ACCOMPLICES

PEOPLE v DE VERA
Facts: That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . .
two (2) other persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior
strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y
DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use
of a .22 cal. with trade mark 'Paspar Armas' bearing
SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo
inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him
with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said Frederick Capulong y Dizon."
Version of Prosecution
As explained by eyewitness Bernardo Cacao, while
bringing out the garbage, the witness saw a car
passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong
together with four (4) other passengers. He knew the
victim by name who was a resident of the
subdivision. He recognized and identified two of the
passengers as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick
Garcia, both familiar in the subdivision. "Cacao did
not at first notice anything unusual inside the car
while it passed by him, but then he heard
unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was
cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular road
whose entrance and exit were through the same point
His curiosity taking [the] better part of him, Cacao
walked to the opposite side of the road from where he
saw the car already parked. Moments later, he saw
the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and
brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a
gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon reaching the grassy spot,
Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim,
hitting him between the eyes. After the shooting,
Florendo and his companions fled in different
directions. "When he submitted a sworn statement to
the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached a sketch
of the crime scene prepared by police officers,
indicating therein his relative position at the time of
the incident. While testifying in court, Cacao
identified Garcia and pointed to appellant as among
the companions of Florendo.

Upon investigation a while later, a security guard

guided the team to the corner of Denver and Doa
Justina Streets, site of the shooting, where they
discovered blood stains and damaged grass. The
policemen then found a color red sports car with plate
no. NBZ 869, with engine still running and its doors
opened. They recovered inside the car several class
cards and a license belonging to one Ric Capulong,
who was later identified as Frederick Capulong. "The
policemen went around the subdivision to look for
possible suspects. They came upon a person wearing
muddied maong pants and white t-shirt 'standing and
walking around' near the clubhouse of the
subdivision. When asked his name, the person
identified himself as Edwin de Vera, herein appellant.
Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant
declared that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious
[of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant to
Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for
investigation.
"Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a
police investigator since 1989, was assigned to
investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong.
"Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid
immediately went to the East Avenue Medical Center
where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive
care unit receiving medical treatment. The victim was
unconscious. After conferring with the victim's
parents and relatives, SPO3 Guspid returned to
Station 5. On his arrival, the desk officer referred
appellant to him for questioning. He was told that
appellant was picked up near the crime scene acting
suspiciously. When appellant was asked about his
participation in the shooting, he was reluctant at first
to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him
that his conscienience would bother him less if he
would tell the truth. "Without any hesitation,
appellant admitted being [with the] group which
perpetrated the crime, and implicated Roderick
Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a group
of policemen to the residence of Garcia, which turned
out to be at Doa Justina Street, Filinvest II
Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3 Guspid
informed him that he was implicated by appellant [in]
the crime. He was then invited to the station to shed
light [on] the incident. Garcia consented.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution,
testified that upon arrival of the suspects [i]n his
office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of
policy, to step outside the building in order to assure
that no pressure would be exerted on the suspects
even by their mere presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6,
1996). After they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the
suspects for about twenty minutes, informing them of

their rights under the constitution and inquiring from

them if they indeed wanted to give voluntary
statements. To the query, the suspects answered
positively.
Version of Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing,
and that it was Kenneth Florendo who had shot the
victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to
Filinvest the other accused and Florendo, who was
his friend, upon the latter's request. A few hours after
the shooting incident, appellant was picked up by the
police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him
into signing his Statement regarding the incident.
Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he
and Kenneth Florendo were already close friends for
about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latter's house
Edwin had slept in Kenneth's house on Kamias Road
from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and went home at 7:00
am of June 8th. Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth
passed by Edwin's house to invite him back to [the
former's] house that morning and to bring Elmer.
Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near
the car because they were going to see a friend. At
that point in time, Edwin knew the person whom,
Kenneth and Elmer went to see, by name, never
having met him personally before then. From his
conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the
house was where Deo stayed. Then, Edwin heard the
voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to
be arguing ('. . . parang nagtatalo sila'). The voices
came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not
before long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came
from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was
shocked because he was not used to hearing gunfire.
Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place.
His singular thought while running was to get out of
Filinvest. Deo also ran away. Edwin denied that
either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Issue: WoN Petitoner is merely an accomplice, and
not a Principal in the commission of the crime
Held: Yes. Appellant should be convicted only as an
accomplice, not as a principal.
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo,
Castro, Garcia and Appellant Vera, the trial court
relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao.
Specifically, it based its conclusions on the following
facts: appellant was seen with the other accused
inside the victim's car; the victim was clearly struck
with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was
unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself;
moreover, it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia

to have been unaware of Florendo's dark design on

Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must
establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. In the
present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do
so. Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in
the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle
an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot the victim
in the head moments later. Cacao's testimony contains
nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the
fact that he was inside the car, no other act was
imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court based its finding of
conspiracy on mere presumptions, and not on solid
facts indubitably indicating a common design to
commit murder. Such suppositions do not constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has
repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be
founded on facts, not on mere surmises or
conjectures. Clearly, Cacao's testimony does not
establish appellant's culpability.
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution
also presented Appellant De Vera's extrajudicial
statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's
malevolent intention
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day,
a fact which revealed the unmistakable plan of the
group.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the
commission of the crime by placing himself at a
certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order
to act as a lookout
In other words, appellant's presence was not
innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill
the victim and that the three co-accused were
carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch
for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he
was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime. These facts, however, did
not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an
accomplice
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish
the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more
persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the
execution of the felony (was) decided upon." Except
in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also
be shown that the accused performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court has held that

in most instances, direct proof of a previous

agreement need not be established, for conspiracy
may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing
to a joint purpose, concerted action and community
of interest.
The Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as
"those persons who, not being included in Article
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts." The Court has held
that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal
design of the principal and cooperates knowingly
or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if
not rendered, the crime would be committed just
the same."
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must be present: (1) the "community of
criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design
of the principal by direct participation, he concurs
with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the
performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are
not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in
common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided upon
such course of action. Accomplices come to know
about it after the principals have reached the decision,
and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the
trial court found that the killing was attended by
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength. We disagree with the court a quo in
appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances,
because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.
Hence, there is only one generic aggravating
circumstance, not two.
Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an
accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder.
PEOPLE v DOBLE
Facts: At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, ten men,
almost all of them heavily armed, boarded a banca
and proceeded to Navotas where eight of them

disembarked and robbed the Prudential Bank and

Trust Company of P10,000.00. killing many persons
and seriously injuring some in the course thereof.
Charged with robbery in band with multiple
homicide, multiple frustrated homicide, and assault
upon agents in authority, only five of ten accused
were brought to trial as the others remained at large.
Based on their extrajudicial confessions, the herein
appellants were found guilty as coconspirators in the
crimes charged and were sentenced to death. The
records, however, show that the appellants did not
participate in the actual perpetration of the crimes.
Simeon was merely present during the final
conference of the malefactors in his house which was
near the landing place of the banca to be used by the
culprits, telling them that he could not join them
because of a foot injury. The participation of
Cresencio consisted in his having been asked by the
leader of the malefactors, just a few hours before the
robbery, to look for a banca, and in accompanying
him to Antonio whose banca they used. Cresencio
and Antonio remained in the banca during the actual
robbery and shooting. Later. only Antonio was given
money in the amount of P441.00 by the conspirators.
On automatic review, appellants claimed that their
extrajudicial confessions, taken in 1966, were not
voluntary and were obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights to counsel and against selfincrimination. The Supreme Court held, that Simeon's
mere presence in his house where the conspirators
met without taking active part in their conversation
did not make him a coconspirator; that the right to
counsel during custodial interrogation did not exist
prior to the 1973 Constitution; and, that appellants'
extrajudicial statements which were shown to be
voluntary by sufficient proof and the positive denial
by the named police investigator of the alleged
maltreatment, may not be a basis for the invocation of
the right against self-incrimination. The Court
acquitted Simeon and found Antonio and Cresencio
liable only as accomplices and only for the crime of
robbery in band since their cooperation was not
indispensable and there was failure to establish their
complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real
malefactors.
Issue: WoN the petitioner is an accomplice in the
commission of the crime
Held: NO.
A review of the evidence of record shows the
foregoing observation of the Solicitor General to be
with convincing rationality. It is only that portion in
which is cited Simeon's statement made before the
Navotas Police Department that "he has not yet
received his share" that detracts from the solidity of

the Solicitor General's recommendation, for it gives

the impression that Simeon had given material or
moral support or encouragement to the malefactors
(referring to those still at large as the principal
culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot.
However, a reading of his whole extrajudicial
statement would erase that impression, and reveals
the true import of that statement as intended only to
show that Simeon had nothing to do with commission
of the crime and therefore did not receive any share
of the fruits thereof.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his
house having been used as the meeting place of the
malefactors for their final conference before
proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank
branch thereat. He did not join them because of a 5year old foot injury which would make him only a
liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture.
To the malefactors he was most unwanted to join
them. If they met at his house it was only because it
was near the landing place of the banca, and so he
invited them to his house while waiting for the banca
to arrive. His mere presence in his house where the
conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he
could not join them because of his foot injury, and
will just wait for them; evidently as a mere gesture of
politeness in not being able to join them in their
criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in
the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being
suspected that he was against their vicious plan for
which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a
co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in
the talks among the malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, :nd no
culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the
commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical
condition alone, he could not in any way be of help to
the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal design,
nor could he have been desired by the latter to be one
of them. Taking up next the case of appellants
Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their main
contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon
which their conviction was principally made to rest,
are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained
by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic
constitutional rights to counsel and against selfincrimination. In support of this contention,
appellants have only their own self-serving testimony
to rely upon.
The circumstances pointed out would not make
appellants liable as coprincipals in the crime charged.
At the most their liability would be that of mere
accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when
Cresencio consented to look for a banca and
Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader
Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the

scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil

purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was
the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to
be robbed and carried them away from the scene after
the robbery to prevent their apprehension. Appellants
thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner.
Even without appellants providing the banca, the
robbery could have been committed, specially with
the boldness and determination shown by the robbers
in committing the crime.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as
defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,
cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code).
There must be a community of unlawful purpose
between the principal and accomplice and assistance
knowingly and intentionally given, to supply material
and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and
in as efficacious way (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil.
38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of
a driver of a car used for abduction which makes the
driver a mere accomplice
It is however, not established by the evidence that in
the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the
malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry
out successfully the plan to rob
The finding that appellants are liable as mere
accomplices may appear too lenient considering the
gravity and viciousness of the offense with which
they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to
establish then complicity by a previous conspiracy
with the real malefactors who actually robbed the
bank and killed and injured several persons, including
peace officers.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and
Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in
band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble
is entitled to acquittal as so recommended by the
Solicitor General who finds no sufficient evidence, to
which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE vs DOCTOLERO
Facts: "That on or about the 8th day of November,
1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San Fabian,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, armed with bolos, went up the house of
Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring together
and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill
and with evident premeditation and treachery, with
abuse of superior strength and with extreme cruelty,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike

Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and

Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the
same accused while already on the road, conspiring
together and mutually aiding one another, with intent
to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery,
attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero,
thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds
which caused his death."|||
It is undisputed that on the evening of
November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and
Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house
of Marcia Sagun in Sitio Binday,
municipality of San Fabian, province of
Pangasinan, where they were living.
Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of
Lolita de Guzman, was on the same
occasion, slightly injured while being fed on
the breast of his mother. On the road, a few
meters from the house of Marcial Sagun,
Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally
injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital but he died on the
way . . .
"The evidence for the prosecution tend to
show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico,
Conrado and Virgilio, all
surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for
the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita
de Guzman, and in inflicting physical
injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And
immediately thereafter, with their father and
co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked
Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which
caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution
are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun,
and Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to
Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening
on November 8, 1970, he and his wife,
Maria Oviado-Sagun and Lolita de GuzmanOviedo (sister-in-law of Maria OviedoSagun) were on their way home to Barrio
Binday. They came from the field where
they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a
crossing of the road in Bo. Binday they met
the accused Ludovico Doctolero who,
without warning and without cause or
reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial
Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial
Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that
blow and wrestled with
Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the
bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo

became frightened when

Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun
were wrestling for the possession of the bolo
of the former, so she ran away in the
direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
"Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial
Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning
palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased
Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio (all
surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the
house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing
stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the
man in the house to come out. Paciencia
Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of
Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming
down from the house going towards her. She
told them: 'Why can't you be patient and
forget?' But she was asked not to interfere.
At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, halfbrother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of
the three accused was going towards the
house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the
three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why
they can't be patient and forget, but the three
accused replied 'Vulva of your mother, we
will also kill you.' Than they struck
Marcelo Doctolero several times with their
bolos. And when their father
Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck
Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head.
Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the
accused ran away.
"The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy
is sought to be corroborated by the
testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of
Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she
was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to
whom she reported the incident between
Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she
saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio throwing stones at their house
and called to all the men in the house to
come out. She was about to go to their house
to get her children but she saw the three
accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio
going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a
few meters away from their house. While
there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her
adopted mother) shouting at her, saying
'Enieng, your children.' Then she saw the
three accused coming down from the house,
going towards the road where they met

Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed

several times until he felt. When
Antonio Doctoleroarrived, he also struck
Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they
all left."
Version of the Defense
Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of
Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with
his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and
the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio
Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial
Sagun, he being the brother of Maria
Oviedo. Marcial Sagun and company
"Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: 'Where
have you been cousin.' (p. 8, ibid) He
noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo holding
his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin
Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was
like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and
boloed Ludovico with a downward swing.
He parried the bolo with his left hand but he
was hurt in the process "At that juncture,
Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and
Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his
bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10,
ibid) with the two women, Lolita de
Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back
of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter
ignored them, as his eyes were towards
Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law,
Antonio Oviedo.
"Realizing that he could not afford to fight
both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo,
Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria
Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He
retreated and then run (sic) away, with
Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo
throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
"Ludovico went to the house of his father,
Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his
meal, together with his small children
upstairs, while accusedappellant,Conrado Doctolero was in the
kitchen downstairs also eating his meal,
when Ludovico arrived.
"He told his father that he was wounded and
asked him to look after his children as he
might meet something bad that night. He did
not enter the house anymore: he was only
until the door. Then he ran away. His father

asked him what happened, but he did not

answer anymore.
Issue: WoN petitioner is only an accomplice

Held: Yes.
When there is nothing in the records which would
show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses
to falsely implicate the accused, identification should
be given full credit. And when there is no evidence
and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that he was not so moved, and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial
court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that
allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however,
are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility.
As correctly explained by the People, the seeming
contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by
the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential
variations on the part of each observer in relating his
own observation of the same incident. Contradictions
and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the
details of an incident far from demonstrating
falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all
persons who witness an incident are impressed by it
in the same manner and it is but natural that said
eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details.
In fact, inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer to
minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. And where the prosecution
witnesses were able to positively identify the
appellants as the authors of the crime and the
testimonies were, on the whole, consistent on
material points, the contradictions become
insignificant

Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a

consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus
negating a common criminal design in their minds.
This pretension must be rejected since one can be an
accomplice even if he did not know of the actual
crime intended by the principal provided he was
aware that it was an illicit act. This is a doctrine that
dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus that
where the accomplices therein consented to help in

the commission of forcible abduction, they were

responsible for the resulting homicide even if the
purpose of the principal to commit homicide was
unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the
criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they
were liable but only with regard to the extent of their
participation. There being ample evidence of their
criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the
nature of their liability, the courts should favor the
milder form of liability or responsibility which is that

of being mere accomplices,

no evidence of
conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the
pendency of this appeal terminated only his criminal
liability but not his civil liability. Also, while the
death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00
under current case law, the same should not apply to
Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn
his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial
court having long since become final and executory
with respect to him.