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Citizenship
EN BANC
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
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Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January
2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and
to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth
of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC
on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim,
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marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley,
and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were
totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No.
04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January
2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and
to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs
certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
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for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same
Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R.
No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken
cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross
denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully
informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or
should be elected to occupy the highest government post in
the land.
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affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist
of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the
phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing
of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not
include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for
President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
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Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C.,
described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
[6]
Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number
to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to
include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could
be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was
active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his
private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over
the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by
and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property,
personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the
19th century to include political citizenship, which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the
right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.
[11]
The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the
modern welfare state as it so developed in Western
Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
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the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be
governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the
first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
[20]
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by
the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens
of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for
the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly
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referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris,
December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who
was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on
the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to
include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a
native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which
period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight
was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at
the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise
also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the
Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this
later.
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Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
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For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,
under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that
aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
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father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17
May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged
marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to
Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
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admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou,
the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and
the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from
1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record
about such fact in the Records Management and Archives
Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that
Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude,
or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person
at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It
would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
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voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of
birth, a will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out
in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted,
the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit
1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be
relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon
it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing
that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as
required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the
data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any
event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
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any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to
claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing
for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a
notary public or other competent official) or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article
172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
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"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural
child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code,
even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws'
or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize
the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well
apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the
child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private
and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions
must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of
civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus
[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate
the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members
of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for
the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
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Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the
Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family,
provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became
the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction,
however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil
law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good
law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence
could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by
the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
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2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at
St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
Declarant
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became
engaged while they were students at the University
of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first
child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three
children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II,
and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo
St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945,
except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed
with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,
[42]
this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless
we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
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the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie
Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with
a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to
Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage
between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by
no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his
parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to
each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an
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already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case
was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was
the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no
valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio
was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with
an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio,
Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin,
based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary
for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply
repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
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The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental
law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines
are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There
utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
In Sum
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substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in RomualdezMarcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,)
and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure
to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
antecedents
of
these
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material representation contained therein is false. It found that
the evidence adduced by petitioner Fornier is not substantial,
and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material
representation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the
COMELEC en banc having been denied, petitioner Fornier
filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to this Court via a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They
assert that only this Court has jurisdiction over the issue in
light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar
petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined
by the Court during the oral argument, are as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions
to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy of
Presidential candidates;
(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
petitions of (a) Tecson, et al., (b) Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
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the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue
of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as
follows:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, the following facts have been
established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either in
the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the
admissions of the parties, through their counsels, during the
oral arguments:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
CONSTI 2 24
Citizenship
Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that
the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Issues
The issues raised in Forniers petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to
disqualify FPJ as a candidate for President on the
ground that FPJ is not a natural-born Philippine
citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the
qualifications of all candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C
of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function
to [E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election. The initial
determination of who are qualified to file certificates of
candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-
CONSTI 2 25
Citizenship
encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The
conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial
determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run
for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelecs
certified list of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified
candidates
making
the
conduct
of
elections
unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out every
presidential election dozens of candidates for president who
are deemed nuisance candidates by the Comelec.[5]
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also
empowers the Comelec to [D]ecide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x
x. The power to decide all questions affecting elections
necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate
possesses the qualifications required by law for election to
public office. This broad constitutional power and function
vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any
situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any
legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born
Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenegger, runs for
President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to
wait until after the elections before such candidate may be
disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on Disqualification of Candidates of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, a voter may question before the
Comelec the qualifications of any candidate for public
office. Thus, Rule 25 provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does
not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
CONSTI 2 26
Citizenship
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine
the qualification of a candidate for President only after the
elections would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would
have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before
he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not
decided immediately after the election, an alien who wins the
election may even assume office as President before he is
finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution
says when it provides that [N]o person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.[9] The clear and specific language of the
Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a naturalborn citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for
President is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be
decided before the election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship
at the time of his birth depends on the Constitution and
statutes in force at the time of his birth. [10] FPJs citizenship at
the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939,
determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.[11] If a person has to perform an act, such as
proving in an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an
event subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to
Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural born citizen.
[12]
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship
of the father. A child born within wedlock is presumed to be the
son of the father[13] and thus carries the blood of the
father. Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in
Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, by the fact of legitimacy, automatically follows the
citizenship of the Filipino father.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at
birth of blood relation to any father unless the father
acknowledges the child at birth.[14]The law has always required
that in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.[15] The only legally known parent of an illegitimate
child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child
who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, unless
the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the
illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only
legally known parent - the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because
the filiation (blood relation of illegitimate child to the father) of
the child to the Filipino father is established in accordance with
law, the child follows the citizenship of the Filipino father. This
gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and
CONSTI 2 27
Citizenship
illegitimate children, to the provision of the 1935 Constitution
that [T]hose whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines[16] are
Philippine citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
CONSTI 2 28
Citizenship
Philippine citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated
that before the illegitimate Vietnamese children may be
considered Filipino citizens it is necessary in every case
referred to that such paternity be established by sufficient
and convincing documentary evidence.[18]
Proof of Filiation
CONSTI 2 29
Citizenship
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of
the Philippines has the burden of proving his Philippine
citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for
President because he is, among others, a natural-born
Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a naturalborn citizen.Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen
is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a
natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election
as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the
Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan: [23]
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to
prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No
presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in
favor of the State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate
child, having been born out of wedlock, the burden is on FPJ
to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. An
illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any
father. Such blood relationship must be established in the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine
citizenship of a person because citizenship is not a private
right or property, but a matter of public and State
interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although
illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot
bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status
of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a naturalized
citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a person as a
natural-born Philippine citizen just because the private party
litigants have admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the
Legitimation
Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation
took effect as of the date of marriage. There was no
retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the
legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights
of a legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the
natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married
on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born more than one
year earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe
was FPJs natural father, the effects of legitimation did not
retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to
the legitimated child. As the Court held in Ching Leng:[25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to
regulate therein political questions. Hence, apart from reproducing
the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship, the Code contains
no precept thereon except that which refers all matters of
naturalization, as well as those related to the loss and reacquisition of
citizenship to special laws. Consistently with this policy, our Civil
Code does not include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28
of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship. (Underscoring in
the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley legitimated FPJ, such legitimation did not vest
retroactively any civil or political rights to FPJ.
CONSTI 2 30
Citizenship
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a
Spanish citizen who came to the Philippines from Spain.[26] To
benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris
of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that
Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of
the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is established that
Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of
the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he is presumed to have
acquired Philippine citizenship under the Treaty of Paris of
1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. [27] Being an inhabitant and
resident
of
the Philippines on 11 April
1899 is
the
determinative fact to fall under the coverage of the Treaty of
Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo
Pou was a Philippine inhabitant and resident on 11 April
1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines is
not known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899,
then he could not benefit from the mass naturalization under
the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of
1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo Pou was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus,
there can be no presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a
Philippine citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the
son of Lorenzo Pou and the alleged father of FPJ, was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the
evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that
Allan F. Poe is a Philippine citizen. Nevertheless, there is no
need to delve further into this issue since the Court can decide
this case without determining the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
and Allan F. Poe.Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe
CONSTI 2 31
Citizenship
guarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality
so that he may not be stateless. The Convention does not
guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely the right to
acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal law. When
FPJ was born in 1939, he was apparently under United
States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his birth FPJ
also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving
his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in accordance with
Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being
stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim
he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
CONSTI 2 32
Citizenship
Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our fundamental law clearly
refers to legitimate children(Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off.
Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those
begotten in lawful wedlock, when the adopter, at least is the
father. In fact, illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the
illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336;
Santos Co vs. Govt of the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v.
Republic, supra; Gallofin v. Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953).Although, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter, pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code,
we have already seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely
those enumerated in Article 264, and do not include the acquisition
of the nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the
term children could not possibly refer to those whose relation to the
naturalized person is one created by legal fiction, as, for instance, by
adoption, for, otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child
would be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved
in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant Ching
Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation before us,
for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given the
status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite the
circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not
permit their legitimation. (Bold underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in
October 1958, was a unanimous decision of the Court En
Banc. Subsequent
Courtdecisions,
including Paa
v.
Chan[35] and Morano et al. v. Vivo,[36] have cited the doctrine
laid down in Ching Leng that the provision in the 1935
Constitution stating those whose fathers are citizens of
CONSTI 2 33
Citizenship
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not
a natural-born Philippine citizen since there is no showing that
his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at
birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a
Philippine citizen from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does not meet this citizenship
qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X.
Fornier. However, I vote to dismiss the petitions of Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo Antonio
Velez on the ground that their direct petitions invoking the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article
VII of the Constitution are premature, there being no election
contest in this case.
[1]
Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor, 45 O.G. No. 31, 1269.
[2]
[3]
17 SCRA 761.
[5]
[6]
[7]
Id., at 95.
[8]
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Ibid.
CONSTI 2 34
Citizenship
[13]
[14]
Garcia, supra., at p. 3.
[15]
[16]
[17]
Under the law, the following were foreigners (a) All persons born
of foreign parents outside of the Spanish territory; (b) Those
born outside of the Spanish territory of foreign fathers and
Spanish mothers while they do not claim Spanish nationality,
(3) Those born in Spanish territory of foreign parents or
foreign fathers and Spanish mothers while they do not make
that claim, (4) Spaniards who may have lost their nationality,
(5) Those born outside of the Spanish territory of parents
who may have lost their Spanish nationality; and (6), the
Spanish woman married to a foreigner. (Garcia, supra., p. 7)
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
Ibid., p. 30.
CONSTI 2 35
Citizenship
[24]
[25]
[26]
Velayo, supra, p. 31
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
Supra., which held that jus soli was never applied in the
Philippines.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
17 SCRA 788.
[35]
95 Phil 167.
[36]
[37]
[38]
29 Phil 606.
[39]
CONSTI 2 36
Citizenship
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with
those which this Code prescribes.
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of
another country, which is executed in accordance with the
law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and
which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
country, shall have the same effect as if executed according
to the laws of the Philippines.
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by
Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the
country where they may have been executed.
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
[40]
Article 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens
of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a
marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of
legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of
the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an
[42]
[43]
CONSTI 2 37
Citizenship
[44]
82 Phil. 771.
[45]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
[46]
21 SCRA 753.
[47]
68 Phil 12.
[48]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]
DECISION
CONSTI 2 38
Citizenship
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134
Amorsolo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were
never married because the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage contracted in China.
SO ORDERED.
CONSTI 2 39
Citizenship
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision.[5]
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CORRECTION OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT
CHULE Y. LIM FROM CHINESE TO FILIPINO DESPITE THE
FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING
RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING HER FATHERS
SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.[6]
To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite
as error respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections
and changes in entries in the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or
CONSTI 2 40
Citizenship
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be
filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.[10]
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory
requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of
respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with
said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age
of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,[11] citing
In re Florencio Mallare,[12] we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on
him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship
(U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May
12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,
1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could
any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino
CONSTI 2 41
Citizenship
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same
issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils.,[16] we held:
SO ORDERED.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Rollo, p. 16.
[7]
CONSTI 2 42
Citizenship
[8]
Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382 SCRA 22, 27,
G.R. No. 130277, May 9, 2002.
[9]
Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, Ching, Bar Matter No.
914, 1 October 1999, 374 Phil. 342, 349.
[10]
Id., at 350.
[11]
Supra.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
EN BANC
CONSTI 2 43
Citizenship
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
RAUL
R.
LEE, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these
twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon
The Facts
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to
his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who
claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered
void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally
thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most
number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously
was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according
to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch
CONSTI 2 44
Citizenship
the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is
cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections
held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the
canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following
votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor
of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a
(supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the
duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated
according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x."
Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
CONSTI 2 45
Citizenship
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim
petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus,
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated
on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition
was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter
alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior
to the filing of this petition."
CONSTI 2 46
Citizenship
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in
G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the abovementioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced
hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election." (Italics supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions
because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by
law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the
Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the
period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is
a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null
and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated
G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately
related in their factual environment and are identical in the
ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position
of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from
the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda.
CONSTI 2 47
Citizenship
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member
of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at
least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this
Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to
show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute
(R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing
him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of
his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
CONSTI 2 48
Citizenship
memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes
of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed
them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as
defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April
11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any
stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal
was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not
categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In
fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or
text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot coexist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even
be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should
be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best,
it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of
applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In
other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but
left it to the first Congress once createdto deal with the matter.
If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
CONSTI 2 49
Citizenship
the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully
rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such
proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the
requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult
to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact,
P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even
the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were
left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets
a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the
applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of
Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who
openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior
to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization he
insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches
of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the reestablishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent
and services to his people.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not
specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year's residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
CONSTI 2 50
Citizenship
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions
only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said
date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern
his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted.
So
too,
even
from
a literal
(as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of
the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should
such qualification be required at the time of election or at the
time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee
insists? Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence
should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and
at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li
Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not
end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one
raised during the oral argument34 to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as
a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to
CONSTI 2 51
Citizenship
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a
voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8,1995.37
CONSTI 2 52
Citizenship
could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to
retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision
of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus,
P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe right to reacquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture,
which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand,
said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in
favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious
and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent
of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA,
96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils
(Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the
existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their
husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the
rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship
by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are
considered essentially remedial and curative."
CONSTI 2 53
Citizenship
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given
the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to
the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take
effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there
is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and
there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of
Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is
that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were
not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his
American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes
outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.47
CONSTI 2 54
Citizenship
"had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless
in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship
but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." 50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December
19, 1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these
"judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American
citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from
running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified
for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the
words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its
assailed Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record
of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said
in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30,
1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo
was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme
Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the
Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
CONSTI 2 55
Citizenship
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317
because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be
entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an
election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds
us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo
filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only
on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period."
Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either
an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution 57 has
given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials."
Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that
Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the
Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317
obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we
ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of
office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed,
we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies
may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
CONSTI 2 56
Citizenship
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has
not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner
Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of
the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course
to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final
and subject to the final outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee,
is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in
1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not
yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending
motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued
an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in
1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8,
1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence
presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully
aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification
as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in
other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots
knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible.
If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and
not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee
was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of
the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of
Labo:
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Citizenship
issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19,
1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both
upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications
even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning number
of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics
supplied)
CONSTI 2 58
Citizenship
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding
that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo,
repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that
such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case.
But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not
directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship.
If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a
Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the
1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or
1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that
Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that
"informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with
the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, we
cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State
determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are
the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the
Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and
such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or
whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is
binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by
chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections,
should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for
being an American was publicly known." First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge.
Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post
facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the
Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his
nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How
then can there be such "public" knowledge?
CONSTI 2 59
Citizenship
we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue
here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and
applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws
relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the
naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters'
obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better
to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a
thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the
Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective
official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We
further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue
thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative
nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as
his unique situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his
CONSTI 2 60
Citizenship
merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled
by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to
find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant
retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time
he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could
have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his
consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running
for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of
the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development
of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in
the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape
the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot
seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication
to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land,
and sought to serve his people once more. The people of
Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took
an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid.
And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
Composed
of
Pres.
Comm.
Regalado
E.
Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring,
and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.
1
CONSTI 2 61
Citizenship
Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E.
Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe
and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that
"Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of
the deliberation and resolution of this case. However, the
Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to submit a
dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171.
3
11
12
211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).
13
14
15
Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six
other Comelec Commissioners
18
19
20
22
Supra, p. 794.
23
24
8.
Rollo, p. 60.
Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for
Frivaldo as "stray votes," and thus Lee was held as having garnered
the "highest number of votes."
10
"MEMORANDUM
TO : The Solicitor General
The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
The Director-General
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by
Presidential Decree or any other executive issuance, and the
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Citizenship
derivative administrative authority thereof, poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution.
Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al, G.R. No. 117577 (December 1,
1995).
26
27
28
"MANIFESTATION
The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following persons have
been repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June
8, 1995:
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900
2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901
3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902
4. Terry Herrera and
Antonio Ching 903
5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904
CONSTI 2 63
Citizenship
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions
No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they
shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
their certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the
required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five. "
30
31
Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).
"The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the
effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of
June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, x x x."
Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
32
33
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Citizenship
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law,
particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when
citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not
correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express
provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local
Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other local
positions should be a voter and to be a voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting
is not an issue here because he was allowed to vote and . he did in
fact vote and in fact, he was a registered voter." (TSN, March 19.
1996.)
Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines," as amended, provides for
the various qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino
citizenship
35
36
37
38
"Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the
election of any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of
the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2,
1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer
on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyally to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court,
respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of
the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC)."
Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161
SCRA 500 (May 25,1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
519 (April 2,1984).
39
id., p. 25.
42
44
Memorandum, p. 9.
45
46
47
51
CONSTI 2 65
Citizenship
Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596
(December 17, 1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA
290 (June 23, 1992).
52
53
55
42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971.
56
57
60
61
62
Supra, at p. 312.
63
64
65
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Citizenship
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a naturalborn citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960,
of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the
1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
CONSTI 2 67
Citizenship
Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June
5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. [3] He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson
III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision [5] dismissing
the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly
elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27,
2000.[6]
CONSTI 2 68
Citizenship
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his
status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as
follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
CONSTI 2 69
Citizenship
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of
the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time; [21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965
and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when
he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
CONSTI 2 70
Citizenship
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as
such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he
does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered naturalborn: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age
of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2
of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from
the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are naturalborn and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in
said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan,
holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its
CONSTI 2 71
Citizenship
discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains
a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a
member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
Main Issue
CONSTI 2 72
Citizenship
should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be
a natural-born citizen.
CONSTI 2 73
Citizenship
of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific
mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral
Tribunals of the two chambers of Congress shall be the sole judges
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members.[16] In several cases,[17] this Court has held
that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are
original and exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a
coequal branch of government. Their judgments are beyond judicial
interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.[18] In the elegant words of Mr.
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:[19]
The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct
perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It
comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of
repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the legal and common
definition
of
repatriation
is
the
reacquisition
of
the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with
grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal
definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But
an interpretation made in good faith and grounded on reason one
way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the
Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was
definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET
the power to be the sole judge of the qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent
any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the
law or any judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of
CONSTI 2 74
Citizenship
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case
of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit
to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. [25] Public
interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount
considerations in election controversies. [26] For it would be better to
err in favor of the peoples choice than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms.[27]
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of
our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal
of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices
to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote.[28]
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice
Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz is not a natural born citizen and, therefore, must be
disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
CONSTI 2 75
Citizenship
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights,
privileges, and immunities of citizens have given rise to some of the
most disputatious and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The
problem is compounded in this petition because citizenship is taken
up in connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their
representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III
asks this Court to deny respondent Teodoro Cruz the right to hold the
Office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
because he does not possess the constitutional requirement of being a
natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand,
insists that he is qualified to be elected to Congress considering that
by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on
April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita
Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed
Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the
service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the
US District Court of Northern District of California and was issued
his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American
citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the
US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act
providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who
lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission
in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The
oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of
his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR No. B-04628111) and
Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued
him an Identification Certificate.
CONSTI 2 76
Citizenship
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections.
As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and
copies thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House
of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on
Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.Costs de oficio.
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said Decision but the same was denied by the HRET in
Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing
the HRET Decision on grounds that:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private
respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did
not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondents acquisition of Philippine
citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when
it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could
not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
CONSTI 2 77
Citizenship
from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902
and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the
former with a proviso which reads:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein.
It was further held therein that under the said provision, every
person born after the 11th of April, 1899, of parents who were
Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this
country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the
Philippine Islands.
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William
McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our
first colonial charter or fundamental law, we were referred to as
people of the Islands, or inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, or
natives of the Islands and not as citizens, much less natural-born
citizens. The first definition of citizens of the Philippine Islands in
our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.[3]
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was
initially a loose or even non-existent qualification. As a requirement
for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more
strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine
citizenship could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus
soli doctrine.[4]
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
appear to have limited citizens of the Philippine Islands to resident
CONSTI 2 78
Citizenship
naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the
Constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:
Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS
WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE
TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be
rendering service to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces
of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship.
respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again
become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his
American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition
of Philipine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The
cardinal rule in the interpretation and construction of a constitution is
to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people who
adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are used according to
their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be
understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding
of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on natural-born citizens of the Philippines is
precise, clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can
construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not
phrased in general language which may call for construction of what
the words imply.
[6]
CONSTI 2 79
Citizenship
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or
legislation, the citizen concerned can not be considered naturalborn. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug [7] in the
instant case, concurred in by Justice Jose A.R. Melo: [8]
Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationality
upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. While an applicant need
not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming process required
by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, as amended), he,
nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal
act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total
and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be considered a natural-born
citizen under the first part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987
Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all or go
through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to
reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-born
citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior
declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this
view, the term natural born citizens could also cover those who have
been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris
and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by
the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the
Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935
Constitution had been elected to public office.)
The two dissenting Justices correctly stated that the stringent
requirement of the Constitution is so placed as to insure that only
Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of allegiance
and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch
of the government directly involved and given the delicate task of
legislation.
The dissenting opinion further states:
CONSTI 2 80
Citizenship
could still be appointed Justice of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a
lower court.[14]
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and
application of the requirement of being natural-born have become
more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution,[15] the President, members of the
National Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court,
Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the majority of members of the
cabinet, must be natural-born citizens. [16] The 1987 Constitution
added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born
citizens.[17]
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the
historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution. It shows a
more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of
natural-born citizen and citizenship in general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine
embodied in no less than the Constitution. Indeed, a deviation from
the clear and constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino
citizen is a matter which can only be accomplished through a
constitutional amendment. Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused
its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby
his citizenship has been restored. He can run for public office where
natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected to
high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for naturalborn Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.
[1]
[2]
Rollo, p. 36.
[6]
Id., at 69.
CONSTI 2 81
Citizenship
[7]
Id., at 13.
[8]
[9]
[11]
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private
Schools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic
are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire
period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
[13]
(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not
less than ten years;
(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal languages; and
(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of
not less than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the
Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;
CONSTI 2 82
Citizenship
(h) He must not be a citizen or subject of a foreign country whose laws do
not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
[21]
[22]
[14]
[23]
Ibid.
[15]
[24]
[25]
Id., at 450.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[16]
[29]
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
[18]
[30]
[19]
[20]
EN BANC
CONSTI 2 83
Citizenship
G.R. No. 176947
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused
Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for
violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18
August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August
2006 Resolution as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February
2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordoras motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law
Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false
assertions in the following items:
CONSTI 2 84
Citizenship
others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No.
9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was]
naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic]
Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the
above basic requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed
eligible for the office to which he seeks to be elected, when in
truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his
own statements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x
x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make
any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute
Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed
that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the
US government after Tambuntings father petitioned him through
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings
possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath
of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines
since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has
spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino
schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and
devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor
of Paraaque.
CONSTI 2 85
Citizenship
the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out
that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when
he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for
public office.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same
grounds and the same arguments in his complaint. In its
Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En
Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable
cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an
election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting
because of Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship and residency
requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare
Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present
petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making
untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc.
CONSTI 2 86
Citizenship
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his
latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate
containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding
one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand,
provides that violation of Section 74, among other sections in the
Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and
an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the
process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims that
because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino
and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification
showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections.
The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify
him from running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run
for public office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado
v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a
ground for disqualification from running for any elective local
position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it
is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines
to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
CONSTI 2 87
Citizenship
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another
state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just
a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
CONSTI 2 88
Citizenship
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
1avvphi1
CONSTI 2 89
Citizenship
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency
requirement because of Tambuntings naturalization as an
American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a
naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
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G.R. No. 199113
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for
certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed
the Order dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for
redetermination of probable cause.
1
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Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro.
In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of
the elements of the crime of falsification of public document
suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the
absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third
person in committing the act of falsification. Consequently, an
information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before
the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was
issued against the petitioner.
9
11
12
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In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner questioned the
foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He
argued that since his application had yet to receive final
evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila,
it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner)
who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he
applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.
13
14
17
19
20
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applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present
situation, it will still not work for petitioners cause for the simple
reason that he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had
already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before
he made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is
a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public
document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to
injure a third person be present. As to petitioners defense of
good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly
raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused
(petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an
affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion
for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to
have submitted his person to the said courts jurisdiction by his
voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that
the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioners motion after a judicious, thorough and personal
evaluation of the parties arguments contained in their respective
pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may
be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in
his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition
of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and
(2) the MTC properly denied petitioners motion for redetermination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Re- acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President
CONSTI 2 94
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such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of
oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born
Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and
"retain" for the second group.
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall
retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the
new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition
and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred
because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a
seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been
understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of
the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letterreply dated January 31, 2011 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI)
to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will
be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
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Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost
their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the
effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired
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to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together
with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such
policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225
without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation
more favorable to the accused following the time-honored
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. R.A. 9225, however,
is not a penal law.
23
25
28
26
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his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other
reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application
therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of
the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when
an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person,
who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is
literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October
8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
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Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POELLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POELLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS
AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora
Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974,
the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"
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to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of
2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to
secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the
OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate
of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
2
11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child
Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. Her two daughters Hanna
MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in
the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.
12
13
15
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they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of
their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the
proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in
the U.S.
20
33
21
22
23
35
25
26
28
30
37
38
39
41
42
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Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner
submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped
using her American passport.
43
44
45
46
47
48
50
51
54
57
58
60
61
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citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of reasoning,
petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost
that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.
63
64
65
66
67
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f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
69
70
72
74
75
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Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international
conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have
a nationality. According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are
necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines. He also stressed that there is no standard state
practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.
76
77
78
least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013
Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim
that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)
year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner,
Contreras' petition, docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited
the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's
2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that
she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for
said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's
residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date
when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was
then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.
85
81
82
86
87
88
84
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Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions
for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for
the Presidency. A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
and not the COMELEC.
91
92
101
95
97
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2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner
instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for
the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further
orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these
cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. PoeLlamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through
its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through
its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
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(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
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any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of,
or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
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into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the
evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also
in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or
the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from
becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in 4.
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certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of
certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and
its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position
which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against preproclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A.
No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.
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authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a
proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged
false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens
under the 1935 Constitution, they then cannot be citizens. As
the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted
that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it
cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden
to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
108
109
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same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only
1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the
oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the
majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.
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To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one
among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of
not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the
statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings
such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an
entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate
disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in
the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, this Court held that:
114
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents."
Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the
Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in
Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of
unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
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Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from
the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no
[more] need for amendment.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this
matter in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and
far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or people born in a
country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is
recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the
subject exhaustively.
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does
not recognize the child, is not unknown.
116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
"unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account, cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
author Jose Aruego who said:
117
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would
exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not
recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think
those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter]
does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
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illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother,
and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General
during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that
what was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit
recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of
Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views
were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect or
even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic.
What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to
convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they
are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in
terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy.
The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This
inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he
was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is
not silently silent, it is silently vocal.
118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers
"worked to create a just and humane society," that "they were
reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that,
given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are
not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention
to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those
who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this
path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration
are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII,
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account
of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
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confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must
be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of
such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee
is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:
119
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is
a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under
these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire
or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a
naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV,
Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status
is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the
object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of
the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
121
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 026-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.
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incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of
the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding
as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on
principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," such as
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness
and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination"
which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." These are the same core principles which underlie
the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
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3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to
obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure
that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of
our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by
the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international
law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of
the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules
applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have
been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
(Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of
the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been
born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of
that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention
nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article
15(1) ofwhich effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as
a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not
even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out,
the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America,
and State Practice in the United States.
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The
Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the
European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on
recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account
the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law"
are based not only on international custom, but also on "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and
which are "basic to legal systems generally," support the notion
that the right against enforced disappearances and the
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
"generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
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because the world community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically
ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the international
instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.
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140
repatriation was
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Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
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The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of
whether or not petitioner committed false material representation
when she stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May
2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016
elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10)
years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections.
Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016,
petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9
May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested
information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which
according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a
beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her
original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3.
an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
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The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even
listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's
domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral
arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence
and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus nonrevertendi. The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that
the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in
the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A.
No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC
relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC, Japzon v.
COMELEC and Caballero v. COMELEC. During the oral
arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC. Respondents contend that these cases decree that
the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.
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But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are
very different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, the
only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured
by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in
the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC did not involve a candidate
who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is
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years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner
that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A
closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as
the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is
no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino
who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing
the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable
the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
society upon their return to the country" in line with the
government's "reintegration
program." Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
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revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version
was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier
than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is
plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the
2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against
petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a
candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a
COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC, the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as
her period of residence where the required period was a minimum
of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and
see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty,
it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
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had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on
24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to
hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had
been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The
event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of
residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No.
9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6)
months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first
brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco
of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents
have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that
time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the
stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already
matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought
up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer,
which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six
( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case
was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she
could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
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statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even
hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it
covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on
her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office
does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which
is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must
be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications to run for public office.
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City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San
Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired
Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan.
[Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother
discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's]
adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its
intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by
petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of
petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the
questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of
discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1a\^/phi1
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions
and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution