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TodayisThursday,July14,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L31156February27,1976
PEPSICOLABOTTLINGCOMPANYOFTHEPHILIPPINES,INC.,plaintiffappellant,
vs.
MUNICIPALITYOFTANAUAN,LEYTE,THEMUNICIPALMAYOR,ETAL.,defendantappellees.
Sabido,Sabido&Associatesforappellant.
ProvincialFiscalZoilaM.Redona&AssistantProvincialFiscalBonifacioRMatolandAssistantSolicitorGeneral
ConradoT.Limcaoco&SolicitorEnriqueM.Reyesforappellees.

MARTIN,J.:
ThisisanappealfromthedecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofLeyteinitsCivilCaseNo.3294,whichwas
certifiedtoUsbytheCourtofAppealsonOctober6,1969,asinvolvingonlypurequestionsoflaw,challenging
the power of taxation delegated to municipalities under the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264, as
amended,June19,1959).
OnFebruary14,1963,theplaintiffappellant,PepsiColaBottlingCompanyofthePhilippines,Inc.,commenceda
complaintwithpreliminaryinjunctionbeforetheCourtofFirstInstanceofLeyteforthatcourttodeclareSection2
of Republic Act No. 2264. 1 otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of
taxingauthorityaswellastodeclareOrdinancesNos.23and27,seriesof1962,ofthemunicipalityofTanauan,Leyte,null
andvoid.

On July 23, 1963, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, the material portions of which state that, first,
bothOrdinancesNos.23and27embraceorcoverthesamesubjectmatterandtheproductiontaxratesimposed
therein are practically the same, and second, that on January 17, 1963, the acting Municipal Treasurer of
Tanauan,Leyte,asperhisletteraddressedtotheManagerofthePepsiColaBottlingPlantinsaidmunicipality,
soughttoenforcecompliancebythelatteroftheprovisionsofsaidOrdinanceNo.27,seriesof1962.
MunicipalOrdinanceNo.23,ofTanauan,Leyte,whichwasapprovedonSeptember25,1962,leviesandcollects
"fromsoftdrinksproducersandmanufacturersataiofonesixteenth(1/16)ofacentavoforeverybottleofsoft
drink corked." 2 For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, firm, company or corporation producing soft
drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report, of the total number of bottles produced and corked during
themonth.3

Ontheotherhand,MunicipalOrdinanceNo.27,whichwasapprovedonOctober28,1962,leviesandcollects"on
softdrinksproducedormanufacturedwithintheterritorialjurisdictionofthismunicipalityataxofONECENTAVO
(P0.01)oneachgallon(128fluidounces,U.S.)ofvolumecapacity." 4 For the purpose of computing the taxes due,
the person, fun company, partnership, corporation or plant producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a
monthlyreportofthetotalnumberofgallonsproducedormanufacturedduringthemonth.5

ThetaximposedinbothOrdinancesNos.23and27isdenominatedas"municipalproductiontax.'
On October 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered judgment "dismissing the complaint and
upholdingtheconstitutionalityof[Section2,RepublicActNo.2264]declaringOrdinanceNos.23and27legaland
constitutionalorderingtheplaintifftopaythetaxesdueundertheoftthesaidOrdinancesandtopaythecosts."
From this judgment, the plaintiff PepsiCola Bottling Company appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn,
elevatedthecasetoUspursuanttoSection31oftheJudiciaryActof1948,asamended.
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Therearethreecapitalquestionsraisedinthisappeal:
1. Is Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264 an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and
oppressive?
2. Do Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific
taxes?
3.AreOrdinancesNos.23and27unjustandunfair?
1. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to
every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. 6 It is a power that is purely
legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the
governmentwithoutinfringinguponthetheoryofseparationofpowers.Theexception,however,liesinthecaseofmunicipal
corporations,towhich,saidtheorydoesnotapply.Legislativepowersmaybedelegatedtolocalgovernmentsinrespectof
mattersoflocalconcern. 7Thisissanctionedbyimmemorialpractice. 8Bynecessaryimplication,thelegislativepowerto
create political corporations for purposes of local selfgovernment carries with it the power to confer on such local
governmental agencies the power to tax. 9 Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous
authoritytocreatetheirownsourcesofrevenueandtolevytaxes.Section5,ArticleXIprovides:"Eachlocalgovernment
unitshallhavethepowertocreateitssourcesofrevenueandtolevytaxes,subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovided
by law." Withal, it cannot be said that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 emanated from beyond the sphere of the
legislativepowertoenactandvestinlocalgovernmentsthepoweroflocaltaxation.

Theplenarynatureofthetaxingpowerthusdelegated,contrarytoplaintiffappellant'spretense,wouldnotsuffice
toinvalidatethesaidlawasconfiscatoryandoppressive.Indelegatingtheauthority,theStateisnotlimited6the
exact measure of that which is exercised by itself. When it is said that the taxing power may be delegated to
municipalitiesandthelike,itismeantthattheremaybedelegatedsuchmeasureofpowertoimposeandcollect
taxes as the legislature may deem expedient. Thus, municipalities may be permitted to tax subjects which for
reasons of public policy the State has not deemed wise to tax for more general purposes. 10 This is not to say
though that the constitutional injunction against deprivation of property without due process of law may be passed over
undertheguiseofthetaxingpower,exceptwhenthetakingofthepropertyisinthelawfulexerciseofthetaxingpower,as
when(1)thetaxisforapublicpurpose(2)theruleonuniformityoftaxationisobserved(3)eitherthepersonorproperty
taxediswithinthejurisdictionofthegovernmentlevyingthetaxand(4)intheassessmentandcollectionofcertainkindsof
taxes notice and opportunity for hearing are provided. 11 Due process is usually violated where the tax imposed is for a
privateasdistinguishedfromapublicpurposeataxisimposedonpropertyoutsidetheState,i.e.,extraterritorialtaxation
andarbitraryoroppressivemethodsareusedinassessingandcollectingtaxes.But,ataxdoesnotviolatethedueprocess
clause, as applied to a particular taxpayer, although the purpose of the tax will result in an injury rather than a benefit to
suchtaxpayer.Dueprocessdoesnotrequirethatthepropertysubjecttothetaxortheamountoftaxtoberaisedshouldbe
determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of the tax and the manner in which it shall be
apportionedaregenerallynotnecessarytodueprocessoflaw.12

Thereisnovaliditytotheassertionthatthedelegatedauthoritycanbedeclaredunconstitutionalonthetheoryof
double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the
taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised. 13 The reason is that the State has exclusively reserved the
sameforitsownprerogative.Moreover,doubletaxation,ingeneral,isnotforbiddenbyourfundamentallaw,sinceWehave
not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and some
states of the Union.14 Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the
same governmental entity 15 or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, 16 but not in a case where one tax is
imposedbytheStateandtheotherbythecityormunicipality.17

2. The plaintiffappellant submits that Ordinance No. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation, because these two
ordinancescoverthesamesubjectmatterandimposepracticallythesametaxrate.Thethesisproceedsfromits
assumption that both ordinances are valid and legally enforceable. This is not so. As earlier quoted, Ordinance
No. 23, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies or collects from soft drinks producers or
manufacturers a tax of onesixteen (1/16) of a centavo for .every bottle corked, irrespective of the volume
contentsofthebottleused.Whenitwasdiscoveredthattheproducerormanufacturercouldincreasethevolume
contents of the bottle and still pay the same tax rate, the Municipality of Tanauan enacted Ordinance No. 27,
approvedonOctober28,1962,imposingataxofonecentavo(P0.01)oneachgallon(128fluidounces,U.S.)of
volume capacity. The difference between the two ordinances clearly lies in the tax rate of the soft drinks
produced: in Ordinance No. 23, it was 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle corked in Ordinance No. 27, it is one
centavo(P0.01)oneachgallon(128fluidounces,U.S.)ofvolumecapacity.TheintentionoftheMunicipalCouncil
of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it was intended as a plain substitute for the prior
OrdinanceNo.23,andoperatesasarepealofthelatter,evenwithoutwordstothateffect. 18 Plaintiffappellant in
its brief admitted that defendantsappellees are only seeking to enforce Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. Even the
stipulationoffactsconfirmsthefactthattheActingMunicipalTreasurerofTanauan,Leytesoughtt6compelcomplianceby
theplaintiffappellantoftheprovisionsofsaidOrdinanceNo.27,seriesof1962.Theaforementionedadmissionshowsthat
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only Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962 is being enforced by defendantsappellees. Even the Provincial Fiscal, counsel for
defendantsappelleesadmitsinhisbrief"thatSection7ofOrdinanceNo.27,seriesof1962clearlyrepealsOrdinanceNo.
23astheprovisionsofthelatterareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheformer."

That brings Us to the question of whether the remaining Ordinance No. 27 imposes a percentage or a specific
tax.Undoubtedly,thetaxingauthorityconferredonlocalgovernmentsunderSection2,RepublicActNo.2264,is
broadenoughastoextendtoalmost"everything,acceptingthosewhicharementionedtherein."Aslongasthe
textleviedundertheauthorityofacityormunicipalordinanceisnotwithintheexceptionsandlimitationsinthe
law,thesamecomeswithintheambitofthegeneralrule,pursuanttotherulesofexclucionattehusandexceptio
firmatregulumincabisusnonexcepti 19Thelimitationapplies,particularly,totheprohibitionagainstmunicipalitiesand
municipal districts to impose "any percentage tax or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles
subject to specific tax except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code." For purposes of this
particular limitation, a municipal ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of the tax and the volume of
sale of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being outside the power of the municipality to enact. 20
But,theimpositionof"ataxofonecentavo(P0.01)oneachgallon(128fluidounces,U.S.)ofvolumecapacity"onallsoft
drinks produced or manufactured under Ordinance No. 27 does not partake of the nature of a percentage tax on sales, or
other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on the produce (whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The
volumecapacityofthetaxpayer'sproductionofsoftdrinksisconsideredsolelyforpurposesofdeterminingthetaxrateon
theproducts,butthereisnotsetratiobetweenthevolumeofsalesandtheamountofthetax.21

Norcanthetaxleviedbetreatedasaspecifictax.Specifictaxesarethoseimposedonspecifiedarticles,suchas
distilled spirits, wines, fermented liquors, products of tobacco other than cigars and cigarettes, matches
firecrackers,manufacturedoilsandotherfuels,coal,bunkerfueloil,dieselfueloil,cinematographicfilms,playing
cards,saccharine,opiumandotherhabitformingdrugs.22Softdrinkisnotoneofthosespecified.
3.Thetaxofone(P0.01)oneachgallon(128fluidounces,U.S.)ofvolumecapacityonallsoftdrinks,producedor
manufactured,oranequivalentof1centavospercase,23cannotbeconsideredunjustandunfair.24anincreasein
the tax alone would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust and confiscatory. Municipal corporations are
allowed much discretion in determining the reates of imposable taxes. 25 This is in line with the constutional policy of
according the widest possible autonomy to local governments in matters of local taxation, an aspect that is given
expression in the Local Tax Code (PD No. 231, July 1, 1973). 26 Unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive,
courtswillgoslowinwritingoffanordinanceasunreasonable.27Reluctanceshouldnotdetercompliancewithanordinance
suchasOrdinanceNo.27ifthepurposeofthelawtofurtherstrengthenlocalautonomyweretoberealized.28

Finally, the municipal license tax of P1,000.00 per corking machine with five but not more than ten crowners or
P2,000.00 with ten but not more than twenty crowners imposed on manufacturers, producers, importers and
dealersofsoftdrinksand/ormineralwatersunderOrdinanceNo.54,seriesof1964,asamendedbyOrdinance
No.41,seriesof1968,ofdefendantMunicipality,29appearsnottoaffecttheresolutionofthevalidityofOrdinanceNo.
27. Municipalities are empowered to impose, not only municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any business or
occupationbutalsotolevyforpublicpurposes,justanduniformtaxes.Theordinanceinquestion(OrdinanceNo.27)comes
withinthesecondpowerofamunicipality.

ACCORDINGLY, the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act, as amended, is hereby upheld and Municipal Ordinance No. 27 of the Municipality of Tanauan,
Leyte,seriesof1962,repealingMunicipalOrdinanceNo.23,sameseries,isherebydeclaredofvalidandlegal
effect.Costsagainstpetitionerappellant.
SOORDERED.
Castro,C.J.,Teehankee,Barredo,Makasiar,Antonio,Esguerra,MuozPalma,AquinoandConcepcion,Jr.,JJ.,
concur.

SeparateOpinions

FERNANDO,J.,concurring:
The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Martin is impressed with a scholarly and comprehensive character.
Insofar as it shows adherence to tried and tested concepts of the law of municipal taxation, I am only in
agreement.IfIlimitmyselftoconcurrenceintheresult,itisprimarilybecausewiththearticleonLocalAutonomy
found in the present Constitution, I feel a sense of reluctance in restating doctrines that arose from a different
basic premise as to the scope of such power in accordance with the 1935 Charter. Nonetheless it is wellnigh
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unavoidablethatIdosoasIamunabletosharefullywhatformearethenuancesandimplicationsthatcould
arisefromtheapproachtakenbymybrethren.Likewiseastotheconstitutionalaspectofthethornyquestionof
doubletaxation,IwouldlimitmyselftowhathasbeensetforthinCityofBaguiov.DeLeon.1
1.ThepresentConstitutionisquiteexplicitastothepoweroftaxationvestedinlocalandmunicipalcorporations.
Itisthereinspecificallyprovided:"Eachlocalgovernmentunitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesof
revenueandtolevytaxessubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. 2Thatwasnotthecaseunderthe
1935 Charter. The only limitation then on the authority, plenary in character of the national government, was that while the
President of the Philippines was vested with the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, or offices, he
couldonly.Itexercisegeneralsupervisionoveralllocalgovernmentsasmaybeprovidedbylaw... 3Asfaraslegislative
power over local government was concerned, no restriction whatsoever was placed on the Congress of the Philippines. It
would appear therefore that the extent of the taxing power was solely for the legislative body to decide. It is true that in
1939, there was a statute that enlarged the scope of the municipal taxing power. 4 Thereafter, in 1959 such competence
was further expanded in the Local Autonomy Act. 5 Nevertheless, as late as December of 1964, five years after its
enactmentoftheLocalAutonomyAct,thisCourt,throughJusticeDizon,inGoldenRibbonLumberCo.v.CityofButuan,6
reaffirmed the traditional concept in these words: "The rule is wellsettled that municipal corporations, unlike sovereign
states,afterclothedwithnopoweroftaxationthatitscharterorastatutemustclearlyshowanintenttoconferthatpower
or the municipal corporation cannot assume and exercise it, and that any such power granted must be construed strictly,
anydoubtorambiguityarisingfromthetermsofthegranttoberesolvedagainstthemunicipality."7

Taxation, according to Justice Parades in the earlier case of Tan v. Municipality of Pagbilao,8 "is an attribute of
sovereigntywhichmunicipalcorporationsdonotenjoy." 9Thatcaseleftnodoubteitherastoweaknessofaclaim"based
merely by inferences, implications and deductions, [as they have no place in the interpretation of the power to tax of a
municipalcorporation."10AstheconclusionreachedbytheCourtfindssupportinsuchgrantofthemunicipaltaxingpower,
I concur in the result. 2. As to any possible infirmity based on an alleged double taxation, I would prefer to rely on the
doctrineannouncedbythisCourtinCityofBaguiov.DeLeon.11Thus:"Astowhydoubletaxationisnotviolativeofdue
process, Justice Holmes made clear in this language: 'The objection to the taxation as double may be laid down on one
side....The14thAmendment[thedueprocessclause)nomoreforbidsdoubletaxationthanitdoesdoublingtheamountof
a tax, short of (confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grouse With that decision rendered at a time when
American sovereignty in the Philippines was recognized, it possesses more than just a persuasive effect. To some, it
deliveredthecoupjusticetothebogeyofdoubletaxationasaconstitutionalbartotheexerciseofthetaxingpower.Itwould
seemthoughthatintheUnitedStates,aswithus,itsghost,asnotedbyaneminentcritic,stillstalksthejuridicalstage.'In
a 1947 decision, however, we quoted with approval this excerpt from a leading American decision: 'Where, as here,
Congresshasclearlyexpresseditsintention,thestatutemustbesustainedeventhoughdoubletaxationresults.12

SoIwouldviewtheissuesinthissuitandaccordinglyconcurintheresult.

SeparateOpinions

FERNANDO,J.,concurring:
TheopinionoftheCourtpennedbyJusticeMartinisimpressedwithascholarlyandcomprehensivecharacter.
Insofarasitshowsadherencetotriedandtestedconceptsofthelawofmunicipaltaxation,Iamonlyin
agreement.IfIlimitmyselftoconcurrenceintheresult,itisprimarilybecausewiththearticleonLocalAutonomy
foundinthepresentConstitution,Ifeelasenseofreluctanceinrestatingdoctrinesthatarosefromadifferent
basicpremiseastothescopeofsuchpowerinaccordancewiththe1935Charter.Nonethelessitiswellnigh
unavoidablethatIdosoasIamunabletosharefullywhatformearethenuancesandimplicationsthatcould
arisefromtheapproachtakenbymybrethren.Likewiseastotheconstitutionalaspectofthethornyquestionof
doubletaxation,IwouldlimitmyselftowhathasbeensetforthinCityofBaguiov.DeLeon.1
1.ThepresentConstitutionisquiteexplicitastothepoweroftaxationvestedinlocalandmunicipalcorporations.
Itisthereinspecificallyprovided:"Eachlocalgovernmentunitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesof
revenueandtolevytaxessubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.2Thatwasnotthecaseunderthe
1935Charter.Theonlylimitationthenontheauthority,plenaryincharacterofthenationalgovernment,wasthatwhilethe
PresidentofthePhilippineswasvestedwiththepowerofcontroloverallexecutivedepartments,bureaus,oroffices,he
couldonly.Itexercisegeneralsupervisionoveralllocalgovernmentsasmaybeprovidedbylaw...3Asfaraslegislative
poweroverlocalgovernmentwasconcerned,norestrictionwhatsoeverwasplacedontheCongressofthePhilippines.It
wouldappearthereforethattheextentofthetaxingpowerwassolelyforthelegislativebodytodecide.Itistruethatin
1939,therewasastatutethatenlargedthescopeofthemunicipaltaxingpower.4Thereafter,in1959suchcompetence
wasfurtherexpandedintheLocalAutonomyAct.5Nevertheless,aslateasDecemberof1964,fiveyearsafterits
enactmentoftheLocalAutonomyAct,thisCourt,throughJusticeDizon,inGoldenRibbonLumberCo.v.CityofButuan,6
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reaffirmedthetraditionalconceptinthesewords:"Theruleiswellsettledthatmunicipalcorporations,unlikesovereign
states,afterclothedwithnopoweroftaxationthatitscharterorastatutemustclearlyshowanintenttoconferthatpower
orthemunicipalcorporationcannotassumeandexerciseit,andthatanysuchpowergrantedmustbeconstruedstrictly,
anydoubtorambiguityarisingfromthetermsofthegranttoberesolvedagainstthemunicipality."7

Taxation,accordingtoJusticeParadesintheearliercaseofTanv.MunicipalityofPagbilao,8"isanattributeof
sovereigntywhichmunicipalcorporationsdonotenjoy."9Thatcaseleftnodoubteitherastoweaknessofaclaim"based
merelybyinferences,implicationsanddeductions,[astheyhavenoplaceintheinterpretationofthepowertotaxofa
municipalcorporation."10AstheconclusionreachedbytheCourtfindssupportinsuchgrantofthemunicipaltaxingpower,
Iconcurintheresult.2.Astoanypossibleinfirmitybasedonanallegeddoubletaxation,Iwouldprefertorelyonthe
doctrineannouncedbythisCourtinCityofBaguiov.DeLeon.11Thus:"Astowhydoubletaxationisnotviolativeofdue
process,JusticeHolmesmadeclearinthislanguage:'Theobjectiontothetaxationasdoublemaybelaiddownonone
side....The14thAmendment[thedueprocessclause)nomoreforbidsdoubletaxationthanitdoesdoublingtheamountof
atax,shortof(confiscationorproceedingsunconstitutionalonothergrouseWiththatdecisionrenderedatatimewhen
AmericansovereigntyinthePhilippineswasrecognized,itpossessesmorethanjustapersuasiveeffect.Tosome,it
deliveredthecoupjusticetothebogeyofdoubletaxationasaconstitutionalbartotheexerciseofthetaxingpower.Itwould
seemthoughthatintheUnitedStates,aswithus,itsghost,asnotedbyaneminentcritic,stillstalksthejuridicalstage.'In
a1947decision,however,wequotedwithapprovalthisexcerptfromaleadingAmericandecision:'Where,ashere,
Congresshasclearlyexpresseditsintention,thestatutemustbesustainedeventhoughdoubletaxationresults.12

SoIwouldviewtheissuesinthissuitandaccordinglyconcurintheresult.
Footnotes

1"Sec.2.Taxation.Anyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,allcharteredcities,
municipalitiesandmunicipaldistrictsshallhaveauthoritytoimposemunicipallicensetaxesorfees
uponpersonsengagedinanyoccupationorbusiness,orexercisingprivateincharteredcities,
municipalitiesandmunicipaldistrictsbyrequiringthemtosecurelicensesatratesfixedbythe
municipalboardorcitycouncilofthecity,themunicipalcouncilofthemunicipality,orthemunicipal
districtcouncilofthemunicipaldistricttocollectfeesandchargesforservicerenderedbythecity,
municipalityormunicipaldistricttoregulateandimposereasonableforservicesrenderedin
connectionwithanybusiness,professionoccupationbeingconductedwithinthecity,municipalityor
municipaldistrictandotherwisetolevyforpublicpurposes,justanduniformtaxes,licensesorfees:
Provided,Thatmunicipalitiesandmunicipaldistrictsshall,innocase,imposeanypercentagetaxon
salesorothertaxesinanyformbasedthereonnorimposetaxesonarticlessubjecttospecifictax,
exceptgasoline,undertheprovisionsoftheNationalInternalRevenueCode:Provided,however,
Thatnocity,municipalityormunicipaldistrictmaylevyorimposeanyofthefollowing:
(a)Residencetax
(b)Documentarystamptax
(c)Taxesonthebusinessofanynewspaperengagedintheprintingandpublicationofany
newspaper,magazine,revieworbulletinappearingatregularintervalandhavingfixedpricesfor
subscriptionandsale,andwhichisnotpublishedprimarilyforthepurposeofpublishing
advertisements
(d)Taxesonpersonsoperatingwaterworks,irrigationandotherpublicutilitiesexceptelectriclight,
heatandpower
(e)Taxesonforestproductsandforestconcessions
(f)Taxesonestates,inheritance,gifts,legaciesandotheracquisitionsmortiscausa
(g)Taxesonincomeofanykindwhatsoever
(h)Taxesorfeesfortheregistrationofmotorvehiclesandfortheissuanceofallkindsoflicensesor
permitsforthedrivingthereof
(i)Customsdutiesregistration,wharfageonwharvesownedbythenationalgovernment,tonnage
andallotherkindsofcustomsfees,chargesanddues
(j)Taxesofanykindonbanks,insurancecompanies,andpersonspayingfranchisetax:
(k)Taxesonpremiumspaidbyownersofpropertywhoobtaininsurancedirectlywithforeign
insurancecompaniesand
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(i)Taxes,feesorlevies,ofanykind,whichineffectimposeaburdenonexportsofPhilippine
finished,manufacturedorprocessedproductsandproductsofPhilippinecottageindustries.
2Section2.
3Section3.
4Section2.
5Section3.
6Cooley,TheLawofTaxation,Vol.1,FourthEdition,149150.
7PepsiColaBottlingCo.ofthePhil.,Inc.vs.CityofButuan,L22814,August28,1968,24SCRA
79396.
8Rubiv.Prov.Brd.ofMindoro,39Phil.702(1919).
9Cooley,anteat190.
10Idemat198200.
11Malcolm,PhilippineConstitutionalLaw,51314.
12Cooleyanteat334.
13Seefootnote1.
14PepsiColaBottlingCo.ofthePhil.Inc.vs.CityofButuan,1,2S14,August28,1968,24SCRA
79396.SeeSec.22,Art.VI,1935
ConstitutionandSec.17(1),Art.VIII,1973Constitution.
15CommissionerofInternalRevenuev.LednickyL18169,July31,1964,11SCRA609.
16SMB,Inc.v.CityofCebu,L20312,February26,1972,43SCRA280.
17Punzalanv.Mun.BdofCityofManila,50O.G.2485manufacturersLifeIns.Co.v.Meer,89Phil.
351(1951).
18McQuillin.MunicipalCorporations,3rd.Ed.,Vol.6,at206.210.
19Villanuevav.CityofIloilo,L26521,December28,1968,26SCRA58586NinBayMiningCo.v.
Mun.ofRoxas,Palawan,L20125,July20,1965,14SCRA66364.
20Arabay,Inc.v.CFIofZamboangadelNorte,etal.,L27684,September10,1975.
21SMB,Inc.v.CityofCebu,ante,Footnote16.
22ShellCo.ofP.I.Ltd.v.Vao,94Phil.39495(1954)Sections123148,NIRCRANo.953,
NarcoticDrugsLaw,June20,1953.
23Brief,defendantsappellees,at14.AregularbottleofPepsiColasoftdrinkscontains8oz.,or192
oz.percaseof24bottlesafamilysizecontains26oz.,or312oz.percaseof12bottles.
24SeePepsiColaBottlingCo.ofthePhil.,Inc.v.CityofButuan,ante,Footnote14,wherethetax
rateisP.10percaseof24bottlesCityofBacolodv.Gruet,L18290,January31,1963,7SCRA168
69,wherethetaxisP.03oneverycaseofbottledCocaCoal.
25NorthernPhilippinesTobaccoCorp.v.Mun.ofAgoo,LaUnion,L26447,January30,1971,31
SCRA308.
26WilliamLines,Inc.v.CityofOzamis,L350048,April23,1974,56SCRA593,SecondDivision,
perFernando,J.
27VictoriasMillingCo.v.Mun.ofVictorias,L21183,September27,1968,25SCRa205.
28Procter&GambleTradingCo.v.Mun.ofMedina,MisamisOriental,L29125,January31,1973,
43SCRA13334.
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29Subjectofplaintiffappellant'sMotionforAdmissionandconsiderationofEssentialNewly
DisseveredEvidence,datedApril30,1969.
FERNANDO,J.
1L24756,October31,1968,25SCRA938.
2ArticleXI,Section5ofthepresentConstitution.
3ArticleVII,Section10ofthe1935Constitution.
4CommonwealthAct472entitled:"AnActRevisingtheGeneralAuthorityofMunicipalCouncilsand
MunicipalDistrictCouncilstoLevyTaxes,SubjecttoCertainLimitations."
5RepublicActNo.2264.
6L18534,December24,1964,12SCRA611.
7Ibid,619.Cf.Cuunjiengv.Potspone,42Phil.818(1922)DeLinanv.MunicipalCouncilofDaet,44
Phil.792(1923)ArquizaLutav.MunicipalityofZamboanga,50Phil.748(1927HerculesLumber
Co.v.Zamboanga,55Phil.653(1931)YeoLobyv.Zamboanga,55Phil.656(1931)Peoplev.
Carreon,65Phil.588(1939)YapTakWingv.MunicipalBoard,68Phil.511(1939)Eastern
TheatricalCo.v.Alfonso83Phil.852(1949)DelaRosav.CityofBaguio,91Phil.720(I!)52)
Medinav.CityofBaguio,91Phil.854(1952)StandardVacuumOilCo.v.Antigua,96Phil.909
(1955)MunicipalGovernmentofPagsanjanv.Reyes,98Phil.654(1956),WeWaYuv.CityofLipa,
Phil.975(1956)MunicipalityofCotabatov.Santos,105Phil.963(1959).
8L14264,April30,1963,7SCRA887.
9Ibid,892.
10Ibid.
11L24756,October31,1968,25SCRA938.
12Ibid,943944.
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