POLICE POWER

PASEI v. Drilon
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of
Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension
of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3
of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines
involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted
the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare
and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power.
RULING: [Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. The petitioner has
shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests
on substantial distinctions.
Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of
the Constitution.

Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause
is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatures
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely
an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the
due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us
to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature,
with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not
interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from
no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
LUTZ v. ARANETA
GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
98 PHIL 148
FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of

Antionio Ledesma,
sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under
section 3 of the CA 567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for
it provided for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such
enactment is not being levied for a public purpose but solely and exclusively for the aid and
support of the sugar industry thus making it void and unconstitutional. The sugar industry
situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent threat of loss and needed to be
stabilized by imposition of emergency measures.
ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the equal protection
clause, the purpose of which is not for the benefit of the general public but for the
rehabilitation only of the sugar industry?
HELD: Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern,
it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for
its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed
to fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means
provided in the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If
objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may
not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the
implement of the state's police power.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners,
vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
FACTS: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of
retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long
as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed
the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who re actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to
rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they
petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as
they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is
violative of the Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full
of just compensation
HELD
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution
itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to
the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However,
there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is
only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have
the right to review with finality the said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other,
what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain.
This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The
initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at

the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full
owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
FACTS: This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of
offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case
moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the
trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the
said statute insist the following ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated
the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt
ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only
acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
DECS v San Diego 180 SCRA 533 (December 21, 1989)
Facts: The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and
he was denied admission to take the test for another time by the petitioner under its rule that
a student is allowed only to take the NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student
shall not be allowed to take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on
academic freedom and quality education in his petition for mandamus before the court.
Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule of the petitioner as an arbitrary
exercise of police power, depriving respondent of his right to pursue medical education thus
this petition for review before the higher court.

process.
Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of
police power.
Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise
of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The
subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor
is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
The State needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing
students to the course where he is best suited through initial tests and evaluation. The
decision of the respondent judge was reversed.
CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the
constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the
merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation of
establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the
total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police
power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the
benefit of the public.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery
to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires
payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real
property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit,
then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the
state.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than
12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and
motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-inintervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators.
The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on
cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,

restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that
under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement,
as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having
a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is
justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as
such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling,
but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon.
City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All
three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular
illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to
be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right
to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the

desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained
by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing
short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at
stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the
right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing
the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a
portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating

innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional Law Police Power)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the
use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure
to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways.
Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that
their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is
unconstitutional.
HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an
exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed
regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures
designed to ensure public safety.
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor
of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies (the brief history of
the Pandacan Oil Terminals is here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002,
which period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision. The SC ruled
that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including
Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc.
(Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the
oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought
to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of
its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes
and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated.

Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated
police power to local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city
council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city.
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful
subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila.
The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this
objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to
commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or
wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As
long as it there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is
vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public
require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the
Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must
be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to
protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in
view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which
reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as
present and future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of
the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the
police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.
Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to
be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which amounts to taking without
compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not

only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of
Manila. However, the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the
businesses and industries in the zones it established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have
invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in
income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument has no merit. In
the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to
promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary
only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property
is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise
of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose
and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health
and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious
use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the use of the
property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable
taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the affected
area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable
uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled
out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with
buildings and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and
Health and Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty
of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification
are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. The law may treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from
another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to prevent is a
catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the
surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or
explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a
fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The
enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these
terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the
ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was
enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses
and industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it
contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress.
However, a brief survey of decisions where the police power measure of the LGU clashed
with national laws shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were clearly
and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies

were so patent that there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited
merely gave DOE general powers to establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and
storage of energy resources and to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry
which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction,
ensure continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers can be exercised without
emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers are
pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances
for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter.
Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not
categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the
Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing
and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to
ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no
showing how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila
of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land
uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of
the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of
control over them. The President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot
interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their
authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion
exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials
must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.
MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,530 SCRA 341 (2007)
Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport
System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited
the need to remove thebus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be
removed, alleges that EO should be declaredunconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the
possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals
Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power
Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone
legislative power. In light of the administrativenature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA
cannot validly order the eliminationof the respondents terminals.
Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact
increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by
the President andadministrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government under an express delegation by the LGC of 1991.
Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the

thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of
police power.
On Constitutional Law, The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws
are enacted with due deference to rights.

EMINENT DOMAIN
October 31, 1919 G.R. No. L-14355
THE CITY OF MANILA,vs.CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
Facts: On Dec. 11 1916 presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands
used by the Chinese Community as their cemetery be expropriated for an extension of Rizal
Avenue. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila alleged that if expropriation would take effect, it
would disturb the resting places of the dead, and would require a large sum of money to
transfer the bodies; furthermore, the expropriation was unnecessary as a public improvement.
Plaintiffs theory however is that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has
authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function
of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither
the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are
mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the
land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant
for its value.
Issue: If the City of Manila may expropriate the lands used as cemetery for extending Rizal
Avenue.

determine the necessity of appropriating private property for a particular improvement for
public use, and may select the exact location of the improvement. The questions of utility of
proposed improvement, the extent of public necessity for its construction, the expediency f
constructing it, the suitableness of its location and the necessity of taking the land for its site
are all questions exclusive for the legislature to determine. The taking of private property for
any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the
state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of
the legislature to delegate.
WON the cemetery is private or public is immaterial. The Court opines that it is difficult to
believe that even the legislature would adopt a law providing expressly that such places under
such circumstances should be violated. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us
in life becomes sometimes the sad duty of the living, but except in cases of necessity or for
laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave should be maintained. In the present case, even
granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record shows no
proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that the
adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which should
answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by
utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT tenable
government offices to call private parties. Their subscription agreement prohibits the public
use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use.

Held: Under Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the City of Manila), the city has the
authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. However, said charter contains no
procedure by which the authority may be carried not effect, and how eminent domain may be
exercised. The Court then opines that the power of the court is not limited to determining
WON a law exists permitting the plaintiff to expropriate. The right of expropriation is not
inherent in municipal corporations, and before it can exercise such some law must exist to
confer such power. When the courts determine the question, they must find only that a law
exists for such a reason, and that the right or authority being exercised is in accordance with
the law. In the present case, there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to
the City of Manila: 1, the land must be private, and 2,the purpose must be public. If the court
upon trial finds that neither exists or either fails, it cannot be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law.

The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk
lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of
rates. On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the
conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the
PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not
only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public,
in competition with the business of the PLDT. Soon after, it disconnected the trunk lines being
rented by the Bureau. Republic commenced suit against the defendant, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a
contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone
system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might
consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to
restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.

The necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is not a judicial question.
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly

ISSUE: Whether the courts may compel PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic.

commenced in 1959.
HELD: We agree with the court below that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract
where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the
contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual
system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by
violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the
Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not
compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection
of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation
of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's
lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not
much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and
benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the
interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.

Republic vs. Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, GR No L-20620, Aug 15,1974

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, Castellvi commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued
that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of
the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemner upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

The essential elements of the taking are:

(1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period,
(3) and under warrant of legal authority,
(4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as
(5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease. The taking of the Castellvi property should
not be reckoned from 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the
contract of lease, and that just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not
be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. Under Section 4 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to
be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The "taking" of the Castellvi
property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be
reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
In expropriation proceedings, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for
which it would bring the most in the market. 17 The owner may thus show every advantage
that his property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold
for in the market may be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may also show that the
property is suitable for division into village or town lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemner has
entered and occupied the property as lessee.

The decision: (1) Castellvis lands are declared expropriated for public use; fair market value
is at P5/sq m;(3) Republic must pay Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just compensation
for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of
P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the
provisional value of the land, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959
until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (4) the Republic must pay appellee
Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land
that have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that she
withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands,
with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is
made or deposited in court; (5) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and (6)
costs against appellant.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings

PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]

Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction
of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be
destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to
their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for
the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor
turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently
convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency
is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless
of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or
interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958,
Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion
of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner
then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership
and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it
was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for
the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its
consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the
government.
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may

properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any
deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner
of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at
this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
PHIL. PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
print space of not less than page for use as Comelec Space from 06March1995 to
06May1995. COMELEC Commisssioner sent letters to publishers informing them of the
same. PPI seek to declare the resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking
private property w/o just compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen argues that even if the
questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the
same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. COMELEC
Chair stated that they will clarify the resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and not to
compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of deprivation of use w/o
compensation of newspaper?
Decision: To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to taking
of private personal property for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers
whether in cities or in non-urban areas.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for
the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. It has not been suggested that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship
between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec
must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of just compensation.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [No. L-48685,September 30, 1987]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, March 01, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide
housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five
(25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667
sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were
valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by
the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The
NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing the total
market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines the
policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation.
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of
possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property
without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the
orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224, as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use,
just compensation, and due process.
Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people,
bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power of eminent
domain.
(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be
expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by
government assessors.
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were
immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the
respondent judge.
Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the middle
and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking
is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at
present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls within the confines of public use.
(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much
thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of
discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave
undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right to use,
enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of
the common good.
(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259,
and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were
declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation

means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitute for just
compensation.
(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of
property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of
a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.
Manosca vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig.
Metro Manila (492 square meters.) When the parcel of land was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Which was approved.
So on on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a
complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, are
religious entity.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the said parcel of land is for the purpose of public
use
Held: Petition is DENIED.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from
the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them
reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square
meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation

in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998)
G.R. No. 127820
292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two
parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living
conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized
housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of
1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private
respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession
of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15%
of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an
ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion
to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted
by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance,
the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by
Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is
obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being
the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,

Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs Linsangan (November 22, 2004)

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Florencia Baluyot is authorized by the Manila Memorial Park Inc. (MMPI) to sell burial
lots to those interested in purchasing. Herein respondent Atty. Linsangan was approached by
Florencia with an offer to sell to the former a lot that she alleges to have already been
previously sold but the owner thereof has cancelled and thus, Atty. Linsangan shall only
continue the payment thereof amounting to P95,000, Atty. Linsangan agreed and payed an
initial P35, 000. Thereafter, Florencia advised Atty. Linsangan that there were changes in the
contract and that she needed him to sign a new contract stipulating the total price of P132,
000 but Florencia assured Atty. Linsangan that he would only pay the agreed P95, 000. In the
new contract, Atty. Linsangan acceded that he has read and understood all the stipulations
therein. The payment was made in installments for two years which Atty. Linsangan
completed, however, after two years, Florencia informed Linsangan that their contract was
cancelled and offered a different lot, Atty. Linsangan refused the offer and filed a suit for
breach of contract against MMPI and Florencia. MMPI avers that Florencia acted beyond the
scope of her authority as MMPIs agent since the latter did not allow her to renegotiate
existing contracts but only to sell new contracts. Atty. Lnsangan on the other hand argues that
MMPI should be liable for the acts of its agents.
Issue: Whether or not MMPI is liable for the acts of Florencia
Held: NO. The SC ruled that Florencia acted outside the scope of her authority as agent of
MMPI and Atty. Linsangan failed to ascertain the authority given to Florencia especially that
their agreement on the second contract had a different stipulation than what he and Florencia
agreed upon. Moreover, Atty. Linsangans signature over the new contract signifies his
agreement thereto and serves as a form of ratification for the acts of Florencia which were
outside the authority given her. As such, the SC ruled that the principal cannot be held liable
for actions of agents outside the scope of their authority when such acts are ratified by the
principal himself. On the part of MMPI, they did not ratify Florencias acts, nor did they know
of such actions.
Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5 parcels of
land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two
voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFCs land
and P164.40 million for HPIs land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot
agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed
before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a
decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government,
through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFCs account and P45M into
HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers
under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI.

The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price
should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at
P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the
CA, the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was just compensation.
FACTS:
No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency
of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the
cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the
RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was given
chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR
failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave
them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch
as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is
not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved
from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the
guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land
shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and
HPIs lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip,

pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital
funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the residential and/or
industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of the
property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such
factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location.
Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as
computed with 12% interest per annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just
compensation or P138 million.
TAXATION
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works
"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived
from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works
particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the
feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition,
were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and
which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important
premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose
because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the
roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied
by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose
of justifying an expenditure of the government?
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of
the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of
the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community,
and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the
public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the
public.
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with
the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance
imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and
penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the
Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in
various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No.
3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law
authorizing it.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and
authorize what amounts to double taxation.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its
discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed.
It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose
occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within
the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be
invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely
recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted
with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.
Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the
law authorizing it.
REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC v. The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The
COURT of TAX APPEALS. G.R. No. L-19201. June 16, 1965
FACTS:
M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was
actually spent for the purpose intended.
A year later, M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. CIR issued an assessment for
donee's gift tax against the parish, of which petitioner was the priest.
Petitioner filed a protest which was denied by the CIR. He then filed an appeal with the CTA
citing that he was not the parish priest at the time of donation, that there is no legal entity or
juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should
not be liable for the donee's gift tax and that assessment of the gift tax is unconstitutional. The
CTA denied the appeal thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner and the parish are liable for the donee's gift tax.
RULING: Yes for the parish. The Constitution only made mention of property tax and not of
excise tax as stated in Section 22, par 3. The assessment of the CIR did not rest upon
general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise
of the privilege of receiving the properties. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on
property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
No for the petitioner. The Court ordered petitioner to be substituted by the Head of Diocese to
pay the said gift tax after the CIR and Solicitor General did not object to such substitution.
Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to
annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to
P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial
Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of
the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor
used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus

the property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable or educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of
the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption
from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the
ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used
as incidental to education (residence of the director).
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was
to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the
peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital
of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their
business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or
voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act. provision for
the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry. provision against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business Lao
Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty
and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences

between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing
dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislatures target in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of
the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in
that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his
living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on
him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country,
the alien may become the potential enemy of the State. The alien retailer has shown such
utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic
control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
**Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v Torres 231 SCRA 335 (1994)
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees
of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing
the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner,
excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees.
However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to
represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical
and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position
papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and
related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing
the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers,
analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who
rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal.
PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition
alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was
under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of

petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to
consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the
parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner
was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it
so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But
it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides,
petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of
Labor.
YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
148 SCRA 659
Date of Promulgation: March 20, 1987
Ponente: Cruz, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held
unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.
Facts:
13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for
violating Executive Order No. 626-A
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be
subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat
Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit (carabao). This amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of
carabaos of age.
Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedeas
bong of P12,000.00
Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the bond;
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed
validity
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the
TC.
Petitioners arguments:
1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries.
2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.
Issue/s:
WON EO 626-A is constitutional.
Ruling:
EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond cancelled
and the amount thereof is ordered restored to petitioner.
Ratio:
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to
review of the Supreme Court.
..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional

questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.
Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution.
On the presumption of constitutionality
Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted
On due process
Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation.
Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient; flexibility
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing intended as safeguard against
official arbitrariness.
On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A
The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by Pres.
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the
exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.
But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the extraordinary power
Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A
Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the
same with the fit between means and objective test)
1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.
Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation of
carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of carabaos.
Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a
change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of
such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the
change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both
petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had
attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte
waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory
questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the
right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial
and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and

(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement
that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. petitioner charged in violation of
Omnibus Election Code (gun ban) invokes deprivation of Constitutional right on due process
of law.
Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the
national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested
petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner
ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress. On
his way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police
search the car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was
referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a party to the
charge but was invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how
Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate
Arellano from the charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec
however issued a resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against petitioner.
Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence this petition
contending that the search on his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded as
respondent in the preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due process was
violated.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.
Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant
duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of (1) moving
vehicles (2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at police or
military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a
visual search, and (4) Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the
basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant
matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search without warrant could
only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched. Because there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the policemen to
suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted, such action constitutes an
unreasonable intrusion of the petitioners privacy and security of his property in violation of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of
petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to
the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among
those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected
by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared
the warrantless search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as
evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.

CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging
rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were
ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted
the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said
that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may
partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a
quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the
supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may
be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give
any notice to the petitioner
ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS
- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered
by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles
in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is
a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of which

are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible to the
respondents.
ISSUE : WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR
HELD NO.
The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi - judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or
recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief
claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court
have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary
to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but t he
evidence must be
substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their
duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (6)
The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does
not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for
the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is grant ed, and the
entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA
644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal
failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72
hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required
respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to filea
reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint AdministrationFaculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing
the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students
were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found

respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of
unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a
TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining
petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of
hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken
out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally
unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of
the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on theincident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusationwere adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition
under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the
trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine
that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a
question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of anyaccusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee orofficial designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
CUDIA VS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudias class had a lesson examination in their Operations
Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said
teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his
next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit
late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when
he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never

dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of
said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the
explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior
tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class
was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that
on record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not
dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that
besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed
from said class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact
dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed
late because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit
their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the
teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was
initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two
students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered
a class; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of saying that his class was dismissed
a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the
Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed
late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their
cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9)
cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were
heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their
vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules
(Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a
practice of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain
their vote. This is to avoid the tyranny of the minority. After the chambering, the dissenter
was convinced that his initial not guilty vote was improper, hence he changed the same and
the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMAs holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers
requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the
Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
where it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff.
But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said
petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should
avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudias petitions is proper.

2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
HELD: Mandamus is not proper
Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudias prayer that PMA should be compelled to
reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts,
even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudias
rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act.
Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA,
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was
sought by Cudia to perform is within PMAs academic freedom as an educational institution
and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.
Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its
responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the
Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to determine
whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter
of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute
rule.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have
surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and
punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less, question it in the
courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at
PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the
educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a
civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests
are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is
entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the
PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia
questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such
controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.
(Authors note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the
Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion,
PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when
it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of
Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the
PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the
entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor
case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him
and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the
witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the
HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty

verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the
SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent.
A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then,
upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a
review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President.
Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb
the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used
by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor
Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering
that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of
Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or
dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act
No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be
delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over

the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic
freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case,
based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any
form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA
as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the
Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.