JAMES DUERLINGER

VASUBANDHUS PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)
VATS

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of his Refutation of the Theory of Self



(Atmav
adapratis
. edha), the appendix to his Treasury of Knowledge with
. ya), Vasubandhu presents a series
Commentary (Abhidarmakosabhas
of philosophical objections to the Vatsputryas theory of persons.1 A
theory of persons is a metaphysical account of persons which includes
or implies accounts of their nature, existence, unity, and identity over
time. The Vatsputryas theory in the Refutation explicitly concerns
only the nature and existence of persons. What is meant by persons is
that to which we refer when we use the pronoun, I, and its equivalents
in other languages, to refer to ourselves. I present here the first of three
articles in which Vasubandhus objections to the Vatsputryas theory
and their replies to these objections are reconstructed and evaluated.2
The theory to which Vasubandhu objects is that persons (pudgala-s)
exist in the sense that they exist apart from being perceived or conceived3
and are neither other than nor the same as4 the phenomena (dharmas) in dependence upon which they are perceived and conceived.5
Both Vasubandhu and the Vatsputryas believe that the phenomena
in dependence upon which persons are perceived and conceived are
the bodies and mental states of persons. Let us, as Vasubandhu and
Vatsputryas do, refer to these phenomena as the aggregates (skandhas).6 What is neither other than nor the same as the phenomena in
dependence upon which it is perceived and conceived is a phenomenon
which the Vatsputryas call inexplicable (avaktavya).7 Let us say
that persons conceived in dependence upon the aggregates are the
objects of the concept of ourselves. The Vatsputryas are claiming
that these objects exist and are inexplicable. I shall also express their
theory by saying that we exist and are inexplicable, since I shall use
we (us, ourselves, etc.) to refer to the objects of the concepts
of ourselves. Their theory may also be expressed by the claim that we
exist and are neither other than nor the same as our aggregates, where

Journal of Indian Philosophy 25: 307335, 1997.

c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

VICTORY: PIPS No.: 133626 HUMNKAP

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.1

308

JAMES DUERLINGER

our aggregates is used to refer to the aggregates in dependence upon

which we are perceived and conceived.
Vasubandhu and the Vatsputryas agree that we are by convention
 atar-s)

conceived to be appropriators (upad
of the aggregates, which
 anaskandha-s),

are therefore called the appropriated aggregates (upad
and that we are not correctly conceived in this way if we are the same
as our aggregates. By virtue of being conceived as appropriators of the
aggregates, they also seem to agree, we are conceived to be perceivers
of objects, thinkers of thoughts about them, performers of actions and
experiencers of the results of these actions. Vasubandhu thinks that we
are incorrectly conceived in these ways, since he believes that we are
in fact the same as our aggregates. The Vatsputryas think that we are
correctly so conceived, since they believe that we perceive ourselves
when our aggregates are present, and that what is perceived in this case
is not the same as our aggregates. Although the perception of ourselves
which attends the presence of our aggregates, they believe, establishes
our existence, it does not establish our conceivability apart from the
aggregates, since we cannot be conceived without reference to them.
In this first article I shall reconstruct and assess what I shall call
Vasubandhus two-realities objection to the Vatsputryas theory, the
Vatsputryas aggregate-reliance reply, Vasubandhus causal objection
to this reply, the Vatsputryas fire-fuel reply to this objection, and
the Vatsputryas middle-way argument for their theory. In the second
article, I shall reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus objections to the
Vatsputryas fire-fuel reply and their replies to these objections. In
the third article, I shall reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus objections
to their theory that inexplicable persons are known to exist by perception and their replies to these objections. Then I shall make my final
assessment of the entire exchange.

VASUBANDHUS TWO-REALITIES OBJECTION

The Refutation begins with a statement of Vasubandhus own theory of

persons. He argues that liberation from suffering is not possible for the
Trthikas,8 who do not accept the Buddhas teaching that we are nothing
but our aggregates, which are a collection of substances (dravya-s) of
different sorts in a causal continuum, since their belief that we are
substances separate in existence from our aggregates will prevent them
from abandoning the grasping at a self which causes them to suffer.
He claims that we are our aggregates, since only the aggregates are
known, by means of direct perception (pratyaks. a) and sound inference

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.2

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

309

. a), to be the phenomena in dependence upon which we are

(anuman
conceived.9 This argument sets the stage for his introduction of the
Vatsputryas theory of persons. They assert, he says, that a person
exists (pudgala santam icchanti). The Sanskrit word for person
(pudgala) is being used here, as the Vatsputryas use it, to refer to
an appropriator of aggregates, which is not the same as the aggregates
appropriated. The Sanskrit word for exists (santam) is used, as
Vasubandhu also uses it, to signify the possession of existence apart
from being perceived or conceived. So when the Vatsputryas assert
that a person exists, they are implying that the person to whom they
refer is not the same as its10 aggregates and asserting that it exists.
Vasubandhu begins his first objection to the Vatsputryas theory of
persons by challenging them to explain whether, in saying that a person
exists, they are claiming that a person is real in the way a substance is
(dravyasat) or real in the way a mental construction is (prajn~aptisat).11
He continues:
If it is a distinct entity like bodily form and other such things [each of which is an
entity of a certain sort],12 it is real in the way a substance is; but if [by analysis] it
is [shown to be the same as] a collection [of substances of different sorts], like milk
and other such things [each of which seems to be, but is not, an entity of a certain
sort], it is real in the way a mental construction is. Consequently, if a person is real
in the way a substance is, it must be said that it is other than the aggregates in the
way that each of them is other than the others, since it will possess a different nature
[than possessed by any of the substances of which the aggregates are comprised].
[If it is other than the aggregates, it must be either causally conditioned or causally
unconditioned. If it is causally conditioned,] its causes should be explained. But if it
is causally unconditioned, the false theory [of persons] espoused by the Trthikas is
held and a person has no function [to perform in the production of aggregates]. If
[a person is said to be] real in the way a mental construction is, [it is the same as
the aggregates, and] this is the theory [of persons found in the Buddhas discourses
and is] held by us.

According to Vasubandhu, to be real in the way a substance is is


to be an ultimate reality (paramarthasatya)
and that to be real in the
way a mental construction is is to be a deceptive conventional reality
(sam
as. ikas.13 What
. vr. tisatya), as these realities are defined by the Vaibh
exactly are these two realities?
The substances to which Vasubandhu refers in the passage above
are distinct entities in the sense that they are phenomena which possess
by themselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of their
possession of this nature. They are called ultimate realities, apparently,
because they are what they are conceived to be. Substances are known to
be what they are conceived to be because they continue to be conceived
even if they are taken apart physically or are mentally analyzed into
parts and brought to consciousness in that form. They continue to be

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.3

310

JAMES DUERLINGER

conceived because they are conceived on the basis of natures they

possess by themselves rather than on the basis of merely appearing to
possess such natures. Substances may be causally conditioned (sam
. skr. ta)
and impermanent (anitya), as are the substances of the different sorts
which comprise the aggregates, or causally unconditioned (asam
. skr. ta)
and permanent (nitya), as are space (akasa) and noncyclic existence
. a).
(nirvan
Mental constructions are called deceptive conventional realities
because they are by convention conceived to be entities of a certain
sort, and so, seem to possess by themselves just one nature on the basis
of which they are conceived, even though they do not, yet are real, since
analysis shows that they are collections of substances of different sorts.
They are known not to be the entities they are conceived to be because
they do not continue to be conceived if they are taken apart physically
or are mentally analyzed into parts and brought to consciousness in
that form. They are known to be collections of substances of different
sorts because, when they are taken apart physically or are mentally
analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that
form, what appear to consciousness are collections of substances of
different sorts. Phenomena which are neither ultimate realities nor
deceptive conventional realities do not exist, and so, are unreal (asat),
since they are neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way
a mental construction is.
In the passage quoted above Vasubandhu assumes, first of all, that
analysis of what is conceived, if it exists, reveals that it is either
a substance or a collection of substances of different sorts. This is
equivalent to the assumption that an entity which exists and is conceived
is either a phenomenon which possesses by itself just one nature and is
conceived on the basis of its possession of this nature or is a collection
of such phenomena which seems to possess by itself just one nature on
the basis of which it is conceived, but does not. Alternatively, we may
say that Vasubandhu assumes that a concept of an object is formed either
in dependence upon a substance or in dependence upon a collection of
substances of different sorts which seems to be an entity of a certain
sort, and that that in dependence upon which the concept of an object
is formed must be the object of the concept.
When an object is conceived in dependence upon a substance, he
assumes, the object is correctly conceived. Phenomena, so conceived,
exist, since they are substances. Vasubandhu believes that substances
are known to exist by means of direct perception or sound inference.
But when an object is conceived in dependence upon a collection

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.4

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

311

of substances of different sorts, he believes the object is incorrectly

conceived, since the object falsely appears to the consciousness which
conceives it as an entity of a certain sort. What Vasubandhu calls a
mental construction is the object of a concept formed in dependence
upon a collection of substances of different sorts which seems to be
an entity of a certain sort. The object is called a mental construction, I
surmise, because its appearance of being an entity of a certain sort is
mentally constructed. Although a collection of substances of different
sorts does not by itself possess just one nature on the basis of which it
is conceived, it is known to be the same as the object being conceived,
Vasubandhu believes, by means of the analysis which eliminates the
false appearance of the object being an entity of a certain sort, since what
is present to consciousness after analysis is a collection of substances
of different sorts.
In the passage translated above, Vasubandhu in effect claims, (a) that
if we are other than our aggregates, we are ultimate realities, (b) that
if we are the same as our aggregates, we are deceptive conventional
realities, and argues, on the basis of the assumption, (c) that we must be
either other than our aggregates or the same as our aggregates, that we
must be either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional realities. At
first sight, it would seem that Vasubandhus assumption, that we must
be either other than or the same as our aggregates, is an application of
the logical principle, that of any two things which exist, one is either
other than the second or the same as the second, which is expressed in
standard logical notation as (x) (y) ([x = y] v [x = y]).14 However,
when he speaks of our being other than our aggregates, he does not
mean that we are not identical to them. What he means is that we are not
clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates in the
sense that we are separable in existence from them, possess by ourselves
just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this
nature. If there can be phenomena which are separable in existence
from other phenomena without being clearly and distinctly separable
in existence from them, the claim that we are either other than or the
same as our aggregates is not an application of a principle of logic.
Both Vasubandhu and the Vatsputryas believe that we are other than
our aggregates if and only if we are substances which exist apart from
our aggregates, and that we are the same as our aggregates if and only
if we are reducible in existence to our aggregates. What they disagree
about is whether or not we can exist without being substances which
exist apart from our aggregates or being reducible in existence to our
aggregates.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.5

312

JAMES DUERLINGER

In order both to avoid the impression that Vasubandhu is merely

invoking a principle of logic in his objection and to incorporate a uniform
terminology into my discussion, hereafter I shall substitute are clearly
and distinctly separable in existence from for are other than in my
discussion of the statement that we are other than our aggregates. And to
make it clear that the statement that we are the same as our aggregates
is a result of the reductive form of analysis used by Vasubandhu to
show that we exist, I shall substitute is reducible in existence to for
is the same as in my discussions of this statement.
So Vasubandhu thinks that if we exist, as the Vatsputryas claim
we do, we must be either substances, which are clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from our aggregates, as the Trthikas claim, or
mental constructions, which are reducible in existence to our aggregates,
as he himself claims. When the Vatsputryas claim that we exist,
Vasubandhu is objecting, they must accept the Trthikas theory of
persons, which they cannot do, or his own theory, since there is no
other alternative available.
Vasubandhus objection to the Vatsputryas theory of persons may
now be reconstructed. According to the Vatsputryas,
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

We exist.
If we exist, we must be either clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to, our
aggregates.
If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from
our aggregates, we possess by ourselves just one nature and
are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature.
If we possess by ourselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature, we are
ultimate realities.
If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the collection
of substances of different sorts called the aggregates.
If by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the
collection of substances of different sorts called the aggregates, we are deceptive conventional realities.

Therefore,
(vii)

We are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional

realities.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.6

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

313

The point of the objection, of course, is that the Vatsputryas only

alternative to adopting Vasubandhus own theory of persons is to accept
that of the Trthikas, and they do not accept that of the Trthikas. So
how can persons exist if they are not reducible in existence to their
aggregates?
 IPUTRIYAS AGGREGATE-RELIANCE REPLY
VATS

The Vatsputryas reply to Vasubandhus objection is as follows:

A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental
construction is, since it is conceived in reliance upon aggregates which pertain to
ourselves, are appropriated, and exist in the present.

In other words, we are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities, as Vasubandhu defines them, since we are conceived
in reliance upon aggregates which possess the three attributes listed.
Let us set aside for the moment a discussion of the three attributes
of these aggregates so we may first come to an understanding of the
 aya)

Vatsputryas use of in reliance upon (upad
in the claim that
we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates.
Although we exist, the Vatsputryas believe, we are inexplicable
phenomena in the sense that we are not ultimate realities, since we are
not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, nor
deceptive conventional realities, since we are not reducible in existence
to our aggregates. We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in
existence from, nor reducible in existence to, our aggregates, because
we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates. But what is meant by
our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates? To understand its
meaning let us begin by seeing why inexplicable phenomena are not
conceived in the way substances are conceived.
Phenomena which are inexplicable, according to the Vatsputryas,
are like substances insofar as their existence is not reducible to that of
a collection of substances of different sorts. But they are also unlike
them insofar as they do not by themselves possess just one nature
and are conceived on the basis of their possession of this nature. The
Vatsputryas apparently believe that inexplicable phenomena do possess
by themselves natures by reason of which they exist, but not that they
can be conceived on the basis of possessing these natures. It is precisely
because the natures we possess by ourselves do not enable us to be
conceived that we must be conceived in reliance upon aggregates.
In the third article in this series I shall discuss Vasubandhus dispute
with the Vatsputryas concerning how we are known to exist. If we are

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.7

314

JAMES DUERLINGER

to comprehend fully what the Vatsputryas mean by our being conceived

in reliance upon aggregates, we need to anticipate their views about
this matter. The Vatsputryas will claim that we are known to exist by
means of perception. Vasubandhu will have difficulty understanding
this claim, since he assumes that a perception which establishes the
existence of the object of a concept must involve a discrimination
of the single nature the object possesses by itself. Only if the single
nature an object possesses by itself is discriminated when the object is
perceived, he believes, can the existence of the object be established by
the perception, since a discrimination of this nature is what determines
the content of the concept of that object. Let us call a perception of
this sort a clear and distinct perception of the object of a concept. The
Vatsputryas, however, do not believe that we possess by ourselves
single natures the discrimination of which is included in the perception
which establishes our existence. In other words, they do not believe
that the perception which establishes our existence is clear and distinct.
Nonetheless, they believe, the existence of the object of the concept
of ourselves is established by perception. How is this possible? How
can a perception establish the existence of the object of the concept of
ourselves if it is not a clear and distinct perception of this object? It
is possible, they believe, if the concept is not formed on the basis of
a clear and distinct perception of ourselves, but on the basis of clear
and distinct perceptions of phenomena which are present when we are
being perceived. Since our natures cannot be discriminated when we
are perceived, the concept of ourselves must be formed on the basis of
clear and distinct perceptions of the phenomena present when we are
perceived. These phenomena are the aggregates.
We have come to see the difference between the way in which the

Vatsputryas believe we are conceived and the way in which ultimate
realities are conceived. Ultimate realities are conceived on the basis of
the single natures they possess by themselves, while we are conceived
on the basis of the single natures of the aggregates present when we
are perceived. What is the difference between the way in which the
Vatsputryas think we are conceived and the way in which deceptive
conventional realities are conceived?
Vasubandhu likens our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates to
the way in which milk is conceived in dependence upon its constituents.
The aggregates in reliance upon which we are conceived, according
to this comparison, must be that to which the concept of ourselves
is applied, just as the collection of phenomena in dependence upon
which milk is conceived is that to which the concept of milk is applied.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.8

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

315

Vasubandhu assumes in both cases that that in dependence upon which

a concept of a phenomenon is formed is that to which the concept
is applied. Let us call that in dependence upon which a concept is
formed the cause of the concept, meaning by this that it determines
the content of the concept formed. Let us also call that to which a
concept is applied its object. The Vatsputryas claim that the object
of the concept of ourselves is not its cause. Part of what they mean to
express by saying that we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates
is that the aggregates are the cause of the concept of ourselves without
being its object.
The theory that the object of a concept must always be its cause I
shall call the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts. Vasubandhu
accepts this theory, while the Vatsputryas do not. Since we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, according to the Vatsputryas,
our aggregates cause the concept of ourselves, but they are not its
object. This is another implication of our being conceived in reliance
upon aggregates upon which the Vatsputryas draw in their reply to
Vasubandhus two-realities objection.
One of the forms which the Vatsputryas reply from aggregatereliance can take may now be reconstructed.
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

We are conceived in reliance upon aggregates

If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, we do not
posses by ourselves single natures on the basis of which we
are conceived.
If we do not possess by ourselves single natures on the basis
of which we are conceived, we are not clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from our aggregates.

Therefore,
(iv)
(v)

We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

our aggregates.
If we are not clearly and distinct separable in existence from
our aggregates, we are not ultimate realities

Therefore, from (iv) and (v) we may infer,

(vi)

We are not ultimate realities.

Moreover,

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.9

316
(vii)

(viii)

JAMES DUERLINGER

If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the concept of
ourselves.
If our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the
concept of ourselves, we are not reducible in existence to
our aggregates.

Therefore, from (vii) and (viii) we may infer,

(ix)

We are not reducible in existence to our aggregates.

But,
(x)

If we are not reducible in existence to our aggregates, we

are not deceptive conventional realities.

Therefore, from (vi) and (xi) we may infer,

(xii)

We are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional

realities.

Vasubandhu, we shall see, would reject premise (vii) of this reconstruction. But since the objection he is about to make against the reply
is directed against its unreconstructed form, the objection will merely
assume the falsity of premise (vii) rather than show it to be false.
We must be careful at this point not to draw the conclusion that
the Vatsputryas mean to deny the truth of the Buddhas doctrine of
two realities. They are, of course, denying the truth of that doctrine
as Vasubandhu interprets it. The Vatsputryas, we may assume, have
their own interpretation of the Buddhas doctrine of the two realities.
Indeed, the Vaibhas. ika interpretation, which is accepted by Vasuhandhu,
is rejected by scholars belonging to all of the other Indian Buddhist
philosophical schools except the school based on Vasubandhus Treasury
itself. The Vatsputryas, I suggest, would interpret the Buddhas doctrine
in such a way that the inexplicability of persons is their ultimate reality,
while such persons, as conceived, are deceptive conventional realities
insofar as the conceiving of them makes them appear to be entities of
a certain sort. Analysis would then show the falsity of our appearance
of being entities of a certain sort, and thereby, enable us to free our
perception of ourselves of the conceptual overlay which causes us to
15

see ourselves as selves (atmadr
. .s.ti).

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.10

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

317

THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE AGGREGATES IN RELIANCE UPON WHICH WE

ARE CONCEIVED

Let us now discuss the attributes the Vatsputryas assign to the aggregates in reliance upon which they believe we are conceived. They say



that these aggregates are those which pertain to ourselves (adhy
atmik
an),




are appropriated (upattan), and exist in the present (varttamanan). The
aggregates which pertain to ourselves are our organs of perception and
mental states, and perhaps even our so-called bodily properties.16 The
aggregates are appropriated, the Vatsputryas seem to believe, in the
sense that they are clung to as possessions of the self which we falsely
appear to be because we form a concept of ourselves in dependence
upon the presence of these aggregates. The self we falsely appear to be,
they claim, is a permanent and partless substance.17 The effect produced
by the aggregates being appropriated in this sense would seem to be the
continued existence of their causal continuum from one lifetime to the
next.18 As causes of the continued existence of this continuum, we are
not selves, since we separately exist without being separate substances.
Vasubandhu verbally agrees with the Vatsputryas that the aggregates
in reliance upon which we are conceived are those which pertain to
ourselves and are appropriated. But he believes, first of all, that we are
conceived in reliance upon these aggregates in the way in which milk
is conceived in dependence upon its constituents, not in the special
way the Vatsputryas claim we are conceived. Secondly, he seems to
think that the inexplicable person the Vatsputryas believe to be the
appropriator of the aggregates is itself the self. For he does not, as the
Vatsputryas do, believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that
we are permanent and partless substances which exist apart from our
aggregates, yet does believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that
we exist without being reducible in existence to our aggregates. Thirdly,
he thinks that the appropriator of the aggregates is real in the way a
mental construction is, not in the way an inexplicable phenomenon is.
In truth, he insists, there is no appropriator of the aggregates which
exists apart from them.
When the Vatsputryas say that the aggregates in reliance upon which
we are conceived exist in the present, what they must mean by the
present is the time we are actually being conceived. The Vatsputryas
are implying that past and future aggregates, which are those not present
at the time when we are conceiving ourselves, are not phenomena in
reliance upon which we are conceived.19 It might be objected that
we conceive ourselves in reliance upon past aggregates when we
remember something we did or experienced in the past and that we

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.11

318

JAMES DUERLINGER

conceive ourselves in reliance upon future aggregates when we foresee

or imagine what we shall do or experience in the future. In these cases,
would we not be conceiving ourselves in reliance upon past and future
aggregates? The Vatsputryas would surely reply that, if we conceive
ourselves on the basis of past and future aggregates, we would not be
conceiving ourselves from the first-person singular perspective, since
past and future aggregates are the phenomena on basis of which we
would conceive ourselves from the third-person singular perspective.
The concept of ourselves is the concept of ourselves as it is used from
the first-person singular perspective, for example, as it is used in the
thoughts that I am feeling pleasure now, that I felt pleasure yesterday,
and that I shall feel pleasure tomorrow. It should be clear that in each
of these cases, I am conceiving myself in reliance upon thinking these
thoughts, not in reliance upon the content of these thoughts.
VASUBANDHUS CAUSAL OBJECTION TO THE AGGREGATE-RELIANCE
REPLY

Vasubandhu objects, on the assumption that the cause of a concept must

be the object of the concept, that it cannot be true, as the Vatsputryas
claim, that if we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, we are
neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities.
If we are to understand this obscure statement [of how a person exists without being
either real in the way a substance is or real in the way a mental construction is], its
meaning must be disclosed. What is meant by [saying that a person is conceived]
in reliance upon [the aggregates]? If it means [that a person is conceived] on the
condition that the aggregates have been perceived, then the concept [of a person]
is applied only to them, just as when visible forms and other such things [that
comprise milk] have been perceived, the concept of milk is applied only to them. If
[saying that a person is conceived in reliance upon the aggregates means that it
is conceived] in dependence upon the aggregates being present, then [once again,
the concept of a person is applied only to them], because the aggregates themselves
will cause it to be conceived. [Therefore,] the difficulty is the same.

Vasubandhu here argues that insofar as the first premise of the

Vatsputryas reply from aggregate-reliance is true, it cannot be used
in a sound inference to prove that its conclusion is true. The sense in
which that premise is true, he claims, is that the concept of ourselves
is formed because the aggregates have been perceived or because the
aggregates are present. The distinction Vasubandhu is drawing between
the perception of the aggregates being a condition for the concept of
ourselves being formed and the presence of the aggregates being the
condition for the concept being formed does not mark a real difference
in his view about the cause of the concept of ourselves, since the

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.12

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

319

aggregates which are present, he thinks, are present to consciousness

as objects of perception. He is arguing that if the aggregates cause the
concept of ourselves, the concept is applied only to the aggregates, and
hence, that the aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves.
He can draw this conclusion, however, only if he assumes that
the phenomena which cause a concept must be the object of that
concept. This assumption, I have already noted, is contradicted by
premise (vii) of my reconstruction of the Vatsputryas aggregatereliance reply. Vasubandhu supports his use of this assumption with the
example of how milk is conceived. Since milk is conceived in reliance
upon the collection of its constituents, he argues, the collection of the
constituents of milk is the object of the concept of milk; likewise,
if we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggregates are
the object of the concept of ourselves. Finally, Vasubandhu concludes
his objection with the statement that the difficulty is the same. The
difficulty to which I believe he alludes is that the Vatsputryas cannot
say that we exist unless they accept the view that we are either ultimate
realities or deceptive conventional realities.
Vasubandhus objection, which I call the causal objection to the
aggregate-reliance reply, may now be reconstructed. Let us assume,
with the Vatsputryas, that
(i)
(ii)

We are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates.

If we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, the
aggregates cause the concept of ourselves.

Therefore,
(iii)

The aggregates cause the concept of ourselves.

But
(iv)

What causes a concept is the object of the concept.

Therefore,
(v)

The aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves.

But
(vi)

If the aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves,

we are reducible in existence to our aggregates.

Therefore,
(vii)

We are reducible in existence to our aggregates.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.13

320

JAMES DUERLINGER

But
(viii)

If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, then we

are deceptive conventional realities.

Therefore,
(ix)

We are deceptive conventional realities.

It follows from (ix), by the rule of logic called addition, that

(x)

We are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional

realities.

Hence, from (i), which is the first premise of the Vatsputryas reply
from aggregate-reliance, Vasubandhu has derived the alternatives he
first posed to the Vatsputryas. So the reason they give for rejecting
these alternatives, he is arguing, provides a reason for accepting them.
The theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts, as well as its use to
reject the content of our actual concept of ourselves, has its analogue in
the philosophy of David Hume, whose own phenomenalistic version of
the theory is that ideas are copies of impressions. He, like Vasubandhu,
uses a version of the theory to argue for the falsity of our actual
concept or idea of ourselves as a phenomenon irreducible in existence
to the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived. Like
Vasubandhu, moreover, he in effect argues that if we exist at all, we
must be reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence upon
which we are conceived, since, if we exist, we must be either clearly
and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to,
the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived, and we
know that we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from
these phenomena, since we are not clearly and distinctly perceived. This
parallel helps us to see what is at stake in Vasubandhus use of the theory
of cause-dependent objects of concepts to reject the Vatsputryas theory
of persons. Vasubandhus acceptance of the theory of cause-dependent
objects of concepts is surely motivated by the same fundamental concern
that motivates Humes theory of concept formation, which is to provide
a way to verify claims about what exists.
 IPUTRIYAS REPLY FROM FIRE AND FUEL
VATS

The crux of the dispute at this point between Vasubandhu and the
Vatsputryas concerns whether or not what causes a concept to be
formed must be the object of the concept. So what the Vatsputryas

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.14

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

321

now need to do, and indeed, do, is to find a way to reject the theory of
cause-dependent objects of concepts. Their rejection of this theory is
built into their attempt to provide an example of a phenomenon other
than a person which is conceived in dependence upon a collection
of substances of different sorts and is neither clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, that collection
of substances. The Vatsputryas reply is as follows:
A person is not conceived in this way, but rather in the way [in which] fire is
conceived in reliance upon fuel. Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel, [they claim,
in the sense that] it is not conceived unless fuel is present, and it cannot be conceived
if it either is or is not other than fuel. If fire were other than fuel, fuel [which is
burning] would not be hot. And if fire were not other than fuel, what burns would
be the same as the cause of its burning.

In the translation I have taken the Vatsputryas to be providing an

account of what it is for fire to be conceived in reliance upon fuel and
have added to that account the qualification that fuel is burning, since it
is clear that fuel which is not burning is not hot and it is being assumed
that the fuel to which the Vatsputryas are referring is in fact hot.
The Vatsputryas reply is more than a simple counter-example on
the basis of which they would have us reject the assumption upon
which Vasubandhus causal objection is based, since it includes, as I
have interpreted it, a definition of conceived in reliance upon. For
if what I am calling their definition of this phrase is substituted for
the phrase in the original aggregate-reliance reply, that reply will then
take the form, A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor
real in the way a mental construction is, since it [is conceived, but] is
not conceived unless aggregates are present and it cannot be conceived
if it either is or is not other than aggregates. This definition in fact
supplies us with premises (iv) and (ix) of the reconstruction I made
above of the aggregate-reliance reply. In my reconstruction, however,
I have supplied the premises upon which (iv) and (ix) are derived, and
then supplied the further premises from which the conclusion of the
aggregate-reliance reply is derived.
A logically perspicuous reconstruction of the Vatsputryas reply to
Vasubandhus causal objection will include arguments for the premises
(a) that fire is not conceived unless fuel is present, (b) that fire is not
clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, and (c) that fire
is not reducible in existence to fuel, and it will end with the conclusion
(d) that that in dependence upon which a phenomenon is conceived need
not be what is conceived. Both Vasubandhu and the Vatsputryas agree,
of course, that fire is conceived and that it is conceived in the sense
that a concept of fire is formed. Both also agree that fire is the object of

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.15

322

JAMES DUERLINGER

this concept, but Vasubandhu believes fire to be a mental construction

reducible in existence to the elements of which it is composed and the
Vatsputryas believe it to be an inexplicable phenomenon conceived
in dependence upon fuel. When it is said that fire is not conceived
unless fuel is present, this means for both that fire is conceived in
dependence upon fuel. But they do not agree, as I shall explain in the
next article, that fire is in fact conceived in dependence upon fuel.
Since the Vatsputryas do not present an argument for this premise,
we shall need to reconstruct an argument for it on their behalf if we
are to identify the cause of their disagreement.
Their reason for believing that fire is conceived in dependence upon
fuel is surely that they define fire by reference to fuel. Our first clue to
uncovering their definition is to note that they most likely believe that
fire is known to exist by perception, since fire is used as the analogue of
a person, whose perception, we have seen, is the basis upon which they
claim that a person exists. But fire is not always perceived when fuel
is present. It is perceived only when fuel burns (dahyate). Because fire
is perceived only when fuel burns, the Vatsputryas surely reason, fire
may be defined by reference to the burning of the fuel. It should be no
surprise, therefore, that the Vatsputryas are in fact later represented by
Vasubandhu as defining fire as what causes fuel to burn. So defined, fire
cannot be conceived without reference to fuel, and in this sense, fire is
conceived in dependence upon fuel. We can be sure that their definition
of fire is not a statement of what it is according to its own nature, since
they must believe that we cannot know what fire is according to its
own nature. They must believe that we cannot know this because they
are presenting fire as the analogue of ourselves and they believe that
we cannot know what we are according to our own natures.
If we are to understand the Vatsputryas definition of fire and
the role it plays in their reply to Vasubandhus causal objection, we
need to contrast their definition of fire to that given in the Treasury

account of the elements (bhuta-s)
of which all bodies are comprised.
According to the Treasury account, bodies are mental constructions
reducible in existence to collections of substances of different sorts,
 uta-s),

including four primary elements (mahabh
known to exist by
sound inference, and various secondary elements (bhautika-s), known
to exist by clear and distinct perception. The four primary elements are
called fire (tejas), earth (pr. thiv), air (ran. a), and water (ap), which are
substances all of which are present in every body in equal proportions
and which in combination must be present if the body is to possess the
secondary elements, which are the special objects of the five senses.20

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.16

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

323

Each of these elements has by itself just one nature which is called
its defining property (laks. an. a) and which cannot be present in any of
the other elements. The defining property of the fire-element is heat
 21 As the defining property of the fire-element, heat cannot be
(us. n. ata).
present in any of the other three primary elements. In addition to the
fire-element, which is an ultimate reality, there is the fire which is a
deceptive conventional reality and is reducible in existence to the special
collection of substances of different sorts of which it is composed. In
the Refutation itself Vasubandhu so analyzes fire, as conventionally
conceived, and claims that fuel, which is similarly analyzed, is the
cause of the arising of fire in the way that milk is a cause of the
arising of curds. Since the four primary elements exist in every body in
equal proportions, a body would seem to be called a fire not because it
contains more fire-elements than the elements of earth, air and water,
but because of the greater intensity of the heat of the fire-elements it
contains.22
It should be clear that when the Vatsputryas define fire as the
cause of the burning of fuel they are offering an alternative to the
Treasury accounts of fire as an ultimate reality and as a deceptive
conventional reality. In the Refutation, when Vasubandhu requests
from the Vatsputryas more specific accounts of fire and fuel, they
identify fire with the heat (aus. n. yam) which is present in burning fuel
(pradpta), and claim that fuel is comprised of the earth-, air- and
water-elements. It is likely that the Vatsputryas hold the view that
fuel is a collection of elemental substances, as they are defined in
the Treasury, since they seem to hold the view that the aggregates,
the analogue of fuel in their analogy, is a collection of substances of
different sorts. But we can be sure that the fire-element, as defined in
the Treasury, is not what the Vatsputryas call fire, because (a) the
fire-element is not the cause of the burning of fuel, (b) the fire-element
is not present in fuel if fuel is comprised solely of the earth-, air- and
water-elements, and (c) the fire-element is not perceived, as fire is, but
inferred to exist on the basis of a clear and distinct perception of its
defining property, heat. Nor can fire, which the Vatsputryas also call
heat, be the heat which defines the fire-element, since the heat with
which the Vatsputryas identify fire is present in fuel, while the heat
which defines the fire-element cannot be present in fuel. Fire, according
to the Vatsputryas, is the heat present in burning fuel which causes
the fuel to burn. This cause of the burning of fuel, we may suppose, the
Vatsputryas call heat because the heat present in fuel is generally
considered to be the cause of its burning. Moreover, this fire or heat

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.17

324

JAMES DUERLINGER

which is present in fuel, if it is an analogue to persons as conceived by

the Vatsputryas, will be separable in existence from the fuel it causes
to burn without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from
it, just as persons are separable in existence from the aggregates they
cause to be appropriated, without being clearly and distinctly separable
in existence from them.
Whether or not the Vatsputryas believe that, in addition to fire, as
they define it, there is also a fire-element, as defined in the Treasury,
is not clear. If they do assert that both fire and the fire-element exist,
they would certainly deny that the heat which is present in fuel is the
defining property of the fire-element, since it is present in fuel and the
defining property of the fire-element cannot be present in fuel. They
would also be forced to claim that the fire or heat present in fuel is
separable in existence from the fire-element without being clearly and
distinctly separable in existence from it, since they believe (a) that it
exists, (b) that it is not reducible in existence to the fire-element, and
(c) that it is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the
fire-element. They seem to think (a) that it exists, since it is perceived,
(b) that it is not reducible in existence to the fire-element, since it
causes fuel to burn and the fire-element does not, and (c) that it is
not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the fire-element,
since it is not a substance. The perception of heat present in burning
fuel, we may also infer, would not be the same as the perception of
the heat present in the fire-element, since that heat, according to the
Treasury account, is clearly and distinctly perceived, while the heat
with which the Vatsputryas identify fire cannot be so perceived if it
is a true analogue to a person.
If the Vatsputryas do not accept, in addition to their own view that
fire is inexplicable, the view that all bodies include fire-elements of
the sort explained in the Treasury, their analogy between persons and
their aggregates and fire and its fuel would seem to be more exact,
since there is no mention of anything comparable to the fire-element
in the analogy. In this case, they would be rejecting the view that fire
is an elemental substance of the sort earth, air and water are and offer
a quite different explanation of the presence of heat in bodies.
Although the Vatsputryas define fire as what burns fuel, they do
not explain what they mean by the burning of fuel. The only account of
. ya is in the Refutation
burning I have found in the Abhidharmakosabhas
itself, where Vasubandhu reports what is commonly said about fire and
fuel so that he may then offer his own reductive analysis of what is
said.23 He reports that it is commonly said that fire burns fuel by

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.18

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

325

 ap
 as
 an
 at).

bringing about an alteration in its continuum (santati vikar
If we suppose that the Vatsputryas accept as true Vasubandhus report
about what is commonly said about how fire burns fuel and that they
believe that what is commonly said is correct, how would they explain
this alteration?
We may be sure that the Vatsputryas do not believe that an alteration
in the continuum of fuel is a change of some sort in a substance, since
all Indian Buddhists reject the idea of a substance which undergoes
change. However, there remains the following possibility. When fire is
present in fuel, which is conceived in dependence upon a collection of
momentary substances of different sorts existing in a causal continuum,
it causes the part of the collection in which it is actually present in
one moment to cease, in the next moment, to be part of that collection;
then in that next moment, without changing or having ceased to exist,
it is present in another part of the collection, which it causes, in the
next moment, to cease to exist, etc., until the collection of momentary
substances in dependence upon which the fuel is conceived ceases to
exist. In this case, there is no element which undergoes a change of
any sort, but the continuum of the fuel is changed in the sense that
the collection of substances in dependence upon which it is conceived
as fuel is being reduced in number to the point where there are no
more phenomena in dependence upon which fuel is conceived. The
fuel, in this sense, is consumed by the fire. The general idea is that
the fire or heat present in fuel continues to exist, without changing,
in its continuum, until it gradually causes the continuum to cease to
exist. The changelessness of fire, of course, will be inexplicable in the
sense that it is not that of a permanent and partless substance or that
of a causal continuum of momentary substances of different sorts as a
collection.
The basic similarities to which the analogy between fire and persons
is meant to call attention, of course, are that both persons and fire
are not conceived on the basis of the single natures they possess
by themselves, since they are not substances, and that they are not,
respectively, reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence
upon which they are conceived. One crucial difference, however, is that
fire would seem to come into existence at the time its fuel begins to
burn, while a person, according to the Vatsputryas, is a beginningless
phenomenon. Another difference is that fire would seem to cease to
exist once its fuel has been consumed, while a person, according to
the Vatsputryas, would not seem to cease to exist once the continuum
of the aggregates it appropriates ceases to exist.24 Neither of these

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.19

326

JAMES DUERLINGER

differences, however, is pertinent to the point the Vatsputryas are

trying to make in the analogy. They do not claim that all inexplicable
phenomena are, as persons are, beginningless and endless.
The Vatsputryas definition of the fire as what causes fuel to burn
supports my earlier suggestion that they define a person by reference to
effects it produces in the continuum of its aggregates. It would seem,
if my analysis thus far is correct, that the Vatsputryas adopt the view
that just as a person is an inexplicable phenomenon which causes the
continuum of the aggregates in which it is changelessly present to
continue to exist, so fire is an inexplicable phenomenon which causes
the continuum of the fuel in which it is changelessly present to cease
to exist. These inexplicable phenomena, we may say, are inexplicable
causes in the sense that they are neither clearly and distinctly separable in
existence from, nor reducible in existence to, the continua of phenomena
in dependence upon which they are conceived to be causes of the
continued or discontinued existence of these continua. Although the
Vatsputryas would not be claiming that all causes are inexplicable,
they would be making a radical addition to the Treasury account of
the causal relation, according to which all momentary phenomena, by
their own natures, are effects produced by other momentary phenomena
or causes which produce other momentary phenomena, yet are clearly
and distinctly separable in existence from one another.25 Inexplicable
causes, by contrast, (a) are not momentary, (b) are not, by their own
natures, effects produced by momentary phenomena or causes which
produce momentary phenomena, and (c) are not clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from other phenomena, yet (d) are causes of
effects in the continua of collections of substances of different sorts
in dependence upon which the causes are conceived. Unfortunately,
Vasubandhus text does not provide us with any clues by which we can
elaborate on this picture of inexplicable causes.
My interpretation of how the Vatsputryas believe fire to cause fuel
to burn, as an inexplicable heat present in its continuum, enables us to
understand the next part of their reply from fire and fuel, which is their
argument for the premise that fire is not other than fuel. Their explicit
argument consists simply in the statement that if fire were other than
 anus. n. am indhanam
fuel, fuel would not be hot (yadi hy anyah. syad,
.
 We can now take this argument to mean that if the fire which
syat).
burns fuel by its presence, as heat, in its continuum, were clearly and
distinctly separable in existence from fuel, fuel which is burning would
not, per impossible, be hot. The argument, in other words, turns on the
account of fire as the heat which causes fuel to burn by its presence in

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.20

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

327

the continuum of fuel. If this account of fire is correct, fire cannot be

clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. For in that case
fire would be either (a) a permanent substance, which is impossible,
since a permanent substance, all Indian Buddhists agree, cannot produce
an effect of any sort, or (b) the impermanent substance called the fireelement, which is impossible, since the fire-element cannot be present
in fuel, and the fire or heat which causes fuel to burn is present in fuel
until the fuel is consumed. Their argument for the theory that fuel which
is burning would not be hot if fire were clearly and distinctly separable
in existence from fuel, can, for our purposes, take for its premises (a)
that if fire were clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel,
it would not be present in fuel as the heat which causes it to burn,
(b) that if it were not present in fuel as the heat which causes it to
burn, fuel which is burning would not be hot, and (c) that fuel which
is burning is hot.
The next part of the Vatsputryas reply from fire and fuel is the claim
that if fire were not other than fuel (i.e. were reducible in existence
to fuel), what burns and what causes it to burn would be the same

 dahyam


 Since they present this
(athananyah
eva dahakam
. syat,
. syat).
claim as part of an argument for the conclusion that fire is not reducible
in existence to fuel, we may assume that they take it for granted that
what burns and what causes it to burn cannot be the same. But fire,
they have assumed, is what causes fuel to burn. So what they deem to
be the impossible consequence of fire being reducible in existence to
fuel seems to be that fuel is what causes fuel to burn. The principle
employed in this argument, therefore, is that nothing can produce an
effect in itself.26 In other words, the Vatsputryas are assuming that a
cause of an effect must be separable in existence from that in which it
produces its effect.
The Vatsputryas reply from fire and fuel, thus far, may be rendered
as follows:
(i)
(ii)

Fire is what causes fuel to burn.

If fire is what causes fuel to burn, fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel.

There, from (i) and (ii) we may infer

(iii)

Fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel.

The argument for fire not being clearly and distinctly separable in
existence from fuel may be reconstructed as follows:

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.21

328
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

JAMES DUERLINGER

If fire is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

fuel, the heat which burns fuel is not present in fuel.
If the heat which burns fuel is not present in fuel, fuel which
burns would not be hot.
Fuel which burns is hot.

Therefore, from (iv), (v) and (vi) we may infer

(vii)

Fire is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

fuel.

The argument for the irreducible existence of fire may be reconstructed

as follows:
(viii)
(ix)

If fire is reducible in existence to fuel and fire is what causes

fuel to burn, fuel is what causes fuel to burn.
Fuel is not what causes fuel to burn.

Therefore, from (i), (viii) and (ix) we may infer

(x)

Fire is not reducible in existence to fuel.

We are now in a position to see how the Vatsputryas fire-fuel reply

constitutes a rebutal of the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts.
Since fire is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel cannot be the
object of the concept of fire, and since fire is conceived in dependence
upon fuel, fuel is the cause of the concept of fire. Therefore, the cause of
the concept of fire is not the object of the concept of fire. Therefore, the
theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts is false. In reconstructed
form, the fire-fuel reply is concluded as follows:
(xi)

If fire is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel is not the

object of the concept of fire.

Therefore, from (x) and (xi) we may infer

(xii)

Fuel is not the object of the concept of fire.

From (iii) and (xii) we may infer

(xiii)

Fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not

the object of the concept of fire.

It is obvious that

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.22

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

(Xiv)

329

If fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not

the object of the concept of fire, then that in dependence
upon which something is conceived need not be the object
which is being conceived.

Therefore, from (xiii) and (xiv) we may infer

(xv)

That in dependence upon which something is conceived

need not be the object which is being conceived.

I shall argue in the next article of this series that Vasubandhu, on

question-begging grounds, rejects premises (i) and (vi) in his objection
to the fire-fuel reply, and fails to address the actual point of the reply,
which is that the cause of the concept of ourselves need not be the
object of the concept.
The Vatsputryas, according to my interpretation of their fire-fuel
reply, are attempting to introduce into the standard Buddhist theory of
causality the idea of an inexplicable phenomenon which can cause the
continuum of a collection of substances of different sorts in dependence
upon which this cause is conceived to continue to exist or to cease
to exist. To be possible, this inexplicable cause must be separable in
existence, without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence,
from the continuum of the collection of substances in which it produces
its effect. Vasubandhu, we shall see, does not even attempt to show,
on philosophical grounds, why a cause of this sort is not possible.

 IPUTRIYAS MIDDLE-WAY ARGUMENT FOR THEIR THEORY OF

THE VATS
PERSONS

We have seen how the Vatsputryas use the fire-fuel reply to overturn
Vasubandhus causal objection to their aggregate-reliance reply to his
two-realities objection to their theory of persons. Their reply is used to
show that our aggregates need not be, as Vasubandhu assumes, what
is conceived when we are conceived. Immediately after replying to
Vasubandhus objection, they introduce premises analogous to those
used in the reply to formulate their main argument for the view that
we are in fact inexplicable phenomena. This is the argument I have
called their middle-way argument.
Similarly, a person is not conceived unless the aggregates are present, [and] if it
were other than the aggregates, the reificationist theory [that a person is a substance]
would be held, and if it were not other than the aggregates, the nihilist theory [that
a person does not exist at all] would be held.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.23

330

JAMES DUERLINGER

This argument takes the form of showing, on the assumption that

persons, nonreductionistically conceived, exist, that the Vatsputryas
inexplicablist theory of persons is the middle-way between reificationist
and nihilist theories. The implication is that since the Buddha propounded
a middle-way theory of this sort, the theory of the Vatsputryas is
that held by the Buddha. Although the Vatsputryas in this argument
implicitly appeal to the Buddhas rejection of extreme theories of
persons in order to argue that we are inexplicable phenomena, these
extreme theories, within the Buddhist tradition, are typically rejected on
independent philosophical grounds. For this reason, I shall assume, it
is in fact an attempt to provide an independent philosophical argument
for the Vatsputryas theory.
Since the conceiving of persons in dependence upon the aggregates
is meant to be analogous to the conceiving of fire in dependence upon
fuel, it is reasonable to assume that the Vatsputryas middle-way
argument is predicated on a definition of persons as inexplicable causes
of effects produced in the continuum of their aggregates, just as their
fire-fuel reply is predicated on the definition of fire as an inexplicable
cause of an effect produced in the continuum of its fuel. The definition
they assume in their argument, I believe, is that a person is what causes
the continuum of its aggregates to continue to exist from one lifetime
to the next. Since the causal action by which this effect is produced
they call appropriation, we may render their definition by saying that
we are what appropriate aggregates. So defined, they can claim, we are
conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate. Since
we do not, by our own natures, appropriate the aggregates, they can
reason, we can exist without appropriating them. It follows that when,
at the time our cyclic existence ends, the continuum of our aggregates
ceases to exist, there will be no phenomena in dependence upon which
we can be conceived, but we can continue to exist. So the advantage
of the Vatsputryas theory, unlike that of Vasubandhu, does not imply
that the goal of the practice of Buddhism, our noncyclic existence, is
our extinction. It implies only our inconceivability when we achieve
this goal.
If the above definition of persons is adopted by the Vatsputryas,
the reconstruction of the middle-way argument begins as follows:
(i)
(ii)

We are what appropriate aggregates.

If we are what appropriate aggregates, we are conceived in
dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (i) and (ii) we may infer,

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.24

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

(iii)

331

We are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we

appropriate.

A central belief of the Vatsputryas, not shared by Vasubandhu,

is that we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates.
We have seen how they can hold this belief, in spite of also believing
that we cannot be conceived on the basis of the natures we possess by
ourselves. Their principal reason for accepting the correctness of this
conception of ourselves, as can be shown by an analysis of their later
objections to Vasubandhus reductionist theory, is their belief that we,
as perceivers of objects, thinkers of thoughts, agents of actions and
experiencers of the results of actions, inexplicably retain our identity
through changes of the perceptions, thoughts, actions, feelings and
bodies which we appropriate.27 If we do not inexplicably retain our
identity through changes of our aggregates, they believe, we do not exist
at all as we are actually conceived, and this is precisely the nihilism
the Buddha warned his followers to avoid. Vasubandhus theory, they
also seem to believe, is also a form of nihilism insofar as it makes us
into mental constructions, which are not, pace Vasubandhu, reducible
in existence to our aggregates, since our aggregates are not in fact the
object of the concept of ourselves. We need not here rehearse all of the
reasons the Vatsputryas may have for adopting their own minimalist
version of the nonreductionist theory of persons, since it would require
an extensive consideration of the later exchanges between Vasubandhu
and the Vatsputryas in the Refutation. For the purposes of the
reconstruction of their middle-way argument, I shall take their belief
that we are correctly conceived in a nonreductionistic way as the basis
of their belief in our separate existence. Our reconstruction, therefore,
may continue as follows:
(iv)
(v)

We are correctly conceived to be appropriators of

aggregates.
If we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates, we exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore,
(vi)

We exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate.

The remainder of the middle-way argument will be comprised of

arguments for the claims that we are neither clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from the aggregates we appropriate nor reducible
in existence to them.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.25

332

JAMES DUERLINGER

In the text, the claim that we are not clearly and distinctly separable
in existence from our aggregates is supported by the claim that if we
should say that we are so related to them, we would be committed to
the reificationist theory of persons rejected by the Buddha. The theory
rejected here, of course, is that we are substances which exist apart
from our aggregates. This theory, we have seen, is the same as the
theory that we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our
aggregates. Indian Buddhists offer a variety of arguments to show that
this theory is false. The very simplest of these arguments we could use
in this context is that we cannot be substances which exist apart from
our aggregates, since we are conceived in dependence upon aggregates.
We may represent this argument, which would also be accepted by
Vasubandhu, as follows:
(vii)

If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

the aggregates we appropriate, we are not conceived in
dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (iii) and (vii) we may infer:

(viii)

We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

the aggregates we appropriate.

Since this part of the middle-way argument is acceptable to Vasubandhu,

we need not discuss it further.
In the text, the premise, that we are not reducible in existence to our
aggregates, is supported by the claim that if we should say that we are
reducible in existence to them, we would be committed to nihilism.
The form of nihilism to which the Vatsputryas believe we would be
committed is the theory that we lack existence apart from the aggregates
we appropriate. This is the nihilist view rejected in premise (vi) of my
reconstruction of the middle-way argument. Hence, the reductionist
theory of persons, they would have us conclude, implies that (vi) is
false. In other words,
(ix)

If we are reducible in existence to the aggregates we

appropriate, we do not exist apart from the aggregates we
appropriate.

Therefore, from (vi), (ix) we may infer,

(x)

We are not reducible in existence to the aggregates we

appropriate.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.26

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

333

Finally, on the basis of (viii) and (x), they conclude that their own
theory of persons is the middle way between the extremes of asserting
that we are separate substances and that we lack existence apart from
our aggregates. Hence,
(xi)

We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence

from the aggregates we appropriate nor reducible in existence to the aggregates we appropriate.

The Vatsputryas middle-way argument, so reconstructed, shows us that

the most basic disagreement between them and Vasubandhu concerns
the truth or falsity of premise (iv), that we are correctly conceived to
be appropriators of the aggregates. Unfortunately, in the Refutation
Vasubandhu does not discuss the Vatsputryas middle-way argument,
and the Vatsputryas are, for the most part, made simply to assume
the truth of (iv) in their arguments against Vasubandhus own theory
of persons, just as Vasubandhu assumes its falsity in his arguments
against their theory. So what the middle-way argument accomplishes,
in the end, is simply a reformulation of the Vatsputryas theory of
persons which fits with the Buddhas claim that his own theory is a
middle way between extreme views. To support their theory they need
to argue that we are in fact correctly conceived to be appropriators of
aggregates. Consequently, their middle-way argument cannot be said
to provide by itself a good reason to accept the truth of their theory
that we are inexplicable phenomena.
University of Iowa,
Iowa City 52242

NOTES
What is known about the Vatsputryas theory is for the most part found in the
polemical works of their Indian Buddhist critics, which include, besides the Refu
 . kara
 and
Asan. gas Sutralam
tation of Vasubandhu, Mogalputtatissas Kathavatthu,
antidevas Bodhicaryavat
 ara,

 ara,

Candrakrtis Madhyamakavat
Madhyantavibhan. ga, S

and Kamalasilas Tattvasam
. graha, along with Santaraks. itas Pan~jika commentary on
Kamalasilas work. Of the texts of the Vatsputryas school, only the fifth century
 . mityanikaya
 Sastra survives, and that only in a Chinese translation. An
C. E. Sam
English translation of a Chinese translation of this text has been published, but

at least in their English translations, seems to me to
neither it nor the Kathavatthu,
portray a clear statement of the Vatsputryas theory of persons. In any case, in this
study, I confine my discussion to the Vatsputryas theory of persons as Vasubandhu
presents it.
There are three translations of the Refutation in print. The most recent translation
is based on the Sanskrit text which was discovered in Tibet in 1934. It was composed
1

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.27

334

JAMES DUERLINGER

by myself and published in The Journal of Indian Philosophy in 1988 (17: 137187)
On the basis of Yasomitras commentary and a Tibetan translation T. Stcherbatsky
composed an English translation, entitled The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, published
by the Bulletin de lAcademie des Science de Russie, 1919, pp. 823854, 937958
(reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). A French translation,
by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his LAbhidharmakosa de
Vasubandhu (Paris, 19231931), is based on Yasomitras commentary and a Chinese
translation by Hsuan-tsang. There is also a complete English translation of Poussins
translation made by Leo Pruden in 1990 and published by the Asian Humanities
Press in Berkeley, California.
2
Since Vasubandhus subsequent criticisms of their theory of persons are based
primarily on scriptural quotations, they require a different sort of treatment which I
hope to provide elsewhere in the context of a more comprehensive account of the
argumentation of Vasubandhus Refutation. Discussions of the Vatsputryas theory
of persons can be found in Nalinaksha Dutts Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi, 1978),
ch. VIII, and Edward Conzes Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor, 1967), pp.
122134. In my 1982 paper, Vasubandhu on the Vatsputryas fire-fuel analogy,
in Philosophy East and West (32: 151158), I made an attempt to make sense of
Vasubandhus critique of the Vatsputryas use of the analogy to fire and fuel to
support their theory, but I have, since its publication, radically changed my view. A
completely new analysis is laid out in the second article of the three of which the
present article is the first. The discussions by Dutt and Conze do not carefully analyze
what I am here calling Vasubandhus philosophical objections to the Vatsputryas
theory of persons. Nor do they, in my opinion, adequately represent the Vatsputryas
theory as it is set out in Vasubandhus Refutation. Claus Oetke, in Ich und das
Ich (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart: 1988), presents a summary
of Vasubandhus Refutation and a close analysis of his own reductionist theory of
persons, but he does not carefully analyze Vasubandhus critique of the Vatsputryas
theory of persons.
3
Among the Indian Buddhist schools, only the Madhyamikas deny that we possess
an existence apart from beign perceived or conceived.
4
Vasubandhu often uses is not other than in place of is the same as, thereby
creating the impression that the Vatsputryas theory violates a law of logic. That
the theory does not in fact violate a law of logic I shall argue below.
5
Here and elsewhere when I use conceived by itself I mean conceived to be
an entity of a certain sort. Similarly, an object of a concept is assumed to be an
object conceived to be an entity of a certain sort, and to form a concept is assumed
to be to conceive an object to be an entity of a certain sort.
6
We need not enumerate and explain the very complicated theory of the aggregates
laid out in the Treasury in order to reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus philosophical
objections to the Vatsputryas theory of persons.
7
Alternatively, inexplicable phenomena may be defined as those which are neither
real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, or as
those which are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities. See
below.
8
Yasomitra, in his commentary on the Refutation, makes it clear that the Trthika
opponents Vasubandhu has in mind are primarily the Nyaya-Vaises. ikas.
9
A more detailed exposition of Vasubandhus argument can be found in James
Duerlinger, Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian Buddhist
Philosophy. in Journal of Indian Philosophy (21: 79101), 1993.
10
Here and elsewhere I shall use the neuter pronoun and its correlates to refer to
a person, since the gender of the phenomena to which we apply I is irrelevant to
its analysis.

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.28

 IPUTRIYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

VATS

335

Dravyasat and prajn~aptisat are difficult terms to translate, an indication of

which is the many different ways in which they have been translated. Part of the
difficulty is that their meanings are differently construed by different Indian Buddhist
philosophers. I have chosen translations which I believe convey the sense they have
for Vasubandhu.
12
In my translations of passages from the Refutation I place in brackets words,
phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressed
parts of theses and arguments presented in the text. So the reader can distinguish
what Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in an effort to make it clearer, I
have translated the text so that it can be read either with or without these additions.
To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader needs to
disregard punctuations required for the readability of the expanded translation.
13
In verse 4 of Bk. VI of the Treasury and in his commentary on the verse
Vasubandhu presents, with approval, the Vaibhas. ika accounts of these two realities.
The accounts are operational definitions in which we are given the means by which to
determine whether a phenomenon known to exist is a deceptive conventional reality
or an ultimate reality. A deceptive conventional reality is defined as a phenomenon
which is no longer conceived if it is taken apart physically or is mentally analyzed
into constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that form. An ultimate reality
is defined as a phenomenon which continues to be conceived if it is been taken apart
phycically or is mentally analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousness
in that form,
14
See note 4.
15
See Conze, op. cit., p. 125.
16
We attribute to ourselves not only the possession of sense organs and mental
states, but also physical properties such as height, weight, color, odor, etc. We need

 in the technical sense of
an
not, as Stcherbatsky and Poussin do, take adhyatmik
internal or subjective.
17
This claim is, among the Indian Buddhist schools, peculiar to the Vatsputryas.
18
We must distinguish the effect produced by the false view of self from the effect
produced by the false view of the aggregates. By reason of accepting as true our
appearance of being permanent and partless substances, the Vatsputryas seem to
believe, we continue to appropriate our aggregates, and by reason of appropriating
our aggregates, the continuum of our aggregates is perpetuated from one lifetime to
the next.
19
We need not suppose, with Poussin, that the Vatsputryas deny that past and
future phenomena exist.
20
. ya, I, 12ab.
Abhidharmakosabhas
21
Ibid., I, 12d.
22
See Stcherbatskys The Central Conception of Buddhism (Motilal Banarsidass,
Delhi: 1970), p. 13.
23
Stcherbatsky and Poussin in fact attribute this account to the Vatsputryas. I
follow Yasomitra in attributing it to Vasubandhu.
24
Dutt claims (op. cit., p. 185) that the Vatsputryas believe that persons cease to
exist when the continuum of their aggregates ceases to exist, but no such view is
expressed in the Refutation itself.
25
This view is later deemed contradictory by the Buddhist philosophers of the
Madhyamika school.
26
The standard Indian Buddhist example of this principle is that a knife cannot cut
itself.
27
See Conze (op. cit., pp. 125126).
11

indi9610.tex; 30/05/1997; 10:13; v.6; p.29