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Myrna Gabbe
Phibsophy Department, University ofDayton
Dayton, OH 454619, USA
mgabbel @udayton. edu
Abstract
In Eudemian Ethics 8.2, Aristotle posits god as the starting-point of non-tational desite
(patticulatly fot the natutally fottunate), thought, and delibetation. The questions that
dominate the lltetature ate: To what does 'god' refer? Is it some divine-like entity in the
soul that ptoduces thoughts and desites ot is it Aristotle's ptime movet? And how does
god opetate as the statting-point of these activities? By ptoviding a catefiil teconsttuction
of the context in which god is evoked, I argue against the popular deflationaty teading
of'god', showing why Atistode's ptime movet must be the end of these natutal activities,
and how it serves as afinalcause fot the tational and desitative patts of the soul. I contend
that EE 8.2 ptovides evidence against the traditional notion that god operates as a final
cause by dtawing natural potentialities to theit completion, and suggests instead that it
serves as a final cause by enteting into the explanation of natutes and natural activities as
theit ultimate end.
Keywords
Atistotle; god; arche;finalcausation; good fortune; luck; thinking; desite; noetic self-motion
DOI: 10.1163/13685284-12.341236
359
360.
cannot both be causes of a single phenomenon, since nature 'is the cause
of what occurs in the same way always or for the most part, whereas luck
is the opposite' (1247a31-3). Aristotle resolves the tension by disambiguating our use of 'good fortune'. He shows us that one type is owed to
nature, the other to luck.
Aristotle explains that those who prosper by nature do so because they
act on impulses {hno xi opn.fi, 1247b29) issuing from correct desires:
'they desire what they ought and when they ought and as they ought'
(1247b24; 1248a6). Hence, the desires of the fortunate are as if engendered by reason or practical wisdom. Aristotle contends that these individuals are called 'fortunate' because one is lucky when reasoning and
calculation are not causes for his success (1248a9-12). But properly speaking, these individuals are neither lucky nor fortunate (1247a38-9). They
are well-endowed (e-cpufi, 1247a38); their 'good fortune accords with the
natural endowment of inclination and desire (TI exu^ia Kax' fbifo'iav
p^ec Kal jit&un.ia)' (1247b39-1248al). All of us, Aristotle explains,
desire naturally what is pleasant, and therefore our desires march towards
the good by nature (1247b20-l). But, evidently, we can be mistaken about
what is genuinely pleasant and desirable, since what we perceive to be
pleasant and desirable can lead us away from the real good. The fortunate,
then, are well-endowed just because they desire correctly, without effort or
coherent thought, that which is good. For this reason, the naturally fortunate are capable of repeated and continuous success.
The lucky do not prosper as the naturally fortunate do. Their success is
sporadic, at best. This type of good fortune does not result from impulse
and choice (1247b30); rather, it is achieved despite the impulses of the
individual. It may be that the individual wanted something other than
what he obtained; or it may be that he received a greater good than the one
he desired (1247b32-3). Whatever the case, the fortunate man's desires do
not explain his success.^ This type of fortune results accidently from one's
^' Fot reasons that are not cleat to me. Woods, in his ttanslation and commentaty, takes
the example of a man teceiving a different ot gteatet good than he desited to be a special
case of natutal good fottune. See M. Woods, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics Books I, II and
VIII (Oxford, 1992), 38 and 169. The example is ptesented in the second patt of an
V KEvot... V ToUTOi clause (1247b30-33) and is designed to showcase the contrast
between the two types of good fottune distinguished in the ptevious sentence. The formet
cases (V KEVOI) exemplify natutal good fottune; the lattet (v Touxot) exemplify sheet
luck. In these lattet cases, because the fortunate man's desite is not fot the outcome
While there is no explicit mention of luck and nature in this passage, arguably the two kinds of fortune divide on these lines. Good fortune resulting
'contrary to impulse' can be owed neither to the individual's desires nor.
his reason; hence, it remains for it to result sporadically from luck. Divine
fortune, by contrast, is 'in accordance with impulse', whose source is nonrational. We can safely presume, then, that the impulse in question issues
from a naturally endowed desirative faculty, explaining, in turn, why this
divine fortune is continuous. The upshot is that nature and god are both
obtained, his luck is contrary to, or despite, his desire and impulse. It is not, then, a matter
of endowment.
'' Aristotle's examples complicate his case since it is not always clear whether he would
characterize them as resulting from luck or nature. Particularly perplexing is his example of
dice-throwing since he appears to identify nature as the cause of successful throws, even
though doing so does not fit with his account of fortune by nature (1247a23). The naturally fortunate are so because of right desires. Yet all dice-throwers desire the same thing,
whether they are lucky or not. This is to say, desire has no impact on the results of the
throw. Hence, I suspect that Aristotle was not describing the fortunate dice thrower at
1247a23, but making reference to the way people describe him. Fot if his success is really
owed to nature, then he should be so lucky always or for the most part. Aristotle denies this
possibility later at 1247b 15-18 for the dice thrower.
"" With some modifications, translations ofthe Eudemian Ethics are from Woods, Aristotle's
Eudemian Ethics (n. 1 above).
361
362
causes of the same phenomenon: the rightly directed desires and impulses
of the fortunate few.^
We might think that god causes natural good fortune by giving certain
individuals a nature that causes them to desire what they ought, when they
ought, as they ought. But Aristotle argued earlier in the chapter that good
fortune cannot be caused by a god acting as steersman since that would
require it favoring an individual who lacks virtue and wisdom over 'the
best and the wisest' (1247a29). Nevertheless, ruling out a steersman god as
the source of this fortune does not preclude a transcendent god from operating as a remote cause of right desires. In order to understand god's role
in fortune by nature, we must turn to the argument presented just before
the summarizing remarks quoted above.
II
Aristotle posits god as the source of rightly directed desires in an argument
advanced in response to the following challenge. He writes (1248a 16-17):
[A] The question might be raised 'Is luck the cause of this very thing - of desiring
what one should and when one should?' Or will luck in that way be the cause of
everything?
Aristotle explains why luck would be the cause of everything in the following lines (1248al8-22):
[B] For it will be the cause both of thinking and of deliberating; for a man who deliberates has not deliberated already before deliberating and deliberated about that there is some starting-point (arche). Nor did he think, after thinking already before
^' Cf. Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford, 1992), 73-5. Kenny takes Aristotle to
distinguish between four ways of being fortunate in EE 8.2: (i) God-given good nature that
engenders sound deliberation and virtuous action (1248al7); (ii) God-given good nature
that engenders flawed deliberation but successful outcome (1247b37); (iii) God-given
inspiration that precipitates successful outcome without deliberation; and (iv) bad desires
that lead to good outcomes due to lucky circumstances. Kenny insists that (iii) and (iv) are
the two ways of being fonunate under discussion in this last passe of the chapter at
1248b3j^The former is divine; these fortunate individuals have inspiration or 'an inner
oracle', like Socrates' daimn, that leads them to do the right thing. The latter is a matter of
sheer luck.
363
thinking, and so on to infinity. Thetefote, nous is not the arche of thinking, not is
counsel the ZrfA of delibetation. So what else is thete save luck?
Since clearly Aristotle does not believe that thinking and deliberating are
owed to luck, he posits something else as their cause, god (1248a23-9):
[C] (i) Ot is thete some archheyon which thete is no othet {r\ eaxi xi pxii fi OK
oxiv .Kk\\ ^(), and this - because it is of such a sott - can have such an efFect? But
what is being sought is this: What is the arche of motion in the soul (xi r\ xf\ KtvpcEcoc
pXTi v XT\ xiruxi)? () It is now evident: just as god <is the arche of motion> in the
univetse, so is god <the arche of motion> in the soul (SfjXov 5ii Sanep v x X,cp
9eo, Kv KEVTi);'' (iii) for, in a sense, the divine element in us moves evetything
(KtvE yap Ttw Jtvxa x6 v TIHV GEOV); (iv) but the arche of teason is not teason but
something supetiot (Xoyov 5' pxil oi) Aoyo, Xh. TI KpExxov). (v) What then could
be supetiot to even knowledge and nous save god (xi ow v KpExxov Kal itioxT|nt\
e'Ti <ical vo> iJi\v 9EO)?
'*' Woods does not supply the vetb and predicate in (ii) ftom the ptevious line, but uses
instead the vetb from the next line: 'as it is a god that moves in the' whole univetse, so it
is in the soul'. I think that Woods' ttanslation obscutes the sttuctute of the atgument
by linking with the same vetb 'god' in (ii) and 'the divine element' in (iii). Note also that
in (ii) the O C T teads: Kav EKEVCO. I accept Spengel's emendation, teading Ksivri fot
EKev) since it most natutally tefets back to the soul. Cf F. Buddensiek, Die Theorie des
Glcks in Aristoteles'Eudemischer Ethik {Gttingen, 1999), 167 n. 38. Though Buddensiek
gets mote ot less the same sense out of the passage, he teads Jtv KEvep fot KV KEVQ). But
this tendeting does not avoid all ttoubles. His ttanslation is as follows: 'OfFensichdich ist
ein theos - wie im Ganzen - so auch fit jenes (d.h. die in Ftage stehenden Dinge in det
Seele) Ptinzip det Bewegung'. The awkwatdness lies with EKevcp since he takes it to tefet
to things in the soul.
364
could have repeated either XT or f).^ That he did not suggests that he
thought it would become clear in the next line, where he specifies god as
the arche. Though Aristotle often refers to the parts of the soul as divine,
he does not call them gods.* An entity can be divine without thereby being
a god, so long as it has its source in one; for nothing is divine except in
relation to god. That, I suggest, is why line (iii) serves as an explanation of
and justification for (ii). On the assumption that the intellect is a divine
element in us that in a sense (TIC) moves everything, god is established as
the cause of the intellect and, thereby, its movements.'
There are a few scholars - notably, Frede, Caston, and Kenny - who
would agree that Aristotle here makes his transcendental god, the prime
mover, the arche of motion in the soul.' Frede and Caston do not demonstrate the viability of reading 'god' in this way. Their discussion of 8 . 2
is cursory, playing a merely supporting role to their analysis of DA 3.5.
Kenny, by contrast, provides a comprehensive account of the chapter.
Briefly, Kenny's view is that correct desires are the product of divine inspiration, not natural endowment. Thus, god, in his view, operates as an
eflScient cause. He likens god's work to actual graces: 'the thoughts and
inarticulate desires that precede all deliberation and choice and are the
expression of the divine in us'." I do not find this approach compelling:
(a) it denies the parallels between good fortune by nature and divine fortune; and (b) it makes god a steersman for those who do not employ
reason.'^ Yet my discussion of Kenny is confined to the notes because the
concern here is to show problematic the deflationary reading of'god'.
'' I am grateful For the insight and advice oF Susan Prince, Fred Jenkins and Fred Miller
on this passage. Miller, it must be noted, disagrees with Prince, Jenkins, and myselF, insisting that V xfi ifuxu niodifies pxi in line (i).
*' CF NE 1153b25-32; 1177al6, b26-8.
'*' I take (iii) to be an observation on the role the intellect plays in human liFe and activity;
For it makes possible cities, political structures, agriculture, crafts, and, more generally,
culture. The claim is qualified with nmc because the intellect is not the source oFall human
actions and processes.
"" M. Frede, 'La thorie aristotlicienne de l'intellect agent' in R. Dherbey and G. Viano
(eds.). Corps et me: Sur le De Anima d'Aristote (Paris, 1996), yjl-'iV) at 387-8; V. Caston,
'Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal', Phronesis 44 (1999), 199-227 at 222-3;
and Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (n. 5 above), 56-81 and 145-66.
' " Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (n. 5 above) 79.
'^' Regarding (a), see Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life 73-5, with note 5 above. As For
(b), Kenny does not worry that making god an efficient cause oF correct desires conflicts
365
It would seem that more often than not interpreters take Aristotle as
seeking a starting-point located in the soul and assume it to be the referent
of'god' in (ii) and (iii), as well as that of'the divine element in us' in (iii).
This, at any rate, is the line pursued by White, Woods, van der Eijk,
Shields, and Wedin." White equates 'god' with 'a kind of insight or intuition' possessed by the naturally fortunate regarding what they ought to
do.'" Woods and van der Eijk, by contrast, take 'god' to be the divine element in us that moves everything as the source of all psychic phenomena.'^
Woods is more or less silent on what he takes this divine element to be, but
van der Eijk describes it as a 'psycho-physiological mechanism', which, in
addition to producing rational activity, 'turns the pn.a into the right
direction'.'^ Evidently, this interpretation makes a single entity in the soul
responsible for both rational and non-rational activity. This leaves us to
wonder whether non-rational impulses have their source in the rational
soul or, contrariwise, the activities of the rational soul stem ultimately
from a mechanism that belongs most properly to the appetitive soul. Yet
. both Shields and Wedin ignore the role this entity plays as cause of the
fortunate man's desires. Shields suggests that 'the divine element in us'
refers to the object of thought, which, in his view, is the formal cause of
with Atistotle's insistence that god would not favot the unteasoning ovet the best and the
brightest. He claims that because god's contribution 'is ptiot to any virtue ot wisdom
acquired by the individual', it cannot favot the one over the othet. Kenny, Aristotle on the
Perfect Life (n. 5 above), 80. This explanation is thotoughly unsatisfactoty. If god is the
efficient of cause of desites fot the lucky, then it favots those who do not use theit capacity
fot teason. It does not mattet that the desires manifest befte the individual might have
exercised teason.
'^' Even Ftede, who insists that 'god' in [C] tefets to the ptime movet, thinks that Atistotle
hete places god in the soul. God, he insists, is in the soul as a ptinciple of out thoughts,
albeit in a metaphotical way. Ftede atgues that to teally think something is to understand
it in telation to god, the fitst ptinciple of all things and most intelligible of objects. Thus,
god becomes a ptinciple of out thinking at the very moment we come to understand
god as the cause of all. M. Ftede, 'La thotie aristotlicienne de l'intellect agent' (n. 10
above), 387-90.
'" S. White, 'Natutal Vittue and Perfect Vittue in Atistotle', Proceedings of The Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Phibsophy S (1994), 133-68 at 151.
'^' M. Woods, Aristotle Eudemian Ethics (n. 2 above), 171; P. J. van det Eijk, 'Divine
Movement and Human Natute in Eudemian Ethics 8, 2', Hermes 117 (1989), 24-42 at 31.
"' P. J. van det Eijk, 'Divine Movement and Human Natute' (n. 15 above), 32.
366
On the two occasions in [D] wherein Aristotle mentions an arche responsible for the success of the fortunate, that starting-point is in the individual. The first instance is found in lines 1248a32-3: the fortunate by nature,
Aristotle writes, 'have such an arche as is superior to nous and deliberation
(others have reason but do not have this nor do they have divine inspiration)'. Clearly, for Aristotle, people bear relations to god, the necessary
being upon which all depends. We do not have or possess such a god.^'
Hence, the arche here cannot refer to a transcendent being. The passage
ends with the assertion that 'the arche seems to be stronger when reason is
disengaged' (1248a40-bl), so illustrating the effect that these two faculties, or aspects ofthe soul, have on one another. Thus, again, arche refers
to something in the soul. Therefore, because the arche in [D] is described
in similar terms as that described in [C] in [C], the arche is superior to
"' C. Shields, 'Mind and Motion in Aristode' in M. L. Gill and J. G. Lennox (eds.), SelfMotionfrom Newton to Aristotle (Princeton, 1994), 117-33 at 132.
'"' M. Wedin, 'Aristotle on the Mind's Self-Motion' in M. L. Gill and J. G. Lennox (eds.),
Self-Motion from Newton to Aristotle (Princeton, 1994), 81-116 at 102-16.
'" M.^edin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle {New Hiven, 1988), 173.
^"^ I have left out lines 1248a34-40 because the text is too corrupt to make good sense of.
^" Pace Frede, 'La thorie aristotlicienne de l'intellect agent' (n. 10 above), 383-90.
367
Ill
Careful consideration of how god averts the regress in [B] will allow us to
assess better the two interpretations (the transcendental and deflationary
readings of 'god') and help us to understand the role that god plays as the
^^' Note that this tension arises on Frede's account as well insofar as he too insists that god,
Aristotle's prime mover, is in the soul. Frede's view is that god is in the soul as the ultimate
intelligible (i.e. that in relation to which all else must be understood) at the moment one is
capable of contemplation.
368
[B] Fot it will be the cause both of thinking and of delibetating; for a man who delibetates has not delibetated alteady before delibetating and deliberated about that thete is some statting-point. Not did he think, aftet thinking alteady befte thinking,
and so on to infinity. Thetefote, nous is not the statting-point of thinking, not is
counsel the starting-point of delibetation. So what else is thete save luck?
The deflationary reading takes the regress to ensue on the assumption that
mental acts are caused by antecedent mental acts of the same type. There
are two versions of the argument. On one, the regress demands an explanation for the first thought or desire: a thought, it is reasoned, cannot
always be caused by a prior thought, a desire always by a prior desire; in a
human being, there has to be a first psychic event.^^ On the other, the
regress demands an explanation for the production of each discrete
" ' Both Shields and Wedin atticulate some vetsion of this atgument. Shields, 'Mind and
Motion' (n. 17 above), 126, wtites: 'If every mental event, e.g., evety instance of thinking,
is caused by anothet event ofthat same type, then the causal ancestry of my thinking/> at
t^ includes my having had some othet thought q at i_,, and so on into infinity'. Wedin's
articulation of the atgument sttaddles both vetsions. Cleatly, Wedin takes the tegtess to
highlight the need fpr an explanation of discrete thoughts: 'The explanation of an ability
can hardly consist in citing a same-level exetcise of the ability. The pXT of thought can be
the cause of acts of thinking, in a theotetically satisfying way, only if the causation opetates
at a difFetent level ftom the combined ot ptopositional thoughts it explains' ('Atistotle on
the Mind's Self-Motion', n. 18 above, 100). Yet, part of the teason why it is 'theotetically
unsatisfying' tO' explain a thought by a preceding thought is because it cannot always
happen that a thought is pteceded by a thought {ib. 98).
369
" ' White, 'Natural Virtue' (n. 14 above), 149. See also Woods, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics
(n. 2 above), 170.
" ' CF Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (n. 5 above), 7.1-3, who limits the regress to the
sphere oF action. According to Kenny, the argument runs as Follows. IF luck is the cause oF
correct desires that precipitate correct action without reason, then it will also be the cause
oF deliberation preceding correct action because deliberation has its source in non-rational
desire. ThereFore, since luck cannot be the cause oF all deliberations, god is its source.
Regarding Kenny's argument, we must ask whether all deliberations preceded by a nonrational desire For some particular good thing or whether only the deliberations and actions
oFthe Fortunate so preceded. Arguably, those who are not naturally Fortunate deliberate in
order to determine what the appropriate thing to desire and do is. Perhaps Kenny has
in mind that all deliberations have their staning-point in some pre-rational desire For the
good. Indeed, Aristode says as much at 1247b 18-21. But it still does not Follow that iF
the non-rational desires oF the Fortunate are owed to luck, then so too is the non-rational
desire For the good that precipitates ordinary acts oF deliberation about what precise end
and course oF action is genuinely good. (Both can be understand as means to some more
general good.) They are different types oF non-rational desire: the one For a particular good,
the other For the good in general. Thus, a non-rational desire For a particular good can be
owed to luck without entailing that all non-rational desires are owed to luck. It is better,
I think, to take the regress as extending Aristotle's concerning about luck beyond the sphere
oF desire and action.
^''^ Physics 8.4, 2553Ln-20.
" ' For a compelling argument against Wedin's conception oF noetic-autonomy, see
370
To b clear, 'noetic autonomy' and 'noetic self-motion' are not expressions that Aristotle uses. The license to use them comes principally from
two remarks found in the De Anima. At 4l7a27-8, Aristotle tells us that a
person with knowledge is one who 'is able to contemplate, if he wished
(o-uA.T|Gelc Swat Bepev)'. Later at A\l\)TiA, he asserts that 'thinking
is up to us whenever we wish' (vofioat ^v in' ax^, 7txav ouA,Tixai)
because 'the universal is somehow in the soul'. Both remarks describe a
person possessed of knowledge. One has knowledge when he can contemplate or apply what he knows, if he so desires. Conversely, if he desires to
employ some bit of knowledge but cannot, he likely does not have the
knowledge he thought himself to possess. In neither remark is it suggested
that the will is necessary for thinking being up to us. For all that Aristotle
says, one could have thoughts against one's wish that were nonetheless up
to the individual. This would happen if she wished to avoid some issue,
but could not keep herself from thinking or deliberating about it. There is
nothing here to indicate that Aristotle envisions the mind as a self-mover
capable of initiating each thought by its own resources.
I will say more about Wedin and Shield's conception of noetic automony in the next section, after we look at the interpretive problems encountered by the deflationary reading. We can begin with passage [B], though
the difficulties start in [A]. According to the deflationary reading, the
regress is designed to show that thoughts and desires have their source
beneath the level of conscious psychic activity. On this interpretive
line, the regress sets up an argument by elimination, first by introducing a
problem - it shows that there must be a source for our thoughts and deliberations - ; next by offering a solution that is to be rejected in favor of a
better alternative. Hence, the argument will not be convincing unless the
alternatives are exhaustive. Read in this way, passage [B] provides two
alternatives that are to be rejected in favor of a divine element in the soul:
mental acts are caused either by prior mental acts of the same type or by
luck. But same-type causation and luck are not the only plausible alternatives to what Wedin dubs 'levels-causation' - the theory that something
beneath the level of conscious psychic activity brings the thought or desire
to actuality. It is well known that Aristotle postulates perception as the
K. Corcilius, 'How ate Episodes of Thought Iniriated accotding to Aristotle?' in G. van Riel
and P. Desttee (eds.). Ancient Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima (Leuven, 2009), 1-15.
371
372
faculties alone do not account for what we take to be desirable; for how
things appear to the imagination is determined by the capacities and dispositions of the soul in virtue of which character is ascribed {EE 2.2,
1220b7-20). As Aristotle explains in the EE, all of us are susceptible to
affections - emotional responses to objects or state of affairs that give rise
to pain and pleasure (1220bl2-l4). Yet how we experience an affection whether we are insensitive to it or quick to feel it pertains to the particular capacities and dispositions of our soul (1220b7-10). Thus, our character
traits play a big role in determining what we desire, how we desire (i.e.,
with ferocity or reservation), and when we desire some object or end
(under appropriate or inappropriate circumstances). The deflationary reading, however, ignores this earlier account of desire by assuming that were
there no arche in the soul to explain correct desires, they would be the
product of luck. Said differently, it assumes that natural endowment cannot be explained without appeal to some divine-like entity in the soul. But
there is no reason to think that consistently correct desires cannot be
explained under the theory just described. All of us are born with natural
inclinations that, as we develop, incline us toward particular kinds of pleasures and pains.^' We ought to presume, then, that the fortunate were
born with natural inclinations that gave rise to capacities or dispositions
(in other words, character traits) that produce right desires.
The problem, then, with the deflationary account is not simply that it
posits an unnecessary mechanism in the soul. The problem is that its way
of understanding the production of desire runs counter to Aristotle's holistic account given earlier in the EE. No single faculty, or entity therein, is
made responsible for whether we take something to be pleasant and desirable. How we respond to an object, person, or state of afFairs is a matter of
numerous faculties, capacities, and dispositions working in tandem. Moreover, to posit an entity that can be solely responsible for desires or thoughts
leaves its powers unexplained. If it can operate independently of these
other faculties, or states of the soul, then what accounts for its ability to
produce correct desires? Not character or knowledge. It is a deus ex machina
that complicates the puzzle without solving it.
'"' Shields, 'Mind and Motion' (n. 17 above), 122. Wedin ('Atistode and the Mind's SelfMotion', n. 18 above, 87), makes a similat tematk, noting that if the intellect wete capable
of self-motion, thinking would be 'a putely passive affait'.
3" Shields, 'Mind and Motion' (n. 17 above), 121.
373
374
the paradox generated by the Russell set, one can call it forth to consciousness at wiir.'^ We might even will ourselves to think about Aristotle's ethics and, in that sense, think when we want (4l7a24). But we do not will
the precise thoughts that comprise an extended episode of theoretical or
practical thinking. Indeed, intellectual and practical progress would be
impossible were willing our thoughts a requirement for us to think autonomously. What we do is rather like what Shields denies to be the case. We
sit down with a goal in mind - say, to solve a puzzle; we make the conditions right for thinking, in part, by obstructing cognitive paths that would
lead us away from our goal; and then we hope that we will discover the
cause of the problem to which we set our minds. Yet what we wish to discover does not go very far to explain the actual thoughts we think. It does
not explain why we hit upon a correct thought or line of reasoning, or why
we follow one that leads us astray. And it certainly does not explain sudden,
unexpected monients of clarity and genius. Hence, the concerns of Shields
and Wedin are unfounded. Though what we think, when we think, is not
determined by the will, we are hardly passive spectators to our thoughts.^^
Yet even if our will does not dictate our thoughts, they tend to display
logical order and directedness. Aristotle makes this observation in the
De Anima: "Thinking,' he writes, 'consists of thoughts... [that] have a
serial unity, like that of number, not a unity like that of magnitude'
(407a7-9). Successive thoughts are unified, and thereby coherent only
insofar as they manifest order and directness towards some conclusion,
some truth. If our thoughts did not manifest unity, then a principal human
good, understanding, would be out of our reach. What the regress shows,
then, is that this unity requires an explanation, since we do not actively
choose, direct, or order the discrete thoughts we think. God, it would
seem, enters into the explanation of their unity. The question becomes
how god explains the unity of thinking.
375
We can rule out the idea that god plants thoughts into our head as an
efficient cause. Supposing god to be a proximate cause of our thoughts
ignores the role that the rational faculty must play in determining the
content of our reflections and in 'producing unified thoughts. Though
Aristotle does not make clear how precisely he envisions the faculty to
operate, we ought to suppose that what we think is a feature of what we
know and our skills in reasoning - our ability to miake sound inferences,
good judgments, and to systematize our beliefs. Clearly, a child's reflections are different from an adult's. One can neither reflect on a subject
about which one knows nothing, nor acquire and contemplate knowledge
without skills in reasoning. Moreover, if god were the proximate cause of
our thoughts, it would also be the proximate cause of the fortunate individuals' desires. Yet this story is irnplausible since god would not only
replace natural endowment as the proximate cause of correct desires, but
favor the unreasoning over the best and the wisest (1247a29).
It is better to suppose that god is the cause of thoughts and desires insofar as it explains the nature of the desirative and rational faculties: namely,
why it is that these faculties have by their very nature the capacities necessary to benefit their possessor and lead the individual to some real good.
Indeed, this way of understanding god's role provides us with a means to
understand the concern that motivates the question in [A]: Could it be
that luck is the cause of natural endowment? On this interpretation, the
question in [A] and regress in [B] are prompted on the assumption that
god does not enter into the explanation of thoughts and desires. For, short
of evolutionary theory, it would be a matter of luck that our faculties benefit us were god not a part of their causal story. That it is not by luck that
we are by our nature capable of achieving success, virtue, knowledge, and
eudaimonia is owed to that fact that god is the ultimate arche of the natural world. The fortunate individual may not have virtue, but what encourages and enables people to seek virtue is part of the same capacity
responsible for naturally correct desires the natural inclination all of us
have to pursue what we take to be good. This desire belongs naturally to all
humans because god is a final cause of our natures.
376
involvement usually see god as driving natural potentialities to their realization as an object of love. Take, for instance, Kahn's seminal paper, 'The
Prime Mover and Teleology'. The argument there is that god 'serves as a
kind of metaphysical magnet drawing all natural potencies on to their
realization in act and to the acquisition of their specific form'.'"* Kahn's
approach to Aristotle's teleology was not new. Joachim, for example, had
earlier written that all things in the universe are 'inspired by love of God,
as striving, so far as in them lies, to attain God; i.e. to imitate in their
activities that perfect and eternal life'.'^ More recently, Sedley asserts: 'Just
as every heavenly sphere is motivated by love for its mover, and through
that mover ultimately by love ofthe prime mover, so too sublunary things
are motivated by love for the prime mover, even if the motivation is
increasingly remote as one travels down the natural hierarchy'."' In these '
three representative accounts, natural and celestial entities need some kind
of motivation or inspiration in order to complete their realization. It must
be emphasized, however, that no concern is shown in these accounts to
explain why things have the natures they do. Indeed, Kahn goes so far
as to say that god plays no role in the determination of natures beyond,
perhaps, the outermost sphere.'^
Yet there is no hint in our EE passages that god's role is to complete
natures we possess from birth in some yet unrealized form. Not only is the
language of imitation and love absent from the discussion, but a cosmic
magnet cannot answer the question in [A]. If god's role is to draw out
potentialities, luck will remain the only explanation as to why the naturally
fortunate, as well as the rest us of us, have faculties that enable the individual to obtain what is good.
Still, the significance of our EE's passages would be limited, were it an
irnmature work. There is, however, indication that his discussion here conforms to his conception of god articulated elsewhere in the corpus. This is
not the place to provide a repudiation of the 'cosmic magnet' view of
god and a defense of the view implied in the EE. But I would like to
^'" Charles Kahn, 'The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristode's Teleology' in A. Gotthelf
{ta.), Aristotle on Nature and Living Things [VmshuT^, 1985), 183-205 at 184.
"' Harold Joachim, On Coming-to-be and Passing-Away {Oxford, 1922), 256.
^''' David Sedley, 'Metaphysics Lambda 10' in M. Frede and D. Charles (eds.), Aristotle's
Metaphysics Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, 2000), 327-50 at 333.
"' Kahn, 'The Place ofthe Prime Mover' (n. 34 above), 186.
377
378
^^ Fot the atgument that Atistotle's teleology is centered on man, see David Sedley, 'Is
Atistotle's Teleology Anthtopocenttic?', Phronesis 36 (1991), 179-96.
379
celestial being's, there is some purpose to, and goodness in, one's life and
death. But this would not be, were it not for god. Our natures allow us to
contribute to the common good only insofar they are all directed to this
single end (1075al8-9): 'For such a principle,' i.e. the common good, 'is
the nature of each of them' (1075a22-3).
Once again, there is no mention of desire or inspiration in this chapter;
rather, the household analogy implies that the common good is established and sustained by activities that are 'ordered' by god. God appears,
then, to be a final cause the ultimate end that explains the character of
inherent final causes without being a catalyst for fulfillment. Inherent
final causes have their end ultimately in god, insofar as the fulfillment of a
creature's nature allows it to participate in the divine.
That god is responsible for the character of natures is exemplified in the
case of natural good fortune. In the final chapter of the , Aristotle urges
us to judge what is appropriate to have and do by asking what best leads to
the contemplation of god (1249b20). Evidently, the virtuous and noble
are those who consciously make god the end of their activities and pursuits. But they are not the only ones oriented in this manner. The fortunate may not consciously use god as their reference, but they are lucky, I
submit, just because they have natures directed toward god nonetheless.^'
^" Earlier drafts oFthis paper were delivered at the 2011 meeting oFthe Ohio Philosophical
Association at the University oF Dayton and the 11th annual meeting oF the Ancient Philosophy Society at Sundance, Utah. I owe special thanks to my two commentators, Priscilla
Sakezles and Tom Tuozzo For their helpful criticisms. I am deeply grateful For the comments and advice oF Larry Jost, Fred Miller, and the anonymous reviewers, which helped
advance this paper a great deal.
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