THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003]

VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE

ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO,
and
Spouses
ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ
and
CARLITO
SALHAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO,
RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA
COLINCO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has
been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with
another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children
born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first
marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging
the February 28, 1995 Decision and the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No. 38583. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby

REVERSED and a new one is accordingly entered
(a) in Civil Case No. 385, DISMISSING the complaint and [counter-claim];
(b) in Civil Case No. 367, ORDERING the defendant spouses to vacate the premises
occupied within Lot 323, Ilog Cadastre, registered under T.C.T. No. 140081 in favor
of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Colinco.
[4]

On the other hand, the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration:

[5]

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:

The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3)
Eduardo Baloyo, (4) Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo. All of the abovenamed persons are now dead.
The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio
Colinco and [respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.
The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was
blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a
spinster and without issue.
Records disclose moreover that decedent Purificacions father, Juan Arbolario,
consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this
cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario
Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to
hereinafter as Arbolarios). It is significant to note, at this juncture, that all the
foregoing [petitioners] were born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot
323 to his sister, Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document
acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego.
In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda,
Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially
declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the
said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion
Arbolario to the other half.
And as far as Julian Baloyo -- the fifth and last child --was concerned, records could
only show that he was married to a certain Margarita Palma; and that he died,
presumably after 1951 without any issue.
Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the
disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.

It was under the foregoing set of facts that [respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving
heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and
Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their
proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361, viz: Irene Colinco, to one-half
(1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irenes) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining
half (1/2). This forthwith brought about the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and the
issuance of T.C.T. No. T-140018 in their names and conformably with the aforesaid
distribution.
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against Spouses Rosalita
Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the
aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late
Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly
purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in
[September] 1978.
Meanwhile, or on May 9, 1988 -- before Civil Case No. 367 was heard and tried on
the merits -- Voltaire M. Arbolario, Fe Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala, Exaltacion
Arbolario, Carlos Arbolario (Arbolarios, collectively) and spouses Carlito Salhay and
Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (the same defendants in Civil Case No. 367), filed Civil
Case No. 385 [f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages, against the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 367. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the Declaration of
Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective and thus
voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they
succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion
Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the
aforesaid lot.
[6]

Ruling of the Trial Court

After a full-blown trial on the consolidated cases, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental (Branch 61) rendered its judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads thus:
[7]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

[Arbolarios] and against the [Colincos] in Civil Case No. 385 --

1) Declaring that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, dated May 8,
1987, executed by Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, as null
and void and of no effect insofar as the share of Purificacion Arbolario in Lot No. 323
is concerned[;]
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to cancel Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-140018 and issue a new one in the names of Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena
Arbolario Ta-ala, Carlos Arbolario, Fe Arbolario and Exaltacion Arbolario, 3/8 share
or One thousand Six Hundred Forty Three Point Five (1,643.5) square meters, and the
remaining 5/8 share or One Thousand Seventy Two Point Five (1,072.5) square meters
in the names of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Colingco
or other heirs, if any[;]
3) Ordering the [Respondents] Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed
Colinco, to pay jointly and severally to [Petitioners] Voltaire M. Arbolario, et al., the
sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages, Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as attorneys fees and the x x x sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,500.00)
as appearance fees; and
in Civil Case No. 367 --

1) Ordering the dismissal of [respondents] complaint and the [petitioners] counterclaim for lack of legal basis.
In both cases --

1) Ordering the Colincos to pay costs.

[8]

The trial court held that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the
deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her cousins and
nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from
her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the
existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand,
had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a portion of the disputed
lot.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that the cohabitation of their
father with their natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid
marriage. The appellate court observed that the Arbolarios had all been born before the

death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of Heirship, which she
had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented showing that her conjugal
union with Juan Arbolario had been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that
year. Because it was also in 1951 when Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca
Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital. Consequently, their children are
illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and
Catalina.
Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. As the
illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot conveniently
undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half-brothers and
half-sisters by the deceased.
On the other hand, there is no impediment for respondents to declare themselves
as the sole and forced heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. Moreover, there is
no clear and reliable evidence to support the allegation of the Salhays that they
purchased from the decedent, Purificacion Arbolario, the lot that they have been
occupying since 1970.
Hence, this Petition.

[9]

Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
I

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the
Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half-sister
Purificacion Arbolario.
II

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the
purchase of the property by Rosela Rodriguez and subsequent acquisition by
Petitioners Rosalita Rodriguez and Carlito Salhay improper.
III

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in deciding that
the court a quo had no right to distribute the said property.
[10]

In other words, petitioners are questioning the CA pronouncements on (1) the

illegitimacy of their relationship with Purificacion; (2) the validity of the Salhays purchase

of a portion of the disputed lot; and (3) the impropriety of the RTC Order partitioning that
lot.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Illegitimacy of Petitioners
Petitioners contend that their illegitimacy is a far-fetched and scurrilous claim that is
not supported by the evidence on record. They maintain that the CA declared them
illegitimate on the unproven allegation that Catalina Baloyo had signed the Declaration
of Heirship in 1951. They aver that this 1951 Declaration does not contain her signature,
and that she died in 1903:

Que Agueda Baloyo, Catalina Baloyo y Eduardo Baloyo murieron ab intestate en Ilog,
Negros Occ.; la primera fallecio en 11 de Noviembre de 1940, la segunda murio el
ano 1903 y el ultimo en 28 de Marzo de 1947 x x x.
[11]

We are not persuaded.

We begin our ruling with the general principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts. However, where the trial court and the CA arrived at different factual findings,
a review of the evidence on record may become necessary.
[12]

[13]

Petitioners, in effect, are asking us to evaluate the 1951 Declaration of Heirship,

deduce that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before it was ever executed, and
conclude that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Juan and
Catalinas only daughter, Purificacion. What we see, on the other hand, is a series
of non sequiturs.
First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas death was
intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the
third digit has been written over to make it look like a 0. Further, the paragraph quoted
by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirs years of
death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in
1903, why then was her name written after Aguedas and not before it? Moreover, the
document, being in Spanish, requires an official translation. We cannot readily accept
the English translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its
correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document.
Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios
marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was
already dead when they were born. It does not follow that just because his first wife has

died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the
marriage as an undisputable fact.
Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners
that they were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The RTC Decision
merely declared that they were half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, while
respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no
pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings. We quote
the appellate court:

x x x. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of
Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or
before Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable
to conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios]
was extra-marital. And consequently, x x x Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate
children of Juan Arbolario.
There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261,
New Civil Code); and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born
after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses must
introduce such evidence to prove his or her allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4, Rule 131, New
Rules on Evidence). It is the x x x Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly
contracted subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this,
they have miserably failed to do.
[14]

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially

established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate.
Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage
between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke
a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
[15]

[16]

As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CAs factual findings cannot be set
aside, because they are supported by the evidence on record. As held by the
appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is
presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the filial
companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouses
cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between husband and wife.
[17]

[18]

Second Issue:
Evidence of Purchase

Petitioners contend that the CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the
testimony that the Salhays had purchased the portion of the lot they had been
occupying since 1970.This issue, according to them, was not even raised by
respondents in the latters appeal to the CA.
We disagree. Although the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their
Brief, respondents (as petitioners in the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale when
they argued thus:

As to the spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita R. Salhay, they could not present any
written contract to support their claim to having purchased a portion of Lot 323 where
their house stands. Rosalita R. Salhay on the witness stand testified under oath that
she has no contract of sale in her favor because it was her mother, Rosela Rodriguez
who had purchased the land, but she was not able to produce any evidence of such
sale in favor of her mother. She declared that she has never paid land taxes for the
land.
[19]

Hence, they prayed for the reversal of the appealed RTC Decision in toto. The CA,
on the other hand, categorically ruled that no clear and reliable evidence had been
introduced to prove such bare [allegation] that a portion of the disputed lot had ever
been purchased by the Salhays. Besides, no favorable supporting evidence was cited
by petitioners in their Memorandum. Thus, we find no reason to overturn the CAs
factual finding on this point.
Third Issue:
Partition
Petitioners also contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when it
ruled that since respondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had
no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot. The CA held, however, that the partition of the
property had not been contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely
sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners
sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition respondents had entered into.
We agree with the appellate court. The purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each
of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate
without supervision or interference.
[20]

Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they
had failed to establish that they were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the
deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the
proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto
should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings

instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
for the recovery of ownership and possession.
[21]

WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED,
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

and

the

appealed

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard
and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of
assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability,
the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best
interests.
[1]

This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma.
Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas
parents in Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma.
Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
[2]

[3]

[4]

Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On

December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage
was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing
in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.
[5]

[6]

[7]

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at
all.
[8]

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous.
It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child
was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
[9]

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage
annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the
reconsideration of the above decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision
which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the
morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday. She argued that there was nothing in the law
granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She
further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to
Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the
mothers surname.
[10]

[11]

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas
motion and made the following observations:

It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the
other, something they should never do if they want to assure the normal development
and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father,
especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that
the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to
maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this
matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby
DENIED.
[12]

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling
of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the
continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo
had already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte).

The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
[13]

On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a
putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the
best interest of the child policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it
(was) the childs welfare and not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary
consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a week.
[14]

The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers
surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate
proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.
[15]

Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of
the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that
she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the
appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and
held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during
her first marriage:

It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant
[Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a
lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the
latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In
other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child
Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under
the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the
void and non-existent marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by
the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa]
and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly
saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child
Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is
it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146,
The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the married
couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.
[16]

The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa were married:

We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee
and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in
the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code
mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring
ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of
his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less,
the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever
be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for
the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.
(Emphasis supplied)
[17]

Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision
but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
[18]

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.
[19]

[20]

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article
167 of the Family Code provides:
[21]

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals :
[22]

[23]

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child.
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
[28]

[29]

[30]

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
[31]

To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to
make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside
in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
[32]

[33]

[34]

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no
evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering
these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in
the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer to the petition for
annulment of marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an
admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an
admission that was binding on her.
[35]

[36]

Gerardos argument is without merit.

First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an
avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there
occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived
with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time
material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of
marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility.
Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
[37]

[38]

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.
[39]

[40]

Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the
trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa
and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial.
That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to
validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a
declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of
the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the
law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to
exploit his defenselessness.
[41]

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no

evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.
[42]

Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of
the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of
filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when
the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought
to be established.
[43]

[44]

[45]

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it
could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in
extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case
was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted
by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the
certificate of birth which isprima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is
also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.
[46]

[47]

It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The
law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the
child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status.
He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full
inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and
be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a
more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart.
Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the
eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor.
Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo
favors his interest.
[48]

[49]

It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble
between the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The
paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness
should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is
that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of
incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which
has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code
on surnames. A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he
belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
[50]

[51]

The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the
entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in
a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to

each others company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:

Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards
them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
[52]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and
January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., no part.

_____________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 142887

March 2, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO PACHECO y CASTILLO, appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision,1 dated January 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City,
Branch 7, in Criminal Case No. 8378, finding appellant Rodrigo Pacheco guilty of raping private complainant, Mary
Jane Cantos, and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The appellant was charged as follows:
That on or about March 14, 1996 at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon at Sitio Dulungan, Brgy. Talahib
Pandayan, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party who was then a minor, 13
years of age, against her will.
That, the special aggravating circumstance of relationship is attendant in the commission of the offense, the
herein complainant and offended party being the sister-in-law of the accused, and therefore a relative by
affinity within the third civil degree.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On May 7, 1996, appellant was arraigned, and with the assistance of counsel de oficio, he pleaded not
guilty.3Thereafter, trial ensued.
The private complainant, Mary Jane Cantos, testified that on March 14, 1996, together with her sister Justina Cantos
Pacheco, the wife of appellant, she went to the river near their home to do the laundry. They were still busy with their
washing when, around 2:00 p.m., appellant arrived. Mary Jane got the impression that he was drunk as he was
shouting.4 Appellant tried to help with the laundry, but shortly afterwards ordered Justina to go home and prepare their
lunch. When Justina was about to leave, appellant told her to go ahead, explaining that he would follow as he wanted
to bathe in the river first.5 Justina then left, leaving Mary Jane and appellant.
Meanwhile, Mary Jane continued rinsing clothes while she was seated on a large stone, which had been worn down
by the ceaseless action of the river. Suddenly, appellant lunged at her and pushed her, causing her to lie flat on the
stone. Without further ado, appellant pinned her down with his legs and held her by the neck with one hand. He
forcibly kissed her on the lips. With his other hand, he mashed Mary Janes breasts and pudendum.6
Although caught by surprise, Mary Jane put up a strong resistance. She pushed and kicked appellant in an effort to
free herself, but he proved to be too strong and heavy for her. Despite her resistance, he succeeded in raising her
dress. He held her breasts with one hand, while his other hand pulled down her panty. He then used the same hand
he had employed to remove her underwear to pin her down by the neck to overcome her resistance. When she could
resist no more, the appellant then inserted his organ into her private part, all the while kissing the private
complainants lips.7
Appellants action was cut short by the arrival on the scene of Mary Janes mother, Araceli Cantos. Mary Jane heard
Aracelis scream. This prompted appellant to relent and pull away from Mary Jane. He headed straight for Araceli.
Mary Jane heard the appellant threaten her mother that he would kill both of them if Araceli would report the incident.
Mary Jane gathered the clothes and they headed home in a single file, with appellant at the tail-end.8
Prosecution witness Araceli Cantos testified that the complainant is her daughter while appellant is her son-in-law,
being the spouse of her daughter, Justina. They are also neighbors, since their houses are located a mere ten (10)
meters apart from each other. She said on that fateful day of March 14, 1996, both daughters were at the river
washing their clothes. Meanwhile, appellant arrived at his home with a visitor who turned out to be his aunt. Araceli

and her husband were entertaining the visitor, while the appellant went to fetch his wife in order to cook lunch for their
guest. Some time later, Justina arrived, but she was alone.9
Araceli immediately asked for Mary Janes whereabouts. Justina replied she was at the river with the appellant.
Aracelis other two daughters, Marilyn and Anastasia, advised her to fetch Mary Jane. Araceli ran to the river,
stumbling along the way in her hurry to reach her daughter. To her great dismay, she saw appellant naked and on top
of Mary Jane. The sight that greeted Araceli made her faint.10
When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant hovering above her with a rock in hand, threatening to hit her
with it. He told her, "Magsasabi kayo o hindi? Magsabi na kayo ngayon at papatayin ko kayong mag-ina!" (Will you
report me or wont you? Tell me now so that I can kill both you and your daughter!) 11 Araceli begged appellant to
spare their lives.12 He relented and they all headed home. An hour or so after she got home, however, Araceli
proceeded to seek the assistance of a neighboring barangay official, Gregorio Rayos, to apprehend the appellant.13
On the witness stand, Gregorio Rayos, a barangay tanod (barrio peace officer) of Talahib Pandayan, testified that
around 3:00 p.m. of March 14, 1996, Araceli Cantos arrived at his home in tears. She sought his help in arresting
appellant for raping her daughter. Rayos then went to see Hilario Balmes, the chief tanod. Rayos, Balmes, and two
other tanods, one Eusebio Asenas and a certain Alberto Catapang, then sallied forth to pick up appellant. But
appellant did not go without a fight. Before he was captured, he ran towards the mountains and pelted the group with
stones.14 Rayos testimony was corroborated by Balmes, who also appeared as witness for the prosecution.
On the morning of the following day, March 15, 1996, private complainant was brought to the Batangas Provincial
Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. Aletha Silang, an OB-Gynecologist. Her medical findings as reduced to
writing read:
This is to certify that I have attended (sic) MARY JANE CANTOS 13 years of age, female, single, Filipino of
Talahib Pandayan, Batangas City, at about 8:00 A.M. [of] March 15, 1996 with the following injuries
sustained by:
Neck left lateral aspect, positive pinpoint abrasion Upper back scapular area, left, positive multiple abrasions with violaceous discoloration.
Back thoracic area with abrasion
External geniatalia (sic) normal looking, positive, mucoid brownish discharge. positive hymenal
laceration, complete with raw edges at 1 oclock, 3 oclock 6 oclock & 8 oclock positions.
Internal examination: admits 5th finger of examiner with ease but with extreme tenderness, cervix
closed, uterus small.
Sperm determination: No sperm cells seen.15
Dr. Silang testified that the abrasions suffered by the private complainant could have been caused by friction caused
by skin contact with a rough surface.16 She also stated that the complaining witness had suffered hymenal
lacerations, which were complete with raw edges, signifying that the whole width of the hymen had been completely
torn or lacerated. The lacerations were fresh and could have been caused by phallic penetration during the previous
24 hours. 17 She reiterated that there were no sperm cells found in the vaginal canal of the private complainant.18
When it was the turn of the defense, appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that on the day
of the incident, he was out on a drinking spree from eight oclock in the morning until twelve oclock noon with four
other fishermen. He then went home and at around 1:30 p.m., he went into a drunken sleep. At 2:30 p.m., he was
awakened by his wife, Justina, who had just arrived from the river. She violently scolded him for failing to cook their
lunch, and drove him away from the house. He then sought refuge at the house of his friend, Rolando Avila. It was
there that he was informed he was wanted for raping his sister-in-law.19 Appellant explained that when he saw
Balmes, he ran to the mountains because he recalled Balmes previous threats that, if he would be involved in any
other trouble, he would just be picked up. Balmes made the threat following a previous quarrel between the appellant
and his wife and parents-in-law, according to appellant.

He surmised that his parents-in-law caused his arrest.20 He said that at noontime, before his arrest, he had another
run-in with Araceli Cantos. She berated him for being a drunkard and a no-good son-in-law. Unpleasant words were
exchanged and, appellant declared, it prompted Juan Cantos, his father-in-law, to come out with a shotgun.21 Luckily,
nothing happened because appellant locked himself inside his house and thereafter Araceli eventually convinced
Juan to go home. Appellant tearfully stated that his parents-in-law disliked him and never approved of him for their
daughter because he is a poor man.
Appellants wife, Justina, corroborated appellants testimony. She testified that private complainants account on the
witness stand was not true. What really transpired was that when she was through with her laundry, according to
Justina, she left Mary Jane alone in the river. She headed home, and found the appellant there sleeping and
inebriated. It provoked a heated argument, ending with her ordering the appellant to leave the house. She also
testified on the extent of her familys disapproval of her husband. According to her, her family sought to prevent her
from testifying in her husbands defense and urged her to stop visiting the appellant in jail. She averred that her
brother even mauled her for taking the appellants side, and she presented a medico-legal certificate to attest to her
injuries as a result.22
Dr. Antonio Salvador, the physician who examined Justina testified that he found two bruises on her body, one on her
left arm and one on her right shoulder.23
On January 26, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against appellant, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 and
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection.
Moreover, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00This
is mandatory upon the finding of rape. And moral damages of P50,000.00, without proof of mental and
physical suffering in accordance with recent jurisprudential evolutionAlso exemplary damages of
P30,000.00 is awarded the victim.
The costs are assessed against the accused.
The Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of this Branch is hereby directed to forward the records of this case to the
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review within twenty (20) days after the promulgation of this
judgment. She is also ordered to comply strictly with the transmittal of the transcripts of stenographic notes
(t.s.n.) as mandated by Section 10 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court and Article 47, as amended, of
the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.24
Before us, the appellant assigns the following as errors of the court a quo:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF MARY JANE
CANTOS AND ARACELI CANTOS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED AND JUSTINA
CANTOS.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF RAPE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH. 25
Appellants assignments of errors may be subsumed into two issues: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence
to prove his guilt of the crime of rape; and (2) the correctness of the penalty imposed on him.
The appellant faults the trial court for choosing to believe the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, while disregarding
those for the defense. He contends that Mary Jane is not a credible witness, stressing that it is not a normal reaction

of a woman who had just been raped to just collect the clothes she was washing and meekly follow the appellant
home. He argues that although people do react differently to a startling event, in rape cases, the victim is always
overwhelmed by bitterness and rage after the incident. He asks us to take notice of the private complainants and her
mothers statements that they were in rage as a result of the rape. That their mood should suddenly change from
rage to meekness is an unusual deportment that should raise doubts as to the credibility of their respective
testimonies.26 Moreover, the very fact that Justina Cantos was prevented by her family from testifying and visiting her
husband in jail should raise doubts as to his guilt as well.27
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the private complainant and her mother
acted in such a manner because the appellant threatened to kill them if they would report the rape. Faced with
looming danger to their lives, they agreed not to report the incident, but it was only a subterfuge to put appellant offguard. Moreover, they had no choice but to walk home in single-file with appellant at the tail-end, lest appellant make
good his threats. In fact, when appellant fled to Binulihan, Araceli lost no time in reporting the incident to
thebarangay officials which eventually led to appellants apprehension.28
The Solicitor General stresses that it is highly unlikely that a barrio lass who was merely 14 years of age when she
took the stand, lacking in sophistication and exposure to the ways of the world, could come up with such a detailed
narration of her ravishment at appellants hands if it did not really happen. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated
by the physical evidence. The OSG highlights the fact that the private complainant willingly underwent physical
examination of her private parts, and subjected herself and her family to the trauma and embarrassment concomitant
to a criminal prosecution for wrongful defloration. According to the OSG, these were indicative of the truthfulness of
her testimony against appellant.
Considering the arguments in the submissions of both parties, in the light of evidence adduced at the trial, we find no
cogent reason to set aside the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Appellants contentions are far from
convincing.
What we find credible and consistent is the testimony of private complainant. She did not waver in her claim that she
was raped by the appellant. She was put on the witness stand no less than five times. Her testimony the entire time
was candid and straight-forward. Despite being subjected to grueling cross-examination, she stood firm in her version
of events. The trial court found her to be a credible witness, without any motive to lie.
Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded great respect by
an appellate court.29 This is because the trial court had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand and assess their credibility.30 We note that while testifying, private complainant broke down in
tears several times because of her fear of the appellant.31 The crying of a victim during her testimony is eloquent
evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.32
We find no persuasive reason to sustain appellants claim that the rape charge against him was fabricated by the
Cantos family in order to rid themselves of an unwanted in-law. The argument that his wifes family had gripes against
him, in our view, would not suffice to move them against him with a very serious accusation. It simply strains ones
credulity that the private complainants family would concoct a false charge of rape, sacrifice the honor and dignity of
their family, and subject their daughter, Mary Jane, to untold humiliation and disgrace, just to separate him from their
other daughter, Justina. The Cantos family might have had their reasons to resent the appellant but there is
absolutely no unbiased evidence to show that they were capable of fabricating a false tale of rape. They would not
deliberately put Mary Jane to shame in the barangay where she grew up, permitting her to be a subject not just of
public trial, but of cruel gossip if she had not really been ravished.33 When the offended party is a young and immature
girl between the age of 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to give credence to her version of the incident,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the public humiliation to which she would be exposed by court
trial if her accusation were untrue.34 Testimonies of youthful rape victims are, as a general rule, given full faith and
credit, considering that when a girl says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was indeed committed.35
We note that private complainants testimony of her defilement is corroborated by physical evidence of penile
invasion as shown by hymenal lacerations she suffered. While we are not unmindful of this Courts pronouncement
that a victims hymenal lacerations need not necessarily prove carnal knowledge,36 nonetheless, Dr. Aletha Silangs
findings of "positive hymenal laceration, complete with raw edges at 10 oclock, 3 oclock, 6 oclock, and 8 oclock
positions" carries convincing weight as corroborative evidence in the light of the private complainants accusation that
she was sexually abused.37

We are not convinced that the private complainants conduct in meekly walking home in single-file with her mother
and the appellant behind after she was raped, would negate her tale of ravishment. First, as appellant himself admits,
there is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. Second, there is nothing bizarre about the behavior of the
private complainant or of her mother, as appellant would have us believe. As the Solicitor General correctly points
out, both Mary Jane and Araceli were threatened with death by the appellant. Araceli, in fact, had no choice but to
placate appellant with promises that she would not disclose the rape lest the latter make good his threats. Hence,
they had to act as if they were calm and had accepted the fait accompli as a matter of course in order to throw
appellant off his guard. Note, however, that once safely out of the appellants clutches, Araceli did not waste time to
report immediately the incident to the barangay authorities when she had the chance to do so. Note likewise that
appellant ran off to the mountains when the authorities sought to bring him in for questioning. His flight strongly
indicates his guilt.38 A truly innocent person would seize every opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.
In fine, we have no hesitance in holding that appellant indeed committed rape beyond a shadow of doubt. But did the
trial court correctly impose capital punishment on him?
Appellant submits that, assuming arguendo he is indeed guilty of raping private complainant, nonetheless, the trial
court erred in sentencing him to death by lethal injection. He concedes that while the prosecution did indeed allege
and prove that the victim was minor through the proffer of her birth certificate, nonetheless, the prosecution failed to
show documentary proof of the alleged relationship by affinity between him and private complainant.39Simply stated,
he avers that the prosecution has not adequately proved that the victim is his sister-in-law, because there is no
sufficient evidence presented that he is legally married to her sister, Justina Cantos.
On this score we rule in appellants favor.
Since the rape was committed in 1996, the applicable law is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, the pertinent provision of which states:
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim
Hence, before the penalty for the crime of rape may be raised from reclusion perpetua to death, two circumstances
must be sufficiently proven: 1) the age of the victim, and 2) the relationship between the offender and the victim. In
the case of People v. Pruna,40 we made clear that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final
nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to nothing less than the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.
In connection with the circumstance of age, Pruna laid down the guidelines for its appreciation. This Court therein
stated that the best evidence is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of the
complainant.41Here, the prosecution was able to present the private complainants original certificate of birth42, proving
that she was only thirteen at the time the offense was committed. However, the prosecution did not present the
marriage contract between appellant and Justina Cantos, to prove the relationship by affinity between appellant and
the victim.
The information alleges that "herein complainant and offended party [is] the sister-in-law of the accused and therefore
a relative by affinity within the third civil degree." Said circumstance presupposes the existence of a legitimate
relationship,43 such that the appellant should be shown as lawfully married to the private complainants sister, Justina.
As held in the case of People v. Berana,44 to effectively prosecute for the crime of rape committed by a relative by
affinity within the third civil degree, it must be established that (1) appellant is legally married to private complainants
sister, and (2) private complainant and appellants wife are full or half blood siblings.45
Considering that said circumstance of relationship by affinity qualifies the offense of rape, such that it becomes
punishable by death, it is compulsory that a more stringent standard of proof must be met by the prosecution.46Mere
testimony of witnesses is not enough to dispel doubts regarding the in-law relationship of appellant and the victim.
Where the life of the appellant hangs in the balance, a more exacting proof must be adduced.47

In our view, the failure of the prosecution to submit an authentic document, such as the original contract of marriage
or the certified true copy thereof, between appellant and Justina Cantos, leaves the alleged in-law relationship
between appellant and the victim inadequately proved. For this reason, we are not prepared to impose on him the
extreme penalty of death. The proper penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
Correspondingly, the damages awarded below must be modified as well. Appellant should pay the victim P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, pursuant to current jurisprudence. Lastly, by way of public
example and to serve as a deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, he should also pay her the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7, dated January 26, 2000, in
Criminal Case No. 8378, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant RODRIGO PACHECO y CASTILLO is found
GUILTY of rape but his sentence is reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay private
complainant, Mary Jane Cantos, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno and Panganiban, JJ., on official leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon

Garcia, petitioner, vs.
JUANITA
TANHOTI-LIYAO,
PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA
LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394 which reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William
Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao
to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased
William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the
suit.
[1]

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.

Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William

Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita
Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. The complaint was later amended to include
the allegation that petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status
of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged
as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."
[2]

[3]

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in
Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage
with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and
president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She
failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land
located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East
Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited
and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and
hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a
copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account
for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to
be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his
good looking son and had their pictures taken together.
[4]

[5]

[6]

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William
Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also presented
pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. During the occasion
of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of
Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still
make a good looking son." Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by
the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food,
[7]

[8]

[9]

clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was Corazon
who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle,
Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old
newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his
last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G.
Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions
like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples residence
and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in
sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her
child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and
later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend
of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy.
She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living
with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household
expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique.
During William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two
(2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy.
He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to
make it engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring. Unfortunately, this
did not happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita
attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized
a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph as well
as another shirt of lime green as belonging to the deceased. A note was also
presented with the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William. Maurita
remembered having invited the couple during her mothers birthday where the couple
had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita
knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been
annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the
entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon
Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.
[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew
that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being
one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado,
Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao
from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains,
Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was
worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in
the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong
and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the

salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria
knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never
had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and
Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo,
from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was
about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the
latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques
half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the
house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by his sister,
Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy
could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her
mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San
Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would
institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San
Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for
conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home
because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping
in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a
home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and
did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his
death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May
1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to
three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move,
walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan,
ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters
to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not
active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke
during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three
(3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He
did not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his
family.
[16]

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo.
Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local
Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their
marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at
the company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to
Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added
[17]

that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out
documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again. Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office
upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not
recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown
three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and
pajamas.
[18]

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati
up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. Her father suffered two (2)
minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack
sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and he
had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet,
serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood
pressure and cholesterol level control. Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr.
Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita
Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize
a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After
assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any
check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house
occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs
presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were
displayed at the latters office.
[19]

[20]

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At
past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over
as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was
only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not
able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered
from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr.
Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office
of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr.
Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died
upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to
arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees
of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda
saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was
also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon.
He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic
Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the
latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that
he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes,
Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers wives.
During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for
Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad
litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son
of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan,
Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the
minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William
Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance
of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was
conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial
court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as
securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing
sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the
law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of
legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between
husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation
to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of
some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were
still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each others
company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William
Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal

certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to
establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William
Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and considering that his
signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family
pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was
presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was
nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or
Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both
parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner
impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only
flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles
of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in
a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
[22]

[23]

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and

consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the
New Civil Code provides:
[24]

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten
(10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late
William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with
Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, Contract of Separation, executed and signed by
Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that
Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.
[25]

[26]

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only
be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason
that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to
his memory.
[27]

[28]

[29]

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as

guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then
the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption.
[30]

[31]

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon
Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the
legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of
the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar
was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through
Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be

impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and
within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with the
late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his
paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
_______________________________________________________________________________

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,

vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
TEODORA
DOMINGO, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by
respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 which affirmed the Order of December
3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein
private respondents Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054
pending therein.
[1]

The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein
petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of
land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the
niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the
sister of petitioners father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on
March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her

husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners father, Hermogenes, died
on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right
of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving
spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January
2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latters name.
[2]

Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for
resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late
Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the
estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved
participation of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section
4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the
defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus
attorneys fees for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the
participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and
knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal
property of the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.[3]

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone
witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners filiation to
their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and
Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and
Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and
place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and
Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners
thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a
Comment was filed by herein private respondent.
[4]

[5]

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the

ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the
testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her
alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls
short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the
records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is
inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for crossexamination.
[6]

On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance .
[7]

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the

documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondents demurrer to evidence is whether or
not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the
Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for consideration
before us: first is the issue on petitioners legitimacy, and second is the question
regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken
separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy
nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower
courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first
place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance,
and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their
legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no
presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
[8]

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:

The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The

legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code
(Article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband
or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest
made in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn
the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a
state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any
doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter,
which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the
child, may still be easily available.
xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs
are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
[9]

The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of

Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for
reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it
is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of
proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their
favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have
been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as
it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as
well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.

Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the
presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in
any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of
proof to overthrow the presumption. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it
is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming
illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it
operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.
[10]

[11]

[12]

Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or
until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and
support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is
uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of
the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal
presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.
[13]

[14]

[15]

Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence

to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in
effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded
the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the
proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby
considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioners relationship with
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy,
requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various
certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits
executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as
part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the
former is Teodoras niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant
is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other
than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is,
not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
[16]

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What
remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents
offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if
at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the

relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other
declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The
rule is stated thus:

One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not
from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding
claimants pedigree, he may not do so by declarants own statements as to declarants
relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarants declaration of his
own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent
proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of
the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarants
relationship to the common family must appear is not met. But when the party
claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or
the declarants estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy,
that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof
of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is
not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential
value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in
determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have noted
is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the
other they are competent from reasons of necessity. (Italics ours.)
[17]

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against
a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or
the declarants estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not
be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.
As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of
the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family.
[18]

[19]

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance
where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are
claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact
that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence
to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute
failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
[20]

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis
of the decedents declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners

are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, where
the subject of the declaration is the declarants own relationship to another person, it
seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of
the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would
render the main evidence unnecessary.
[21]

Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same
result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly
conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion
that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondents failure to interpose any
timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., it has been repeatedly laid down as a
rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must
be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The
proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer
thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or
may be inferred.
[26]

Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a
witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the admission
of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is
too late. Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand,
where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.
[27]

[28]

The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent
unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary
evidence that were offered.At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility
thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private
respondents counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and
regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private
respondent in her comment to petitioners offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor
were already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence
during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely
raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted
therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondents failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the
facts therein asserted.
[29]

Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the

parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the
Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller
(Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia
Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero;
[30]

and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were
made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint
Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein
petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller -- these can be deemed to have
sufficiently established the relationship between the declarant and herein
petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient
and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. Finally, it may not be amiss to
consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and
the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller.
[31]

[32]

III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the
estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving
spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his
total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs
evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent
may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section
1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that if the motion is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.
[33]

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are
declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and threefourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.