CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO (G.R. NO.

118127)
Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged
in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms
of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and
which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors,
karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any
place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The
Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment
shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional
for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial
of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
Held: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power,
not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the
ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing
down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no
reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will
not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive
as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids
running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up
their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An
ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types
of taking: A possessory taking and a regulatory taking. The latter occurs when the governments
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is
reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial
distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Courts view, there are no
substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for
prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention
of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions
of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN,

DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe,
is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is
subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland
under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not
an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of
ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an
environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle compliance.
FACTS: Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already operating a resort in the
area, and the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a threestorey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioners application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued
the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order
was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan
should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.
RULING: Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se.
Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact

legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given
powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with
authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to
order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary
permits.
TIMONER VS. PEOPLE
Mayor fenced public nuisance.
Abatement of public nuisance without judicial proceedings, municipal mayor not criminally
liable when he acted in good faith in authorizing the fencing of a barbershop for being a public nuisance
because it occupied a portion of the sidewalk. Art 699 authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance
without judicial proceedings.
Grave coercion is committed when a person who without authority of law, shall by means
of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something
against his will either it be right or wrong.
Elements:
a. That any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong.
b. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material
forceor such display of it as would produceintimidation and control the will of the offended party
c. That the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other
words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
Facts: The Court of Appeals found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave
Coercion penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner was the mayor of a town and
by the recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer, he barricaded some establishments and stalls
which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway and who were not complying
with certain health and sanitation requirement. The petitioner then filed a complaint against the owners of
the stalls saying that these stalls constituted public nuisance as well as nuisance per se. The owners of the
stalls charged the petitioner with the offense of grave coercion.
Issue: W/N the conviction of the court of appeals that the petitioner committed grave coercion is correct
the complainants were public nuisance.
Decision: The court is in agreement that the complainants were public nuisance for affecting a
considerable number of persons in their neighbourhood.
Petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaidrecommendation of the Municipal
Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no
criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law,
shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something notprohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong." The third element being absent in the case at bar,
petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.

CARAM VS. LAURETA

FACTS: On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land covered by OCT No.
3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in favor of the
plaintiff was not registered because it was not acknowledged before a notary public or any other

authorized officer. Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is in continuous, adverse and
notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or stopped by any of the defendants
or their representatives. In fact, Laureta had been paying realty taxes due thereon and had introduced
improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. On May 5, 1947,
the same land covered by OCT No. 3019 was sold by Marcos Mata to defendant Fermin Z. Caram, Jr.,
petitioner herein. The deed of sale in favor of Caram was acknowledged before Atty. Abelardo Aportadera.
On December 9, 1947, the second sale between Marcos Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr. was registered with
the Register of Deeds. On the same date, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in favor of Fermin
Caram Jr.The defendant Fermin Caram Jr. claimed that he has no knowledge or information about the
previous encumbrances, transactions, and alienations in favor of plaintiff until the filing of the complaints.
ISSUE: Whether or not the knowledge petitioner of a prior unregistered sale of a titled property
attributable to petitioner and equivalent in law of registration of sale.
HELD: Yes. There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the
property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency, Caram as principal, should also be deemed
to have acted in bad faith.Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no
registration at all. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Laureta was first in possession of the property. He is also a
possessor in good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in favor of Laureta was
procured by force. Such defect, however, was cured when, after the lapse of four years from the time the
intimidation ceased, Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an action for annulment or to set up nullity of
the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same.
HEIRS OF LORETO MARAMAG V. MARAMAG
Facts:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were
Loretos illegitimate family.
Loreto designated respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife).
Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for
being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Pursuant to the motion to dismiss incorporated in Insular and Grepalifes respective answers, the TC
dismissed the complaint with respect to the illegitimate children, who are the the designated primary
beneficiaries in the life insurance policies, for lack of cause action. However, trial court ruled that the
action may proceed against the concubine, Insular Life, and Grepalife.
Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the
petition failed to state a cause of action against them.
TC granted, and dismissed the case against them. In doing so, the TC court considered the allegations
found in Insulars answer.1
CA dismissed petitionersappeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. Further, it
found that due to petitioners failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration, the dismissal against
Insular and Grepalife had already attained finality.
Issue: WON the TC erred in granting the motion to dismiss? NO
Arguments:
Petitioners:The finding that Eva was either disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance companies or that
her designation was revoked by Loreto was raised only in the answers and motions for reconsideration of
both Insular and Grepalife. For a motion to dismiss to prosper on that ground, only the allegations in the
complaint should be considered.

1 Specifically, the allegations that Loreto revoked the designation of the concubine in one policy and that
Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such that the entire proceeds would be paid to
the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.

Ratio: When a motion to dismiss is premised on Sec. 1(g) 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the ruling
thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on
the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action
rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of
the veracity of the allegations if:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;

such allegations are legally impossible;
the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in
the course of the hearings related to the case.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light
of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by
special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states that the insurance
proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose
benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. From the petition filed before the trial court
that, it is clear tat although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. Thus, they are not entitled to the
proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the
insurance proceeds to petitioners.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LEON SILIM
Facts: Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of the Bureau of Public
Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that
the said property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only." This donation was
accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or
Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that
was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released since the government
required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was
authorized to officially transact for the exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which
would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a
Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. The
Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building
previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that
there was no valid acceptance made by the donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the
donation.
Issue:
1. Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC?
2. Was the condition in the donation violated?

2 SECTION 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court: Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x (g) That the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action.

Ruling:
(1) Yes. There was a valid acceptance.
The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. The purpose of
the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly
communicated to the donor.
Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had
knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the school building was being dismantled
and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the
donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by
respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the
acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to accept the donation personally, or through an authorized
person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation
shall be void.
The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the
absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in
favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendias acceptance was authorized under
Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf
of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever
demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not prohibited
by law.
(2) No. The condition was not violated.
The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected when Buendia exchanged the lot
for a much bigger one. It was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.