December 2013

CASE 2
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES FRAUD UPON THE GOVERNMENT
Hadji Hashim Abdul v. Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 184496, December 02, 2013
Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order of Sadiganbayan
resolution in the criminal case of herein petitioner Hadji Hashim Abdul, Tan-Alem Abdul (Abdul) and
Candidato S. Domado (Domado), suspending them for 90 days from office as Municipal Mayor, Human
Resource Management Officer, and Budget Officer, respectively, of the Municipality of Mulondo, Lanao
del Sur, for falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
Sometime on 22 April 1999, the petitioners made it appear that Engr. Zubair F. Murad as Municipal
Engineer prepared and signed the Local Budget Preparation Form Nos. 152, 153 and 154 known as the
Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object, Personnel Schedule and Functional Statement and
General Objective, respectively, when, in fact, they knew that said Zubair F. Murad was never employed
as Municipal Engineer of the said Municipality.
Sandiganbayan suspended the petitioner and his co-accused as mandated under Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner, however, asserted that he
cannot be suspended pendente lite because the crime for which he was charged is not among those
enumerated under Section 13 of RA 3019. He was not charged under RA 3019 or Title Seven, Book II of
the RPC. Neither does fraud upon government or public funds or property cover falsification of public
document nor fraud per se, an ingredient of the offense of falsification of public document.

ISSUE: Should petitioner be suspended from office for allegedly committing fraud upon the government
when the crime charged against him is falsification of public document?
HELD: No.
To warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section 13, he must be charged with an
offense (1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property. Admittedly, petitioner in this case was not charged under RA
3019. Neither was he charged under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC as the crime of falsification of public
documents under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four,26 Book II thereof. The relevant question
now is whether falsification of public documents is considered as fraud upon government or public funds
or property.
In construing the term fraud as used in Section 13 of RA 3019, the Court held in Bustillo v.
Sandiganbayan that the same is understood in its general sense, that is, referring to an instance or an
act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation. The act imputed against petitioner
constitutes fraud upon government or public funds.
However, the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic, considering the petitioners
acquittal by the Sandiganbayan in its November 24, 2009 Decision.
Hence, the petitioner may not be suspended.

CASE 3
INELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE FOR THE CRIME OF SIMPLE RAPE
People of the Philippines v. Rogelio Manicat y De Guzman
G.R. No. 205413, December 02, 2013
Brion, J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal filed by Rogelio Manicat y de Guzman (appellant), from the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole
The victim is a 13-year old girl afflicted with mild mental retardation, with a mental age of 7-8 years old.
The RTC gave credence to her statements since her mental age did not make her incompetent witness,
as she testified in a clear and straightforward manner as to how the accused employed threat, force, and
intimidation in order to rape her. Her testimony was corroborated by Medico Legal Report stating that the
victim is in a non-virgin physical state. Thus, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordered him to pay the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment with the modification that the award of exemplary damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 be deleted. The CA noted that the Clinical Abstract issued by the National
Center for Mental Health does not indicate whether the victims condition impairs her capacity as a
witness. It also explained that her credibility cannot be impaired by her behavior as a rape victim because
rape victims do not all react in the same way. The CA rejected the appellants defense of denial and alibi
for failure to substantiate these defenses. Lastly, the CA found that the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole was proper because under Resolution No. 24-4-10, those convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua are disqualified from the benefit of parole.
ISSUE: Is without eligibility for parole a penalty appropriate only to qualified rape and not simple rape to
which the accused had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua?
HELD: No.
The accused was found to have committed the crime of rape as the following element required under
Article 266-A of the RPC were established: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
Article 266-B of the RPC is explicit that rape committed through force, threat, or intimidation is punishable
by reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, Resolution No. 24-4-10 states that those convicted of offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua are disqualified for parole. Thus, the RTC did not alter the appropriate
penalty for simple rape as it merely reflected the consequence of having been convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Hence, the accused may not be eligible for parole.

CASE 19
MALICE IN LAW AND MALICE IN FACT IN THECRIME OF LIBEL
Elizalde S. Co v. Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr.
G.R. No. 181986, December 04, 2013
Brion, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition filed by Elizalde S. Co (Co) for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) acquitting respondent Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr. (Muoz)
of three counts of libel punishable under Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Co, a wealthy businessman, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi (RTC) of three criminal
informations for libel against Muoz, a contractor, for making statements against Co in several interviews
in radio stations in Legaspi City. Muoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as
a call of public duty. He argued that Co is a public figure considering his participation in government
projects and his prominence in the business circles. He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with
matters of public interest and are, thus, privileged.
ISSUE: Should Munoz be held liable for libel?
HELD: No.
In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law presumes that every
imputation is malicious; this is referred to as malice in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of
the burden of proving that the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the
accused proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive.
Article 354 of the RPC states that malice is not presumed when:
(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and
(2)

a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish
that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact the knowledge
that the statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was
arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public
interest, and the context of Muoz statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer
presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving that Muoz acted with malice in fact.
Hence, herein respondent may not be held liable for libel in light of the privileged nature of Muoz
statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.

CASE 32
FAILURE TO OBSERVE PROPER CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF SEIZED DRUG
People of the Philippines v. Jay Montevirgen y Ozaraga
G.R. No. 189840, December 11, 2013
Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal against the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City Decision convicting beyond reasonable doubt Jay Montevirgen y
Ozaraga (appellant) for the crime of illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The herein appellant was apprehended after a successful buy-bust operation conducted by operatives of
Makati City Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force in Malvar
Street, Barangay South Cembo, Makati City. Appellant Montevirgen sold to PO3 Ruiz, designated as
poseur-buyer, zero point zero four (0.04) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and a total
of zero point fourteen (0.14) gram of the same substance were recovered from his person.
Appellant contends that the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation failed to observe the proper
procedure in the custody and control of the seized drug by not marking the confiscated specimens in the
manner mandated by law.
ISSUE: Does failure to physically inventory and photograph seized drug render it inadmissible in
evidence, and therefore acquit the accused in the crimes of illegal sale and possession of shabu?
HELD: No.
In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following
elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, in prosecuting a case
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same law, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were
established. First, the two plastic sachets containing shabu subject of the case for the illegal possession
of drugs were found in appellants pocket after a search on his person was made following his arrest
inflagrante delicto for the illegal sale of shabu. Second, appellant did not adduce evidence showing his
legal authority to possess the shabu. Third, appellants act of allowing the poseur-buyer to choose one
from among the three sachets and putting back into his pocket the two sachets of shabu not chosen
clearly shows that he freely and consciously possessed the illegal drugs.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory
and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the
items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist
justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved,
the seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The absence of
evidence that the buy-bust team made an inventory and took photographs of the drugs seized from
appellant was not fatal since the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the shabu.

Hence, the seized drug from appellant is admissible in evidence, and he was correctly charged and
convicted for illegal sale and possession of shabu.
CASE 36
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21, R.A. 9165 AND SECTION 21(A) OF ITS IRR
People of the Philippines v. Ferdinand Bautista y Sinaon
G.R. No. 198113, December 11, 2013
Abad, J.:
FACTS: This case is about the gross and deliberate failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the
mandatory procedural safeguards of Section 21, Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 and Section 21(a) of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) with no justification for such non-compliance.
After confirming through surveillance that Bautista had indeed been peddling illegal drugs
in Barangay Saluysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan, a buy-bust operation was ordered. Bautista was arrested
after the operation, and from him, the money paid by the poseur-buyer and another sachet of shabu was
recovered. Ma. Rocel Velasco (Ma. Rocel) was arrested with Bautista, and from her, plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu were recovered. PO1 Viesca marked these items with his initials
FTV. Bautista and Ma. Rocel were brought to the police station. At the police station, PO1 Tadeo marked
the shabu subject of the buy-bust with the initials BBWCT. He marked the second plastic sachet seized
from Bautista as WCT on one side and the letter P on the other side. After marking the seized items,
the police submitted them for forensic examination which proved positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. No elected official was present when the police made the arrest and when they
conducted their investigation. No representative from the media or the DOJ was present during the
inventory of the seized items. Both PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain regarding whether they
photographed the seized items.
ISSUE: Did the arresting officers preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items?
HELD: No.
To prove the corpus delicti when prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the
prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized from the accused and subsequently examined in
the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt. To ensure
that this is done right and that the integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is safeguarded,
Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure that law enforcers must observe
following the seizure of such substance.
The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided in Sec. 21 of
R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as
long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. Here, however, the buy-bust team did not bother to show that they intended to
comply with the procedure but where thwarted by some justifiable reason or consideration. Accordingly,
despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, the Court stresses that the stepby-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.
Hence, due to the gross disregard of the buy-bust team of the procedural safeguards mandated by Sec.

21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR and its failure to give justifiable reasons for it, the Court concluded that the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti have been compromised.