Commissioner of Customs v.

Relunia
G.R. No. L-11860. May 29, 1959
FACTS:
The Commissioner of Customs appeals to the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals affirming that the
forfeiture of the electric range in question under Section 1363 (g.) is illegal. The RPS "MISAMIS
ORIENTAL"' a unit of the Philippine Navy was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents of the 14th
BCT bound for Pusan, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers there. It seems that thereafter, it
was used for transportation purposes in connection with the needs of our soldiers there and made trips
between Korea and Japan, so that it did not return to the Philippine until September 2, 1954. While in
Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles subject to customs duties.
In the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, all the articles were declared forfeited by the Collector of
Customs of Manila for violations of the Customs Law pursuant to Section 1363 (g) of the
Administrative Code as an unmanifested cargo including the aforesaid electric.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a manifest is required of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"
HELD:
Yes. Section 1228 of the Administrative Code provides that Every vessel from a foreign port or place
must have on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargo. The court ruled that
whether the vessel be engaged in foreign trade (Section 1221 and 1225, Revised Administrative Code)
or not (Section 1228), and even when the vessel belongs to the army or the navy (Section 1234), the
universal requirement from a reading of all the foregoing provisions is that they be provided with a
manifest.
The court also believes that there was no necessity where as in the present case the application of
Section 1234 of the Revised Administrative Code to our navy ships is so clear and manifest,
considering that the reasons for requiring a manifest for transport and supply ships of the army and
navy of the United States are and with more reason applicable to our navy ships to carry out the policy
of the government, and because we have complete control over them. It was therefore held that the
RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was required to present a manifest upon its arrival in Manila on
September 2, 1954.
In conclusion, the court holds that all vessels whether private or government owned, including ships of
the Philippine navy, coming from a foreign port, with the possible exception of war vessels or vessels
employed by any foreign government, not engaged in the transportation of merchandise in the way of
trade, as provided for in the second paragraph of Section 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are
required to prepare and present a manifest to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine
port.

People vs. Purisima (Statutory Construction)

Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law.
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders
quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts
constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime,
which is, that the carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to
maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless
violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other
legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned
that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the
purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The
petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act
is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The
City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of
the act is voluntary is enough.
Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of
Illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?
Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to
penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion,
subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and
spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify
the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales

G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981,
declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00
on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that
when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it
declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of
P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim
was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that "granting, without
admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner is already barred from claiming the same
considering that more than two years had already elapsed between the payment and the filing of the
claim in Court.
ISSUE:
Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 or
the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid
or from the date the filing of the Final Adjustment Return?
HELD:
Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or
Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes should
receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from
the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. Section 292 should be
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent
and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on
its Adjustment Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. A
literal application of Section 292 would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the
quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section
292 would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive
period at the time of filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can
be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund
of overpaid income tax.

People v. Subido
G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.
FACTS:
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying that (1) the court enter of record

that the judgment of the Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be
cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the amount of fine
and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly and
specifically provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to accused-appellant's motion for
cancellation of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of
P500.00 and the indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The lower
court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared in accordance with the terms
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity in form of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
HELD:
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing, printing,
litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition
or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period or
a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by
the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to
impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted that the lower
court chose to impose upon the accused: three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00;
indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the
indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby
sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five
hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma in the part of the sentence is to make "the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but
also to non-payment of the fine.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil liability.
It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused. In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency
is to give it careful scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the
defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the
accused-appellant, the same should be made applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to serve his civil liability
to the offended party in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no

longer required by the aforesaid article.

Hidalgo

cir

delmar

IT IS A WELL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, COURTS

MAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL AS
THOSE EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF THE
STATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR THE
PASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp.
(Phil.), respondent.
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975
FACTS:
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining
plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the
five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of
customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories,"
respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax (which it paid under protest).
Court procedures:
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the
payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No.
2352, and dismissed the protest.
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the
Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of
Customs.
3
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for review of
the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30,
1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund
of the amount of P775.62 to respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest.
Statutes subject of construction:
a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) title, Art. 103, Art. 102, Art. 104;
b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No. 2352 - title

ISSUE:
WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO from custom duties granted by
R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace or include the special import tax
imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).
HELD:
Yes. Petition denied
o The title of R.A. No. 1394 (Special Tax Law) indicates unmistakably that it is repealing
six prior statutes (all these laws dealt with the imposition of a special excise tax on
foreign exchange or other form of levy on importation of goods into the country).
o On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act), has not been
repealed (although this law had granted more concessions and tax exemption privileges
than any of the statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394.
o The CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under
the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to exploitation and
development of the petroleum resources of the country.
o The SC is convinced that R.A. No. 387 or the Petroleum Act of 1949 was intended to
encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of
the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the
raison d etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their
financial resources towards the achievement of this national economic goal.
Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids the history of the
enactment of the statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or provision in
the law had been applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body, We are
convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage the
exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the country by giving
it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d etre for the
generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards
the achievement of this national economic goal.

1987 Constitution does not expressly declare the abolition of the death penalty. It merely says
that the death penalty shall not be imposed and if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua;

People vs. Degamo

Facts: Complainant Ellen Vertudazo and her children were living in a rented apartment at Barangay
Punta, Ormoc City. She was not personally acquainted with the appellant and only came to know him
through her brother in law who stayed with her for a period of time.
At one oclock in the morning on October 1,
1994, complainant heard someone calling her name. Thinking that her brother in law had returned, she
unwittingly opened the door. Appellant then forced his way inside the house and poked a knife at
complainants neck.
He then laid her on the concrete floor and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Appellant was
holding the knife while having sexual intercourse with complainant. He warned her not to tell anyone

about the incident andafter that he left. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant went upstairs and just
cried. In the morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to the Barangay Captain and
to the police. On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant with
the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.On January 17, 1995, before the start
of the trial proper, the court a
quo
allowed the complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the
victim has become insane
.
The trial court then found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed a punishment of
death penalty upon him.

1. ALHAMBRA CIGAR & CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY INC VS SEC G.R No. L23606
July 29, 1968
PONENTE: SANCHEZ
FACTS:
On January 15, 1912, Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company, Inc. was incorporated. Its
lifespan was for 50
years so on January 15, 1962, it expired. Thereafter, its Board authorized its liquidation. Under the
prevailing law, Alhambra
has 3 years to liquidate.
In 1963, while Alhambra was liquidating, Republic Act 3531 was enacted. It amended Section 18 of the
Corporation Law; it
empowered domestic private corporations to extend their corporate life beyond the period fixed by the
articles of
incorporation for a term not to exceed fifty years in any one instance. Previous to Republic Act 3531,
the maximum nonextendible term of such corporations was fifty years.
Alhambra now amended its articles of incorporation to extend its lifespan for another 50 years. The
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) denied the amended articles of incorporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation under liquidation may still amend its articles of incorporation to extend its
lifespan.
HELD:
No. Alhambra cannot avail of the new law because it has already expired at the time of its passage.
When a corporation is
liquidating pursuant to the statutory period of three years to liquidate, it is only allowed to continue for
the purpose of final
closure of its business and no other purposes. In fact, within that period, the corporation is enjoined
from continuing the
business for which it was established. Hence, Alhambras board cannot validly amend its articles of
incorporation to extend
its lifespan.

EPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and
chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging,
filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide,
construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such
municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with
Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between
RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce
of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man
because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the
definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by
the CA with modifications.
I.
II.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.
Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the
term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper
limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden
its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to
include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so
provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Case Digest: Vera vs Avelino

Facts of the Case:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report
regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of
terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the
voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report
ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the
16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions
on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of
the protest filed against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution,
praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial
duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issues of the Case:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes
cast in the said provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the
case was not a contest, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question
raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts
The case is therefore dismissed

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners
in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art.
VIII.