Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for "Certiorari, mandamus and Prohibition",
seeking the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-7770 below, we have,
as factual background, the following:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics
of the Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan City. Private
respondent,, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident
Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant, hospital Administrator of the
Caloocan City General Hospital became vacant upon the
resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor
Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as
Assistant Hospital Administrator private respondent Dr.
Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr.
Medalla, Jr., protested Dr. Mackay's designation and
subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as Chief
of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City
Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who succeeded former Mayor, now
Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated
September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay's appointment stating:
... as of April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G.
Mackay was promoted to Assistant Hospital
Administrator from his previous position of
Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the
said higher position by reason of his having
completed all academic requirements for the
Certificate in Hospital Administration ...
contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio
Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service
Commission on appeal. On December 29, 1978, the Civil
Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49
sustaining Medalla's appeal and revoking Mackay's
appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. The pertinent
portion of the aforestated Resolution reads:
A perusal of the records shows that appellant
Medalla is the Chief of Clinics of the
Caloocan City General Hospital; he is a
holder of the Degree of Doctor of Medicine;
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the Civil Service Merit Systems Board and by the Office of the
President.
In his Compliance, Medalla included an additional prayer that
the City Mayor of Caloocan be ordered to immediately appoint
him as Hospital Administrator and to pay him salary
differentials.
In his Comment, the City Mayor of Caloocan invoked the
privilege of an appointing authority to determine who can best
fulfill the functions of an office citing the case of Aguilar vs.
5
Nieva, Jr. to that effect. And as to the matter of his readiness
to issue an appointment to Medalla, he manifested his
preference to withhold action pending Mackay's unresolved
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of June 27, 1979 of
the Civil Service Merit Systems Board.
Petitioner Medalla submits that the Trial Court erred in not
dismissing Mackay's Petition before it, there being a clear
showing of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and
that said Court was devoid of jurisdiction in reviewing on
certiorari decisions of the Office of the President and of the
Civil service Commission rendered in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial functions.
Private respondent Mackay takes the contrary view and prays,
instead, that the contested Decisions/Resolution be declared
null and void and respondent Judge ordered to proceed with
the hearing of the case below.
Although Mackay's Motions for Reconsideration were, in fact,
still pending resolution by Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil
Service Commission, respectively, at the time private
respondent Mackay filed the Petition below, dismissal of said
Petition can no longer be anchored on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, as Medalla prays,
considering that Manifestations dated August 17 and 23, 1979
filed by the said parties before the Court a quo show that they
6
had resolved the incidents adversely against Mackay. That
issue, therefore, has become moot and academic.
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by
certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is
concerned, there should be no question but that the power of
judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress
this conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a
Presidential act arises from a failure to
recognize the most important principle in
our system of government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three coequal
departments, the executive, the legislative
and the judicial, each supreme within its own
assigned powers and duties. When a
presidential act is challenged before the
courts of justice, it is not to be implied
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SYLLABUS
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Okla. 372) In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice
regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the bidding
that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It
was not because of their expired licenses, as private
respondents now claim. Moreover, the plans and specifications
which are the contractors guide to an intelligent bid, were not
issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be
placed on equal footing when they submit their bids. The
purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some contractors
are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and
specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
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Code
defines
government
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It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are
the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition and a
basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter
which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive
character of the system and thwarts and purpose of its
adoption.
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the
pre-qualification requirement and the bidding that caused the
elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because
of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim.
Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the
contractors guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on
time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on
equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of
competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are
informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications
that are to be the subject of their bids.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162784
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BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Court views with grave concern the alarming incidents of
illegal recruitment which demonstrate all too clearly that
overseas employment has fast developed into a major source
not only of much-needed foreign exchanged but also, for the
cunning and the crafty, of easy money.
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Hence,
it
should
be
proven
and
substantiated by a clear and convincing
evidence. Mere allegation of complainant
that the agency charged more than the
authorized fee will not suffice to indict the
agency for illegal exaction unless the
allegation
is
supported
by
other
corroborative circumstantial evidence.
Thus, for lack of concrete evidence or proof
to support our initial findings, we are inclined
to reconsider the penalty imposed upon
respondent.
Foregoing premises, the penalty of
suspension imposed upon respondent
Career Planners Specialist(s) International,
Inc. pursuant to our Order dated May 7, 1990
is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly,
the alternative fine of
P40,000.00 which was paid under protest by
respondent is hereby ordered refunded to
6
them.
Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor. On 5 July 1991,
then Undersecretary of Labor Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor
(now Secretary of Labor) sustained the reconsideration of
POEA. Her Order reads in part
We find . . . no cogent reason or sufficient
justification to reverse or modify the assailed
Order.
Records reveal that the only basis for holding
respondent Career Planners Specialist(s)
International, Inc., liable for illegal exaction,
as held in the previous POEA Order dated
May 7, 1990 was the uncorroborated
testimony of the complainants. There was no
concrete evidence or proof to support the
POEA Administrator's initial findings.
We take this opportunity to inform the
complainants that the charge of illegal
exaction is a serious charge which may cause
the suspension or cancellation of the
authority or license of a recruitment agency.
Therefore, said charge must be proven and
substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. A mere allegation will not suffice to
find an agency liable for illegal exaction
unless said allegation is supported by other
corroborative circumstantial evidence. In this
connection, records show that complainants
could not narrate the specific circumstances
surrounding their alleged payment of the
amount of P30,000.00. They could not even
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within ten (10) working days from the service of the order or
decision" (parenthesis supplied).
Petitioners also argue that public respondents gravely abused
their discretion when they violated petitioners' right to
administrative due process by requiring clear and convincing
evidence to establish the charge illegal exaction. This point is
well taken. There was grave abuse of discretion.
In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation
or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that
testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary
evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially
proven. All administrative determinations require only
substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as
erroneously contended by pubic respondents.
Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere
preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is
required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . .
13
." while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a
mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a
14
preponderance . . . ." Consequently, in the hierarchy of
evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at
the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence,
preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that
order.
That the administrative determination of facts may result in the
suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI does not
require a higher degree of proof. The proceedings are
administrative,
and
the
consequent
imposition
of
suspension/revocation of Authority/License does not make the
proceedings criminal. Moreover, the sanctions are
administrative and, accordingly, their infliction does not give
rise to double jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for
the same act.
Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
15
Corporation v. Factoran, Jr.
. . . it is sufficient that administrative findings
of fact are supported by evidence, or
negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings
of fact are not shown to be unsupported by
evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is
needed to support an administrative finding
of fact, and substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69
Phil.
635,
642;
Police
Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984].
The POEA, after assessing the evidence of both parties, found
that private respondents collected from petitioners P30,000.00
as placement fees; consequently, it ruled that there was illegal
exaction. Surprisingly, without altering its findings of fact, POEA
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[25]
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
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xxx
xxx
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SO ORDERED.
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his
and
PANGANIBAN ,J.:
In this rather factually complicated case, the Court
reiterates the binding force and effect of findings of specialized
administrative agencies as well as those of trial courts when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals; rejects petitioners theory of
simulation of contracts; and passes upon the qualifications of
private respondent corporation to acquire disposable public
agricultural lands prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
[1]
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 27, 1990, in C.A. G.R. CV No. 09062, affirming the
dismissal by the trial court of Petitioner Vicente Villaflors
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The Facts
The facts of this case, as narrated in detail by Respondent
[2]
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The evidence, testimonial and documentary, presented during
the trial show that on January 16, 1940, Cirilo Piencenaves, in a
Deed of Absolute Sale (exh. A), sold to [petitioner], a parcel of
[3]
agricultural land containing an area of 50 hectares, more or
less, and particularly described and bounded as follows:
A certain parcel of agricultural land planted to abaca with
visible concrete monuments marking the boundaries and
bounded on the NORTH by Public Land now Private Deeds on
the East by Serafin Villaflor, on the SOUTH by Public Land; and
on the West by land claimed by H. Patete, containing an area
of 60 hectares more or less, now under Tax Dec. 29451 in the
(sic) of said Vicente Villaflor, the whole parcel of which this
particular parcel is only a part, is assessed at P22,550.00 under
the above said Tax Dec. Number.
This deed states:
That the above described land was sold to the said VICENTE
VILLAFLOR, xxx on June 22, 1937, but no sound document was
then executed, however since then and until the present time,
the said Vicente Villaflor has been in open and continuous
possession and occupation of said land; (and)
That the above described land was before the sale, my own
exclusive property, being inherited from my deceased parents,
and my ownership to it and that of my predecessors lasted
more than fifty (50) years, possessing and occupying the same,
peacefully, openly and continuously without interruption for
that length of time.
Likewise on January 16, 1940, Hermogenes Patete, in a Deed of
Absolute Sale (exh. D), sold to Villaflor, a parcel of agricultural
land, containing an area of 20 hectares, more or less, and
particularly described and bounded as follows:
A certain parcel of agricultural land planted to abaca and corn
with visible concrete monuments marking the boundaries and
bounded on the North by Public Land area-private Road; on
the East by land claimed by Cirilo Piencenaves; on the South by
Public Land containing an area of 20 hectares more or less,
now under Tax Declaration No. 29451 in the name of Vicente
Villaflor the whole parcel of which this particular parcel, is
assessed at P22,550.00 for purposes of taxation under the
above said Tax Declaration No. 29451.
This deed states:
That the above described land was sold to the said VICENTE
VILLAFLOR, xxx on June 22, 1937, but no formal document was
then executed, and since then until the present time, the said
Vicente Villaflor has been in possession and occupation of (the
same); (and)
xxx (O)n June 22, 1937 but the formal document was then
executed, and since then until the present time, the said
VICENTE VILLAFLOR has been in continuous and open
possession and occupation of the same; (and)
That the above described property was before the sale, my own
and exclusive property, being inherited from my deceased
parents and my ownership to it and that of my predecessors
lasted more than fifty (50) years, possessing and occupying
same, peacefully, openly and continuously without interruption
for that length of time.
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Par. 4. That the Party of the Second Part has bound as it does
hereby bind itself, its executors and administrators, to pay unto
the Party of the First Part of the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00)Philippine Currency, upon presentation by
the latter to the former of satisfactory evidence that:
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NASIPIT may well have added that at any rate while there are
transactions where the proper evidence is impossible or
extremely difficult to produce after the lapse of time xxx the
law creates presumptions of regularity in favor of such
transactions (20 Am. Jur. 232) so that when the basic fact is
established in an action the existence of the presumed fact
must be assumed by force of law. (Rule 13, Uniform Rules of
Evidence; 9 Wigmore, Sec. 2491).
Anent Villaflors claim that the 140-hectare land relinquished
and awarded to NASIPIT is his private property, little (need) be
said. xxxx The tracks of land referred to therein are not identical
to the lands awarded to NASIPIT. Even in the assumption that
the lands mentioned in the deeds of transfer are the same as
the 140-hectare area awarded to NASIPIT, their purchase by
Villaflor (or) the latters occupation of the same did not change
the character of the land from that of public land to a private
property. The provision of the law is specific that public lands
can only be acquired in the manner provided for therein and
not otherwise (Sec. 11, C.A. No. 141, as amended). The records
show that Villaflor had applied for the purchase of the lands in
question with this Office (Sales Application No. V-807) on
December 2, 1948. xxxx There is a condition in the sales
application signed by Villaflor to the effect that he recognizes
that the land covered by the same is of public domain and any
and all rights he may have with respect thereto by virtue of
continuous occupation and cultivation are relinquished to the
Government (paragraph 6, Sales Application No. V-807 xxx) of
which Villaflor is very much aware. It also appears that Villaflor
had paid for the publication fees appurtenant to the sale of the
land. He participated in the public auction where he was
declared the successful bidder. He had fully paid the purchase
prive (sic) thereof (sic). It would be a (sic) height of absurdity
for Villaflor to be buying that which is owned by him if his
claim of private ownership thereof is to be believed. The most
that can be said is that his possession was merely that of a
sales applicant to when it had not been awarded because he
relinquished his interest therein in favor of NASIPIT who (sic)
filed a sales application therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x During the investigation proceedings, Villaflor presented
as his Exhibit (sic) (which NASIPIT adopted as its own exhibit
and had it marked in evidence as Exhibit 1) a duly notarized
agreement to Sell dated July 7, 1948, by virtue of which Villaflor
undertook to sell to Nasipit the tracts of land mentioned
therein, for a consideration of Twenty-Four Thousand
(P24,000.00) Pesos. Said tracts of land have been verified to be
identical to the parcels of land formerly applied for by Villaflor
and which the latter had relinquished in favor of NASIPIT under
a deed of relinquishment executed by him on August 16,
1950.In another document executed on December 7, 1948 xxx
Villaflor as FIRST PARTY and NASIPIT as SECOND PARTY
confirmed the Agreement to Sell of July 7, 1948, which was
maintained in full force and effect with all its terms and
conditions x x x (Exh. 38-A); and that for and in consideration of
xxx TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND (P24,000.00) PESOS that the
Second Party shall pay to the First Party xxx the First Party
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hereby sells, transfers and conveys unto the Second Party xxx
his right interest and participation under and by virtue of the
Sales Application No. V-807 and, in its paragraph 8, it made
stipulations as to when part of the said consideration xxx was
paid and when the balance was to be paid, to wit:
a) the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND xxx PESOS has already
been paid by the Second Party to the First Party upon the
execution of the Agreement to Sell, on July 17, 1948;
b) the amount of FIVE THOUSAND xxx PESOS shall be paid
upon the signing of this present agreement; and
c) the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND xxx PESOS, shall be paid
upon the execution by the First Party of the Absolute Sale of
the Two parcels of land in question in favor of the Second Party
of the Certificate of Ownership of the said two parcels of land.
(Exh. 38-B). (Emphasis ours)
It is thus clear from this subsequent document marked Exhibit
38 ANALCO that of the consideration of the Agreement to Sell
dated July7, 1948, involving the 140-hectare area relinquished
by Villaflor in favor of NASIPIT, in the amount of Twenty-Four
Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos:
(1) the amount of Seven Thousand (P7,000.00) Pesos was
already paid upon the execution of the Agreement to Sell on
July 7, 1948, receipt of which incidentally was admitted by
Villaflor in the document of December 7, 1948;
(2) the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos was
paid when said document was signed by Vicente J. Villaflor as
the First Party and Nasipit thru its President, as the Second
Party, on December 7, 1948; and
(3) the balance of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos to be
paid upon the execution by the First Party of the Absolute
Deed of Sale of the two parcels of land in favor of the Second
Party, and upon delivery to the Second Party of the Certificate
of Ownership of the said two parcels of land.
Villaflor contends that NASIPIT could not have paid Villaflor the
balance of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos x x x
consideration in the Agreement to Sell will only be paid to
applicant-assignor (referring to Villaflor) upon obtaining a
Torrens Title in his favor over the 140-hectare of land applied
for and upon execution by him of a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. x x x. Inasmuch as
applicant-assignor was not able to obtain a Torrens Title over
the land in question he could not execute an absolute Deed of
(sic) Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. Hence, the Agreement to Sell was
not carried out and no Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos
was overpaid either to the applicant-assignor, much less to
Howard J. Nell Company. (See MEMORANDUM FOR THE
APPLICANT-ASSIGNOR, dated January 5, 1977). xxx.
xxx Villaflor did not adduce evidence in support of his claim
that he had not been paid the xxx (P12,000.00) xxx
Page 32 of 150
That as to when the applicant has complied with all the terms
and conditions which would entitle him to a patent is a
questioned (sic) fact which your office would be in the best
position to determine.However, relating this to the procedure
for the processing of applications mentioned above, I think
that as the applicant has fulfilled the construction/cultivation
requirements and has fully paid the purchase price, he should
be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of
land and (sic) the area (sic) in the provision in question of the
new constitution would not apply.
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The Issues
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[28]
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right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase
public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and
twenty-four hectares. Petitioners prohibition action is barred by
the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest. (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is the privilege to enjoy property
legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of
property conferred by existing law (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6)
or some right or interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy
(Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales,
51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power (16
C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term vested right
expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just an imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5,
citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl.
nd
2 587).
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that
where the applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had
fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act
in order to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to
be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or
release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the
applicant had fulfilled the construction or cultivation
requirements and has fully paid the purchase price, he should
be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of
land and to him the area limitation in the new Constitution
would not apply.
In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held
that where the cultivation requirements were fulfilled before
the new Constitution took effect but the full payment of the
price was completed after January 17, 1973, the applicant was,
nevertheless, entitled to a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo).
Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional
prohibition by a high executive official carries great weight and
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BELLOSILLO, J.:
Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for
collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants?
On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a
complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners
Lope Machete, Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John
Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin,
Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and
Justiniano Villalon. The complaint alleged that the parties
entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private
respondent's landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol,
under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a
certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However,
despite repeated demands and with no valid reason,
petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private
respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him
back rentals and damages.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter.
They contended that the case arose out of or was connected
with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the
complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of
the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to
1
dismiss, and on 28 September 1989 denied the motion for
2
reconsideration.
Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before
respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May 1992 rendered
judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume
3
jurisdiction over the case on the basis of its finding that
. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent
laws on agrarian reform cannot be seen to
encompass a case of simple collection of
back rentals by virtue of an agreement, as
the one at bar, where there is no agrarian
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On 18 April 1988 Agda filed with the court below in Civil Case
25
No. 88-577 his Amended Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining order
against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC
alleging, in substance, that Special Order No. 219 of 13
November 1987 issued by then Fida Administrator Lanuza is
null and void for having been issued in violation of Section 48
of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) which prohibits the detail
or re-assignment of civil service personnel within three months
before an election and Section 261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg
881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which prohibits transfer or
detail of officers and employees in the civil service within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission
on Elections, and that all succeeding orders or memoranda
issued in connection with or by reason of such Special Order or
in implementation thereof are likewise null and void. The
election referred to was the January 18, 1988 local election. He
further alleges therein that he "is filing" with the COMELEC
criminal charges for violation of Sections 3, 261(h) and 264 of
B. P. No. 881 against former Administrator Lanuza and Teotico.
He prays inter alia, that the court declare null and void and set
aside Special Order No. 219, Teotico's Memoranda of 7
January, 2 March, and 11 March, 1988, the Formal Charges of
23 March, the preventive suspension of 4 April, Special Order
No. 86, the Memorandum of 11 April 1988, and Ordinario's
letter of 14 April 1988, and the formal investigation to be
conducted on the charge against him.
On 18 April 1988 respondent Judge issued a restraining order
directing respondents therein to refrain from enforcing
Annexes "E", "I", "M", "O", "R", "S", and "Z" of the amended
petition until further orders of the court and setting the
hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
26
on 26 April 1988.
On 2 May 1988 Teotico and his co-respondents in the court
below filed, through the office of the Solicitor General, a
motion to dismiss the case and opposition to the issuance of a
27
writ of preliminary injunction alleging that the petition is
premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
patently lacks merit and is merely intended to derail the
administrative investigation against Agda. Movants set the
hearing thereof on 5 May 1988.
On 4 May 1988 Agda filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss and memorandum in support of his application for a
28
writ of preliminary injunction.
On 11 May 1988 respondent Judge issued an Order granting
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
29
filing of a bond of P50,000. 00 on the basis of the following
findings:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
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I
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he ordered petitioner, allegedly in
compliance with the writ of injunction issued, to
reinstate respondent Agda to his previous position as
Fiber Regional Administrator FIDA Region I with full
backwages and allowances notwithstanding that such
act was not mandated or even mentioned in the
prohibitory injunctive writ.
II
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he refused to dismiss respondent's
petition in Civil Case No. 88-577 despite his finding
that respondent has already availed of an
administrative remedy which is pending resolution by
the Civil Service Commission.
III
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary
injunction dated May 11, 1988 without hearing on the
merits.
In compliance with Our resolution of 12 April 1989, herein
respondents filed their Comment on 2 May 1989.
As We stated in the introductory portion of this Decision, in the
resolution of 29 May 1989 We gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their Memoranda, which
they complied with.
Page 48 of 150
45
., We held:
Page 49 of 150
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction and a host of cases has
50
buttressed its stability. There are, of course, recognized
exceptions thereto, but, unfortunately, private respondent
cannot seek safe refuge under their protective mantle, for in
respect to the remedy provided for in Section 24(c) of P.D. No.
807, which is also the remedy provided for in Section 24(f),
availment thereof is indispensable for the viability of any
judicial action. As we held in Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et
al., supra:
Finally, respondent Navarro has not exhausted
administrative remedies as she did not elevate the
matter of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission
in accordance with Section 24(c), P.D. No. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, which
provides:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Page 50 of 150
Page 51 of 150
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 29, 2004
[1]
decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which read:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the petition
[2]
is GRANTED, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation is
hereby ordered to give due course to petitioners, Chinese
General Hospital and Medical Center, claims for the period
from 1989 to 1992, amounting to FOURTEEN MILLION TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY
[3]
EIGHT PESOS and 71/100 PESOS (P14,291,568.71).
Page 52 of 150
xxxxxxxxx
We agree.
[10]
which
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Page 57 of 150
VIOLETA J. JOSEF,
Respondents.
x-------------------- - - - - - -x
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
- versus -
ANTONIETA FORTUNA-IBE,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
July 5, 2010
DECISION
Subject
Theory of Accounts
Business Law
Management Services
Auditing Theory
Auditing Problems
Practical Accounting I
Practical Accounting II
Petitioners Grade
65 %
66 %
69 %
82 %
70 %
68 %
77 %
Page 58 of 150
[3]
case was raffled to Branch 33, and docketed as Civil Case No. 9886881. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its
members (the respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies of the
Examination Papers. Petitioner also prayed that final judgment be
issued ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with all documents
and other materials as would enable her to determine whether
respondents fairly administered the examinations and correctly
graded petitioners performance therein, and, if warranted, to issue to
[11]
her a certificate of registration as a CPA.
On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to
the Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and
argued, inter alia, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought,
that the respondents did not have the duty to furnish petitioner with
copies of the Examination Papers, and that petitioner had other plain,
speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, namely,
[12]
recourse to the PRC. Respondents also filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in the main case, which asked that the
Petition for Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for lack of merit
on the following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no cause of action
because there was no ministerial duty to release the information
demanded; and (3) the constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law, including
[13]
Section 20, Article IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
(which was admitted by the RTC), where she included the following
allegation in the body of her petition:
The allegations in this amended petition are
meant only to plead a cause of action for access
to the documents requested, not for re-correction
which petitioner shall assert in the proper forum
depending on, among others, whether she finds
sufficient error in the documents to warrant such
or any other relief. None of the allegations in this
amended petition, including those in the
following paragraphs, is made to assert a cause of
[14]
action for re-correction.
xxxx
3. that have been given in the
examination except if the test
bank for the subject has on
deposit at least two thousand
[7]
(2,000) questions.
[8]
If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking
of her exam, the following prayer for relief was deleted from the
Amended Petition: and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA.
On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed the
May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a
[15]
CPA. Petitioner
filed
her
Opposition
on July
8,
[16]
1998. Subsequently, on October 29, 1998, respondents filed their
Answer with Counterclaim to the amended petition. They reiterated
their original allegations and further alleged that there was no cause
of action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted,
they had ceased to be members of the Board of Accountancy and
they were not in possession of the documents sought by the
[17]
petitioner.
Page 59 of 150
2. Judgment be issued
a)
(a) commanding respondents to give petitioner all
documents and other materials as would enable
her to determine whether respondents fairly
administered the same examinations and
correctly graded petitioners performance
therein and, if warranted, to make the
appropriate revisions on the results of her
examination. (Emphasis ours)
b)
c)
Questionnaire in each of
the seven subjects comprising
the Accountancy Examination of
October, 1997;
Petitioners
Answer
Sheets; and
Answer keys to the
questionnaires.
[23]
SO ORDERED.
On June 21, 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition on
the ground that the petition had already become moot, since
petitioner managed to pass the 1998 CPA Board
[20]
[21]
examinations. Petitioner sought reconsideration which was
[22]
granted by the trial court in its Omnibus Order dated November 11,
2002. The Omnibus Order provides in part:
On the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner, the Court is inclined to reconsider its
Order dismissing the petition. The Court agrees
with the petitioner that the passing of the
petitioner in the subsequent CPA examination did
not render the petition moot and academic
because the relief and if warranted, to issue to her
a certificate of registration as Certified Public
Accountant was deleted from the original
petition. As regard the issue of whether the
petitioner has the constitutional right to have
access to the questioned documents, the Court
would want first the parties to adduce evidence
before it can resolve the issue so that it can make
a complete determination of the rights of the
parties.
The Court would also want the Professional
Regulation Commission to give its side of the case
the moment it is impleaded as a respondent in
the Second Amended Petition for Mandamus
[24]
(a)
(b)
(c)
Page 60 of 150
Our Ruling
Propriety of Writ of Mandamus
At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Any claim for recorrection or revision of her 1997 examination cannot be compelled
by mandamus. This much was made evident by our ruling in Agustin[31]
Ramos v. Sandoval, where we stated:
After deliberating on the petition in relation to the
other pleadings filed in the proceedings at bar,
the Court resolved to DENY said petition for lack
of merit. The petition at bar prays for the setting
aside of the Order of respondent Judge
dismissing petitioners mandamus action to
compel the other respondents (Medical Board of
Examiners and the Professional Regulation
Commission) to reconsider, recorrect and/or
rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from
their present failing grades to higher or passing
marks. The function of reviewing and reassessing the petitioners answers to the
examination questions, in the light of the facts
and arguments presented by them x x x is a
discretionary function of the Medical Board,
not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence,
not within the scope of the writ of
mandamus. The obvious remedy of the
petitioners from the adverse judgment by the
Page 61 of 150
Page 62 of 150
FIRST DIVISION
MERIDA WATER DISTRICT,
ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
NAMELY: SUSANO
TOREJAS,
JR., LOURDES QUINTE,
ROMULO
PALES,
CARMELITA
DE
LOS
ANGELES, VILLAFRANCA
ROSAL,
AND
MWD
GENERAL MANAGER NILO
C. LUCERO,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AZCUNA,
REYES,* and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
- versus FRANCISCO
BACARRO,
VICTORINO DOMANILLO,
PATRICK BACOL, CARLITO
BARRERA,
RUSTICA
MENDOLA, JOSE DELIO
HERMOSO,
CHARITO
TOLORIO, MA. VICTORIA
MAINGQUE, ELMER GO,
AND GERARDO BIOCO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the
[1]
Decision
[2]
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Page 71 of 150
just because the first paragraph of Section 18, Article VII fails to
[54]
state the magic word only.
But let us for the nonce pursue Philcemcors logic further.
It claims that since Section 5 does not allegedly limit the
circumstances upon which the DTI Secretary may impose
general safeguard measures, it is a worthy pursuit to determine
whether the entire context of the SMA, as discerned by all the
other familiar indicators of legislative intent supplied by norms
of statutory interpretation, would justify safeguard measures
absent a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission.
The first line of attack employed is on Section 5 itself, it
allegedly not being as clear as it sounds. It is advanced that
Section 5 does not relate to the legal ability of either the Tariff
Commission or the DTI Secretary to bind or foreclose review
and reversal by one or the other. Such relationship should
instead be governed by domestic administrative law and
remedial law. Philcemcor thus would like to cast the
proposition in this manner: Does it run contrary to our legal
order to assert, as the Court did in its Decision, that a body of
relative junior competence as the Tariff Commission can bind
an administrative superior and cabinet officer, the DTI
Secretary? It is easy to see why Philcemcor would like to
divorce this DTI Secretary-Tariff Commission interaction from
the confines of the SMA. Shorn of context, the notion would
seem radical and unjustifiable that the lowly Tariff Commission
can bind the hands and feet of the DTI Secretary.
It can be surmised at once that respondents preferred
interpretation is based not on the express language of the
SMA, but from implications derived in a roundabout manner.
Certainly, no provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI
Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure despite the
absence of a positive final recommendation of the Tariff
Commission. On the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that
the DTI Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure
upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission.
The causal connection in Section 5 between the imposition by
the DTI Secretary of the general safeguard measure and the
positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is patent,
and even respondents do not dispute such connection.
As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 5
to be clear, plain and free from ambiguity so as to render
unnecessary resort to the congressional records to ascertain
legislative intent. Yet respondents, on the dubitable premise
that Section 5 is not as express as it seems, again latch on to
the record of legislative deliberations in asserting that there
was no legislative intent to bar the DTI Secretary from
imposing the general safeguard measure anyway despite the
absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission.
Let us take the bait for a moment, and examine
respondents commonly cited portion of the legislative record.
One would presume, given the intense advocacy for the
efficacy of these citations, that they contain a smoking
gun express declarations from the legislators that the DTI
Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure even if the
Tariff Commission refuses to render a positive final
determination. Such smoking gun, if it exists, would
Page 72 of 150
[by the Tariff Commission], since the DTI Secretary may choose
to impose a general safeguard measure different from that
recommended by the Tariff Commission or not to impose a
safeguard measure at all. Nowhere in these cited deliberations
was Congressman Punzalan, or any other member of Congress
for that matter, quoted as saying that the DTI Secretary may
ignore a negative determination by the Tariff Commission as to
the existence of the conditions warranting the imposition of
general safeguard measures, and thereafter proceed to impose
these measures nonetheless. It is too late in the day to
ascertain from the late Congressman Punzalan himself whether
he had made these remarks in order to assure the other
legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose the general
safeguard measures notwithstanding a negative determination
by the Tariff Commission. But certainly, the language of Section
5 is more resolutory to that question than the recorded
remarks of Congressman Punzalan.
Respondents employed considerable effort to becloud
Section 5 with undeserved ambiguity in order that a proper
resort to the legislative deliberations may be had. Yet assuming
that Section 5 deserves to be clarified through an inquiry into
the legislative record, the excerpts cited by the respondents are
far more ambiguous than the language of the assailed
provision regarding the key question of whether the DTI
Secretary may impose safeguard measures in the face of a
negative determination by the Tariff Commission. Moreover,
even Southern Cross counters with its own excerpts of the
[57]
legislative record in support of their own view.
It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated
legislation, for two sides with contrapuntal interpretations of a
statute to highlight their respective citations from the
[58]
legislative debate in support of their particular views. A futile
exercise of second-guessing is happily avoided if the meaning
of the statute is clear on its face. It is evident from the text of
Section 5 that there must be a positive final determination
by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported
into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute
or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry.
Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of
wishful thinking.
For the same reason that Section 5 is explicit as regards
the essentiality of a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission, there is no need to refer to the Implementing
Rules of the SMA to ascertain a contrary intent. If there is
indeed a provision in the Implementing Rules that allows the
DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure even
without the positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission, said rule is void as it cannot supplant the express
language of the legislature. Respondents essentially rehash
their previous arguments on this point, and there is no reason
to consider them anew. The Decision made it clear that nothing
in Rule 13.2 of the Implementing Rules, even though captioned
Final Determination by the Secretary, authorizes the DTI
Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure in the
absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff
[59]
Commission. Similarly, the Rules and Regulations to Govern
the Conduct of Investigation by the Tariff Commission Pursuant
Page 73 of 150
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Page 81 of 150
VI. On Forum-Shopping
We remain convinced that there was no willful and
deliberate forum-shopping in this case by Southern Cross. The
causes of action that animate this present petition for review
and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct from each
other, even though they relate to similar factual antecedents.
Yet it also appears that contrary to the undertaking signed by
the President of Southern Cross, Hironobu Ryu, to inform this
Court of any similar action or proceeding pending before any
court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from knowledge
thereof, Southern Cross informed this Court only on 12 August
2003 of the petition it had filed with the CTA eleven days
earlier. An appropriate sanction is warranted for such failure,
but not the dismissal of the petition.
for
Page 82 of 150
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on
June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Among its pertinent provisions
are the following:
(1) The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of
the telephone service not later than 30 days from the end of
each billing cycle. In case the statement is received beyond this
period, the subscriber shall have a specified grace period within
which to pay the bill and the public telecommunications entity
(PTEs) shall not be allowed to disconnect the service within the
grace period.
(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a
voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or similar
facility excluding the customers own equipment.
(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each
purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM
cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first
use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from
the date the prepaid SIM card is fully consumed but not
beyond 2 years and 45 days from date of first use to replenish
the SIM card, otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered
invalid. The validity of an invalid SIM card, however, shall be
installed upon request of the customer at no additional charge
except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
(4) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their
cards before the start of every call using the cards.
(5) The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service
whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute
per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The authorized rates per
[1]
minute shall thus be divided by 10.
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take
effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the
UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The
[2]
Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions
of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of
prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile
telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the
Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to
all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which
contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the
incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The Memorandum
directed CMTS operators to:
a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000
requiring the presentation and verification of the
[4]
Page 83 of 150
[8]
[10]
Page 84 of 150
Page 85 of 150
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule
[1]
[2]
45, seeking to nullify the July 12, 2002 and the November
[3]
22, 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The
decretal portion of the first assailed Order reads:
Page 86 of 150
The Facts
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year
computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges
of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family,
Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of
her relatives. During the second semester of school year 20012002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad,
respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign
dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution, the proceeds of
which were to go to the construction of the schools tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two
tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly
implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets
with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to
pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from
attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to
pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics,
her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic
class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The
next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she
was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their
statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets,
allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioners pleas
ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who
unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with
PCSTs policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a
[5]
Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad.
In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal
damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as
exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the
costs of litigation and attorneys fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to
[6]
Dismiss on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. According to respondents, the
question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of
an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should
have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the
Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
In her Comment to respondents Motion, petitioner
argued that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues
for our consideration:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies in a civil action exclusively for damages based
on violation of the human relation provisions of the Civil Code,
filed by a student against her former school.
Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of
invalidity of a certain school administrative policy by the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) before a former
student can successfully maintain an action exclusively for
damages in regular courts.
Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for damages
based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on human
[9]
relations filed by a student against the school.
All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.
The Court, however, sees a second issue which, though not
expressly raised by petitioner, was impliedly contained in her
Petition: whether the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of
action.
Page 87 of 150
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on
petitioners alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies
before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the
determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the
wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs academic policy. Thus, the
Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the
administrative body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to
implement the state policy to protect, foster and promote the
right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels
and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is
[10]
accessible to all.
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to
the present case since she is praying for damages, a remedy
beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the
[11]
jurisdiction of the courts.
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case.
[12]
In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on
the rationale behind this doctrine:
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and convenience,
should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities
have been given the appropriate opportunity
to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum. x x
[13]
x.
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of
PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not
adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances,
the consequences of respondents acts could no longer be
undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained
[14]
of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial
[15]
tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to
[16]
award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one
of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within
[17]
the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Page 88 of 150
14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own
two tickets because aside form the fact
that she could not afford to pay them it
is also against her religious practice as
a member of a certain religious
congregation to be attending dance
parties and celebrations;
15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A.
Gamurot gave her class its final
examination in the subject Logic she
warned that students who had not paid
the tickets would not be allowed to
participate in the examination, for
which threat and intimidation many
students were eventually forced to
make payments:
16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay,
defendant
Rachelle
A.
Gamurot
inhumanly made plaintiff sit out the
class but the defendant did not allow
her to take her final examination in
Logic;
17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the
final examination in the subject
Statistics, defendant Elissa Baladad, in
connivance with defendants Rachelle A.
Gamurot and PCST, announced in the
classroom that she was not allowing
plaintiff and another student to take
the examination for their failure and
refusal to pay the price of the tickets,
and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff
and the other student from the
classroom;
18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the
examination but all defendants could
say was that the prohibition to give the
examinations to non-paying students
was an administrative decision;
19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and
other obligations in the school;
20. That the above-cited incident was not a first
since PCST also did another forced
distribution of tickets to its students in
the first semester of school year 2001[22]
2002; x x x
The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first,
breach of contract; and second, liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract
[23]
Page 89 of 150
xxxxxxxxx
(2) The right to
freely choose their
field of study subject
to existing curricula
and to continue their
course therein up to
graduation, except in
cases of academic
deficiency, or
violation of
disciplinary
regulations.
Liability for Tort
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private
respondents inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of
their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which
inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and
[33]
unworthiness; as a result of such punishment, she was
allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second
semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her
studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly
caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of
Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the
law state thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers
residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on
account of his beliefs, lowly station
Page 90 of 150
[39]
Present:
- versus -
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT,
Respondent.
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to
academic freedom. We are not impressed. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
[36]
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. In Garcia v. the
[37]
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the
Court upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female
students admission to theological studies in a seminary for
prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom of an
academic institution thus: to decide for itself aims and
objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when overriding public
[38]
welfare calls for some restraint.
Page 91 of 150
of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional
concept of fiscal autonomy.
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was
appropriated for its Central Office by the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations
for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered,
[1]
amount to P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the
total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during
the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving
an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
held:
Page 92 of 150
Unmanageable
national
government budget deficit as used in this
Section shall be construed to mean that
the actual national government budget
deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget
deficit targets consistent with the full-year
target deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in
the FY 2002 Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing submitted by the
President to Congress pursuant to Section
22, Article VII of the Constitution or there are
clear economic indications of an impending
occurrence of such condition, as determined
by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee and approved by the President.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Page 93 of 150
Sec.
64.
Appropriations
of
Agencies
Vested
with
Fiscal
Autonomy. Any provision of law to the
contrary
notwithstanding,
the
appropriations authorized in this Act for the
Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the
Commission on Human Rights, the Office of
the
Ombudsman, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit and
the Commission on Elections shall be
automatically and regularly released.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Page 94 of 150
For review is the decision dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by
herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in
order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied
petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by
herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24,
.[2]
1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin. h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as
follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2)
motor vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733
loaded with one thousand and twenty six
(1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber
valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio
Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143
loaded with one thousand two hundred
twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97)
board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued
at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio
Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela
.[3]
Babalcon. "
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the
vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses.
Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department
of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
.[4]
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts
were issued but the drivers refused to accept the
.[5]
receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutors
Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in
Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78),
Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
[6]
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Mis sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly
taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR,
prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal
complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda.
Page 95 of 150
.[19]
Page 96 of 150
Page 97 of 150
Page 98 of 150
statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their
letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter
[3]
should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. Pending
resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed
as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against
[4]
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the
[5]
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ
ordering
the
return
of
the
truck
to
private
[6]
respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of
action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated
[7]
December 28, 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having
been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which
sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question
[8]
involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present
[9]
petition, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on
September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated
[10]
September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this
Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the
other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle
asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was
violated because they were not given the chance to be heard,
and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the
grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized
in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as
admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the
crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and
relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion
that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of
[11]
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver
or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause
[12]
of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
Page 99 of 150
acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is
authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the
second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go
along with private respondents thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor
include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by
the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces
the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein
below:
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or
His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all
cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and
policies on the matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a
way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the
[33]
statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
[34]
benefits intended. In this wise, the observation of the
Solicitor General is significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more
responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the
urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country,
that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This
March 2, 2007
21
SO ORDERED.
The Case
The Facts
2. Not to enforce the Cease and Desist Order issued against xxx
[petitioner];
3. To maintain the status quo by not withholding the issuance
of yearly school permits and special order to all graduates.
Let a writ of preliminary Injunction to that effect issue upon
posting by [petitioner] of an injunction bond in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), and subject to
the approval of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
On September 22, 1998, [petitioner] filed before public
respondent a Motion To Declare [Respondent] in [D]efault
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 9 in relation to Section 4, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, and at the same time praying
[for] the Motion to [S]et for [H]earing on October 30, 1998 at
8:30 a.m. On the same date, [respondent] filed a Motion For
Extension of Time to File its Answer, x x x until November 18,
1998. On November 17, 1998, [respondent] filed its [A]nswer.
[Petitioner], on November 11, 1998 filed its Opposition to the
Motion for Extension of Time to File [Respondents] Answer and
on November 9, 1998, a Motion to Expunge [Respondents]
answer and at the same time praying that its [M]otion be heard
on November 27, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. On even date, public
respondent judge issued an Order directing the Office of the
Solicitor General to file within a period of ten (10) days from
date its written Opposition to the Motion to Expunge
[Respondents] answer and within the same period to file a
written [N]otice of [A]ppearance in the case. Unable to file their
written Opposition to the Motion to Expunge within the period
given by public respondent, the OSG filed a Motion to Admit
Written Opposition stating the reasons for the same, attaching
thereto the Opposition with [F]ormal [E]ntry of [A]ppearance.
In an Order dated December 9, 1998, (Annex A), public
respondent judge ruled on [Petitioners ] Motion to Declare
[Respondent in Default], to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the present
motion is granted. [Petitioner] is hereby directed to present its
evidence ex-parte before the [b]ranch [c]lerk of [c]ourt, who is
designated as [c]ommissioner for the purpose, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this [O]rder, and for the latter to submit
his report within twenty (20) days from the date the case is
submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
[3]
[4]
Issues
July 9, 2002
EN BANC
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a
new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x
1
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date,
then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
2
offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a
memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP,
so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which
stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction,
and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be
agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to
progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for
items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price
escalation, retention and other terms and conditions
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the
financing required for such works shall be provided by
PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights
and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of
PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of
CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by
CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which
have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise
disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas
consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the
Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5
and approximately Three Million Three Hundred
Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight
(3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at
varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level
located outside the Financial Center Area and the First
3
Neighborhood Unit."
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total
area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently,
on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311,
and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One
(1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the
Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
4
negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed
5
the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the
6
JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the
JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation
in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16,
7
1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA
are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28,
1999, the Office of the President under the administration of
then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the
President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null
14
and void."
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA
follows:
15
and AMARI
16
are as
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic
because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of
the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions
agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied
petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations.
Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have
already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999.
Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the
Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the
constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and
approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on
the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial
review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and
AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to
moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA
and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on
constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public
domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed
violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the
effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but
one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5
hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila
Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more
compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony.
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the
Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can
still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable
lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in
cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the
17
bench, bar, and the public.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All
previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
18
1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The
transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim
the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect
19
32
(Emphasis supplied)
36
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed
of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject
to such regulations and safeguards as the GovernorGeneral may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis
supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain
title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also
vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore
lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the
government only if these lands were no longer needed for
public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the
lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made
government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to private parties,
these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private
parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private
parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by
private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act
46
No. 2874, the Public Land Act. The salient provisions of Act
No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell
to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section
59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only
alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that
the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires
congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the
government previously transferred to government units or
entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No.
141 declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such
as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably
necessary for the purposes for which such sale or
lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred
and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this
limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or
transfers made to a province, municipality or branch
or subdivision of the Government for the purposes
deemed by said entities conducive to the public
interest; but the land so granted, donated, or
transferred to a province, municipality or branch
or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in
a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No.
141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section 56 of
Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of
CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the
maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the
State. These government units and entities should not just turn
around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of
lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and
entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations
on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used
to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain
to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by
57
operation of law a lien on these lands.
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public
domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and
67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by
this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as
property of public dominion those properties of the State
which, without being for public use, are intended for public
service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus,
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if
not employed for public use or public service, if developed to
enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public
dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973,
likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution stated that
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands
of the public domain, natural resources shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural
lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the
1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial,
60
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. If the
land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it
would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the
public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands
of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution.
Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account
conservation, ecological, and development
requirements of the natural resources, shall determine
by law the size of land of the public domain which
may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to,
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only
lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only
benefit private individuals.
xxx
101
where the
CASTRO, J.:p
Leticia Cipriano served as record clerk in the office of municipal
treasurer Gregorio P. Marcelino of Calabanga, Camarines Sur,
from January 1, 1963 to January 15, 1966, at a monthly salary of
eighty pesos (P80). On the latter date she resigned. Because
the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her severance from
the service, refused to pay her salary corresponding to the
period from September 1, 1965 to January 15, 1966, inclusive
(P349), as well as the commutation equivalent of her
accumulated vacation and sick leaves (P600), Cipriano filed on
May 5, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
an action for mandamus (civil case 6152) to compel the said
municipal treasurer to pay her the total amount of P949. She
also asked for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and costs of suit.
Marcelino moved to dismiss upon the ground that she had not
"exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the present
action," arguing that exhaustion of all administrative remedies
is a condition precedent before an aggrieved party may have
judicial recourse. Granting the motion, the court a quo ordered
the dismissal of the case. Cipriano's motion for reconsideration
was denied on May 15, 1967.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari on pure questions of
law.
FIRST DIVISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court from the Decision dated 27 October
1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30388 which
dismissed petitioners Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
said courts Resolution dated 10 January 1994 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
On 9 November 1992, public respondents promulgated
Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992, revising the
rules of practice before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to
take effect on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of said
administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rule 15 of
A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees payable to the BPTTT for
registration of patents and trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No.
2 which prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that is,
[1]
one application covering several classes of goods.
On 11 March 1993, petitioners, who are registered patent
agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to stop public respondents from enforcing the
[2]
aforementioned administrative orders and to declare Rule 16
of A.O. No. 1 and Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2, series of 1992
of the BPTTT null and void.
On 27 October 1993, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for prohibition and on 10 January 1994, denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on 18
[3]
November 1993.
In the present appeal, petitioners assign the following
errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE GROUND OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
QUESTIONED ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS ARE NULL AND VOID
FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PUBLICATION
we ruled that:
And
declared:
in
Philnabank
Employees
v.
Estanislao,
[10]
we
SO ORDERED.