Bar Matter No.

553 June 17, 1993

GUAM DIVORCE.

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

DON PARKINSON

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same
tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as
follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,
5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on

Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that
it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further
argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly

in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the
issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers'
Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation
of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this
case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted
by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

that the same are essentially without substantial

distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman
in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports,
local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made
its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms
its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms,i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc."

gives the impression that respondent corporation is

being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal

services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it
offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the
effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published
in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or
services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is

merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And
it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support
services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal
services are being offered by lawyers, whether true
or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims,
the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code

(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract
of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements,
it is obvious that the message being conveyed is
that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this
can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out

that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its
bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of
permanent union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication
of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas)
with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is

that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,

members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should
be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.

them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession

will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be doing better than
a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing

computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and
like services will greatly benefit the legal
profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice
but to prohibit such business.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent

is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which
should be made available exclusively to members
of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the

case at bar can be better performed by specialists
in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit

It must be emphasized, however, that some of

respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be

prohibited from simply disseminating information

regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that
it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the
Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that
it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot
be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit,
without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the

practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and
3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and
soliciting employment for its enumerated services
fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields
itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense.
From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then
take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look
after their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can
engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public
and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when

the public cannot ventilate any grievance

for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members
of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that
not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged
in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of
law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of

law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral

advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and
the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But
its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its
advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages,
absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines
and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice
of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable
Court, paramount consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take
a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards,
the fact remains that at present, these do not exist
in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who
may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do
so.
In the same manner, the general public should also
be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility

from advertising, it appears in the instant case that

legal services are being advertised not by lawyers
but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives
the misleading impression that there are lawyers
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the
very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly

advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it
is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal
in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of
a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that
one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized
only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada
and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the
use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act
may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that
such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it
is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic

about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it
falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . .
acting as a consultant can render

effective service unless he is familiar

with such statutes and regulations.
He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a
factor in determining what measures
he shall recommend, do not
constitute the practice of law . . . . It
is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of
the law . . . . Our knowledge of the
law accurate or inaccurate
moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but
when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning,
building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by
his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations expert cites,

in support of some measure that he

recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion,
they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and
of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to
erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this
function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of
the industrial relations experts are
the officers and business agents of
the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice
for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to

a management group chosen for

their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to
legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from
their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is
growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities.
The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or
that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given
by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is
practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees,
to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the

law. But such is not the fact in the

case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic
and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant
may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily
reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work
is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a
mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in
the subject under discussion, and
the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or
not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a

question of law. Most real estate

sales are negotiated by brokers who
are not lawyers. But if the value of
the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the
same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations
of a contract, or of a statute, it is
quite likely that defendant should
not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent
the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of
the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without power
to interfere with such determination
or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National

Labor Relations Board give to a party

the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative.
Rules and Regulations, September
11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant
may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher
v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice
or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work
for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and nonlawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another

profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client
whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears
to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may
not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx
for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may
be involved is actually the practice of law. If a nonlawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that
of a bookstore where the customer buys materials
on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the

publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that
the conjoining of these two, that is,
the text and the forms, with advice
as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that
relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney
and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL
OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF
A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or

readily identified person in a

particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper
basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact with
any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems
which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of

law, particularly with reference to

the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in
connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its
services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory.
"It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par.
6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in
that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With
all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of

law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty,
and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself
as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case
in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation

regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on
court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St.
23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board,

body, committee, or commission constituted by

law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity, performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending
the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the

legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.

262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court,
Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in

Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.

[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in
and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case
at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent,
as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving
ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to
laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they
may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to

emigration to the foreign country, and other

matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for
the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization
of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law.
That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article

published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors
and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984.
Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.
"when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you
how you contracted what's bothering you, they
take your temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then
it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms,

require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or,
if this were a hospital the residents or the interns.
We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, outpatient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had
a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in
taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and
your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist
in taxation would be properly trained to deal with
the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged
in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.

WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted
to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by

the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science

entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the
rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can
exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position
that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed
by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with
their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association.29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As

pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice

law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services
are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person
who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return
for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to
be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct,
the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's

advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved
in the present proceeding,39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to

trust. This cannot be forced but must be the

outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned
as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper.
A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to
the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent
to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two
broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and
those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal

fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the

names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may
a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.
The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes
in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under
any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not

applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the

disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule
of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or
the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless
and until it is implemented by such authority in that
state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at
bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of
our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve
to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this

point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such

negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and
maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,
subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is
the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by
respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after
due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative

misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is

referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN
herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing
the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant,
vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO,respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY.

RIZALINO
T.
SIMBILLO, petitioner,
vs.
IBP
COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL
G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator
and
Chief,
Public
Information
Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public
Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and
can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of
P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been
rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements
were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of theManila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his
legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him,
but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views

about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the

interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on
lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered
by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order
as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation. [5] On June 29,
2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The
IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. [7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No.
XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]

[10]

Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating

that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and
is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of
pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand,
filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and
XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed

as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo,
Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael
G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated
with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4,
2003.

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were

required to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not

a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not

primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law

advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
[14]
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.[15]The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication
of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs
for
the
Courts
indulgence,
his
contrition
rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services
again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he
had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months
later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the

October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent

are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts
authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage
Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not
only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case, [19] he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would
have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury
to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement
in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.
[21]
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyers name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission
to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices;

posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;

membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal
or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of
which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of

the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as
attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.

The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes
in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and
italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this

PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with
the Office or the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent)
with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to
complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women
while respondents first marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of
this Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did
on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP

(Commission) issued a Notice5 setting the mandatory conference
of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel
and respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be
resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful
solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct
for having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective
verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position
Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01
August 2005.8
Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by
respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on
technical and financial matters in the latters numerous petitions
for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby
he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by
the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten
percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged that,
from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in
millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they
were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued

by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total

of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful
solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to
advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant
supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the
Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to
clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused
respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having
married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office
(NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent,
contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M.
Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time
on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City
of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He
asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was

unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a

financial consultant, resulting in the latters dismissal of many
rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been
paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied
committing any. He contended that his law firm had an
agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the
firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation
case; and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of
the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be
presented in court. To support this contention, respondent
attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates
Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an
Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for
Operations of the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the
Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value,
since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent
did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged
bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies
of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the
certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the
contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO

Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent.

The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took
place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas,
Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was
between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place
at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28
September 1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a
marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it
took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second
and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single
under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the
Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the document
was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted
during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was
supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those
documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were
filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further informed the
Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case
No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTCCalamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In
both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that
there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing
his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar
Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment,
because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the
Commission scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November
2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he

would not attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his

willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the
resolution of the administrative case against the latter.
Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna,
seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered
to be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the
Commission duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed
with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." 32 The first criminal
case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy
for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126,
charged respondent with having committed bigamy for
contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the
Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his
provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the
clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission
denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the
RTCLaguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report
and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against
respondent.37 The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment

of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with
the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine
respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant
failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent. 38 On the
second charge, the Commission found respondent to have
violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised
his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended
that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to
point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be
guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove
through documentary evidence that respondent committed
bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters
first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of
respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred,
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01
August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature.
He contends that the Commission should have suspended the
disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate
cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts
bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with
other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by
complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was
not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus,
respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to
disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative

proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately

filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts.43

the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this

matter.
Second Charge:

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions

for Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April
2008 recommending respondents disbarment.44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against
respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the
nonpayment of the formers share in the fees, if proven to be true
is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the
Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the
allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant
the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the
respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a
lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients
secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer
involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering
that complainants allegations in this case had not been proven,

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients
and advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi
& Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were
owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latters
legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but
it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the
business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in
corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he
violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from
soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other
lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business
is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily
lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on
the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer,
would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by

complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to
be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by
respondent as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the
Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the
engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that,
should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the formers
loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered
objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed
by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and
not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated
to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be
operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing
for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering
consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the
degree of prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm
the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules
2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a

serious accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant
submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered
into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter
objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that
they were submitted after the administrative case had been
submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to
controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis.
Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in
filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as
the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this
case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for
the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second,
lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern
that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.1wphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.54In this case, complainant
submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent
entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was

still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second

and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he
contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of
the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna
one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the second
and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent.
He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the
genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers
marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes
of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing
the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified
by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records
pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having
been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is
accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a
presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second
and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the
Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for
Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the
second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements,
rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then
Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds
in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment

by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage contracts

as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of
the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what
course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil
Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that
respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage
was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we
held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar
whom we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack
of that good moral character required of them not only as a
condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise,
for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been
made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the
lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is
because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is
expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times
since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and
honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of
dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of
justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an
officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and
moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may
rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly

immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section

27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as Deputy

Sheriff, respondents.

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar

respondent and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.

Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against

Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal
advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in
bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of
Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S.
Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution dated 10
November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No.
53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal,
earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the
pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the
Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian
Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 757-R. 1

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G.
SALAYSAY, in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,

On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding

petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other
defendants. 2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and
Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.G.R. No. 53546-R. 3

During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein,

Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court,
he was substituted by his heirs Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R.
Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes who
are now the private respondents in this present petition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record,
received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from
receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which
to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974,
respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to
file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. 4 A copy
of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17
July 1974. 5
As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution,
respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued another
Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:
It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant
failed to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief
within the reglementary period which expired on
April 5, 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in
the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was
received by said counsel on July 17, 1974; . . . 6
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW
OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty.
Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO
& ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are still being settled

between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby
Alberto, the latter having established her own law office;
furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this
case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended
to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it
through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the
motion for reconsideration, stating that:
Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for
defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds
therein stated, that the resolution of September 9,
1974, dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that
appellant be granted a reasonable period of time
within which to file its brief: considering that six (6)
months had elapsed since the expiration of the
original period and more than two and one-half (2) months since counsel received copy of the
resolution requiring him to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file
brief; Motion Denied. 8
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above
Resolution within the period to file a petition for review, the same
became final and executory, and the records of the case were
remanded to the court of origin for execution.
The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October
1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff and
Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with
Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice
of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at
10:00 o'clock in the morning, the auction sale thereof. 10

On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a

Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing
the following allegations:
1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has
the inherent power to modify and set aside its
processes, in the interest of justice, especially so in
this case when the case was dismissed on account
of the untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas,
counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).
2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the
appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the
late Atty. Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to
denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is,
therefore, a clear and unmistakable denial of due
process on the part of BRSEI.
3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not
impair the rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI
is asking for, is a day in court to be heard on
appeal in order to have the unfair, unjust and
unlawful decision, set aside and reversed.
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of
10 November 1975: 12
. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by
the law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and
while Atty. Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law
firm was not dissolved since it received the notice
to file brief on February 19, 1974, and the copy of
the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant
to show cause why the appeal should not be

dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17,

1974 and no cause was shown; . . .
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original
petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and
Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

14

On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the

Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the
ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his
lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during
the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of
Appeals.
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered
petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt
of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment
until after the amendment is presented and admitted. 16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached
the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment consists in the
substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes with his heirs.
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the
respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from
notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April
1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April
1976.20

In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition

for lack of merit: 21
L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, et. al.). Considering the allegations,
issues and arguments adduced in the amended
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, respondents' comment
thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said
comment, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition
for lack of merit.
However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its
reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right
to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given
due course.
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment
Motion for Reconsideration.

23

to said

On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its

Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit
simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30)
days from notice thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November
1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November
1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the present
case submitted for decision. 27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed
for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.

Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on

respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and
cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of
Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 28 Indeed, in said
case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals
reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the
appellants therein to file their brief, and after entry of judgment
and remand of the records to the lower court and cancelled
the entry of judgment, requiring the lower court to return the
records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Said
case, however, had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which
prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this
Court found sufficient to justify such action. As this Court,
through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:
We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or
singular factual situation in this case and to
forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of
the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should
be upheld.
That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans
in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it
because they allegedly failed to give to their
counsel the money needed for paying the cost of
printing their brief.
But presumably the Appellate Court realized later
that fraud might have been practised on appellants
Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not
included in the record on appeal. In (sic) sensed
that there was some irregularity in the actuations
of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been
misled into dismissing the appeal.

Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished

them with copies of his motions for extension of
time to file brief so that they would have known
that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of
their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing
their brief and they could have articulated their
reaction directly to the Court. Counsel could have
moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to
withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be
required to manifest whether they were still
desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a
mimeographed brief to be filed for them
(SeePeople vs. Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 728). Since counsel did none of those
things, his representation that the appellants had
evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is
difficult to believe.
If the appellate court has not yet lost its
jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in
reinstating an appeal, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case and the
demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. Alquiza,
L-23342, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G.
276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62 Phil.
275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the
appeal by reason of the remand of the record to
the lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent
right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the
record to the lower court if it had rendered a
decision or issued a resolution which was induced
by fraud practised upon it. Such a right is not
affected by the statutory provision that after the

record has been remanded, the appellate court has

no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur.
2nd 433citing Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So.
176; 84 ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623,
203 Pac. 279).
In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple
negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel, which is neither
excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated
in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 30We said:
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate
an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or
implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an
appeal, still such power or discretion must be
exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient
cause, in like manner as the power or discretion
vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of
time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a
showing which would call for, prompt and justify its
exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be
upheld.
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies
mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and the supposed
confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES. It says: 31
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian,
engaged the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to
handle its defense in Civil Case No. 757-R;
however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered

petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law

firm operating under the name and style "Crispin
D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, the Answer to the
complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to
Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said
case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas &
Associates" represents petitioner in the action.

any of the surviving associates of the defunct law

firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing or
that the law office had been dissolved and that the
law office had been dissolved and that none of the
lawyers herein formerly connected desired to
handle the appealed case of petitioner. . . .

On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as

a result of a brief heart attack. In consequence
(sic) of his death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates" was in a terribly confused state of
affairs. In effect, said law firm was dissolved. Atty.
Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other
associates left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining
other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose
Baizas, son of deceased Crispin D. Baizas, took
over the management of why may have been left
of his father's office, it appearing that some, if not
many, cases of the defunct office were taken over
by the associates who left the firm upon its
dissolution.

The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas,

Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none
of the associates took over petitioner's case, and
no notice of such state of affairs was given to
petitioner who could have engaged the services of
another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before
respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an
UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to
the relief prayed for. On the other hand, the nondissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for
relief since, in such event, the said firm had
ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which act
constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the
result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in
court. In the abovementioned Yuseco case, this
Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully
declared that it will always be disposed to grant
relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud,
reckless inattention and downright incompetence
of lawyers, which has the consequence of
depriving their day (sic) in court.

But, none of the former partners and

associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed
the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner
in its appealed case before the respondent Court of
Appeals. No notice was served upon petitioner by

We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel

was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not
merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not
extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and
petitioner.

After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial

court, petitioner's counsel appears to have
changed its firm name to "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates." The appeal was thus pursued for
petitioner by the law firm "Baizas, Alberto &
Associates."

In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed
by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of
respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the
requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse
presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas. This Court held therein that:
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid
excuse on the part of his associates for not
attending to Alvendia's appeal,
supposing arguendo that his office was solely
entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in
the Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not
Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating
with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did not
file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of
Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file
the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained
until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law
firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial
and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was
designated to handle the case, later left the office after the death
of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could
have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the
law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate
or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by
the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the
services of a new lawyer.
In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:

Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of

petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As
revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief
on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted
to it. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's
Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within
the reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it,
thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September
1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the
former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974, the BAIZAS
LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution
which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October
1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year
when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in
reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court
following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.

The negligence committed in the case at bar

cannot be considered excusable, nor (sic) is it
unavoidable. Time and again the Court has
admonished law firms to adopt a system of
distributing pleadings and notices, whereby
lawyers working therein receive promptly notices
and pleadings intended for them, so that they will
always be informed of the status of their cases.
Their Court has also often repeated that the
negligence of clerks which adversely affect the
cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the
latter.
Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW
OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for
reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any
further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said

motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is

presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. The latter has
neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.

33

-versus-

QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.

Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed

to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As pointed out
by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to
be the intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of
the latter must have been known to the former. 34 This fact
should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the
case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence,
thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural
due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. 35
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a
good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement
August 23, 2007
of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's
x-----------------------------------------motion to reinstate its appeal.
- - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted.
PER CURIAM:

Costs against petitioner.

IT SO ORDERED.
DIANA RAMOS,
Complainant,

A. C. No. 6788
(Formerly, CBD 382)
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension [1] against Atty.

Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
THE COMPLAINT
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the
assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and

criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita

Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but
the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her
cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed
her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
He would then come out after several hours to inform her that
the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. [4] This
happened six times and for each appearance in court,
respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases
in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was
shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in
the government service from the very start. In fact, he first met
the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian,
Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's
daughter.[6]
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action
for damages against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the
PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult
Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. [9] Atty.
Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she
was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.
[10]
Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant
allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the

complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she

raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an
antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to
account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent
for safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. [14] A few
months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked
respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as
he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare
the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost
contact with the complainant.[15]
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint
was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22,
2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the
IBP Board of Governors.[16]
The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992
when respondent was still with the PAO.[18] It also noted that
respondent
described
the
complainant
as
a
shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer.
For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a
spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD
rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to
accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of
violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting
private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public

service.[24]

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or

property collected or received for or from a client.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves

completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice
of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal

service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he
can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to
the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated
by the receipt.[21]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of
the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the
CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000
by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in
case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an
additional suspension of six months.[22]
THE COURT'S RULING
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in government service are
expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are
subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In

addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with
their official function.[25]
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases
for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work
of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was
still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.[26] Respondent's

admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the

receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed
that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition
on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of
attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing
free legal assistance to indigent litigants. [27] Section 14(3),
Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the
Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal,
civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's

fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the
office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against
accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. [30] This undertaking
includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions
blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration

of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of

the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private
practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private
cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also
surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to
file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place
he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to
believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He
even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked
the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that
never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation
of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good
moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a
public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a
keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of
social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
[32]

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of

violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither
held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount
delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in
favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific
purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).
[34]
Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a

government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not

allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the
lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days
from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Fifth
Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG
POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL
KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO
RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP.,
ALLIED
LEASING
AND
FINANCE
CORPORATION,
ASIA
BREWERY,
INC.,
BASIC
HOLDINGS
CORP.,
FOREMOST
FARMS,
INC.,
FORTUNE
TOBACCO
CORP.,
GRANDSPAN

DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS

HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND
TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with
significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the
other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent
counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central
Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors,
officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3
million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505
million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank
extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a
total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK
failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977,
the Central
Bank
issued
a
resolution
declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety
to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering

its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was

held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos
government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino
was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against respondents
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian,
Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo,
Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance
Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost
Farms,
Inc.,
Fortune
Tobacco
Corporation,
Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services
and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern
Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings,
Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp.,
(collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O.
Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second
Division of theSandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the

PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties

allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former
President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.
[7]
After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the
cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases
were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these
cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel,
former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General [10] and counsel to
Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents
Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent
Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor
General,
he advised the
Central
Banks
officials
on
the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its
petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he
filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government
lawyers from
accepting
engagement
or

employment in connection with any matter in which he had

intervened while in said service.
On April
22,
1991 the
Second
Division
of
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion
to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. [11] It
found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as
Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the
Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a
position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
during his term as Solicitor General. [12] It further ruled that
respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession
in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It
appears
that
Civil
Case
Nos.
0096-0099
were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second Division to
the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion
to disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of
its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its
resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of

the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition

forcertiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil
Procedure.[18] The
PCGG
alleged
that
the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions
contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from
accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3)
that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent
Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues
of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and
the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the
substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again,
the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace

the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical
standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts
of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in
one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time.
The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the
litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of
truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the
client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to
inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement
alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees
and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's
practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early postrevolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in
England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes,
judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness
and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England
varied over time, but the variation in early America was far
greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony
and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the
effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation
was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only
three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and postrevolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency
and reasonable fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages
of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American
legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field
Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for
lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became
law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century.
At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and
George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to
flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers
wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus
brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A
number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than
the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial
regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit
prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued
to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior.
The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.

Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the

attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law.
Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive
statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were
more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and
they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. [21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of
ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the
nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar
association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty
and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur
of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes
became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the
re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but
they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking
up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the
new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar
Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the
task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their
members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a
comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was

the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908

Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties
of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public
respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,
the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32
of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the
form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest
conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially
related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by
the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.[26] On
the
other
hand, congruent-interest
representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons
through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative
opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified
them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is
rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be

to the advantage of parties who might later become private

practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any
matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a
judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in
the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend
many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and
1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as
its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
[32]

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was

growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis
Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the
adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in
part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the
inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise
observed thatCanon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible
participation in matters during their employment with the
government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace
it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of
Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary
Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer
must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35]became
the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained
unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by
DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as
a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules
used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new
format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for
enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons

altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by

placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model
Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly
with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA
did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of
the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs,
traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new
realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained
the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional
Ethics
but replaced the
expansive
phraseinvestigated
and
passed
upon with
the
word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest
aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has
no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents

Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the
issue of
whether
there
exists
a congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the
meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes
and bounds of the intervention made by the former
government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association
in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not
merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was
the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was
the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he
intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of

the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying
the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the
CFI of Manila.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board,

it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate
the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March

29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank,
namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and
General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor
Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to
proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion
of the said memorandum states:

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the

Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
had been taken and praying the assistance of the
Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the

Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure
should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the
Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation
had been made since the last examination of the
bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the
bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition
so that it may be permitted to resume business with
safety to its depositors and creditors and the general
public.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal

stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved
by the Monetary Board.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977
of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza
was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition
for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of
the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor
General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor,
Supervision and Examination Sector, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977,

containing a report on the current situation

of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re:
General Bank and Trust Co., dated March
23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A.
No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a
repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary
or needed by the Solicitor General for his
use in then CFI-praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of
respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve
whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept
of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is
given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever,
upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners

or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank

financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the
same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head
concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and
liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather
all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing
suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasibanking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm
within the said period that the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by
the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken
and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation
of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in

the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims

against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and
to implement the liquidation plan approved by the
Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an
official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously
appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The
liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the
assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to
money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same
to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying
the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may
be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and
recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section
34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be
set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its
actions under this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is

pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in

an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order
or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be
dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank
cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will
pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court
insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance
and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to
mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay
its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary
course of business. Provided, however, That this shall
not include the inability to pay of an otherwise noninsolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by
extraordinary demands induced by financial panic
commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section
28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under
this Section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or
special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended
by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on

the
procedure
to
liquidate
GENBANK
is not
the
matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as
daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not
fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.

legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the

sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does
not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot
apply
to
respondent
Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument

that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it
may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that
respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did
not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
matter where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not
the same nor is related to but is different from the
subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves
the sequestration
of
the
stocks owned
by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that
they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank
are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution
and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of

the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means,
viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of
time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two
things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;
2: interference that may affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word
intervene. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant
or has no effect or little influence. [43] Under the second
interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who
has the power to influence the subject proceedings. [44]We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer

does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x

drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has
investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of
former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its
latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to
a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service,
had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent
Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial.
We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of
respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the
case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the
parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this
type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role
of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to

assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In

such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service.
As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the
legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of
various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation
and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus,
the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it
is already difficult for government to match compensation offered
by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate
that the only card that the government may play to recruit
lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the
experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
income in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that
the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great
for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from
engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they
devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they

become associated to be disqualified. [46] Indeed, to make

government service more difficult to exit can only make it less
appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on
its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as
well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing
counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the
opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and
embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so
prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt
frequent judicial and academic commentary. [48] Even the United
States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals
description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. [49] In
the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent
Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent
Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after
the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal
incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court
which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at
bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting
a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the
law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the

client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer

must start again often without the benefit of the work done by
the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial
of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse
effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service.
According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of
knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the
government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions
when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal
demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom. [53] He adds:
Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the
ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit
inhibits official independence.[54] The case at bar involves the
position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent
Mendoza.
It
cannot
be
overly
stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed
with a great degree of independence. It is this independence
that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the
innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to
refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any
undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General
will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation
of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in
danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be

remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of
gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at
best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former
government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that
free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect. [58] Notably, the
appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [59]and
some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on
Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and
demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in
all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch
sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that
former government employee may compromise confidential
official information in the process. But this concern does not
cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the
case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is
indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in
liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their

interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason

that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no
two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03
is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties
while still in government service. [61] The example given by the
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work
for the company that he or she is currently charged with
prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. [62] In
the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of employment
through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this
concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone
who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that
law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who were
hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non
factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents
Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above
cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail
what is perceived as the excessive influence of former
officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against

extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an employees influence
may actually be the power or authority of his or her position,
power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government
x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant
decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more
about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal
officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores
the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends
in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among
others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply
retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so,
they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent
Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted
by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time
whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At
bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule
if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at
that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules
of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions

dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.

GISELA HUYSSEN,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6707

DECISION

Present:

PER CURIAM:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,*
This treats of a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still
CARPIO,
connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for
- versus CORONA,
Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration
CARPIO MORALES,
Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa
CALLEJO, SR.,
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed
AZCUNA,
to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which
TINGA,
could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was
CHICO-NAZARIO, and indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent
GARCIA, JJ.
on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total
amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as
proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the
Promulgated:
complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ,
despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded
Respondent.
March 24, 2006
from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that
said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return
the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which
complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter
dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount
not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise,
the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In
response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19
March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the
release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks
postdated to 6 April and20 April 1999 and authorized
x----------------------------------------------complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited
---x
the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were
dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the
same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated

25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the

checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the
assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant
deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they
were all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by
respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises
to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter
to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The
demand letters remained unheeded.
Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by complainant in
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar
Discipline, required[3] respondent to submit his answer within 15
days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,[4] respondent denied
the allegations in the complaint claiming that having never
physically received the money mentioned in thecomplaint, he
could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the
amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining
the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained
thus:
a)
Through
a
closefriend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a
friend of the complainant, the latter was
introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of
Immigration with a big problem concerning their
stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one
of which is already of major age while the two
others were still minors then. Their problem was
the fact that since they have been staying in the
Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of
missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend
their said status as under the law and

related polic[i]es of the government, missionary

visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10)
years after which they could no longer extend their
said status and have to leave the country.
b)
Studying their case and being
U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better
secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of the
Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as
Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list
of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one
of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000
deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son
Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age,
has to have the same amount of show money
separate of her money as he would be issued
separate visa, while her two minor children would
be included as her dependents in her said visa
application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her to
a lawyer to work for their application, which I did
and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family.
c)
The application was filed,
processed and followed-up by the said Atty.
Mendoza until the same was finished and the
corresponding permanent visa were obtained by
the complainant and her family. Her son
Marcus Huyssen was
given
an
independent
permanent visa while the other two were made as
dependents of the complainant. In between the
processing of the papers and becoming very close
to the complainant, I became the intermediary
between complainant and their counsel so much
that every amount that the latter would request for
whatever purpose was coursed through me which

request were then transmitted to the complainant

and every amount of money given by the
complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me
which is the very reason why my signature appears
in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d)
That as time goes by, I noticed
that the amount appeared to be huge for services
of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and,
to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and
inquired from him regarding the matter and the
following facts were revealed to me:
1)
That
what was used by the complainant
as her show money from the bank is
not really her money but money of
World Mission for Jesus, which
therefore is a serious violation of the
Immigration Law as there was a
misrepresentation. This
fact
was
confirmed later when the said entity
sent their demand letter to the
undersigned affiant and which is
attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2)
That
worst, the same amount used by the
complainant, was the very same
amount
used
by
her
son
Marcus Huyssen,
in
obtaining
his separate permanent visa.These
acts of the complainant and her son
could have been a ground for
deportation and likewise constitute
criminal
offense
under
the
Immigration Law and the Revised
Penal Code. These could have been

the possible reason why complainant

was made to pay for quite huge
amount.
e)
That after they have secured
their visas, complainant and her family became
very close to undersigned and my family that I was
even invited to their residence several times;
f)
However after three years,
complainant demanded the return of their money
given and surprisingly they want to recover the
same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no
longer around, he died sometime 1997;
g)
That it is unfortunate that the
real facts of the matter is now being hidden and
that the amount of money is now being sought to
be recovered from me;
h)
That the fact is I signed the
vouchers and being a lawyer I know the
consequences of having signed the same and
therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to
raised the fund needed but up to the present my
standby loan application has not been released
and was informed that the same would only be
forthcoming second week of August. The same
should have been released last March but was
aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to
be paid, according to the complainant has now
become
doubled
plus
attorneys
fees
of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and
April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August
2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of

respondents evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings)
were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was
allegedly out of the country to attend to his clients
needs. Reception of respondents evidence was scheduled for the
last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to
appear, despite due notice and without just cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan submitted her report[5] recommending the disbarment of
respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no
question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent
himself admitted that he signed the vouchers
(Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his
receipt of said amount from complainant.
Respondent however claims that he did not
appropriate the same for himself but that he
delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.
Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant. On record is the 1
March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the
World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint)
where he stated thus:
I really understand your feelings on
the delay of the release of the
deposit but I repeat, nobody really
intended that the thing would
happen that way. Many events were
the causes of the said delay
particularly the death of then
Commissioner L. Verceles, whose
sudden death prevented us the
needed papers for the immediate

release. It was only from compiling

all on the first week of January this
year, that all the said papers were
recovered, hence, the process of the
release just started though some
important papers were already
finished as early as the last quarter
of last year. We are just going
through
the
normal
standard
operating procedure and there is no
day since January that I do not make
any follow ups on the progress of the
same.
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of
Complaint) where he stated thus:
I am sending you my personal
checks to cover the refund of the
amount deposited by your good self
in connection with the procurement
of your permanent visa and that of
your family. It might take some more
time before the Bureau could release
the refund as some other pertinent
papers are being still compiled are
being looked at the files of the late
Commissioner Verceles,
who
approved your visa and who died of
heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that
everything would be fine later as all
the documents needed are already
intact. This is just a bureaucratic
delay.
From the above letters, respondent makes it
appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited
with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash

Vouchers
were
issued
by
respondent
to
complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum
and official receipts therefore were never issued by
the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue
his personal checks to cover the return of the
money to complainant if said amount was really
officially
deposited
with
the
Bureau
of
Immigration? All these actions of respondent point
to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use. It
should also be noted that respondent has failed to
establish that the late Atty. Mendoza referred to in
his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one
correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the
visa application of complainant and his family, and
complainant has also testified that she never met
this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to
perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his
position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it
more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the
reputation and integrity of said office. It is
submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02
of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
A lawyer in the government service
shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved [6] the

Investigating Commissioners report with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby
ADOPTED
and
APPROVED,
with modification, the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record
and applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents violation of Rule
6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and ordered to return the amount
with legal interest from receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate
administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should
be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who
holds a responsible public office.[7]
It is undisputed that respondent admitted [8] having received the
US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in the
petty cash vouchers[9] and receipts[10] he prepared, on the false

representation that that it was needed in complainants

application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he
misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense
that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.
[11]
Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza
already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza.Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to
someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only
impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him.[12] He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell
short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given
the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the
evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without
any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case
was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus,
not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely selfserving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his
moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such
admissions were also apparent in the following letters of
respondent to complainant:
1) Letter[13] dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of
which reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the
last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the

latest of which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be

released on said date, I understand to pay the
same to you out of my personal money on said
date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send
somebody here at the office on that day and the
amount would be given to you wether (sic) from
the Bureau or from my own personal money.
2) Letter[14] dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to
cover the refund of the amount deposited by
your goodself in connection with the procurement
of your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the
Bureau could release the refund as some other
pertinent papers are still being compiled and are
being
looked
at
the
files
of
the
late
Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa
and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure
that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a
bureaucratic delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in
peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April
6, 1999 and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I
leave the amount vacant because I would want you
to fill them up on their due dates the peso
equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be
sure
that
the
peso
equivalent
of
your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have
postdated them to enable me to raise some more

pesos to cover the whole amount but dont worry as

the Lord had already provided me the means.

necessary action against me, I just had to put an

end to this matter and look forward. x x x

3) Letter[15] dated 25 April 1999 provides:

4) Letter[16] dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these

troubles. You are aware that I have done my very
best for the early return of your money but the
return is becoming bleak as I was informed that
there are still papers lacking. When I stopped the
payment of the checks I issued, I was of the
impression that everything is fine, but it is not. I
guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I
really have to personally return the money out of
my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is
the truth that I must face. It may hurt me
financially but it would set me free from worries
and anxieties.

The other day I deposited the amount

of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I
issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all other
checks that are becoming due to some of my
creditors to give preference to the check I issued to
you.

I have arranged for a loan from money

lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday
the releases of which are on the following:
May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the
province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this
trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you
will be sufficiently funded on their due dates by
reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me
for the last time, if any of these checks, is
returned, dont call me anymore. Just file the

This morning when I went to the Bank, I

learned that the bank instead of returning the
other checks I requested for stop payment instead honored them and mistakenly returned
your check. This was a very big surprise to me and
discouragement for I know it would really upset
you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the
amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to
withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not
entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I
bring the same to your place considering
that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a
check for you to immediately deposit today and I
was assured by the bank that it would be honored
this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely
accused of appropriating the money of another. As correctly
observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would
not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially
deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in

consideration of the latters pending application for visas
is violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 [18] of
the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest
includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office.[19] Respondents conduct in
office betrays the integrity and good moral character required
from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public
office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe
a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and
is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to
camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by
issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless
checks constitutes gross misconduct, [20] as the effect transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private
duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to

accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty

or good morals.[21]
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a
check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, thedrawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.[22]
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall
to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued
checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to
continue, being a member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a
noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in
his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully
perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession
subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes
suspension and disbarment.[23] More importantly, possession of
good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[24]
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against
lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyers oath have proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the bar.[25] These pronouncement gain practical significance in
the case at bar considering that respondent was a former
member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears
stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants

owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such,

government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more
likely to be magnified in the public eye.[26]
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably
failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the
legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that
a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of
the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers
oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.[27]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[28] we ordered the disbarment of a
lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,[29] we also
disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of

Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted

from a certain person.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent
with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus
preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.[30]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received
from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision
be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution
to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.