Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest

Leonardo Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167
FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de
Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on
its way to Bulacan because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest product
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and
required the owner to explain. Private respondents
failed to submit required explanation. The DENR
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan
sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered
the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought
the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal,
private respondents filed a replevin case before the
RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC
granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
case contending, inter alia, that private respondents
had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The trial court denied their
motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was
under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has
consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative
processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before courts judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to
ones cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it
is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due
process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppels on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of
the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)

when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9)

when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against
the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained
by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended.
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action
in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper
course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
writ ordering the return of the truck

BAGUNU V. SPS.AGGABAO
FACTS: Spouses Aggabao filed a protest against the petitioners free
patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan,
Sto. Tomas, Isabela, pending before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it
(first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista. In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject
land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag. On December 12, 1961, Atty.
Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land with the Bureau of
Lands. On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale)
to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant.
The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the
same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the
petitioners free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership
over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale,
dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs
of one Rafael Bautista. On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled
that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application
since this lot belongs to the respondents. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration.
The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in determining the
identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are
controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the CIV
PRO SMC 3 petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258,
what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous
description of the lot sold as Lot 322.
On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional
Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties
respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land
claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties
respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the
petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot
322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the
petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322. The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed DENR Secretary Decision
applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a
technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings
of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary,
are entitled to great respect, if not finality.
ISSUE: WON CA is wrong in applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
HELD: NO. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must
refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the
latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is

suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body

for its view
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within
the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial
in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively
resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since
under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition
and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LAND OWNERSHIP

BELONGS TO DENR, NOT TO REGULAR COURTS.
In BAGUNU VS. SPS. AGGABAO, G.R. NO. 186487, AUGUST 15, 2011,
the question as to who between the DENR and the regular courts has
primary jurisdiction over matters of land ownership was clarified. Primary
jurisdiction over matters of public land ownership belongs to the Director of
Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over matters of private land ownership is exclusively vested with
the regular courts.
The pertinent portions of the pronouncement are quoted as follows:
The petitioner insists that under the law actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those
involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before
the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in
excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering
the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the
parties written agreement reflects their true intention. In the present case,
this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and
third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves
the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to
recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not
only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to
recover.
While these actions ordinarily fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve
controversies involving ownership of real property extends only
to private lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted
private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public
character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the
DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own
private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners act of
applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment
that the land covered by his application is a public land whose management
and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the
Bureau of Lands.

Xxxx
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property
is within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue
is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to
conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given

the public character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation
to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and management of public
lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands,
subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
Xxxx
With this clarification, it should now be clear that jurisdiction on
questions of land ownership is determined by the nature of the land
involved. If the land is still a public land, then the DENR has primary
jurisdiction. If the subject land is already a private land, the authority to
adjudicate matters of ownership belongs with the regular courts.
VILLAFLOR v CA
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In this rather factually complicated case, the Court reiterates the binding
force and effect of findings of specialized administrative agencies as well as
those of trial courts when affirmed by the Court of Appeals; rejects
petitioners theory of simulation of contracts; and passes upon the
qualifications of private respondent corporation to acquire disposable public
agricultural lands prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
FACTS:
The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty
(140) hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the
public domain, but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which he
acquired the property, have been in open, exclusive and notorious
possession of the same for sometime. After acquisition, petitioner asserts
exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.
In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit
Lumber Co. Inc. However, an Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights
was entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied
all the requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of
the property since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales
application in 1950 over the property to bolster his claim which the Bureau
of Land otherwise granted on the same year as proof of an Order of
Award issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned
and made several collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent.
However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner
no longer has any substantial rights to question the validity of acquisition of
the respondent and the subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau
of Lands.
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of
Natural Resources which likewise dismissed the petition. On July 6, 1978,
petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for "Declaration of Nullity of
Contract (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of
two parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages" at about the
same time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural
Resources to the Office of the President.
On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioners heir substituted in his
behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take
cognizance of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds that:
(1) petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the contract
and was estopped from proving its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements
were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his

causes of action were barred by extinctive prescription and/or laches. The

heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by
uphelding the lower courts ruling.
Not satisfied, petitioner's heirs filed the instant petition for review which the
court granted, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
First Issue: WoN the petitioner still has cause of action to pursue
claim of ownership over the property since his rights thereon was
already transferred and relinquished to the respondent by virtue of
the Deed executed thereon
NO. The court ruled that the petitioner no longer has a cause of action to
demand declaration of nullity over the rights conferred to respondents since
his claimed thereof was merely based on speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The petitioners claim of ownership and rights over the
property was negated by proof that he ceded the same to the respondent
by virtue of an Agreement on the Relinquishment of Rights which they
have executed. The petitioner insistence that the court erred in affirming his
cause is misplaced.
The finding of the court and the agency which acquire primary jurisdiction
over the petition, was accorded great weight by the court.
Second Issue: WoN the private respondent corporation is qualified to
acquire ownership over the land of public domain
As to the prohibition that xxxx corporation or association may not hold
alienable land of public domain except for lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares, that court declared that xxx where the applicant had,
before the Constitution took effect, fully complied with all this obligations
under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a Sales patent, there
would be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or release
the sales patent. The requirements for a sales application under the Public
Land Act for a corporation to acquire ownership of public domain, was
essentially complied upon by the respondent, hence no disqualification
exist not to extend and validly issued the confirmation of title over the land
in question to the respondent corporation.
All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private respondent
is the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against the holding of alienable
lands of the public domain by corporations. However, this Court settled the
matter, declaring that said constitutional prohibition had no retroactive effect
and could not prevail over a vested right to the land. Application for patent
for and in behalf of Nasipit has clearly no impediment, for they have proven
satisfactory compliance of the requirements of the law. Petition is
DISMISSED.
VIGILAR v AQUINO
G.R.
No.
SERENO,

180388:

January

18,

2011
J.:

SHORT FACTS: Respondent Aquino was invited to bid for a dike project in
Pampanga. Respondent eventually won the bid, and finished constructing
the dike. However, petitioners, government officials of the DPWH, refused
to pay respondent the contract price because the contract is void for
violation of P.D. 1445, for absence of an appropriation. Respondent brought
suit in the RTC, which petitioners sought to dismiss, raising the nonsuability of the state, as well as non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The lower court ruled for the validity of the contract and ordered payment
for the project. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
lower court and declared the contract invalid. However, the CA ordered the
Commission on Audit to determine the value of the services rendered by
respondent, and compensate him based on quantum meruit.
LONGER FACTS:

Angelito M. Twao, petitioner, then the OIC District Engr. of

DPWH 2nd Engineering District of Pampanga sent an Invitation
to bid to respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino (owner of A.D. Aquino
Construction and supplies). The bidding was for the construction
of a dike by bull-dozing a part of the Porac River at Brgy.
Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga.
On July 7, 1992, the project was awarded to respondent, and a
"Contract Agreement" has been executed between him and
petitioners for the amount of Php 1,873,790.69 to cover the
project cost. On July 9, 1992, the project was completed, and
respondent was issued a Certificate of Project Completion on
July 16 (signed by Yumul, Supan and Twao).
Respondent Aquino, however claimed that Php 1,262,696.20
was still due to him, but petitioners refused to pay. He thus filed
a complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages
before the RTC of Guagua.
Petitioners has the following contentions: that the Complaint was
a suit against the State; that respondent failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; and that the Contract of Agreement
was void for violating PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code)absent the proper appropriation and the Certificate of
Availability of Funds.
On November 28,2003, lower court ruled in favor of the
respondent. The lower court ordered DPWH to play Aquino the
amount for the completion of the project (Php 1,873,790.69Take note Aquino said 1.2 M na lng kulang), Php 50,000
attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision. It said that
Contract Agreement is declared null and void ab initio. CA
ordered COA to determine the total obligation due to Aquino on
a quantum meruit basis. [[quantum meruit definition fr. net=
When a person employs another to do work for him, without any
agreement as to his compensation, the law implies a promise
from, the employer to the workman that he will pay him for his
services, as much as he may deserve or merit]]
Dissatisfied with the Decision the Court of Appeals, petitioners
are seeking for the reversal of the appellate court's decision and
dismissal of the Complain in civil case

ISSUES:
First Issue: WON the case should have been dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
NO. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and doctrine of
primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. There are numerous exceptions,
and the pertinent ones in this case are 1.) Where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 2.)
Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by courts of justice. Also, the issues of the present case involve
the validity and enforceability of the Contract of Agreement entered into by
the parties which are questions of law and clearly beyond the expertise of
COA.

The government project was completed almost two decades ago, and the
public has benefitted from the work done by the respondent. The contractor
should be duly compensated. Not doing so would unjustly enrich the
government. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of
quantum meruit.
Third Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that the doctrine of nonsuability of the State has no application in this case
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating injustice to a citizen. This rule is not absolute
anyway.
PAL INC v NLRC
G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998
MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were
dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the currency
smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents
filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction. The NLRC issued a temporary
mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing
its Memorandum of dismissal.
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the
NLRC adopted the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly
dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of Discipline which was
declared illegal by this Court for the reason that it was formulated by the
petitioner without the participation of its employees (2) the whimsical,
baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents which "caused
them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are
left "with no speedy and adequate remedy at law' except the issuance of a
temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered not only to
restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts but also to require the performance of a particular act in any
labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary mandatory
power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC
erred in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to
issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under
Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor
disputes.
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
now petitioner, for one, cannot validly claim that NLRC cannot exercise its
injunctive power under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code on the pretext that
what NLRC have here is not a labor dispute as long as it concedes that as
defined by law, Labor Dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment.
Issues:
1.
2.

The Final Decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of
justice. Exhaustion of Administrative remedies does not apply, because
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does
not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve
the interpretation and application of law.
Second Issue: WON the CA erred in ordering the COA to allow
payment to respondent on a quantum meruit basis despite the latters
failure to comply with the requirements of PD 1445
NO. The Court has held that contracts which involved government projects
undertaken in violation ofn the relevant laws, rules etc. covering public
bidding , budge appropriations and release of funds were VOID for failing to
meet the requirements mandated by law. However, THE CONTRACTOR
SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR SERVICES RENDERED AND WORK
DONE.

WON the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue injunction order without

a complaint for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter
WON injunction is proper

Ruling:
1.
NO. It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor
dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the
present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private
respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed
with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. The
petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for
illegal dismissal. Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and
ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an
illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this
rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying
that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders.

2.
NO. An examination of private respondents' petition for
injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any
urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer.

then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from
the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private
rights or claims of herein Appellant.

An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law

considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of
settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the
parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise,
mediation and arbitration. Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of
extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due
consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted
which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case.

Homeowners association was not in the lawful exercise of its

predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the
road lots in question to vehicular traffic.

Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive

rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the
injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special
reason before the main case be regularly heard. The essential conditions
for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction
and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the
litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases
where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law
NEW SUN VALLEY VS SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY
GR 156686 July 7, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
Facts: The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV
Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096 entitled
"Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic. The New
Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), opposed the
ordinance and filed a Petition for a "Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the
RTC of Paraaque City. NSVHAI claimed that the implementation of BSV
Resolution No. 98-096 would:
(1) "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected
homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential purposes";
(2) that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would
provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles
of public places";
(3) and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of
the subdivision. The maintenance of peace and order in the residential area
was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision was regulated
by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was controlled
and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the
opening to public use of the roads in question.
Issue:
1.
2.

WoN the homeowners association has a right to the protection

of the law that would entitle it to injunctive relief against the
implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096
WoN the case falls under exceptions to non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies

Ruling:
1.

NO. The subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest

traffic in the area have already been donated by the Sun Valley
Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name
of, the City Government of Paraaque since the year 1964.
Having been already donated or turned over to the City
Government of Paraaque, the road lots in question have since

The barangay resolution had for its purpose not the opening of a
private road but may be considered merely as a directive or
reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road
which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.
2.

NO. We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an

exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this
doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale
for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.

Other rulings:
(1) Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective
Barangays. - The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor
concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component barangays
to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
(2) It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays
actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and
functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local
government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court
committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local
Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant
to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case
because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque.
(4) The local government units power to close and open roads within its
jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which
provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit
may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open
any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian,
and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.
FABIAN V DESIERTO
G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
REGALADO, J:
[Express Limitations to Power of Legislation; Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Court]
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was
engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin
was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects,
and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for

some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the
same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship,
private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent
of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed
an
administrative
complaint
against
private
respondent.

Petitioner Quarto denied the allegations claiming that he merely relied on

his subordinates when he signed the job orders and the inspection
reports. In contrast, the respondents admitted the existence of irregularities
and offered to testify and to provide evidence against the DPWH officials
and employees involved in the anomaly in exchange for their immunity from
prosecution.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct. After private

respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that
the private respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close
associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to
respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from
the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the

Sandiganbayan charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with
plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and
violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. Furthermore, the Ombudsman
granted the respondents request for immunity in exchange for their
testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan,
questioning the Ombudsmans grant of immunity in the respondents favor.
However, the Sandiganbayan, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction
and advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsmans actions
before this Court. Hence, this present petition.
In the petition, the petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have
included the respondents in the informations since it was their
inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission of
the alleged irregularities. By excluding the respondents in the
informations, the Ombudsman is engaged in selective prosecution which is
a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, there should be absolute
necessity for the testimony of the proposed witness and that he/she should
not appear to be the most guilty. The petitioner claims that the respondents
failed to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsmans evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives

or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
HELD:
NO. The Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of
quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule
of appellate procedure
for
quasi-judicial
agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC, without its concurrence.
QUARTO v OMB
October 5, 2011, G.R. No. 169042
Brion, J:
Doctrine:
Mandamus cannot be used if there is other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law
Facts:
Petitioner Quarto is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts
Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE), DPWH, Port Area, Manila.
As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team
(SIT) of the DPWH. The respondents are members of the SIT.
DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate
alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of
spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001.
DPWH-Internal Audit Service learned that the emergency repairs and/or
purchase of spare parts of DPWH service did not actually take place,
resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this tenmonth period alone.
DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit
charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees including the
petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly
benefited from the anomalous transactions with Plunder, Money
Laundering, Malversation, and violations of RA No. 3019 and the
Administrative Code.

1.

Issues:
1. Whether or not petition for certiorari and mandamus is filed
correctly
2. Whether or not an immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule
out a review by the Supreme Court of the Ombudsmans
exercise of discretion
Held:
No. As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus),
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these
remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown
that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed resolutions based
substantially on the same grounds stated in this present petition. Petitioner
did not file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents in the informations
before filing the present petition. These are adequate remedies that the
petitioner chose to forego and proceed to exercise certiorari.
Likewise, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition with
this Court within the sixty-day reglementary period from notice of the
assailed Ombudsmans resolutions. He did not do so, of course, since he
initially and erroneously filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the remedy from the
Ombudsmans orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65with this Court.
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel
the respondent to take action. It cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the
Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude
of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the
filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of
those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these
matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he
gravely abuses his discretion, which is when his action amounts to an

evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by

law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
2. YES.
Like all other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all
their acts must adhere to the Constitution. The parameters of the Supreme
Court, however, are narrow. In the first place, what the Supreme Court
reviews are executive acts of a constitutionally independent Ombudsman.
Also, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Since the determination of
the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly
factual in nature, the Court must thus generally defer to the judgment of the
Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or the
defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence
presently in his possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony he
needs to enable him to prove his case. It should not be forgotten, too, that
the grant of immunity effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of
the criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have incurred, as defined
in the terms of the grant. This point is no less important as the grant
directly affects the individual and enforces his right against selfincrimination. These dynamics should be a constant reminder to the
Supreme Court to tread softly, but not any less critically, in its review of the
Ombudsmans grant of immunity. The Supreme Courts room for
intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of
discretion is shown.
ST MARTINS FUNERAL HOME v NLRC,
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was dismissed from work by petitioner for
allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Hence, a complaint was filed for
illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner argued that respondent was
not its employee. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner declaring that
no employer-employee relationship between the parties and therefore his
office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. Hence the present petition alleging
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
WoN decision of NLRC are appealable to the CA
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court clarified and stressed that ever since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment is that the special civil action of certiorari was and still the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The concurrent
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be availed of only under
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
To further explain, (1) the way to review NLRC decision is through the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; (2) the jurisdiction of such
action belongs both to the SC and CA; but (3) in line with the doctrine of
hierarchy, of courts, the petition should be initially presented to the lower
court of the two courts, that is the Court of Appeals.

ROBERTO BORDOMEO v .COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 161596 : February 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:

workers, had a bargaining deadlock with the IPI management. This

deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI ordering a lockout.
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. dismissed the Company petition to declare the
strike illegal and ordered reinstatement of employees.
IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly in this Court through
a petition for certiorari but the Court dismissed its petition on the ground
that no grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance of the assailed
decisions. Considering that IPI did not seek the reconsideration of the
dismissal of its petition, the entry of judgment issued in due course on
January 19, 1994.
With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of
the DOLE Secretary, the Union, moved in the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board in DOLE, for their execution and likewise filed a so-called
Urgent Motion for Execution. Both motions were granted.
On July 11, 1995, IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued
in favor of the 15 employees by filing its Appeal and Prohibition with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order in the Office of then DOLE Undersecretary
Cresenciano Trajano.
On December 22, 1995,Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on
IPI appeal, recalled and quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, and
declared and considered the case closed and terminated.
Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the December
22, 1995 Order of Acting DOLE Secretary Brillantes.
On August 27, 1996, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing granted the
Motion for Reconsideration, and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution and declared the quitclaims executed by the employees without
the assistance of the proper office of the DOLE unconscionable for having
been entered into under circumstances showing vitiation of consent; and
ruled that the execution of the quitclaims should not prevent the employees
from recovering their monetary claims under the final and executory
decisions dated December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991, less the
amounts received under the quitclaims.
On September 3, 1996, and pending resolution of IPI motion for
reconsideration, Regional Director Macaray issued a writ of execution in
favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover
P3,416,402.10 pursuant to the order dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary
Quisumbing. Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the amount of P3,416,402.10
out of the funds of IPI with China Banking Corporation, which released the
amount. Hence, on September 11, 1996, the 15 employees represented by
Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of Judgment and Quitclaim/Release
upon receipt of their respective portions of the award, subject to the
reservation of their right to claim "unsatisfied amounts of separation pay as
well as backwages reckoned from the date after 15 March 1995 and up to
the present, or until separation pay is fully paid."
Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction of judgment and
quitclaim/release, Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in
behalf of the 15 employees but also in behalf of other employees named in
the notice of computation/execution, with the exception of the second
group, seeking another writ of execution to recover the further sum of
P58,546,767.83.
On December 24, 1997, Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27,
1996 order, denied IPI Motion for Reconsideration for being rendered moot
and academic by the full satisfaction of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution.
He also denied Atty. Arnado omnibus motion for lack of merit; and dealt with
the issue involving the June 5, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the
second group of employees, which the Court eventually resolved in the
decision promulgated in G.R. No. 164633.

FACTS:
IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union), representing the

Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas declaring

that the full execution of the case "completely CLOSED and

TERMINATED."
Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime
Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena assailed the July 4, 2001 order of
Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA denied the
petition.
SHORT FACTS:
The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under
the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional
Director Macaraya, They further submit that the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution issued in favor of the first group of employees, including
themselves, had only been partially satisfied because no backwages or
separation pay from March 16, 1995 onwards had yet been paid to them;
that the reduced award granted to the second group of employees was in
violation of the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution; that no writ
of execution had been issued in favor of the other groups of employees;
and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas thus committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to fully execute the December 26, 1990 and
December 5, 1991 orders. IPI counters that the petition for certiorari should
be dismissed for being an improper remedy, the more appropriate remedy
being a petition for review on certiorari.
HELD:
REMEDIAL LAW
An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to be taken to the Supreme Court within 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order raising only questions of law, was the proper
remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for
certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CA May 30, 2003 decision and
October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their
allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper.
The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not
warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari, unless the petition further
showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was not an adequate
remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari
cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, like an appeal in due course.
An appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of
discretion committed by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for
that purpose.
It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines
whether a special civil action forcertiorari can be a proper alternative
remedy. In Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v.
Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez, the Court held:
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy
does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from
making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally
beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all
other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ,
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain,

speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by
resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order
annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to
comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being
available as a proper remedy against an assailed order, because it is better
on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the
ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void
order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and
justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined,
because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of
the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the
court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise
of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of
justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
Even so, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for certiorari
to comply with the following requisites, namely: (1) the writ of certiorari is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari may be deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may
be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law;
(f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.Yet, a
reading of the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that the petition
does not come under any of the situations. Specifically, the petitioners have
not shown that the grant of the writ of certiorari will be necessary to prevent
a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice to them.
In dismissing the petitionerspetition for certiorari, the CA in effect upheld the
Secretary of Labor declaration in her assailed July 4, 2001 decision that the
full satisfaction of the writs of execution had completely closed and
terminated the labor dispute.
Yet, the petitioners have ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the CA for
doing so.There is no just cause to now issue the writ of certiorari in order to
set aside the CA assailed May 30, 2003 decision. There is nothing on the
records to support the allegation of petitioners that the Secretary of Labor
and Employment abused her discretion.
DISMISSED