinking of dunameis kat a

positive powers or forces, while here he is thinking of mere potential!ties'.

Certainly Ar' s examples

here take no special notice of cases

be

,)f

responsibility by
1U48a

10.

7,

and

absence:

note

the

all

are coveredby the

positive

29

supply no eta.

have

no

connection with

the

It might be argued that

for poiein or

l05la

9-

the

first

geometrical

example

is strajghtforward,

that

previous

texts

in 9

2,

those

on one side of a straight

line,

and this implies the ex-

and

the

triangle's

be

what

can

dunameis

assigned

be

this

the

guaranteed

to

mere dunamis

depended

carried the weight.

on

be

the

of

always

argument

being
from

so;

so

and

never

but for

~1051a

absence,

and

antiphasis

the

to

~D

Not in our passage.

what is it

10:

side

be sure,

~ABC is

to

like

their

CD

oarallel

'seen'

and QAc to ~CD;

LncE

equal

viz.

(26),

Then

AB.

counterparts, LABC

with 'ACB

make

up

to

and

two

be

hence,
bAG

right-

that can either be built or be demolished (fall

angles.

To

BCE:

line parallel

not-s0

irrational

together
down)?

base

it takes up the general argument of l050b

to

cannot

though

The angles about one point (24-25) are evi-

the other addition is the

8-34,

eremein/kineisthai

tension of
8.

seems to

In short our passage seems

oikodomeisthai too indirect.

direct

still

On the question whether

in the intellectual object recall (of course) Soph. 248a-49d.

dently
to

argument

being or coming to be understood requires a dunamis

the moral is less clear.

are too wide,

The

in value.

poiein-paschein

oikodomein/katabalein of

Nor is he preoccupied with rational dunameis:

in

one for priority in ousia, not

~~ein

of

ant a

ten kinesin,

a house:

but,

i.s
Z 7-9 is 0n us ,1gain.

3econd), what house?

What

is

the 9ia

which

ti

on the first option (but not the

~

201a 29-34 taken

immediately clear

proof

employing

:vhich

intersects

to

one who

theorem about

sees
the

the

construction

angles

formed

by

(26)?

(a)

a straight

line

>'ith e.g. 188a 15-16 might suggest that what can be built up and knocked
down

is

t-he

plinthoi,

but

one

does

not

think kataballein.

Are we to say that

0nce

though

could

he

built

now it

oikodomein plinthous,

nor

present

is

bizarre,

~;

~re

can

pulled

be

built

dmvn

rhat

the

No:

t:o_inde.

of

at

ship
have

sea

Building

and

used'

(pace
to

Eudemus.

prove

the

who ascribed to T.

construction

(b)

something more

valid)?

theorem that he
Alex.

seems

to

is being and
It

both ways

(deixomen,

596. 15,

'It's a house' on seeing a house,

is what
j96. 20); recent edd. opt for the first.

pulling down

not even congeners.

Or

calculating the distance

the past without a

and in Z 8 l033b 22-26 \vhat

~de

lines?

device for

the built house, tode toionde,

cannot?

is not a tode toionde but a toionde.

is

straight

as perhaps with Thales'

have it
st1ll

parallel

intuitive,

'must
!:>rev1ous

two

,~6

14/

I.HAPTER 9

~._hld

Ll~t.'.;;

~ass.

Heath,

:-,;t L~

pr,,ves

l.ne

second

5eornctricat

che

theorem first

example

i~

a11d Reale complicate

for

Bvnitz,

debatable.

is

Arts~

needlessly by supposing that

isoc<2lt:!s

an

triangle

in the semi-

Biancano*

also

external

angles

uses

(as

but

construe

in

conformity

to our diagram.)

rtnd then generalizes this

In figura tres lineae sunt aequales,

king a theorem (e.g. Eucl. iii. 21) to the effect that all,angles having

duae

~he

dividitur,

as

diameter
in

EucLid,

mention of
rem

as

just

base

all

in the semi-circle are equal (or. more generally

angles

in

the

same

this further theorem;

mentioned,

that

the

Aristotle

segment).

makes no

the ekeino in a 29 is surely the theo-

angles

a triangle are equal to two

of

right angles; and its introduction spoils the picture of simple recognit ton

at

Orth~

28-29.

in a

28

does

not

mean

as

'perpendicular',

Ross Reale and Apostle translate it (and as Heath supplies in brackets);

a line

used of

,straight

line

(not an angle) it means

erected

from

the

'straight', and the whole phrase

centre'

applies

to

any radius within

Then:

the semi-circle.

l.et ACD
~ith

be

any

diameter

circumference,
the

centre

BA,

BC

both

LoAB

as

base

let BD be erected from

the

BD

So

is

equal

Hence

trian$1;le
to

p,les DAC,

ACD

the

But

DCA.

is

.\DC

equal

to

is

equal

to

ii:J>s

total

Hence

_:.::t-=rna l
;.,~les

;1:B.

DCA.

the angle ADC

L', )

rL~nt

lAne j
ungles.

is

equal

But.

to

given

the

sum

'lf

of

this,

viz.

(from i

c-.pposite

32)that the

since

these

sint

si

cuipiam

trium

aequalitas

continuo

ei

etiam manifestum erit

in

rectum,

quia

statim apparent

isoscelia
ad

CBD,

bases

ABD,

CD,

invicem;

et

quibus

AD,

conflatur

anguli

aequales

totus

sed

duo

B sunt

ADB,

anguli

ADC;

esse

anguli

duo ad

angulorum

Ergo duo

dupli

qorum
sunt

anguli

duorum

ADC.

semicirculo

(How does he reach this?

and

internaJ

angulus

to the triangle ABD is equal to the

two

duo

anguli

therefore,

ad B sunt aequales duobus rectis .

opposite

is

internal

them;

ABD

and

angles

and

given that the triangle

isosceles,

of

to

twice

similarly with
the

triangle

either

the

angle

But

BDC.

he does not spell it out.)

Why do Euclid and (on my reading)
about

the

angles

1051a
last

external

29

of

would

theorem

angle

triangle

and

takes

lie on a straight line they amount

case

r~~ht

the angles of a triangle.

without

the

course

him use

drawing

the

the

directly

right

theorem about

in

then makes

more

two

Because,

the

established

Biancano base the proof on a theorem

not

equal

suggest?

our

So

suggest

arguing that the angle CBD external

B sunt

system

triangles

BDC,

ad

the

angle.

harum

ADC

LcDE

isoceles

keeps

innotescat,

which is

internal

suggestion

adapt the lettering

(1

circuli.

DAB,

the

So ADC is une

omnes

eiusdem

angle ADC

is also equal to the sum of those angles.

and

cum

eri-

angulum

the

two

BD,

same theorem about

et

basis

the remaining an-

half

the

Aristotle's

AC

BA,

the angles of a tri-

3l) extends AD to ADE and 3.rgues

.lm"';le CDE
DAC.

'"'~ua L to
'l

(iii

basis

CB,

medic

metri

actum,

ex

1ne right angle.

~Jclld

in

hence
are

quas
sunt

ex

estque

linearum

and

CBD

below)

Educta itaque linea BD de potentia

radii

1ngle are equal to two right angles; hence

gitur.

dupli

ABD,

in

quae

quae

semidia

apex.

the

sum of

the

tertia,

the

LCDB is equal to j,pcB.

and

the

all

on

nimirum

to

triangles

isoceles.

in

apex

circle

are

the

and

semi-circle

and

of

and

equal.

in a

triangle

him
with

the construction internal to the semi-circle.

circle (viz. one whose apex is vertically ahove the centre of the circle)
to other triangles in the semi-circle by invo-

ln5ta 27

of

take it,
the

prior

particular

the
as

theorem

Ar's

that

ekeino

in

Euclid s proof of this

external

the

on

angles,

proof,

and more

angles
and

as one step

the

economy

of

general

theorem

in

unnecessary

corollary

about

Ar. by contrast is following a narrower path.

*Loca mathematica Aristotelis (1615)

149

:lOTES ON THETA

lOSla !5

1') d:pa. ~v~pyeLo ~E:\'tCwv

t05la 15

The

actuality

is

better

potentiality

musician

t.hat

plays

be

It

realized in either way.

in actuality better

than he

is

able

is

to

not

play

that

(ii)

one

might

1)Ja

!tapO:, -thv ~cUnv

have expected

that

rather

~a.p<l

than

Both objections could he met hy redrawing (ii) as (iii):

paten-

Rather, it is better that he should be playing actually than

tially.

it

could

because
to

the

! ; I{

' [

he

is

better

should

just have

the

more

than

corresponding ~~Lt;;,

the

worth

potentiality.

something

~, .. ,w""<lp<t

Hence

_!lli maintains

having.
so

the

that

( Sla 4):

activity is

possibility of

exercising

a &6v~L~ for the worse is not crucial.

!OS!a !7-!9

It is not clear "why the bad actuality is

As Ross,

far

268 points aut,

p.

llo-cepov

1:~ q>6a"<

all we have settled so

is that it is less desirable than the latter.

Perhaps we should

supply some thoughts about the need to understand the bad as a deviation
from

the

to

take

is

an

the

good.
of

~pit

We

'good'
are

in

things

set

there

notes

the

passage,

better

than

from

were inclined
there

that which things strive for,

'cosmic'

comparable

i.e.

but there is not in the same way

they merely fail

absolute

man.

the view we

no evil xa.p& 'tO. 1tpd.YJ.ll.'fa.

is

viz.

to achieve,

things run

this

connect with

1:1t xp4y..a~a,

they are

something that
fully.

would

the claim that

&yaabv

nature

This

to

(not

the

Compare

to strive success-

kind-relative)

remark in

also Physics

VI

II.

use

of

that there

esp.

l99a

33-b7.
~!!9.9!~.!.12!!_.ill.:.. __ 2~!-Q!!!!!!~~-t!2!!

Suggestion (ii)
one

set

of

alternate

corresponding
two
Thus,
Proculs,

in Euc.

I,

p.

squares with Ar's

sets

where

angles,

of

{i)
and

to

one

(ii)

alternate

according

uses
of

uses

angles.

Eudemus

379, 2-15, the Pythagorean proof of the theorem.

mentioning

only one

line

to

Euc.

berg,

III 3!.

claims

construction

that
Ar

Heath (Euclid's Elements I,

p. 320-l) following Hei-

our passage proves that

rather than (ii) is the

has

in mind

in his

(i)

many references

because &.viix"to (25) means the line is drawn up.

!50

to

this

theorem,

It was also objected

The

&~6't't that

asyndeton

it

makes

understanding

of

clear

who

Ar

to

could

one
well

enough.

We

it

so

li<lt 1:C

in Ross's

the

version

explanation

(28):

the

is

of

we

express

and

the

did

not

himself

think there
the

were

second

objects

theorem dependent

theorem does
But

Ross

dwkward;

the

knows i:xEtvo.

hetween the two texts. On

not

hold

because

thought

this

was

point

comes

geometrical

of

example,

it

is

pedantry:

across

any differences

to

on our

clearly

substance
see

Owen's

note.
The geometrical moral What is the 6 ~6. d

which is immediately apparent

to one who sees the construction (26)?

of

from

the

cp.

that

24-6

first.

and

grounds

for

step

from

the way

the

of

the Eqa"tov in mathematics).

a

rejecting

Euclid-type
Ross'

'graspings'

of

story

connections

It would not follow

proof is seen.
about

two-stage procedure is too cumbrous for

.:1nd

This seems

second example uses the theorem

And it must be seen from the construction (6Ldyp~~a:

on vo\3<; of

every

What is seen is at least some-

'E because 9.', not just the fact that E.

thing of the form

the

Thus it

second

seeing'.

intermediate

in

is further

example

that

his

There are 'seeings'

articulateness

between

a proof using a theorem and something more intuitive.

to be drawn and with

his not using exterior angles in the second example either, in contrast

Jaeger 6~\ov.

tav

tttv...

clear

rn~_!!r~!_9~2~!!!!~l-~~~~~!!
'QHL~~~~~

(ii)

1:C;

6,a

1:C. tv ~.. ,xux\C~ 6p6~ xa66\ou

tv -l!.. ux\C'f' 6p61i xa86\ou; 6,6H

Ross reads 6~\ov 6n

Text of !OS!a 26-7

It is another question whether Ar thinks that what is seen in these

examples is the 6 L~ "tC in the full APo.

sense.

The writing is compa-

tible with this,

but he is surely not here addressin~ Euclid's problem

of which

to bring in where in the

science.

thorem
(And

if

not,

neither

finished organization of

is he correcting APo.,

273.)

l 51

pace Ross,

the
p.

J/

ignoring the imperfection,

"! 9,
draw

\4r>'l1d

]r)rwthan

by

attention

rietail

on

(~

Lear
As

that

int~resting

agree with,

to

published

Aristotle's

)fl

me

an

Aristotle's

sensible world of at

tary geometrical shape.

~weds

1982)
thdt

su~gests

Lear's suggestion 1s
in the

m11ch

9 9

~;ery

c_he

.-\pril

against

'..i'hich

to

1051a 21 "JJ

philosophyof mathe-

there

alternative

theory

article

is

one

point

the

existence

least one perfect specimen of each elemen-

lOSla 21-33 suggests to me that all Aristotle

in connexion, say, with a sphere is that there should be an imper-

fectly

spherical

actuali_~

orange,

perfect

that

dnd

sphericity

in

the geometer should by a mental act

the

orange.

His

mental act

would

involve attending to the features of the orange relevant to sphericity,

,vhile

ignoring

the

tmperfcction

in

a manner

is described

for

449b 30-450a 7 (q.v.).

different kind of case in De Hemoria

-'l

l<~hich

kind

(II)

(b)

of

case

might

in a manner which is rlescribed for a diffe-

in De Hem.

be

found

at

Objections:

(i)

the

449b 30-450a

Xet.

geometry can be lv-re\e:xe:Cc; or

of

im:.erpretation.

requires

rent

7.

Further

M 3 1078a 29-31:

the

support

ov"a.

for

stated by

b)..t.xWc:;.

meaning of

this

last

passage

hecomin~

bronze in itself does have the potential of

could be that

a perfect material

sphere even if the bronze-smith cannot ensure its coming out just right
-

thesis

On (II)

about

physical

matter,

not

intelligible

(ii)

matter.

(b) it would be true to say that every book is a sphere, albeit

the sphere actualizable in it by v&-rp-c.c:; may be psychologically difficult

to realize.
perfect

(iii) If Ar agreed that no physical object was an actual

sphere

commonly

or

cited

the

for

like

this

(Met.

997b

agreement,

are

35-8a

6,

K 1 1059b 10-12,

statements

of

the

Platonist

view that Ar is worrying over - Lear, p. 175-9), this would be an important

problem

for

him,

and

one would

expect

to

find

texts discussing

it and discussing the thinking away of imperfections in spherical oranl05la 29-33 and its relevance to Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics
suggestion was

The

for

an

advanced

interpretation of

Ar 's

that

our

overall

passage

could

that

(I)

least

one

mathematics,

actual

geometrical

in Ar's

perfect

figures

can

sphere
be

view,
and

found

requires

one

by

the

ges.

basis

IJhilosophy of maths alternative

to that presented by Jonathan Lear in Phil. Rev. 1982.

ts

be

The Lear thesis

the

actual

existence

straight

construction).

of

line

To

this might

be opposed the strong view

(a) that there are no actual perfect spheres

physical

(b)

1n
~

that

there

it.

ne

[(a)

example

plexin~

._ne

Lines

these

'ldssa.Q;e

may
is

of

the

in

the

the

be

but

the

disproved,

as

heavens;

the

world

truth

of

as

far
case

the

_heir
T~.,e

lines

in support of

.JOtential

scometer

,1f

to

the

weaker
not

existing

in

can

take

r:he

in

view

depend

spheres are concerned,

straight

lines

is

more

actuality?]

The

role

of

by

perBut

our

(a) or (b) ,wuld be to suggest that what guaran-

of

existence,

;(Jheric~ty

tendin1.1;

or

natural motions of the sublunary elements, perhaps?

stra1.ght

physical Horld

'eru:::cr.

Ar,

mathematics does

the

of

tees the truth of geometrical theorems

:__n

for

an
it

teatures

the

is not

primitive

(I)

the actual existence

geometrical

elements

but

(II)

actualizable by the mathematician's v6r,<rloC:.

imperfectly
hy
.Jt'

spherical

v-5T)<JL~.

r:he

Pran<J;e

His

orange

mental

relevA-nt

to

act

and

actualize

would

involve

talks often of

thinking

away

the

colour,

motion,

etc., of

properties other than its sphericity, but not of thin-

king

and

away

dents

.!.

imperfections

its

sphericity.

The

De

Mem.

account is of the former rather than the latter.

at

(other

}r

straight

Ar

the orange, i.e.

Against (I) one objection is (i) that if the last physical straight
line were

to

perish,

geometry would

quite Aristotelian to reply,

try

is

true

there will

An alternative
(p.

with

perfectly straight

180-1)

point.

mattered

touches

cannot

the

grounds

first
and

the

touch
that

place.
the

point

false.

It seems, however,

be straight lines in the world.

put

up of

De An.

(ii)

403a 13, cited by

as proof that Ar did think there are physical objects

Namely,

but

always

interpretation was

Lear

fall

reversing the objection, that since geome-

the
it

This,
about

edges capable of

the

touching

hronze sphere

at

claim could be that the straight line if en-

sphere at a point if we perform the abstraction,

sphere
cannot

at

all

even be

if

separated

separated

from

from

its

the

matter,

matter

in

on
the

it was suggested,

fitted better with the context

the

does

soul;

but

it

require

the

reference

to

ab5traction to be supplied in the first clause.

On the whole,

however,

these larger issues.

we doubted that 9 9 ..Jas the place to decide

Our passage makes no suggestion that all mathe-

sphericity while

153

clOTES ON THETA

1051d 29

matical

objects

discussion

is

are

by v6ncn.c;.

actualized

potentiality

;~APTt:R

of

The

something which

potentiality

under

already a mathe-

is

and the point made here about the priority of lv~pyet.a.

matical object,

Wherever it is best placed (see above),

is special to constructions.

a footnote to the chapter which

the passage is what it purports to he,

proves that actuality is first.

of

asuntheta Ar

Rz.,

(Etudes

cas

sur

simplicit~

la

lOSlb

into

three,

( lOSla

34-b2)

the

chapter

divides

broadly

it is a question whether the third part attaches more

and

directly to the first or the second.

1051b 2-17

(i)

Reale, most recently Aubenque

est

comparable

celui

de

1a

17-1052a

2,

with backward

glances

at

(i)

in 1051b 18-24,

do
in

they

include

Z and

the definable

(Cf.

H?

on unity

.Jhat are these?

essences whose

unity was

"' indivisibility Met.

1052b

(a)

H 3 1043b 28-32 seems to contrast the definable which is composite

with

the

14-23
proem

have

15-16, 1041a 18-19.)

Note by G.E.L. Owen

'leur

being and truth with respect to incomposites.

an interest

After

86-87,

others

logique . ').

Specifically,

Structure

Met.,

flut

S. Maurus apud Reale Li 94 ('Circa

simplicia cognita ut immobilia ... '),

(ii)

~ntheta').

to ct:rtain

read (iii) as an extension of (ii):

34-35:

CHAPTER

now recurs

lO

Ar

indefinable

incomposites

which

make

it

up;

argues

if

asunetheton

it

is

ousia

is

definable only in some way still to be explained.

in

105lb

25-28

substances,

(with back-ref. in (ii) at 1051b 34-35):

that

Ar

while

seems
still

to distinguish
claiming

at

and

Z 1039a

indefinable

(l..Jhere?)

the

ti

esti

something

in

common

from

or

Similarly
incomposite

for

them

(see

truth invol-

below).
ving

combination

and

separation

in

the

pragmata

thought/spoken

of.
But

((b)

Truth/falsehood
of

their

are

objective

treated

as

properties
cf.

correlates:

of

thought

or

1027b 25-33

speech,

and

tr.

16a 9-18,

abandons

his

at

whole

at

De Anima 432a 11-12, Cat.

principle

but about

the hoper

argument

einai

about

ti

is given as the subject of

incomposites.

In

view of

this,

what is claimed to be common to the ti estin and incomposite substances

that

'the Cat.

contrast

2a 4-10 (?-Here Ackrill's

not ...

is

That they cannot come to be and cease to be is not

1051b 25-30?

for this is true of the composites at 1051b 15-17.

enough,

incomposite

substances,

error

is

simply

not

possible

the

ti estin,

it

is

possible

only kata sumbebekos

The spoken/thought

the things that names signify').

Concerning

( 1051b

26-28);

explicitly about
concerning

ndmes,

105lb 30

preceding

Combination/separation are treated as properties

29 1024b 17-1025a 1.

Int_.

the

contrast 6

of pragmata not explicitly of their spoken thought correlates:

De

not

This

may

suggest

(using

the

familiar

contrast

from

~Po

(25-26).

B 10)

that in

the

intended

correlates of combination and separation in pragmata seem to be respectively true positive and true negative predications:
253c 1-3, cf. Met.

falsehood,

not

E 4 1027b 20-23.

vice-versa,

1n

conclusion,

1051b 6-9,

that

are

understood
a

description of

~eometrical

So

to be

definition one

concerning

things

that

unchangeable
them true

at

there
one

cannot.

be

be

object but at best (erroneously) of a name.

speaking

of

(Met. 1026b 13-14?)

'Incomposite substances'

Still

can hardly be those

identified by a definition by contrast with those introduced by accidental description,

cannot

cannot

The first

14b 13-22.

be

otherwise

seems to lead naturally to (iii), maintaining that with things

supposing

21.

cf. Cat.

not truth/falsehood.

opinion/statement cannot be true at one time but not another (lOSlb

15-17),

The

that

faulty

there is a distinction.

have being/not being (lOSlb 11-13),

The

ancestry in

But the pragmata ground the truth/

producing a

the

error

of

for do not the first

fall under the suntheta of 1051b

l5-17?

(iii)

1052a 4-11,

developing

(i)

introducing a pate from ( ii) but otherwise apparently

1051b 9-16,

unless it is assumed that (ii) has reduced

eternal verities to expressions of what is asuntheton and left synthesis

time but not at another.

to accidental time-bound truths.

example

seems to echo the type (i) truth of 1051b 18-

apparently ps.-Alex.

601.

16

ff.,

Ross ('From the treatment

On simplicity-plus-definability cf.
of

points

to lines and letters to syllables,

fined via the latter but definable (Bz.

i.54
155

VI

4 141b 3-9 on priority

the former

701b 25-29).

not to be de-

[ I \ )

L ..l

,\!db 2

~~

a hridge to section II
(~_t_~~!_c!.uction

are

Why

(dnd,

r-1h 0v

truth

been

has
be

t)ne

with

rhougn

it

mentioned;
the

truth,

Lt

It

is

t-his

of

expressly

of

were.

to

however,

application

not

is

deleting xupLtirta:ta. or

objection

appl1cation

and

as

truth

stated
will

xup~oOytCL'ta.

lJe

seen

that

Ls

Jcleted

in

the

or

Ov

trdnsferred,

S"!ntence

t.o~ether.

makes

Jaeger

it

that

very

could

with

but

the

difficult

be

fact
to

and

fills,

marginal

that

Ov

is

lacuna;
gloss

~--~hand

fruth and

falsehood
tte

nnd

cf.

ngs

here

Lhought

fal.sehood

~~

~~retties

ot

.Ls

18,

L~~nim~

or

l 1J)ih

;;unE'

depend

in

way

:nisplaced

spei'lking

r.~re

on

the

as

in

(lOSlb 11-13);
by

15-17

dnd

thinking,

E 4

l027b

Truth

rather

25-33;

than

whereas

not

vice

always

either

is

things
15-17,

that
and

are

always

so;

the dia)?,onal

N.B.

fhere

still

is
is

to

to

are

ZH

of

simple

they

concepts,

definable

(and

on

the

the

definable

is

incomposite

be

the

explained
argument

irreducible

essences?

fhe unity

link between

unity

and

cf. H 6 1045b

and Z 13 1039a 14-23 argued (dia1ecti-

1043b28-32

what

appeal

perfectly
or

composite;

it is

the

latter

indefinable,

(where?),

st1ggesting

or definable only

One possible course would

Z 12, where the entire definition is

of

but

that did not remain Aristotle's

lOSlb 25-28

seems

30-31

seems

to

about

the 't( ~CT'tLV

to distinguish essences

suggest

that

what

The

distinction

per

accidens ,

from

incomposites;

but

has

been

said

relates

to

whatever

is

made

that

one

be

mistaken

but

about

can

incornposites

not

at

all

.'3eparat ion

are

ltJir::h

cr'.JE'

defined without
dn

identity

cerned

false.

reference

statement

with

the -rC

the incomposites are a sub-class of things

x~l

to

(cf.

in

26-7 is restrictive); namely, forms

their

De

matter,

Anima

so

that

the

6 430b 27 ff.,

3.

riefinition

is

intellect con-

is true and does not say one thing xa'tO. an-

l()"t'LV

other; Sorabji in Language and Logos, 296-9).

On this view a plurality

treated

as

of

that

!-1.'::.__~~

elements

This

l6a 9-

pn,vides

in

the

definition

does

not

imply

the

object defined

is composite; and there is no need to appeal to the argument of Z 12.

The
P.Ssence

or

6t

(so that 6~oCwc;

6-

Lhey are r10t 8Xplicitly trea-

cnntTast

On one view put forward,

defined

l05lb

versa;

form a sort of ap!Jendix; for things that don't change,

are

there

section with the composites dealt with

contained in the last differentia;

things

J. 8 432a tl-12, Cat. 4 2a 4-10.

(tpiniuns

just

in b

1 1052b 15-16 and Z 17 1041a 18-19);

34-

carried over to the things themselves.

the 1tpdy).1a.'ta,

thought,

but

settled view of definition.

A-x..,etc;

from

in this

theme

l-2, Netaph. E 4 l027b 20-3.

spoken of

However,

an

it was also sug-

no change;

(b 25-6).

.;ombination and

the ~p6.y~..l.a:ta.
of

253c

located

13-22.

l4b

~'Utpo:rties

' "d

't1e

are

19 l'!L4b l7-1025a l they

1n 1:::.

rrtJth
'~,

1.11i

Plato ~ophist

23.

in

key term

indivisibility cf.

be

composites (104lb 2-17)

cf.

was

second

fa tsehood depend on the combination and separation of

t"'tptiy~a:to.);

latter

not impos-

is

as an example of a composite in b 20-1.

incomposites

substance

the

Not

composites

definitions,

if

sentence

take xup Ll.lrta:ta. and

a

the

the
of

that

the

this was awkward but

of

as

contrasts

that

5.

incomposites?

described

cally?)

will have to he predicative if xupt.Urra.-ra.

too),

postulates,

rhat xupt.W-ra.-ra.

the

there

1051b 18-24, 34-5.

elements

he problems if

of

in (I):

below

( 1051 b 26); but that needn 1 t imply

Ov d:XT)6c;,

felt

sibJ.e t_and indeed the second

<I

these

explicit

inferior

that being deceived about

-rO Ov \l:':ye:'t/'l.C. (3) tO xupLUrta:ta.

\Je

an

are

Are

in (II)
is

there m1.ght

structure

predicative.

the contrast

in such cases.

with d.XT)Ob;

taken

that

the

being

is

no non-xupCwc; sense of

incomposites

to

there

be

~accidens

that

transferring it

was suggested that

lt

~(}"t Lv can only occur ~cidens

lf

is

indeed stated in ([I)

that truth too is only

tnd

are

incommensurable

proposed

also

II. Truth and incomposites (1051b 17 1052a 4)

l,.Jhat

being

Ross

Ov.

gested

13,

he also mentioned the possibility of taking it wi!:h &:>..T)EI<; rather

34;

31.

than with

,.iLl

1028a

to

:)v

Contrast

were

l.021b

-<: C

Ov

described here as )(UpLW'tcl.'ta.

apparently

respectiv~ly)?

where

lOSlb 17) - see further below.

these

It

fals~hood

and

presumably,

could

3~_:U

( l05la

rruth

also a contrast (0~

:::>ne
as

claim
'..Jill

simply
opposed

that

rest

fails
to

the

one

on
to

cannot

the

refer

fact
to

incomposite

be

the
1

in

that

error
if

one

essence

at

has

the

all.

is the essence,

l57

a detinition of

about

the

wrong
If

an

definition

the -r( trr-r~v

reference to bei.ng

/JTE3 DN

l05lb 17

deceived
name,

l3-14)i
are

per

accidens

though
if

not

the

however

incomposites,

point

26)

forms

,.!!APTER lfl

may suggest

essence

and

might be that

(b

tHETA

that

r:~~st.

(cf.

defined

those defined

..,rith such
the

refer

10, Metaph.

reference

without

in the case of

one will

2.

to

are

posites

are

the

the

objects

of definitions,

truth discussed in (II)

not,

one can at

it clearly cannot

was

objected,

against

the

interpretation

of

incomposites

as

forms defined without reference to their matter, that there were rather
few plausible examples, and none that
kinds.
out
it

~wuld

give the essences of natural

'Righteousness' was suggested as an example, but it was pointed

that
was

that was

human souls

not

a substance.

that

Aristotle

It
had

was

also suggested that, if

tn mind here,

it was

odd that

they were said not to come-to-be or pass away (b 28-9); but this could
be

taken as

a denial that they undergo

t~rocesses

discuss

forms

considered apart

from

And Aristotle

their matter

at

the

end of

11.

Another suggestion was that incomposites are predicate expressions

without

their

subjects,

e.g.

tnere

There would

'two-footed animal'.

be no possibility of falsehood,

then

as there could be no false combination,

In~

However, there were two objec-

5 17a 10.

tions:
!)

'seventeen-footed

context.

It

If the answer is

How can such an incomposite be true?

'because

animal'

noted,

',.,laS

though,

not

by

saying

that

'seventeen-footed'

combine with 'animal', or,

perhaps, that

se-

venteen' does not combine with 'footed'.

If the basic point is that a simple term, as opposed to a complete

2)

proposition,

cannot

be false,

why

is

the

point made as

well,

6~oCw'

if

it were a

It was argued that

need not refer to definition; it could refer to classification

't( l<T'ti.V

as

and

6t

one

MS,

omits 't(

A ,

in b 32;

but N.B. o6crCa.<; in 27.

X4~ in 26-7 could indicate a restriction (as suggested above),

generalising,

cases;

if

unless

one

or

the

the

last,

introduction

the

reference

reads lvfpyec.a.1.

with

of

to

the

second,

separate

group

1S1tep e!va.c.

'tL

in b 30

in

and

takes xa.i.

MSS

31

of

is odd,
not

as

lOSlb 25-28,

so

epexegetic.
But
that

there,

is

one

can

be

in

about

attached

to bj.i.oCw'?

the

being deceived at
Aristotle

fact,

deceived

deceived

might

contrast

about

incomposites
If

all,

not

at

all 1

failing

felt

it

per

in

accidens

but

How much force

being deceived

but

have

intended

the 't( lcrtc.

per accidens

is

not

be

should

be

not

really

to make contact with the subject,

necessary to

add

the

point

that

we

can be deceived per accidens in 26-8 as well as in 25-6.

Two suggestions had been put forward previously as to how one might

For the

being no combination of subject and predicate at all.

description of a string of words not forming a sentence as a definition,

reference was made to De

that

in any

composition

does

of coming-to-be and

passing away, rather than as assertions of immortality.

does

rather

true

special one about definitions, which obscures it?

posites in (I) (see above, on lOSla 34-b 2).

It

of

the

be the case

not

that it is very tempting to analyse this point in terms

least

inferior to that relating to com-

1-:i

is

If incom-

refer to the matter, even if one does not grasp the essence.

that

defined, but

the

matter

their

reference

latter (only)

to

E 2 1026b

iJ5lh 17

be deceived about

something

per accidens:

failing

to refer to the thing,

to

essence.

the

that

one

could

It was
refer

by

(2)

now suggested
an

( 1)

by using the name but

by referring to the matter but not

ace idental

( 3)

that

the

description

point might

( c f.

An Post.

there is an implicit reference in the context to the thing it is being

22 83a 6, 2. 8 93a 21 ff.)i

.:1dvanced

human soul yesterday, by saying 'the thing we were talking about yester-

as

definition

of',

( i)

would

seem that

by

the

same token

day is a forked radish'

with the subject in the way the simple statement

are

radish'

not

much

false

as

simply

failures

to

refer

to

in

is
the

not

just

context

would.

It

was

pointed out

that

where

it

'two-footed'
Ls

horse

animal

is

not

that is being

dental
e.g.

if

and
we

those
do

where

know

that

we

58

in An.

'the soul is a forked

Post. 2. 8 93a 21 a

have

some

knowledge

of

the

thing

thunder is a noise in the clouds,

,;hat causes it.

j_

that

contrast is drawn between cases where our knowledge of a thing is acci-

definiendum at all.

the point
true

so

the

- which doesn't completely fail to make contact

an appeal to the suggestion above, that wrong definitions

~he

( ii)

it

There are two possible solutions:

it could be false as well.

for example, if we were talking about

be
1.

159

itself,

though not

'n51 b

1 .J

! I

An

application

of

( 2)

to

composite

being would

be

our

saying

'the oeing whose matter is f1esh and bone of a certain sort (i.e. man)
is

forked

radish'.

concerned -

It

su~gested

was

if we are now supposing that

:~::1ccidens

where

these

are

concerned

that

where

26-28 does
as

well

incomposites

are

not rule out error

- a part analogous

to

that played by the matter in the case of composites might here be played
by

the

lion's

that

I.e.,

genus.
1

suul

we

are

we

if we say

are

wrong

if

'the human soul has

referring

to

soul,

though

the faculties of

our statement shows

That

we think we are referring to human soul.

;Josite

respectively

and

b~1ng

each

second f.-Lkv understood dfter ~Tt~

an EJ't~ in the
rather,

the

introductory words
sense

subsequently
below)

the

be

noted.

similar

is

'being

in

at

like

is

'that

being

construction

in

~-!e

indeed

like

(i.s)

this

like

well.

clause

and

are not to understand

('being

is)

and

as

its

being

and -rO 6: ~v.

(that

33

of

b.:: aJ.verbial, answering

truth .. ',

-rb Wt; -rO in b 34.

suits

.3uhject

( l).

bJ3-4

between Ev J.l~V

divided
sense

lti

-r.? 6t in (2) ..lill then

of the following one.

one

subject

rather

Or

cruth');

It

truth');

the

this.

(see
it may

might have expected

was

pointed

out

that,

tJne can talk about soul in general, rather than the souls of particular

with Ross's interpretation, one might have expected -rb 6~ l-rEpov rather

species,

than ~o 6~ ~v

is suggested by De Anima L.

412a 3 ff.;

on the other hand.

Alternatively

l. lla -b).

If
-

the

incomposites

and 1t was

t~J

refer
what

to

are

forms,

pointed out that

coming

into

as

opposed

to

forms

.!...!_ it is taken

LU5Lb 28 supports this,

being

without

process

plus matter

(see

p.

158

the wider class of things described as -rC lcrtL?

are

Essences

33.

pattern of

should

being

in

we

read tO

things

J.Jc:; or We; -rO

corresponding to

!he

be

latter

fits

the

truth in propositions and

part

33-l052a
it

(Because the line numbers of different editions may

seems useful

to set out

this

passage,

10 0~ e[v~ w~ ~0 ~~~et,, ~t ~b ~~ eTv~ ~0

w,

numbering the clauses:)

~0 teuoo~. (1) EV ~lv

cr(,yxe.~~. <i\~et,, (2) ~0 o'd ~~ <J'Uyxe~~. +euoo, (3)

:crnv, d

"lis print.
1

'",J

1-

at
(

the

l)

the

end

of

(4)

in early

,~lause

(1 )

hut
{f

to

0~

except

of

Ross

is

(lOSlb

2-17):

tt1ey

do

not
II

relate

directly
:~ee

(105lb 7-33i

in so far as CT\.)"'("lte:t'cr13a.L is something that ~esn~_! apply

.u\composites

(105lb

The &..cr-uvee-ra.,

18-22).

on

the

t:..ther hand,

do

,eem to he taken up by (3) + (4).

takes ltv f-L~V
't

tn.ese

(J"Lt:ki.ng

in

(1)

to

out a different

be answered by -rO 6E ~\1 in (J),

t60

this

ev

parallel

from

Politics

l285b

38-l286a

it

taken

awkward.

(1).

105lb

But in this case,

(1),

in
in

34

could

the

first

(it

to

is)

what

is the subject
~

or prima-

tO 6~ in (3) introducing composite being;

it

is

then to tadke of

presumably

does make sense,

seem particularly
if

~~v

12,

taken as referring

And, what are we

in

like that'

'but

Ev

that

(cf.

'the other sort of thing (--rQ 6!: ),

just

as

suggested

cruth'

It could be 33-34,

predicative

indeed.
one

'vas

single

v will not of course then be carried over

(2) as well as

is

is

doesn't

the

not

point

like

so

in

if it

(J)

(3)

is

as

(~..

and

(4)?

well.
at all),

though the reference to unity

here;

this,

it

but
is

(4) '.Vill have

not

(2.!_1~)',

to be

which

is

The general significance of lOSlb 33-l052a 4 and its place in the struc-

What
i.1"~

each

composite and incom-

do

the

chapter

these

force

of

concerning

if ,;.Ev in

t~hole.

chat

lines
the

add

t:_ruth.

line

to

what

has

observations made

is

Being

ilOt

was

preceded?
in

They extend to

the earlier parts of the

referred

to

answered by 0 in b 13

in

105Lb

(dnd we

23;

even

noted that

..Jith one reading in b 23 it is answered at once bY -tO Ot: +e:U6ot;). never~heless

'J,1

rype of heinJ?; -

to composite being, Hith

c 1 early take up again the discuss ton of O""Oyxe::taBa.t.

chapter

Ross,
is

chapter).

nd ( 2 ) '!

to

'it

ture of the chapter as a

editions

discussion of a-Uv9e;'ta. and drr6v8e;--ra. .in part

_,E'low),
t'J

( l)
of

part
the

mark

Ross's

not lhe sense required .

~v, F.:L~ep Ov, o\hwc;: l<Y"tCv, (4) e: 6E. f-'"h oU'twt;, obx Ecrnv.

rhe quest.1on

the

to

is
l05lb

of

'' f

And

,-ice versa (cf. above on ()).

vary,

predicative,

~.ily

in categories other than that of substance, it was suggested.

In

(3);

in

only has ~v o~.

1. 1 402b 7 suggests that soul may not be a genus (cf. Alexander, Quaest.

the

hein~

on

b 22-23 does lead us to expect a subsequent ceference to being.

other

hand,

33

refers

both

the ccmposite and to incomposite

(see above), whereas b 23 refers only to Llle truth of incomposites;

that

of

composites

in

(105lb

L0l

2-17)

and

that of the incomposites

:51 b

jj

. !JJES 1/N THETA

05lb .lJ

<:IIAPTRR 10

in II (starting at lOSlb

It was poin-

17 and really ending at b 33).

(2)
t~d

out

that

this

makes

al;so

truly

suppose

that

in separation t1nd falsehood in combination,

that

things which are separated are separated;

compressed

statement which

can only

rf'ally

be

r~marked

It was
to

the

it refer to

in

tence

ZH9 carry out the progralllme of E,

with being in the sense of truth and falsity.

be

felt

refer
'"hat

2;

is

and

.:f.

under

discussing

rliscussion

incomposites
that

A 29)

after

to being again at

the

in

is

necessary,

back

place,

truth
ff.

33

the

is

type

in
But

of

I and II,

sections

in things

to

truth or

truth and

falsehood

(cf.

(3}

been discussed,

doesn't

seem

one

won't

or

to mathematical

1026a 29 he uses obo-Ca. of

intermediates?

to

require

be

But

such

tempted

to

it.

(Could

the point of the sen-

metaphysical

e:L uc; ...

Perhaps

then

What

is

the

is

potulate,

on

simply to emphasise

attribute

tion

and

in

of xo"tb. 'tO 1to't'f

force

oe

Jto~t ~v Jto~!:

properties

other

respects?

II)?

to point

Only

if

we

(indefinite;

Does it suggest

below)?
(See

at

are willing

to

not

there

one

1t6"t.

~an

at some times'

give

parallel

Cf.

be decep-

Could Jto-rf mean

below).

'in some cases' rather than strictly

falsity in statements; and it

have

etc.

time to what results and not at another.

1051b

1051b 28;

Unmoved Mover

to

it .vas pointed out that

being

'Platonic'

interpretation.)

that

is concerned

lt is odd that it should

things which are lvepye:CCf,

are

corresponds

after

any

that since the object of discussion in 9 10, accor-

view that

the

hesitation about the UM at

so b 34-

understood

to

It seems more intelligible to hesitate about the former,

but the ensuing examples are mathematical, and when Ar does express

if one

the light of what has gone before.

ding

&xCvn1'a. refer

Does

1052a 4 ff.

With regard to b 34-5, it was remarked that there

truth

asserts

are

be

t0

objects?

takes up only (II).

r:an

'!ven h<Hder

it

t052a

loosely

&.el. at

(cf.

interpretation

out how this type of being corresponds to them.

III.

(4)

4-1~2

Deception and the changeless (1052a

This picks up the idea of heing deceived from (II),

but otherwise

seems to be a development of the last part of (I) (10Slb 15-17),

(II)

in

t:he

That

(III)

Rossi

that

Reale

of

7-11;

l)f

interimhas

picks
it

up

is

(I)

continues

himself,

shown

quantification

the

.<Ind

is

timeless

truths

are

vi.ew of S.

in

~J2.

16 ff.

and

Reale i.i.

94,

( Etu~~.!~~

Aubenque

possible

Maurus

the

case

of

class,

centred

around

some

nine

questions,

of

varying

D0es

belong with what immediately precedes ( "t"b 6~ lv

ff.

at

b 35,

at

the opening of the chapter?

introducing composite being), or wi.th the general problem

different

f3r
;f:'c

as

one

t ion).

reason
is

for

~iven)

absence

If the former, if must be

,,f

deception

at b 15-7 (';o.Thich

'be

than

belon~ed

that

givin~

given

of

or

thing

particular?
that

might

particular

change

triangle

its properties,

different

in different cases';

if

or any tri'vary'

we would still get a false

belief as long as necessary properties were taken, but the contrast

with what follows would be spoilt.

How

(so

in the composites

does

"tt j.JkV... relate to Xo"tt

about triangles,
and

importance. treated here in roughly textual order:

( 1)

or

( 5)

discussion

universal
sort

not

an i.ndividual.
'lur

the

The universal would be needed if ~"taadAXLV meant

angle.

R6-7).
but

be

anything did, but Ar could mean the triangle as such,

~l~ss

incomposite.

the view of ps. Alexander 601.

(II)

Bonitz,

that

Is "tb -rpCywv0\1
would

some

in one
make

of

g~;~ise

good

ensuing

and

general

governing

another

Are

we

still

talking

(or that the triangle in general appears now

but makes

examples.

very
More

representation of

verb

Lmmediately

...

This would

and now in another, if 't'\ is predicate)?

sense,

the

~ev

the false belief being that some are of one kind

still

abrupt

by

an

change

likely '<L f.LEv ~

the

form

being ol-f)ae-ra.L of

illustrated

the

example

163

an error
course.
where

of subject

o'o6

is

might
But

take,
why

one doesn 1 t

in

vague

is

the
it

wrongly

(6)

think some are of one kind and some of another, but wrongly thinks

as

truth

all

of

simples

are

of

one

kind?

though Ar 1 s

We had no very clear answer,

and

falsehood,

and

with

the 1:'( lO"'tt.Y

reference

in

forward

to

l027b 27;

10 (E 4

the

discussion

where,

it may be

main point seemed clear enough.

noted, the reference to -r<'i. d.~Xd 'X.o.\ 't'h -cC ~rr-tLY does not seem to suggest
that

the

Is -cl subject or predicate?

hard

to

On the vague interpretation it could

former
resist

a sub-class of

are
that

the

l.Jhole

of

the latter).

EZH9 form

The conclusion was

a systematically arranged

discussion of the senses of being - at whatever stage in their develop-

still be either.

ment the arrangement took place.

( 7)

How

does

had

no

T, -cLvb.c:

clear

relate

answer.

to

the

Could Ar

~..;ords?

preceding
mean

Tr

(with

Again

epexegetic)

we

that

Despite our

a
Does &.pL8~4 tva.

(8)

mean

the

number

one,

or

any

single

number?

list

takes

make

says

mistakes

about.

false

beliefs)

One

But on the whole we

could

not

there

of the form

hold

preferred

any single

beliefs (and a fortiori not

'some are of one kind and some of an-

other'.

of

senses

up being
we

must

relevant

of

'being',

as

consider

( l027b

Are 'tLvfl -c~ov&

masculine

singulars or neuter plurals?

Nothing

and

the

later

28-9),

but

after

list

Truth

those
adds

them (~eCrr6w

i!:p6.y)..J.o.-ca.

in

the

be

cleceived,

31).

But

heme
->ut
l

falsity

of

exist
it

was

in

10-15);

that

to

there

is

potentiality

incomposites,

actuality

felt

only and
try

and

not
link

about

which

potentially
9 10 as

potentiality and actuality was implausible,

particular

passages

and

this

phrases.

Rather,

it

for

change

It

we

cannot

scrappy

(l05lb 28,

a whole

to the

::H,

having

before

proceeding

been dealt

further

sense

2 l026a

33-l026b

falsity,
: ;1e

of

with

lists

is

and

falsity

these

in

E 2-J,

l64

l3 9,

(cf.

three

actuality),

discussed

'being 1

after

in

this

since

brief

neither

is

said

being.

E 4

discussion

area

which are

accidental

being

1028a 3) and look at the causes and principles

programme

out,

ZH9 forms a single connected whole car-

let

alone

that

Ar

envisaged

the

whole

of

which presumably no-one would

(the

34-b

with
then

E 4

thesis

that

particular

ZH8 form

we

we

noted

refers

still

rough whole,

have

earlier

however

the difficulties
(see above, yp.

back copiously,

but

not

for

loose

l-3).

apparently to

the

Moreover E
truth and
accidental;

t.ntroduces

being

does

not

refer

back on

9 10 itself does pick up from E 4,

does
it

to

it

come where

come
1

in

e,

it

but

does?

topic

of

the

as we

matter,
Also

it

does

not

seem

Ar get it out of the way at

~ccidental

being?

actuality

and

but there are problems.

Why

There is no obviously better place for

why didn t

ot

this

1-9 doesn It dO mUCh piCking Up from !Jlhat. precedes,

this
the

It

and

the unifi-

have

it.

that

but

anyway the unity of Z itself is by no means unproblematic.

2).

and

in

true

and

categories,

together

be

places,

noH

that

8 10 wi.llthen ~o on to

lOSla

uses

catlon

may
in

noted

being in potentiality and actuality;

by the end of

truth and
2

potentiality

accidental

to

that

accidental

questions

that

entirely

involving picking
was

refers back to being in substance and the other categories, the theme

of

saying

not

E 2 starts with

say.

change where

(l051b

remained

Ar does go on to do this of course. but we cannot

assume without futher ado that

rying

8 10 in 9 as a whole

and

we

and

t:H8 in detail when writing the end of E,

T__Q~~of

it

nor being as truth is being in the proper sense (xupCwc;;: b 31) we must
dismiss

seems to hang on this.

on

discussion of

truth from

of being qua being.

(9)

discussions

EZHA formed a unified whole.

continues with a

in many ways

It seems easier to think of the number one as something one cannot

number

previous

satisfied about how far

fyl.ng one's belief that some numbers are prime and some not?

EZH9

General considerations on

thinking no evens are prime is a 'Nay one could go wrong in speci-

to

rely on

the rest of 8,

the start in E,

so

as he did with

What connexion has it with the preceding discussion

potentiality?

x.up~Utta.,;a.

)1)5

( l05lb 1)

is

embarrassing

on

any

cc,uld
some
If

view
be

defence ..,;oas

we

assume

3 takes till
and

if

Ar

had

good a place
6Uvni-J.&.t; at

put

(but

up

for

should

tne

we?)

something

to

so

being
~nding

9 10 was

above),

unificati0n
that

the

thesis

programme

but

perhaps

On the other hand

as

regards

sketched

at

10.

1028a

there would be no room for 9 10 earlier,

810 seems as

t?t~ reference to !!wtpye~a. and

lOSlb 28 might gi\e a positive reason for putting 9 10 after

10 does, in part, focus on truth concerning the ~xCv~~~

arisen without

of

mentioned

as any for him to sa7 it.

the

rest

flirted with the idea that

idea

31,

or interpolated.

say about truth and falsity

compared with composites,

have

and

1027b

misplac~d

9 9 to complete,

the rest of 8;
as

.(upCw; at

(cf.

dealt with as

not

as

truth

which gi1es 11s a

focussing that wouldn't

of A,

9 8.

up as xup\.<irta.'t'a.

say definitely what

\.Je

even briefly

9 10 was written by someone warming

presupposing

by Aristotle,

especially

and

being

being -

to

the

and actuality/potentiality,

but we did not seriously think

ended

by reaffirming that we couldn't

10 presupposed,

and that the unification thesis

had not Oeen freed from all its difficulties.

l66