Bok:978 1 4020 2119 0

PASSIONS IN WILLIAM OCKHAM' S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Volume 2
Editors
Henrik Lagerlund, Uppsala University, Sweden
Mikko Y rjonsuuri, Academy of Finland and University of Jyviiskylii, Finland
Board of Consulting Editors

Lilli Alanen, Uppsala University, Sweden
Ioel Biard, University ofTours, France
Michael DelIa Rocca, Yale University, U.S.A.
Eyj6lfur Emilsson, University of Oslo, Norway
Andre Gombay, University of Toronto, Canada
Patricia Kitcher, Columbia University, U.S.A.
Simo Knuuttila, University of Helsinki, Finland
Beatrice M. Longuenesse, Princeton University, U.S.A.
Calvin Normore, University of California, Los Angeles, U.S.A.
Aims and Scope

The aim of the series is to foster historical research into the nature of thinking and the
workings of the mind. The volumes address topics of intellectuai history that would nowadays falI into different disciplines like philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, etc. The monographs and collections of
artic1es in the series are historicalIy reliable as well as congenial to the contemporary
reader. They provide original insights into central contemporary problems by looking at
them in historical contexts, addressing issues like consciousness, representation and
intentionality, mind and body, the self and the emotions. In this way, the books open up
new perspectives for research on these topics.
PASSIONS IN WILLIAM OCKHAM' S

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
by
VESA HIRVONEN
University of Helsinki, Finland
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-6592-6
ISBN 978-1-4020-2119-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-2119-0
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Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
vii
ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introductory Remarks
1.2. Terms and Things
CHAPTER 2. THE PASSIONATE HUMAN BEING
2.1. The Human Being
2.2. Passions of the Souls
1
1
7
23
23
47
CHAPTER 3. SENSORY PASSIONS

3.1. Genesis of the Sensory Passions
3.2. What Are Sensory Passions?
75
75
100
CHAPTER 4. PASSIONS OF THE WILL

4.1. Genesis of the Passions of the Will
4.2. What Are Passions ofthe Will?
107
107
140
CONCLUSION
171
BffiLIOGRAPHY
185
NAME INDEX
201
SUBJECT INDEX
205
ABBREVIATIONS
a.
Br. summa Phys.
c.
d.
EZem. Zog.
Exp. EZeneh.
Exp. Periherm. Arist.
Exp. Phys. Arist.
Exp. Porph. Praed.
Exp. Praed. Arist.
FeS
ibid.
ido
OPh
Ord.
OTh
praeamb.
prol.
prooem.
q.
articulus
Brevis summa libri Physieorum
capitulum
distinctio
EZementarium Zogieae
Expositio super libros EZenehorum
Expositio in librum Perihermenias
Aristotelis
Expositio in libros Physieorum
Aristotelis
Expositio in Zibrum Porphyrii de
Praedieabilibus
Expositio in librum Praedieamentorum
Aristotelis
Francisean Studies
ibidem
idem
Opera philosophica. Guillelmi de
Ockham, Opera philosophica et
theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani
Universitatis S. Bonaventurae.
Ordinatio
Opera theologica. Guillelmi de Ockham,
Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura
Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S.
Bonaventurae.
praeambula
prologus
prooemium
quaestio
vii
viii
Quaest. Phys. Arist.

Quaest. variae
Quodl.
Rep.
SL
Summ. phil. nat.
Tract. corp. Chr.
Tract. praed.
Tract. praedest.
Tract. rei.
un.
ABBREVIATIONS
Quaestiones in fibros Physicorum

Aristotelis
Quaestiones variae
Quodlibet
Reportatio
Summa logicae
Summula philosophiae naturalis
Tractatus de corpore Christi
Tractatus de praedicamentis
Tractatus de praedestinatione et de
praescientia Dei respectu futurorum
contingentium
Tractatus de relatione
unicalunicum
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Several persons have helped me in various ways during the process
of writing this study. In the Department of Systematic Theology of
the University of Helsinki, 1 wish to express my greatest thanks to
Professor Tuomo Mannermaa who helped me to begin the study, and
to Academy Professor Simo Knuuttila who was my mentor in the
study. 1 am also grateful to Professor Heikki Kirjavainen, Professor
Reijo Tyorinoja, Professor Risto Saarinen, Doctor Taina Holopainen,
Senior Assistant aHi Hallamaa, the members of the research projects
led by Professors Mannermaa and Knuuttila, and all other people in
the Department of Systematic Theology who helped me over the
years. Among the people outside the Department, 1 wish to thank
Professor Arthur Stephen McGrade, Professor Girard J. Etzkorn,
Professor Lilli Alanen, Professor Marilyn McCord Adams, Professor
Calvin Normore, and Professor Mikko Yrjonsuuri for reading and
commenting on my texts. 1 also wish to thank Master of Philosophy
Margot Whiting for making my English more readable.
It was agreat pleasure to me to work in the inspiring
atmosphere of the Department of Systematic Theology of the
University of Helsinki. Part of the time 1 had the privilege to work as
an assistant in the Department, and at other times 1 received financial
support from the Academy of Finland, the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth
Foundation, the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, the Lehto Foundation,
and the Oskar Oflund Foundation. Bayrische Landeskirche, The
Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the ChanceHor of the
University of Helsinki supported my stays abroad and journeys to
international conferences.
Vesa Hirvonen
Helsinki, Autumn 2003
ix
CHAPTERONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
At the end ofthe 19th century, when the discipline called psychology
is said to have become "independent" 1, attention began to be focused
towards nominalistic philosophy from a point of view that can be
called psychological. At that time, Vienna, the capital of the AustroHungarian Dual Monarchy, was a center for several disciplines. It is
no wonder that it was there that the research conceming the
psychological themes of William Ockham and other nominalists
began. Karl Wemer (1821-1888), a Catholic, neo-scholastic scholar,
professor of New Testament studies at the Universty of Vienna
(1870), and a member ofthe Imperial Academy of Sciences (1874),
seems to have planned a history of medieval psychology. However,
only fragments of it were printed, among them the following articles:
'Der Averroismus in der christlich-peripatetischen Psychologie des
spteren Mittelalters' (1881), 'Die nominalisirende Psychologie der
Scholastik des spteren Mittelalters' (1881) and 'Die augustinische
Psychologie in ihrer mittelalterlich-scholastischen Einkleidung und
Gestaltung' (1882).2 Wemer deals especially with Ockham's
See Kusch 1995 and 1999.
Pluta 1987, 12-13. See Wemer 1881a, 1881b, 1882. (Those three texts were republished
in 1964 under the name Psychologie des Mittelalters.) Prior to those books, Wemer had
written about William of Auvergne's, Bonaventure's, John Duns Scotus's and Roger
CHAPTERONE
psychology, among other things, in the second of these articles.

Some years later Hermann Siebeck (1842-1920), professor of
philosophy at the University of Giessen (1883), published articles on
scholastic psychology in which he dealt with late medieval
psychology3. In 1897 he published an article in which he discussed
particularly Ockham's theory of knowledge, 'Occam's
Erkenntnislehre in ihrer historischen Stellung'.4
In the early 20th century, there were also some studies which
concentrated on Ockham's theory of knowledge. Lothar Kugler
wrote a dissertation in Breslau with the title Der Begriff der
Erkenntnis bei Wilhelm von Ockham. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte
mittelalterlicher Noetik (1913).5 Franz Federhofer's dissertation in
Munich had the title Die Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Ockham,
insbesondere seine Lehre vom intuitiven und abstraktiven Erkennen
(1923).6 Federhofer later published an article 'Die Psychologie und
die psychologischen Grundlagen der Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm
von Ockham' (1926).7 In 1927, Erich Hochstetter published his
widely known book Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre
Wilhelms von Ockham. 8 Ockham also aroused interest among
scholars who viewed his thought in a very negative manner. Etienne
Gilson wrote in the chapter 'The Road to Scepticism' in his book
The Unity of Philosophical Experience (1937) that Ockham
introduced "a new intellectual disease", which he called
"psychologism", into the world. According to Gilson, Ockham "was
convinced that to give a psychological analysis of human knowledge
Bacon's psychology, and about the development ofthe medieval psychology from Alcuin
to Albert the Great. See Pluta 1987, 13, 159.
3
Siebeck 1888-1889, 1888-1890.
Siebeck 1897. In 1898 he briefly wrote about Ockham' s theory of the will in his articJe
'Die Willenslehre bei Duns Scotus und seinen Nachfolgem' (pp. 195-199). Siebeck 1898.
5 Kugler 1913.
Federhofer 1923.
Federhofer 1926.
Hochstetter 1927.
INTRODUCTION
was to give a philosophical analysis of reality".9 On the whole, in the

psychological studies published before the Second World War, the
main interest lay in Ockham's theory of knowledge.
After (and already during) the Second W orId W ar, a new era in
Ockham research began, thanks especially to Philotheus Boehner' s
studies of Ockham and the critical edition of Ockham' s works begun
by him. lO Ockham research expanded remarkably. Ockham's
philosophical psychology, with the exception of his theories of
cognition and the freedom of the will, has still been very little dealt
with in research. Since the 1950' s, from time to time it has been
noted that since it is a part of Ockham's philosophical psychology,
his theory of passions should be examined properly.l1 Over the years
some scholars indeed have written a little about passions in various
studies of Ockham, such as Oswald Fuchs in his study on Ockham's
conception of habits in 1952 12 , Gordon Leff in his monograph on
Ockham in 1975 13 , and Taina Holopainen in her study on Ockham's
ethics in 1991 14 In addition, certain aspects of Ockham's theory of
passions were analyzed in some articles and books, such as Arthur
Stephen McGrade's article on enjoyment in Ockham in 1981 15 ,
Kimberly Georgedes's dissertation on enjoyment and use in 1995 16 ,
and Marino Damiata's study on Ockham in 1997 17 However, in
1990 Girard J. Etzkom published an article that can be said to be the
Gilson 1937 (reprint. in 1982), 86-91. See Adams 1987, 588-589; Georgedes 1995,
13-14.
10 See Boehner 1958.
11 Uon Baudry who wrote briefly about passions ("moral passions") in his Lexique
philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham (I958) ended his article on them by stating: "La
theorie ockhamiste des passions meriterait de faire l'objet d'une etude plus approfondie."
Baudry 1958,193. See McGrade 1981, 707; 1986, 153, and Courtenay 1987,283.
12 Fuchs 1952.
13 Leff 1975.
14 Holopainen 1991.
15 McGrade 1981.
16 Georgedes 1995.
9
17
Damiata 1997.
CHAPTERONE
first systematic analysis that deals with Ockham's theory of

passions. 18 It is a brief one, though, and a broader analysis of
passions seems to reveal important matters with regards to passions
that have not been analyzed in it. Above all, the theme of the
passions of the will requires a detailed analysis since Etzkom only
mentions Ockham as positing passions in the will, but does not
discuss them in gre ater detail. Even now there is no monograph on
Ockham' s view of human passions, and that is why 1 have
undertaken a study on this theme.
The aim of this study is to analyze William Ockham' s
psychology of passions. 1 begin by investigating Ockham's view of
terms and their significations. Then 1 analyze Ockham's conception
of the souls and other parts of the human being, the appetitive and
other faculties of the souls, and the passions and other qualities of
the souls. Subsequently, 1 discuss his thoughts on the passions of the
sensory appetite and the will, especially their genesis and types.
Ockham's texts are analyzed from the point of view of semantics,
metaphysics, natural philosophy, theology, and, to some extent,
ethics. It seems to me that Ockham, following the scholastic
tradition, wanted to present an exact and even exhaustive conceptual
theory of reality on an Aristotelian basis. 19 As part of this intended
ontological theory, Ockham also dealt with the human being and his
or her properties. Therefore, 1 find an approach that could perhaps be
characterized as semantic-ontological relevant to the discussion of
Ockham's view of human passions.
18 Etzkorn presented his paper in 1988 and published it in 1990 under the name 'Ockham' s
View of the Human Passions in the Light of his Philosophical Anthropology'. Etzkorn
1990b.
19 Marilyn McCord Adams and Calvin Normore also emphasize Ockham's ontological
interest: "Ockham's philosophical focus, whether he is doing logic, natural science, or
theology, is on the branch of metaphysics commonly called 'ontology'." Adams 1987, 3.
"Like Professor M. Adams, 1 see Ockham as primarily an ontologist whose ultimate concern
is the metaphysical furniture of the world." Normore 1987, 212.
INTRODUCTION
AH of Ockham's philosophical and theological works are

sources for this study. 20 The reason is that nowhere in his works does
Ockham present a systematic theory of philosophical psychology. A
place for developing some psychological considerations would have
been a commentary on Aristot1e's On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics
or Rhetoric, but it seems that Ockham never wrote on these. 21
However, in various contexts, because of reasons that will be
discussed in the course of this study, Ockham writes quite
extensively about the human being and the phenomena he calls
passions. In addition, he often refers to them throughout his works.
Ockham' s treatises and remarks on psychology are connected
with the psychological discussions proper to his time. His nearest
predecessors' and contemporaries' psychology is also yet to be
thoroughly examined. In his artic1e on medieval theories of passions,
Simo Knuuttila states that Avicenna's On the Soul (a part of
A vicenna' s encyc10paedia al-Shif '), which was translated into Latin
in the middle of the twelfth century, was the main source for
Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Ad fidem codicum

manuscriptorum edita. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae. St.
Bonaventure, N. Y.: St. Bonaventure University. 1967-1986. 1 have occasionally made
references even to the (probably) inauthentic texts ascribed to Ockham in OPh VII. Also,
I have frequently used Summula philosophiae naturalis, the authenticity of which has also
been sometimes questioned; see forexample Brampton 1964, Weisheipl1968, Richter 1975
and 1986, and Leibold 1982 and 1987. However, the doubts presented have also been
criticized; see for example Miethke 1967, and Brown 1987. James A. Weisheipl's doubts
are based (among other things) on the position ofthe form in Summula. He claims that in
Summula, Ockham argues on the assumption of the unicity of the substantial form rather
than the plurality which he holds to in his commentary on the Sentences and Quodlibeta
septem. Weisheipl1968, 172-173.1, however, agree with Gordon Leffwho says: "Ockham
in the Summulae is for most ofthe time treating form generically in the abstract." Leff 1975,
565. Besides, it is never explicitly said in Summula that there is only one form in the human
being. Occasionally, the authenticity of some other texts usually considered to be Ockham' s
has been doubted, too; see for instance Richter 1986, 95-105. As this is the case, I have
tried to document ali my claims with ample textual evidence.
20
Some researchers have thought that Ockham intended to write an exposition on

Aristotle's On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics. See Quaest. variae, q. VI,
a. 9; OTh VIII, 251, footnote 3; SL III-3, c. 6; OPh 1, 610, footnote 10; SL I1I-3, c. 24; OPh
1,685, footnote 3.
21
CHAPTERONE
medieval philosophical psychology untiI the middle of the thirteenth

century and influenced it even later. Although A vicenna' s On the
Saul was not properly a commentary on Aristotle's On the Saul, his
theory of the soul was influenced by Aristotelian doctrines. Another
source that Avicenna used was neoplatonic theories. According to
A vicenna, the human soul animates the body as its form, but is in
itself a spiritual substance. It has vegetative, sensitive and intellectual
faculties. Both the sensitive and the intellectual faculties are divided
into moving and apprehensive powers with their acts. In the middle
of the thirteenth century, some new questions, however, were
brought to bear on psychological discussions. An important impulse
for them carne from Aristotle's On the Saul, which had been already
translated into Latin in the middle of the twelfth century but which
only began to be commented upon a hundred years later. Another
impulse carne from Averroes's commentary on Aristotle's On the
Saul, which was translated into Latin and began to be studied. Some
Arabic treatises on medicine translated into Latin also had their
impact on the discussions. The new questions did not, however,
mean a sharp break with the traditional approach. The first
commentators on Aristotle's On the Saul (such as Peter of Spain)
adopted, according to Knuuttila, Avicenna's conception of the soul
as a form of the body and as an individual substance, and they
continued employing the Avicennian doctrine of the faculties of the
soul. Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and even the Franciscans
continued this tradition in many respects. 22 On the other hand, from
the end of the 13 th century there are certain special features in
Franciscan psychology which distinguish it from traditional views, as
will be seen below.
In this study 1 shall, in some cases, pay attention to the
historical background of Ockharn's views. Sometimes this can even
be found in Ockham' s works themselves, that is, when Ockharn
explicitly discusses psychology with his predecessors and
22
Knuuttila 2002. For medieval psycho1ogy, see also Harvey 1975.
INTRODUCTION
contemporaries, such as Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol. My purpose,

however, is more to make a systematic-philosophical than genetic
analysis of Ockham' s thoughts.
1.2. TERMS AND THINGS

In this chapter 1 sketch Ockham' s conception of terms and the ways
they signify things in order to be able to approach the terms dealt

with in this study, 'human being', 'potency', and 'passion', for
example, and the things signified by them. Ockham's main
considerations of terms were formulated in his Summa logicae, but
some details or explications can also be found in his works on
theology and natural philosophy.
According to Ockham, categorematic terms have a definite and
determinate signification23 as such, while the syncategorematic terms
only signify in propositions together with the categorematic terms. 24
Among categorematic terms of natural languages, there are both
absolute and connotative terms. Sometimes the same word can be
used both as an absolute and as a connotative term. 25 Absolute terms
have only primary (direct) signification, and they signify alI their
significata equally. 26 0 ckham's examples ofthose terms are 'human
23
For Ockham's theory of signification, see SL 1, c. 33; OPh 1, 95-96: 2-54.
24 Ockham on categorematic and syncategorematic terms, see SL 1, c. 4; OPh 1, 15-16:

4-34.
25 " 'caritas' dupliciter accipitur. Uno moda praecise pro quodam habitu absoluto infuso,
et sic non est nomen connotativum. Aliter accipitur 'caritas' ut est abstractum respectu
istius concreti 'carum', connotando aliquem cui ilIe est carus." Ord. 1, d. 17; q. 1; OTh III,
466: 15-19. " ... 'angeIus' est nomen mere absolutum, saltem si non sit nomen officii sed
tantum substantiae." SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 36: 23-24.
26 "Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud veI
idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque prima significatur, sicut
patet de hoc nomine 'animal' quod non significat nisi boves, asinos et homines, et sic de
aliis animalibus, et non significat unum prima et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid
significari in recto et aliud in obliquo ... " SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 35: 6-12. See also Quodl. V, q.
25; OTh IX, 583: 15-22.
CHAPTERONE
being', 'animal', 'whiteness' and 'blackness' .27 According to Claude

Panaccio, absolute terms correspond to what are now called 'natural
kind terms' .28 Calvin Normore states that they are the terms that
purport to pick out the things that we are supposed to admit into our
ontology as existing beings. 29 Connotative terms are ones that signify
something primarily (directly) and something (else or perhaps even
the same thing) secondarily (indirectly).30 An categorematic terms
that are not absolute are connotative. Paul Vincent Spade has
collected a list of the types of connotative terms in Ockham: (l) alI
figment-terms, (2) negative, privati ve and infinite terms, (3) aU
relative terms, (4) quantitative terms, and alI terms in categories
other than substance and quality, (5) transcendental terms, and such
terms as 'power', 'act', 'intellect', 'intelligible', 'will', 'volible', etc.,
and (6) certain concrete terms, such as 'just', 'white', 'animate' and
'human' .31 In mentallanguage, that is, in the intemallanguage of
thought as distinguished from communicative languages, the
categorematic terms used are at least mainly absolute. 32
27 " de nominibus mere absolutis quod stricte loquendo nullum eorum habet definitionem
exprimentem quid nominis. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi 'homo', 'animal', 'capra',
'lapis', 'arbor', 'ignis', 'terra', 'aqua', 'caelum', 'albedo', 'nigredo', 'calor', 'dulcedo',
'odor', 'sapor' et huiusmodi." SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 36: 32-37. " ... quidam sunt termini
absoluti, qui significant sua significata aeque primo et una moda significandi. Et istorum
terminorum quidam important substantias et quidam qualitates, sicut 'homo', 'animal',
'albedo', 'nigredo'. AHi sunt termini connotativi." Quodl. VI, q. 16; OTh IX, 642: 68-72.
28
Panaccio 1990,3; 1995, 190; 1999a, 267; 1999b, 56.
29
Normore 1987,212.
3D "Nomen autem connotativum est illud quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid
secundario." SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 36: 38-39. However, according to Michael J. Loux,
"Ockham's subsequent use of the term 'connotative' is such that terms which have
significata2 but no significatal can be connotative". Loux 1974, 7. See also Spade 1996,
203.
31
Spade 1996,213. (References to Ockham, see esp. SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 37-38: 52-94.)
About the discussion of whether there are connotative terms in mental language, see
Spade 1975,55,64-76; BoIer 1985; Adams 1987,289,297-298,322-323; Normore 1990,
58; Spade 1990,599-608; Panaccio 1990; 1992,31-35,94-96,240-245; Tweedale 1992;
Goddu 1993, 108-123; Michon 1994,364-379; Leffler 1995, 187; Spade 1996, 187-239;
Yrjonsuuri 1997,19-21; Chalmers 1999,95-96.
32
INTRODUCTION
Ockham describes the difference between absolute and

connotative terms by referring to the different modes in which they
signify. However, when people use language, they can use certain
terms as absolutes, that is, having only primary signification and
signifying alI their significata equally only if they have intuitive
knowledge of the significata of the terms. If they do not have it, they
can use absolute terms in a connotative way. Marilyn McCord
Adams says that, according to Ockham, the concept 'Hon' is simple,
absolute and proper to lions only for someone who has had an
intuitive cognition of a Hon, for example. According to her, those
who have not seen Hons can, however, know what the name 'lion'
signifies, which means that they can fix the extension of the term
'Hon' .33 Paul Vincent Spade says that "in fact, virtually any term in
any category may be connotative. It alI depends on the given
language user's personal experience.,,34 Calvin Normore states that
"absolute terms are the effect in the mind of causal contact with
objects".35
Changing from a term to a thing which the term signifies can
be done by paying attention to a definition of the term which
expresses the nature ofthe thing (definitio exprimens quid rei) that is
signified by it. There are two parts in this so-called real definition:
the genus-term proper to the thing, and certain other terms predicated
of it. 36 The first part, the genus-term of the thing, is the part of the
33
Adams 1987,324. Reference to Ockham: SL III-2, c. 29; OPh 1,558-560: 47-100.
34
Spade 1990,602, footnote 18.
Normore 1990, 59. Normore does not mention the possibility that the intuitive cognitions
of the objects, on which the absolute terms are based, do not need to be caused by the
objects themse1ves but they can be caused by God. See footnote 7 on page 77 below. Calvin
Normore and Deborah Brown suggest that, according to Ockham, absolute terms are neither
innate nor leamed, but passive1y acquired. See Normore 1990, 59-61; Brown 1996, esp.
86-87.
36 "Definiti o exprimens quid rei, non data per additamentum, semper continet pro prima
parte aliquid genus definiti et pro alia parte veI pro aliis partibus continet differentiam veI
differentias essentia1es veI aliquos obliquos significantes per se et prima partes rei. Et istae
partes sunt diversae; nam genus importat totum, aliae partes significant partes distinctas
rei." SL III-2, c. 29; OPh 1, 557: 3-8. " ... si aliqua res debeat definiri, primo ponendum est
35
10
CHAPTERONE
definition that imports the thing as a whole, and it is predicated in

quid of the thing. 37 As the second part of the definition, there are the
difference-terms predicated in quale of the thing or certain terms
predicated in quid of the thing. 38 According to Ockham, real
definitions are either definitions of metaphysics Of of natural
philosophy. In metaphysics, the second part of the definition is the
difference-terms predicated in quale of the thing, and in natural
philosophy the second part is certain terms predicated in quid of the
thing. 39
By the real definitions one can define absolute terms.
Sometimes Ockham even says that there are such definitions only for
absolute terms. 40 Re does not, however, think that alI absolute terms
can be defined by the real definition - taking the definition strictly or
properly. By the strict Of proper version of this definition, i.e. by the
one whose parts import only the thing and its parts, we can define
only absolute terms that signify those entities that are compositional
substances. 41 The absolute terms that signify simple entities cannot
genus, secunda addendae sunt differentiae essentiales vei accidentales." SL 1, c. 20; OPh 1,
69: 39-41. Marilyn McCord Adams states that this definition "expresses the nature ofthe
thing in its extension". Adams 1987,323. Paul Vincent Spade says that these definitions are
the ones "that somehow reflect the internal metaphysical make-up of the objects defined".
Spade 1990, 599.
causa quare genus praedicatur in quid, et non differentia, est ista, quia genus importat
totam rem et non plus un am partem quam aliam, et ideo praedicatur in quid ... " Exp. Porph.
Praed., c. 7; OPh II, 102: 6-9. For more about the genus, see, for instance, SL III-3, c. 18;
OPh 1, 651-671: 3-580.
38 About difference, see for instance SL 1, c. 23; OPh 1, 74-78: 2-127. About the other
terms predicable in quid of the thing, see the definition of the human being in natural
philosophy in sub-chapter 2.1.
37 "
39 In other sciences there may be definitions that also express what the thing is, but only
such which include terms referring to non-essential aspects in the thing. For references to
Ockham' s texts, see the definitions of the human being, sub-chapter 2.1.
40 " . definitio
exprimens quid rei est solum nominum absolutorum... " Quodl. V, q. 19; OTh
IX, 555: 51-52.
"Quaedam enim definitio talis est quae nihil importat extrinsecum rei alia moda quam
importat rem vei partem rei. Et talis definitio vocatur definiti o propriissime dicta, quae non
potest esse nisi substantiarum vei nominum substantiarum, quia talis definitio non potest
41
INTRODUCTION
11
be defined by a strict definition, since simple entities do not have

differential parts that would be referred to by the second part of the
definition. 42 However, there is a less strict real definition by which
we can also define those absolute terms that cannot be defined by the
strict version. That looser definition that expresses the thing is called
'definition by addition' (definitio per additamentum). The parts of
this definition import the thing and also something that is extrinsic to
the thing. 43 U sing an additional definition, the absolute term
esse nisi compositorum, tamquam illorum quorum essentia exprimitur per orationem,
cuiusmodi composita per se una non sunt nisi substantiae. Talis definiti o est ista 'animal
rationale'; sit 'animal' genus et 'rationale' differentia, quia 'animal' importat totum
hominem et 'rationale' importat partem hominis sicut suum abstractum." SL III-2, c. 28;
OPh 1,556: 19-27. See also SL III-3, c. 23; OPh 1, 682: 16-19.
42 " nullum simplex potest definiri definitione proprie dicta quae sit data ex genere et
differentia essentiali. Quia cum nullum simplex possit habere differentiam essentialem,
nullum simplex potest definiri tali definitione. Et ista est causa Philosophi quare accidens
non potest definiri definitione proprie dicta. Unde nec dependenti a accidentis ad
substantiam, nec imperfectio accidentis, nec aliquid tale est causa quare non potest definiri,
sed soIa simplicitas propter quam caret differentia essentiali. Et propter eandem rationem,
forma substantialis et angelus et materia substantialis et caetera simplicia - quaecumque sint
illa - non possunt definiri definitione proprie dicta." Ord. 1, d. 8, q. 3; OTh III, 208: 22 209: 7. (See also ibid., 209: 8 - 214: 18.) Scotus also denied universal hylomorphism
according to which alI created substances are composed of form and matter. See Williams
2001, 8. It has to be noticed that there are, according to Ockham, various kinds of
simplicity: "Simplicium vero quaedam carent omni compositione partium quarumcumque,
cuiusmodi sunt substantiae abstractae intellectuales, scilicet intelligentiae; cuiusmodi sunt
etiam omnes intellectiones et omnia accidentia animae intellectivae, si ipsa sit indivisibilis,
sicut multi ponunt esse de intentione Aristotelis. Quaedam autem simplicia dicuntur non per
carentiam partium quarumcumque sed per carentiam partium dissimilium et alterius
rationis, cuiusmodi sunt omnia corpora caelestia secundum intentionem Aristotelis, et
omnia accidentia corporalia et materia prima et forma quaelibet." Summ. phil. nat.,
praeamb.; OPh VI, 154: 423-431. (Here and elsewhere 1 have underlined the spread
words.)
"Alia est definitio importans quid rei, quae simul cum hoc quod importat rem, importat
veI exprimit aliquid quod non est de essentia rei; sicut definiti o animae, quae est ista 'actus
corporis physici organici' etc. importat animam et corpus, quod non est pars animae nec
anima. Et ista vocatur definiti o per additamentum. Et tales definitiones importantes quid rei
convertuntur cum nominibus mere absolutis affirmativis." SL III-2, c. 28; OPh 1, 556:
28-33. "Definitio data per additamentum non solum explicat essentiam rei, sed etiam simul
cum hoc explicat aliquid aliud a re, et hoc veI affirmative veI negative. Et ideo talis definitio
non solum componitur ex aliquo praedicabili per se prima modo, sed etiam componitur ex
43
12
CHAPTERONE
'whiteness', for instance, can be defined (following Aristotle) as

color (genus of the thing defined) [that is] most dazzling to sight
(difference of the thing), and 'angel' as substance (genus) [that is]
incorruptible (difference). 44
Ockham, however, sometimes admits that some connotative
terms can also be said to have a kind of real definition. An example
of such a connotative term is 'saw'. Its real definition is something
like "iron that we can cut wood with". Here the difficulty is, as
Ockham remarks, that if there were something other than iron with
which one could cut wood, it would also be a saw. So, the definition
that is most proper to 'saw' (and to other connotative terms) is the
definition that expresses the name itself (definitio exprimens quid
nominis). Such a definition of 'saw' is "something that we can cut
wood with".45 This so-called nominal definition only expresses
which other words the term could be expres sed by.46
aliquibus praedicabilibus secundo modo, quae sunt passiones definiti." SL 1II-2, c. 32; OPh
1, 566: 3-7. "Alia est definitio data per additamentum, quae scilicet habet aliquam partem
importantem aliquid extrinsecum illi quod importatur per definitum..." SL 1II-3, c. 23; OPh
1,682: 20-22.
44 SL 1II-2, c. 32; OPh 1, 566-567: 3-36. See also SL III-3, c. 23; OPh 1, 682: 20-24; c. 25;
OPh 1,688: 2-12; Exp. Porph. Praed., c. 2; OPh II, 46: 55-62. See also Moody 1935
(republ. 1965),274-275; Webering 1953, 115-116; Leff 1975,304-308.
45 SL III-2, c. 33; OPh 1, 568-569: 2-46.
"Definitio exprimens quid nominis est quando exprimitur significatum vocabuli, quid
scilicet debemus per vocabulum intelligere." SL III -3, c. 23; OPh 1, 682: 9-10. "Definitio
autem exprimens quid nominis est oratio explicite declarans quid per unam dictionem
importatur, sicut alicuis volens docere alium quid significat hoc nomen 'album' dicit quod
significat idem quod haec oratio 'aliquid habens albedinem'." SL 1, c. 26; OPh 1, 88:
113-116.The absolute terms, on the other hand, cannot be defined by the nominal definition
unless it is taken in a loose way. " ... proprie loquendo talia nomina [mere absoluta] non
habent definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, quia proprie loquendo unius nominis
habentis definitionem exprimentem quid nominis est una definitio explicans quid nominis,
sic scilicet quod talis nominis non sunt diversae orationes exprimentes quid nominis
habentes partes distinctas, quarum aliqua significat aliquid quod non eodem modo
importatur per aliquam partem alterius orationis. Sed talia quantum ad quid nominis
possunt aliquo modo pluribus orationibus non easdem res secundum suas partes
significantibus explicari, et ideo nuUa earum est proprie definiti o exprimens quid
nominis ...de nominibus mere absolutis quod stricte loquendo nullum eorum habet
46
INTRODUCTION
13
What are the things in the world signified by various terms?

According to Marilyn McCord Adams, Ockham had a program for
refuting his predecessors' and contemporaries' thesis that Aristotle' s
ten categories were categories of common or universal things that
somehow exist in reality in particulars. This program, according to
Adams, is divided into two parts. The first part consists of the
argument that nothing but particulars can exist in reality. The second
part consists of the argument that natural reason will support only a
belief in particular substances and particular qualities, and because of
the Christian doctrine, one only has to add the existence of certain
relations. 47 Adams calls this a "program of ontological reduction".48
There are various opinions on the question as to whether Ockham' s
approach to ontology can be interpreted as "reductionistic".49 It is,
nevertheless, quite c1ear that, according to Ockham, alI distinct and
absolute things in this world are either substances or qualities. So,
'substance' and 'quality' are the most general genus-terms of distinct
and absolute things in the world. sO Ockham seems to have accepted
that there are, besides distinct and absolute things, some real relative
definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi 'homo',
'animal', 'capra', 'lapis', 'arbor', 'ignis', 'terra', 'aqua', 'caelum', 'albedo', 'nigredo',
'calor', 'dulcedo', 'odor', 'sapor' et huiusmodi." SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 35-36: 14-23,32-37.
" ... definitio exprimens quid nominis non est proprie nominum absolutorum sed
connotativorum et relativorum." Quodl. V, q. 19; OTh IX, 555: 52-53. See also SL III-3,
c. 26; OPh 1, 689-691: 2-49.
47 Adams 1987, 143. About Adams' s theory that Ockham had an "ontological program", see
ibid., 143-313.
48 Adams 1987,277.
For this discussion, see BoIer 1994-97. Graham White states as follows: "Neither is he
[Ockham] straightforwardly an ontological reductionist... where he thought that entities were
needed, he would postulate them." White 1993, 299. Paul Vincent Spade says that
Ockham's ontology is "pretty sparse". Spade 1990,601. Later he remarks that it is "not as.
sparse as sometimes portrayed". Spade 1999, 111. One of the themes of the extensive
discussion of connotative terms pertains to the question of whether the connotation-theory
serves for a program of ontological reduction. See the articles and monographs referred in
footnote 32 on page 8, and in addition Klima 1999, and Panaccio 1999b, 58.
50 SL 1, c. 21; OPh 1, 70-71: 31-42; ibid., c. 42; OPh 1,118: 11-14.
49
14
CHAPTERONE
things that are really distinct from absolute things. 51 1 shall now
discuss Ockharn's conception of substances and qualities.
In its basic sense the terrn 'substance' signifies the things that
exist without inhering in or being a part of any other thing, that have
no opposite, that do not admit of more and less, and that can
successively admit contrary qualities while remaining numerically
the same thing. 52 Ockham's examples of absolute terms that signify
substances include 'human being', 'animal', 'goat', 'stone', 'tree',
'fire', 'earth', 'water', and 'heaven' .53
The term 'quality' signifies the things inhering in substances
because of which the substances have a certain character which is
referred to in answering the question of what a substance is like
(quale). The things that are in substances as their substantial parts
(substantial forms and matter) are not qualities. 54 The terrn 'quality'
The question of whether respectus is the third most general genus remains a little unclear.
Ord. 1, d. 8, q. 2; OTh III, 187: 2-5. But: SL III-3, c. 18; OPh 1, 666: 443-451. About this
problem, see Adams 1987,267-276; Henninger 1989,140-145; Etzkom 1990a, 560-562;
Wood 1997,29-30; Spade 1999, 104-105.
51
52 " . substantia multipliciter accipitur. Uno moda substantia dicitur quaecumque res
distincta ab aliis, sicut frequenter talia inveniuntur in auctoribus 'substantia albedinis',
'substantia coloris', et sic de aliis. Aliter dicitur substantia magis stricte omnis res quae non
est accidens realiter inhaerens alteri. Et sic substantia dicitur tam de materia quam de forma
quam etiam de composito ex utrisque. Aliter dicitur substantia strictissime de ilIo quod nec
est accidens alteri inhaerens nec est pars alicuius essentialis, quamvis possit componere cum
aliquo accidente. Et isto moda substantia ponitur genus generalissimum." SL 1, c. 42; OPh
1, 118: 5-14. " ... substantia cognoscitur in conceptibus connotativis et negativis, sicut in
talibus: ens per se subsistens, ens non in alio, ens quod est subiectum omnium accidentium,
et sic de aliis." Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 2; OTh II, 417: 4-7. In Summa logicae, Ockham admits that
the substances have a number of other properties, too. See SL 1, c. 43; OPh 1, 122-132:
2-265. There cannot be a proper real definition of the absolute term 'substance', since alI
the parts of the definition would be connotative or negative concepts. Besides, about the
transcendental term ens Ockham says that it cannot be a genus since it is said about
everything: "Alia regula est: quod dicitur de omnibus, non est genus; et propter hoc ens non
est genus..." SL III-3, c. 18; OPh 1, 670: 550-551. See Loux 1974, 19.
53 SL 1, c. 10; OPh 1, 36: 34-36; Quodl. VI, q. 16; OTh IX, 642: 68-71.
"Videtur autem mihi quod secundum principia Aristotelis debet poni quod
praedicamentum qualitatis est quidam conceptus veI signum continens sub se omnia illa per
quae respondetur convenienter ad quaestionem factam per 'quale' de substantia, quod non
exprimit partem substantialem substantiae." SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1, 180: 7-11.
54
INTRODUCTION
15
still does not always signify entities that are absolute and really
distinct from the substances. Absolute qualities are signified by such
quality terms as 'whiteness', 'knowledge' and 'light', and nonabsolute by such terms as 'figure', 'straightness' and 'thinness' .55
The former qualities are simple entities. 56 By God's power, they
could exist without inhering in any substance, but this is not possible
naturally.57 The inherence is a kind of union (unio) relation between
55 "Sunt autem quaedam in genere qualitatis quae important res distinctas a substantia, ita
quod illa res non est substantia, sicut sunt 'albedo' et 'nigredo', 'color', 'scientia', 'lux' et
huiusmodi. Quaedam autem sunt quae alias res a praedictis qualitatibus et substantia non
important, cuiusmodi sunt 'figura', 'curvitas', 'rectitudo', 'densitas', 'raritas' et
huiusmodi." SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1,180: 14-19. How can one know whether it is a question of
an absolute quality? Ockham thinks that if a predicable which cannot simultaneously be
predicated truly of the same thing can successively be predicated of the same thing just by
virtue of a local motion, it does not need to signify distinct things. SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1,
180-181: 20-35; Quodl. VII, q. 2; OTh IX, 708: 36-54. Such connotativeterms as 'health'
(sanitas) and 'illness' (aegritudo) refer to certain commensurations of qualities. See Exp.
Phys. VII, c. 4; OPh V, 651-652: 8-9, 10-13, 15-18,24-25; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh
II, 287-288: 44-52; Rep.lII, q. 7; OTh VI, 204: 10-14.
56 See footnote 42 on page Il.
About the case of the Eucharist, see SL 1, c. 44; OPh 1, 135: 92-104; 138: 162-164;
Quodl. IV, q. 32; OTh IX, 456: 23-24; ibid., q. 34; OTh IX, 466-467: 13-63; Tract. corp.
Chr., c. 22; OTh X, 135-141: 5-167. See also Buescher 1950 (republ. 1974), 119-130. On
the position that God can make a quality exist without a subject, Ockham is in line with the
Paris Condemnation of 1277. See Grant 1996, 78-79. As Ruedi Imbach states, for Ockham
the principal possibility that there are qualities that exist without subject opens up the
possibility that the qualities of the souls, like volitions and intelIections, can exist without
the soul: "Diese Moglichkeit fiihrt Ockham zu sehr folgenreichen Grenzbetrachtungen oder
Gedankenexperimenten. Sofem man beriicksichtigt, daB nach ihm die Akte des Willens
oder des IntelIekts als Qualitten der Seele zu begreifen sind, ist man keineswegs uberrascht
festzustellen, daB Ockham die Hypothese von freischwebenden WiIIens- und
Vemunftsakten erwgt. Es liegt auf der Hand, welche Denkmoglichkeiten durch diese
Erwgung freigesetzt werden!" Imbach 1987, 50. 1mbach refers to the folIowing passage:
" ... non est maior contradictio quod accidens absolutum spirituale [intelIectio et volitio 1sit
sine subiecto per potentiam Oei quam corporale... " Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 155: 15-17.
(Imbach remarks: "Man denke in diesem Zusammenhang an die UberJegungen von
Descartes, der erwgt, dass das sich im cogito entdeckende Subject nur eine res cogitans
sein konnte." Imbach 1987, footnote 47.)
57
16
CHAPTERONE
a substance and a quality.58 According to Ockham, qualities can have

three properties: they admit of contraries, they admit of more and
less, and according to them, some things (the substances that they
qualify) are said to be similar Of dis similar. The last one of these
three properties pertains to alI qualities, but the first and second do
not. 59
Following Aristotle (in the Categories, c. 8), Ockham thinks 60
that there are four classes of quality. Most often Ockbam calls them
'species' (species) , but sometimes 'modes' (modus) since these
classes are not exclusive species of quality because many of the
qualities can belong to more than one ofthem. 61 The first one is habit
or disposition, the second is natural potency Of impotency, the third
is passion or passible quality, and the fourth is form. 62 The last one
does not, however, involve absolute qualities. 63 Thus, absolute
qualities are either habits or dispositions, or natural potencies or
impotencies, or passions or passible qualities.
In the first class, 'habit' usually refers to qualities that can be
changed only with difficulty, and 'disposition' or sometimes
58 Ockham gives this list of unions: " ... unio naturae humanae ad divinam, unio materiae ad
formam et e converso, unio accidentis ad subiectum, unio unius partis continui ad aliam."
Ord. 1, d. 30, q. 4; OTh IV, 369: 3-6. About the ontological status of the relations, see
footnote 51 on page 14.
SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1, 182: 69-83; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 15; OPh II, 288: 4 - 292: 10. Taking
'similar' and 'dissimilar' broadly, the qualities are not the only principles of similarity or
dissimilarity.
59
Generally, if there is no explicit reason not to do so, ] take Ockham himself as agreeing
with what he says that Aristotle says.
60
61
SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1, 181-182: 60--65; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 271: 47-53.
62 "Hoc viso sciendum est quod Aristoteles ponit quatuor modos veI quatuor species
qualitates." SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1, 181: 36-37. "".est sciendum quod, sicut ponit Philosophus
in Praedicamentis, quattuor sunt modi qualitatum: unus modus est habitus et dispositio;
alius est naturalis potentia et impotentia; tertius est passio et passibilis qualitas; quartus est
forma et circa aliquid constans figura." Summ. phil. nat. III, c. 14; OPh VI, 293: 7-10. See
also Exp. Phys. Arist. III, C. 2; OPh IV, 422: 28-31; Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 8; OPh VI,
413: 21-24.
SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1,181: 56-60; Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 282: 2 ( 10) - 285: 2
( 10); Quodl. VII, q. 2; OTh IX, 707: 20-22.
63
INTRODUCTION
17
'affection,64 to qualities that are easily changeable. The very same

quality can be called a habit with respect to one subject and a
disposition with respect to another subject. 65 Ockham explicitly
states that alI qualities are either habits or dispositions, since they are
alI changeable either easily or with difficulty.66
'Natural potency' and 'natural impotency' refer to qualities by
which their subjects can easily act in a certain manner or resist an
influence. Ockham mentions such absolute qualities as hotness and
coIdness as belonging to this class. 67 Not alI qualities can be included
64 "Sed dispositiones seu affectiones sunt de facili permutabiles... "Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14;
OPh II, 269: 9 ( 3). See also Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 11; OPh II, 237: 9 ( 8). Sometimes the
term 'affect' (affectus) seems to have the same meaning. See Ord. 1, d. 30, q. 3; OTIt IV,
337: 1; Tract. rei., c. un.; OPh VII, 349: 5I.
''Primus modus est habitus et dispositio. Et vocatur habitus omnis qualitas de difficili
mobiIis, sive sit spiritualis sive corporalis. Dispositio autem vocatur omnis qualitas de faciIi
mobilis, si ve sit corporalis si ve spiritualis. Et secundum hoc qualitas eiusdem speciei in uno
est habitus et in alio est dispositio. Et est sciendum quod sub isto modo non tantum
comprehenditur illud quod importat aliam rem a substantia sed etiam illud quod quandoque
non importat aliam rem. Unde omne illud sub hoc modo continetur quod, faciliter vei
difficiliter, propter mutationem rei removetur a subiecto. Et ut breviter dicam, omnis
qualitas sub hoc modo continetur, et ideo dicitur 'species qualitatis': non quia aliqua sit
qualitas quae nec sit habitus nec dispositio, sed quia aliqua qualitas non est habitus et aliqua
qualitas non est dispositio; veI dicitur 'species', quia aliquid specialius connotat quam hoc
nomen 'qualitas'." SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1,181: 37-50. See also Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh
11,269: 2 ( 3) - 274: 121; Elern. log. 1, c. 18; OPh VII, 76: 5-6; Tract. praed., c. 4; OPh
VII, 325: 14-18.
65
Philosophus non ponit hic in prima specie qualitatis praecise habitus et dispositiones
veI qualitates ipsius animae, immo omnis qualitas quae est res una per se collocatur in ista
prima specie qualitatis, quia omnis talis res veI est de faciIi mobilis veI de difficili. Et ita
omnes qualitates sensibiles et omnis potentia naturalis veI impotentia quae est res per se
una, continetur sub prima specie qualitatis, quia omnis talis qualitas veI est de facili mobilis
veI de difficili mobiIis. Unde de calore et frigore exemplificat. In ista specie sunt omnes
actus et passiones animae, et universaliter omnis res per se una, alia a substantia, quia
quaelibet talis veI est de facili mobilis vei de difficili mobilis, hoc est veI facHiter amissibilis
veI difficiliter." Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh 11,272-273: 84-94.
66 .....
"Aliud genus qualitatis ponitur potentia naturalis veI impotentia. Unde omnis res qua
potest aliquid faciliter agere vei resistere actioni in hoc genere ponitur." SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1,
181: 51-53 ...... aliud genus qualitatis est secundum quod naturalis potentia aliquid faciliter
faciendi veI patiendi, et similiter impotentia naturalis aliquid faciliter faciendi vei non
patiendi dicitur qualitas.Et exemplificat dicens quod illud propter quod aliqui dicuntur
67
18
CHAPTERONE
in this c1ass, since there are qualities that are not principles of acting
or resisting an influence. 68
Terms that refer to qualities in the third c1ass of quality are
'passion' and 'passible quality'. In Summa logicae 1, c. 55, Ockham
states briefly that this c1ass inc1udes alI the sensible qualities. 69 Does
it only consist of them? In Quaestiones in librum tertium
Sententiarum, q. 3, Ockham states that all the passions and passible
qualities can be sensed by a sense. 70 Thus, on the basis of those texts,
it would seem that, according to Ockham, the third c1ass of quality,
passions and passible qualities, consists of all the sensible qualities,
that is, qualities that can cause a sensory intuitive cognition of
themselves, and only them.
Ockham' s rather extensive consideration of the third c1ass of
quality in Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, c. 1471
gives support to this interpretation, but mainly only as far as it is a
question of corporeal third-c1ass qualities. The discussion is not a
thorough analysis but inc1udes Ockham's comments on Aristotle's
remarks. Following Aristotle, Ockham deals separately with the
corporeal passions and passible qualities and the passions and
passible qualities of the soul. As corporeal passions and passible
qualities, Ockham considers objects of the various particular senses.
pugilatores naturaliter veI cursores veI salubres veI insalubres, dicitur qualitas. Narn ilie qui
faciliter potest pugilare habet aJiquid quod non habet ille qui non potest sic faciliter
pugilare, et illud vocatur potentia naturalis pugilandi, et est de secunda specie qualitatis. Et
ita est de aliis ... sicut durum et molIe sunt in secunda specie quaJitatis, ita caJidum et
frigidum sunt in eadem specie, et huiusmodi, quia possunt poni principia faciJiter agendi
seu operandi aJicui, a quo sunt de difficili mobiles."Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 274:
2-11,276: 54-57. See also Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 274: 12 - 276: 53; Elem. log.
1, c. 18; OPh VII, 76: 6-7; Tract. praed., c. 4; OPh VII, 325: 19-21.
68
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 276: 58-61.
69 "Terti a species ponitur passio et passibilis qualitas. Ornnis enim qualitas sensibilis ponitur
in terti a specie qualitatis." SL 1, c. 55; OPh 1, 181: 54-55. Sec aIso Elem. log. 1, c. 18; OPh
VII, 76: 7-8; Tract. praed., c. 4; OPh VII, 325: 22-23.
ornnis passio et passibilis qualitas ab aliquo sensu potest sentiri." Rep. III, q. 3; OTh
VI, 117: 18-19. Sec a1so Rep. III, q. 2; OTh VI, 60: 12-16.
70 " .
71
Exp. Praed. Arist., c.14; OPh II, 276: 2 - 282: 26.
INTRODUCTION
19
He first analyzes the corporeal passible qualities. He claims that, in

Aristotle's view, various (corporeal) qualities are called passible
qualities for different reasons. Those qualities that are objects of taste
(such as sweetness and bittemess) and tactile sense (such as hotness
and coldness) are called passible qualities because they produce
passions in the senses through sensory cognition. The qualities that
are objects of sight (such as whiteness, blackness and other colors)
are called passible qualities because they are caused by some
passions of the soul. Therefore, for instance, redness in the face is
called a passible quality because it is caused by shame, and paHor
also because it is caused by fear. 72 After saying this, Ockham
remarks that aH the qualities as objects of the senses can cause
pleasure or distress in the senses, but Aristotle, in this connection,
especially mentions the objects of tactile sense and taste because
everybody knows that they cause pleasure or distress, they cause
intense pleasure or distress, and they cause pleasure or distress in alI
animals. 73
After analyzing the corporeal passible qualities, Ockham tums
his attention to the distinction which Aristotle draws between them
and the corporeal passions. According to Ockham, Aristotle thinks
that alI the corporeal qualities that are caused by passions of the soul
that are permanent or are only changeable with difficulty, or by
nature or by illness or fever or some other reason and are permanent
or changeable only with difficulty are passible qualities. 74 A little
later Ockham remarks that in this connection 'passible quality' is not
used only for alI the qualities that factually are caused by the
permanent passions, but also for alI permanent qualities that can be
caused by permanent passions, no matter how they are caused. 75
Correspondingly, qualities that are caused by easily changeable
73
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh 11,277-279: 7-20, 47-61.

Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh 11,279: 62-75.
74
75
72
20
CHAPTERONE
passions are passions. 76 Even the very same quality can be called a
passion or a passible quality with respect to different subjects.
Redness, for instance, is a passible quality of the blood but usually
only a passion of the face (when blushing).77 In this connection,
Ockham does not discuss those corporeal qualities that are inc1uded
in the third c1ass because they produce passions in the senses through
sensory cognition (objects of taste and tactile sense). He probably
thinks that the same distinction can be made in their case.
Thus, in Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, c.
14, Ockham thinks that certain corporeal qualities are called passions
or passible qualities because of their connection with the passions of
the soul. After having explained the difference between corporeal
passions and passible qualities, Ockham makes some remarks on
passions and passible qualities of the soul. What Ockham writes
about them will be examined in detail in sub-chapter 2.2.
After all is said and done, Ockham does not seem to be
convinced that the Aristotelian division of the c1asses of quality is
sufficient to cover all qualities. In his Quaestiones in librum tertium
Sententiarum, q. 3 and 4, he c1aims that, in connection with certain
natural phenomena there occur qualities that are neither passions nor
passible qualities, since they cannot be sensed. Such qualities occur
in connection with seeing, poisoning and magnetism. Because of the
fact that they cannot be passions or passible qualities, Ockham says
that Aristotle's list of the c1asses of quality is not sufficient. 78 He
76
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279-280: 10-15.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280: 23-34. After saying this, Ockham remarks that in
the "vulgar" language and sometimes even in Aristotle, something is called quale, e.g.,
white or black, only because of a permanent quality, that is, when it is white or black
permanently. Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280-281: 34-62.
77
.in visu imprimitur quaedam qualitas confortans vei debilitans organum visus, et illa est
subiective in organo, quia organum debilitatur et non potentia, sicut patet per Philosophum,
1 De anima, de oculo senis. Et est illa qualitas alterius rationis ab obiecto extrinseco, et illa
nec est passio nec passibilis qualitas, sed est quaedam qualitas quae non est in aliqua specie
qualitatis enumerata ab Aristotele, quia omnis passio et passibilis qualitas ab aliquo sensu
potest sentiri. Sed ista a nullo potest sentiri, quia potest manere in organo etiam si potentia
78 "
INTRODUCTION
21
does oot say why such qualities could oot beIoog at Ieast to the first
class. EIsewhere he says that alI qualities beIoog to it. 79
nullum actum potest elicere, sicut patet in aliquo caeco. Et ideo illae species quas enumerat
Aristoteles sunt insufficientes. Exemplum: venenum per aliquam qualitatem interficit
hominem, et illa nec est passio nec passibilis qualitas, quia a nullo sensu potest sentiri."
Rep. III, q. 3; Olb VI, 117: 12 -118: 5. " ... ma virtus [causata a magnete], si ponatur, nec
est passio nec passibilis qualitas, quia nullo sensu potest sentiri. Et per consequens, illae
quattuor species qualitatis quas ponit Philosophus sunt insufficientes." Rep. III, q. 4; Olb
VI, 141: 1-4.
In Summula philosophiae naturalis III, c. 14 Ockham states that, in addition to the
Aristotelian division of the classes of quality concemed, one can posit another division. He
does not deve10p that division to agreat extent, and it even remains unclear whether it is
only meant to be a division ofthe third class of quality. lbe first element in that division is
the sensible quality that can be sensed by a particular (exterior) sense. Such qualities are
hotness, co1dness, color, savor, and odor. lbe second element is the quality that is not
sensible by any particular (exterior) sense. Such qualities are the sensations, interior
imagination, appetitive act, intellection, and volition, and in addition to the things in the
soul, some corporeal things: "Sed praeter istam divisionem qualitatis potest poni alia, quia
quaedam est qualitas sensibilis quae ab aliquo sensu particulari potest sentiri, cuiusmodi est
calor, frigus, color, sapor, odor et sic de aliis. Alia autem est qualitas quae non est sensibilis
ab aliquo sensu particulari, cuiusmodi sunt ipsae sensationes, quia ipsa visio oculi non
potest videri nec ab aliquo sensu sentiri. Similiter talis qualitas est imaginatio interior, et
actus appetendi, et intellectio et volitio. Utrum autem in rebus inanimatis corporalibus sit
aliqua qualitas quae non possit sentiri aliquo sensu particulari, patebit ~." Summ. phil.
oot. III, c. 14; OPh VI, 293: 11-19. (lbe editor of Summula writes that by 'inferius' the
author referred to the third part of Summula he intended to write. Ibid., 293, footnote 2.)
79
CHAPTERTWO
THE PASSIONATE HUMAN BEING
2.1. THE HUMAN BEING

In this chapter, 1 shall first discuss Ockham's theory of the human
being as consisting of souls and other parts. In order to do that, 1
investigate Ockham's approach to the term 'human being' and his
view of the things signified by it. According to Ockham, the word
'human being' (homo) in written and spoken languages is a term
which signifies a substance. As an absolute term it signifies nothing
else, and it signifies equally everything that it signifies, that is, alI
human substances, whether actual or possible. In Summa logicae
Ockham presents two kinds of 'strict' real definitions of the term
'human being': one proper to natural philosophy and the other proper
to metaphysics. The difference between those definitions is
delineated as follows: the definition proper to natural philosophy
consists of a first part that is a genus-term importing in quid the
whole thing, the human being, and a second part that includes certain
terms in the oblique cases expressing in quid the essential parts of
the human being. In this definition, the terms that express the
essential parts of the human being also supposit for them. The
metaphysical definition is composed of a first part which is a genusterm importing in quid the whole human being and of a second part
that includes difference-terms in the nominal cases expressing in
quale the essential parts of the human being. In this definition, the
23
24
CHAPTER TWO
differences do not supposit for what they express but for the whole
human being. 1
When the term 'human being' is defined in natural philosophy
with definition that expresses the thing signified by the term, the
result is that the human being is something composed of some
essential parts, like a substance (genus importing the whole subject)
that is composed of matter and the sensory and the intellectual soul
(the terms that express the essential parts). 2 In metaphysics, when the
term 'human being' is defined with a real definition, it is said that the
human being is an animated, sensible, rational (differences)
substance (genus) or a rational (difference) animal (genus).3 One
can perhaps say that the definition proper to natural philosophy
1 SL 1, c. 26; OPh 1, 85-86: 15-49; SL III-2, c. 28; OPh 1, 556: 19-27; SL III-2, c. 29; OPh
1,557: 3-8; Ord. 1, d. 8, q. 4; OTh III, 247: 5-14. See also Quodl. V, q. 15; OTh IX, 540:
38-40,43-49.
quandoque in tali sermone ponuntur casus obliqui exprimentes partes rei essentiales,
sicut si defini am hominem sic dicendo 'homo est substantia composita ex corpore et anima
intellectiva'; isti enim obliqui 'corpore et anima intellectiva' partes rei exprimunt. Et ista
potest vocari definiti o naturalis." SL 1, c. 26; OPh 1, 85: 21-25. " ...definitionum non
indicantium aliquid extrlnsecum rei...quaedam [datur] per genus et nomina exprimentia
partes essentiales ... exemplum... 'substantia composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva' est
definiti o hominis ... " SL III-3, c. 23; OPh 1,682: 25-27, 29-30. "In alia autem definitione
ponuntur abstracta in obliquo, correspondentia differentiis essentialibus. Et talis est
definitio ista 'substantia composita ex materia et anima sensitiva et intellectiva'. Ista enim
est definitio hominis, in qua ponuntur abstracta correspondentia istis concretis 'materiale' ,
'sensibile', 'rationale'." SL 1II-3, c. 24; OPh 1, 686: 80-84. See also Quodl. V, q. 15, OTh
IX, 539-540: 18-21,32-34.
2 "
"Alia est definiti o in qua nullus ponitur casus obliquus, sed ponitur genus in recto et
similiter in recto ponitur differentia, vei ponuntur differentiae exprimentes partes rei
definitae, ad modum quo 'album' exprimit albedinem. Et ideo sicut 'album' quamvis
exprimat albedinem non tamen supponit pro albedine sed tantum pro subiecto albedinis, ita
differentiae illae quamvis exprimant partes rei non tamen supponunt pro partibus rei sed
praecise pro toto composito ex partibus illis. Talis est ista definitio hominis 'animal
rationale' vei ista 'substantia animata sensibilis rationalis'. Nam istae differentiae 'animata',
'sensibilis', 'rationalis' supponunt pro homine, quia homo est rationalis, animatus et
sensibilis, tamen important partem hominis, sicut abstracta correspondentia eis important
partem vei partes hominis, quamvis non eodem modo. Et ista potest vocari definiti o
metaphysicalis, quia sic metaphysicus definiret hominem." SL 1, c. 26; OPh 1, 85: 26-39.
See also SL III-2, c. 31; OPh 1, 564: 78-79; Quodl. V, q. 15, OTh IX, 539: 22-32.
3
25
reveals the (functional) structure of the human being: the human

being is a composition of certain essential parts. The definition
proper to metaphysics reveals only which essential qualifiers the
human being has. However, none of the standard definitions
mentioned above can be taken as the most complete definition of the
term 'human being'. Ockham states that only a definition that has a
term for all the substantial parts of a thing indicates the essence of
the thing explicitly and completely, and can be called the most
complete definition (completissima definitio) of the defined. 4 What
are the genus and the substantial parts of the human being that need
to be revealed in the most complete definition of the term 'human
being'?
The first part of the definition of the term 'human being' is the
genus-term proper to the human being, and the most general genusterm proper to the human being is 'substance'. Therefore, one can
probably say that the ontological status of the human being is a
substance. The second part of the definition of 'human being' is
formed by the terms that refer to the essential parts of the human
being.
One essential part of the human being is prime matter (materia
prima)5. It seems Ockham found it difficult to define the term
'matter' or 'prime matter' with a definition that would express the
thing that it signifies, that is, with a real definition. At least it cannot
be defined with a strict or proper real definition, since the thing that
SL II1-3, c. 24; OPh 1, 684-685: 34-52.
It is important to note that the term 'matter' does not always refer to so-called prime
matter (materia prima). About the concept of 'matter' in the history of philosophy, see for
instance The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy (ed. by E. McMullin),
1965. In this connection it is perhaps important to notice that the faur elements are not parts
of the human being (ar in any other substances) in the same meaning as forms and matter
since, according ta Ockham. they are, as it seems, substances composed ofform and matter,
and substances cannot be parts of other substances. About Ockham' s conception of the four
elements, see Quodl. III, q. 5; OTh IX, 220-224: 3-96; Summ. phil. nat. III, c. 24; OPh VI,
323: 16.
5
26
CHAPTER TWO
it signifies is not a composite substance but a simple entity.6 It may

even be problematic to define it with a real definition that includes
additional elements, since matter is not per se in any genus, as it is a
partial being or entity that is naturally an essential part of total or
complete beings (composite substances), together with forms. 7
Ockham also states that matter is not a substance per se but per
reductionem, as a part of a substance. 8 However, by God's absolute
power it could exist without forms. 9 The appeal to form appears in
the definition or description of 'matter', since for us, matter is not
6 " nullum simplex potest definiri definitione proprie dicta quae sit data ex genere et
sed soIa simplicitas propter quam caret differentia essentiali. Et propter eandem rationem,
illa - non possunt definiri definitione proprie dicta." Ord. r, d. 8, q. 3; OTh III, 208: 22209: 7. (See also cont.: ibid., 209: 8 - 214: 18.) Prime matter is simple in the meaning that
it does not have parts that would be different from each other or existing in a different way:
"Quaedam autem simplicia dicuntur non per carentiam partium quarumcumque sed per
carentiam partium dissimilium et alterius rationis, cuiusmodi sunt omnia corpora caelestia
secundum intentionem Aristotelis, et omnia accidentia corporalia et materia prima et forma
quaelibet." Summ. phil. nat., praeamb.; OPh VI, 154: 427-431.
haec est causa quare materia vei forma substantialis non est per se in genere, quia est
pars essentialis alicuius exsistentis per se in genere... " Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 110; OPh VI,
691: 30-32. " ... materia recipit ipsam formam et esse quod est realiter forma, et nihil aliud
recipit. Et ista duo esse partialia sive duae entitates partiales constituunt sive faciunt unum
totum, vei magis proprie loquendo sunt duae partes unius entis seu esse totalis quod est
totum compositum ex illis." Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 9; OPh VI, 180: 22-27.
7 " ..
materia et forma substantialis sunt per reductionem in praedicamento substantiae quia

sunt partes substantiae quae est per se in praedicamento substantiae." Summ. phil. nat. III,
c. 2; OPh VI, 251: 48-51.
9 "Tamen Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere ibi materiam sine forma, et formam
sine materia, et totum compositum, et quod accidentia illa informent illud compositum vei
materiam sicut placet sibi." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 180: 10-13. " ... haec indefinita non
potest esse vera 'materia est' nisi haec indefinita sit vera 'forma est'. Sed ex hoc non
sequitur quod materia non sit prior forma, sed quod de hoc conceptu communi ad omnes
materias non potest praedicari 'esse exsistere' nisi de hoc communi ad omnes formas
praedicetur 'esse exsistere', nisi per potentiam divinam." Ord. 1, d. 9, q. 3; OTh III, 311:
2-7.
8 " .
27
intelligible in itself, without form. IO Thus, in Summula philosophiae

naturalis 1, c. 17, it is said that matter is a potency to receive a form
(potentia nata recipere jormam).ll
The fact that matter is, in Summula, said to be a potency has
aroused questions among researchers. James A. Weisheipl's doubts
about the authenticity of Summula are partly based on the way matter
is understood in it. According to him, prime matter is understood as
a pure potency in Summula, that is, not a real thing while in other
texts attributed to Ockham it is not. 12 U nlike Weisheipl, 1 think that
even in Summula it is admitted that prime matter is not a pure
potency but a real thing existing in nature. 13 Therefore, 1 think that
the way matter is understood in Summula is quite in line with the
ways it is understood in other texts attributed to Ockham where
Ockham explicitly says that the potentiality of matter does not mean
that matter would be pure potentiality, nothing in itself, something
10 " materia non potest intelligi per se ... causa quare materia non est intelligibilis a nobis
nisi per comparationem ad formam, non est quia materia non habet entitatem distinctam a
forma, sed est propter defectum intellectus nostri. Unde si intellectus noster posset
imrnediate totaliter moveri ab aliquo ente extra animam sine phantasmate medio et sine
omni sensibili medio, ita posset materia intelligi sicut forma ... " Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 16;
OPh IV, 176: 4, 27-32. " ... [materia] est de se intelligibilis ab intellectu sicut forma;
quamvis nos, qui de istis corporalibus exterioribus non habemus scientiam nisi mediantibus
qualitatibus sensibilibus, non possumus ea cognoscere in se et in particulari, sed tantum
quaedam praedicabilia de eis quae concIuduntur virtute cognitionis sensibilium, quia a
talibus sensibilibus abstrahuntur quamvis aliqua sint comrnunia sensibilibus et ipsis." Exp.
Phys. Arist. IV, c. 3; OPh V, 22: 17-23. "Ista autem materia prima, quamvis sit vera res
exsistens in rerum natura, non tamen a sensu veI intellectu est apprehensibilis cognitione
simplici et propria sibi, sed est intelligibilis per analogiam ad formam tantum, hoc est
tantum potest cognosci notitia composita sub forma, quia est quaedam entitas se habens ad
formas substantiales sicut subiectum se habet ad diversas qualitates quas recipit veI potest
reci pere successive et sicut idem corpus potest successive esse in diversis locis." Summ.
phil. nat. 1, c. 9; OPh VI, 180-181: 37-44. See also ibid., c. 14; OPh VI, 194-195: 2-17.
11 " materia est quaedam potentia nata recipere illam formam ... " Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 17;
OPh VI, 199: 18.
12 Weisheipl 1968, 172.
13 See Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 9; OPh VI, 180-181: 37-44 (the text is in footnote 10 above).
See also ibid., c. 14; OPh VI, 194-195: 2-17.) About prime matter as a potency, see Wolter
1965,134-136.
28
CHAPTER TWO
like an empty space for something. 14 Ockham thinks that matter is an

entity that is naturally capable of receiving a form, in fact, any kind
of form. 1s When it has received a form, it can no longer be called a
potency.16
Just like everything else in the world, prime matter has been
created by God. 17 For this reason, it is not eternal, but yet it cannot be
generated or corrupted by any natural power. 18 The same prime
14 " notandum est quod materia prima non est pura potentia ita quod non sit de se actualiter
exsistens in rerum natura, immo est de se actualiter exsistens inter entia, ita de se sicut
forma substantialis, in tantum quod si per impossibile esset sine omni forma, nullum agens
posset eam destruere secundum intentionem Philosophi. Et ideo quamvis esse habeat a
forma, quod non est ali ud quam habere formam, tamen ipsa est actu exsistens per essentiam
propriam quamvis non sine forma." Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 18; OPh IV, 206: 26-32.
15 " . .intelligit Commentator quod vere substantia materiae est potentia et in potentia ad
omnes formas, quod non est aliud quam dicere quod materia potest habere in se omnes
formas." Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 16; OPh IV, 181: 57-59. " ... materia est in potentia passiva
solum respectu forrnae et non activa... Sed materia non plus habet inclinationem ad unam
formam quam ad ali am, nec plus violenter exsistit sub una forma quam sub alia, sed
praecise respectu cuiuslibet formae et sui non esse, est in potentia neutra." Rep. III, q. 6;
OTh VI, 177: 3-4, 16-19. (The inclination of matter to form means just being in potency
to farm. "Large accipiendo 'inclinationem', non est ali ud quam esse in potentia ad aliud
sine omni inclinatione et activitate ad contrarium; et sic materia est in potentia naturali ad
formam et inclinatur ad eam." Quodl. III, q. 22; OTh IX, 290: 34-37.)
16 " quod innuit Commentatar quod potentia aufertur a materia et quod potentia
corrumpitur in adventu formae, debet sic intelligi quod in adventu formae ipsa materia vere
et realiter cessat esse in potentia ad formam, quia realiter cessat non habere formam, et ita
nihil imaginabile aufertur realiter ab ea, sed aliquid advenit. Una tamen praedicatio cessat
esse vera quae prius fuit vera propter hoc solum quod forma sibi advenit nullo a parte rei
ablato ab ea." Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 16; OPh IV, 182: 81-87. " ... potest concedi quod
potentia materiae corrumpitur vei privatio corrumpitur in adventu formae. Non quod ibi
aliquid corrumpatur vere, sed quia materia cessat esse in potentia vei esse privata, hoc est,
incipit habere formam." Ord. 1, d. 30, q. 2; OTh IV, 333:5-9.
17 " materia a solo Deo creatur." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 180: 10. " ... nullum esse fuit ab
aetemo nisi solus Deus." Ord. 1, d. 36, q. un.; OTh IV, 547: 14-15.
18 " . [materia prima] est ingenerabilis et incorruptibilis, ita quod per nullam potentiam
potest generari nec corrumpi." Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. II; OPh VI, 186-187: 5-7. See also
Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 18; OPh IV, 204-205: 3-43; 205: 2-14.
29
matter successiveIy receives various forms in history19, and it has the

same nature (eiusdem rationis) in alI the composites, even in heaven,
since it does not seem to be necessary to postulate a piuraIity in this
connection20 According to Ockham, the quantity of a certain piece of
matter does not depend on matter itseIf, but matter is quantified, by
rarefaction or condensation, in accordance with the form unified with
it. 21
19 "Et materia successive recipit diversas formas et diversa esse formali a quae sunt realiter
ipsae formae, quae materia est una numero in generata et corrupto, quamvis sint in diversis
generatis simui exsistentibus diversae materiae quae sunt omnino eiusdem rationis ... "
Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 9; OPh VI, 180: 27-30. " ... nec illud esse [materia] variatur,.
quantumcumque formae varientur veI esse formalia, hoc est esse quae sunt formae,
varientur. De quo esse Ioquitur Commentator quando dicit quod materia prima variatur
secundum esse; quod non est ali ud dicere quam quod materia potest habere successive
diversas formas." Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. Il; OPh VI, 188: 35-40. In resurrection, a human
being can get quite another matter than he or she had as viator. "lta in resurrectione non erit
omnibus modis idem homo ante resurrectionem et post, quia secundum omnes doctores non
est simpliciter eadem materia numero in resurgente quae fuit ante resurrectionem... " Rep.
IV, q. 13; OTh VII, 264: 14-17.
"Ista autem materia prima est eiusdem rationis in omnibus compositis ... Quod autem
materiae primae omnium generabilium et corruptibilium sunt eiusdem rationis probatur,
quia frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora... " Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 12; OPh VI.
188-189: 3-4, 6-8. " ... illa materia [prima] est eiusdem rationis in omnibus generabilibus
et corruptibiJibus ... " Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 1; OPh IV, 20: 161-162. See also Exp. Phys.
Arist. 1, c. 18; OPh IV, 207: 66-69. "Sic igitur videtur mihi quod in caeI o sit materia
eiusdem rationis cum istis inferioribus. Et hoc, quia pluralitas nunquam est ponenda sine
necessitate, sicut saepe dictum est. Nunc autem non apparet necessitas ponendi materiam
alterius rationis hic et ibi, quia omnia quae possunt salvari per diversitatem materiae
secundum rationem possunt aeque bene veI melius salvari secundum identitatem rationis."
Rep. II, q. 18; OTh V, 404: 4-10.
20
21 " .istae sunt dimensiones interminatae de quibus Ioquitur Commentator, quae isto moda
intelligendae sunt: non quod dimensiones illae interminatae sint quaedam res non habentes
terminum advenientes materiae, sed quod materia non est ex se necessario alicuius certae
quantitatis, puta materia haec extensa non est ex se necessario pedalis quantitatis veI
bipedalis quantitatis, sed secundum diversitatem formae est quantitatis maioris veI minoris.
Sicut magis extenditur eadem materia numero quando est sub forma ignis, et minus
extenditur quando est sub forma aeris, et minus quando est sub forma aquae et adhuc minus
quando est sub forma terrae, et ideo sicut materia non est ex se sub ista forma nec sub illa
sed quandoque sub ista et quandoque sub illa, ita materia quantum est ex se non est alicuius
certae quantitatis, et per consequens ex se non est terminata termino certo, hoc est non est
ex se necessario bicubita nec tricubita, et sic de aliis ... Adhuc guaeres, quare materia est
30
CHAPTER TWO
What is the function of prime matter in the world and

especialIy in the composites where it naturally exists? Unlike
substantial forms, prime matter does not, according to Ockham, seem
to be immediately able to receive any absolute qualities. 22 In
Ockham, prime matter is not needed as a principle of individuation,
since the forms are alI individual beings. Neither is it necessary
because of locality, since pure forms, like angels, are also in a place
(in loco).23 ls it necessary because of extension? The extension of a
thing means that it has parts which are 10calIy distant from each
other. According to Ockham, prime matter is extended, but not by
conceptual necessity. In Summula philosophiae naturalis 1, c. 13,
Ockham states that the proposition 'matter is extended' is not true
maioris quantitatis quando est sub una forma, et quando est sub alia est minoris. Dicendum
quod quando agens naturale inducit formam substantialem in materiam, prius disponit
materiam condensando vei rarefaciendo eam, quae cum fuerit convenienter rarefacta vei
condensata secundum diversitatem formae introducendae introducitur forma talis
substantialis; qua forma introducta, adhuc agens tempore imperceptibili rarefacit vei
condensat materiam simul cum forma usque ad terminum convenientem tali formae, et ita
materia non fit maioris quantitatis vei minoris per receptionem alicuius accidentis absoluti
in ea sed per solam condensationem vei rarefactionem quae non est nisi partes materiae
magis vei minus sibi invicem appropinquari, quod potest fieri per solum motum localem
partium materiae, scilicet per dilatationem et contractionem partium materiae. Hoc tamen
non potest fieri ni si causa agente concurrente, faciente partes dilatari vei contrahi." Summ.
phil. nat. 1, c. 13; OPh VI, 192-194: 23-37,71-85. What quantity there would be in prime
matter if it were separated from any form? This sort of position is naturally impossible
according to Ockham, but if it were the case, then there would be, according to him, a
certain quantity that matter would get by its nature or by an action of an agent in it: "Sed
guaeritur: si materia esset separata ab omni forma, cuius quantitatis esset? Dicendum quod
positio est impossibilis, ideo non est inconveniens concedere inconvenientia quae
sequerentur. Tamen dicendum est quod si materia esset separata ab omni forma substantiali
et accidentali, esset certae quantitatis quae sibi competeret per naturam suam vei per
actionem agentis in eam." Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 13; OPh VI, 193: 65-70.
22 " . materia prima immediate reciperet accidentia absoluta, quod non videtur verum ... "
Quodl. II, q. 11; OTh IX, 162: 18-19.
23 "Nam secundum Sanctos et Doctores authenticos - et satis est de intentione Scripturae
canonicae - angelus est in loca et transfertur de una loca ad alium, quantumcumque non sit
quantus sed indivisibilis, carens omnibus partibus natis distare localiter." Tract. corp. Chr.,
c. 26; OTh X, 148: 66-70. A thing can be in loca only definitively. See Rep. IV, q. 6; OTh
VII, 96: 8-12.
31
per se prima mada but per se secunda mada. This means that the
predicate, 'extended', is not included in the strict definition of the
subject, 'matter', but the subject is included in the definition of the
predicate. Therefore, matter is not extended by conceptual necessity,
but what is extended is matter. Prime matter, however, is, according
to Ockham, by natural necessity and always extended, since it is not
naturally possible that there could be matter whose parts would not
be locally distant from each other. 24 Only by God's absolute power is
it possible that there could be matter without extension. 25 On the
basis of Summula one could think that only prime matter is,
according to Ockham, extended in itself. However, in the light of
several other texts, that does not seem to be Ockham' s opinion. The
other components of the substances, forms, and qualities can also be
24 "Sciendum est au tem quod quamvis haec sit per accidens 'materia est extensa',
distinguendo 'per accidens' contra 'per se primo modo', tamen haec est necessaria et
semper vera et per se secunda modo, quia impossibile est quod sit materia sine extensione:
non enim est possibile quod materia sit nisi habeat partem distantem a parte ... numquam
partes materiae possunt esse in eodem loco. Et ideo semper materia habet partem distantem
a parte, et hoc est materiam esse extensam et quantam vei dimensionatam, quia dimensio,
quantitas sive extensio non est nisi distantia unius partis ab alia. Propter quod sicut haec
non est per se prima modo 'materia habet partem distantem a parte', ita nec haec est per se
prima moda 'materia est extensa'; una tamen est necessaria sicut alia." Summ. phil. nat. 1,
c. 13; OPh VI, 191: 6-10, 12-18. " ... materia de se habet aliam et aliam partem in alia et alia
parte loci, igitur de se est quanta - quamvis haec non sit per se prima moda 'materia est
quanta'." Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 13; OPh VI, 193: 52-54. About per se primo and secundo
modo by Ockham, see Baudry 1958, 198-199.
25 "Sed Deus potest conservare tam materiam quam formam sine quantitate et omni
extensione, et tamen tune haberent partes realiter distinctas licet non extensas." Rep. III, q.
8; OTh VI, 227: 9-11. See also Adams 1987,685; Massobrio 1984,200; Weisheipl1959,
443-444.
32
CHAPTERTWO
extended in themselves. 26 Thus, it is difficult to say what is the

function of prime matter in substances. As Allan B. Wolter remarks:
"Why is matter potency and form act? One can only say that it is
because matter is matter and form is form. This admittedly is not
giving the intrinsic reasons or proper cause thereof. And if you
say: Nothing should be assumed or postulated without necessity
or reason, 1 reply that many things must be postulated the causes
of which we know not. And this because of experience or reasons
based upon empiric al observations. And so it is with matter and
form and the function ascribed to each.'.27
In addition to prime matter, there are substantial forms in the

human being. Like 'matter', the term 'form' cannot be defined with
a strict or proper real definition, since the thing that it signifies is not
a composite substance but a simple entity.28 Is even a real definition
26 "Secundo [arguitur] sic: omne iIlud quod potest esse sine omni alia extrinseco et habere
distinctionem partium realem, situ et loca distinctarum, potest esse quantum et extensum
sine omni extrinseco. Sic est in proposito de materia et forma et qualitate ... " Rep. IV, q. 6;
OTh VII, 73: 17-20. See also the following statements: 'The final characteristic of form is
that it too, Iike matter, has physical extension for the same reasons as matter has." Leff
1975, 578. "Given that matter of itself has some extension or other, just as the various
substantial and qualitative forms do ... " Adams 1987, 682. See also ibid., 693. See also
Weisheipl 1965, 160. The intellectual soul with its qualities, as will be argued below,
cannot be extended at ali.
27
Wolter 1965, 142.
28 " nullum
simplex potest definiri definitione proprie dicta quae sit data ex genere et
sed soia simplicitas propter quam caret differentia essentiali. Et propter eandem rationem,
illa - non possunt definiri definitione proprie dicta." Ord. 1, d. 8, q. 3; OTh III, 208: 22 209: 7. (See also cont.: ibid., 209: 8 - 214: 18.) It seems that other substantial forms but the
intellectual one are simple only in the meaning that they do not have parts that would be
different from the other parts or existing in a different way than the others. The intellectual
form is simple in the way that it is totally indivisible into parts: "Simplicium vero quaedam
carent omni compositione partium quarumcumque, cuiusmodi sunt substantiae abstractae
intellectuales, scilicet intelligentiae; cuiusmodi sunt etiam omnes intellectiones et omnia
33
that includes additional elements excluded, since the forms, like

matter, are not per se in any genus? They are partial beings Of
entities that are naturally essential parts of total or complete beings
or entities. With matter, the forms build composite substances. 29 In
Summula philosophiae naturalis li, c. 2, Ockham says that since
they are parts of substances, forms are per reductionem in the genus
of substance. 30 This still does not mean that God could not make
accidentia animae intellectivae, si ipsa sit indivisibilis, sicut multi ponunt esse de intentione
Aristotelis. Quaedam au tem simplicia dicuntur non per carentiam partium quarumcumque
sed per carentiam partium dissimilium et alterius rationis, cuiusmodi sunt omnia corpora
caelestia secundum intentionem Aristotelis, et omnia accidentia corporalia et materia prima
et forma quaelibet." Summ. phil. nat., praeamb.; OPh VI, 154: 423-431.
haec est causa quare materia vei forma substantialis non est per se in genere, quia est
pars essentialis alicuius exsistentis per se in genere ... " Quaest. phys. Arist., q. 110; OPh VI,
691: 30-32. " ... materia recipit ipsam formam et esse quod est realiter forma, et nihil aliud
recipit. Et ista duo esse partialia si ve duae entitates parti ales constituunt si ve faciunt unum
totum, veI magis proprie loquendo sunt duae partes unius entis seu esse totalis quod est
totum compositum ex illis." Summ. phil. natur. 1, c. 9; OPh VI, 180: 22-27. "Potest tamen
concedi quod totum compositum est effectus formae, quia hoc non est aliud quam dicere
quod anima vei forma est pars totius compositi." Ord. 1, d. 32, q. 2; OTh 1, 413: 12-15.
" ... dico quod post separationem animae intellectivae non remanet sensitiva. Nec prius
tempore introducitur in generatione hominis sensitiva quam intellectiva. Et ad Philosophum
dico quod intelligit quod sensitiva prius natura est in corpore, non autem prius tempore,
quia simul introducuntur et expelluntur. Ad ultimum dico quod si per potentiam divinam
remaneret sensitiva in corpore, illud compositum est vivum, sed nec est animal rationale nec
irrationale; nec est animal vere contentum sub animali quod est genus. Et tota ratio est, quia
non est ens completum existens per se in genere, sed est natum esse pars essentialis alicuius
existentis per se in genere. Et nullum tale est in genere substantiae vei animalis per se; nec
de illo praedicatur aliquod genus per se primo modo. Tamen vocando animal ornne illud
quod habet animam sensitivam, sic bene est animal. Sed tunc 'animal' dicitur aequivoce de
illo et de aliis animalibus. Ad principale dico quod hominis est tantum unum esse totale, sed
plura sunt esse partialia." Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX, 161: 103-119. See Adams: "Many
pluralists labelled the compound of prime matter with its full complement of substantial
forms a 'complete being' and those with less than the fuII complement 'incomplete
beings'." Only complete beings are said to falI under the genus strictly speaking; incomplete
beings, by reduction only." Adams 1987,665-666. " ... pluralists have tumed composite
substances into wholes that are naturally posterior to their parts." Ibid., 669.
29 " .
30 " materia et forma substantialis sunt per reductionem in praedicamento substantiae quia
sunt partes substantiae quae est per se in praedicamento substantiae." Summ. phil. natur. III,
c. 2; OPh VI, 251: 48-51.
34
CHAPTER TWO
them exist without being parts of anything. 31 In defining Of

describing forms, an appeal to matter is necessary, since for us,
forms are not intelligible as themselves, without matter. 32 In
Summula philosophiae naturalis 1, c. 17, Ockham acquiesces in
saying that the form is an act which, because of its nature, is received
in matter (actus natum recipi in materia).33 In the definition or
description of the form there could also probably be the simplicity
mentioned above, as well as some other features common to forms
that will be mentioned when discussing the various forms of the
human being.
In any case, according to Ockham, there is a plurality of forms
in the human being. 34 Ockham, however, admits that this plurality
might be difficult to prove. 35 Actually, the plurality of forms in the
31 Ockham explicitly states that in God's absolute power, there can be form without matter:
"Tamen Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere ibi materiam sine forma, et formam sine
materia, et totum compositum, et quod accidentia illa informent illud compositum vei
materiam sicut placet sibi." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 180: 10-13.
32 " non intelligimus formam substantialem nisi intelligendo quod si cut se habet albedo ad
hominem informando ipsum et faciendo cum ipso unum compositum per accidens, ita forma
substantialis se habet ad materiam informando eam et faciendo unum compositum per se."
Exp. Phys. 1, c. 16; OPh IV, 177: 47-51. See also Summ. phil. natur. 1, c. 14; OPh VI, 195:
18-28.
est quidam actus natum recipi in illa materia." Summ. phil. natur. 1, c. 17; OPh
VI, 199: 19. In Summa logicae, Ockham refers to the Aristotelian definition according to
which the soul can be defined as actus corporis physici organici etc.: "Alia est definiti o
importans quid rei, quae simul cum hoc quod importat rem, importat vei exprimit aliquid
quod non est de essentia rei; sicut definitio animae, quae est ista 'actus corporis physici
organici' etc. importat animam et corpus, quod non est pars animae nec anima. Et ista
vocatur definitio per additamentum. Et tales definitiones importantes quid rei convertuntur
cum nominibus mere absolutis affirmativis." SL III-2, c. 28; OPh 1,556: 28-33.
33 " ... forma
34 " ... secundum opinionem quam reputo veram, in homine sunt plures formae
substantiales ... " Rep. Il, q. 7; OTh V, 137: 8-9. " .. .in composito habente plures formas,
quod probabile est de animalibus et plantis et de homine; et istud reputo verum etiam
secundum philosophiam." Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 1; OPh IV, 20: 173-175.
35 "Quod autem in homine sint plures formae substantiales difficile est bene probare vei eius
oppositum." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 161: 8-9. About the possibilities of proving it, see SL
III-2; OPh 1, 560-561: 10-22. See also the sections an each of the parts of the human
being. Positing more than two parts in a substance raises difficult problems for the subjectrelationships between the parts. See ibid.
35
human being is an idea that was widely accepted among the medieval
Franciscans. 36 Ockham even seems to think that the Paris
Condemnation of 1277 required the plurality of forms in the human
being. 37 However, this plurality did not need to mean the plurality of
souls (anima) in the human being. 38 In Ockham's theory, as will be
seen below, it does mean a plurality of souls, since two of the forms
ofthe human being are souls, i.e., they refer to life (vita).39
According to Ockham, there are three really distinct40
substantial forms in the human being. The forms are:
1) the form of corporeity
2) the sensory form or soul
3) the intellectual form Of sou1. 41
Ockham does not think that one should, because of the vegetativetype of acts or operations, posit a distinct vegetative form or soul in
"Du point de vue philosophique, Ockham suggere ... une vraie pluralite de formes dans
I'homme, tout en perpetuant une tradition franciscaine, ii la suite d' A1exandre de Hales et
de Roger Bacon." Kuc 1986, 283. See a1so Zavalloni 1951, 383-384.
37 See Damiata 1996, 42.
36
38 According to Marilyn McCord Adams (who follows Robert Zavalloni), Ockham's

predecessors had a1so spoken of two or three substantial fonns of soul, but "Ockham seems
uninhibited in his reference to two souls in man". Adams 1987,664.
anima quae est vita... " Quaest. variae, q. 5; OTh VIII, 163: 154.
40 Ockham's criterion for the real distinction: " ... quando a1iqua sic se habent quod unum
manet a1io non manente, ilIa distinguuntur realiter..." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 407: 13-15.
39 " ...
anima intellectiva, sensitiva et fonna corporeitatis distinguuntur realiter..." Quodl. IV,

q. 14; OTh IX, 369: 72-73. In Ockham's earlier works, it is not, still, so c1ear that there are
three distinct fonns in a human being. " ... secundum opinionem quam reputo veram, in
homine sunt plures fonnae substantiales, saltem forma corporeitatis et anima intellectiva;
et quando totum compositum... " Rep. II, q. 7; OTh V, 137: 8-11. " ... dico quod in homine
praeter animam intellectivam est ponere unam a1iam formam, scilicet sensitivam, super
quampotest agenscreatumcorrumpendoetproducendo." Rep. II, q. 13; OTh V, 407: 9-11.
"Ideo ponendo quod in homine sint tres res pertinentes ad eius essentiam, - sicut oportet
necessario [ponere] propter articulum - puta materia prima, fonna sensitiva et forma
intellectiva ... " Rep. III, q. 1; OTh VI, 22: 2-5.
41 " ...
36
CHAPTER TWO
animals. 42 He also rejects the existence of a distinct form of the

whole (forma totius) in the composite. In that way, the whole is not
more than a sum of its partS.43 The forms have the capability of
receiving certain qualities. According to Ockham, they determine for
themselves certain qualities and their grade. 44
The form of corporeity (forma corporeitatis) is one of the
substantial forms of the human being. It perfects prime matter so that
there develops a body (corpus). Thus, the body is, in faet, a
combination of two parts, the form of corporeity and the prime
matter. 45 Ockham thinks that it is necessary to posit a distinct form of
corporeity even in human beings and the brute animals that have the
sensory fom or soul. The distinction between the form of corporeity
and the sensory soul in human beings can be proved experientially:
When human beings die (the souls separate or corrupt), numerically
the same accidents (such ascolors and heat) remain. Therefore, they
have numerically the same subject, since an accident does not
42 ..... dico
quod nulla est necessitas ponendi distinctionem inter [animam] sensitivam et

vegetativam [in animali] , quia illa ratio de diversitate operationum non concludit; quia idem
potestesse principiumdiversarumoperationum." Quodl.Il, q. Il; OTh IX, 164: 64-67. As
Girard Etzkom has remarked, in Rep.Il, q. 19; OTh V, 413: 13-15 Ockham speaks about
a vegetative soul. See Etzkom 1990b, 275. However, even at this point Ockham does not
say that there would be a distinct vegetative soul in animaIs. In Summa logicae (SL III-3, c.
18; OPh 1, 666: 455-456), Ockham a1so seems to posit the vegetative soul. 1 think that in
plants there indeed is a vegetati ve soul according to Ockham, since plants cannot be said to
have a sensory soul (otherwise they would be defined as animals): " ... haec est falsa 'planta
est substantia animata sensibiIis' ... " SL III-3, c. 18; OPh 1, 659: 237-238.
"Ad inteIIigendum quid totum addit super partes sciendum quod negando illam formam
totius quam ponit Ioannes, - quae impossibilis est ad intelligendum... " Quaest. variae, q.
6, a. 2; OTh VIII, 207: 2-4. Scotus did not hold a distinct 'forma totius' view either,
a1though OCkham seems to have thought so. See Rep. II, q. 1; OTh V, 18, footnote 1.
43
44
Rep. III, q. 8; OTh VI, 262: 8-12. About this, see Damiata 1997, 253.
corpus compositum ex materia et forma corporeitatis hominis ... " Exp. Praed. Arist., c.
9; OPh II, 187: 30-31. "Aliter accipitur corpus magis stricte pro a1iquo longo, lato et
profundo quod potest per se exsistere sine a1io, et quod potest a1iud in se recipere quod non
potest esse sine eo. Et sic nec materia nec forma nec qualitas a1iqua est corpus, sed tantum
substantia composita ex materia et forma veI corpus simpIex, cuiusmodi est corpus caeleste,
secundum Philosophum." Exp. Phys. Arist. IV, c. 9; OPh V, 106: 134-139. See a1so
Klocker 1992, 56.
4S .....
THE PASSIONATE RUMAN BEING
37
migrate from one subject to another naturally. The subject is not

prime matter since it does not seem to be true that prime matter
would immediately receive absolute accidents. Therefore, a
previously existing form remains. The sensory soul cannot be that
form. It must be the form of corporeity.46 The distinction between the
form of corporeity and the sensory soul in a human being also is,
according to Ockham, more consonant with the faith of the Church
than their identity.47 In positing the existence of the form of
corporeity in the human being, Ockham follows the Franciscan
tradition. 48
The sensory form (forma sensitiva) is, as a principle of life,
also called the sensory soul (anima sensitiva). The question as to
what is the immediate receiver or subject of the sensory soul is not as
easy as it is in the case of the form of corporeity. When discussing
the immediate subject of the sensory soul in Quodlibet II, q. 11,
Ockham seems to hesitate over whether it is prime matter or the form
of corporeity. Re finds both possible. Even prime matter can be the
subject of the sensory soul, although, as stated above, there is a form
of corporeity that perfects prime matter immediately, for there does
"Utrum anima sensitiva et forma corporeitatis distinguantur realiter tam in brutis quam in
hominibus ... Ad istam quaestionem dico quod sic, quamvis per rationem sit difficile hoc
probare. Tamen ad hoc probandum arguo primo sic: mortuo homine sive bruta animali,
remanent eadem accidentia numero quae prius; igitur habent idem subiectum numero.
Consequentia patet, quia accidens naturaliter non migrat a subiecto in subiectum; sed illud
subiectum non est materia prima, quia tune materia prima immediate reciperet accidentia
absoluta, quod non videtur Verum; igitur remanet aliqua forma praecedens, et non sensitiva;
igitur corporeitas." Quodl. II, q. Il; OTh IX, 162: 2-4, 12-20. The body cannot be the
primary subject of the absolute corporeal qualities, since it is not the case that an accident
would be more simple than its primary subject. The corporeal absolute qualities, such as
colors, are simple, but the body is a combination of matter and the form of corporeity.
" ... generaliter subiectum cuiuscumque accidentis primum est ita simplex sicut ipsum
accidens... " Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 118: 12-13. See also the discussion: ibid. 118: 14 - 119:
16.
46
Quodl.n, q. 11; OTh IX, 163-164: 49-58. For more about Ockham's discussion on the
possibilities of proving the distinction between the form of corporeity and the sensory form,
see Gannon 1975, 13-22.
47
48
Federhofer 1926, 267; Copleston 1963, 11 O.
38
CHAPTER TWO
not seem to be any reason why there could not be two forms that
perfect the same prime matter immediately. Whatever the immediate
subject of the sensory soul is, it is not a complete entity. If it were,
the sensory soul would only be its accident. 49 In Quaestiones in
librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 9, Ockham seems to have thought
that the immediate subject of the sensory soul is the form of
corporeity.50
Although Ockham seems to admit that the immediate subject
of the sensory soul is the form of corporeity, the sensory soul is also
present in matter. As divisible into parts which have the same nature
but which can be locally distant from each other, the sensory soul
exists in the body circumscriptively, so that a part of it exists in one
part and another part in another part of the body. For instance, a part
of it exists in the organ of sight, and another part in the aural organ.
The distinction of the parts (and a jortiori of the capacities) of the
sensory soul is indeed real, since after the destruction of one part of
it, the other parts can remain. 5 ! Ockham also states that a new part of
"Sed dubium est...secundo, de subiecto immediato formae sensitivae, utrum sit materia
vei forma corporeitatis ... Ad secundum dico quod sensitiva immediate recipitur in forma
corporeitatis, vei in materia immediate, quia non videtur aliqua ratio cogens quin duae
formae extensae perficiant eamdem materiam immediate .. .illud quod advenit enti in actu
completo et specifico, illud est accidens; sed anima sensitiva non advenit tali enti; igitur
etc." Quodl. II, q. 11; OTh IX, 164: 60-62,69-75.
49
"Si autem ponantur plures formae, sicut in homine, tunc est ibi una forma substantialis
[immediate] informans [materiam et illa est dispositio ad aliam formam]. Et sic sunt
diversae materiae in composito habente plures formas, quia forma prior est materia respectu
posterioris informans materiam immediate, et alia forma posterior informans formam
priorem immediate tamquam subiectum immediate receptivum." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII,
160: 21 - 161: 7. (The parts of the text in brackets are text criticali y uncertain. See the text
critical apparatus ibid., 160.)
5l " .. tota forma sensitiva in homine est una forma, Iicet habeat diversas partes extensas sub
diversis partibus quantitatis." Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 124: 24 - 125: 1. "Intelligendum
tamen quod licet in animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva quae elicit ornnes istas
operationes, tamen ipsa forma non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis,
quia forma sensitiva in quolibet animali - sicut pono - extenditur ad extensionem
quantitatis in materia ita quod sicut una pars quantitatis est in una parte materiae et alia pars
in alia parte, ita una pars animae sensitivae perficit unam partem materiae et alia pars
eiusdem rationis per ornnia perficit aliam partem, ita quod pars illa formae sensitivae
50
39
the sensory soul is added if a new part of matter is added. 52 Thus, the
sensory form does not remain the same during the entire life of a
human being and less so after resurrection. 53
The body of the human being remains, as argued above, after
the exit of the souls. Could the sensory soul of the human being
remain within the body without the intellectual soul? By God's
absolute power, there could be such a composite. It would be a living
(vivus) thing (since it has a soul), but it would not be a complete
being, but a thing which is naturally a part of a complete being. As
such it would not be an anima1. 54 This kind of view is in line with
perficiens organum visus est potentia visiva, eo modo quo nunc loquimur de potentia, et
alia pars eiusdem rationis perficiens organum auditus est potentia auditiva, et sic deinceps.
Et ideo non obstante quod in una animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva, cum hoc tamen
stat quod potentiae sensitivae aliquo moda distinguuntur ab invicem sicut partes eiusdem
formae quae sunt eiusdem rationis. Et ista distinctio est realis, quia potest una pars formae
quae dicitur una potentia totaliter destrui, et alia pars quae dicitur alia potentia potest
manere. Sicut si eruatur oculus, tunc illa pars formae quae perficiebat pupillam oculi
corrumpitur, et adhoc remanet illa pars forrnae sensitivae quae perficit organum auditus. Et
ideo inter potentias est distinctio realis, talis qualis est inter partes eiusdem formae quae
faciunt per se unam formam, quo moda partes albedinis in una parte superficiei
distinguuntur a partibus eiusdem albedinis in alia parte eiusdem superficiei." Rep. III, q. 4;
OTh VI, 136: 22 - 138: 1. (See until ibid., 139:15.) " ... sed anima sensitiva in homine est
extensa et materialis ... " Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX, 159: 63-64.
non est haereticum dicere quod per augmentationem hominis advenit nova pars
materiae, secundum omnes, et nova pars formae sensitivae quae extenditur secundum
veritatem, faciens unum cum corpore praeexsistente, et [non est haereticum dicere] quod
per diminutionem deperditur aliqua pars materiae et similiter formae praeexsistentis." Rep.
IV, q. 13; OTh VII, 269: 12-17.
52 "
"Ita in resurrectione non erit omnibus modis idem homo ante resurrectionem et post, quia
secundum omnes doctores non est simpliciter eadem materia numero in resurgente quae fuit
ante resurrectionem, nec eadem forma sensitiva, si ponatur distincta ab intellectiva et
extensa... " Rep. IV, q. 13; OTh VII, 264: 14-18.
53
54 " dico
quod post separationem animae intellectivae non remanet sensitiva. Nec prius
tempore introducitur in generatione hominis sensitiva quam intellectiva. Et ad Philosophum
dico quod intelligit quod sensitiva prius natura est in corpore, non autem prius tempore,
quia simul introducuntur et expelluntur. Ad ultimum dico quod si per potentiam divinam
remaneret sensitiva in corpore, illud compositum est vivum, sed nec est animal rationale nec
irrationale; nec est animal vere contentum sub animali quod est genus. Et tota ratio est, quia
non est ens completum existens per se in genere, sed est natum esse pars essentialis alicuius
existentis per se in genere. Et nullum tale est in genere substantiae vei animalis per se; nec
40
CHAPTER TWO
what Ockham thinks about the ontological status of the substantial

parts of the human being, forms and matter. In addition, it is in line,
or at least it is not in apparent disagreement, with the Paris
Condemnation of 1277, which censured the view that when the
human being dies and loses his or her intellectual soul, there still
remains a living animal. 55
The intellectual form (forma intellectiva) or soul (anima
intellectiva) is, according to Ockham, the ultimate form (forma
ultima) of the human being, making a human being what he or she
specifically is. Therefore, it can also be called the specific form
(forma specifica) of the human being. 56 Every human being has a
separate intellectual soul. It is not the case that there is numerically
one and the same intellect in everyone, as Averroes thought. 57 Just
like the other forms, the intellectual soul of a human being is not a
substance per se, but a part of a composite substance. 58
Ockham admits, however, that it is not easy to present proofs
for a distinct intellectual soul in a human being. According to him, it
de ilIo praedicatur aliquod genus per se prima modo. Tamen vocando animal omne illud
quod habet animam sensitivam, sic bene est animal. Sed tunc 'animal' dicitur aequivoce de
illo et de aliis animalibus. Ad principale dico quod hominis est tantum unum esse totale, sed
plura sunt esse partialia." Quodl. Il, q. 10; OTh IX, 161: 103-119. ''Tunc istae duae
differentiae, rationale et sensibile, ordinantur, quia omne rationale est sensibile et non e
converso. Non tamen unum est per se inferius et aliud per se superius ... " Ord. 1, d. 8, q. 6;
OTh 1, 254: 19-22.
55 See Damiata 1996,41-42; Gannon 1975,42-45.
Sometimes, like in the following citation, Ockham uses the term 'rational soul' instead of
'intellectual soul': " ... forma ultima est forma simplex quae est forma specifica; sicut forma
ultima in homine est anima rationalis ... " Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 1; OPh IV, 20: 163-164.
" ... dico quod duae formae specificae et ultimae, si ve sint elementares sive mixtae, non
possunt esse in eodem individuo. Et tota ratio est quia utraque forma est ultimate
constituens speciem suam; et loquor de substantialibus formis. Sed idem individuum
numero non potest exsistere per se in diversis speciebus, sicut idem individuum non potest
esse homo et asinus nec ignis et aqua etc." Rep. II, q. 19; OTh V, 418: 3-9.
56
In Quodlibet 1, there is a whole question in which Ockham tries to prove that Averroes is
wrong. Quodl. 1, q. Il; OTh IX, 66-68: 2-58.
58 " .. anima intellectiva quae non est natura completa in genere substantiae, quia nata est
esse pars alicuius exsistentis per se in genere substantiae." Rep. III, q. 1; OTh VI, 5: 3-5.
57
41
cannot be proved from propositions that are known per se that there
is a real distinction between the sensory and the intellectual soul. 59
However, the distinction can be proved otherwise. 1 take up only the
proof that deals with the theme of this study, the acts of the soul.
This proof runs as follows: Given the distinction between those two
souls, one can explain how there can simultaneously be in the same
human being contrary acts related to the same object. Separate forms
or souls can, of course, have separate acts; the sensory soul has acts
of its own and so does the intellectual soul. 60 Moreover, given the
distinction, one can explain how the human being can
simultaneously have natural and free acts that relate to the same
object. Ockham states that the same form could not, at the same
time, elicit an act of desiring something naturally and an act of
desiring the same thing freely. But positing the distinction between
the souls or forms, one can say that the sensory appetite (the sensory
soul as appetitive potency) acts naturally, and the will (the
intellectual soul as appetitive potency) acts freelyY
59 "Utrum anima sensitiva et intellectiva in homine distinguantur realiter. .. Ad istam

quaestionem dico quod sic. Sed diffici!e est hoc probare, quia ex propositionibus per se
notis probari non potest." Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX, 156-157: 2-3,11-12.
60 "Probo tamen quod distinguuntur realiter prima sic: impossibile est quod in eodem
subiecto sint simul contraria; sed actus appetendi aliquid et actus renuendi idem in eodem
subiecto sunt contraria; igitur si sint simul in rerum natura, non sunt in eodem subiecto; sed
manifestum est quod sunt simu! in homine, quia illud idem quod homo appetit per
appetitum sensitivum, renuit per appetitum intellectivum. Confirmatur per Aristote!em, III
De anima, qui dicit quod in eodem sunt appetitus contrarii; hoc est, essent actus contrarii,
si essent nati recipi in eodem subiecto ... Praeterea eadem forma substantialis non potest
simu! et seme! habere duos actus appetendi respectu eiusdem obiecti; sed in homine
frequenter sunt simu! actus volendi aliquod obiectum et actus appetendi idem appetitu
sensitivo; igitur isti actus non sunt in eodem subiecto." Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX, 157-158:
13-22,32-36. See also Rep. III, q. 8; OTh VI, 270: 20 - 271: 7; Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII,
161: 9-22.
61 "Praeterea eadem forma numero non eli cit simul et seme! unum actum appetendi aliquid
naturaliter et alium libere; sed homo libere vuit aliquid et appetitus sensitivus naturaliter
appetit illud; igitur etc." Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX, 158: 37-40. Id., sec Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh
VII, 162: 1-3. Other proofs of the distinction of the sou!s, see Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX,
158-159: 42-53, 62-65. Sec also Holopainen 1991, 3-5; Adams 1987,657-661; Gannon
1975, 29-45.
42
CHAPTER TWO
Even if it were proved, by various incompatible acts, that there

is a distinct intellectual soul in the human being, it would not yet be
proved that the intellectual soul has, as Ockham thinks, a nature and
way of existing in a substance which fundamentally differ from the
nature and the way of existing of the other forms. In Quodlibet 1, q.
10, Ockham even states that, following natural reason, one would
think that the "higher" acts that are experienced (understanding,
willing, etc.) are caused and received in a form that distinguishes a
human being from a brute animal but that that form is extended,
generable and corruptible, since it does not seem that experience
would establish a different sort of form. On theological grounds,
however, it has to be believed that there is in human beings an
intellectual soul which has special properties and which, as such,
exists in human beings in a special way. Does this mean that
Ockham sees a contradiction between faith and natural reason? He
may see one, but it is, of course, not a question of two truths, since,
according to Ockham, the true view is the one of faith. According to
the truth of faith, the intellectual soul is, unlike the other substantial
forms of the human being, a naturally ingenerable and incorruptible62
form, which is simple in the way that it is totally indivisible.
(Ockham even says that it is as simple as GOd. 63 ) As such, it is not
present in the body circumscriptively but definitively: a whole in the
whole body and a whole in each of its parts. 64 It is indeed a form of
62 For various ways to take 'corruption', see Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 113; OPh VI, 701:
95-101. The same in detaiI: Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 18; OPh IV, 204-205: 20-35.
63 "
anima intellectiva est ita simplex sicut Deus ... " Quodl. VII, q. 13; OTh IX, 750: 28.
dico quod intelligendo per 'animam intellectivam' formam immaterialem,

incorruptibilem quae tota est in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte, nec potest evidenter
seiri per rationem veI per experientiam quod talis forma sit in nobis, nec quod intelligere tali
substantiae proprium sit in nobis, nec quod talis anima sit forma corporis, - quidquid de
hoc senserit Philosophus non curo ad praesens, quia ubique dubitative videtur Ioqui - , sed
ista tria solum credimus. Quod autem non possit demonstrarl patet, quia omnis ratio
probans ista accipit dubia homini sequenti naturalem rationem. Nec per experientiam
probantur, quia solum experimur intellectionem et volitionem et consimilia; sed omnia ista
diceret sequens rationem cum experientia esse operationes et passiones causatas et receptas
in forma iIla per quam poneret hominem distingui a brutis. Et licet secundum fidem et
64
"
43
the body, not just a mover (motor) in it. Ockham thinks that if an
imrnaterial and incorruptible intellectual form in a human being has
been posited, it is more reasonable to say that the form in question is
the form of the body than to say that it is only a mover of the body.65
The question of what is the imrnediate receiver or subject of
the intellectual soul in the human composite remains open, since
Ockham does not say very much about it. At Ieast it appears that alI
the other parts of the human being, that is, prime matter, the form of
corporeity and the sensory soul are (naturally taken) presupposed for
receiving the intellectual soul. Ockham may think that the Iast one of
veritatem iIIa sit anima intellectiva quae est forma incorruptibilis, tamen talis diceret quod
esset forma extensa et corruptibilis et generabilis; nec videtur quod experientia aliam
formam concludat...Ad principale, concederet sequens naturalem rationem quod experimur
intellectionem in nobis, quae est actus formae corporeae et corruptibilis; et diceret
consequenter quod talis forma recipitur in forma extensa." Quodl. 1, q. 10; OTh IX, 63-65:
39-57, 88-91. "Utrum anima intellectiva sit tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet
parte... Ad questionem dico quod sic. Cuius ratio est quia anima est in qualibet parte et tota
in qualibet parte; igitur tota est in toto et tota in qualibet parte. Prima pars antecedentis
patet, quia aliter aliqua pars non esset informata anima, et per consequens non esset pars
hominis. Secunda pars patet, quia anima intellectiva est forma indivisibilis et inextensa,
igitur ubicumque est, totaliter est." Quodl. 1, q. 12; OTh IX, 68-69: 2-3, 9-15. "Sed esse
in loca definitive est totum esse in toto loca et totum esse in qualibet parti loci, sicut
angelus est in loco, et corpus Christi in Eucharistia; et anima intellectiva sic est in toto
corpore et in qualibet parte, licet non sicut in loco." Quodl. IV, q. 21; OTh IX, 401: 16-19.
See also Holopainen 1991, 6-8. Scotus also thought that the immortality of the soul could
not be proved by human reason alone. See Williams 2001, 9. Ockham's opinion of the
conception of the natural reason about the subject of intellections resembles Alexander of
Aphrodisias' s view. See Pluta 1987, 60-61.
65 "Si autem ponatur, sicut ponimus secundum veritatem, quod anima intellectiva, quae est
forma immaterialis et incorruptibilis, sit in nobis et quod per eam intelligamus, tunc
rationabilius est ponere ipsam esse formam corporis quam quod sit solus motor. Quia si
esset motor, aut moveret corpus motu locali aut alterationis. Non prima modo, quia tunc
aequaliter moveret corpus pueri et adulti; similiter ad movendum corpus motu locali sufficit
anima quae est forma corporis, igitur superfluum est ponere alium motorem. Nec secunda
modo, quia ad omnem alterationem corporalem sufficiunt alia agentia corporalia; igitur talis
motor superfluit." Quodl. 1, q. 10; OTh IX, 64-65: 67-77. About this, see also Damiata
1996, 37-40. Siger of Brabant advocated the view that the intellectual soul is only a mover
of the body: "La teoria dell' anima intellettiva come motore del corpo era stata proposta da
Sigieri di Brabante, il fondatore del cosiddetto averroismo latino." Ghisalberti 1991, 50,
footnote 21.
44
CHAPTERTWO
those, that is, the sensory soul, is the immediate subject of the
intellectual soul. 66
As mentioned above, the intellectuai soul is, according to
theological truth, naturalIy incorruptible. After its separation from
the human composite, it continues to exist without being in a
composite until it is again united with the other parts of the human
being at the resurrection. In fact, at the resurrection, a human being
is not necessarily in alI respects exactly the same composite that he
or she was before, since the matter, the form of corporeity, and the
sensory soul are not necessarily the same. For the numerical
sameness of a human being, it suffices that the intellectuai soul is the
same. 67
66 " . si esset possibile animam intellectivam informare immediate materiam primam vei
formam corporeitatis sine anima sensitiva, - si cut potest esse separata sine anima sensitiva
- , non esset contradictio quod aliquid esset compositum et rationale et tamen quod non
esset sensibile. Nec tunc ordinarentur taliter differentiae ilIae nisi secundum communem
cursum naturae et quod naturaliter non potest aliter esse, non tamen repugnaret divinae
potentiae aliter facere." Ord. 1, d. 8, q. 6; OTh III, 257: 9-16. " ... antequam corpus recipiat
animam intellectivam praecedit forma corporeitatis, et ilIa non corrumpitur in adventu
animae intellectivae. Quia forma corporeitatis praecedit animam intellectivam duratione et
manet in corp ore cum anima intellectiva, igitur est ibi generatio sine corruptione." Rep. II,
q. 7; OTh V, 137: 15-19. "Si autem ponantur plures formae, sicut in homine, tunc est ibi
una forma substantialis [immediate] informans [materiam et ilIa est dispositio ad aliam
formam]. Et sic sunt diversae materiae in composito habente plures formas, quia forma prior
est materia respectu posterioris informans materiam immediate, et alia forma posterior
informans formam priorem immediate tamquam subiectum immediate receptivum." Rep.
IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 160: 21 - 161: 7. (The parts ofthe text in brackets are text criticaIly
uncertain. See the text critical apparatus ibid., 160.) In this connection, it can be mentioned
that before being united with the other parts of a human being, the intellectual soul does not
exist: " ... anima [intellectiva] prius tempore exsisteret quam uniretur corpori, quod non est
verum." Rep. IV, q. 12; OTh VII, 245: 1-2.
quomodo fiet resurrectio. Respondeo iuxta doctrinam Sanctorum, licet istud non possit
sufficienter probari, quod ministerio angelorum fiet sic quod prima congregabunt materiam,
qua congregata inducetur prima forma substantialis praecedens animam intellectivam, ct
ultimo inducetur anima intellectiva." Rep. IV, q. 12; OTh VII, 245: 11-16. "Ha in
resurrectione non erit ornnibus modis idem homo ante resurrectionem et post, quia
secundum ornnes doctores non est simpliciter eadem materia numero in resurgente quae fuit
ante resurrectionem, nec eadem forma sensitiva, si ponatur distincta ab intellectiva ct
extensa, quia tunc dicendum est de ea sicut de materia in augmentatione per ornnia. Tamen
bene dicitur idem homo numero, quia anima intellectiva, quae est forma simplex remanct
67 " ...
45
In his anthropology, Ockham wants to maintain both the

distinction of the parts of the human being and the unity of the
human being. 68 His solution is that there is a union (unio) among the
parts of the substance which stiH enables the parts to remain really
distinct. 69 There also are unions among the parts of different kinds of
composites other than the substantial ones, for instance the
accidental composites, in which it is a question of a substance having
a quality.70 However, Ockham presents two reasons why a per se
composite (a substance is such) is more united (one) than an
accidental composite. His reasoning mns as follows: a thing that is a
composite per se is composed of the essential parts that belong to the
same genus - unlike an accidental composite that is composed of
parts that belong to different genera. In addition to this, the essential
parts - potentia (that is, matter) and actus (that is, form) - of such a
composite are not per se in any genus (theyare neither substances
nor qualities), but only per reductionem are they substances, as
mentioned before. In an accidental composite the parts are per se in
in toto et in qualibet parte... Sed in homine remanet anima intellectiva omnino eadem
secundum se et secundum quodlibet sui ante augmentationem et post, et ante resurrectionem
et post." Rep. IV, q. 13; OTh VII, 264: 14-21; 265: 9-11.
For example, Harry R. Klocker is not convinced that Ockham manages to maintain the
numerical unity of a human being. He states:"It is here, perhaps, that his [Ockham's]
position becomes as weak as it ever does. It is difficult to conceive how man remains a
numerical unity composed as he is of four different and separable realities." Klocker 1992,
57.
69 "Nam in unione materiae cum forma, materia et forma remanent distinctae secundum suas
entitates sicut prius, et hoc non obstante propter unionem unius ad alteram, materia
denominatur a proprietatibus formae et e converso." Rep. III, q. 1; OTh VI, 10: 11-15.
" ...dico quod nihil est compositum sine unione partium componibilium, accipiendo
unionem pro ipsis partibus unitis ... " Ord. 1, d. 30, q. 1; OTh IV, 318: 1-3. In the severalform-compositional substances there is also a union between the forms, not only between
the forms and prime matter. Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 424: 8-11.
70 Ockham gives this list of unions: " ... unio naturae humanae ad divinam, unio materiae ad
formam et e converso, unio accidentis ad subiectum, unio unius partis continui ad aliam."
Ord. 1, d. 30, q. 4; OTh IV, 369: 3-6.
68
46
CHAPTER TWO
a genus (they are either substances or qualities).71 However, are the

unions in question themselves entities? It is dear that, for Ockham,
theunions are not absolute things, since aU the absolute things in the
world are either substances or qualities. But it remains a little undear
if they, after aU, are real relative things. 72 In Summula philosophiae
naturalis 1, c. 19, it seems to be said that, besides the form and
matter, there is not a third thing in the substances, but the parts exist
simultaneously and conjunctively in them. Ockham continues that
"the whole is not~ing but aU the parts; yet not always, but only when
[the parts] are debito modo settled or ordained, or united". How this
comes about remains undear. 73 However, in this way Ockham tries
to justify the unity of the human being that is composed of four really
distinct parts.
71 "".dico quod duplex est ratio quare totum compositum per se est magis unum quam illud
quod est solum unum aggregatione. Una est quia totum per se componitur ex partibus
essentialibus eiusdem generis; totum per accidens ex partibus alterius generis. Alia est quia
totum per se componitur ex partibus essentialibus, quarum una est potentia essentialiter et
alia actus, et neutra est per se in genere sed solum per reductionem. Totum per accidens,
licet componatur ex partibus talibus quarum una est in potentia ad ali am, tamen utraque
pars talis entis est per se in genere, quia tam accidens quam eius subiectum. Et propter istas
rationes dicitur unum totum magis unum quam aliud." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 2; OTh VIII,
213-214: 151-162. " ... materia vei fonna substantialis non est per se in genere, quia est pars
essentialis alicuius exsistentis per se in genere... " Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 110; OPh VI, 691:
30-32. "Accipiendo hoc nomen 'materia' et hoc nomen 'forma' primo modo, concedendum
est quod semper materia et fonna realiter distinguuntur, et hoc si ve faciant per se unum
si cut est in omni substantia composita, si ve accidentaliter faciant unum sicut est quando
albedo vei aliqua alia qualitas informat suum subiectum." Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 15; OPh IV,
161-162: 126-130.
72
See footnote 51 on page 14.
" secundum eum [Aristotelem] totum non est aliud a partibus simul iunctis et
unitis ... Dicendum est igitur quod praeter partes quae sunt materia et forma non est alia tertia
entitas distincta ab illis, sed est aliqua composita quae nec est una pars nec alia, ita quod
illud compositum nec est materia nec fonna sed simul et coniunctim materia et fonna
unitae ... Et de compositis quae sunt per se unum, verum est simpliciter quod quodlibet
eorum est suae partes simul et coniunctim, ita quod illud totum non est nisi suae partes
simul exsistentes. Sed de artificialibus est aliud ... Sic igitur patet quod totum non est nisi
omnes partes; sed non semper, sed solum tunc quando sunt debito moda collocatae veI
ordinatae seu unitae." Summ. phil. nat. 1, c. 19; OPh VI, 205-208: 14-15,30-33,35-38,
91-93.
71
47
2.2. PASSIONS OF THE SOULS
My aim in this sub-chapter is to clarify what Ockham means by the

passions of the souls when referring to appetitive phenomena of the
souls. For that purpose, 1 shall first investigate Ockham's theory of
the potencies of the souls. After that, 1 shall analyze his conception
of the qualities of the souls. The passions belong to the latter. Like
many terms, the term 'potency of the soul' (potentia animae) has
more thanjust one meaning. In its most important meaning, it is used
for something that exists in the soul as a (partial) principle
(principium) or faculty of acting. In that meaning, the potencies of
the souls cannot really be distinguished from the souls themselves or
from the other potencies of the souls "as distinct things and
essences" (sicut res et essentiae distinctae). According to Ockham,
the souls themselves are capable of having different acts, and that is
why it is not necessary to posit really distinct potencies in them. 74
dico quod potentia animae potest dupliciter accipi...alio moda pro illo praecise quod
se tenet a parte animae elicientis tanquam principium partiale... Secundo moda [potentiae
sensitivae] non distinguuntur realiter, sicut res et essentiae distinctae, nec inter se nec ab
anima sensitiva. Quod probatur, quia frustra tit per plura quod potest tieri per pauciora. Sed
per unam animam sensitivam quae se tenet a parte principii elicientis indistinctam possunt
elici ornnes operationes sensitivae, ergo frustra ponuntur plures formae." Rep. III, q. 4; OTII
VI, 135: 2-3,4-6; 136: 16-21. " ... potentia dupliciter accipitur in proposito. Uno moda pro
eo quod se tenet a parte animae. Et sic ex diversitate operationum non arguitur diversitas
potentiarum. Nam intellectus est sic una potentia et habet diversas operationes specie
distinctas, sicut actum simplicis intelligentiae et actum componendi, dividendi et
discurrendi. Eadem voluntas habet volitionem et nolitionem tanquam operationes distinctas
specie ... Sed si aliqua potentia potest habere plures operationes specie distinctas, non
coexigito tali organo [corporali], sicut voluntas volitionem et nolitionem, tunc ex pluralitate
operationum non potest argui pluralitas potentiarum." Rep. II, q. 4; OTh V, 58: 4-10,
17-21. In the other meaning mentioned in the texts referred to above, 'potency ofthe soul'
is used for everything that is necessarily needed in order to have acts in the soul. Among
others, various absolute and other qualities and bodily organs are potencies of the soul in
that meaning ofthe term. See Rep. III, q. 4; OTh VI, 135: 2-4,7 -136: 14; Rep. II, q. IV,
OTh V, 58: J O- J 5. Compare with Aquinas, according to whom the potencies are distinct,
see Damiata 1996,44-46; Ghisalberti 1991,51; Federhofer 1926, 269-273. According to
74 "
48
CHAPTER TWO
Therefore, one can speak about the potencies of the souls as

principles of acts, but then the term 'potency of the soul' signifies the
soul itself and connotes acts in it.
In the sensory soul, taking 'potency' in the meaningjust given,
there are the basic potencies called 'sensory cognition' and 'sensory
appetite' .75 However, in addition to these, there, in fact, seems to be
a third basic potency. There are so-called vegetative (such as
nutritive) operations in the human being and in brute animals (and,
of course, in plants). 76 Apparentl y thinking of them, Ockham at least
once in his writings c1early posits the vegetative potency.77 This has
to be a potency of the sensory soul since, according to Ockham, it is
not necessary to make a distinction between the sensory and the
vegetative soul in animals. 78 In the intellectual soul, taking 'potency'
in the meaning given above, there are the potencies called 'intellect'
and 'will' .79
.
Franz Federhofer, Ockham "kehrt zu der friihscholastischen Auffassung zuriick, die in den
Verrnogen der Seele nur verschiedene Ttigkeitsweisen derselben erblickt". Ibid., 269.
About Ockham's discussion with Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Scotus on this question, see
Rep. II, q. 20; OTh V, 425:1- 447:19.
cognitiva sensitiva et appetitus sensitivus nullo moda distinguuntur ex natura rei...et
hoc loquendo de quid rei istarum potentiarum, non de quid nominis ... " Rep. II, q. 20; OTh
V, 446: 16-19.
75 " .
76 " . dico quod Philosophus non vocat operationem actum appetitus sensitivi, sed
cognitionem sensitivam vei operationem vegetativae vei aliam operationem quae potest esse
sine sensu." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 181: 80-83.
77 " ... potentiae vegetativae sunt activae secundum ornnes. Patet II De anima, ubi ostendit
quod praeter calorem naturalem in augmento est alia potentia activa, scilicet potentia
vegetativa; sed in beata Virgine fuit potentia vegetativa ... " Rep. III, q. 6; OTh VI, 163:
15-18.
78 " .. dico quod nulla est necessitas ponendi distinctionem inter [animam] sensitivam et
vegetativ am [in animali], quia illa ratio de diversitate operationum non concludit; quia idem
potest esse principium diversarum operationum." Quodl. II, q. 11; OTh IX, 164: 64-67.
.intellectus et voluntas sunt ornnino idem, et ideo quidquid est in intellectu est in
voluntate et e converso. Et ita fruitio est in intellectu et est actus intellectus ex quo est actus
voluntatis. Sed intendo dicere quod fruitio non est intelligere nec scire et sic de aliis actibus
qui dicuntur actus quocumque moda cognitivi. Et isto modo, conforrnando me moda
loquendi aliorum, intelligo quando dico fruitionem esse actum non intellectus sed voluntatis
et similia." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1, 396: 13-20. " ... illa potentia quae est intellectus et illa
79 "
49
According to Ockham, the sensory soul is an extended form in

the body and, as such, divisible into really distinct parts, although
onIy into parts which alI have the same nature. Referring to such
parts of the sensory soul, one can speak about really distinct
potencies of the sensory soul. For instance, referring to the part of the
soul which perfects the organ of sight, one can speak about the
potency of seeing, and referring to the part which perfects the aural
organ, one can speak about the potency of hearing, and then it is
indeed a question of really distinct potencies of the sensory soul. 80
quae est voluntas nullo moda distinguuntur a parte rei nec a parte rationis ... quia ista sunt
nomina significantia idem, connotando praecise distinctos actus, scilicet intelligendi et
volendi." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1, 402: 14-15, 16-17. " ... sciendum quod non obstante
identitate intellectus et voluntatis, tamen actus intelligendi et volendi sunt distincti. Et ideo
voI o uti intellectu et voluntate prout connotant istos actus, propter quam connotationem
aliquid potest attribui intellectui et negari a voluntate... " Ord. 1, d. 13, q. un.; OTh III, 418:
19-23. In Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, there is a whole question of
whether the intellect and the will (and the memory) are really distinct potencies. In that text,
Ockham rejects both Aquinas' s real distinction and Seotus' s formal distinction. See Rep. II,
q. 20; OTh V, 425:1 - 447:19. See also Rep. III, q. 11; OTh VI, 368: 14-21. For the
intellect and the will, see also Perler 1988, 255-261.
80 " tota
forma sensitiva in homine est una forma, licet habeat diversas partes extensas sub
diversis partibus quantitatis." Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 124: 24 - 125: 1. "Intelligendum
tamen quod Iicet in animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva quae elieit omnes istas
operationes, tamen ipsa forma non est indivisibilis sed divisibilis in partes eiusdem rationis,
quia forma sensitiva in quolibet animali - sicut pono - extenditur ad extensionem
quantitatis in materia ita quod sicut una pars quantitatis est in una parte materiae et alia pars
in alia parte, ita una pars animae sensitivae perficit unam partem materiae et alia pars
eiusdem rationis per omnia perficit aliam partem, ita quod pars illa formae sensitivae
perficiens organum visus est potentia visiva, eo moda quo nune Ioquimur de potentia, et
alia pars eiusdem rationis perficiens organum auditus est potentia auditiva, et sic deinceps.
Et ideo non obstante quod in una animali sit tantum una forma sensitiva, cum hoc tamen
stat quod potentiae sensitivae aliquo moda distinguuntur ab invicem sicut partes eiusdem
formae quae sunt eiusdem rationis. Et ista distinctio est realis, quia potest una pars formae
quae dicitur una potentia totaliter destrui, et alia pars quae dicitur alia potentia potest
manere. Sicut si eruatur oeuIus, tune illa pars formae quae perficiebat pupillam oculi
corrumpitur, et adhoe remanet illa pars formae sensitivae quae perficit organum auditus. Et
ideo inter potentias est distinctio realis, talis qualis est inter partes eiusdem formae quae
faci unt per se unam formam, quo moda partes albedinis in una parte superficiei
distinguuntur a partibus eiusdem albedinis in alia parte eiusdem superficiei." Rep. III, q. 4;
OTh VI, 136: 22 - 138: 1. (See untit ibid., 139: 15.) " ... sed anima sensitiva in homine est
extensa et materialis ... " Quodl. II, q. 10; OTh IX, 159: 63-64.
50
CHAPTERTWO
By the term 'sense' (sensus), Ockham means the composites of

the sensory potency and a corporeal organ. 81 There are five exterior
senses (sensus exterior) in the human being with sensations proper to
them: sight, touch, hearing, taste and smell. 82 Furthermore, there are
in the human being the interior senses (sensus interior), such as
common sense or fantasy, with apprehensions proper to them. 83
Whether the senses are, besides being instances of various cognitive
phenomena, instances according to which appetitive phenomena are
divided will be discussed later. 84 Most often Ockham simply speaks
about the sensory appetite as a subject of the appetitive phenomena
without trying to decide its place in the sensory soul or the body.
Thus, there are at least cognitive and appetitive potencies and
phenomena in the souIs. The division of the potencies of the soul
into cognitive and appetitive was generalIy in use in medieval
psychoIogy.85 Oswald Fuchs calis the appetitive potency "the
conative factor" the processes of which cover "alI those noncognitive experiences which have an overtone of feeling, pleasure,
81 " accipiendo
sensum pro composita ex organo et potentia... " Rep. III, q. 3; 0Th VI, 105:
19-20.
82 "Quia unus motus est ad sensibile visus, puta aIbedinem, et sic est idem cum sensibili
iIIius sensus quo ad positivum in eo; alius motus est ad sensibile tactus, puta ad calorem;
tertius ad sensibile auditus, puta ad sonum; quartus ad sensibile gustus, puta ad saporem;
quintus ad sensibile oIfactus, puta ad odorem." Rep. II, q. 7; OTIt V, 125: 11-15.
" ... sensationibus quinque sensuum exteriorum." Rep. III, q. 3; OTIt VI, 125: 3-4. TIte acts
are extended in the senses. " ... visio corporalis extenditur in toto organo sive composito ex
materia et forma ... " Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTIt V, 285: 11-12. " ... sensationes extenditur in
sensibus ... " Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTIt V, 292: 18.
83 " sensus aliquis interior, puta sensus communis veI phantasia, apprehendit actum sensus
exterioris et actum desiderii sensitivum, sicut ponit Philosophus, II De Anima." Quaest.
variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTIt VIII, 255: 92-94.
84 See page 86.
According to Peter King, "following Aristotle's lead, medieval philosophers generally

accepted... a distinction between the apparatus of powers whereby information about the
worid is acquired and assimiIated, known as the cognitive or apprehensive potencies, and
the apparatus of powers. whereby one engages the worid, known as the appetitive
potencies". King 1999, 101.
85
51
strain, effort, etc.,,86 1 am not sure whether it is a good idea to call the
appetitive potency "the conative factor", since, in Ockham, conation
does not seem to be reserved for referring only to appetite. 87
The sensory soul (as sensory appetite) and the intellectual soul
(as will) are not the only instances of appetite. In addition to them,
there are, according to Ockham, natural appetites in the world that do
not require any cognition in order to function. The mechanical drives
in nature, such as gravity, are appetites of this kind. 88 The appetitive
potencies of the souls are, however, the only appetitive instances
where the acts are absolute qualities. 89
86
Fuchs 1952,49.
87 " dico quod omnis inclinatio fonnae importat quendam conatum et nisum, sine quo
potest esse forma; hoc autem non potest esse nisi actus ... " Quodl. III, q. 22; OTh IX, 289:
10-12. (Fuchs quotes this paragraph in his book when handling habits. See Fuchs 1952,63,
footnote 38.) See also Quaest. variae, q. 5; OTh VIII, 180: 506-507.
Even a potency which totally passively receives something can be called 'natural
appetite'. In this meaning of the tenn, matter can be said to be appetitive. "Notandum est
etiam quod, secundum Commentatorem, quidam est appetitus animalis qui est cum sensu,
et sub illo appetitu comprehendit appetitum rationalem qui potest esse sine actu sensus
exterioris quamvis praesupponat actum sensus exterioris praefuisse nec possit esse sine
omni cognitione. Alius est appetitus naturalis qui scilicet potest esse sine omni cognitione.
Et 'appetitus naturalis' dupliciter accipitur, hoc est hoc nomen 'appetitus naturalis'
dupliciter dicitur. Uno moda pro quodam nisu et inclinatione quasi motiva, sicut dicitur
quod grave appetit esse deorsum quia quando non est deorsum, nititur effective se facere
deorsum. Et talis appetitus numquam est in principio pure passivo, sed semper requirit in
recipiente fonnam aliquod activum. .. Aliter accipitur 'appetitus naturalis' pro potentia qua
potest aliquid reci pere aliud tamquam perfectionem suam et contra quod per nihil sibi
intrinsecum inclinatur. Et sic materia appetit omnem fonnam, quia ad omnem est in potentia
et per quamlibet perfici potest nec per aliquid de essentia materiae contra quamcumque
fonnam inclinatur." Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 18; OPh IV, 202: 85-96, 100-104. In a very
general meaning of 'appetite', Ockham even seems to agree that alI the entities 'appetite'
their perfection. "Similiter quod dicit Commentator quod omnia entia appetunt assimilari
Deo, intelligendum est quod omnia appetunt ita esse perfecta sicut convenit naturae eorum."
Exp. Phys. Arist. 1, c. 18; OPh IV, 202: 82-84.
88
89 According to Ockham, the souls also can remain passive when they have an appetitive act,
unlike the natural appetites. " ... non sic se habet appetitus naturalis in sensu carentibus sicut
animalis in sensibilibus et voluntas in intellectualibus. Quia appetitus naturalis in actualiter
appetendo nullum absolutum sibi fonnaliter inhaerens adquirit, et appetitus animalis et
etiam intellectualis adquirunt in appetendo aliquod absolutum sibi formaliter inhaerens,
quia actum appetendi, qui est una qualitas absoluta, sicut actus cognoscendi est una qualitas
52
CHAPTERTWO
When dealing with absolute qualities in the souls, Ockham

refers to two Aristotelian divisions. One of them is the general
c1assification of qualities in the Categories, c. 8. Ockham mentions
this c1assification in several texts, but he seems to apply it to the
qualities of the soul only when he comments on it generally in his
Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, c. 14. fu
discussing the qualities of the soul, Ockham more often refers to
Aristotle's division of the things of the soul in Book 2 of the
Nicomachean Ethics, c. 4. According to that division, there are (1)
habits, (2) potencies, and (3) passions in the soul. fu Ockham's use
the c1assification is sometimes modified. For instance, the group of
potencies is skipped in some cases and a group of acts added.
When Ockham applies the general Aristotelian quality
c1assification to the qualities of the soul in his Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, c. 14, the first group of qualities is
referred to by the terms 'habit' and 'disposition' or 'affection'. By
'habit', according to Ockham, in this connection is meant all
qualities changeable only with difficulty, and by 'disposition' or
'affection' alI easily changeable qualities. Ockham mentions
(scientific) knowledge (scientia) andjustice (iustitia) as habits ofthe
soul. 90 AlI acts (actus) and passions (passio) of the soul seem to
belong to dispositions or affections of the soul. 91 The second group
of qualities is referred to by the terms 'natural potency' and 'natural
impotency' . By these terms, according to Ockham, one refers to the
absoluta... appetitus naturalis non habet tales actus elicitos sicut habet appetitus rationalis et
appetitus animalis. Similiter, appetitus naturalis semper est activus respectu actus quem
elicit. Unde grave nunquam appetit nisi active agat vei movendo localiter vei destruendo
a1iquid repugnans. Appetitus autem animalis et similiter rationalis potest habere actum
quantumcumque pure passive se habeat." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 409: 18 -410: 3,21-27.
90
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh Il, 269: 4-9 ( 3).
"In ista specie sunt omnes actus et passiones animae ... " Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II,
273: 91-92. Ockham only states that ali the acts and passions ofthe soul belong to the first
class of quality, but on the basis of what he says about acts and passions of the soul in the
same text in connection of the third class of quality, it is obvious that they belong to the first
class of quality as dispositions or affections.
91
53
qualities with which their subjects can easily act in a certain manner
or resist an influence. Ockham probably thinks that some qualities of
the soul can be ascribed to this class, but among the examples he
mentions only corporeal qualities.
The third group of qualities is, in the general Aristotelian
classification of qualities, referred to by the terms 'passion' and
'passible quality'. As elements of this group, Ockham mainly
considers corporeal passions and passible qualities, but he also draws
attention to the passions and passible qualities proper to the soul. The
first consideration of the passions of the soul is presented in the
context of corporeal passible qualities, such as sweetness and
bittemess, hotness and coldness, and colors. These corporeal
qualities can cause or be caused by the passions of the soul, and
therefore one has to clarify what is meant by the passions of the soul.
According to Ockham, there are several uses for the term 'passion'
which are ali relevant in the case of qualities of the soul. Sometimes
'passion' means the same as reception or loss of something. 92
Sometimes it is taken in its categoreal meaning. In that case, it
signifies an act as something that a subject receives, while the term
'action' (actio) signifies an act being caused by an agent. Taking
'passion' in this way, even the intellections and the sensations are
passions. 93 Sometimes 'passion' is used for a reception of a form
with a casting off of a contrary form. 94 Sometimes one caUs
"Notandum est hic prima quod passio multipliciter accipitur. Aliquando enim passio est
idem quod receptio vei deperditio alicuius. et sic pertinet ad naturalem ... " Exp. Praed.
Arist. c. 14; OPh II, 277: 21-23.
93 " ... vel [passio] est praedicamentum, et sic non loquitur Philosophus hic de passione. Et
isto moda intellectus vere pati tur quando intelligit, et sensus quando sentit." Exp. praed.
Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 277: 23-25. " ... actio et passio significant eundem actum, sed actio
significat illum actum esse ab agente et passio significat illum actum esse in passo.
Secundum istum modum loquendi actio et passio sunt unus motus et unus actus." Summ.
phil. nat. III, c. 28; OPh VI, 334: 18-2l. See ali chapter 28: ibid., 333-334: 2-36. See also
Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 25; OPh VI, 459-462: 4--100; SL 1, c. 57; OPh 1,183-186: 2-102;
SL 1, c. 58; OPh 1,187-188: 2-32. See also Baudry 1958, 12.
94 "Aliquando dicitur passio pro receptione fonnae cum abiectione contrarie formae ... " Exp.
praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 277: 25-26. See until 278: 29.
92
54
CHAPTERTWO
something by the term 'passion' that is predicable per se secunda

mada of something. In this meaning, a pas sion does not need to
really (realiter) inhere in a subject. 95 Sometimes, but rarely in
Aristot1e, 'passion' is taken as referring to an accident proper to a
subject. However, none of these uses is the one in which the term
'passion' is used for the qualities of the soul now. 96
What other uses are there, then, for the term 'passion' in the
case of the soul? There are, at least, the uses in which 'passion'
refers to appetitive phenomena of the soul. Ockham gives, in this
connection, three such uses: Sometimes one means by 'passion' an
act (actus) of an appetitive potency that is followed by pleasure or
distress. In this way Aristot1e, according to Ockham, uses the term in
Book 2 of the Nicamachean Ethics, c. 4, where he gives the
following list of passions: concupiscence, anger, fear, courage, envy,
joy, amicability, hatred, desire, zeal and pity. Sometimes 'passion' is
used for pleasure or distress. Sometimes it means alI the acts of an
appetitive potency that follow cognition. 97 Ockham does not here
explain what he means by 'appetitive potency'. By it he seems to
refer to both the sensory appetite and the will, since he says that the
"Aliter dicitur passio pro praedicabili per se secunda moda de aliquo; et sic frequenter
accipit Philosophus passionem in libro Posteriorum. Et talis passio non oportet quod
inhaereat realiter subiecto, sed sufficit quod praedicetur per se de subiecto, non pro se, sed
pro re." Exp. praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 278: 29-33. See also SL 1, c. 37; OPh 1, 104-106:
2-47. For per se primo and secundo moda, see sub-chapter 2.1., page 31.
96 "Aliter accipitur passio pro accidente proprio alicuius subiecti; et sic rara accipitur a
Philosopho. Sed istis praedictis modis non accipitur passio in proposito." Exp. praed. Arist.,
c. 14; OPh II, 278: 33-35.
95
"Alio moda dicitur passio actus potentiae appetitivae quem sequitur delectatio vei
tristi tia; et isto moda accipitur II Ethicorum, ubi dicit Philosophus sic: 'Dico autem
passiones quidem concupiscentiam, iram, timorem, audaciam, invidiam, gaudium,
amici tiam, odium, desiderium, zelum, mi sericordi am, et universaliter quibus sequitur
delectatio vei tristitia'. - Aliquando autem accipitur passio pro delectatione veI tristitia. Aliquando accipiturpro omni actu appetitus consequentis cognitionem." Exp. Praed. Arist.,
c. 14; OPh II, 278: 36-43 ( 7).
97
55
question of whether pleasure can be distinguished from an act of the

intellectual or the sensory appetite is not discussed in logic. 98
Is one of these meanings of the term 'passion' the one in which
it is used when it is said that the corporeal passible qualities cause or
are caused by the passions of the soul? After having given the above
uses, Ockham says that in that context 'passion' is used for pleasure
or distress following sensory apprehension. 99 A little later Ockham
says that Aristotle uses the term 'passion' for pleasure or distress or
fear and things like those that are in the sensory part, and follow a
cognition, and do not remain in the absence of a cognition. 100 On the
basis of this, it seems that, according to Ockham, the term 'passion',
when it is used for the qualities of the soul in the context of the
corporeal passible qualities, is used for pleasure, distress, and alI the
acts of an appetite that follow cognition.
Outside the context of the corporeal qualities, Ockham has
very little to say about the passions of the soul in Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, c. 14. At the end of the consideration
of the third class of quality he presents a comparison between
passions and passible qualities of the soul. Aristotle says, according
to Ockham, that those qualities of the soul that are caused by not
easily changeable passions or by whatever cause and are permanent
or changeable only with difficulty are called 'passible qualities'.
Because of them, someone, for instance, is said to be mad (demens)
or hostile (iracundus).lOl Correspondingly, those qualities ofthe soul
that are caused by easily changeable passions and are not permanent
or changeable only with difficulty are called 'passions'. Because of
"Utrum autem delectatio distinguatur ab actu appetitus sive intellectivi si ve sensitivi veI
non, non est logici considerare." Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 278: 44-45.
99 "Sed dico quod in proposito accipitur passio pro delectatione veI tristitia consequente
apprehensionem sensitivam ... " Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 278: 45-47.
100 " .in parte praecedenti accipit [Philosophus] passionem pro delectatione vei tristitia vei
timore et huiusmodi, quae sunt in parte sensitiva, et sequuntur cognitionem, et non manent
in absentia cognitionis ... " Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280: 17-20. See also Exp.
Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 277: 15-20.
98
JOI
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 282: 3-7 ( 9).
56
CHAPTER TWO
them, someone, for instance, is said to be angry (iratus), which does

not mean being so permanently.102 This is the only text in which
Ockham posits passible qualities in the soul. Ockham usually
considers things in the soul in accordance with an analysis based on
the division of the things of the soul presented in the Nicomachean
Ethics, and that division does not involve passible qualities.
When Ockham classifies the qualities of the soul applying
Aristotle's remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, c. 4, the first
group of qualities is referred to by the term 'habit'. The term 'habit'
used in the Nicomachean Ethics does not, according to Ockham,
refer to all the qualities of the soul that are changeable only with
difficulty, as it does when the classification of the qualities in the
Categories is applied to the soul. In Book 6 of the Nicomachean
Ethics and elsewhere, 'habit' is used for an accidental thing of a
potency which is generated by acts of that potency and which
inclines the potency towards similar acts. 103 In Ockham' s works,
'habit' is used (more or less) in this meaning, for example, in
Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 12, where Ockham
discusses the question of whether alI virtuous habits are generated by
acts. Ockham there states that the reason for calling something by the
term 'habit' (taking the term properly) is that it either inclines to an
act or is 'inclinative', and it is caused by acts and remains in the
absence of acts. 104 In some texts, Ockham remarks that (in this life)
102
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh Il, 282: 7-10.
notandum quod, quantum ad praesens spectat, habitus dupliciter accipitur: una modo
pro omni re exsistente in substantia subiective de difficili amissibilis, et sic accipitur in
proposito. Aliter accipitur pro aliqua re accidentali, generata in aliqua potentia ex actu veI
ex actibus illius potentiae, sive iIla potentia sit activa si ve passiva nihil refert, quae quidem
res inclinet potentiam eandem ad actus consimiIes. Et sic accipitur habitus in VI Ethicorum,
et alibi." Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 273: 95-101.
103 " .
104 " .. habitus proprie non dicitur ni si quia veI inclinat ad actus alicuius potentiae veI quia
est inclinativum causatum ex actibus et remanens in absentia actuum." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh
VI, 396: 1-3. In Quodlibet II, the proper meaning of 'habit' is said to be taken broadIy and
strictIy: " ... 'habitus' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet Iarge et stricte. Large accipitur pro omni
qualitate generata post actus, quae tamen potest generari sine actu; et talis habitus est
subiective in corpore, non in anima ... Aliter accipitur ~habitus' stricte pro habitu immediate
57
habits are not known intuitively but abstractively and 'discursively'

or 'argumentatively' .105
The second group of things in the soul is, in the c1assification
of the Nicomachean Ethics, referred to by the term 'potency'. As
argued before, the term 'potency of the soul' can be used to signify
the soul itself and connote its acts, but it also can be used for
everything that is necessarily needed in order to have acts in the soul.
Among others, various absolute and other qualities and bodily organs
are SUCh. 106 Therefore, some qualities of the soul can be considered
as potencies of the soul. However, Ockham does not de facto seem
to be interested in considering certain qualities of the soul as
potencies, but he seems to think that the other groups of qualities
suffice to pick them up. As mentioned, Ockham sometimes even
omits the group of potencies from the c1assification of the things of
the soul. 107
The third group of things of the soul is, in the c1assification of
the Nicomachean Ethics, referred to by the term 'passion'. There are
generato ex actu, qui habitus aliter generari non potest. Habitus accepti prima moda [large]
sunt in corpore et in parte apprehensiva; secunda moda [stricte], sunt in voluntate." Quodl.
II, q. 18; OTh IX, 189-190: 11-14,26--29. For habits in Ockham, see Fuchs 1952.
105 ..... dico quod notitia intuitiva pro statu isto non est respectu omnium intelligibilium,
etiam aequaliter praesentium intellectui, quia est respectu actuum et non respectu habituum.
Quod autem ita sit, scimus per experientiam, quia quilibet experitur se intelligere, diligere
et delectari; non sic autem se inclinari ad actum per habitum, quia tantum posset inclinari
potentia per Deum agentem sicut per habitum inclinantem. Et ideo illa inclinatia quam
quilibet experitur in se non potest cognosci evidenter ex notitia intuitiva habitus inclinantis,
sed potest tantum cognosci illo modo quo potest cognosci per rationem et discursum. Ex
isto patet quod nullus potest intuitive videre fidem et caritatem quae sunt habitus in nobis,
quamvis possit intuitive videre actus qui eliciuntur ex istis habitibus qui sunt credere et
amare." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; 0Th 1, 69: 5-18 ...... habitus [cognoscuntur] abstractive et
arguitive... " Rep. IV, q. 2; 0Th VII, 36: 13.
106 Rep. III, q, 4; OTh VI, 135: 2 -136: 21; Rep. II, q. IV, OTh V, 58: 4--21.
107 Such cases are the following ones: .... .in anima non est realiter distinctum ab anima nisi
habitus veI actus secundum Philosophum... " Exp. Periherm. Arist. 1, prooem.; OPh 11,351:
11-12. " ... satis videtur esse de intentione eorum [Philosophus et Commentator] quod nihil
reale est in anima nisi veI habitus vei actus veI passio." Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 6; OTh II, 507:
12-13. u ... sicut saepe dictum est, nihii est in anima nisi actus et habitus et passiones
consequentes actus, puta delectatio et tristitia." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 293: 22 - 294: 1.
58
CHAPTER TWO
three lengthy texts where Ockham considers the passions of the soul
in the light of the Nicomachean Ethics. In alI of them, Ockham's
main interest, or at Ieast one of his main interests, is to prove that
passions and appetitive acts are not different things, except in the
case of two passions.
In Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 12, the
theme of passions comes up when Ockham discusses the question of
whether alI the virtuous habits are generated by acts. By 'habit' he
here means something that inc1ines to an act, is caused by acts, and
remains in the absence of acts. J08 Therefore, a probIem arises in the
case of the sensory appetite: How could habits be generated in the
sensory appetite, since there only seem to be passions in it, and they
do not seem to generate habits since they shouId, on the contrary, be
curbed by habits?l09 Ockham reports the opinion that the habit
concemed is generated as follows: First, there is a natural potency as
a foundation. Second, there is a 'hability' (habilitas). Third, there is
a pas sion or passible quality by which one is moved towards good
and averted from bad. Fourth, there is an elicited act with respect to
those objects. Fifth, there is a habit generated. Sixth, there is an act
elicited by the habit. 110 Ockham has two objections to this model.
The first one deals with the 'habilities': It is not necessary to posit
any natural 'habilities' in an appetitive potency, since those
'habilities' can and have to be posited in the body.111 The second
objection deals with the passions, and it begins a Iengthy discussion
of the passions of the soul. According to Ockham, to posit a passion
108 " habitus proprie non dicitur nisi quia veI inclinat ad actus alicuius potentiae veI quia
est inclinativum causatum ex actibus et remanens in absenti a actuum." Rep. IIl, q. 12; OTh
VI, 396: 1-3.
109 "".est difficuitas magna de parte sensitiva: ex quibus actibus generantur habitus in parte
sensitiva? Quia in appetitu sensitivo non videtur esse nisi passio, sed passio non videtur
generare habitum cum debeat refrenari per habitum." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 398: 12-15.
110 Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 398: 16 - 399: 6. The editors of this text say that they have not
found out where this is said: ibid., 398, footnote 2.
111
Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 399: 7-17.
59
preceding an act is false and contrary to Aristotle in Book 2 of the

Nicomachean Ethics. 112
Ockham argues for his second objection as folIows: Aristotle
says that there are only three things in the soul, namely passions,
potencies and habits. But there are acts in the soul. Thus, Aristotle
takes a pas sion to be [and not precede] an act. 113 This is also evident
because of the examples of the passions that Aristotle gives. The list
of the passions that Ockham refers to is the same as that which
occurs in Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, c. 14,
except that the last passion is not pity (as it is in the Nicomachean
Ethics), but justice: concupiscence, an ger, fear, courage, envy, joy,
amicability, hatred, desire, zeal and justice. AlI the things that
Aristotle calls 'passions' are, according to Ockham, acts of an
appetitive potency.1l4 Therefore, with Aristotle Ockham says that
there is nothing other than passions, potencies and habits in the soul,
and that passions are acts of the sensory part, and that by 'passion'
Aristotle means an act. 115
This is not, however, the whole truth, as soon appears. After
his conclusion, Ockham decides to give one more proof for the claim
that passions are acts, and that argument leads him to qualify a little
what he has said. The argument deals with pleasure and distress:
Every passion is either pleasure or distress or precedes them. Pas sion
is neither pleasure nor distress, since, according to Aristotle, these
112 "Aliud dictum suum est falsum et contra Philosophum, II Ethicorum, scilicet quod passio
praecedit actum." Rep. m, q. 12; OTh VI, 399: 18-19.
113 "Nam Philosophus dicit quod in anima sunt tantum tria, scilicet passiones, potentiae et
habitus. Sed constat quod in anima est actus. Igitur per passionem intelligit actum." Rep. III,
q. 12; OTh VI, 399: 19 - 400: 3.
quod [Philosophus] per 'passiones' intelligit actum patet per exempla sua. Ait enim:
'Dico autem passiones quidem concupiscentiam, iram, timorem, audaciam, invidiam,
gaudium, amicitiam, odium, desiderium, zelum, iustitiam'. Et omnes isti sunt actus
potentiae appetitivae. Igitur etc." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 400: 11-15.
114 " ...
115 "Ideo dico cum Philosopho quod in anima non sunt nisi tantum passiones, potentiae et
habitus, et quod passiones sunt ipsimet actus partis sensitivae, et per passionem
Philosophus intelligit actum." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 400: 17-20.
60
CHAPTER TWO
two follow passions and so are not passions. Thus, every passion
precedes p1easure or distress. But p1easure and distress are not
preceded except by acts. Therefore a passion, properly taken, is an
act, and there is no difference between act and passion, taking
'passion' properly."6 The term 'passion' can also, however, be used
in an improper way, and even the proper way can be divided into a
broad and a strict way. The ways to take the term 'passion' referring
to the appetiti ve phenomena of the soul are, according to Ockham, as
follows: Taken properly, 'passion' is used for an act elicited in the
sensory appetitive potency that is effectively caused partially by
intuitive or abstractive sensory cognition and partially by appetitive
potency. Taking 'passion' properly and broadly, it is used for all the
acts concemed, but taking it properly and strictly it is used for
intense and vehement acts, i.e., acts that vehemently impel towards
exterior acts. Taken improperly, 'passion' is used for pleasure and
distress which follow the phenomena that are passions when the term
'passion' is used properly.l17
A little later in the same text Ockham gives some additional
proofs for the claim that passions (taken properly) are acts. In the
first of them, he examines some Aristotelian examples of passions
and claims that they cannot be distinguished from the acts of the
sensory appetite. For example, anger (ira) is taken as a pas sion, and
116 " .. omnis passio veI est delectatio veI tristitia veI aliquid praevium alteri eorum. Sed non
est delectatio nec tristitia. Nam secundum Philosophum, delectatio et tristitia consequuntur
passionem; igitur non sunt ipsa passio. Igitur est aliquid praevium delectationi et tristitiae.
Sed nihil est praevium istis ni si actus. Igitur passio proprie est actus, et sic intelligit
Philosophus. Nec est differentia aliqua inter actum et passionem proprie loquendo de
passione."Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 400: 20-401: 7.
117 "Sciendum tamen quod passio tripliciter accipitur. Uno moda proprie, et sic accipitur pro
ipso actu elicito a potentia appetitiva sensitiva, qui actus causatur effective ab
apprehensione sive cognitione sensitiva, intuitiva veI abstractiva, sicut a causa partiali una,
et a potentia appetitiva sicut ab alia causa partiali...Alio moda accipitur pas si o improprie
pro delectatione veI tristi tia consequente passionem prima moda dictam. Sed sic accipere
est improprie accipere. Primo moda accipiendo passionem potest adhuc accipi Iarge, et sic
accipitur pro ornni actu appetitus sensitivi. Alio moda stricte, et sic accipitur pro actu
intenso et vehemente, vehementer impellente ad actum exteriorem." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI,
401: 8-12,20 - 402: 4.
61
to get angry (irasci) as an act of the sensory appetite, and it does not
seem that those two can be distinguished in anyone. Thus, passions
are acts. 118 The second argument deals with movements. According
to Aristotle (in his On the Saul), the movements of the appetitive
potencies are passions. However, the movements in question are
acts. Hence, passions are acts. 119 The last proof deals with potencies.
According to Aristotle (in the Nicamachean Ethics), we call
potencies those things through which we receive passions. But
something is called a potency with respect to elicited acts. Therefore,
passions are acts. 120
Most of the objections Ockham has to address in this text
concern the moral status of acts and passions. Two of them, in my
opinion, deserve attention in this connection. The first one deals with
the use of the term 'passionate' (passianatus). If passions are acts, is
more passionate more virtuous? Ockham answers that it depends on
the circumstances. Therefore, in some circumstances, it indeed is
good to be impassioned. However, he admits that according to "the
common way of talking", one having vehement acts or movements
against the judgment of reason is said to be passionate, and then
more passionate is not more virtuoUS. 121 According to another
objection, the view according to which passions and acts of the
sensory appetite do not differ (taking 'passion' properly) means that
118 "Quod autem istae passiones sunt actus eliciti patet per exempla et rationes. Per exempla:
ira enim ponitur passio et irasci actus appetitus sensitivi. Et non videtur quod ira et irasci in
aliquo distinguuntur. Similiter, secundum Philosophum, odium est passio partis sensitivae,
et tamen ibi non est ponere duplex odium, unum passionem et aliud actum. Et similiter est
de concupiscentia quod non est ibi duplex concupiscentia, una passio et alia actus." Rep.
III, q. 12; OTh VI, 409: 1-8.
119 "oo.Philosophus, II De anima dicit quod motus potentiae appetitivae est cum phantasia
boni veI mali secundum passiones. Et dicit quod illi motus sunt passiones. Sed illi motus
sunt actus. Igitur passiones sunt actus." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 409: 9-12.
120 "Item, [Philosophus,] II Ethicorum dicit: potentias dicimus secundum quas passibiles
sumus, id est, secundum quas receptivi sumus passionum. Sed potentia receptivi sumus
passionum. Sed potentia dicitur respectu actus eliciti. Igitur etc." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI,
409: 12-15.
121
Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 405: 16-17,416: 10-21.
62
CHAPTER TWO
passions can also be posited in the will. The train of thought is as

follows: If there is no distinction in the sensory appetite between
acts, which can be evaluated morally, and passions, which cannot,
then one can also posit passions in the will, since there are acts
which can be evaluated morally in the will. 122 Ockham does not
respond to this objection here, but only later.
In Quodlibet II, q. 15 Ockham defends the position according
to which passion and act do not differ in the sensory appetite with
proofs that resemble some of the proofs in Quaestiones in librum
tertium Sententiarum, q. 12. The first proof runs as follows:
According to Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, there is nothing
but potencies, habits and passions in the soul. Passions are neither
potencies nor habits. Therefore, they are acts. 123 The second proof is
based on examples of passions. It runs as follows: Joy, pain, hope,
fear and love are counted as passions. Love is an act, and so is fear.
Consequently, those things that are counted as passions are acts. 124
The third proof is also based on cxamples of passions: By passions,
Aristotle means concupiscence, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy,
amicability, hatred, desire, zeal and justice. These are an acts of
appetite. Therefore, by passions Aristotle means acts of appetite. 125
122 " . si sic, tunc possent poni passiones in voluntate sicut in parte sensitiva, quia actus boni
et mali moraliter ponuntur in voluntate; et ilIae sunt passiones ~ ~; conclusio falsa et
contra omnes qui ponunt passiones solum in parte sensitiva." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 406:
1-4.
123 " .. dico quod in appetitu sensitivo passio et actus non differunt. Quod probatur, quia
secundum Philosophum, II Ethicorum, in anima non sunt nisi potentia, habitus et passiones;
sed passiones non sunt potentiae nec habitus; igitur sunt actus." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX,
178-179: 9-13. This inference does not, however, seem to be in order. It would probably
make sense if there were in the inference the term 'actus' in the latter premise instead of the
term 'passiones', and the term 'passiones' in the conclusion instead of the term 'actus'.
(Compare with an inference in Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 399: 19 - 400: 3.) Another
possibility would be to replace 'passiones' in the first premise with 'actus'.
124 "Item istae ponuntur passiones: gaudium, dolor, spes, timor et amor; sed amor est actus,
et timor; igitur etc." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 179: 13-14.
125 "Item Philosophus, ubi prius, dicit sic: 'Dico autem passiones quemadmodum
concupiscentiam, iram, timorem, audaciam, invidiam, gaudium, amicitiam, odium,
desiderium, zelum, iustitiam'; et omnes isti sunt actus appetitus; igitur etc." Quodl. II, q. 15;
63
The fourth proof is based on habits. It runs as follows: The passions

can be curbed by virtuous habits. It is sufficient for one to curb acts.
Therefore, passions are acts. 126 In this text, Ockham no longer makes
the reservation that pleasure and distress or pain in the sensory
appetite are not acts. A little later in Quodlibet III, q. 17, he clearly
says that pleasure and pain in the sensory appetite cannot be
distinguished from acts. 127 The "razor" is in full use.
As in Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 12, so in
Quodlibet II, q: 15, there is also the objection which deals with the
use of the term 'passionate' (passionatus). Does a more passionate
human being elicit more virtuous acts? Ockham's answer is that
there are two ways to understand 'passionate'. In the broad way, it is
taken as referring to someone having any passions whatever. In the
strict way, it is taken as referring to someone having passions that
incline against right reason. In neither sense is more passionate
always more virtuoUS. 128 There is also in this text the objection
according to which Ockham' s view of identifying the passions with
acts in the sensory appetite means that passions can also be posited
OTh IX, 179: 15-18.

126 "Item passiones sunt refrenandae per habitus virtuosos; sed sufficit refrenare actus; igitur
etc." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 179: 18-20.
127 "Hic prima videndum est an dolor et delectatio appetitus sensitivi distinguantur ab
actu ... Circa primum dico quod quamvis voluntas simul, dum habet tristitiam vei
delectationem, habeat actum volendi vei nolendi distinctum ab istis passionibus, tamen
appetitus sensitivus non habet simul actus distinctos a dolore sensus et delectatione, sed isti
actus immediate sequuntur apprehensionem sensitivam, quia nec per experientiam, nec per
rationem potest probari quod sit ibi talis multitudo actuum; quia si aliqui actus simul essent
cum istis, illi essent actus desiderandi et fugiendi, quia alii non apparent in appetitu sensiti vi
praevii dolori et delectationi. Sed isti non manent cum eis, quia istud est generaliter verum,
quod dolor sensus et delectatio numquam sunt respectu rei absentis sed respectu rei
praesentialiter habitae; actus autem desiderandi et fugiendi in appetitu sensitivo sunt semper
respectu absentium; igitur isti actus non manent simul cum dolore et delectatione sensus
respectu eiusdem obiecti, licet respectu diversorum possunt forte." Quodl. III, q. 17; OTh
IX, 268-269: 9-10,12-27.
128 Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 179-180: 22-24, 44-54.
64
CHAPTERTWO
in the will. 129 Ockham' s response to this is in question 17 which will

be analyzed next.
In Quodlibet TI, q. 17, Ockham deals with the question of
whether passions can also be posited in the will. Since his answer is
yes, he also ponders whether passions in the will differ from acts.
Ockham first states that by 'pas sion ' he means every form that exists
in an appetitive potency that can be naturally regulated by right
reason and which requires an actual cognition in order to exist. 130
Then he continues that, "briefly said", passion is a form (forma
aliqua) distinct from a cognition, existing in an appetitive potency,
and which requires an actual cognition in order to exist. 13l After this
he remarks that these conditions exclude some candidates. The nonappetitive qualities in the souls are excluded by the first and the
second condition, and the appetitive qualities that are habits by the
third. 132 Then Ockham ponders what different things satisfy the
conditions, that is, for which various things can the term 'passion' be
used on the basis of what has been said. In fact, agreat number of
things satisfy the conditions and appear to be passions. The result is
that not only acts of the sensory appetite, but also acts of the will and
pleasure and distress that are in the will, are passions. 133 The question
129 " ... tunc passiones possent poni in voluntate, sicut actus boni et mali ponuntur in
voluntate; quod est contra omnes, quia ab omnibus ponuntur solum in appetitu sensitivo ... "
Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 180: 36-38.
130 " ... per passionem intelligo omnem formam existentem in potentia appetitiva natam
regulari ratione recta ad hoc quod sit recta, quae requirit actualem cognitionem ad suum
esse existere." Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 186: 10-13.
131 "Vei breviter, passio est forma aliqua distincta a cognitione, existens subiective in
potentia appetitiva, requirens cognitionem actualem ad suum esse existere." Quodl. II, q.
17; OTh IX, 186: 13-15.
132 "Per primum excluditur cognitio actualis, quia illa non est passio; per secundum, habitus
omnes intellectuales et operationes vegetativae; per tertium excluduntur habitus in
voluntate, quia possunt esse sine actuali cognitione, sicut patet in dormiente."Quodl. II,
q.17; OTh IX, 186-187: 15-19.
133 "Ex isto sequitur quod tam actus appetitus sensitivi, et breviter omnes, quam actus
voluntatis quam etiam delectatio et tristi tia quae sunt in vo1untate, sunt passiones; quia
omnia ista sunt formae distinctae a cognitione, et sunt subiective in potentiis appetitivis, et
65
of whether there are passions in the wiU seems to be answered. After

this statement, Ockham stiU finds it necessary to give a proof that
deals with examples of passions. It mns: Love, hope, fear and joy are
in the wiU, and they are commonly taken to be passions. Pleasure and
distress are also in the will, and they are also passions. Therefore,
there are passions in the Will. 134
A very important question for Ockham is whether pleasure and
distress in the will differ from acts. In Quodlibet II, q. 17, he deals
with this question rather briefly but is sure of his opinion: they do
differ. Pleasure and distress in the will are only passions and not acts
since they cannot naturally exist without acts (of the wiU) by which
they are caused and conserved. 135 As such, one can even say, they do
sunt regulabiles recta ratione mediate veI immediate, et requirunt actualem cognitionem ad
suam existentiam." Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 187: 20-25.
134 " ... passiones sunt in voluntate, quia amor et spes, timor et gaudium sunt in voluntate,
quae tamen communiter ponuntur passiones. Similiter delectatio et tristitia sunt in
voluntate, quae etiam sunt passiones; igitur etc."Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 187: 27-30.
135 " ... quaedam passiones voluntatis non distinguuntur ab actibus, et quaedam distinguuntur.
Amor enim et spes non distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet per inseparabilitatem illorum
ab actibus, sed sunt actus immediate eliciti a voluntate et ab habitibus voluntatis. Sed
delectatio et tristi tia distinguuntur ab actibus, quod patet ex hoc quod actus voluntatis
possunt remanere sine delectatione et tristitia, sicut patet de daemone qui intensissime
diligit se et tamen in hoc nullo modo delectatur. Similiter angelus bonus habet noIle
respectu alicuius quod evenit; sicut nollet hominem peccare ad cuius custodiam deputatur,
et tamen homo peccat mortaliter; sed ex hoc nullo modo tristatur quia sicut in damnato
nulla est delectatio, ita in beato nulla est tristi tia. Sed delectatio et tristitia non possunt esse
sine actibus naturaliter, quia ab illis causantur et conservantur; igitur istae formae sunt
passiones et non actus." Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 187-188: 31-45.
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CHAPTER TWO
not properly have objects. 136 I shall return to this subject in subchapters 4.1. and 4.2. 137
It was argued above that Ockham is very interested in proving
that the passions and acts of an appetitive potency do not differ.
There stiH are two passions which cannot be considered as acts,
namely pleasure and distress in the will. It was argued before that
sometimes Ockham modifies the classification of the things of the
soullocated in the Nicomachean Ethics so that it includes the group
of acts. This happens especially when deal ing with cognitive acts
since they, as absolute qualities of the soul, need to be placed in the
classification of the things of the soul. The added group of acts does
not, however, involve only cognitive acts of the soul, but, of course,
136 " . potest dici quod proprie delectatio non habet obiectum, cum non sit actus. Hoc tamen
concesso, dico quod obiectum delectationis consequentis fruitionem est ipsemet Deus et
non actus aliquis. Et quando dicitur quod beatus summe gaudebit de visione, dico quod
summe gaudebit de ipso Deo in se, si cut ipsum summe diliget. Et quando dicitur quod
delectatio provenit ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti, igitur est de ipsa
coniunctione, nega consequentiam: sed erit de obiecto illius coniunctionis." Ord. 1, d. 1, q.
4; OTh 1, 445: 12-20.
l37 In addition to the theories of the passions based on the Categories and the Nicomachean
Ethics, Ockham in Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis VII, c. 4 briefly refers to some
approaches to the passions, the origins of which are unclear. In the context of virtues, he
states that there are two opinions of the passions. According to the first one, passion is not
a thing distinct from the corporeal qualities and other dispositions, but a corporeal quality
which is sensed by its subject. For instance, pain (dolor) is thenjust an inconvenient heat.
The same can be said about joy (gaudium), hope (spes) and other such things. According
to the second opinion, passions are qualities proper to the animated beings, that is, to the
beings that have soul, and they are distinct from aII the qualities which non-animated beings
can have. For instance, anger (ira), according to this opinion, is not only an ascension of
blood around the heart, but it is a quality caused by the blood, and such a quality cannot be
found in a non-animated being. Ockham is in this text speaking about two views about
passions with respect to physiological changes. According to the first one, pain, for
instance, is a bodily state which is perceived, and according to the second one, something
in the soul which is caused by a bodily state. The details of the theories are not explicated
and Ockham does not discuss them. It is enough for him to state that no matter which
opinion is right, there are no virtues or vices without passions, such asjoy (gaudium), anger
(ira), and distress (tristitia). In the light of what he says about passions in other texts, one
can think that the latter opinion is at least closer to his opinion than the previous one. Exp.
Phys. Arist. VII, c. 4; OPh V, 656: 39-55. (The editors ofthe text say that they do not know
the origins of these opinions. See Exp. Phys. Arist. VII, c. 4; OPh V, 656, footnote 2.)
67
also those passions which are acts. AlI the passions are not,
according to Ockham, acts, but despite this, he often, when he posits
the group of acts, skips the group of passions. In these kinds of cases,
the classification of the things of the soul does not manage to pick up
those passions which are not acts, namely pleasure and distress in the
will. 1 shall now examine some cases in which Ockham posits the
group of acts in the classification of the qualities of the soul.
In his Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis 1,
prooemium, Ockham discusses the ontological status of the concept
(conceptus). He says that Aristotle, in Book 2 of the Nicomachean
Ethics, does not seem to posit anything but potencies, habits, and
passions or acts in the soul. 138 Later in the same text, Ockham says
that, according to Aristotle, there is nothing else in the soul which is
really distinct from the soul but habits or acts. 139 The opinion with
which Ockham ultimately agrees is that the concept is an act in the
soul, more precisely said, an act of understanding (actus
intelligendi).140 Another text in which the group of acts occurs in the
classification of the things of the soul is in Scriptum in librum
primum Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 6 where Ockham discusses universals.
According to him, Aristotle and A verroes seem to think that there is
nothing else real in the soul other than habit or act or pas sion. 141 On
the basis of this, Ockham claims that A verroes thinks that the
universals are either cognitive habits or acts in the soul. 142 The group
138 ..... Philosophus non videtur ponere in anima nisi potentias et habitus et passiones sive
actus, sicut habetur II Ethicorum." Exp. Periherm. Arist. 1, prooem.; OPh II, 350: 11-13.
139 .... .in anima non est realiter distinctum ab anima nisi habitus veI actus secundum
Philosophum... " Exp. Periherm. Arist. 1, prooem.; OPh II, 351: 11-12.
140 "Alia posset esse opinio, quod passio animae [conceptus] est ipse actus intelligendi. Et
quia ista opinio videtur mihi probabilior de ornnibus opinionibus quae ponunt istas
passiones esse subiective et realiter in anima tamquam veras qualitates ipsius ... " Exp.
Periherm. Arist. 1, prooem.; OPh II, 351(6): 4-7. (The concept is said to be a passion in
the meaning ofbeing predicable of something. See ibid., 349 [ 4]: 5-8.)
141 ..... satis videtur esse de intentione eorum [Philosophus et Commentator] quod nihil reale
est in anima nisi veI habitus veI actus veI passio." Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 6; 0Th II, 507: 12-13.
1420rd. 1, d. 3, q. 6; 0Th II, 507: 5-13.
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CHAPTER TWO
of acts also occurs in Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum,

q. 14 where Ockham discusses the cause of recalling acts. A habit
generated by abstractive acts is their cause, Ockham thinks, since the
cause has to exist in the soul, and there is nothing else in the soul but
acts, and habits, and passions which follow acts, namely pleasure and
distress l43 , and there can be recalling acts in the soul when there are
neither acts nor passions. 144 Here Ockham is c1early going on the
assumption that the group of acts does not only involve cognitive
acts of the soul, but also those passions which are acts. The passions
that are not acts but follow them are mentioned separately.145
However, Ockham was not quite sure that there are no other
things in the soul but habits, potencies, passions and acts. In
Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 2, he discusses the
question of whether there is a special character (character)
impressed in the soul when one receives baptism. According to what
Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics and in other places, there
are only the following things in the soul: potency, passion, and habit,
and act. Since the character, according to Ockham, is none of them,
it does not seem, in his theory, to be an absolute form. 146 Ockham
states that, in addition to the things of which we can get knowledge
through our capacities, there can be some other things of which we
have neither any intuitive nor abstractive knowledge in the soul, and
the baptismal character seems to be such a thing. In this connection,
Ockham explains how the elements in the soul are known: He states
143 " ... sicut saepe dictum est, nihil est in anima nisi actus et habitus et passiones
consequentes actus, puta delectatio et tristitia." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 293: 22 - 294: 1.
144 Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 293:18 - 294: 3.
145 This may also be the case in Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 7 where
Ockham only states that when there is pleasure in the souI, there is either an act, a habit or
a passion in the souI, without saying which: " .. .in anima quando delectatur non est nisi
actus veI habitus veI passio ... " Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI, 198: 17-18.
146 " ... videtur quod [character] non sit forma absoluta, quia secundum Philosophum, II
Ethicorum et alibi, in anima sunt tantum tria [in some manuscripts: quattuor], scilicet
potentia, passio et habitus et actus. Sed character non est aliquod illorum. Patet per
praedicta." Rep. IV, q. 2; OTh VII, 34: 13-17.
69
that operations, pleasures and distresses are known by intuitive

cognition, and habits are known by abstractive or argumentative
(arguitive) cognition. 147 In other connections, Ockham specifies that
the acts of the sensory soul are apprehended intuitively by the
interior sense 148 , and the acts of the intellectual soul by the
intellece 49
147 " .licet non sint plura in anima ad quorum cognitionem possumus devenire per notitiam
intuitivam veI abstractivam, sicut operationes, delectationes et tristitiae cognoscuntur
intuitive, et habitus abstractive et arguitive, propter hoc tamen non sequitur quod non sunt
plura in anima. Quia sicut aliqua sunt accidentia corporalia, quae tamen per sensus homo
non potest cognoscere, - ut qualitas in herbis et venenis - , quia visus et quilibet sensus
determinatur ad certa obiecta in quae potest ita quod non in plura, eodem modo possunt
esse aliqua accidentia spiritualia quae tamen intellectus non potest cognoscere, quia
intellectus determinatur pro statu isto ad certa obiecta et non ultra, de quorum numero
videtur esse character." Rep. IV, q. 2; OTh VII, 36: 10-20.
148 " ... sensus aliquis interior, puta sensus communis veI phantasia, apprehendit actum sensus
exterioris et actum desiderii sensitivum, sicut ponit Philosophus, II De Anima." Quaest.
variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 255: 92-94. "Potest enim sensus interior apprehendere actum
sensus exterioris secundum Philosophum et actum desiderandi et fugiendi..." Quodl. III, q.
17; OTh IX, 272: 93-95.
.
149 " ... intellectiones, affectiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et
nullo modo sensibiles... quilibet experitur in se quod intelligit, diligit, delectatur, tristatur... "
Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 28: 10-11, 15-16. "Patet etiam quod intellectus noster pro statu
isto non tantum cognoscit ista sensibilia, sed in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua
intelligibilia quae nullo modo cadunt sub sensu, non plus quam substantia separata cadit
sub sensu, cuiusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio consequens et tristitia
et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quae tamen non sunt sensibilia nec sub
aliquo sensu cadunt." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 39: 18 - 40: 4. " ... [mens] potest intuitive
cognoscere aliqua quae interius sunt, cuiusmodi sunt actus intellectus et voluntatis et
delectationis et huiusmodi, sine sensu, hoc est sine notitia intuitiva sensitiva illorum,
quamvis notitia intuitiva sensitiva aliquorum necessario praesupponatur... dico quod notitia
intuitiva pro statu isto non est respectu omnium intelligibilium, etiam aequaliter
praesentium intellectui, quia est respectu actuum et non respectu habituum. Quod autem ita
sit, scimus per experientiam, quia quilibet experitur se intelligere, diligere et delectari; non
sic autem se inclinari ad actum per habitum, quia tantum posset inclinari potentia per Deum
agentem sicut per habitum inclinantem. Et ideo illa inclinatio quam quilibet experitur in se
non potest cognosci evidenter ex notitia intuitiva habitus inclinantis, sed potest tantum
cognosci illo modo quo potest cognosci per rationem et discursum. Ex isto patet quod
nullus potest intuitive videre fidem et caritatem quae sunt habitus in nobis, quamvis possit
intuitive videre actus qui eliciuntur ex istis habitibus qui sunt credere et amare." Ord. 1,
prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 68: 9-13; 69: 5-18.
70
CHAPTER TWO
1shall now examine Ockham' s view of the passions of the soul

as presented above. The term 'passion' can, according to him, be
used for certain absolute qualities of the appetitive potencies of the
souls. Ockham's main interest is, in accordance with his principle of
economy, to identify the passions with the acts of the appetitive
potencies, as far as possible. Passions are not, according to him,
things which precede appetitive acts (and as such could not be
estimated moralIy), but various appetitive acts themselves are
passions. In addition to the passions that are acts, however, he has to
posit two passions which normalIy folIow them, namely pleasure and
distress. In Quodlibet il, where Ockham dearly admits that besides
the sensory appetite the will is a subject of passions, he ends up
holding that even pleasure and distress are realIy distinct from acts
only in the will. Passions as appetitive phenomena are, according to
Ockham, distinct from cognitions, but cognitions are usualIy their
partial causes. Therefore, right reason can regulate them.
1 am not sure as to whether 'passion' in this use is an absolute
term. AlI the terms which signify absolute entities are not absolute
terms. 1SO First, in Ockham' s lists of absolute or connotative terms,
'passion' does not occur, and 1 have not been able to find any place
where Ockham unambiguously says that the term 'pas sion , is
absolute or connotative. Secondly, an analysis of the uses of the term
does not make it dear whether it can be said to have only a primary
signification and to signify alI its significata equalIy, i.e., whether it
is an absolute term. It is even possible that the term 'passion' is a
connotative one, but at least most of the passion-terms that refer to
the particular passions, like the terms 'love' and 'pleasure', are
absolute terms. 1S1
150 E.g., scientia tums out to be a connotative term although it signifies an absolute quality.
Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI, 213: 3--4, 215: 4-7.
151 There is a place where Ockham says that the term 'charity', taken as referring to a habit,
is not connotative: ..... 'caritas' dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo praecise pro quodam habitu
absoluta infuso, et sic non est nomen connotativum." Ord. 1, d. 17; q. 1; OTh III, 466:
15-17.
71
Despite admitting that the term 'passion' can be used for both
sensory and intellectual phenomena, Ockham most often in his texts
uses it for acts of the sensory appetite, and even for them, mostly in
moral contexts. Quodlibet III, q. 18 is an example of this. Ockham
there asks whether the moral virtues have the passions as their
matter, and there he means by passions only the phenomena of the
sensory appetite. 152 In Quaestiones in librum secundum
Sententiarum, q. 17, he (in passing) even remarks that the passions
exist only in the sensory appetite. 153 In a few texts, instead of calling
acts of the will by the term 'passion', Ockham calls them by the term
'affection' (affectio ).154
As a matter of fact, positing passions only in the sensory part
of the human being was the traditional solution since Augustine.
This was because the passions were thought to be essentially
connected with bodily changes, and the phenomena of the will were
not thought to be such. The term 'passion' was, however, in the
152
Quodl. III, q. 18; OTh IX, 273-275: 1-54.
153 " ... solum
in appetitu sensitivo consistunt passiones." Rep. II, q. 18; OTh V, 389: 19.
154 " .. .intellectiones,
affectiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et

nullo moda sensibiles ... " ard. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 28: 10--11. " ... notitia intuitiva
intellectionis vei affectionis vei delectationis praesupponit notitiam obiecti illius
intellectionis vei affectionis vei delectationis ... " ard. 1; prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 67: 15-17.
" ... aliquae [voces] sunt inventiae ad exprimendum affectiones, tristitias, delectationes et
huiusmodi, quae sunt actus voluntatis et passiones consequentis." ard. 1, d. 22, q. un.; OTh
IV, 50: 16-18. " ... substantia angeli subiacet diversis intellectionibus et affectionibus ... "
Rep. II, q. 11; OTh V, 242: 22-23. "[Contra:] Sed voluntas moda afficitur ad aliquam rem
et non ad eius oppositum contradictorie, et post afficitur ad suum contradictorium et non ad
istam rem. Igitur necesse est ponere quod aliquid produci tur in voluntate per quod afficitur
voluntas alicui cui prius non afficiebatur. Hoc non potest esse ni si nova affectio, igitur non
afficitur utrique oppositorum per unam affectionem. Confirmatur: quia licet idem actus
terminatur ad obiectum primarium et secundarium, loquendo de affectione, non tamen
potest terminari ad aliquid et suum oppositum." Rep. II, q. 16; OTh V, 361: 6-15. See more
broadly ibid., q. 16; OTh V, 360: 9 - 366: 19; 375: 16 - 378: 4. " ... voluntas humana in se
ipsa causat suas volitiones et affectiones ... " Summ. phil. nat. II, c. 13; OPh VI, 246: 20. In
a text dealing with the will, Ockham mentions in passing the distinction between affectio
commodi and affectio iusti used by Anselm and Scotus. ard. 1, d. 1, q. 6; OTh 1, 502:
16-18. The term 'affection' in the use based on Aristotle's Categories, that is, referring 10
alI easily changeable qualities, see pages 17, and 52.
72
CHAPTER TWO
Middle Ages sometimes used for the phenomena of the will, but only
in a loose or another kind of meaning than for the forms in the
sensory appetite. For instance, Thomas Aquinas thought that by
taking the term 'passion' analogically, one could posit passions in
the will. 155 By the end of the 13th century, however, the Franciscans
seem to have begun to reappraise this solution. Before Ockham, at
least Duns Scotus posited passions in the will without emphasizing
that it was a question of passions in the loose sense of the term. 156
Another traditional solution with respect to passions was that
they were thought to be 'passions' also in the sense that they were
passive reactions to cognitions in the meaning that they were not free
acts of their subject. Ockham does not employ this criterion for
passions. It would be appropriate in his way of thinking for the acts
of sensory appetite but not for acts of will. However, as will be seen
in sub-chapters 4.1. and 4.2., there are, according to Ockham, certain
phenomena in the will that are not freely caused by the will. Pleasure
and distress mentioned above are such. It is worth noting that even in
the places where Ockham does not call the acts of the will 'passions',
he calls pleasure and distress 'passions'. 157 Another group of the
phenomena of the will that are not its free acts are the acts
necessitated by other acts of the will. AlI those phenomena posited
by Ockham could also be called 'passions' in the sense that they are
not free acts of the will.
Why did Ockham and the other Franciscans then end up
diverging from the beaten track and calling also certain phenomena
of the will 'passions'? A reason might be that, according to them, the
will and its phenomena resemble the sensory appetite and its
155
Kent 1984, 367-370; King 1999, 105, footnote 7.
John Duns Scotus 1986, 330-331 (Ord. III, supplementum, dist. 33). See also Kent
1984,400.
156
157 " .. passio consequens actum, puta delectatio." Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI, 197: 13. See also
ibid., q. 7; OTh VI, 197: 17; 198: 17-18. " ... dilectio est actus elicitus, sed delectatio est
quaedam passio causata naturaliter a dilectione." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 11; OTh VIII, 308:
485--486. See also Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 266: 322.
73
phenomena. According to the Franciscans, the intellectual cognitions

which partially cause phenomena of the will do not only deal with
universal but also singular objects. In addition, the will is not bound
by the judgments of reason. Some of its acts are unpremeditated
reactions to things, and even when the intellect evaluates alternative
ways of reaction, the will does not necessarily conform to the
judgments of reason. Even though the reactions of the sensory
appetite are natural and the reactions of the will are free, both of
them are subjective reactions of a human being. 158
158
See also Knuuttila 2002,77-78.
CHAPTER THREE
SENSORY PASSIONS
3.1. GENESIS OF THE SENSORY PASSIONS

In this chapter 1 shall analyze Ockham's conception of the passions
which exist in the sensory appetite. All the acts of the sensory
appetite are, according to Ockham, passions, although Ockham does
not always use the term 'passion' for them. 1 shall first focus on the
genesis of the passions in the sensory appetite. After that 1 shall say
something about their effects. Then 1 shall turn to their types.
Ockham accepts the traditional formulation according to which
an effect "sufficiently" depends on its essential causes and their
dispositions. 1 The actuality of essential causes is sufficient to bring
about their effects, provided that there is no hindrance. What are the
essential causes of the passions of the sensory appetite? Ockham
does not present a thorough theory of them anywhere in his works.
Various causes are considered in various contexts. Ockham most
often mentions sensory cognitions as causes of the passions of the
sensory appetite, but also the sensory appetite itself, the habits, the
corporeal qualities, and the acts of the will are discussed as their
causes, but not necessarily accepted as such. AlI the natural causes,
of course, can be, at the most, partial causes since God is a necessary
1 "o 00 patet per propositionem frequenter acceptam quod effectus sufficienter dependet ex suis
causis essentialibus et dispositionibus earumo" Quaesto variae, qo 6, ao 9; OTh VIII, 251:
10-120
75
76
CHAPTER THREE
cause of everything. 2 Taken naturally, some of them seem to be able

to function as total or sufficient causes of the passions of the sensory
appetite, but often they seem to function as partial ones, that is,
together with other causes. Ockham does not seem to be interested in
discussing the basic bodily disposition needed for passions of the
sensory appetite but probably takes it as granted: it is the fleshly
body with its organs. 3 1 shall deal below with the texts in which
various corporeal qualities are considered as partial causes of the
passions of the sensory appetite.
The sensory cognitions are the most-often mentioned causes of
the passions of the sensory appetite. They occur in almost all the
texts in which Ockham discusses these passions. Their role is
decisive, especially from the point of view of the types of the
passions, as will be seen later. 1 shall now examine what kinds of
cognitions Ockham posits, and especially, what kinds of cognitions
he posits in the sensory cognitive potency.
A thing can, according to Ockham, be known either intuitively
or abstractively.4 An intuitive cognition of a thing includes a kind of
2 " Deus est causa prima et irnmediata omnium effectuum productorum a causa secunda
irnmediatione causae, et hoc sine aliqua mutatione ex parte sui." Rep. II, q. 3-4; OTh V, 65:
25 - 66: 4. " ... nuUa creatura potest in aliquem effectum nisi coagente Deo irnmediate
tanquam causa partiali et principali." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 168: 12-14. " ... nuUacreatura
est causa totalis respectu alicuius effectus sed tantum partialis, quia in omni actione
creaturae concurrit Deus." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 171: 23-25.
3 " potentia organica est illa quae utitur organo corporali in actione sua, cuiusmodi sunt
omnes potentiae extensae in materia, sicut potentiae sensitivae." Rep. IV, q. 7; OTh VII,
121: 6-8. The same is in Quodl. IV, q. 14; OTh IX, 369: 75-77. See also the folIowing
statements: " ... dico quod plantae non sentiunt, quia non habent camem, iel est determinatam
dispositionem quae requiritur ad actum sentiendi nec habent principium quod potest
recipere formas sensibilium, id est actus." Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 127: 9-12. "Sed non
possunt sentire, quia dispositio accidentalis quae necessario requiritur ad actum sentiendi
deficit in illis et corrumpitur... " Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 139: 12-14.
About pondering on the difference between intuitive and abstractive cognition, see among
others Adams 1987, 501-506; Tachau 1988; Karger 1999. According to Robert G.
Wengert, it was cornmon to make a distinction between intuitive and discursive cognition
before the fourteenth century. Before Ockham, however, at least Duns Scotus made the
distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. See Wengert 1981,416.
4
SENSORY PASSIONS
77
notification of the thing which is apprehended, but it is not a proper

judgment of the existence of the thing. 5 The proper judgments of
existence are other acts caused with the help of the intuitive
cognitions, and there are such acts only in the intellect. 6 In the natural
course of things, intuitive cognitions of things are caused by the
things themselves when present. 7 There are no habits generated by
previous intuitive acts causing them. 8 The sensory intuitive
cognitions of exterior objects, i.e., the objects that are outside the
sensory soul, exist in the five exterior senses (sensus exterior): sight,
touch, hearing, taste and smel1. 9 The sensory intuitive cognitions of
5 "Et g guaeratur de iudicio consequente praecise notitiam intuitivam sensitivam an

distinguatur ab illa, potest dici quod non distinguitur ab illa, sicut nec iudicium intellectus
quod stat praecise in notitia incomplexa; et ideo non est iudicium sequens nec est proprie
iudicium, quia non est respectu alicuius complexi, sed tantum est iudicium aequivalenter... "
ard. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 69: 22 - 70: 2.
ard. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 31: 10 - 32: 3; Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 256: 13 - 261: 2; 286:
16 - 287: 1.
7 " ... ab eadem causa simpliciter possunt fieri plura, puta a Deo ... Tamen naturaliter Ioquendo
istae notitiae habent distinctas causas effectivas, quia causa effectiva notitiae intuitivae est
ipsa res nota... " ard. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 61: 6-10. "Et quando dicit [Scotusl quod
obiectum non est praesens in se, dico quod in cognitione intuitiva est praesens in se... " Rep.
II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 310: 2-4. " ... obiectum extra, sensibile, movet immediate sensum et
intellectum ad actum intuitivum... " Rep. III, q. 2; OTh VI, 64: 20 - 65: 2. About Ockham' s
hesitation over whether external corporeal substances, in addition to the sensible qualities,
can be objects of intuitive cognition, see Adams 1990, 12.
8 " ... respondeo quod ex nulla cognitione intuitiva sensitiva veI intellectiva generari potest
habitus." Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 264: 14--15. Experience shows this. Seeibid., 15-24.
See also Fuchs 1952,21-22.
9 "Quia unus motus est ad sensibile visus, puta albedinem, et sic est idem cum sensibili
illius sensus quo ad positivum in eo; alius motus est ad sensibile tactus, puta ad calorem;
tertius ad sensibile auditus, puta ad sonum; quartus ad sensibile gustus, puta ad saporem;
quintus ad sensibile olfactus, puta ad odorem." Rep. II, q. 7; OTh V, 125: 11-15.
" ... sensationibus quinque sensuum exteriorum." Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 125: 3-4.
" ... qualitas sensibilis quae ab aliquo sensu particulari potest sentiri, cuiusmodi est calor,
frigus, color, sapor, odor et sic de aliis." Summ. phil. nat. III, c. 14; OPh VI, 293: 12-13.
78
CHAPTER THREE
interior objects, that is, the acts that are in the sensory soul, exist in
the interior senses (sensus interior). 10
Abstractive cognition, correspondingly, is such a cognition
with which one cannot evidently know contingent truths. If one, for
instance, knows Socrates as absent, with that cognition he ar she
cannot evident1y know that Socrates is ar is not, and it is a question
of abstractive cognition. II In the natural course of things, abstractive
cognitions of a thing are caused by the intuitive cognitions of the
thing or the habits generated by the abstractive cognitions. 12 The
sensory abstractive cognitions exist in the interior senses (fantasy).13
So, unlike intuitive acts, abstractive acts in the interior senses
generate habits. Those habits incline the interior senses to abstractive
acts similar to those which caused them. Therefare, even after a
sensible object has been destroyed, and there cannot be abstractive
10 " concedo quod in omni sensu, tam interiori quam exteriori, est cognitio intuitiva, hoc
est, talis cognitio virtute cuius potest...cognoscere rem esse veI non esse... " Rep. II, q.
12-13; OTh V, 269: 1-4. " ... dico quod sensationes sensuum non percipiuntur ab ipsis
sensibus quorum sunt, sed veI a sensibus superioribus, puta a sensu communi, veI ab
intellectu. Et sic intelligit Philosophus." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 314: 14--17. " ... sensus
aliquis interior, puta sensus communis veI phantasia, apprehendit actum sensus exterioris
et actum desiderii sensitivum, sicut ponit Philosophus, II De Anima." Quaest. variae, q. 6,
a. 9; OTh VIII, 255: 92-94. "Potest enim sensus interior apprehendere actum sensus
exterioris secundum Philosophum et actum desiderandi et fugiendi..." Quodl. III, q. 17;
OTh IX, 272: 93-95.
11
Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 30: 12 - 31: 9; 32: 4--15.
ab cadem causa simpliciter possunt fieri plura, puta a Deo ... naturaliter loquendo istae
notitiae habent distinctas causa effectivas ... causa autem effectiva notitiae abstractivae est
ipsamet notitia intuitiva veI aliquis habitus inclinans ad notitiam abstractivam ... " Ord. 1,
prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 61: 6-12. " ... concedo quod omnis notitia abstractiva alicuius rei
naturaliter adquisita praesupponit notitiam intuitivam eiusdem... Tamen Deus potest causare
notitiam abstractivam et deitatis et aliarum rerum sine notitia intuitiva praevia, et ita notitia
abstractiva deitatis est communicabilis viatori." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 72: 3-5,9-11.
" .. .in [cognitione] abstractiva [obiectum] est praesens in habitu." Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V,
310: 4. " ... cognitio singularis abstractiva praesupponit intuitivam respectu eiusdem
obiecti..." Quodl. 1, q. 13; OTh IX, 73: 40-41.
12 " ...
13 "Sicut patet quando aliquis sensus interior, puta phantasia, per actum abstractivum
apprehendit aliquod obiectum nocivum veI delectabile ... " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh
VIII, 251: 14--16.
SENSORY PASSIONS
79
acts of the object caused by an intuitive act of it, there can be

abstractive acts of it because of habits. 14 By such terms as 'fantasm'
(phantasma) , 'picture' (simulacrum), 'idol' (idolum) and 'image'
(imago), the authorities do not, according to Ockham, refer to the
sensible species of the objects Of anything else mediating between
the objects and the acts of the interior senses. The terms signify the
sensible objects themselves and connote the acts of the interior
senses. 15
14 "Sed quantum ad sensum interiorem, puta phantasiam, est ibi duplex qualitas ... alia
generata per actum imaginandi quae...est subiective in potentia ut distinguitur contra
organum, sicut ipse actus phantasiandi. Et illa qualitas secunda non est obiectum alicuius
actus, sed est habitus generatus per actum phantasiandi inclinans sicut causa partialis ad
actus consimiles in absenti a rei sensibilis, sicut posui prius in intellectu, ita quod post
primum actum si ipsum sensibile destruatur, potest potentia phantastica cum illo habitu
generato ex prima actu elicere actum phantasiandi terminatum ad idem sensibile numero
quod prius vidi." Rep. III, q. 3; OTh VI, 120: 16-17,19,21 - 121: 7......est necessitas
ponendi habitum in potentia phantastica, quia potest habere actum phantasiandi, non
exsistente aliquo sensu extrinseco in actu suo." Rep. III, q. 11; OTh VI, 364: 10-12..... .in
potentia apprehensiva sunt ponendi habitus, quia post frequentiam actuum imaginandi
redditur aliquis promptus ad consimiles actus; et nullo moda redditur promptus ad tales
actus ante omnem actum imaginandi; igitur ex illis actibus generatur habitus." Quodl. III,
q. 20; OTh IX, 282: 26-30.
15 "Quia omnia illa quae a philosophis et sanctis doctoribus vocantur phantasmata,
simulacra, idola, sunt ipsamet sensibilia prius sensata et post phantasiata, et non species
sensibilium. Eundem enim hominem quem prius vidi, nunc imaginor, et non speciem
hominis. Et ideo de istis idolis dicendum est...quod ipsamet res singularis quae prima
terminat actum videndi corporalem, ipsamet omnino indistincta terminat actum phantasiandi
et intelligendi abstractive, et nulla species terminat...hoc nomen 'phantasma' veI conceptus
eius significat principaliter ipsam rem imaginatam, connotando actum phantasiandi. Et
secundum istud patet quod quot sunt individua phantasiata, sive sit eiusdem speciei sive
alterius, tot sunt phantasmata. Et sic illud dictum commune falsum est, quod quaelibet
species habet tantum unum phantasma, quia tot sunt phantasmata quot individua." Rep. III,
q. 3; OTh VI, 121: 15, 122: 4-7, 9-15. "Et dico quod Philosophus per phantasmata,
simulacra, idol a, imagines non intelligit aliqua realiter distincta a rebus extra, sed.. .in
proposito imago dicit ipsam rem secundum quod terminat actum sensus interioris in
absentia rei sensibilis. Hoc patet in simili, quia dicimus quod aliquis videt imaginem ipsius
in speculo, et tamen nulla imago videtur sed ipsa res extra videtur... sicut in aqua apparet
idolum, non quia aliquid ibi apparet praeter rem extra exsistentem, sed ipsamet res, ita est
interius quod ipsamet res prius sensata apparet, hoc est terminat actum phantasiandi..." Rep.
III, q. 3; OTh VI, 128: 10-12, 14-18, 129: 3-6.
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In the sensory memory, it is a question of the habits in the

interior sense generating acts similar to the ones that generated the
habits themselves. 16 Ockham remarks, however, that properly taken,
'memory' does not refer to the sensory cognitive potency at all but
only to the intellect since only there can there be acts with respect to
something past as past, that is, recalling acts. 1?
With the help ofhabits that generate acts, the interior sense can
even apprehend or imagine something complex, for example, a
golden mountain (the classica1 Porphyrian example). This happens as
follows: because of habits, there is simultaneously an act of
imagining with respect to a mountain and with respect to gold.
Ockham says it does not matter whether this happens by one act (in
which case an act has several objects) or more; it can probably be
16 " . memoria dupliciter accipitur: uno moda pro potentia habente aliquem habitum vei
qualitatem derelictam ex actu praeterito, virtute cuius potest talis potentia in aliquem
consimilem actum et eiusdem rationis cum actu praeterito, qui quidem actus praeteritus
aliquid requirit ad suum esse quod non exigitur ad esse secundi actus, puta obiectum
extra ... Primo modo accipiendo memoriam, dico quod memoria repetitur in parte sensitiva
et intellectiva, quia certum est quod in utraque derelinquitur aliqua qualitas mediante qua
potest in aliquem actum in quem prius non potuit et in actum consimilem prima actui, sicut
diffuse est probatum... " Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 297: 11-17; 298: 7-11. See also Rep. IV,
q. 14; OTh VII, 279: 14-21; 313: 2-5. See also Fuchs 1952,48. (For Ockham's whole
theory of the memory, see Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 278-318. See also Baudry 1958,
147-148.)
17 "Alio moda [memoria] accipitur pro potentia quae potest in actum recordandi proprie
dictum mediante habitu generata ex actibus praeteritis, non quidem incomplexis sed
complexis, puta ex istis 'intelligo me nunc audire vei videre hoc'. Ex istis et similibus
generatur alius habitus ab habitu generato ex actibus incomplexis intuitivis vei abstracti vis,
et mediante tali habitu cognosco postea evidenter per actum recordandi quod hoc vidi et hoc
audivi. Et ratio est quia habitus semper inclinat ad actus consimiles illis ex quibus
generatur.. .Secundo moda loquendo de memoria dico tamquam certum quod est in parte
intellectiva, sed non est ita certum quod est in parte sensitiva." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII,
297: 18 - 298: 4,13-15. Ockham ends up claiming that taken in this way, memory does not
exist in the sensory soul: "Secundo dico quod in parte sensitiva non est memoria proprie
dicta." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 299: 17-18. To prove this Ockham, among others, remarks
that the object of the recalling act is complex, and there are no such acts in the senses.
" ... nullus sensus respicit aliquod complexum pro obiecto, sed actus recordandi respicit
complexum pro obiecto ... " Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 300: 1-2. About the recalling act, see
also ibid., 294: 17 - 296: 5.
SENSORY PASSIONS
81
true both ways.18 In the same way, without positing acts that have
complex objects, Ockham seems to explain a kind of judgment that
brute animals and children have between harmful and agreeable, and
the "syllogizing" of dogs, which one has to posit because of certain
exterior operations. 19
What kinds of cognitions can cause passions in the sensory
appetite? Do pure intuitive cognitions proper to exterior senses
(having external things as objects) and interior senses (having
internal acts as objects) suffice to cause passions of the sensory
appetite? Or is it only some abstractive cognitions proper to interior
senses which can cause them? As said before, there can be sensory
abstractive cognitions even about complex objects through habits.
A text in which Ockham discusses sensory cognitions as
causes of the passions of the sensory appetite is in Quaestiones in
librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 12. 1 examine that text in detail,
since it seems to Oswald Fuchs that there Ockham wavered over
whether intuitive cognitions can contribute to the production of the
act-passions or if it is only the abstractive ones that can. Fuchs says
that Ockham first attributes the causality in question both to the
intuitive and abstractive sensory cognitions, but he thinks that later
in the same text that position is reversed, and the ability of the
18 " .imaginativa potest mediantibus habitibus apprehensivis incomplexis simul

apprehendere partes montis. aurei, puta per unum habitum montem et per alium aurum. Et
hoc est imaginari montem aureum: habere simul actum imaginandi respectu montis et
respectu auri, sive hoc sit per unum actum sive per plures non euro, utrumque potest
probabiliter dici." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 315: 7-12. See also ibid., 313: 13 - 314: 13.
19 " . dico quod sensitiva habet iudicium. Patet in brutis, pueris, fatuis etc., qui iudicant inter
nociva et convenientia, sed non habent actum iudicandi distinctum ab actibus apprehensivis
incomplexis, si cut intellectus habet. Quia talis. actus assentiendi est complexus et
praesupponit formationem complexi qualis non potest esse in parte sensitiva, quare talis
actus ponitur in intellectu ... Sed illi habitus et actus incomplexi aequivalent eis ac si
haberent notitiam complexi, et hoc quantum ad opera exteriora. Ad aliud de syllogizatione
canis patet per idem, quia apprehendit incomplexa quae aequivalent notitiis complexis
quantum ad opus extra." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 314: 18 - 315: 7. For the estimation in
a sheep when it fears a wolf, an often-quoted Avicennian example, see Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 2;
OTh II, 410: 20 - 412: 18.
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intuitive sensory cognitions to contribute to the production of actpassions is expressly denied. 20

In that text Ockham discusses the question of how habits are
generated in the sensory appetite. In this connection he realIy seems
to posit habits in the sensory appetite, but later he ends up rejecting
them, as will be argued below. Since it is only acts which generate
habits, Ockham in this context concentrates on dealing with those
phenomena of the sensory appetite which he here clearly considers as
acts, that is, passions other than pleasure and pain. They are,
according to him, caused partially by a sensory cognition, either
intuitive or abstractive, and partially by the appetitive potency.21 AlI
of these acts cannot, however, generate habits. Which acts of the
sensory appetite can do so? First Ockham says that "one has to note
here" that a habit can be generated in the sensory appetite of any
interior or exterior sense. This being so, it is a sensory apprehension
of an object, whether it be intuitive Of abstractive, which is a partial
efficient cause of the first act of the sensory appetite, that is, of the
act from which the habit is generated. Thus, the object is not the
cause. 22
It is, however, unclear what will prove to be Ockham's actual
view, since a little later in the same text, Ockham backs a rather
different opinion. He still thinks that cognitions (and not the objects
immediately) are partial causes of those acts of the sensory appetite
from which habits are generated, but he does not think that a habit
can be generated in the sensory appetite of just any interior or
20
Fuchs 1952, 53-55.
21 "Sciendum tamen quod passio tripliciter accipitur. Uno moda proprie, et sic accipitur pro
ipso actu elicito a potentia appetitiva sensitiva, qui actus causatur effective ah
apprehensione sive cognitione sensitiva, intuitiva veI abstractiva, sicut a causa partiali una,
et a potentia appetitiva sicut ab alia causa partiali." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 401: 8-12.
"Et nota hic quod talis habitus potest generari in appetitu sensitivo cuiuslibet sensus
interioris et exterioris, et tunc ipsa apprehensio si ve cognitio sensitiva - sive sit intuitiva
sive abstractiva - erit causa efficiens partialis respectu primi actus eliciti ab appetitu
sensitivo et non sensibile extra. Et ilie primus actus appetitus vocatur a Philosopho passio
et est generativus habitus in tali appetitu " Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 401: 13-19.
22
SENSORY PASSIONS
83
exterior sense. Instead, it is, according to him, the appetite of fantasy

and interior senses which generate habits, not the appetites of
exterior senses. That is because there are habits posited only in those
appetites in which there is more inclination after an act than before.
The appetite of fantasy or the appetite following fantasy is such an
appetite, since after an object has been apprehended by fantasy and
an appetitive act has been elicited in the appetite which follows
fantasy, that appetite is more inclined to similar acts than before the
act. Instead, after something is apprehended by sight, and there has
once been an appetitive act towards it, one does not sense himself or
herself more inclined to have an appetitive act towards it when it is
apprehended at another time. This is, according to Ockham,
everyone's experience. Therefore, in such an appetite (the appetite
following sight) there are no habits generated from acts. From this
Ockham makes a generalization: "If it is not such in one (appetite),
so it is not in another (appetite)." By that he seems to mean that,just
as in the appetite following sight, there are no habits generated from
acts, so in the appetites which follow other exterior senses, there are
no habits generated from acts. From what has been said, it is,
according to Ockham, apparent that an act of the sensory appetite
(from which a habit can be generated) is caused with the mediation
of abstractive sensory cognition (in fantasy), not intuitive sensory
cognition (mostly in exterior senses). This is said, Ockham remarks,
about the cases in which an act of the sensory appetite presupposes
an apprehension. 23
"Si guaeras cuius sensus appetitus est generativus illorum habituum, respondeo:
phantasiae et sensus interioris, non exterioris. Cuius ratio est, quia in ilIo appetitu tantum
ponuntur isti habitus qui magis inclinantur post actum elieitum quam ante. Sed huiusmodi
est appetitus phantasiae sive sequens phantasiam. Nam apprehenso obiecto per phantasiam
et eHeito actu appetendi, frequenter in appetitu sequente phantasiam - si ve obiectum
exsistat sive non, si ve sit praesens sive non - magis inclinatur talis appetitus ad actum
consimiIem quam ante actum. Et per consequens, in appetitu sequente phantasiam oportet
ponere taIem habitum generatum ex actibus, et hoc circa obiectum cuiuslibet sensus
quatenus phantasiatur. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis semei appetit aliquod visibile apprehensum
a visu, non sentit se magis inclinatum ad appetendum ilIud visibile alias apprehensum quam
prima apprehensum, sicut quilibet experitur in se. Ideo in taIi appetitu non generatur
23
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On the basis of this analysis, my view is that Ockham in this

text thinks without hesitation that both intuitive cognitions (of
exterior and interior senses) and abstractive cognitions (of fantasy)
cause acts in the sensory appetite. Ockham does not give examples in
this connection, but he seems to think that, for instance, just sensing
heat can cause avoidance towards that heat. The desires of the
sensory appetite which have been caused by pure intuitive cognitions
do not, however, suffice to generate habits of desiring in the sensory
appetite. Only such desires of the sensory appetite as have been
generated by abstractive cognitions proper to fantasy can generate
habits. Accordingly, if there is in the sensory appetite, for instance,
a habit of desiring food, it has been generated from desires which
have been caused by abstractive fantasy-cognitions of food. As said
before, the pure intuitive cognitions cannot generate cognitive habits
in the sensory cognitive potency. Now it has become dear that the
appetitive acts caused by them cannot generate habits in the sensory
appetitive potency. (As mentioned severa! times, Ockham elsewhere
ends up rejecting habits in the sensory appetite.) In addition to the
text just considered, there are severa! other texts in which Ockham
quite explicitly says that the intuitive sensory cognitions cause acts
in the sensory appetite. 24 Thus, 1 think that it is Ockham's opinion
that even pure intuitive cognitions of objects can cause acts, such as
desire, in the sensory appetite. Often those acts, however, are
qualitas si ve habitus ex actibus; et sicut non in uno, ita nec in alio. Ex hoc apparet quod
actus appetitus sensitivi causatur mediante cognitione sensitiva abstractiva non intuitiva,
licet forte non sit in appetitu intellectivo. Et hoc dico quando actus appetitus sensitivi
praesupponit apprehensionem." Rep. IlI, q. 12; OTh VI, 409: 16 - 410: 18.
appetitus sensitivus potest elicere actum suum circa obiectum nude ostensum et
apprehensum a sensu sine omni compositione et divisione praecedente intellectus veI
sensus." Rep. II, q. 16; OTh V, 364: 3-6. " ... dico quod nullum obiectum, nec bonum nec
malum, potest cognosci ab aliquo cognitione sensitiva veI intellectiva quin appetitus
sequens taIem potentiam possit habere actum circa idem obiectum." Rep. II, q. 20; OTh V,
447: 2-7. "Si autem [anima intellectiva et anima sensitiva] sint diversae formae, sicut credo
quod sunt, tunc dico quod visio sensitiva ... sufficiat ad causandum actum in appetitu
sensitivo ... " Quodl. 1, q. 15; OTh IX, 84: 27-30.
24 " ..
SENSORY PASSIONS
85
probably caused by abstractive cognitions by which evencomplex

objects can be cognized in the sensory cognitive potency.
The most important texts in which Ockham deals with the
causation of pleasure and pain in the sensory appetite, that is, the
passions which he does not always (as in the text analyzed above)
consider to be acts, are Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 9, and Quodlibet
III, q. 17. In them, Ockham's purpose is to prove that pleasure and
pain of the sensory appetite are caused by sensory cognitions.
Pleasure and pain are not immediately caused by the objects since,
after the destruction of an object, there can be pleasure or pain with
respect to it if an apprehension of it remains. 25 They are not caused
by some (other) acts ofthe sensory appetite either, since there are no
such acts in the sensory appetite which could cause them. Desire or
avoidance, which may precede them, cannot co-exist with them. 26 In
these texts, Ockham clearly says that even pure intuitive cognitions
(sensations) of things suffice to cause pleasure or pain in the sensory
appetite. 27 Ockham thinks that pleasure or pain can simply be caused
because of the agreeableness (convenientia) or disagreeableness
(disconvenientia) of an apprehension with the (sensory) potency.28
This could be understood to mean that some apprehensions have the
Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 251-252: 9-28; Quodl. III, q. 17; OTh IX, 269-270:
29-54.
25
1 shall examine this matter in detaii when discussing the types of the passions of the
sensory appetite in the folIowing sub-chapter.
26
27 " . [obiectum apprehensum] naturaliter causat cognitionem intuitivam in sensu et eam

conservat, quae cognitio causat immediate passiones ... " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII,
252: 26-28. " ... talis dolor causatur immediate ex apprehensione, quia sensatione existente
potest esse dolor, et ipsa non existente non potest esse dolor; igitur sensatio est eius
causa... de secundo doi ore dico quod quamvis non maneat naturaliter ni si praesente
sensibili, non tamen causatur a sensibili extra sed a sensatione, quia sufficit quod sensibile
sit causa apprehensionis, quae est causa doloris; quia si Deus conservaret taiem visionem
si ve sensationem et destrueret sensibile, adhuc illa sensatio causaret dolorem." Quodl. III,
q. 17; OTh IX, 270: 45-47,49-54.
28 " . si obiectum gustus et tactus solum apprehenderetur sine immutatione, adhuc causaret
dolorem et delectationem in appetitu propter convenientiam veI disconvenientiam illius
apprehensionis cum potentia." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 264: 283-286.
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CHAPTER THREE
feature that they are agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, and

therefore they cause pleasure or pain.
Sometimes Ockham connects passions with senses so strongly
that he even speaks about the appetites of certain senses. He seems
then to mean that the sensory appetitive acts can be divided
according to the senses whose acts have caused them. In Quaestiones
in librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 12, when dealing with such acts of
the sensory appetite as desire, Ockham first speaks about the
appetites of exterior and interior senses, and then about the appetites
following the senses. 29 In Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 9, he posits
pain in the senses and in an appetite. 30 In Expositio in librum
PraedicamentorumAristotelis, c. 14, there are several remarks about
pleasure and distress in exterior senses. 3! In most texts, however,
Ockham speaks about the sensory appetite as a subject of the
appetitive phenomena.
Although pleasure and pain can, according to Ockham, be
caused by pure sensations, they often are caused by abstractive
cognitions through which there can be a kind of judgment in the
29 "Et nota hic quod talis habitus potest generari in appetitu sensitivo cuiuslibet sensus
interioris et exterioris ... " Rep. III, q. 12; Olb VI, 401: 13-14. "~ guaeras cuius sensus
appetitus est generativus iIIorum habituum, respondeo: phantasiae et sensus interioris, non
exterioris. Cuius ratio est, quia in iIIo appetitu tantum ponuntur isti habitus qui magis
incIinantur post actum elicitum quam ante. Sed huiusmodi est appetitus phantasiae sive
sequens phantasiam. Nam apprehenso obiecto per phantasiam et eIicito actu appetendi,
frequenter in appetitu sequente phantasiam... magis incIinatur talis appetitus ad actum
consimilem quam ante actum." Rep. III, q. 12; Olb VI, 409: 16 - 410: 6.
30 "Si guaeras utrum apprehensio sensibilis delectabilis vei nocivi potest causare dolorem
in appetitu sine immutatione reali eiusdem, respondeo quod sic. Quia licet gustus et tactus
simul apprehendant obiectum sensibile et immutantur realiter ab illo obiecto, tamen hoc
accidit ad causandum dolorem. Patet enim quod in aliis sensibus, qui solum apprehendunt
et non immutantur, realiter causatur dolor. Et eodem moda si obiectum gustus et tactus
solum apprehenderetur sine immutatione, adhuc causaret dolorem et delectationem in
appetitu ... " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; Olb VIII, 264: 277-285.
31 " . .istae qualitates inferunt passionem taiem sensui, quia gustus in apprehendendo
duJcedinem veI amaritudinem tristatur veI delectatur, et similiter tactus sentiendo calorem
delectatur vei tristatur...omne obiectum cuiuscumque sensus potest causare aliqualem
delectationem veI tristitiam in sensu ... " Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 278-279: 50-53,
62-63.
SENSORY PASSIONS
87
sensory soul. No matter what kind of cognition there is as a cause,

the cognition functions as a necessitating cause of passions. 32 For
more about various cognitions required for various passions of the
sensory appetite, see sub-chapter 3.2.
Irrespective of the fact that Ockham seems to think that sensory
cognitions of objects are (naturally taken) sufficient causes of the
passions of the sensory appetite, he does not seem to think that they
function as their total natural causes, at least not always. He even
thinks that there can be cases in which the passions of the sensory
appetite are not even partially caused by the cognitions. Such
passions, however, are too difficult for human beings to
distinguish. 33 Let us now turn to look at the other partial causes of
the passions of the sensory appetite.
Can the sensory appetite itself function as one of the partial
efficient causes of the passions in it? In Quaestiones in librum
tertium Sententiarum, q. 12, Ockham states that when 'passion' is
taken properly, it is used for such acts elicited in the sensory
appetitive potency as are effectively but partially caused by a
cognition, and partially by appetitive potency.34 Earlier in the same
work, Ockham mentions the appetitive potency itself as a cause of
those of its acts which do not presuppose cognition at alI. 35 1 shall
return to the cases of such acts below. In Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a.
9, Ockham says that in the case of pain, it does not seem to be
[actus appetitus sensitivi] necessario poniturposita apprehensione sensitiva... " Quaest.

variae, q. 7, a. 3; OTh VIII, 364: 527-528. " .. .iudicante sensu et apprehendente quod hoc
est nocivum veI delectabile, appetitus sensitivus statim fugit veI appetit nec potest
resistere ... " Quaest. variae, q. 7, a. 3; OTh VIII, 368: 622-624.
33 See pages 93-95.
32 " .

"Si autem [actus appetitus sensitivi] non necessario praesupponit cognitionem, tunc
causatur totaliter a potentia appetitiva et aliquibus qualitatibus corporalibus." Rep. III, q.
12; OTh VI, 410: 19-21.
34
35
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CHAPTER THREE
necessary to posit the sensory appetite as a partial efficient cause. 36 1t

seems to me that the idea that the sensory appetite itself is a partial
efficient cause of its other passions, but not of pleasure and pain,
would not be in contradiction with Ockham' s theory of the souls and
the acts in them. The corresponding potency in the intellectuai soul
is the will, and it surely is an efficient cause of its acts. There would
be nothing odd in thinking that both appetites were partial causes of
acts in them, but the sensory appetite is a natural efficient cause
while the will is a free and contingent one. One sti Il has to say that
even though Ockham sometimes may consider the sensory appetite
itself as an efficient cause of some passions in it, he is not interested
in it as such a cause.
A partial cause of the passions of the sensory appetite that
interests Ockham is the habit or some other thing that inc1ines the
appetite towards acts after there have been acts in it. Traditionally it
was thought that there is a habit in the sensory appetite which
remains after there have been acts in it, and the habit inc1ines the
appetite towards acts. As seen above, there are texts in which
Ockham c1early posits habits in the sensory appetite. 37 However, in
the text in which he analyzes at length the question of habits of the
sensory appetite, namely Quodlibet il, q. 16, he ends up rejecting
habits there, and positing corporeal qualities instead.
Ockham's starting point in that text is that it is everyone's
experience that after repeated acts Of exercise of acts in the sensory
appetite, a human being is more inc1ined towards similar acts than he
36 "Circa delectationes, dolores et tristitias sciendum prima quod dolor, qui proprie est
passio et qualitas appetitus sensitivi, ab apprehensione sensitiva causatur, et non ab obiecto
apprehenso [al sensu nec ab actu appetitus, sed solummodo ab apprehensione et potentia
appetitiva et Deo. Si tamen appetitus habeat aliquam efficientiam respectu illius passionis,
hoc non videtur necessarium ponere sicut alias patebit." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh
VIII, 251: 2-8. In this section, the term 'passio' does not refer to passion in its appetitivephenomenon -meaning but to passion in the passion-action -scale. (The editors of
Quaestiones variae explain alias as follows: "Perhaps in his exposition on Aristotle's book
De anima that he intended to make." lbid., 251, footnote 3.)
37
See also Fuchs 1952, 53-55.
SENSORY PASSIONS
89
or she was before. That is why there must be something that remains
after the acts concemed - in the sensory appetite or at least outside
the wil1. 38 Is it a habit in the sensory appetite which remains? One
cannot, according to Ockham, at least not always, sufficiently prove
that the thing that inclines the sensory appetite to acts after similar
acts is something that exists in the sensory appetite itself, since one
can sufficiently claim that there are, after the acts concemed,
corporeal qualities in the human being that incline the sensory
appetite towards such acts. 39 This is proved as follows: Whatever can
be induced without any act of the sensory appetite does not
necessarily have to be placed subjectively in the sensory appetite.
Everything that we can experience in ourselves, can be in us without
any act of the sensory appetite. Therefore, nothing that we can
experience in ourselves has to be placed in the sensory appetite. 40
Ockham states that the major premise is obvious. The minor premise
is not obvious but has to be proved, and Ockham proves it as
38 " quilibet post frequentiam actuum in appetitu sensitivo experitur se magis inclinatum
ad consimiles actus quam ante; igitur oportet quod aliquid sit in illo appetitu quod prius non
fuit, vei saltem extra voluntatem oportet aliquid ponere. Item quando primo est aliquis
exercitatus in actibus virtuosis, si postea careat usu rationis et fiat furiosus vei stultus,
manifeste patet quod talis inclinatur ad consimiles actus quos prius exercebat; sed hoc non
potest esse sine habitu derelicto extra voiuntatem, veI sine omni alia re derelicta post actus
laudabiles." Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX, 183: 26-35. By 'inclining' (inclina re) Ockham, in
these kinds of connections, refers to causing an act. In Quodlibet III, he explains his
conception of 'inclining' and 'inclination': " .. .inclinare est actum causare, quod reputo
verum. .. Large accipiendo 'inclinationem', non est aliud quam esse in potentia ad aliud sine
omni inclinatione et activitate ad contrarium; et sic materia est in potentia naturali ad
formam et inclinatur ad eam... Stricte accipitur 'inclinatio' secundum quod addit aliquid
ultra esse in potentia receptiva, puta activitatem... breviter sic inclinare idem est quod
agere." Quodl. III, q. 22; OTh IX, 289-290: 23-24, 34-40,44-45.
39 "Sed tunc est dubium quid est illud quod remanet post actus. Respondeo quod non potest
sufficienter probari quod sit aliquid existens in appetitu sensitivo, saltem quantum ad
multos actus virtuosos; quia potest poni sufficienter quod sit aliqua qualitas vei qualitates
corporales inclinantes ad tales actus." Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX, 183: 37-41.
"Quod probo: illud quod potest induci sine omni actu appetitus sensitivi, non est
necessario ponendum subiective in appetitu sensitivo; sed omne quod possumus experiri in
nobis, potest esse in nobis sine omni actu appetitus sensitivi; igitur etc." Quodl. II, q. 16;
OTh IX, 183: 42-45.
40
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CHAPTER THREE
follows: AlI the inclinations concemed can be induced by the art of

medicine and in some other ways. Physicians can, for instance,
weaken concupiscence (cancupiscentia) and in this way dispose
people towards chaste (castus) acts. Thus, it is evident that the
inclinations are generated and removed by changes of the corporeal
qualities, heat (calar) or coldness (jrigus), without any acts of the
sensory appetite. 41 FolIowing the "razor" principle, this suffices to
exclude the habits generated by the acts in the sensory appetite.
But Ockham goes even further. In the light of experience, one
perhaps cannot even postulate any habits generated by the acts in the
sensory appetite. Ockham argues as folIows: IT, after a lot of exercise
of good acts in a person's sensory appetite, there are certain
corporeal changes in the person, such as augmentation of heat caused
by eating, it is possible that as strong evil passions and acts appear as
if there never had been any good acts in the person' s sensory
appetite. This would not be the case if the good acts had generated
habits in the sensory appetite, since the habits would have weakened
the evil passions aroused by the corporeal qualities. 42
Hence, following the "razor" principle - when it is not
necessary to postulate habits generated by the acts existing in the
sensory appetite, they should not be postulated - and also following
the experience according to which there are no habits generated by
the acts in the sensory appetite, Ockham concludes in the end that the
"Maior est manifesta. Minor probatur, quia omnis talis inclinatio potest induci per artem
medicinae et per alias vias. Nam medici per artem medicinae diminuunt concupiscentiam,
et sic disponunt ad actus castos. Patet etiam quod ta1es inclinationes auferuntur et
generantur per transmutationem corporalem, puta per generationem veI corruptionem
caloris veI frigoris, sine omni actu appetitus sensitivi; igitur etc." Quodl. II, q. 16; aTh IX,
183-184: 45-52. See also Rep. III, q. 12; aTh VI, 395: 14-19.
41
"Praeterea post magnum exercitium actuum appetitus sensitivi, si corpus transmutetur per
infirmitatem veI potionem veI comestionem, ita fortes passiones insurgunt et actus in
appetitu sensitivo sicut si numquam habuisset aliquos aclus laudabiles. Et hoc est frequenter
quia per comestionem calor augmentatur et frigus diminuitur, ex quo causatur apprehensio
et talis actus appetitus sensitivi; quod non esset verum si tales habitus inclinantes ad actus
virtuosos ponerentur in appetitu sensitivo, quia tunc iIli habitus mitigarent tales passiones."
Quodl. II, q. 16; aTh IX, 184: 53-61.
42
SENSORY PASSIONS
91
human being is not, after acts of sensory appetite, more inclined to

similar acts because of a habit in the sensory appetite generated by
the acts but because of a corporeal quality that has been caused. 43
The corporeal qualities which Ockham posits in this
connection are such as heat and coldness. Theyare sensible qUalities,
that is, qualities that can cause a sensation of themselves. As such,
do they incline the sensory appetite through a cognition of
themselves or somehow immediately? Ockham does not debate the
question but seems to think that they do it through apprehension. 44
"Et ideo dico quod ex actibus appetitus sensitivi nullus habitus generatur irnrnediate
subiective existens in appetitu sensitivo... Nec post multos actus appetitivos experitur quis
se magis inclinatum ad consimiles aetus irnrnediate per habitus, sed solum mediate; puta
quando appetit eomedere et bibere, tune post eomestionem alieuius ealidi experitur se magis
inclinatum ad aetus coneupiscentiae quam ante aetum appetendi...Sed actus appetitus
sensitivi non sunt irnrnediate generativi talis qualitatis inelinantis ad aetus eonsimiIes, sed
solum mediate; sed alii actus posteriores aetibus appetitivis generant irnrnediate tales
qualitates inclinantes ad passiones. Exemplum: aliquis frigi dus, non habens aetum
temperantiae nisi remissum propter frigiditatem, appetit eomedere cibaria ealida, quae
eausant aliquas qualitates corporales quae inclinant ad eonsimiles aetus appetitus sensitivi
quos prius habuit. Tune istae qualitates corporales non causantur irnrnediate ab aetibus
appetendi cibum, sed ab illis cibariis. Illud totum maxime habet veritatem in virtute
temperantiae et in aetibus eius, quia eius aetus suscitantur et impediuntur per
transmutationem corporalem, puta per eomestionem veI abstinentiam. Utrum autem
eonsimiliter sit de aliis virtutibus, et quomodo ita est, non est modo dicendum propter
prolixitatem. Credo tamen quod eodem modo est in aliis virtutibus; nec video aliquam
necessitatem ponendi quemcumque habitum irnrnediate generatum ex aetibus appetitivis el
inclinantem ad consimiles actus. Ad argumentum principale, patet ex dictis quod, lieet in
appetitu sensitivo sint aetus, non tamen habitus, quia non omnis aetus est generativus
habitus." Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX, 184-186: 62-63,65--69,91-110. However, Oekham
does not always seem to be so sure that the acts of mind eannot eause eorporeal qualities
immediateIy...... potest esse dubitatio an ista sanitas posset adquiri melius per operationem
exteriorem veI per amorem veI odium voiuntatis veI etiam per studium et exercitium
intellectus. Quia secundum medicos - et experientia docet - quodlibet istorum potest esse
eausa infirmitatis, saltem partialis, et etiam eausa partialis sanitatis." Ord. 1, prol., q. 10;
OTh 1, 294: 22 - 295: 2.
43
44 ..... per
eomestionem ealor augmentatur et frigus diminuitur, ex quo eausatur apprehensio

et talis aetus appetitus sensitivi... .. Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX, 184: 57-59 ...... virtutes morales
quae sunt quaedam qualitates eorporales, non habent passiones pro materia sive obieeto; sed
passiones sunt aetus illarum virtutum et eausantur ab illis habitibus mediante
apprehensione..... Quodl. III, q. 18; OTh IX, 273: 20--23.
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CHAPTER THREE
Sometimes the passions of the sensory appetite to which a

corporeal quality inclines one are overwhelming from the moral
point of view. In that case, the corporeal inclining quality has to be
weakened or suppressed by an external operation. For example, in an
intemperate (intemperatus) and incontinent (incontinens) person, in
whom the passions of concupiscence (passiones concupiscentiae)
abound, the corporeal quality that inclines him or her towards the
passions of concupiscenc~ has to be weakened by mortifying the
flesh and fasting. According to Ockham, it may be possible that
simultaneously when the old quality is corrupted, another corporeal
quality is generated to incline the person towards different passions.
But Ockham remarks that it is the physicians who know the changes
of corporeal humors better. 45 However, if the passions are deficient
(deficiens) , then a new corporeal quality definitely has to be
generated to incline towards suitable passions. But in this case, it is
not certain if any old quality has to be corrupted. 46
It has to be noted that Ockham even caUs some corporeal
qualities 'moral virtues', but when he does this, he is taking the term
'moral virtue' improperly. The moral virtuousness of corporeal
qualities can only be extrinsic since, properly, the term 'moral virtue'
45 " ... secundum
Philosophum. quandoque passiones sunt superabundantes, quandoque

deficientes. Quando autem sunt passiones superabundantes, tunc ad eliciendum actus
virtuosos oportet aliquam qualitatem destruere in homine quae ad tales passiones inclinat;
et illa qualitas forte frequenter est calor. Exemplum: intemperatus et incontinens, in quo
passiones concupiscentiae abundant, per macerationem carnis et subtractionem victualium
remittit illam qualitatem inclinativam ad passiones concupiscentiae. Et possibile est forte
quod eo ipso quod tale principium inclinativum remittitur vei destruitur, generetur simul
cum hoc alia qualitas corporalis inclinans ad actus temperatos. Utrum autem ita sit vei non,
et qualis debeat esse illa qualitas, pertinet principaliter ad medicos determinare, qui plures
experientias de mutatione corporum humorum debent habere." Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX,
184-185: 73-87. " .. .in virtute temperantiae et in actibus eius, quia eius actus suscitantur et
impediuntur per transmutationem corporalem, puta per comestionem vei abstinentiam."
Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX, 185: 100-103. About the medieval discussion oftemperance and
continence, see Kent 1984, 614; 1986, 125-139. See also Suk 1950.
"Si autem sint passiones deficientes, tunc prima generatur aliquid inclinativum ad tales
passiones, sive aliqua qualitas praecedens corrumpatur sive non, quia forte semper aliqua
qualitas corporalis corrumpitur et alia generatur." Quodl. II, q. 16; OTh IX, 185: 87-90.
46
SENSORY PASSIONS
93
only refers to a virtuous habit of the Will. 41 It is of some interest that

besides the virtuous habits of the will, the virtuous corporeal
qualities have significance in Ockham's moral theory.
According to Oswald Fuchs, Ockham's negative stand in
Quodlibeta with respect to habits in the sensory appetite "represents
a definite break with the position maintained in the Commentary [of
the Sentences]".48 1 do not think so. In his earlier works, Ockham
indeed posits habits in the sensory appetite, but already there he also
posits corporeal qualities which incline the sensory appetite towards
actS. 49 One could, therefore, think that in Quodlibeta Ockham just
takes one more step along his line, and thinks that one cannot ever
posit a habit in the sensory appetite, but one always has to posit a
corporeal inclining quality instead.
Usually, when Ockham speaks about the effects of the
corporeal qualities on acts of the sensory appetite, he says that the
corporeal qualities incline the appetite towards acts. Then he
probably thinks that usually there is also a cognition of the object
functioning as a cause in addition to the corporeal qualities within
the individual. However, there are texts in which Ockham discusses
the cases in which a pas sion of the sensory appetite is caused by a
corporeal quality without any cognition of the object. In Quaestiones
dico quod 'virtus moralis' dupliciter accipitur: !!!!Q moda improprie, pro aliqua
qualitate derelicta post actus appetitus sensitivi, quae est qualitas corporalis inclinans ad
actus appetitivos; de qua qualitate dictum est in secunda Quodlibet. Aliter accipitur 'virtus'
pro habitu virtuoso voluntatis. Per hoc ad quaestionem dico quod virtutes morales quae sunt
quaedam qualitates corporales, non habent passiones pro materia sive obiecto; sed
passiones sunt actus illarum virtutum et causantur ab illis habitibus mediante
apprehensione... " Quodl. III, q. 18; OTh IX, 273: 14-23.
48 Fuchs 1952, 58.
47 "
See for instance what Ockham says about the tinder of sin ifomes peccatl): " ... potest dici
quod illud inclinans [fomes] sit in ipsa carne ut distinguitur contra appetitum sensitivum.
Hoc patet, quia illud potest aliquando esse calor. Patet etiam, quia ex diversa dispositione
qualitatum corporalium generantur actus qui vocantur passiones in appetitu sensitivo. Sed
constat quod tales qualitates sunt in carne." Rep. III, q. 5; OTh VI, 158: 15-20.
49
94
CHAPTER THREE
variae, q. 6, a. 9, Ockham refers to hunger (james) and thirst (sitis)50

in newborn children. If a baby does not have any cognition of food or
drink, the passion of its sensory appetite has to be caused by the

corporeal qualities, such as hotness or coldness. 51 As argued before,
hotness and coldness are sensible corporeal qualities, and those kinds
of qualities have an effect on the soul through cognition.
It is obvious that if a passion is posited without any cognition
of its object, there are difficulties in localizing it among the types of
the passions which are organized according to certain cognitive
contents. Ockham admits that, in the case of those who have not seen
food, one cannot make a distinction between a passion of appetite
(desire) for food and the pain of not having food. 52
Hunger and thirst are desires for food and drink: " ... fames et sitis sunt actus appetitus
sensitivi, quia sunt desideria victualium." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 181: 78-79. " ...
[Christus] esurivit et perconsequens per appetitum sensitivum desideravit cibum et potum."
Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 271: 449-450.
50
51 " ... utrum actus appetitus sensitivi et dolor et delectatio semper causentur ab
apprehensione praevia, respondeo quod non. Quia si esset infans natus qui numquam
apprehendit alimentum extra uterum matris, iste tamen naturaliter esuriret vei sitiret, - quae
nihil aliud sunt quam cibum et potum appetere - , et doleret. Iste igitur actus non potest
causari ab aliqua apprehensione praevia quia nulla est, sed tunc causatur ab aliqua qualitate
corporali, puta a caliditate vei frigiditate." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 260-261:
202-209. In Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum, q. 12, Ockham briefly refers to
the same example. There he also mentions the appetitive potency as a cause of the acts
concemed. "Si autem [actus appetitus sensitivi] non necessario praesupponit cognitionem,
tunc causatur totaliter a potentia appetitiva et aliquibus qualitatibus corporalibus.
Exemplum: si enim puer natus maneat sine usu cuiuscumque sensus exterioris, iste, ut
videtur, esuriet et sitiet. Et per consequens, appetit cibum et potum, et tamen iste appetitus
non praesupponit aliquam cognitionem, quia non in sensu exteriori per casum, nec in
phantasia, quia phantasia non habet aliquem actum nisi circa prius sensatum." Rep. III, q.
12; OTh VI, 410: 19 - 411: 5. As an example of (appetitive) operations that are not caused
by a cognition, Ockham also mentions brute animals' perhaps instinctive need to make a
nest. Exp. Phys. Arist., II, c. 12; OPh IV, 379: 31 - 380: 45.
si istae passiones, fames et sitis, causentur a qualitatibus corporalibus et non ab

apprehensione, utrum causetur dolar distinctus ab istis passionibus. Potest dici quod
potentia sensitiva interior infantis posset illas passiones apprehendere, quia tunc ab illa
apprehensione potest causari dolor distinctus ab istis passionibus ... Si autem non possit tales
passiones apprehendere, - quod credo esse verum - , tunc rationabilius est dicere quod illae
passiones sunt duae qualitates, puta fames et sitis, vei una qualitas indistincta numero a
doi ore. Sed aliquando vocatur actus appetendi, aliquando dolor. Quia, ut videtur, dolor
52 " ...
SENSORY PASSIONS
95
When discussing morals, Ockham deals with the role of the

will, or the acts of the will, with respect to the passions of the
sensory appetite of the human being. The will (the intellectual soul
as a principle of appetitive qualities) is not among the immediate
causes of acts of sensory appetite. It does not have those acts in its
immediate power, because its immediate power pertains only to its
own acts, i.e., volitions. 53 Instead, it can have acts of sensory appetite
in its power mediately, through its acts. Ockham thinks that the acts
(and habits) of the will can have the passions of the sensory appetite
as their common objects in the same way as executive operations. 54
distinctus ab actu appetitus numquam naturaliter causatur nisi ab apprehensione praevia,

quae nulla est in proposito per casum positum. Sed in nobis distinguuntur, quia in nobis
sunt apprehensiones tales ex quibus potest dolor distinctus causari. Similiter illae passiones
in puero, puta fames et sitis, distinguuntur specie a fame et siti habitis post apprehensionem
alimenti. Et post apprehensionem est distinctio inter dolorem et actum appetendi cibum
specifica propter distinctionem subiectorum, - sed nulla ante est distinctio nisi numeralis -,
et ideo sunt passiones tunc alterius rationis." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 261-262:
217-236.
"Operati o interior duplex est: una, quae immediate est in potestate voluntatis, sicut
volitio; alia, quae non est in potestate voluntatis nisi mediante prima actu, et ideo prima
actu destructo, ille actus non est in potestate animae sicut intellectio." Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh
VII, 358: 21-24.
53
54 " actibus
voluntatis generativis virtutum, quia illorum actuum aliqui habent actus

appetitus sensitivi pro obiectis communibus, tamen ... aliqui habent actum potentiae
executivae pro obiecto. Exemplum: possum enim non tantum velle secundum
circumstantias debitas comedere, sed possum velle secundum circumstantias debitas habere
appetitum comedendi. In prima volitione est actus potentiae executivae obiectum commune;
in secunda, actus appetitus sensitivi...habitus in voluntate rescipit ipsas passiones in parte
sensitiva tamquam obiecta communia, et etiam tamquam actus imperatos et causatos ab
ipsis habitibus mediante actu voluntatis elicito et imperato." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 411:
5-7, 8-14, 16-19. " ... actus voluntatis virtuosus potest terminari ad timores et audacias qui
sunt actus partis sensitivae et non eliciti a virtute in voluntate. Nam sicut intellectus potest
per unum actum formaliter dictare quod est timendum pro loca et tempore et aliis
circumstantiis, et quod est audendum alia tempore et secundum determinatas
circumstantias, potest voluntas velle timere per unum actum et audere cum eisdem
circumstantiis, ita quod tam actus intellectus quam voluntatis terminantur ad timores et
audacias tamquam ad obiecta communia istorum actuum. Unde iste actus non sunt eliciti
immediate ab habitu voluntatis sed sunt imperati mediantibus actibus elicitis a taIibus
habitibus." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 413: 13 - 414: 3. " ... dico quod actus virtutis in
voluntate est causa partialis passionis in appetitu sensitivo - actus dico imperativus
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CHAPTER THREE
Through its acts (and habits), the will needs to curb overwhelming
and deficient passions and arouse moderate ones. On the whole, the
virtuous will should make sure that the sensory passions are
moderate with respect to the circumstances. 55 A pas sion of the
sensory appetite may be in accordance with circumstances naturally,
but agreement with the circumstances does not determine it to be
morally virtuous or vicious. The sensory passions are morally
praiseworthy or blameworthy only by extrinsic denomination, that is,
based on (the acts or the habits of) the will. A sensory pas sion can be
conformed to a virtuous or vicious volition, and through this kind of
conformity, the passion can become morally virtuous or viciouS. 56
quatenus ad eius imperium potest talis passio elicL" Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 416: 3-5.
"Secundo modo, virtus est circa passiones sicut circa materiam, quia passiones sunt obiecta
communia actus et habitus virtuosi essentialiter, quamvis non omnis talis virtus habeat
passiones pro obiecto; nam guaedam virtus est circa passiones sicut circa obiecta
communia, guaedam est circa operationes sive executiones exteriores sicut circa materiam
vei obiectum. Exemplum primi: temperantia et eius actus habet passiones pro
obiecto... habitus virtuosus voluntatis habet duplicem actum: unum elicitum ab habitu; et
alium actum in appetito sensitivo, qui est obiectum habitus, sicut est obiectum actus eliciti
ab habitu." Quodl. III, q. 18; OTh IX, 274-275: 28-35,49-51.
55 " dico
quod virtutis est excitare passiones quando oportet et ubi oportet etc., quia virtus
potest esse causa partialis respectu passionis mediante actu suo elicito ... Sed virtutis est
sedare et refrenare passiones vitiosas, sive superabundantes sive deticientes, et reducere eas
ad medium secundum debitas circumstantias. Et tales passiones, consistentes in medio,
virtus habet excitare. Exemplum: ille qui non habet passiones simpliciter, est insensibilis et
vitiosus, sicut numquam comedens dicitur vitiosus. Et qui habet passiones superabundantes
dicitur vitiosus, sicut semper comedens. Sed ilie qui comedit quando oportet et ubi etc., ilie
dicitur virtuosus. Et sic virtus habet aliquo moda excitare passiones, et aliquo moda sedare
et refrenare." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 417: 1-3,4-13. " ...quandoque magis virtuosus habet
pauciores actus, quia mitigat quandoque actus appetitus sensitivi...habitus virtuosi sunt
causativi actuum et similiter moderati vi actuum inordinatorum... virtutis est excitare sive
causare passiones virtuosas, et refrenare passiones vitiosas, reducendo ad medium debite
circumstantionando." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 180--181: 48-49, 55-56, 74-76.
56 " ... actus
appetitus sensitivi non est natus esse bonus moraliter ex se, sed denominatione
extrinseca.. .Ideo non est bonus ex integritate circumstantiarum, puta ex hoc quod tit loco
determinato, tempore determinato, etc." Rep. III, q. Il; OTh VI, 379: 15 - 380: 2. " ... dico,
secundum intentionem Philosophi, quod passiones se habent indifferenter ad laudem et
vituperium, nec determinant sibi Iaudem vei vituperium." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 412: 4-6.
See also ibid., 412: 7 - 413: 9. "Ad aliud dico quod propter passiones moderatas veI
immoderatas Iaudamur vei vituperamur, quando sunt in potestate nostra. Unde tales actus
SENSORY PASSIONS
97
Not alI passions of sensory appetite can be objects of acts of

will. In Ockham, at least precipitate (surrepticius) and excessive
(excellens) or vehement (vehemens) passions are not objects of acts
of will and thus within a human being' s power. For instance, getting
frightened (timere) and getting angry (irasci) - where a human being
is overtaken when the object is apprehended - are precipitate
passions. We see that Ockham tries to distinguish precipitately
occurring passions from the other ones by using verbs to refer to
them. Thus, the apprehension of the objects instantly causes these
passions so that the person cannot control them by an act of his or
her will, even though he Of she at all times has "the use of reason." It
seems that the precipitate passions mentioned above can appear in
anyone. 57 At least in those who do not have "the use of reason" - that
is, in children and simpletons - pain and joy also can appear as
precipitate. Ockham also uses verbs for them, calling them
'sorrowing' (dolere) and 'rejoicing' (gaudere).58 Ockham may think
that those who have "the use of reason" do not have precipitate
sensory pains or joys that the will could not control.
sive passiones non determinant sibi laudem vei vituperium, ita quod conveniant eis
intrinsece; sed solum quadam denominatione extrinseca per conformitatem ad volitionem
virtuosam vei vitiosam dicitur talis passio laudabilis quando elicitur secundum debitas
circumstantias, et vituperabilis quando elicitur secundum circumstantias indebitas ... Ad aliud
dico quod tam passiones laudabiles quam vituperabiles imperantur a voluntate virtuosa vei
vitiosa." Quodl. II, q. 15; OTh IX, 181: 63-70, 84-85. " ... ad eliciendum actum laudabilem
semper requiritur voluntas et eius actus ...Praeterea quilibet actus ad quem inclinat
quicumque habitus in appetitu sensitivo, potest esse malus propter malam intentionem
voluntatis, sicut patet de se; et per consequens ad eliciendum actum laudabilem concurrit
voluntas; igitur nihil aliud a voluntate est sufficiens principium talis actus." Quodl. Il, q. 16;
OTh IX, 182: 18-19, 20-25. About Ockham's ethical theory, see Freppert 1988,
Holopainen 1991, Wood 1997.
57 " ... Philosophus intelligit de passionibus sensitivis quae non sunt in potestate nostra,
cuiusmodi sunt actus appetitus sensitivi surrepticii; puta timere, irasci, quibus statim homo
capitur facta apprehensione obiectorum, nec sunt in potestate sua... " Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh
IX, 188: 52-55.
58 " ... Philosophus intelligit de passionibus sensitivis quae non sunt in potestate nostra ... sicut
est etiam dolere, gaudere, quae conveniunt pueris et fatuis, qui non habent usum rationis."
Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 188: 52-53, 56-57. In Ockham, the counterpart of dolor usually
is delectatio.
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CHAPTER THREE
At least pain (do lor) and pleasure (delectatio) may, according

to Ockham, be so excessive Of vehement that they can totally impede
"the use of reason" of the person whose intellect is well disposed,
and it can even happen that the person has neither intellections nor
volitions. This can happen, for instance, in fomication: because of
vehement pleasure a person cannot have intellections or volitions. In
such a situation, the sensory pas sion effects the corporeal quality that
enables intellections and volitions so that there cannot be acts in the
intellectual souI. 59 Even the precipitate and excessive or vehement
passions can, however, probably be indirectly controlled by
controlling some of their causes, like cognitions60 and corporeal
qualities.
It was shown above that the sensory cognitions are the most
important efficient causes of the sensory passions. Although Ockham
seems to think that they are (taken naturally) sufficient causes of the
passions of sensory appetite, he does not seem to think that they
always function as the total causes of those passions. Whether the
sensory appetite it self is a partial efficient cause of some of its acts
remains unclear. In any case, Ockham does not seem to be interested
in it as a cause of its passions. Instead, he is very interested in the
corporeal qualities which incline the sensory appetite towards acts.
sciendum quod in appetitu sensitivo potest esse dolor et delectatio ita excellens quod
potest totaliter impedire usum rationis. Sicut patet per experientiam in forti qui,
aggrediendo terribilia, potest tantum dolorem habere quod nihil potest intelligere et velle.
Et similiter in fomicante qui propter vehementem delectationem nec potest intelligere nec
velle. Cuius causa est quia licet talis habeat intellectum bene dispositum et phantasma,
tamen propter excellentiam talis passionis impeditur actus qualitatis corporalis qui
necessario requiritur pro statu isto ad causandum actum intelligendi ... " Quaest. variae, q.
6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 262: 237-246. " ... appetitus sensitivus potest impedire iudicium [rationis],
sicut aliquae passiones possunt esse ita vehementes in appetitu sensitivo quod totaliter
impedient iudicium rationis; et tamen propter hoc non est liber... " Quaest. variae, q. 7, a.
3; OTh VIII, 369-370: 665-668.
59 "
60 "VeI forte ipse actus voluntatis est causa mediata respectu illarum passionum, quia est
causa causae. Est enim causa immediata partialis apprehensionis praecedentis talem actum
qui vocatur passio." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 411: 19-22.
SENSORY PASSIONS
99
Acts of will are also considered by Ockham as partial efficient causes

of the passions of sensory appetite.
After looking at the causes of the passions of sensory appetite,
let us see what they, in their turn, cause or can cause. First, they have
an effect on bodily behavior. Medieval writers traditionally thought
that the causation for a great deal of bodily executive operations
comes from the passions in the sensory appetite, and Ockham seems
to take this for granted. In a traditional way Ockham also links such
acts as laughing with pleasure and crying with pain. 61 Second,
Ockham refers to bodily effects of the passions such as colors:
Someone's face can, for example, become red (rubeus) because of
shame (verecundia), and paIe (pallidus) because of fear (timor).62 In
that connection Ockham remarks that when certain qualities appear
in the body, it is not always the case that there is a new absolute
quality generated. For instance, in the case of blushing because of
shame, it can happen that there is just more blood flowing in the face
than before. The color-quality of blood appears in this case so that
the color-quality of the face is not as visible as before. 63 Third,
Ockham in some texts focuses on the effects of the passions of
sensory appetite with respect to acts of will. This theme will be dealt
with when examining the causes of the passions of the will (in subchapter 4.1.).
Ockham says that the terms referring to the operations in question signify passions
naturally. " ... voces signiticativae naturaliter, sicut 'risus', 'ploratus' et huiusmodi, quae
naturaliter signiticant gaudium veI dolorem." Exp. Periherm. Arist. 1, c. 1; OPh II, 378:
25-27. " ... gemitus [naturaliter signiticat] intirmi dolorem et risus interiorem laetitiam." SI,
1, c. 14; OPh 1, 49: 55-56.
61
62 " ... propter varias passiones animae causantur varii colores in corpore, sicut ex
erubescentia causatur rubor in facie, et ex timore pallor... " Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II,
277: 15-17. " ... aIiquis propter verecundiam tit rubeus et propter timorem tit pallidus ... "
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280: 14.
63 " ... quando aliquis tit rubeus ex verecundia, forte non semper generatur nova rubedo in
facie, sed concurrit plus de sanguine quam prius, et ideo color sanguinis interioris apparet,
et ideo quasi occultatur color cutis exterioris." Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 280:
23-26.
CHAPTERTHREE
100
3.2. WHAT ARE SENSORY PASSIONS?

The passions of sensory appetite were traditionally divided into
'concupiscible' and 'irascible'. The interpretation ofthis division has
changed over time, but the dominant view was, after John of la
Rochelle had presented it in his Summa de anima (c. 1235), that the
'concupiscible' passions were reactions to sensually good or evi!
things, and the 'irascible' ones to good or evi! but arduous things.
The division was thought to be based on two motive potencies of the
sensory level of the human being. 64 According to Thomas Aquinas,
the 'concupiscible' passions are love (amor), desire (desiderium),
and joy (gaudium), and hatred (odium), aversion or avoidance (fuga),
and sorrow (tristitia or dolor). The 'irascible' passions are hope
(spes), and courage (audacia), and despair (desperatio), fear (timor),
and anger (ira). The objects of 'concupiscible' passions, according to
Aquinas, are good or bad taken absolutely, and the objects of
'irascible' passions are good or bad taken as difficult Of arduous. 65
Ockham does not posit 'concupiscible' and 'irascible'
potencies in the sensory soul, and he does not even seem to call some
passions of sensory appetite 'concupiscible', and some 'irascible'.
However, he posits both passions that were traditionally taken as
'concupiscible' and passions that were taken as 'irascible' in sensory
appetite.
The most important texts in which Ockham deals with the
types ofthose passions ofthe sensory appetite that were traditionally
taken as 'concupiscible' are Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 9 and
Quodlibet m, q. 17 in which he discusses the causation of pleasure
64
Knuuttila 2002, 66.
King 1999, 102, 108, 117-118; Knuuttila 2002, 73. See also Brennan 1942, 150-151,
156-157, 158 (diagram), 246, 248; Jordan 1986, 87; Knuuttila 1996, 15-16; 1998,
133-134.
65
SENSORY PASSIONS
101
(delectatio) and pain (dolar) or distress (tristitia)66. In those texts

Ockham proves that the efficient cause of pleasure and pain in
sensory appetite is not an act distinct from them in the same potency
(as is the efficient cause of pleasure and distress of the will). That is,
since the object of pleasure and pain is a present thing, and there are
no acts distinct from them in the sensory appetite, the object of
which acts would be a present thing. In addition to pleasure and pain
there are only desire (desiderium) and avoidance (fuga) in the
sensory appetite, but their object is an absent thing, and therefore
they cannot be causes of pleasure and pain. As argued before,
according to Ockham, both pleasure and pain, and desire and
avoidance are caused by apprehensions. It appears now that pleasure
and pain are caused by an apprehension of a thing as present and
possessed, and desire and avoidance by an apprehension of a thing as
absent and not possessed. 67 1f it seems to happen that someone has,
for instance, pleasure when an object is cognized to be absent, he or
she, according to Ockham, tums out to have pleasure with respect to
something that is indeed cognized as present, such as the act of
apprehension by which an absent object is apprehended, or the act of
Ockham prefers to caU the negative passion concemed in the sensory appetite pain
(dolar), while the corresponding one in the will is always called distress (tristitia). See
Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 254: 66-68; Rep. II, q. 15; OTh V, 339: 11-12. See
also Holopainen 1991,33, footnote 44.
67 " quamvis voluntas simul, dum habet tristi tiam veI delectationem, habeat actum volendi
vei nolendi distinctum ab istis passionibus, tamen appetitus sensitivus non habet simul actus
distinctos a dolore sensus et delectatione, sed isti actus immediate sequuntur
apprehensionem sensitivam, quia nec per experientiam, nec per rationem potest probari
quod sit ibi talis multitudo actuum; quia si aliqui actus simul essent cum istis, illi essent
actus desiderandi et fugiendi, quia alii non apparent in appetitu sensiti vi praevii dolori et
delectationi. Sed isti non manent cum eis, quia istud est generaliter verum, quod dolor
sensus et delectatio numquam sunt respectu rei absentis sed respectu rei praesentia!iter
habitae; actus autem desiderandi et fugiendi in appetitu sensitivo sunt semper respectu
absentium; igitur isti actus non manent simul cum doI ore et delectatione sensus respectu
eiusdem obiecti, !icet respectu diversorum possunt forte." Quodl. III, q. 17; OTh IX,
268-269:12-27. See also ibid., 271: 77-83, and Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII,
252-256: 29-59, 108-116. In Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 359: 20-22; 360: 1-6 Ockham also
deals with this theme. There he says that the opposite of an act of desi ring is an act of
avoiding or an act of revenging (actus vindicandi).
66
102
CHAPTER THREE
desire by which the object is desired, not with respect to an absent

object. 68
Consequently, sensory pleasure or pain with respect to
something cannot be efficiently caused by desire or avoidance with
respect to it, since there cannot simultaneously be desire or
avoidance and pleasure or pain with respect to the same object. In
order to have pleasure or pain with respect to something, there did
not even need to be a previous desire or avoidance with respect to it.
For instance, if someone puts his Of her hand over a flame, he Of she
instantly experiences pain, without having any avoidance with
68 ..... nec delectatio praedicta nec tristi tia est respectu obiectorum non habitorum respectu
quorum est actus desiderandi vei fugiendi in utraque potentia. Sed utraque est vei respectu
actus apprehensivi quo tale obiectum desideratum apprehenditur vei respectu actus desiderii
quo appetitur tale obiectum vei respectu utriusque. Et isti actus, tam apprehensivus quam
appetitivus, habentur et sunt praesentes ... sensus aliquid interior, puta sensus communis vei
phantasia, apprehendit actum sensus exterioris et actum desiderii sensitivum, sicut ponit
Philosophus, II De anima. Et ipse actus apprehensivus praedictorum actuum causat
immediate, sine ornni actu appetitus prima vei medio, delectationem in appetitu sensitivo
respectu illorum actuum tamquam respectu obiectorum, et non respectu actus fomicandi qui
appetitur. Et hoc quia ilie actus non habetur, [sed] praedicti actus, respectu quorum est
delectatio, habentur. Et eodem moda per ornnia dicendum est de dolore et tristi tia quando
apprehenditur aliquod obiectum nocivum quod appetitus sensitivus fugit et rationalis non
vuit per actum nolendi." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 254-255: 70-76, 92-103 .
..... nec tristitia nec delectatio est respectu absentium non habitorum, respectu quorum sunt
actus desiderandi et fugiendi, nec in appetitu sensitivo nec in voluntate; sed sunt respectu
actus apprehensivi quo obiectum desideratum apprehenditur, vei respectu actus desiderandi
vei fugiendi, vei respectu utriusque; et omnes isti actus actualiter habentur in ilIo qui
delectatur... Potest enim sensus interior apprehendere actum sensus exterioris secundum
Philosophum et actum desiderandi et fugiendi, et talis actus apprehensivus causat
immediate dolorem vei delectationem in appetitu sensitivo." Quodl. IIl, q. 17; OTh IX,
271-272: 85-91,93-97.
SENSORY PASSIONS
103
respect to fire before. 69 However, sensory pleasures and pains often

pertain to things that have previously been desired or avoided.
The question of whether pleasure and pain are acts of sensory
appetite seems to have caused trouble for Ockham, as argued before.
In Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 9, Ockham says that the sensory
appetite has acts only with respect to absent objects since it does not
have acts other than desire and avoidance, which are with respect to
absent objects. Pleasure, instead, is a passion (passio) caused by an
apprehension of a present object. 70 AIso in Quaestiones in librum
quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, Ockham seems to think: that pleasure
and pain in the sensory appetite are not acts. 71 However, in Quodlibet
rn, q. 17, he seems to think that pleasure and pain in the sensory
appetite are acts caused by an apprehension of a present object. 72 As
seen before, in Quodlibet II, Ockham ends up thinking that only such
69 " utrum dolor veI delectatio possit causari in appetitu sensitivo sine omni actu
desiderandi et fugiendi praevio, respondeo quod sic. De doI ore patet quia si aliquis
poneretur subito in igne statim doleret, et tamen nullum aetum desiderii habuit respeetu
ignis, nee fugiendi forte. Similiter patet ex praedictis quod sic. Quia praedicta potentia
imaginativa veI alia interior potest apprehendere visionem eorporalem qua visus videt
a1iquod obiectum pulchrum et delectabile, et aetum desiderandi fomicationem et aetum
fugiendi nocivum. Et iIIa apprehensio potest imruediate eausare dolorem veI deleetationem
in iIIo appetitu sensitivo sequente iIIam apprehensionem sine omni actu desiderandi veI
fugiendi in ilIo appetitu, quia praedieti aetus sunt obiectorum non habitorum. Sed obiecta
iIIius apprehensionis phantasticae habentur forte ... " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII,
260: 187-200.
10 " appetitus
sensitivus nullum aetum habet respeetu a1ieuius obiecti nisi quando obieetum
est absens et non habitum, quia non habet nisi aetum desiderii et fugae, et isti solum sunt
respectu obiectorum absentium et non habitorum... quando obieetum desideratum veI
concupitum habetur et est praesens potentiae apprehensivae, tune eessat aetus desiderii qui
solum est respectu non habiti, et eausatur tune deleetatio quae est passio causata ab
apprehensione obiecti. .. " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 252: 30-33, 36-40.
11 " . appetitus sensitivus non habet a1iquem aetum positivum nisi actum desiderandi et eius
oppositum, puta fugiendi veI vindicandi...Nune autem in appetitu sensitivo praesente
obieeto delectabili eessat aetus desiderii, quia ilie non est ni si respectu absentis ut absens
est. Et ideo tune appetitus sensitivus nullum aetum habet circa tale obieetum sed solum
delectationem quae eausatur ab obiecto mediante eognitione sensitiva... " Rep. IV, q. 16;
OTh VII, 359: 20-22; 360: 1-5.
12 Quodl. III, q. 17; OTh IX, 268-269: 9-10, 12-27.
104
CHAPTER THREE
phenomena in an appetitive potency as cannot naturally occur

without acts of that potency are not acts but only passions. There are,
according to him, only two such passions: pleasure and distress in
the will. 73
Ockham is not interested in considering to any great extent
which objects cause, through cognitions, desire or avoidance or
pleasure or pain in the sensory appetite. He stiH seems to accept
Aristotle's view that the objects of tactile sense and taste are
particularly central to sensory pleasure and pain. 74 Apparently
referring to the pleasure caused by an act of tactile sense, Ockham
remarks in passing that it is evident that in some venereal acts, the
sensory appetite can have so much pleasure that there is no
simultaneous pain in it. 75 Ockham also uses the pleasure in
fornication as an example of vehement pleasure which impedes
rational thinking. 76
Thus, in sensory appetite, Ockham posits a four-fold division
of basic 'concupiscible' phenomena, not six-fold, as in the will.
Ockham thinks that there is desire for absent good objects, pleasure
in present good objects, avoidance of absent bad objects, and pain in
present bad objects. There is no love or hatred distinct from pleasure
and pain in sensory appetite, unlike in the will. On the basis of this,
it could perhaps be said that to illustrate the phenomena in the
sensory appetite, Ockham seems to accept the simple Stoic model,
which involves four types of acts: positive and negative acts towards
absent and present things. That model was commonly known in the
7)
Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 187-188: 31-45.
Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279: 62-75. See also Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh
VIII, 264: 277-286.
74
sic enim potest appetitus sensitivus quietari in aliquo finito. Patet enim quod appetitus
sensitivus potest sic delectari in actu aliquo venereo quod nullus dolar tunc inest..." Rep.
IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 348: 8-11.
76 See page 98.
75 " ..
SENSORY PASSIONS
105
Middle Ages and was used especially in the early part of that
period. 77
According to Ockham, there are two types
'concupiscible' passions in the sensory appetite:
1) desire (desiderium)
2) pleasure (delectatio).
of positive
Correspondingly, there are two types of negative 'concupiscible'

passions in the sensory appetite:
1) avoidance (fuga)
2) pain (dolor).
Ockham's model of the 'concupiscible' passions of the sensory
appetite:
good object
desiderium
delectatio
bad object
absent object
present object
x
x
fuga
dolor
x
x
The passions in the model are 'concupiscible' ones in the

traditional c1assification. What about the 'irascible' passions? In
various texts and contexts, Ockham explicitly posits at least some of
them in sensory appetite. Re perhaps avoids talking about hope
(spes) and despair (desperatio) in the sensory appetite, but at least
courage (audacia) , fear (timor) and anger (ira) occur as acts of
sensory appetite. 78 As was argued in sub-chapter 2.2., Ockham, at
77
Knuuttila 1996, 15; 1998, 132; 2002, 51.
See e.g. Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 2; OTh II, 411: 4; Rep. III, q. 12: OTh VI, 409: 3-7; 413: 13414: 3.
78
106
CHAPTER THREE
least in some of the places where he refers to Aristotle's list of

passions in the Nicomachean Ethics, seems to posit alI the
'concupiscible' and 'irascible' acts in the sensory appetite. However,
Ockham seems to think that the phenomena of sensory appetite are
quite elementary and show similarities to the functions of a nonpsychic natural appetite. The phenomena associated with the will are
more sophisticated.
CHAPTER FOUR
PASSIONS OF THE WILL
4.1. GENESIS OF THE PASSIONS OF THE WILL

In this chapter 1 intend to analyze the passions of the will in
Ockham's works. As argued before, both acts of the will and
pleasure and distress, which are not acts in the will, can be according to Ockham - called 'passions', although Ockham does not
often use the term to refer to them. 1 begin the analysis of the
passions of the will by examining their genesis (and effects). After
that 1 examine their types.
What are the causes and the dispositions needed for the
passions of the will? Ockham never presents a thorough theory of the
causes of the passions of the will, but he considers various causes of
them in various contexts. Intellectual cognitions are often mentioned
in this connection, and so is the will itself. Other causes are various
simultaneous acts of will, habits of will, and the passions of sensory
appetite. All these causes can be, at the most, partial causes of the
passions of the will, since God is a necessary concurring cause of alI
effects. I God can also be the only cause of the passions of the will. 2
I " ... Deus est causa prima et immediata omnium effectuum productorum a causa secunda
immediatione causae, et hoc sine aliqua mutatione ex parte sui." Rep. II, q. III-IV; OTh V,
65: 25 - 66: 4. More broadly, see Rep. II, q. 3-4; OTh V, 60: 20- 66: II. " ... nulla creatura
potest in aliquem effectum nisi coagente Deo immediate tanquam causa partiali et
principali." Rep. IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 168: 12-14. " ... nulla creatura est causa totalis respectu
alicuius effectus sed tantum partialis, quia in omni actione creaturae concurrit Deus." Rep.
107
108
CHAPTER FOUR
And he indeed is, according to Ockham, the only cause of some of

them, as will be seen. Taken naturally, some ofthe causes mentioned
may be able to function as total or sufficient causes of the passions of
the will, but usually they seem to function as partial ones, that is,
causing effects together with other causes. What about the bodily
dispositions needed for the passions of the will? On the one hand,
Ockham states that the intellectual potencies, the intellect and the
will, do not need bodily organs for their action. 3 On the other hand,
he says that the disposition needed for intellectual acts is a body with
its qualities. Sometimes he even seems to think that one is inc1ined
to intellectual acts according to one's bodily disposition. 4
Just as in the case of sensory cognition, 1 shall first sketch how
Ockham understands intellectual cognitions, and after that discuss
their rale with respect to the passions of the will. As he did in
discussing the sensory soul, Ockham distinguishes between intuitive
IV, q. 9; OTh VII, 171: 23-25.

2 "Licet enim voluntas nostra, veI angeli, ut est activa et passiva sit debito moda
approximata et etiam Deus, non sequitur propter hoc quod voluntas habeat actionem in
volitione causata in voluntate, quia illa potest causari totaliter a Deo." Rep. II, q. 15; OTh
V, 350: 14-17.
3 "Potentia non organica est illa quae non indiget organo corporali in actione sua, sicut
intellectus et voluntas ... Sed ~ qui pono animam intellectivam distingui realiter a sensitiva
in homine, habeo ponere quod anima intellectiva in corp ore habet solum potentiam non
organicam." Rep. IV, q. 7; OTh VII, 121: 8-9, 14-17. See also Quodl. IV, q. 14; OTh IX,
369: 86-88. Ockham remarks that, according to Scotus, the intellectual soul has both
organic and non-organic potencies. Rep. IV, q. 7; OTh VII, 121): 10-14.
4 " ... dico, secundum Philosophum, II De anima, quod dispositio corporalis multum disponit
hominem ad scientiam. Dicit enim quod molles carne sunt apti mente. Unde aliquis per
complexiones corporis disponitur ad virtutes, aliquis ad vitia. Et secundum quod disponitur
ad unum veI ad aliud, sic magis inc1inatur ud unum veI ad aliud." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI,
406: 14-19. " ... habitus adquisiti in corpore composito, habitus dico intellectuales, causantur
mediante dispositione corporali, sicut et actus. Quia ad hoc quod aliquis scientifice
cognoscat aliquid requiritur determinata complexio et qualitas in corpore, et ipsa deficiente
non potest homo intelligere, sicut patet in dormientibus, fatuis et furiosis. Et eodem moda
tam actus illi quam habitus mediante tali dispositione conservantur et propter eius defectum
corrumpuntur, sicut patet per Philosophum, libro Praedicamentorum, qui dicit quod per
longam infirmitatem potest scientia prius adquisita diminui vei totaliter corrumpi. Hoc
etiam docet experientia manifeste." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 281: 15 - 282: 3.
109
and abstractive cognitions in the intellectual soul. What was said

about intuitive and abstractive acts in connection with sensory
cognition is also valid concerning intellectual intuitive and
abstractive cognition. As it was argued in chapter 3.1., an intuitive
cognition of a thing includes a kind of notification of the thing which
is apprehended, but it is not a proper judgment of the existence of the
thing. The proper judgments of existence are other acts caused with
the help of the intuitive cognitions. In the natural course of events,
intuitive cognitions of things are caused by the things themselves as
present. This, among other things, means that there are no habits
generated by previous acts causing them.
Thus, according to Ockham, in the intellect, too, the intuitive
acts of things are caused by the present things themselves. 5 Just as in
the sensory cognitive potency, there are intuitive cognitions both
with respect to exterior and interior objects in the intellect. Ockham
seems to think that sensible exterior objects immediately and
effectively cause intuitive cognitions of themselves in the intellect,
but they cannot do so unless they cause cognitions of themselves in
the sensory cognitive potency. These sensory acts seem to be
immediate partial causes of intuitive cognitions in the intellect. By
God's power, however, human intellects could perceive the external
world without senses. 6 Ockham emphasizes that external objects that
One does not need to postulate any species of the things as an intermediary. " ... ad
cognitionem intuitivam habendam non oportet aliquid ponere praeter intellectum et rem
cognitam, et nullam speciem penitus. Hoc probatur, quia frustra fit per plura quod potest
fieri per pauciora. Sed per intellectum et rem visam, sine ornni specie, potest fieri cognitio
intuitiva... " Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 268: 2-7. " ... opinionem quae ponit quod obiectum
non potest esse praesens intellectui nisi per speciem et potentias inferiores. Quod non est
verum, quia ipsum obiectum in se debito moda approximatum est sufficienter praesens."
Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 309: 4--8. In positing intuitive cognitions of particular things in
the intellect, Ockham deviates from the Thomistic theory and Scotus also does so. See
Williams 2001,10.
omnis notitia intellectiva praesupponit pro statu isto necessario cognitionem sensitivam
tam sensus exterioris quam interioris ...dico quod non est de intentione Philosophi quod
nihil intelligitur ab intellectu nisi quod praefuit sub sensu, sed quod nullum sensibile
extrinsecum intelligitur ab intellectu nisi quod praefuit sub sensu ... [Philosophus] vuit quod
illorum quae exterius sunt, id est sensibilium, mens nihil sentit, id est intuitive cognoscit
6 "
110
CHAPTER FOUR
are cognized intuitively by the intellect are the same (idem) as those
that are sensed, and they are even 'intellected' sub eadem ratione as
sensed. 7
In the case of intuitive intellectual cognitions of things inside
the intellectual soul sensory cognitions are not involved. There are
various interior objects conceming which the intellect can have
intuitive acts. First, it can have acts with respect to its own acts, that
is, with respect to various intellectual cognitions. 8 According to
sine sensu, hoc est: nisi praevia notitia sensitiva intuitiva eiusdem. Per hoc quasi innuens
quod mens potest sentire - hoc est intuitive cognoscere - aliqua quae exterius sunt..." Ord.
1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 67: 8-10, 21 - 68: 1, 5-9. " ... obiectum extra, sensibile, movet
immediate sensum et intellectum ad actum intuitivum, ita quod primum causatum in
intellectu ab obiecto est actus intuitivus. Ita quod iste est ardo naturaliter procedendo quod
primo sensibile - quamvis aliter posset fieri per potentiam divinam - causat actum sentiendi
intuitivum. Secundo, illud idem obiectum causat et terminat actum intuitivum intellectus."
Rep. III, q. 2; OTh VI, 64: 20 - 65: 6. " ... dico quod Philosophus dicit quod nihil eorum
quae sunt extra intelligitur ni si prius sit sub sensu; et illa sunt solum sensibili a per eum. Et
de illis veraest auctoritas, de spiritualibus autem non." Quodl. 1, q. 14; OTh IX, 82: 92-95.
" ... cIico quod visio sensitiva est causa partialis visionis intellectivae ... " Quodl. 1, q. 15; OTh
IX, 86: 68-69.
7 " ... idem totaliter sub eadem ratione a parte obiecti est primum obiectum sensus exterioris
et intellectus primitate generationis, et hoc pro statu isto; et ita obiectum intellectus in illa
intellectione prima non est magis abstractum quam obiectum sensus." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1;
OTh 1, 64: 22 - 65: 4. " .. .illud idem singulare quod prima sentitur a sensu idem et sub
eadem ratione prima intelligitur intuitive ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquod impedimentum, quia
de ratione potentiarum ordinatarum est quod quidquid - et sub eadem ratione - potest
potentia inferior potest et superior. Patet quod idem sub eadem ratione est sensatum sensu
particulari et imaginatum sensu interiori. Similiter, idem sub eadem ratione est cognitum a
sensu et appetitum a potentia appetitiva, ita idem sub eadem ratione est cognitum ab
intellectu et volitum a voluntate, igitur illud idem quod est prima sensatum a sensu erit
intellectum ab intellectu, et sub eadem ratione." Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 6; OTh II, 494: 20 - 495: 4.
.intellectiones, affectiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et
nullo moda sensibiles ... quilibet experitur in se quod intelligit, diligit, delectatur, tristatur... "
Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 28: 10-11, 15-16. "Patet etiam quod intellectus noster pro statu
isto non tantum cognoscit ista sensibili a, sed in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua
intelligibilia quae nullo moda cadunt sub sensu, non plus quam substantia separata cadit
sub sensu, cuiusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, de1ectatio consequens et tristitia
et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quae tamen non sunt sensibilia nec sub
aliquo sensu cadunt." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 39: 18 - 40: 4. " ... [mens] potest intuitive
cognoscere aliqua quae interius sunt, cuiusmodi sunt actus intellectus et voluntatis et
delectationes et huiusmodi, sine sensu, hoc est sine notitia intuitiva sensitiva illorum... dico
8 " ..
111
Ockham, such a cognition presupposes awareness of the object of the

intellection. 9 That this cognition is indeed intuitive is, according to
Ockham, clear, since "ego intelligo" is evidently known by the
thinker.lO This cognition can be called a reflective one. lI The
reflective acts in the intellect are caused partially by objects, i.e.,
cognitions, and partially by acts of the will since for Ockham it is
evident that the human being does not always cognize his Of her acts
of thinking. 12 Can there be an infinite regress of cognizing that one
quod notitia intuitiva pro statu isto non est respeetu omnium intelligibilium, etiam
aequaliter praesentium intelleetui, quia est respectu actuum et non respectu habituum. Quod
autem ita sit, scimus per experientiam, quia quilibet experitur se intelligere, diligere et
deleetari ... " Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; 0111 1, 68: 9-12; 69: 5-9. " ... concedo quod aliquis
potest...intuitive videre actum suum intelligendi, volendi ... secundum Augustinum... " ReI'.
III, q. 7; 0111 VI, 214: 1, 2-3. For intuitive cognition of cogito, see de Muralt 1976,
152-156. Compare with Chatton who thought that the experience of an inner act was not
another act, separate from the inner act itself. See Adams 1987,513; Yrjonsuuri 1996,
116-117. For a comparison between Ockham' s and Descartes' s view of this question, see
de Muralt 1976, 156; Imbach 1984, 133; VossenkuhIl986, 125.
notitia intuitiva intelleetionis veI affeetionis veI delectationis praesupponit notitiam
obieeti ilIius intellectionis veI affeetionis veI delectationis, et sic de aliis. Tamen si esset
possibile quod esset amor in voluntate sine ornni cognitione praevia, notitia intuitiva ilIius
amoris nullam aliam praesupponeret. Sed hoc non est possibile pro statu isto." Ord. 1, prol.,
q. 1; 0111 1, 67: 15-20. In the case of the intelleetions, the awareness of the object may be
Iogically neeessary.
10 "Quod enim talia cognoscantur a nobis in particulari et intuitive, patet, quia haec est
evidenter mihi nota 'ego intelligo'." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; 0111 1, 40: 4-6.
9 " .
Il According to Ockham, in the proper meaning of the term 'reflective', no act can be
refleetive. In the improper meaning, an act of the intelleet, whose object is a straight act of
the intellect, can be called reflective: " ... ilIud dicitur proprie reflexum quod incipit ab
eodem et terminatur in idem; et ideo nullus actus proprie dicitur reflexus. Sed accipiuntur
ista improprie, quia vocatur actus rectus quo intelligimus obiectum extra animam, et actus
reflexus quo intelligitur ilie actus rectus." Quodl. II, q. 12; 0111 IX, 165: 11-15.
12 " dico quod actus reflexus causatur ab actu recto tanquam ab obiecto et ab actu
voluntatis quo vuIt ilIum actum intelligi. Quod autem causetur ab actu recto patet, quia
actus reflexus necessario dependet ab actu reeto quia non potest causari nisi exsistente actu
reeto. 19itur in aliquo genere causae dependet, et patet quod nonnisi sicut ab efficiente.
Quod autem actus voluntatis requiritur patet, quia aliquis potest aliquid intelligere et tamen
non percipere se intelligere, sicut potest aliquis videre et tamen non percipere se videre. Sed
si actus reflexus causaretur praecise ab intellectu et actu recto, statim posito et stantu actu
recto, intelleetus necessario statim perciperet se intelligere quod est manifeste contra
112
CHAPTER FOUR
cognizes? Ockham does not seem to be sure when the regress of the
intellections stops, but at least there is no infinite regress of the
reflective acts in the human intellect since the intellect is a limited
potency.13
Second, the intellect can have intuitive acts with respect to the
passions of the will. 14 According to Ockham, these cognitions
presuppose awareness of the objects of the passions of the will. If it
were possible, however, to have acts in the will without any previous
cognition, then this rule would not be valid. This is not, according to
Ockham, possible in this world. 15 Like the cognition of acts of
intellect, this cognition is also not inevitable. The human being does
not necessarily know that he or she loves, for instance, but an act of
will is needed as a cause of that cognition. 16
experientiam. Igitur requiritur actus voluntatis quo vuIt illum actum cognosci. Sed posito
isto actu voluntatis cum actu recto statim naturaliter, sine omni activitate intellectus,
sequitur actus reflexus in intellectu." Quaest. variae, q. 5; OTh VIII, 177-178: 449-464.
Generally for the will rather than the intellect itself causing acts ofthe intellect, see Quaest.
variae, q. 5; OTh VIII, 155-191: 4-736.
13 " .. standum est in prima: quod prima intellectio intuitive videbitur, et illa intuitio pro
statu isto impedit secund am intuitionem, non simpliciter, sed quia soIa praesentialitas
primae intellectionis non sufficit ad secundam intuitionem. Causa autem quare non sufficit
non potest dari nisi natura rei quam per experientiam scimus. Sicut causa quare intellecta
una re impeditur intellectio alterius rei non potest dari alia quam natura rei, quia istae
intellectiones in nullo sibi penitus repugnant, sicut nec obiecta intellecta. Quod tamen ita
sit, per experientiam novimus, nec aliter scire possumus." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh I, 66:
8-17. By God's power, there can be infinite regress in the human intellect: "Et concedo
processum in infinitum per potentiam divinam. Sed naturaliter loquendo, erit aliqua visio
quae non potest videri; et hoc quia intellectus noster est potentia limitata, ideo potest in
certum numerum visionum et non in maiorem. Sed in qua visione est status nescio. Forte
tameh status est in secunda visione, quia ipsa forte non potest naturaliter videri." Quodl. 1,
q. 14; OTh IX, 80: 35-40. About the infinite regress, see also ibid. II, q. 12; OTh IX,
166-167: 42-54.
14 See footnote 8 on pages 110 - 111.
15
quando aliquis amat, non oportet quod percipiat se amare, sed statim quando voluntas
vuIt actum suum cognosci, secunda volitio causatur a voluntate et a prima volitione et
cognitione qua cognoscitur obiectum amatum. Et istis positis, statim sine omni activitate
intellectus, sequitur naturaliter unus alius actus cognitionis quo cognoscitur primus actus
amandi." Quaest. variae, q. 5; OTh VIII, 179: 481-487. See also ibid., 178-179: 472-481.
16 "
113
As was seen in connection with sensory cognition, abstractive

cognition is cognition by which one cannot evidently know
contingent truths. Taken naturally, there can be abstractive
cognitions of things only through intuitive cognitions or habits.
Hence, abstractive intellectual cognitions of things are, in the natural
course of things, caused by the intuitive cognitions of them or the
habits generated by previous abstractive acts. Just as in the case of
the sensory abstractive cognitions, one does not, in the case of
intellectual abstractive cognitions, need to postulate any species of
things as intermediates between the things and the abstractive
cognitions of them. 17
In the intellect there also are, unlike in the sensory cognitive
potency, acts with respect to complex objects. 18 These acts are,
according to Ockham, partially caused by cognitions and partially by
acts of will. 19 Based on such acts, the intellect has, in addition to the
memory capacity comparable to the one which the sensory cognitive
17 " ... praeter habitum non oportet aliud ponere in intellectu ... omnia illa quae possunt salvari
per speciem, possunt salvari per habitum; igitur habitus requiritur et species
superfluit...species non ponitur ni si propter assimilationem vei propter causationem
intellectionis, vei propter repraesentationem obiecti, vei propter determinationem potentiae,
vei propter unionem moventis vei moti. Propter ista maxime ponitur species. Sed propter
nullum istorum oportet ponere, igitur non est ponenda." Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 271:
11-12; 272: 3-4, 17-21. About Ockham's proofs, see ibid., 272: 23 - 276: 11. " .. .ipsamet
res singularis quae prima terminat actum videndi corporalem, ipsamet omnino indistincta
terminat actum phantasiandi et intelligendi abstractive, et nulla species terminat." Rep. III,
q. 3; OTh VI, 122: 4-7.
18 " ... talis actus assentiendi est complexus et praesupponit formationem complexi qualis non
potest esse in parte sensitiva, quare talis actus ponitur in intellectu." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh
VII, 314: 21 - 315: 2.
19 " ... formatio propositionis non possit fieri nisi mediante voluntate ... " Ord. 1, d. 3, q. 4;
OTh II, 438: 16-17.
" ... ad causandum tantum actum quo apprehenditur complexum, qui dicitur compositio,
concurrit actus voluntatis ... posito actu voluntatis quo voluntas vuit tale complexum formare
et positis notitiis incomplexis terminorum illius complexi, necessario sequitur actus
apprehendendi sive formandi illud complexum, sicut effectus sequitur necessario et
naturaliter ad causam suam." Quaest. variae, q. 5; OTh VIII, 169-170: 268-269, 285-289.
114
CHAPTER FOUR
potency has zo , a more sophisticated memory capacity. This memory

capacity is also based on habits, but habits generated by cognitions
having complex objects. If a person, for instance, has had a cognition
of his or her own actual seeing or hearing something, and this
cognition has generated a habit, the habit inclines him Of her to have
recalling acts (actus recordandi) by which he or she can know his Of
her seeing or hearing something as past. Ockham also terms the
recalling acts 'imperfect intuitive cognitions'. Only the intellect can
have such acts, and therefore the term 'memory', properly taken,
refers only to it. zl
20 This capacity is based on habits generating acts similar to the ones that generated the
habits themselves. " ... dico quod memoria dupliciter accipitur: una moda pro potentia
habente aliquem habitum veI qualitatem derelictam ex actu praeterito, virtute cuius potest
talis potentia in aliquem consimilem actum et eiusdem rationis cum actu praeterito, qui
quidem actus praeteritus aliquid requirit ad suum esse quod non exigitur ad esse secundi
actus, puta obiectum extra... Primo moda accipiendo memoriam, dico quod memoria
repetitur in parte sensitiva et intellectiva, quia certum est quod in utraque derelinquitur
aliqua qualitas mediante qua potest in aliquem actum in quem prius non potuit et in actum
consimilem prima actui, sicut diffuse est probatum ... " Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 297: 11-17;
298: 7-11.
21 "Ali o moda [memoria] accipitur pro potentia quae potest in actum recordandi proprie
dictum mediante habitu generata ex actibus praeteritis, non quidem incomplexis sed
complexis, puta ex istis 'intelligo me nunc audire veI videre hoc'. Ex istis et similibus
generatur alius habitus ab habitu generata ex actibus incomplexis intuitivis veI abstractivis,
et mediante tali habitu cognosco postea evidenter per actum recordandi quod hoc vidi et hoc
audivi. Et ratio est quia habitus semper inclinat ad actus consimiles illis ex quibus
generatur. .. Secundo moda loquendo de memoria dico tamquam certum quod est in parte
intellectiva, sed non est ita certum quod est in parte sensitiva. Primum probatur, quia illa
potentia quae potest cognoscere actum suum esse praeteritum veI praecessisse habet
memoriam proprie dictam. Sed intellectus est huiusmodi. Probatio, quia probatum est prius
quod [intellectus] intuitive videt actum suum et potest tunc cognoscere evidenter quod actus
suus est. Et ex illo actu complexo evidenti generatur habitus inclinans evidenter ad
cognoscendum quod ilie actus fuit, et ilie est actus recordandi, igitur etc." Rep. IV, q. 14;
OTh VII, 297: 18 - 298: 4, 13 - 299: 2. " ... dico quod ilIa notitia evidens qua intellectus
evidenter assentit huic complexo 'hoc vidi', 'hoc audivi' causatur ex notitia intuitiva
terminorum. Sed intuitiva duplex est, sicut alibi patet: quaedam perfecta, quaedam
imperfecta. Perfecta est iIIa mediante qua intellectus evidenter iudicat quod talis actus est,
et haec est generativa habitus incomplexi inclinantis partialiter ad actum recordativum,
mediate tamen. Imperfecta est illa mediante qua intellectus evidenter iudicat quod talis actus
fuit, et intuitiva imperfecta generatur ex intuitiva perfecta. Tunc dico quod ista notitia
evidens praedicti complexi causatur ex notitia intuitiva imperfecta terminorum, et hoc
PASSIONS OF THE Wll...L
115
What is the role of intellectual cognitions as a cause of the

passions of the will? In the case of the will, as argued before,
Ockham clearIy makes a distinction between those passions which
are acts, such as Iove and hatred, and desire and avoidance, and those
which are not acts but onIy passions (caused by the acts of the will),
namely pleasure and distress.
Ockham says clearIy that intellectual cognitions are partial
efficient causes of acts of the will. 22 Re also maintains that an
intellectual cognition partialIy inclines the will towards its acts. 23
What kinds of cognitions, then, can partially cause acts of will? Also
conceming acts in the will, there is the question of whether pureIy
intuitive cognitions can cause them without abstractive acts or
judgments. In the case of acts of will, the answer is the same as in the
case of acts of sensory appetite: the pure intuitive cognitions can
partially cause acts in the will. No abstractive acts or judgments are
required in order to have acts in the will. 24
praesupponit, naturaliter Ioquendo, intuitivam perfectam." Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 312:
4-16. "Cognitio autem intuitiva imperfecta est illa per quam iudicamus rem aliquando
fuisse veI non fuisse. Et haec dicitur cognitio recordativa; ut quando video aliquam rem
intuitive, generatur habitus inclinans ad cognitionem abstractivam, mediante qua iudico et
assentio quod talis res aliquando fuit quia aliquando vidi eam...cognitio intuitiva imperfecta
est simpliciter cognitio abstractiva." Rep. II, q. 12-13; OTh V, 261: 13-18,262: 5-6. For
Ockham's wholetheoryofthememory, seeRep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 278: 2-317: 7. See
also Baudry 1958, 147-148; Fuchs 1952,29-42.
22 ..... volitio non potest esse sine intellectione, et causatur ab ea." Ord. 1, prol., q. 9; OTh 1,
263: 24 - 264: 1. .....dico quod actus volendi est effective ab actu intelligendi." Ord. 1, d. 3,
q. 10; OTh II, 566: 5-6...... nec est hoc magis inconveniens quam quod idem effectus, puta
volitio, producatur libere et contingenter a voiuntate, et naturaliter et necessario a
cognitione... " Quodl. II, q. 8; OTh IX, 146: 37-39.
23 ..... cognitio actualis in intellectu quodammodo inclinat voiuntatem ut causa partialis
respectu sui actus." Rep. III, q. 5; OTh VI, 158: 1-2...... actus dictandi in intellectu inclinat
ad actum voluntatis, quia actus intelligendi est vere causa efficiens respectu volitionis el
non obiectum extra." Rep. III, q. 12; OTh VI, 396: 6--8.
aliquid potest esse opus humanum, nullo exsistente in intellectu nisi soIa notitia
intuitiva alicuius rei veI aliquarum rerum, quia habita soIa notitia intuitiva potest diligi quod
est quoddam opus." Ord. 1, d. 27, q. 2; OTh IV, 224: 23 - 225: 3...... non minoris virtutis
est voiuntas in eliciendo actum suum quam appetitus sensitivus in eliciendo suum. Sed
appetitus sensitivus potest elicere actum suum circa obiectum nude ostensum et
24 .....
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CHAPTER FOUR
Nevertheless, quite often there are abstractive cognitions and

judgments of reason contributing to acts in the will. The essential
thing with the judgments of reason is that the will does not
necessarily conform to them. It can conform, but it can also not
conform. 25 The human will can even will something that the intellect
finds impossible or involving a contradiction - because of its
defectiveness. 26 Any object whatever that is somehow advantageous
(commodum) to the will or to the person, either truly or estimated to
be such, can be an object of willing. 27 Correspondingly, any object
that is somehow disadvantageous (incommodum) , either truly or
estimated, can be an object of willing-against. 28
According to Ockham, an intellectual cognition is a naturally
necessary partial cause of acts of will. Only by God's power can
apprehensum a sense sine omni compositione et divisione praecedente intellectus veI
sensus. Igitur multo magis hoc potest voluntas." Rep. II, q. 16; OTh V, 364: 2-7. " ... non
maior ostensio obiecti requiritur a parte voluntatis quam a parte appetitus sensitivi. .. ad hoc
quod voluntas habeat actum suum solum requiritur ostensio obiecti praecedens sine omni
iudicio rationis." Rep. III, q. 5; OTh VI, 161: 8-10,12-14. " ... non plus dependet voluntas
in volendo ab intellectu quam appetitus sensitivus a sua cognitiva; sed appetitus sensitivus
potest in actum suum facta soIa ostensione obiecti sine omni iudicio veI dictamine; igitur
multo magis voluntas." Quaest. variae, q. 7, a. 3; OTh VIII, 368: 636-639.
25 " voluntas non necessario conformetur iudicio rationis, potest tamen conformari iudicio
rationis tam recto quam erroneo." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 6; OTh 1, 503: 18-19. " .. non est talis
connexio inter intellectum et voluntatem quin voluntas possit in oppositum iudicati ab
intellectu; aliter non posset peccare." Rep. III, q. 11; OTh VI, 355: 15-17. " ... potentia
obliquabilis quae non necessario conformatur rationi rectae, qua ratione potest in oppositum
unius dictati ab intellectu eadem ratione potest in oppositum alterius dictati. Sed voluntas
creata est obliquabilis, et potest in oppositum unius dictati hic in via, patet per
experientiam. Igitur non obstante quod intellectus dictet hoc esse finem ultimum, potest
voluntas noile illum finem." Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 350: 22 - 351: 5.
ex hoc quod voluntas creata est defectibilis, potest velle impossibile et illud quod
includit contradictionem, cuiusmodi est infinita esse." Quodl. II, q. 9; OTh IX, 154-155:
114-116. " ... voluntas nostra potest velle impossibile ... " Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1,439: 2-3.
" ... [voluntas] potest velle et noile impossibile ... " Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 353: 16-17.
26 " ..
omne commodum - si ve verum si ve aestimatum - potest esse obiectum volitionis ... "
Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 6; OTh 1, 505: 25 - 506: 2.
27 " .
omne incommodum potest esse obiectum nolitionis, si ve sit vere incommodum si ve

aestimatum... sed Deus potest tali esse incommodum, saltem aestimatum; igitur Deus potest
esse obiectum nolitionis." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1, 505: 24-25; 506: 2-3.
28 "
PASSIONS OF THE Wll...L
117
there be acts in the will without any cognition at al1. 29 Ockham does
not speculate about such acts, but on the basis of what he says about
the passions of sensory appetite caused without cognitions, one can
assume that, according to him, it might be difficult for human beings
to distinguish them. 30 Could there, on the other hand, be an act in the
will which is sufficiently or totalIy caused by a cognition? In
Quodlibet II, q. 17, Ockham speaks about such precipitate acts (for
instance, getting frightened and angry) in the sensory appetite by
which a human being is overtaken when the object is apprehended.
Thus, the apprehension of objects causes these passions. It is not in
the power ofthe will to control them. 31 Ockham may think that when
the person has a chance to consider his or her reactions, the acts
concemed are already over. In the same connection, Ockham rejects
such precipitate acts from the will, since "alI the acts which are in the
will are in the power of the will. ,,32 As will be seen below, elsewhere
"Tamen si esset possibile quod esset amor in voluntate sine omni cognitione praevia,
notitia intuitiva illius amoris nullam aliam praesupponeret. Sed hoc non est possibile pro
statu isto." Ord. 1, prol., q. 1; OTh 1, 67: 18-20. " ... dilectio contingenter respicit
cognitionem in communi, quia potest esse sine omni cognitione, saltem per potentiam Oei,
licet non naturaliter." Rep. IV, q. 6; OTh VII, 91: 12-14. " ... dilectio potest esse sine
cognitione intuitiva et abstractiva; igitur potest esse per potentiam divinam sine omni
cognitione." Quodl. IV, q. 18; OTh IX, 394: 147-148. Marilyn McCord Adams "suspects"
that Ockham does not thillk. that "it is logically possible for an act of love to exist without
any awareness of its object." This does not seem to be the case. Adams 1987, 514.
30 See pages 93-95.
29
31 " . Philosophus intelligit de passionibus sensitivis quae non sunt in potestate nostra,
cuiusmodi sunt actus appetitus sensitivi surrepticii; puta timere, irasci, quibus statim homo
capitur facta apprehensione obiectorum, nec sunt in potestate sua... " Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh
IX, 188: 52-55.
"Tales autem actus surrepticii non sunt in voluntate, quia omnes actus qui sunt in
voluntate, sunt in potestate voluntatis." Quodl. II, q. 17; OTh IX, 188: 58-60. In
Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a 9, Ockham, when dealing with precipitate pleasure (that is not
an act), ponders the possibility that there are acts in the will that are not in the power of the
will but that are naturally caused by apprehension and the will. " ... est dubium de
delectationibus subreptitiis, a quo causantur...Respondeo: semper tales delectiones (sic)
causantur a volitionibus praeviis. Sed tales volitiones forte non sunt in potestate voluntatis,
sed causantur naturaliter ab apprehensione intellectus et a voluntate, et postea eadem
naturali tate et necessitate causant delectationem. Vei si sint in potestate voluntatis, tunc
32
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CHAPTER FOUR
Ockham does not seem to think that all the acts of the will are in the
power of the will, at least from their beginning. Ockham may,
however, think that cognitions are never sufficient or total causes of
acts of the will. Even if the will were not one of the causes of an act
in itself, there would be habits or something else concurring with a
cognition when an act is caused in the will.
The immediate role of intellectual cognitions of objects in
causing those passions of the will which are not acts, namely
pleasure and distress, is not very important. Pleasure and distress in
the will are sufficiently caused by certain acts of the will which, in
their turn, require a cognition of the object to be caused. In
Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, Ockham admits
that the cognition by which a person apprehends that a previously
desired object is present can, however, at least intensify the pleasure
caused by the love of that object. 33
Let us now discuss the role of the will itself as a partial cause
of the passions in it. 1 shall first look at the will as a cause of those
passions in it which are acts. The will is a very special cause of the
acts in it, since it is a free one - in a certain meaning of the term
'free' (liber). The term 'free' had several meanings in medieval
thinking, but in the case of the will, according to Ockham, it most
relevantly refers to inner contingency in causing an act. Its opposite
is necessity in causing an act, the necessity of a naturally active
voluntas numquam deleetaretur nisi libere vellet:' Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 266:
328-329,332-337.
33 "Voluntas autem quando obieetum prius desideratllm est praesens sibi - vei alteri eui
desideravit - non habet tune aetum desiderii, propter eandem rationem, sed habet tune
aetum amicitiae quo diligit tale obieetum in se, quia ilie aetus potest indifferenter esse
respeetu praesentis et absentis. Et tune mediante isto aetu eausatur deleetatio in voluntate.
Et forte ista delectatio augetur per apprehensionem praesentiae talis obieeti. Et post aetum
desiderii potest illa eognitio eausare deleetationem in vollintate immediate sicut in appetitu
sensitivo. Et ideo vei est duplex delectatio: una sequens aetum desiderii quando obieetum
est praesens, et ilIa eausaretur tune ab obieeto et eognitione apprehensiva, sieut est in
appetitu sensitivo, et alia eausatur ab aetu amicitiae - qllod videtur superfluum; vei erit una
deleetatio intensior si solum haberet aetum desiderandi vei amandi - et hoe videtur verum."
Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 360: 6-20.
PASSIONS OF THE Wll..L
119
principle, like fire. 34 The inner contingency of the will with respect
to an act means that it is in the power of the will to cause Of not to
cause that act without any change in the will itself, in the intellect, in
the body or anywhere else in the surrounding circumstances.
Therefore, the inner contingency of the will with respect to an act
means that the will is not determined with respect to the act. 35 This
In Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6 Ockham states that freedom can be

taken in three ways, but when speaking about the will, it is taken to mean the same as
contingency. " ... distinctio est de libere frui. Quia Iibertas una moda distinguitur acoactione,
et sic accipitur impropriissime, quia isto moda Iibertas potest competere intellectui. Alio
moda opponitur servituti creaturae rationaIis, et hoc vei servituti culpae vei servituti
poenae. Et hoc moda beati sunt Iiberiores quam viatores, quia magis liberi a servitute culpae
et poenae. Alio moda opponitur necessitati secundum quod necessitas opponiturcontingenti
secunda moda dicto in priori distinctione [de contingenti]. Et sic libertas est quaedam
indifferentia et contingentia, et distinguitur contra principium activum naturale. Et sic
utuntur philosophi libertate et voluntate, et isto moda distinguuntur principia activa II
Physicorum et IX Metaphysicae." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 6; OTh 1, 501: 13-24. In Quaestiones in
librum secundum Sententiarum, q. 15 Ockham puts it thus: " ... dico quod libertas accipitur
quinque modis. Uno moda ut opponitur servituti culpae, secunda moda ut opponitur
servituti miseriae, terti o moda ut opponitur servituti poenae, quarto moda ut opponitur
coactioni, quinto moda ut opponitur immutabilitati." Rep. II, q. 15; OTh V, 354: 7 - 355:
2. See also the following sections: " ... voluntas respectu cuiuscumque obiecti libere et
contingenter agit, igitur simpliciter de potentia sua absoluta potest cessare ab actu suo."
Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1,399: 10-12. " ... [libertas] est unum nomen connotativum importans
ipsam voluntatem veI naturam intellectualem connotando aIiquid contingenter posse fieri
ab eadem." Ord. 1, d. 10, q. 2; OTh III, 344: 15-17. " ... omnem actumcausatumin voluntate
a voluntate libere potest voluntas impedire." Rep. II, q. 15; OTh V, 340: 13-14. " ... voco
libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter diversa ponere, ita quod
possum eumdem effectum causare et non causare, nulla di versitate existente alibi extra ilIam
potentiam." Quodl. 1, q. 16; OTh IX, 87: 12-15. See aIso Baudry 1958, 135-138; Kuc
1986, 281. Ockham remarks that freedom cannot be distinguished from spontaneity.
" .. .Iibertas et spontaneitas videntur non posse distingui." Ord. 1, d. 10, q. 2; OTh III, 340:
15. David Clark comments on Ockham's remark: '''Spontaneous causality' is Ockham's
metaphor although the phrase has little explanatory vaIue." Clark 1978, 147-148. In this
study, I do not particularly deal with the question of liberum arbitrium in Ockham. For this
in the voluntaristic tradition, see Kent 1995. I aIso do not go into such theologicaI problems
of free will Iike its relationship with God's omnipotence, omniscience and predestination.
35 " ... distinctio est de contingenti: quod dupliciter accipitur - ad praesens - frui aIiquo
contingenter si cut et producere aliquid contingenter. Uno moda quod simpliciter potest frui
et non frui, vei producere et non producere. Et isto moda quidquid producit quemcumque
effectum, producit contingenter, quia potest Deus facere quod non producat. Alio moda
accipitur pro illo quod producit aliquem effectum, et nullo variato ex parte sua nec ex parte
34
120
CHAPTER FOUR
position seems to be in line with the Parisian Articles of 1277 that

dealt with this matter. 36 The contingent causation ofthe will does not
end with any satiation of the will. Ockham does not think that any
object of the will, not even God, satiates the will in the way that the
will would no longer cause acts with respect to other objects.
Ockham states that even though the blessed in heaven see God
c1early and love him intensely, they Can also love something else
(unless God wants to prevent them).37
Ockham sometimes says that the freedom (contingency) ofthe
will means that the will is free to elicit an act insofar as it pleases
(sicut placet) the Will. 38 He does not, however, develop the idea of
cuiuscumque alterius habet in potestate sua ita non producere sicut producere, ita quod ex
natura sua ad neutrum determinatur. Et eodem moda dicendum est de contingenter frui. Et
isto secunda moda intelligitur quaestio [de libertate actus fruendi]." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 6; OTh
1,501: 2-12. " ... voluntasindeterminate ferturin obiectumsuum ... " Rep. III, q. 11; OTh VI,
354: 11-12. " ... [voluntas] propter libertatem suam potest indifferenter agere unum
oppositorum veI reliquum, ita quod si esset soIa passiva et nullo moda activa, non videtur
quomodo posset salvari eius Iibertas." Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 358: 4-7. " ... volitio et
nolitio sunt contraria quae possunt successive esse in eodem subiecto sine omni mutatione
alia quam ad istas formas tam a parte corporis quam a parte intellectus. Patet enim quod
aliquis odiens aliquem potest eum diligere sine omni mutatione nova corporali et etiam
intellectuali solum ex libertate voluntatis; igitur soia voiuntas est subiectum istarum
formarum." Quodl. 1, q. 11; OTh IX, 67-68: 41-47. " ... voluntas libere potest velle aliquid
et non velle in tantum quod volente aliquid operari, nulla facta mutatione circa intellectum
veI circa ipsam primam operationem voluntatis et eius actum nec etiam facta aliqua
mutatione circa quodcumque extra, potest ipsa destruere illud velle quod habet, et alium
effectum contrarium illi de novo producere, vei potest aequaliter illum eundem effectum in
se continuare et alium non producere de novo, ita quod aequaliter se habet ad producere et
non producere, quia nulla mutatione facta praevia potest producere et potest non producere.
Aequaliter etiam se habet ad effectus contrarios, quia potest causare dilectionem alicuius vei
odium." Exp. Phys. Arist. II, c. 8; OPh IV, 319-320: 111-120. See also Tract. praedest., q.
3; OPh II, 536: 84-98; Exp. Phys. Arist., prol., OPh IV, 5: 9-15. The will producingits acts
de novo: Quaest. Phys. Arist., q. 126; OPh VI, 737-738: 83-94; Quaest. Phys. Arist., q.
127; OPh VI, 740: 69-81. The contingency does not, however, mean that the will could
cause or not cause an act simuitaneously. See, for instance, Clark 1978, 146-147.
36
See Saarinen 1994, 168.
37
Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 117-118: 404-429.
38 " .in
agente libere est instantia manifesta, quia obiectum cognitum potest esse praesens
voluntati in ratione volibilis, et Deus similiter ad causandum, et similiter omnia requisita ad
actum volendi et sufficientia possunt manere per tampus magnum, et tamen non oportet
PASSIONS OF THE WllL
121
inner placentia further, but he does not seem to mean that the
placentia in question would be an(other) act of the will which would
determine the willing. li he thought so, and that first act of the will
were free, the freedom would not have been explained, and if the
first act were not free, the freedom of the will would collapse. One
perhaps has to believe David W. Clark, who conc1udes that: "In the
end, Ockham finds freedom as unsearchable as the personality
itself.,,39
Can the contingency-freedom of the will be proved? Ockham
seemed to think in the end that the freedom of the will is evident
only through experience and cannot be proved rationally. This is his
view in Quodlibet 1, q. 16.40 However, in Expositio in libros
Physicorum Aristotelis II, c. 8 he seems to have thought that the
freedom of the will can also be proved rationally (and
authoritatively).41
quod eliciatur actus volendi, quia hoc totum est in libertate voluntatis quae potest libere
elicere et non elicere, si cut sibi placet quantumcumque ornnia sufficientia ad actum volendi
sint praesentia et bene disposita, ita quod agens liberum exsistens in potentia essentiali ad
actum, potest exire in actum ex se solo sine ornni alia extrinseco quocumque moda aliter
concurrente nunc quam prius, per casum positum." Rep. IV, q. 15; OTh VII, 333: 19 - 334:
5. " ... posito ornni sufficienti et necessario requisito ad taIem actum, puta ad actum
[voluntatis], si obiectum cognoscatur, et Deus velit concurrere cum voluntate ad causandum
quando placet voluntati, potest voluntas ex sua libertate - sine omni alia determinatione
actuali vei habituali - actum illum vei eius oppositum elicere vei non elicere. Et ideo
respectu illius actus non oportet in aliquo quod determinetur voluntas ni si a se ipsa." Rep.
IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 359: 3-10. " ... [voluntas] potest in se ipsa producere velle et noile sicut
placet sibi." Exp. Periherm. Arist. Il, c. 7; OPh Il, 481: 57-58. See also Quaest. variae, q.
6, a. 11; OTh VIII, 303: 352-364.
39 Clark 1978, 148.
utrum possit probari sufficienter quod voluntas est libera ... dico quod non potest
probari per aliquam rationem, quia ornnis ratio hoc probans accipiet aeque ignotum cum
conclusione veI ignotius. Potest tamen evidenter cognosci per experientiam, per hoc quod
homo experitur quod quantumcumque ratio dictet aliquid, potest tamen voluntas hoc velle
vei non velle veI nolle." Quodl. 1, q. 16; OTh IX, 87-88: 18-19, 23-28. See also Perler
1988, 254-255.
41 About the rational and authoritative proofs, see Exp. Phys. Arist. II, c. 8; OPh IV,
320-324: 121-269.
40 " ...
122
CHAPTER FOUR
It has to be noted that the fact that the will is not naturally (that
is, as determined) inclined towards one effect more than another42
does not, however, mean that the will would not at alI tend to will
something. It appears from Ockham' s texts that the will at least tends
to will something which causes sensory pleasure. Its nature is, by
experience, known to be such. It is even difficult for the will not to
consent to the sensory passions, but it should not consent sometimes,
and it is possible for it not to consent. 43
What sort of acts should be freely elicited by the will? In this
study, 1 do not extensively deal with Ockham's ethics. 44 1, however,
refer to some of Ockham's principles of the moral evaluation of an
act of the will. In order to be morally good, an act has to fulfill
several conditions. Ockham states that the principal object of an act
of will is the end, and all (the other) circumstances, such as right
reason, time and place, are its secondary objects. 45 There also may be
voluntas non habet inclinationem naturalem ad aliquid quod fit in ea plus quam ad eius
oppositum, ideo voluntas non potest moveri violenter, quia violenter movetur aliquid quod
movetur contra inclinationem naturalem in eo." Rep. III, q. 6; OTh VI, 175: 21 - 176: 1.
" ... agente libero, quod non plus inclinatur ex natura sua ad unum effectum quam ad
alium ... " Quodl. IV, q. 1; OTh IX, 300: 152-154. Ockham about 'inclination': " .. .nclinare
est actum causare, quod reputo verum... Large accipiendo 'inclinationem', non est aliud
quam esse in potentia ad aliud sine omni inclinatione et activitate ad contrarium; et sic
materia est in potentia naturali ad formam et inclinatur ad eam... Stricte accipitur 'inclinatio'
secundum quod addit aliquid ultra esse in potentia receptiva, puta activitatem... breviter sic
inclinare idem est quod agere." Quodl. III, q. 22; OTh IX, 289-290: 23-24, 34-40,44-45.
42 " ..
43
See pages 133-137.
For Ockham' s ethics, see Adams 1986, Freppert 1988, Holopainen 1991, Wood 1997,
Miiller 2000.
45 "Sed fines sunt obiecta primaria actus voluntatis ... omnes circumstantiae actus voluntatis
sunt obiecta partialia illius actus, ita quod finis in omni actu est obiectum principale ... Aliae
circumstantiae sunt obiecta secundari a partialia respectu illius actus." Rep. III, q. Il; OTh
VI, 380: 13-14; 381: 12-15. " ... recta ratio, si ve locus sive tempus si ve finis sive
quaecumque circumstantia [quae] est obiectum partiale actus virtuosi in voluntate ... " Rep.
III, q. 12; OTh VI, 416: 7-9. Ockham's example is a virtuous act of the will by which
someone wills to pray to God. In this case, the principal object is (has to be) to honor God.
The common object is the act of praying. The secondary and partial objects are right reason,
Sunday (time) and the church (place): "Exemplum: si enim ad hoc quod actus voluntatis
quo aliquis vuIt orare Deum sit perfecte virtuosus requirantur necessario istae
44
123
acts in the will that are morally indifferent. For instance, if the end is
neither good nor bad, the reason neither right nor wrong, the time
and place neither required nor not required, etc., the act of will is
morally neither good nor bad but neutral and indifferent. 46 Also, if
acts ofwill are not free, they are morally indifferent. 47 Can a morally
indifferent act of will still become morally good or bad extrinsically
(like, for example, the acts of sensory appetite, which are morally
good or bad only extrinsically)? It can, if there is simultaneously
another act in the will by which the neutral act is willed to be
continued. Ockham states that he believes that there can
simultaneously be two acts of willing in the will, and therefore acts
of will that are morally indifferent in themselves can become
extrinsically morally good or bad. 48 For example, loving one' s father
circumstantiae: quod velit orare propter honorem Dei, secundum rectum dictamen rationis,
in tempore statuto, puta die dominico, in loca debito, puta in ecclesia, tunc iste actus sic
virtuosus habet honorem Dei pro obiecto principali, actum orandi pro obiecto communi,
rectam rationem, diem dominicum et ecclesiam pro obiectis secundariis et partialibus ... "
Rep. III, q. II; OTh VI, 381: 16 - 382: 5.
"Puta si diligam aliquem hominem, non propter aliquem finem bonum vei malum, nec
secundum rectam rationem nec contra, nec loca nec tempore debito nec non [debito], et ita
de aliis circunstantiis virtuosis et vitiosis, iste actus nec est bonus moraliter nec malus sed
neuter et indifferens. Ad hoc igitur quod fiat bonus veI malus, oportet eum
circumstantionari circumstantiis virtuosis vei vitiosis, puta quod voluntas diligat illum
hominem propter finem talem, et tempore debito, et sic de aliis. Sed sic diligendo habet
alium actum quia... circumstantiae non sunt nisi obiecta partialia actus voluntatis virtuosi ad
quorum variationem variatur necessario actus." Rep. III, q. Il; OTh VI, 384: 6-14, 15-16.
See also ibid., q. 12; OTh VI, 412: 7-11.
47 "Alio moda potest dici quod aliquis actus sit indifferens in voluntate si causetur totaliter
a Deo, quia tunc nec dicetur bonus moraliter nec malus, quia ista nomina connotant
activitatem voluntatis sicut meritorius actus ... si Deus faceret in voluntate mea actum
conformem rationi rectae, voluntate nihil agente, non esset ilIe actus meritorius nec
virtuosus. Et ideo requiritur ad bonitatem actus quod sit in potestate voluntatis habentis
ilIum actum." Rep. III, q. Il; OTh VI, 389: 6-9, 19-22. Here Ockham speaks about acts
which are not free because God has been the total cause ofthem, but as will be seen below,
there can also be such acts naturally.
48 ..... si quaeratur utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit esse indifferens prima ad bonitatem
et malitiam et post fieri bonus vei malus denominatione extrinseca sicut actus partis
sensitivae, tunc distinguendum est. Quia aut ponitur quod in voluntate possunt esse simul
duo actus volendi naturaliter, aut non. Si non, tunc in voluntate non potest esse aliquis actus
46
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CHAPTER FOUR
can be an indifferent act in itself, but it can become morally good if

it is done with a good intention (bona intentia), say, because of the
divine precept. 49
The fact that the will can function as a free cause of acts does
not, according to Ockham, mean that alI acts of will are free in sense
of being in the free power of the will, at least at the moment when
they are elicited. An act of will can be free only if there are certain
cognitive acts as partial causes of it. More precisely said, an act of
will can be free only if the intellect has a chance to estimate
alternative ways of reaction. If a person has a perception of
something, and he or she can - in a real sense - consider whether to
act or not with respect to it, the act which is elicited can be free. In
this case, the freedom concerns eliciting or not eliciting the act. If a
person has such a perception and consideration only after the
moment when the act is elicited, the act can become free after it has
begun. In this case, freedom concerns continuing or not continuing
the act. so However, even if the intellect had considered alternative
indifferens dicto modo, quia non posset sic esse indifferens nisi quatenus posset conformari
alteri actui perfecte et intrinsece virtuoso, sicut actus appetitus sensitivi non dicitur aliter
virtuosus, ut patet. Si au tem duo actus volendi possunt simul esse naturaliter in voluntate,
quod credo esse verum sicut fi prima probatum est, tunc in voluntate potest esse aliquis
actus indifferens moda praedicto." Rep. III, q. II; OTh VI, 385: 10- 386: 2. " ... concedo
conclusionem quod in voluntate possunt esse simul duo actus volendi." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 1;
OTh 1, 389: 22-23.
49 " amare patrem absolute, sine omni circumstantia, quandoque est actus rectus et
quandoque deformis, quia propter assistentiam novi actus potest dici rectus, puta si
continuet ilIum amorem bona intentione, puta propter praeceptum divinum; et tunc dicitur
rectus propter actum quo vuIt illum actum continuare propter praeceptum divinum. Et idem
actus postea dicitur deformis propter carentiam istius actus necessario virtuosi, veI propter
positionem alterius actus essentialiter vitiosi, puta si velit iIIum actum continuare propter
vanam gloriam." Quodl. III, q. 15; OTh IX, 260: 52-60. See also Rep. III, q. II; OTh VI,
386: 2 - 387: 7.
See Marilyn McCord Adams's and Norman Kretzmann's discussion of this, William
Ockham 1969, 30-32. See also Quodlibet II, q. 6 where Ockham explains his view of
deliberation. In that text, Ockham defends the opinion that an angel can have a meritorious
act of the will in the first moment of its existence. This means that the deliberation which
is needed for the meritorious act of the will can be instantaneous and simultaneous with the
act ofthe will. Quodl. II, q. 6; OTh IX, 138-141: 4-139.
50
125
ways of action, the act of will which is caused is not necessarily free.
The will is only one of the causes of the acts in it, and there may be
cases where the other causes cause an act in the will without any
activity of the will. Cognitions have already been considered as
partial causes of the passions of the will, and it was noted that
Ockham does not seem to think that they could sufficiently or totally
cause acts in the will. When 1 now continue examining various
causes of the passions of the will, 1 shall, in the case of each cause,
also ask whether it can sufficiently cause an act in the will.
A group of the causes of those passions of the will which are
acts are other acts which exist in the will. According to Ockham, the
first (primus) or absolute (absolutus) act of will, which is free, can,
together with a cognition, necessitate the will to have other acts, that
is, acts which he calls second (secundus) acts, and these can further
necessitate other acts. For instance, if someone efficiently wills or
desires to become healthy and knows that he or she cannot become
healthy without drinking a bitter medicine, his or her will is
necessitated to will the bitter medicine. Ockham admits that in this
case, the act of willing the bitter medici ne is caused by the act of
willing health together with the cognition concemed, without any
activity of the wil1. 51
Let us then have a look at the acts of the will causing those
passions in the will which are not acts, namely pleasure and distress.
As said before, in the sensory appetite, pleasure and pain are caused
by cognitions by which the object is apprehended as present, not by
the object immediately. In Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum,
d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, in which the causation of pleasure and distress is
discussed to agreat extent, Ockham defends his view that pleasure
and distress are not caused by the object immediately in the will
either. Instead, these passions in the will are immediately caused by
Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 6; OTh 1, 493: 17 - 500: 17; Quaest. variae, q, 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 259:
168-173; Quaest. variae, q, 6, a. 11; OTh VIII, 302: 352-360. See a1so Rep. III, q. 7; OTh
VI, 210: 18 - 211: 18. For various cases in which acts of the will necessitate other acts of
the will, see sub-chapter 4.2.
51
126
CHAPTER FOUR
acts of the will. This is because, given an equal act in the will, an
equal pleasure follows, no matter whether the object exists Of not,
but without an act of the will there cannot be pleasure. 52 Certain acts
of the will always cause pleasure Of distress: Only if there is an
impediment, such as an overwhelming opposing passion Of God's
mirade, are pleasure and distress not caused by them. 53 Thus,
cognition of an object is not the cause of pleasure and distress in the
will, unlike the case of pleasure and pain in sensory appetite. 54
In Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 9, Ockham discusses this matter
as well. There he states that all pleasure and distress in the will are
caused through the mediation of an act of the will, and that even a
conditional volition or 'nolition' suffices to cause pleasure Of
distress. 55 On the basis of this, Ockham states that the cases posited
obiectum non est causa immediata delectationis, sed causa immediata delectationis est
ipse actu voluntatis. Et ratio est quia posito actu voluntatis aequali - sive obiectum sit sive
non sit - sequitur aequalis delectatio, et sine actu voluntatis nuBo moda potest sequi
delectatio. Ergo solus actus voluntatis erit causa immediata." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1,415:
17-22. See also ibid., 414: 23 - 415: 16.
52 "
53 " .. semper
[posito actu voluntatis] sequitur delectatio veI tristitia nisi sit impedimentum.
Sed aliquando est impedimentum, si cut quando est summa tristitia impeditur actus
voJuntatis a delectatione, quae deberet sequi, propter ipsam tristitiam." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 3;
OTh 1, 422: 12-16. "Ad Augustinum leviter diceretur quod est ibi praedicatio causalis, quia
amor fruens est causa delectationis et laetitiae nisi impediatur." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1,
412: 14-16. For the impediments, see also e.g. Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 11; OTh VIII,
268-270: 362-421.
".fu dicatur quod qua ratione cognitio sensitiva est causa immediata delectationis in
appetitu sensitivo, ead.em ratione cognitio intellectiva erit causa immediata delectationis in
appetitu intellectivo, respondeo negando consequentiam. Et causa est quia praeter notitiam
intellectivam et delectationem est unus actus voluntatis medius, et ideo ilie erit causa; sed
praeter cognitionem sensitivam et delectationem in appetitu sensitivo non est talis actus
medius, et ideo cognitio sensitiva erit causa immediata." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1,421: 1-8.
54
omnis delectatio et tristitia causatur in voluntate mediante volitione veI nolitione ... Sed
volitio et nolitio est duplex: quaedam absoluta, quaedam condicionata. Absoluta est illa qua
simpliciter volo aliquid sine omni condicione; condicionata est illa qua volo vei nolo sub
condicione, sicut nauta nolet proicere merces in mari si posset evadere submersionem. Et
utraque tam volitio quam nolitio absoluta et condicionata est sufficiens ad causandum
tristitiam et deJectationem moda prius declarato." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 265:
297-298, 299-305. " ... delectatio est quaedam passio causata naturaliter a dilectione
... delectatio voluntatis causatur immediate a dilectione, ita quod dilectio causatur a
55 "
127
by Scotus in which there can be pleasure or distress in the will

without an act of the will are not valid. In the first case, the object is
naturally agreeable or disagreeable to the will, and therefore pleasure
or distress can be caused through natural willing (affectio commodi)
that is not an act elicited. In the second case, the object is agreeable
or disagreeable to the senses, and therefore pleasure or distress can
be caused in the will without a free act. If the will did not have other
acts than desire and avoidance, Scotus would be right. This is the
case, because when a desired thing would be attained, desire and
avoidance would cease, and pleasure and distress would be caused by
the apprehension of the intellect of that object. But, since the will
does not only have desire and avoidance, but also an act of
complacence (actus complacentiae) or an act of amicability (actus
amicitiae) by which it can love a possessed thing, the apprehension
does not cause anything in the will except by the mediation of a
volition or 'nolition' .56 What about so-called precipitate pleasures?
cognitione sicut a causa partiali, et delectatio causatur immediate a dilectione ... delectatio est
quaedam qualitas consequens dilectionem sicut effectus causam. .. " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a.
11; OTh VIII, 308-310: 486, 510-512, 525-527.
"Ex quibus patet quod illi duo modi quod Ioannes ponit causare delectationem et
tristitiam non sunt veri. Ponit enim quattuor modos quibus potest causari delectatio veI
tristi tia in voluntate, quaestione praeallegata quorum duo modi sunt per volitionem
absolutam et volitionem condicionatam, et isti sunt veri. Alii sunt quod si obiectum sit
naturaliter conveniens veI disconveniens voluntati, potest causare tristitiam veI
delectationem in voluntate sine omni actu libere elicito, sed solum mediante velle naturali
qui non est actus elicitus. Alius modus est si obiectum sit conveniens veI disconveniens
sensui, potest causare delectationem veI tristitiam in voluntate sine omni volitione libere
elicita praevia. Sed isti modi falsi sunt et contra omnem experientiam. Nec potest dictum
istud improbari ni si per experientiam. Si enim voluntas non haberet nisi actum desiderii vei
fugiendi, sicut habet appetitus sensitivus, tunc haberet evidentiam. Quia tunc quando res
desiderata haberetur, cessarent iIli actus et causarentur praedictae passiones [delectatio et
tristitia] ab apprehensione intellectus obiecti iam habiti. Sed quia, ut alibi patet, non tantum
voluntas habet praedictos actus [actum desiderii et fugiendi] sed actum complacentiae sive
amicitiae quo diligit rem habitam praesentem, ideo numquam causat iIla apprehensio
aliquid in voluntate nisi mediante aliqua volitione vei nolitione." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9;
OTh VIII, 265-266: 306-327.
56
128
CHAPTER FOUR
Even they, according to Ockham, are caused by acts of the will,

although perhaps not by free ones. 57
Now it has appeared that not alI acts of the will cause pleasure
or distress. Desire and avoidance of something absent do not cause
pleasure or distress. Instead, the acts of complacence or the acts of
amicability and their negative counterparts with respect to present
objects cause pleasure and distress in the will. What about the cases
when there seem to be pleasure or distress with respect to something
absent that is desired or avoided? Ockham answers that in those
cases, the objects of pleasure or distress (in the meaning in which
they have objects) are present acts of the will or the apprehensions,
not those objects that are desired Of avoided. The present acts are
Ioved (by a complacence-act) or hated, and those acts of Ioving or
hating cause pleasure or distress in the wiIl. 58
"Sed tunc est dubium de delectationibus subreptitiis, a quo causantur...Respondeo:

semper taJes delectiones (sic) causantur a volitionibus praeviis. Sed taIes volitiones forte
non sunt in potestate voluntatis, sed causantur naturaIiter ab apprehensione intelleetus et a
voluntate, et postea eadem naturali tate et neeessitate causant delectationem. VeI si sint in
potestate voluntatis, tunc voluntas numquam deleetaretur nisi libere vellet." Quaest. variae,
q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 266: 328-329, 332-337.
57
58 " nee deleetatio praedicta nec tristitia est respeetu obiectorum non habitorum respeetu
quorum est actus desiderandi veI fugiendi in utraque potentia. Sed utraque est veI respeetu
actus apprehensivi quo taIe obieetum desideratum apprehenditur veI respeetu actus desiderii
quo appetitur tale obieetum veI respeetu utriusque. Et isti actus, tam apprehensivus quam
appetitivus, habentur et sunt praesentes ... Quoad deleetationem in voluntate, sic est quod
intelleetus apprehendit illud obieetum et cogitat de illo et percipit et apprehendit
cognitionem suam quam iam actuaIiter habet, et voluntas vuIt illam cognitionem actu
complacentiae, non actu desiderii, qui iam habetur. Ex taIi volitione cognitionis habitae
sequitur deleetatio in voluntate, et nullo moda respectu actus fomicandi qui non habetur.
Sed vei causatur respectu cognitionis intelleetus veI respeetu visionis corporaJis veI respeetu
actus desiderandi appetitus sensitivi. Puta si intelleetus intelligat illam visionem corporaIem
et actum appetendi sensitivum et cognitionem propriam, et voluntas velit quemcumque
istorum actuum, statim causatur in voluntate deleetatio, et hoc quia obieetum illius
volitionis habetur, puta actus quicumque praedictus." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII,
254-255: 70-76,79-91. " ... dico quod nec tristitia nec deleetatio est respeetu absentiumnon
habitorum... nee in appetitu sensitivo nee in voIuntate... Similiter in voluntate sunt [tristitia
et deleetatio] respeetu intelleetionis, volitionis, veI nolitionis, quia de illis delectatur
voluntas veI tristatur, et non de actu desiderato. Potest enim sensus interior apprehendere
actum sensus exterioris secundum Philosophum et actum desiderandi et fugiendi, et taJis
129
According to Ockham, there can be pleasure only when

something is positively willed (loved). What should be said about the
case when somebody wills-against (nolle) good (to his or her
enemy), and the lack of good, Of bad happens (to the enemy)? In a
case like this, the person immediately has an act of willing with
respect to the lack of good or with respect to bad (that something bad
would happen to the enemy). And this act of willing is caused
naturally and necessarily from the act of willing-against and by the
wil1. 59 Correspondingly, there can be distress only when something
is willed-against (nolle). What about the following case: Someone
wills good (to himself Of herself), but the opposite happens?
Ockham's answer is that in this case, the person immediately elicits
an act of willing-against with respect to the bad. That act may be
caused naturally from the volition with respect to (the) good and by
the will- just as naturally as fire heats. 60
actus apprehensivus causat immediate dolorem veI delectationem in appetitu sensitivo.
Eodem moda est de intellectu et voluntate." Quodl. III, q. 17; OTh IX, 271-272: 85-86,
87-88,91-97.
59 " si nolit per actum positivum inimico suo bonum et illud nolitum eveniat sicut nolitum
est, et hoc quia bonum non accidit sibi nec malum, veI quia malum evenit sibi, tunc iste sic
nolens habet statim actum volendi respectu carentiae boni vei respectu mali quod evenit. Et
ilie actus volendi causatur naturaliter et necessario ab actu nolendi primo et voluntate... Et
ideo forte ex soIa volitione potest causari delectatio in voluntate sine omni actu nolendi,
puta si volo alicui bonum et illud eveniat...nec ex soIa nolitione sine omni actu volendi
medio potest causari delectatio." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 259-260: 174-180,
180-182,185-186.
ex soIa volitione non potest causari tristi tia quia tristitia, secundum AUgustinum,
accidit nobis nolentibus ... dico quod si velit sibi bonum et oppositum eveniat, statim elicit
actum nolendi respectu oppositi mali et ille actus forte causatur naturaliter a volitione
praecedente respectu boni et a voluntate ita naturaliter sicut ignis naturaliter calefacit. (Si cut
si quis vuIt sanari efficaciter et scit sanitatem consequi non posse sine potione amara,
necessitatur voluntas ad volendum potionem amaram. Nec est in eius potestate illam
potionem simpliciter non velle, stante praedicto casu, licet possit contingenter velle
potionem amaram cessante volitione efficaci.) ... Et ex soIa nolitione potest causari tristitia
in voluntate, puta si nolo aliquid et illud nolitum non eveniat." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9;
OTh VIII, 258-260: 162-164, 164-168(173), 182-184. " ... tristitia autem et poena non
possunt esse sine actu nolendi poenam... " Rep. II, q. 15; OTh V, 340: 1-2. " ... secundum
AUgustinum tristitia [dissensio] est [ab his rebus] quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt." Rep.
IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 347: 12-14.
60 "
130
CHAPTER FOUR
In the texts considered above, Ockham only speaks about acts

of will, such as complacence and love, as immediate causes of
pleasure and distress in the will. Cognitions are not posited as
immediate partial causes of pleasure and distress. The acts of will
which cause pleasure and distress are, however, partially caused by
cognitions which concern present objects. Ockham in Quaestiones in
librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16 admits that a cognition, namely
the cognition by which someone apprehends that a previously desired
object is present, can even have an immediate effect on pleasure. At
least it can intensify the pleasure caused by the love of that object. 61
However, an act of love with respect to the object always remains
crucial for pleasure concerning the object. 62
Can acts of the will generate habits to incline the will to similar
acts? Ockham states that it is difficult to prove that it is necessary to
posit habits in the will. However, the necessity to posit them can,
according to him, be sustained rationally and argued for. Ockham's
"Voluntas autem quando obiectum prius desideratum est praesens sibi - vei a1teri cui
desideravit - non habet tunc actum desiderii, propter eandem rationem, sed habet tunc
actum amicitiae quo diligit tale obiectum in se, quia ilie actus potest indifferenter esse
respectu praesentis et absentis. Et tunc mediante isto actu causatur delectatio in voluntate.
Et forte ista delectatio augetur per apprehensionem praesentiae talis obiecti. Et post actum
desiderii potest iIIa cognitio causare delectationem in voluntate immediate sicut in appetitu
sensitivo. Et ideo vei est duplex delectatio: una sequens actum desiderii quando obiectum
est praesens, et iIIa causaretur tunc ab obiecto et cognitione apprehensiva, sicut est in
appetitu sensitivo, et alia causatur ab actu amicitiae - quod videtur superfluum; vei erit una
delectatio intensior si solum haberet actum desiderandi vei amandi - et hoc videtur verum."
Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 360: 6-20.
61
It has been argued that, according to Ockham, pleasure and distress in the will are (at
least mainly) caused by the acts of the will. Could it then be that the subject of pleasure and
distress would not be the will but the act of the will? Ockham ends up thinking that even
though pleasure is caused by the acts of the will, its subject is the will, not an act of the will.
In other words, pleasure is not subjectively in the acts of the will, but in the will itself.
Ockham's argument runs as follows: Every subject that receives something that has an
opposite, may recei ve a1so that opposite. Thus, if an act of willing received pleasure, it
could also receive the opposite of pleasure, i.e., distress. But it would be disagreeable and
perhaps even impossible that someone could love something a lot, and get distress from it.
Therefore, the subject of both pleasure and love is the will. Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 422:
18-25. Ockham, however, doubts whether it can rationally be proved sufficiently that the
subject of pleasure is the will, not an act of the will. Ibid., 424: 26 - 425: 9.
62
131
train of thought runs as follows: After many acts, it is easier for the
will to cause (similar) acts, and the will can also cause more intense
acts than before. On the other hand, after many acts, it is more
difficult for the will to cause acts contrary to them. Therefore, it is
necessary to posit habits in the will inclining to acts similar to those
from which they were generated. 63 Ockham's stand seems to be that
habits in the will cannot necessitate the will to will something. 64
Sometimes, however, he admits that in some cases it is not in the
power of the will not to elicit an act with (cum) an inc1ining habit.
Such an act of the will can be called 'a first movement' (primus
motus) of the will, and it is excused from sin, according to the
authorities. 65
Ockham thinks that the habit of a positive act (such as love)
inc1ines with pleasure and the habit of a negative act (such as hating
or envying or detesting) with distress, since the acts that are elicited
"Quinto dico quod maior difficultas est de voluntate, quia voluntas non potest aliquid
velle nisi cognitum nec sine cognitione, et actum ita perfectum potest elicere in prima
cognitione sicut post multos actus elicitos; et ideo difficile est probare necessitatem ponendi
habitum in voluntate. Potest tamen sustineri rationabiliter et persuaderi; turn quia facilius
exit in actum post multos actus quam ante, et magis inclinatur ad actum; et actum
intensiorem potest voluntas elicere post multos actus quam ante... post multos actus elicitos
circa aliquod obiectum, cum maiore difficultate et tristitia potest elicere actum contrarium
quam ante omnem actum, sicut quilibet experitur in se. Igitur necesse est ponere habitum
generatum ex illis actibus." Quodl. III, q. 20; OTIt IX, 284: 58-66. (See until 77.) See also
Rep. III, q. 11; OTIt VI, 357: 16 - 358: 14; 363: 1-19; 365: 3-23.
64 " .in via [habitus] non necessitat voluntatem, igitur nec in patria. Patet de caritate." Rep.
II, q. 15; OTIt V, 340: 22-23. " ...quantumcumque inclinetur [potentia libera] in aliquod
obiectum, potest tamen de se propter suam libertatem in actum oppositum." Rep. III, q. Il;
OTIt VI, 357: 16-18.
63
65 " potest
dici in proposito quod apprehenso aliquo concupiscibili, et stante inclinatione

habitus in voluntate - inclinatione dico actuali, sicut homo experitur plus uno tempore
quam alio - tunc dico quod non est in potestate voluntatis quin eliciat cum habitu inclinante
aliquem actum circa illud. Et ilIe actus potest dici primus motus qui excusatur a peccato
secundum doctores. Hoc etiam videtur Augustinus dicere quod non est in potestate nostra,
quin visis perintellectum, tangamur in voluntate." Rep. III, q. 7; OTIt VI, 211: 21- 212: 7.
See also Clark 1978,139. Forthe extensively discussed theme ofthe first movements in the
history oftheology, see Lottin 1948,493-589.
132
CHAPTER FOUR
by those habits are pleasant (delectabile) and distressing (tristabile)

ones, that is, cause pleasure Of distress. 66
As seen in sub-chapter 3.1., the passions (acts) ofthe will can
be partial efficient causes of the passions of the sensory appetite. Can
it be the other way around, that is, can the passions of the sensory
appetite be partial efficient causes of the passions of the will?
Ockham deals with the question of the effect of the sensory passions
on acts of the will extensively in Quaestiones variae, q. 8, a. 2, and
Quodlibet IT, q. 13, and briefly in Quodlibet lll, q. 22.
dico quod delectatio potest esse sine omni habitu. Unde primus actus ex quo generatur
habitus potest esse delectabilis, et ita si semper eliceretur sine habitu posset esse
dclectabilis, et ita prapter delectationem non oportet ponere habitum talem ... non est causa
delectationis nisi quia est causa actus quem consequitur delectatio ... si est de ratione actus
meritorii esse delectabilis, hoc non est nisi quia est de ratione sua quod sit amor veI
procedens ab amore. Unde aliquando potest esse actus meritorius cum tristitia et dolore,
sicut patet quando aliquis dolet meritorie de peccatis suis. Similiter, non est plus de ratione
habitus causare delectationem quam tristi tiam. Unde sicut habitus inclinans ad volitiones est
aliquo moda causa delectationis, ita habitus inclinans ad actus nolitionis - quando aliquid
evenit quod est nolitum - est aliquo moda causa tristitiae, et hoc quia ex istis actibus
provenit delectatio et ex illis tristitia, et ita delectabilitas habitus nihil facit." Ord. 1, d. 17,
q. 2; OTh III, 474: 3-7, 10-12, 13-23. " ... de ratione habitus non est plus inclinare
dclectabiliter quam tristabiliter. Quod patet, quia sicut in voluntate est actus volendi ita
actus nolendi, ita etiam ibi sunt habitus generati ex istis actibus. Sed habitus generatus ex
actibus nolendi inclinat ad actum tristabiliter, sicut habitus generatus ex actibus vo1endi
inclinat delectabiliter. Unde habitus generatus ex actibus odiendi, invidendi, detestandi
inclinat tristabiliter ad omnem actum ad quem inclinat. Nullus enim potest aliquem odire
delectabiliter." Rep. III, q. 5; OTh VI, 158: 21 -159: 7. "Nullus enim diceret quod habitus
inclinans ad odium alicuius inclinat delectabiliter, sed tristabiliter. Unde dico quod quidam
inclinat ad actum cum delectatione consequenti, si cut habitus generatus ex actibus
diligendi; quidam inclinat ad actum cum tristi tia, sicut habitus generatus ex actibus
odiendi ... " Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI, 216: 12-17. " .... aliquis habitus delectabiliter inclinat ad
actum, puta habitus diligendi; et aliquis habitus inclinat tristabiliter, puta habitus odiendi;
et hoc secundum quod actus eliciti sunt delectabiles veI tristabiles." Quodl. III, q. 21; OTh
IX, 288: 70-73. The other habits, namely the cognitive ones, incline neutrally to their acts:
" ... quidam ad actum inclinat neutra modo, sicut actus cognitivi. Nullus enim dubitat quin
habitus speculandi [sit] aliquid naturale, et naturaliter inclinet ad actum sine omni
delectatione veI tristi tia in intellectu, !icet tamen post sequatur delectatio veI tristitia in
appetitu mediante actu diligendi veI odiendi." Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI, 216: 17 - 217: 2. In
this study, I shall not to agreat extent discuss the important question of the virtuous habits
generated by the acts of the will. They have been quite recentIy written by, among others,
Rega Wood. See Wood 1997.
66 "
133
In Quaestiones variae, q. 8, a. 2, Ockham admits that the will

is more inc1ined to will things that cause pleasure in the sensory
appetite than to will things that do not cause pleasure there, and to
will-against things that cause pain in the sensory appetite than to
will-against things that do not cause pain there. However, according
to him, it is difficult to say why this is the case. A dictating cognition
in the intellect cannot be the explanation of this, since there can be a
case when, according to a dictate of right reason, the will should will
something that causes pain in the sensory appetite, but the will is
inclined to will against that dictate. 67 But neither can the inclination
of the will be explained, according to Ockham, by an immediate
causation of the passions in the sensory appetite, since, no matter
how intense the passions in the sensory appetite are, the will can
freely will the opposite. Therefore, Ockham says, the inclination
does not appear to have any (natural) cause, "unless that the nature of
the thing is like that", and this is known by experience. 68
Mter saying that, however, Ockham remarks that a partial
cause can be given why an act of willing is caused with respect to an
object that causes pleasure in the sensory appetite and an act of
willing-against with respect to an object that causes pain. Namely, it
can be said that the sensory passions are partial efficient causes of
the acts of the will, immediately concurring with the will itself and
67 " difficile est dare causam quare voluntas plus inclinatur ad volendum illud quod causat
delectationem in appetitu sensitivo, et ad nolendum illud obiectum quod causat dolorem in
appetitu sensitivo. Quia nec cognitio dictativa potest esse causa illius inclinationis, quia
cognitio dictativa potest esse aeque intensa ad volendum aliquid quod causat dolorem in
appetitu sensitivo sicut ad volendum illud quod causat delectationem, immo forte intensior
- saI tem hoc est possibile. Et tamen hoc non obstante, voluntas inclinatur ad contrarium
illius dictati a ratione recta. Per experientiam patet illud. Si intellectus dictet mortem esse
sustinendam pro re publica, voluntas quasi naturaliter inclinatur ad contrarium." Quaest.
variae, q. 8, a. 2; OTh VIII, 446-447: 828-839.
68 "Nec actus nec delectatio appetitus sensitivi potest sic inclinare voluntatem, quia
quantumcumque delectatio sit intensa in appetitu sensitivo, potest voluntas ex liberate sua
velle contrarium. Et ideo non apparet, ut videtur, aliqua causa illius inclinationis voluntatis
- naturalis dico - nisi quia natura rei talis est, et hoc innotescit nobis per experientiam."
134
CHAPTER FOUR
the cognition of the object. Positing sensory passions, it is easier for

an act to be caused in the will, and the will can will more intensely.69
The facts that it is easier for the will to will in accordance with
the sensory passions and that the will can will more intensely in
accordance with them do not, according to Ockham, explain why the
will de faeta is more or less inc1ined when there are those passions in
the sensory appetite. That is, since even if there are vehement
sensory passions and other causes concurring in causing acts in the
will, the will remains free (contingent) in the sense that it has the
power to elicit an act of willing or willing-against or not to elicit any
act with respect to an object. Thus, after alI, with respect to the
inc1inations of the will, one does not seem to be able to give a cause,
"unless that the nature of the thing is like that", and this is known by
experience. 70
69 " potest reddi aliqua causa quare causatur actus volendi respectu obiecti quod causat
delectationem in appetitu sensitivo et actus nolendi respectu obiecti quod causat dolorem
in eodem. Quia potest dici quod actus appetitus sensitivi - sive melius ipsa delectatio in
appetitu sensitivo - est causa effectiva partialis immediate concurrens cum voluntate et
cognitione talis obiecti ad causandum talem volitionem. Et similiter dolor est causa
effectiva partialis ad causandum actum nolendi respectu talis obiecti. Et ideo, posita
delectatione in appetitu sensitivo, potest faciliter actus volendi causari in voluntate respectu
illius obiecti. Et ipsa non posita, non potest ita faciliter talis actus causari quia tunc deficit
una causa partialis requisita ad eliciendum talem actum faciliter, veI saltem intense. Et
eodem modo, posito dolore in appetitu sensitivo, potest faciliter causari actus nolendi
respectu talis obiecti in voluntate et non actus volendi. Quia dolor est causa effectiva
partialis immediate causans cum voluntate et aliis actum nolendi, et non est causa ad
causandum actum volendi. Et ipso dolore deficiente, non potest talis actus nolendi ita
faciliter causari. Nec videtur plus inconveniens quod aliqua qualitas in appetitu sensitivo,
puta actus appetitus, delectatio sive dolor, sit immediate causa respectu alicuius actus
voluntatis, quam quod res extra sit immediate causa respectu actus assentiendi et
dissentiendi in intellectu. Sed unum est verum, igitur et aliud." Quaest. variae, q. 8, a. 2;
OTh VIII, 447-448: 844-868. "Actus etiam appetitus sensitivi inclinat quodarnmodo
voluntatem sicut causa partialis." Rep. III, q. 5; OTh VI, 158: 2-4.
70 "Sed istis non obstantibus, non redditur causa quare voluntas plus veI minus inclinatur,
positis talibus passionibus in appetitu sensitivo. Quia quantumcumque ponatur delectatio
vehemens in appetitu sensitivo et cognitio dictativa in intellectu et alia concurrentia ad
actum, adhuc est in potestate voluntatis elicere actum volendi respectu illius obiecti, veI
nolendi, veI nullum actum elicere. Et ideo, respectu illius inclinationis voluntatis, non
videtur posse reddi aliqua causa nisi quia natura rei talis est, et hoc innotescit nobis per
135
In Quodlibet II, q. 13, Ockham also deals with the question of

the connection of the sensory passions to acts of will. The exact
question is whether a habit of sensory appetite can create a difficulty
for the will, but the consideration also deals with the passions of
sensory appetite. As we have realized, Ockham seems to end by
denying the existence of habits in sensory appetite generated by the
acts there, but in the text concerned, he seems to posit them. There
are, according to Ockham, two possibilities for replying to the
question of whether a habit of sensory appetite can create a difficulty
for the will.
In one way, one can say that a habit in sensory appetite cannot
create a difficulty for the will, since, if it could, it would happen
through a productive or destructive action towards the will. Neither
of these can be posited. Instead, the will spontaneously, without any
coercion, follows the passions in the sensory appetite. Therefore, in
the difficulty concerning the will there is a question of the
spontaneity of the will itself: The will in general follows the sensory
passions spontaneously and without any coercion. 71
In another way, one can, according to Ockham, say that a habit
(or a passion) in sensory appetite creates a difficulty for the will.
Ockham agrees that a habit in the sensory appetite can, in principle,
be so intense that it inclines (through acts ofthe sensory appetite) the
will to an act conformed to the sensory appetite, so that the will
could not at an will the contrary. However, even if it were admitted
that the happenings in the sensory appetite could necessitate the will,
there are stiH chances to save the freedom of the will. Ockham raises
the possibility that there might be a limit to the augmentation of the
experientiam." Quaest. variae, q. 8, a. 2; OTh VIII, 448: 868-877. For the complicated
discussion concemed, see also Fuchs 1952, 72-73.
potest dici quod habitus [appetitus sensitivi] non potest facere difficultatem voluntati;
quia si sic, hoc esset per actionem aliquam productivam veI destructivam, quorum neutrum
potest poni in proposito. Tamen voluntas ut communiter sponte sine ornni coactione
sequitur passiones. Et hoc vocant Sancti ingerere difficultatem voluntati." Quodl. II, q. 13;
OTh IX, 175: 196-201.
71 "
136
CHAPTER FOUR
passions in the sensory appetite. Further, he says that the sensory

appetite is perhaps not capable of having habits or passions of such
a degree that the will could not overcome them. If the will, after alI,
were necessitated (and not able to sin) with respect to some object, it
would stiU have freedom (and a chance to sin) with respect to other
objects, since it is not said that it would be necessitated with respect
to everything. And in that case, there is stiU a possibility that the
habit or sensory passion that has necessitated the will could be
weakened, and then the wiU would be free even with respect to the
same object. 72
In Quodlibet III, q. 22, Ockham says that the sensory habits and
passioos do oot incline the will unless the will coosents to the
passions through its volitions. It is, however, difficult for the will not
to consent (consentire) to the sensory passions through its volitions. 73
Ockham seems here to think that the passions in the sensory appetite
can function as partial causes of acts of will, but only if the will
consents to them.
On the basis of the texts examined above, Ockham seems to
admit that the proper difficulty of the will with respect to the sensory
passions comes from the wiU itself: It is difficult for the will not to
consent to them because of the will itself. However, Ockham agrees
"Aliter potest dici quod habitus ingerit difficultatem voluntati. Et concedo quod habitus
potest esse ita intensus quod inclinaret voluntatem sufficienter ad actum conformem
appetitui sensitivo, ita quod nullo moda potest in contrarium, nisi forte sit status in
augmento passionis; et tune forte voluntas potest vincere supremam passionem, et per
consequens quamlibet remissiorem. Et forte appetitus sensitivus non est capax talis habitus
vei passionis ultra certum gradum quem voluntas potest vincere. Et secundum primam
viam, si habitus potest augeri tantum quod necessitet voluntatem, oportet dicere quod
voluntas in tali casu non posset peccare. Non tamen haberet [careret] speciem libertatis,
quia respectu aliorum obiectorum posset peccare; et etiam respectu istius obiecti potest
peccare, si habitus vei passio remittatur." Quodl. II, q. 13; OTh IX, 175-176: 210-222. See
the text critical apparatus ibid., 176.
72
"Ad aliud dico quod habitus et passiones sensitivae proprie loquendo non inclinant
voluntatem nisi quando voluntas consentit eis mediante volitione; et ita, si voluntas nolit
iIlas passiones et nolit elicere actum secundum habitum, tune non inclinabunt voluntatem.
Et ista est inclinatio quam homo difficulter vincit, quam cum difficultate potest non
consentire talibus passionibus." Quodl. III, q. 22; OTh IX, 291: 54-59.
73
137
that the sensory passions can function as partial causes of certain acts
of will, but they cannot necessitate the Will. 74
It was seen above that intellectual cognitions were, according
to Ockham, naturally necessary partial efficient causes of those
passions of the will which are acts. Pleasure and distress, which are
not acts, are sufficiently caused by acts of the will, but certain
cognitions can intensify them. The will it self is also a partial efficient
cause of those passions which are its acts. It is a special cause since
it is free in the meaning of contingency. Pleasure and distress are not
even partially caused by the will immediately but by certain acts of
the will. According to Ockham, the first or absolute acts of the will,
which are free, can, together with a cognition, necessitate the will to
have other acts, that is, theacts which he calls the second acts. They
can, in their turn, necessitate other acts. After acts, the will can,
because of habits generated from them, be inc1ined to similar acts.
Even the passions of the sensory appetite are, at least, such
immediate partial efficient causes of the acts of the will that, having
them, it is easier for the will to cause certain acts in itself.
After dealing with the causation of the passions of the will, 1
shall briefly examine what the passions of the will, in their turn,
immediately cause. At least those passions of the will which are acts
have an effect on the will itself. The acts can cause habits 75 as well as
Quite another matter is the indirect power that the sensory passions have on the acts of
the wiIJ. Ockham admits that there can be such surpassing Of vehement passions in the
sensory appetite that the person cannot have any volitions. Ockham states that in a situation
like this, the sensory passion effects the corporeal quality that enables intellections and
volitions. " ... sciendum quod in appetitu sensitivo potest esse dolor et delectatio ita excellens
quod potest totaliter impedire usum rationis. Sicut patet per experientiam in forti qui,
aggrediendo terribilia, potest tantum dolorem habere quod nihil potest intelligere et velle.
Et similiter in fomicante qui propter vehementem delectationem nec potest intelligere nec
velle. Cuius causa est quia licet talis habeat intellectum bene dispositum et phantasma,
tamen propter excellentiam talis passionis impeditur actus qualitatis corporalis qui
necessario requiritur pro statu isto ad causandum actum intelligendi..." Quaest. variae, q.
6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 262: 237-246.
74
"Quinto dico quod maior difficultas est de voluntate, quia voluntas non potest aliquid
velle nisi cognitum nec sine cognitione, et actum ita perfectum potest elicere in prima
cognitione sicut post multos actus elicitos; et ideo difficile est probare necessitatem ponendi
75
138
CHAPTER FOUR
other (so-called second) acts in the will76 Some acts also cause
passions which are not acts. 77 Further, the passions of the will have
an effect on bodily behavior, just as the sensory passions have.
According to Ockham, such exterior operations as walking and
eating are, in fact, common objects of acts of will. 78 For example,
acts and habits of justice (iustitia), e.g., volitions and habits to carry
out operations in the appropriate way, have external operations, such
as distributing Of dividing goods equally, as their objects. 79 The
passions ofthe will can also cause absolute qualities in the body, just
as the passions of the sensory appetite can. Ockham, for instance,
habitum in voluntate. Potest tamen sustineri rationabiliter et persuaderi; turn quia facilius
exit in actum post multos actus quam ante, et magis inclinatur ad actum; et actum
intensiorem potest voluntas elicere post multos actus quam ante ... post multos actus elicitos
circa aliquod obiectum, cum mai ore difficultate et tristi tia potest elicere actum contrarium
quam ante ornnem actum, sicut quilibet experitur in se. Igitur necesse est ponere habitum
generatum ex illis actibus." Quodl. III, q. 20; 0111 IX, 284: 58-66. (See through 77.) See
also Rep. III, q. 11; 0111 VI, 357: 16 - 358: 14; 363: 1-19; 365: 3-23.
760rd. 1, d. 1, q. 6; 0111 1,493: 17 - 500: 17; Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; 0111 VIII, 259:
168-173; Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 11; 0111 VlII, 302: 352-360. See also Rep. III, q. 7; 0111
VI, 210:18 - 211: 18. For other cases in which the acts of the will necessitate other acts of
the will, see sub-chapter 4.2.
77
See sub-chapter 4.2.
actus exterior est obiectum commune, quia potest idem manere respectu multorum
actuum voluntatis ... Et ideo dicitur obiectum commune, quia potest esse obiectum multorum
actuum volendi, et potest manere idem cum circumstantiis et sine circumstantiis." Rep. III,
q. 11; 0111 VI, 383: 2-4, 10-13. " ... actibus voluntatis generativis virtutum, quia illorum
actuum... a1iqui habent actum potentiae executivae pro obiecto." Rep. III, q. 12; 0111 VI,
411: 5-6, 8-9. "Respondeo quod duplex est actio conveniens homini, scilicet exterior et
interior. Tunc ad hoc quod voluntas agat actum exteriorem mediate vei immediate, magis
unum quam eius oppositum - ut ambulare veI non ambulare, comedere magis quam non
comedere - oportet quod determinetur ad unum istorum per aliud a se, puta per electionem
sive volitionem efficacem qua vuit unum esse et non aliud. Et sic intelligit Philosophus
quando dicit quod determinatur per prohaeresim et electionem." Rep. IV, q. 16; 0111 VII,
358: 13-20.
78 " ..
" .iustitia non habet passiones sed operationes exteriores pro obiecto et materia: sicut
bona aequaliter distribuere, aequaliter dividere, liberare etc. Nam actus iustitiae est velle
tales operationes debito moda exercere; et per consequens illae operationes sunt obiecta
illorum actuum, igitur et habituum ad tales actus inclinantium, quia hoc est generaliter
verum, quod idem est obiectum actus et habitus correspondentis." Quodl. lll, q. 18; 0111
IX, 274: 35-41.
7~
139
thinks that pleasure may cause health (sanitas)80.81 An important

group of effects, caused by passions of the will which are acts, are
the effects on the passions of the sensory appetite. The passions of
Health and illness are certain commensurations of certain qualities. " ... sanitas corporalis
non est alia res a substantiis et qualitatibus sensibilibus ... sicut sanitas corporalis non est
illae qualitates nisi quando debite commensurantur, et quando debite commensurantur tunc
sunt sanitas, - ad modum quo homines sunt acies quando debite disponuntur et quando sunt
dispersi non sunt acies ... Philosophus non intendit probare quod secundum sanitatem non est
alteratio, - quasi aliquid possit fieri sanum et non alterari - , sed intendit probare quod
secundum sanitatem non est aliqua alteratio distincta ab alteratione secundum
qualitatem ... sanitas non est alia res a qualitatibus sensibilibus, sic nec aegritudo est alia res
ab eis." Exp. Phys. VII, c. 4; OPh V, 651-652: 8-9, 10-13, 15-18,24-25. "Aliter potest
contingere quod aliquid dicitur quale, non propter unam rem praecise, sed propter multas
res, sicut est de pulchro, sano, sapiente, una modo accipiendo sapiens, et huiusmodi. Et in
isto casu abstractum et concretum non sunt synonyma, sed de virtute sermonis concretum
praedicatur de subiecto, et abstractum de illis pluribus rebus simul sumptis, et de nulla
illarum separatim sumpta, sicut ornnes humores taliter proportionati in homine sanitas
possunt dici, sicut plures homines dicuntur unus populus, et tamen ipsum animal dicetur
sanum." Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 287-288: 44-52. See also Rep. III, q. 7; OTh VI,
204: 10-14.
80
potest esse dubitatio an ista sanitas posset adquiri melius per operationem exteriorem
vei per amorem vei odium voluntatis vei etiam per studium et exercitium intellectus. Quia
secundum medicos - et experientia docet - quodlibet istorum potest esse causa infirmitatis,
saltem partialis, et etiam causa partialis sanitatis." Ord. 1, prol., q. 10; OTh 1, 294: 22 - 295:
2. " ... anima intellectiva, vei aliquis actus exsistens in ea, potest immutare corpus quantum,
sicut per experientiam patet quod per tristitiam exsistentem in parte intellectiva immutatur
corpus." Ord. 1, d. 30, q. 1; OTh IV, 302: 23 - 303: 1. " ... ex actibus intellectus et voluntatis
frequenter elicitis causatur aliqua qualitas in corpore... ex frequenti intellectione et volitione
potest generari et augeri aliqua qualitas corporalis ... frequenter secundum alterationem
animae sequitur alteratio corporis ... " Rep. IV, q. 14; OTh VII, 306: 8-9, 13-15, 16-17.
" ... volitio habet veram efficaciam corruptivam et productivam super qualitates corporales,
sicut aliquis per solum actum nolendi et tristitiam incurrit infirmitatem et per actum volendi
et delectationem adquirit sanitatem ... " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 271: 440-443.
" ... anima intellectiva est tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte, et tamen secundum
Augustinum, IX De Trinitate, ipsa agit in corpus transmutando et alterando, causando
sanitatem, infirmitatem et multas qualitates corporales ... " Quodl. IV, q. 13; OTh IX, 361:
31-34. " ... aliqua qualitas, puta tristi tia, in anima intellectiva potest mutare et alterare corpus
quantum ad sanitatem et infirmitatem et econverso, ubi illa qualitas vere agit..." Quodl. VI,
q. 12; OTh IX, 631-632: 72-74.
81 "
140
CHAPTER FOUR
the sensory appetite as common objects of acts of will were dealt

with when examining the causes of the sensory passions. 82
4.2. WHAT ARE PASSIONS OF THE WILL?

According to Duns Scotus, the distinction of acts into
'concupiscible' and 'irascible' ones can be made in the will as well
as in the sensory appetite. 83 Even though Ockham does not say so
explicitly, he de Jaeto considers the phenomena of the will in
keeping with this distinction. Ockham focuses his attention on the
'concupiscible' phenomena of the will. He applies to them various
classifications. The first classification might be characterized as
dealing with passions of the will as such. It answers the question how
something is willed or willed-against, or what kind of reaction one
has to something.lts elements are desire (desiderium) and avoidance
(fuga), love (dileetio) and hatred (odium), and pleasure (deleetatio)
and distress (tristitia). The second classification answers the question
why something is willed. Its elements are amicable love (amor
amieitiae) and wanting love (amor eoneupiseentiae). 1 prefer the
translation 'wanting love' to 'concupiscent love', since in this case
Ockham clearly uses 'concupiscence' for wanting generally. The
third classification answers the question of whether something is
willed as the highest or less high good. Its elements are enjoyment
(fruitio) and use (uti).
See sub-chapter 3.1. In a text. Ockham has to commcnt on Peter Aurio!' s and other
theologians' position according to which union with the object, transformation in it, having
rest in the beloved, and giving oneselfto the beloved belong to Iove. He does not then begin
to analyze what those phenomena are but just says that some of them are effects of love.
ard. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 406: 16-18; 412: 10-13. For the act of love by which the will
unites itself to God, see ard. 1, prol., q. 12; OTh 1, 362: 7-11. However, having rest (as
well as satiation) comes up when Ockham considers a special case of love, enjoyment
lfruitio). For it, see sub-chapter 4.2.
83 John Duns Scotus 1986,340-341 (ard. III, supplementum, dist. 33).
82
141
The principal text in which Ockham discusses various types of

'concupiscible' phenomena of the will as such is question 3 in the
first distinction of his Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. As
Ockham poses it, the question here is whether enjoyment is a quality
that is really distinct from pleasure, but in fact he discusses more
generally whether there is love (amor, dilectio) in the will which is
really distinct from desire and pleasure. Peter Auriol, with whom
Ockham mainly debates, thought that there were only two positive
and two negative 'concupiscible' acts in the will. The positive, that
is, love (amor) acts, are 1) desire (desiderium) and 2) pleasure
(delectatio), and the negative, that is, hatred (odium) acts, are 1)
avoidance (fuga) and 2) distress (tristitia).84 Auriol proved his simple
model partly by some terminological remarks. If there were,
according to him, some love other than desire or pleasure, it would
surely be the one which incites desire and makes one take pleasure.
However, that is nothing else but taking pleasure in (delectari) and
being pleased (complacere) with an object and the things associated
with it, as is evident from the terms. This is because it is the same
thing to say "such a thing which 1 love" and "such a thing which
pleases (complacere) me and is pleasurable (delectabile) to me".
Auriol also c1aimed, according to Ockham, that alI love is wanting
love (amor concupiscentiae) or amicable love (amor amicitiae), and
alI wanting love is desire, and alI amicable love is pleasure with
absent or present objects. Further, Auriol c1aimed that alI love
(amor) is desire or complacence, and it is evident from the terms that
alI complacence is pleasure since "if you please (complacere) me,
you are pleasant (delectabilis) to me". Ockham does not, however,
seem to present Auriol's model correctly as far as amicable love and
dicunt aligui [Petrus Aureoli] 'quod omnis actus voluntatis affirmativus est desiderium
vei delectatio, sic quod omnis amor est amor desiderii vei delectationis; et per oppositum,
omne odium dividitur per fugam et tristi tiam, sic quod omne odire vei est abominari et
fugere vei tristari et displicere. Et secundum hoc omnis actus voluntatis prout est
concupiscibilis - qui quidem actus sunt noile et velle - sunt quatuor, videlicet velle
desiderii et velle delectationis, noile fugae et noile displicentiae' ." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1,
405: 6-13.
84 "
142
CHAPTER FOUR
wanting love are concemed. Auriol did not think that an wanting
love is desire and alI amicable love is pleasure. Instead, he thought as
foUows: AU wanting love with respect to the objects which are
absent from oneself is desire, and with respect to the objects which
are present to oneself is pleasure. In this case, one wills good to
oneself. Correspondingly, aU amicable love with respect to the
objects which are absent from a friend is desire, and with respect to
the objects which are present to a friend is pleasure. In this case, one
wills good to the friend. 85 However, Ockham's incorrect
interpretation of Auriol's opinion of amicable love and wanting love
does not foiI his criticism of Auriol' s four-fold model of acts of will.
Ockham begins his refutation of Auriol' s opinion by presenting
arguments in which he refers to cases in which one has to posit an
act of love (amor) or hatred (odium) in the will that can be neither
desire or avoidance nor pleasure or distress. Desire and avoidance
are excIuded by positing an act with respect to a present object, Of an
act which causes desire or avoidance. Pleasure and distress are
85 "Secundo [probatur] sic: "Si aliquis amor esset alius a desiderio et delectatione, esset
utique ille amor qui incitat desiderium et facit delectari. Sed ille non est aliud quam
delectari et complacere in obiecto et condicionibus eius, ut ex terminis patet. Idem enim est
dictu 'tale quid amo' [continues in Auriol: 'veI diligo'], et 'tale quid est complacens mihi
et delectabile"'. Igitur est delectatio praeveniens desiderium et delectatio obiecti praesentis
subsequens desiderium. Tertio [probatur], quia omnis amor est amor concupiscentiae veI
amicitiae, sed omnis amor concupiscentiae est desiderium et omnis amor amicitiae veI est
delectatio absentis veI praesentis. Quarto [probatur]: omnis amor est desiderium vei
complacentia, sed omnis complacentia est delectatio. Patet ex terminis: complaces mihi,
delectabilis es mihi." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 406: 3-15. 1 shall discuss Ockham's stand on
the matters in these arguments when discussing Ockham' s view of
complacencel'displicence' and amicable love/wanting love below. Other arguments of
Auriol presented by Ockham are ibid., 405: 14 - 406: 2, 16 - 407: 6. Ockham's stand on
the matters referred to in them has been discussed before. The relationship ofthe will and
the natural appetite has been discussed when examining the appetite of the souls in subchapter 2.2., the being united with the object and other such things when discussing the
effects of the passions of the will in sub-chapter 4.1., and the causal relationship between
love and pleasure when discussing the causation of pleasure and distress in sub-chapter 4.1.
For Auriol's argumentation, see Peter Auriol 1952, 394-397 (Scriptum super primum
Sententiarum, d. 1, sectio 7). See also Wemer 1881 a, 212-213 (1964, 40-41); Courtenay
1987, 283-284 and 1990, 8; Georgedes 1995, 192-198.
143
excluded by positing blessed Of damned subjects for the act, or a

subject having an overwhelming opposing passion. Ockham refers to
the following examples of acts that can be neither desires/avoidances
nor pleasures/distresses: The devil's act of love (dilectio) towards
people's actual sinning or punishment86 (this act is complacence
[complacentia], as Ockham remarks later), a blessed person's act of
will which causes his or her act of avoidance towards something87 ,
and a very distressed person' s act of will which motivates activity in
him or her88 Some further examples of acts that are neither desire Of
86 "Ideo arguo contra istam opinionem sic: quando aIiqua sic se habent quod unum manet
aIio non manente, ilIa distinguuntur reaIiter; sed potest manere dilectio destructo desiderio
et etiam destructa delectatione; ergo distinguuntur reaIiter ab utroque ... Maior est manifesta.
Minor patet, nam diabolus tentans aliquem hominem et perducens eum ad peccatum vuit
eum esse in ilIo peccato, et tunc habet aIiquem actum voluntatis respectu illius peccati, quia
detinet eum in ilIo peccato quantum potest, quod non faceret sine omni actu voluntatis
respectu ilIius peccati. Et tamen tunc non habet desiderium, quia desiderium, secundum
istum, est respectu non-habiti; nec habet delectationem, quia damnatus nullam
delectationem habet. Et hoc potest probari, quia sicut beatus se habet ad tristitiam ita
damnatus ad delectationem; sed beatus nullam penitus habet tristitiam; igitur nec damnatus
habet aIiquam delectationem. - Hoc confirmatur, quia secundum omnes, damnatus post
iudicium nullam habebit delectationem; sed post iudicium habebunt damnati multos actus
voluntatis respectu praesentium, sicut diabolus volet aIios secum puniri; igitur praeter
desiderium et delectationem habebunt aliquem actum voluntatis." Ord. I, d. 1, q. 3; OTh I,
407: 13-16,408: 3-17.
87 "Praeterea, non omne odium est fuga vei tristi tia, ergo eadem ratione non omnis amor est
desiderium vei delectatio. Consequentia patet, quia omni odio opponitur aliquis amor, igitur
distincto odio distinctus amor, et ita illi odio quod nec est fuga nec tristitia opponitur unus
amor qui nec est desiderium quod opponitur fugae nec delectatio quae opponitur tristitiae.
Antecedens probo: nam sicut omne desiderium, secundum istum [Petrus Aureoli, ibid.],
praesupponit amorem ex quo causatur, ita omnis fuga praesupponit odium a quo causatur;
sed fuga non necessario praesupponit tristi tiam; ergo i1Jud odium praesuppositum nec est
fuga nec tristi tia. Assumptum, quod fuga non necessario praesupponit tristitiam, patet, quia
beatus fugit aliquid, quia vuit aliquid non esse quod adhuc est, si cut desiderat aliquid esse
quod nondum est. Ergo tunc habet unum actum oppositum desiderio, et per consequens
fugam, et per consequens unum odium a quo causatur fuga; sed nullam habet tristitiam,
secundum omnes; igitur illud odium praesuppositum nec est fuga nec tristitia." Ord. 1, d. 1,
q. 3; OTh 1, 408: 18 - 409: 9.
"Praeterea, secundum Philosophum X Ethicorum, summa tristi tia excludit delectationem

non sibi oppositam et oppositam sibi, sicut qui summe tristatur de amissione rei temporaIis
non delectatur de consideratione alicuius speculabilis. Sed illa tristitia non excludit omnem
amorem iIIius considerationis; patet, quia hoc posito adhuc poterit laborare ad adquirendum
88
144
CHAPTER FOUR
avoidance nor pleasure or distress are given when Ockham replies to

Auriol's arguments. The devil's and the damned people's love
(dilectio) of themselves and the acts that cause in them desire for
beatitude and other things are such acts. Ockham also refers to an act
that causes a desire for revenge in a furious person. This case is
qualified a httle later so that it is a question of a furious person who
does not believe he Of she can carry out the revenge and who is
distressed because of that. The act that causes the desire for revenge
in such a person is an act of love (amor) of self or of a friend for
whom revenge is desired. 89
As a matter of fact, the theme of the need to posit an act-pair in
the will besides desire/avoidance and pleasure/distress gets so much
attention from Ockham that he also deals with it in some of his other
theological works. In Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 9 and 11, Ockham
discusses this question mainly with Duns Scotus and J ohn of
Reading. 90 John of Reading thought that there was no distinction
between enjoyment and pleasure, and Ockham rejects his arguments
one by one, but speaks about love (dilectio) generally, not enjoyment
iIlam considerationem." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 409: 10-16.
"Secunda ratio non concludit, quia deberet probare quod idem est dicere 'amo aliquid' et
'illud delectabile est mihi'; et ita narrat falsum quod non probat. Quod enim hoc sit falsum,
probatum est. Et patet, quia diabolus et quilibet damnatus intense diligit se et tamen nullam
delectationem habet respectu sui ipsius; similiter desiderat beatitudinem et multa et tamen
in iIlis non delectatur. Tunc enim cum intense desiderat aliqua, intense delectaretur in illis,
quod est manifeste falsum. Similiter iracundus non delectatur in vindicta quam intense
desiderat, quamvis delectaretur si poneretur in esse. 19itur non omne desiderium causatur
ex delectatione. Confirmatur, quia aliquis iracundus credens se non posse vindicare, summe
tamen desiderans se vindicare, tristatur et non delectatur; igitur iIIud desiderium non
causatur ex delectatione, et tamen causatur ex amore sui ipsius vei ex amore amici quem
desiderat vindicare; igitur non omnis amor est desiderium vei delectatio. Et ita argumentum
est ad oppositum, sic arguendo: omne desiderium causatur ab aliquo amore qui non est
desiderium; sed non omne desiderium causatur ex delectatione; igitur est aliquis amor qui
non est dcsiderium nec delectatio. Maior habetur ab eo [Petrus Aureoli], minor probata est
de desiderio iracundi et de desiderio diaboli respectu beatitudinis et multorum aliorum.
Ideo dico ad argumentum quod non omnis amor incitans desiderium est delectatio" Ord. 1,
d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 411: 1-24.
89
Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 255-258: 105-151 (partly about only sensory
happenings); a. 11; OTh VIII, 297-310: 258-529.
90
PASSIONS OF TRE WILL
145
(jruitio) particularly.91 1 choose not to go into Ockham's discussion

with John of Reading, since it does not cast any additionallight on
Ockham' s c1assification of the phenomena of the will. Duns Scotus,
meanwhile, drew a distinction between love (dilectio) and pleasure
(delectatio), and Ockham, as a matter of fact, follows his position.
Despite this, Ockham accepts only two of Scotus' s arguments for the
distinction. 92 Ockham, however, interprets and develops those
arguments so that with them he proves that there is amicable love in
the will which is really distinct from wanting love and pleasure.
Therefore, 1 shall discuss them later when dealing with the
c1assification of the acts of the will in answer to the question as to
why something is willed.
What are the passions that Ockham wants to posit in the will?
Ockham does not oppose Auriol about desire and avoidance. Re
accepts the traditional view that they are acts with respect to absent
good or bad objects, and is not especially interested in talking about
them as such. Ockham is, however, interested in their causation, or
more precisely said, the acts of will that cause them. Desire and
avoidance in the will are not so-called first or absolute acts of the
will, but they presuppose other acts by which they are caused and
even necessitated, as mentioned before. Auriol thought that desire or
avoidance was caused by pleasure or distress (with respect to
something el se), but Ockham does not agree with this, and he tries to
prove that the acts that cause and necessitate desire or avoidance are
distinct from pleasure and distress.
Ockham also takes the meaning of pleasure and distress for
granted and is not interested in talking about them as such, but their
causation interests him. As argued in the previous sub-chapter,
Ockham, in fact, pays a lot of attention to their causation. Pleasure
91
Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. Il, d. 4; OTh VIII, 308-310: 480-527.
"Sic igitur patet quod Ioannes facit octo rationes ad probandum distinctionem inter
dilectionem et delectationem quarum duae concludunt et aliae sex non ... " Quaest. variae,
q. 6, a. II, d. 4; OTh VIII, 308: 477-479. The discussion with Scotus, see ibid., 297-307:
258-469.
92
146
CHAPTER FOUR
and distress are, according to him, mainly caused by certain

simultaneous acts of the will which are really distinct from them.
Ockham uses various terms for those acts which one has to
posit in the will in addition to desire (desiderium) or avoidance
(fuga) and pleasure (delectatio) or distress (tristitia). Some of these
terms are so general that they do not seem to distinguish the acts
concemed from desire and avoidance and pleasure and distress. On
the other hand, some more specific terms used for them do not
perhaps suffice to refer to all of these acts.
The acts concemed are sometimes simply called by the terms
'love' (amor) or 'hatred' (odium), but those terms do not suffice to
distinguish them from desire/avoidance, and pleasure/distress, since
sometimes Ockham (as well as Auriol) seems to use the term 'love'
(amor) for alI the positive phenomena concemed, and the term
'hatred' (odium) for all the negative. 93 A rather often-used term for
the positive acts which one has to posit besides desire and pleasure
is another love-term, dilectio. It suffices, at least better than amor, to
distinguish the positive acts concemed from desire and pleasure. It
does not, however, seem to have a different negative counterpart than
odium, which is also the negative counterpart of amor.
Besides the rather general love- or hatred- terms, there are
some more specific terms which Ockham uses for the acts
concemed, or at least for some of them. The terms 'complacence'
(complacentia) and 'displicence' (displicentia) are such. As seen
above, according to Auriol, it is the same thing to say "such a thing
which 1 love" and "such a thing which pleases (complacere) me and
is pleasant (delectabile) to me". Auriol also claimed that alliove is
desire or complacence, and it is evident from the terms that alI
complacence is pleasure since "if you please me, you are pleasant to
me.,,94 Ockham answers to this that 'to please' (complacere) can be
used in two ways. The first way is how he himself uses it, and the
93
See e.g. footnote 87 on page 143.
94
147
second one is how Auriol (according to Ockham's interpretation)

does. When 'to please' is used in the first way, it refers to alI willing
with respect to present objects. Ockham remarks that taking 'to
please' (complacere) in this way, not everything that pleases causes
pleasure. In the second way, 'to please' (complacere) is the same as
to have pleasure. Ockham states that taking 'to please'(complacere)
in this way, not everything that is loved pleases. As evidence,
Ockham uses an example which he used before: The deviI wills
(with complacence) a person's actual sinning, but he does not have
pleasure in it. 95 .
In some sections in Quaestiones variae Ockham also uses the
term 'complacence' for a willing or love (dilectio) the object of
which is a present thing, which (act) therefore cannot be desire. 96
However, there is a text in Quaestiones variae in which
'complacence' refers to a willing or Iove (amor) with respect to an
absent object. Even in that text, 'complacence' does not, however,
refer to desire, not even to non-efficient desire. 97 Thus, 1 think that
the central point about complacence is that it is a willing that is not
"Tamen 'complacere' potest accipi dupliciter: veI pro ornni velle respectu aIicuius habiti,
et sic non ornne complacens delectat; aIiter idem est quod delectari, et sic non ornne
amatum complacet. Patet de diabolo qui vuIt istum peccare qui peccat, et tamen non
delectatur in peccato ipsius ... patet prius: quae complacentia est delectatio et quae non."
Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh I, 411: 24 - 412: 3, 8-9.
96 " ... voluntas vuit ilIam cognitionem actu complacentiae, non actu desiderii, qui iam
habetur." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 254: 82-83. "Si enim voluntas non haberet
nisi actum desiderii veI fugiendi, sicut habet appetitus sensitivus, tunc haberet evidentiam.
Quia tunc quando res desiderata haberetur, cessarent illi actus et causarentur praedictae
passiones ab apprehensione intellectus obiecti iam habiti. Sed quia, ut alibi patet, non
tantum voluntas habet praedictos actus sed actum complacentiae sive amicitiae quo diligit
rem habitam praesentem... " Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 266: 323-325.
95
97 " ... si amor ilIe quo amatur sanitas non sit volitio efficax sed magis condicionata vei
complacentiae - puta si infirmus vellet sanitatem actu complacentiae vei si vellet sanitatem
nisi esset impedimentum, puta poti o amara quam nollet bibere - stante taIi volitione in
voluntate et dictamine in intellectu quod nullo moda potest consequi sanitatem nisi bibendo
potionem amaram, nunquam propter hoc necessitatur ad volendum potionem amaram, sed
contingenter adhuc potest velle potionem amaram. Et tota causa est quia volitio sanitatis
non est efficax." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 126: 598-607.
148
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desire, whether its object is present or not. If the object is present, the
willing cannot be desire, but also if the object is absent, the willing
can be something other than desire. 98 The term 'to displease'
(displicere) probably has the corresponding negative uses. 99
Therefore, Ockham seems to mean by the term 'complacence'
another sort of willing but not desire, and by the term 'displicence'
another sort of willing-against but not avoidance. Consequently,
these terms seem, after alI, to cover an acts which Ockham wants to
posit in the will besides desire and avoidance.
Let us then turn to see the texts in which Ockham approaches
the passions of the will by dividing them into amicable love (amor
amicitiae) and wanting love (amor concupiscentiae ).100 This division
concerns only the positive acts of the will, but the negative acts can,
in principle, be divided in a similar way.
Ockham makes some remarks about amicable love and
wanting love in his discussion with Auriol about the need to posit a
Scotus also made a distinction between complacence of an object and efficient volition
to have the object: "Alio moda dici potest, duplex est volitio; una simplex, quae est
quaedam complacentia obiecti; alia efficax, qua scilicet volens prosequitur ad habendum
volitum, si non impediatur... " John Duns Scotus 1639,704 (Quaestiones in librum tertium
Sententiarum, d. 33, q. un.).
98
The term displicentia occurs in Quaestiones variae when Ockham discusses with Scotus:
" ... voluntas reflectens se super actum nolendi ante adventum [noliti] complacet sibi in illo
actu libere elicito, non tamen voluntas reflectens se super actum nolendi post adventum
noliti complacet sibi in illo actu sed magis tristatur. Istud patet per experientiam: nam
aliquis nolens amicum suum peccare, volendo illud noile potest sibi complacere et delectari.
Si post peccet, tunc in nolendo eum peccare tristatur et displicet sibi. Et similiter in volendo
eum noile, quia displicet sibi quod voluit illud noile, ad quod naturaliter sequitur in eo
tristi tia et poena... non tamen concludit quod reflectendo se super actum suum naturaliter et
necessarioelicitum complaceat sibi in illo actu, sed magis displicet. Nunc autem ... nolle
alicuius noii ti naturaliter causatur per adventum noii ti, et est aliud nolle a praecedente
eventum noliti. Et per consequens, reflectendo se super illud noile magis tristaretur et
displiceret..." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. Il; OTh VIII, 303-304: 375-384, 391-393, 394-397.
99
100 About the origin of this distinction, Arthur Stephen McGrade gives a hint: "The Ottawa
editors of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae (n. to la2ae, q. 26, a. 4) refer the
distinction, which Thomas develops on an Aristotelian basis, to Praepositinus ofCremona,
Summa, Tours MS 142, foI. 102vb and Guilelmus Altissiodorensis, Summa Aurea in
quattuor Libros Sententiarum (paris 1500) foI. 139rb." McGrade 1987,75, footnote 25.
149
third phenomenon-pair in the will in addition to desire/avoidance and

pleasure/distress. Auriol c1aimed, according to Ockham (but not in
reality, it seems), that alilove is wanting love or amicable love, and
that alI wanting love is desire, and that alI amicable love is pleasure
of absent or present objects. 101 In his answer, Ockham rejects the
c1aim that alI amicable love is pleasure in absent or present objects
by saying that Auriol should prove that alI amicable love is pleasure.
The opposite, instead, has been proved, since someone can love
himself or herself with amicable love and yet not have pleasure. 102
Ockham also considers amicable love and wanting love in his
discussion with Duns Scotus about the distinction between pleasure
(delectatio) and love (dilectio) in Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 11. As
mentioned before, Duns Scotus drew the distinction between love
(dilectio) and pleasure (delectatio), but Ockham accepts only two of
Scotus' s arguments for the distinction, and he does not even consider
them as such but interprets and develops the arguments so that with
them he proves that there is amicable love in the will which is really
distinct from wanting love and pleasure. The first of Scotus's
arguments which Ockham accepts and modifies is a rational proof
dealing with an evil angel's love (dilectio) of itself. That act,
according to Ockham, is an act of amicability (actus amicitiae) since
one cannot have "an act of desire and wanting" with respect to
present objects, and an evil angel cannot have pleasure. 103 This
101
102 "Terti a enim ratio non conc1udit: deberet enim probare quod omnis amor amicitiae est
delectatio; quia oppositum probatum est: quia aliquis diligit se amore amicitiae et tamen
non delectatur." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1, 412: 4-7.
\03 " dico quod licet Scotus in materia de beatitudine videatur dicere quod rationabile sit
dicere quod voluntas respectu boni praesentis habeat alium actum distinctum a
concupiscentia et delectatione et non necessarium, videtur tamen quod hoc possit probari
per rationem et experientiam. Per rationem sic: quia angelus malus diligit se intensissime
secundum Augustinum, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. ultimo: Duo amores fecerunt duas
civitates. Civitatem diaboli fecit amor sui usque ad contemptum Oei. Igitur mali angeli
fabricantes civitatem diaboli, diligunt se. Quaero tunc an ilie amor sit actus concupiscentiae
vei delectatio vei aliquis actus distinctus ab utroque. Non prima modo, quia actus
desiderandi et concupisciendi est semper respectu rei non habitae praesentialiter. Nihil
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argument seems to be based on the idea that wanting is desire, and

then there can be concupiscence only with respect to absent objects.
Is alI willing (complacence) with respect to present objects, then,
amicable love? In this text, and in at least one other text, Ockham,
rather surprisingly, seems to think so. \04 The other argument of
Scotus accepted and modified by Ockham is an experiential proof
dealing with the fervent and intense love (dilectio) for God in a
believer who is not devout. That love is amicable love since, as an
ordered love of God in himself (in se), it cannot be wanting, and
because of the lack of devotion, there is only minimal pleasure in the
person. \05 In this argument, Ockham refers to the fact that amicable
autem est ita praesens ipsi angelo sicut ipsemet angelus. igitur etc. Nec secunda modo, quia
in angelis malis nulla est delectatio, sicut in bonis nulla est tristi tia, quia tristitia vehemens
excludit quamcumque de\ectationem, non solum contrarium sed contingentem, ex VII
Ethicorum. Igitur necesse est dicere quod ilIe actus sit distinctus quo diligit se ipsum, et
iIlum vocamus actum amicitiae. Et ista ratio efficacior est ad probandum duas conclusiones
inter omnes [rationes] quas adducit Scotus in Lectura Parisiensi, 1, dist. 1. Prima conclusio
est quod delectatio distinguitur a dilectione. Secunda est quod praeter delectationem et
actum concupiscentiae necesse est ponere actum amicitiae distinctum ab eis." Quaest.
variae, q. 6, a. 11, d. 4; OTh VIII, 297-299: 258-282. The same argument is briefly
referred to ibid., a. 9; OTh VIII, 257: 140-144.
104 " .. appetitus rationalis habet duplicem actum amoris respectu obiecti absentis: unum
actum quo diligit obiectum tale in se et propter se, et hic est amor amicitiae; alium habet
actum quo concupiscit et desiderat tale obiectum ut bonum sibi veI alteri ... Voluntas autem
quando obiectum prius desideratum est praesens sibi - veI alteri cui desideravit - non habet
tunc actum desiderii, propter eandem rationem, sed habet tunc actum amicitiae quo diligit
tale obiectum in se, quia iIle actus potest indifferenter esse respectu praesentis et absentis.
Et tunc mediante isto actu causatur delectatio in voluntate." Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 359:
22 - 360: 1, 6-11. Sometimes Ockham corre1ates complacence and amicability by the
conjunction sive. "Si enim voluntas non haberet nisi actum desiderii veI fugiendi, sicut
habet appetitus sensitivus, tunc haberet evidentiam. Quia tunc quando res desiderata
haberetur, cessarent ilIi actus et causarentur praedictae passiones ab apprehensione
intellectus obiecti iam habiti. Sed quia, ut alibi patet, non tantum voluntas habet praedictos
actus sed actum complacentiae sive amicitiae quo diligit rem habitam praesentem ... "
105 "Per experientiam patet etiam, nam aliquis intensius diligit Oeum ordinate, et tamen
minorem delectationem habet. Sicut aliquis tidelis qui non est devotus, et per consequens
non multum delectatur in dilectione Oei, tamen ferventius diligit Oeum et intensius quam
aliquis devotus, quia citius exponeret se periculo pro amore Oei quam alius et multum dolet
quod non potest habere devotionem sive delectationem, quia circa hoc laborat quantum
151
love is loving something in itself (in se), while wanting love is

something else, but Ockham does not here say what.
In Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16,
Ockham says that an act of will by which something is loved
(diligere) in itself (in se) and because of itself (propter se) is ca11ed
an act of amicable love. 106 In Quaestiones variae, q. 4, he says that
this love is absolute in the sense that it does not presuppose any other
act in the will. 107 By this kind of love, people love (diligere) God,
their own lives and other people. 108 Does this love necessarily
involve some kind of benevolence towards the object, by existing
with it or somehow containing it? Further, does it involve a
reciproca1 love of friends (provided that its object is a friend)? In
Quaestiones variae, q. 1, Ockham states that for Peter Auriol, an
amicitia-act in fact contains two acts: an act of complacence with
respect to the object and an act of willing something good to it, and
in addition, it presupposes a reciprocity of the love between the
friends. 109 Ockham does not, however, explicate his own opinion
potest, licet propositum non possit obtinere. Ille igitur amor quo talis diligit Deum in se non
est amor concupiscentiae, quia sic non esset amor ordinatus nec delectativus, quia tunc
haberet maiorem delectationem quam alius devotus, sicut habet maiorem dilectionem, quia
maiorem dilectionem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis, - ad
quod iste est paratus et alius non. Igitur iste habet actum amicitiae. Alias rationes addit
Scotus quae non concludunt propositum ita efficaciter." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 11, d. 4;
OTh VIII, 299: 283-298.
106 " unum actum quo diligit obiectum tale in se et propter se, et hie est amor amicitiae ... "
Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII, 359: 23-24.
107 "Dico quod actus praecise amicitiae est ilie quo absolute diligo aliquod obiectum, non
praesupponendo necessario aliquem actum in voluntate volendi vei nolendi. Exemplum:
actus quo absolute diligo Deum vei vitam meam et huiusmodi." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh
VIII, 137: 813-816. Thus, 1 think that it is wrong to say, as did Gordon Leff, that amieable
love is "wanting the object for itse1f'. See Leff 1975, 522.
108 " homo vei vita eius amatur amore amicitiae ... homo vei vita hominis diligitur amore
amicitiae... " Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 105-124: 144--145,550-551. See also the
previous footnote.
.in nobis respectu proximi ita est quod scilicet est duplex amor: unus complacentiae
sive benevolentiae, alius amor amicitiae. Et isti amores distinguuntur quia amor amicitiae,
secundum Philosophum VIII Ethicorum, non est sine redamatione; igitur redamatio est
109 ....
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regarding this matter, at least in this connection. Thomas Aquinas

also thought that such a love which is with (cum) benevolence is an
amicable love (amor amicitiae). In other words, when one loves an
object so that one wills good to it, this is amicable love. Furthermore,
Aquinas thought that amicable love is reciproca! between friends. On
the other hand, when one loves an object without willing good to it
but to oneself, this is wanting love, according to Aquinas. 110 What is
Ockham's view? At least he does not seem to think that an act of
amicable love contains two acts. An act of amicable love can still
cause acts of willing good to a friend. As will be argued later, the
acts of amicable love are on the top of the hierarchy of the chain of
willing. The chain of the acts of the will begins with them. Their
objects are jinis primus praestitutus a voluntate -types of ends
because of which other ends are willed. 111 Ockham does not say
anything about the reciprocity of the love between friends.
In Quaestiones variae, q. 4, Ockham says that an act of love
regarding an object because of something other (propter aliud) than
the object it self is wanting love. This love is not absolute but it
naturally presupposes another act, amicable love, which efficiently
complementum amoris amicitiae. Sed amor complacentiae et benevolentiae potest bene esse
sine redamatione, quia possum alicui esse benevolus et potest mihi complacere absque hoc
quod diligat me. Igitur eodem moda est in nobis respectu Oei, quia Oeus respectu naturae
rationalis potest habere amorem benevolentiae et complacentiae absque hoc quod natura
rationalis diligat Oeum, sed non amorem amicitiae. Cum igitur caritas informans animam
sit illa redamatio, sequitur quod est complementum amicitiae Oei promerens eum, ergo
etc ... quando aliquis diligit aliquem amore amicitiae ... tunc respectu dilecti habet duplicem
actum: unum quo complacet in dilecto, alium quo procurat sibi bona quae potest." Quaest.
variae, q. 1; OTh VIII, 8-9: 115-128,153-156.
110 Thomas Aquinas 1986, IlO (Summa theologiae Ha Hae, q. 23, a. 1).
111 " ... finis primus praestitutus a voluntate ... ille inquam finis amatur amore amicitiae ... "
Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 124: 540, 541-542. " ... finis amatus amore amicitiae, propter
quem primus finis produci tur; quia enim homo diligit seipsum concupiscit sibi ipsi
sanitatem, et ideo iIlam habendam operatur. Similiter, quia aliquis diligit Oeum summe et
propter se, ideo omnia agit propter Oeum, et ita Oeus est finis omnium actuum suorum."
Ord. I, prol., q. II; OTh I, 306: 11-15.
153
causes it. 1I2 One of Ockham' s examples of wanting love is the love
of health: Health is loved or desired only because of the life of the
human being which is loved by amicable love. Ockham calls the
object of that kind of love finis (inter)medius or finis subordinatus
(while the object of amicable love is calledfinis primus). 113
It is, however, necessary to note that, according to Ockham, if
an act is related to several objects, it can be called both an act of
amicability and an act of wanting love with respect to various
objects. For instance, by the same act one can love God because of
God Himself and a neighbor because of God. In relation to God, the
112 "Actus praecise concupiscentiae est ille quo diligo aliquid propter aliud dilectum, qui
causatur a dilectione alterius. Nec aliter naturaliter causaretur nisi esset dilectio alicuius
alterius distincti. Ita quod ad talem actum requiruntur duo: unum quod causetur ab actu
amicitiae, aliud quod habeat solum concupitum pro obiecto. Exemplum: actus
concupiscentiae quo diligo proximum causatur naturaliter ab actu amicitiae quo diligo
Deum, et habet solum proximum pro obiecto et nullo moda Deum. Et tunc debet illa
communis propositio intelligi: quod 'actus concupiscentiae est quo diligo unum obiectum
propter illud dilectum' quod Iy propter denotat causalitatem alicuius alterius obiecti quod
diligitur amore amicitiae. Non quod denotet quod utrumque sit obiectum amoris
concupiscentiae, sed sic diligit propter quod actus amicitiae est causa efficiens actus
concupiscentiae." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 137-138: 817-830. See also ibid., 140:
869-878...... omnis amor concupiscentiae, qui est praecise concupiscentiae, praesupponit
amorem amicitiae, ita quod quando aliquid diligitur amore concupiscentiae est aliquid
magis dilectum amore amicitiae. 19itur si Deus praecise diligeretur amore concupiscentiae
esset aliquis magis dilectum quam Deus, quod est inconveniens." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1,
444: 16-20.
113 ..... non omnis causa finalis amatur amore amicitiae, sed aliqua amore amicitiae et aliqua
amore concupiscentiae. Nam finis primus praestitutus a voluntate, propter quem omnes
fines intermedii intenduntur a voluntate, ilIe inquam finis amatur amore amicitiae; fines
autem intermedii solum amatur amore concupiscentiae. Exemplum de istis: homo vuit
sanitatem propter vitam suam, ita quod nisi esset vita nollet sanitatem. Similiter propter
sanitatem vuIt potionem amaram, quam potionem nullo moda vellet nisi esset sanitas; et sic
procedendo usque ad finem ultimum intentum. Et in isto processu vita hominis est primus
finis praestitutus a voluntate hominis - ponamus saltem quod ita sit - sanitas autem est finis
subordinatus. !sto casu posito, dico tunc quod homo sive vita hominis diligitur amore
amicitiae, sed sanitas diligitur solum amore concupiscentiae ... " Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh
VIII, 124: 538-551. See also ibid., 124-125: 554-577.
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act is called amicability, in relation to the neighbour, wanting 10ve. 1l4

In a case like this, in order to have wanting love, a distinct act of
amicability is not presupposed.11 5
Negative acts of the will are also considered in the order Of
hierarchy of the acts of the will. Is there hatred in the will
corresponding to amicable love? Ockham does not have a proper
term for such hatred, but he does not totally seem to exclude the
possibility that there could be hatred towards an object propter se. It
would perhaps be possible that the intellect could dictate that
something has to be absolutely willed-against and that the will could
will-against that object absolutely, without presupposing any other
act. However, de Jacto amor amicitiae of something is presupposed
for willing-against something else. 116 Thus, usually with hatred, it is
a question of a negative act towards an object because of something
else (propter aliud) that is loved because of it self. The hated object
is realized to be inimical to something that is loved because of itself,
and that is why that object is hated. Ockham gives an example of this
that deals with hatred towards death and infirmity: A person loves
114 "Actus ilie qui est actus amicitiae et concupiscentiae simul est actus quo diligo unum
obiectum praecise propter aliud, ita quod ilIo eodem actu diligo utrumque obiectum, unum
tamen propter aliud praecise. Exemplum: eodem actu possum diligere Deum et proximum
propter Deum, ita quod non diligerem proximum nisi quia diligo Deum isto actu eodem, et
tunc actus habet diversam denominationem. Nam ut habet Deum pro obiecto, dicitur actus
amicitiae; ut autem habet proximum pro obiecto, dicitur actus concupiscentiae. Et sic idem
actus numero potest habere diversam denominationem." Quaest.variae, q, 4; OTh VlII,
138: 831-840.
115 " ... actus ilie qui simul est actus amicitiae et concupiscentiae non necessario praesupponit
distinctum actum amicitiae, sed potest ilie actus esse simpliciter primus actus voluntatis.
Hoc probatur, quia omne ostensum et dictatum a ratione ante omnem actum voluntatis
potest voluntas velle. Sed ante omnem actum voluntatis potest intellectus apprehendere et
dictare quod Deus sit diligendus et proximus propter Deum. Ergo actu prima voluntatis
elicito potest voluntas diligere proximum propter Deum, nullum alium actum voluntatis
praesupponendo." Quaest.variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 139-140: 854-862.
116 "Si dicas quod intellectus potest dictare quod aliquid absolute sit nolendum et potest
voluntas prima actu iIlud noile, nullum alium actum praesupponendo, potest concedi
conc\usio. Et tunc non esset tanta necessitas quod noile praecise praesupponat actum
amicitiae, tamen de facto semper videtur tanta necessitas." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII,
141: 882-887.
155
his Of her life because of that life itself. This is amicable love. Love
towards life is an efficient cause of an act of hatred regarding death.
The hatred regarding death is an efficient cause of an act of hatred
regarding infirmity. The willing-against infirmity is an efficient
cause of an act of willing a bitter medicine. 117
After alI, one has to note that, according to Ockham, if an act
is related to several objects, it can be called an act of willing or
Iov ing and an act of willing-against or hating Of detesting, with
117 " causalitas finis in isto processu exempli est mortem odiri per unum actum nolendi.
Quia nunquam voluntas praestituit sibi aliquid tanquam finem alterius noliti propter ipsum
praecise, nisi intellectus prius cognoscat illum finem nolitum et ipsum nolit et reprobet,
saltem prius natura. Propter illum finem reprobatum per actum nolendi potest voluntas odire
infirmitatem per alium actum nolendi et propter mortem noii tam, ita quod non odiret
infirmitatem nisi quia odit mortem. Et tunc prima mors est causa finalis secundae nolitionis
qua oditur ipsa infirmitas propter mortem, non autem primae nolitionis qua oditur mors.
Eadem infirmitas est causa finalis illius volitionis qua volo bibere potionem amaram; quia
infirmitas est noii ta et praecognita, praecise volo bibere potionem amaram." Quaest. variae,
q. 4; OTh VIII, 129: 644-656. "Primum autem noile, sicut et omne noIle, habet causam
finalem praestitutam a voluntate creata, quia omne noile, naturalitcr loquendo, praesupponit
velle, sicut post patebit. Quia nihil odio veI nolo positive nisi quia aliquid volo cui illud
nolitum non convenit sed magis repugnat veI discordat. Sicut non odio mortem per actum
nolendi nisi quia volo et diligo vitam meam cui mors repugnat, ita quod praecise odio
mortem quia diligo vitam. Et ideo quod est obiectum volitionis necessario praesuppositae
primae nolitioni, illud est causa finalis primae nolitionis. Patet per illud principium
frequenter acceptum quod illud est causa finalis praestituta a voluntate creata quod est in se
amatum vei nolitum, et propter ipsum amatum veI nolitum est aliud praecise amatum veI
nolitum. Sed vita mea sic est a me cognita et amata, et propter ipsam amatam praecise odio
mortem. Igitur vita mea est causa finalis respectu primae nolitionis qua noI o et odio
mortem." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 130-131: 666-681. " ... primus actus volendi quo
diligo vitam meam in se est vere causa efficiens primae nolitionis qua nolo mortem propter
vitam cognitam et dilectam a me. Et eodem moda prima nolitio est causa efficiens illius
nolitionis qua noi o infirmitatem. Et ista secunda nolitio est causa efficiens illius volitionis
qua voi o potionem amaram." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 131: 683-688. " ... vita
hominis, propter quam dilectam praecise odit mortem, amatur amore amicitiae... finis
secundae nolitionis, quae est mors, solum oditur et nullo moda amatur." Quaest. variae, q.
4; OTh VIII, 131: 694-697. See also ibid., 136: 794-804. " ... actus simpliciter nolendi
praesupponit necessario de facto actum volendi. Nullus enim de facto aliquid odit nisi quia
non convenit veI repugnat alicui dilecto." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 141: 879-881.
" ...dico quod causa finalis odii est ipse odiens, quia ilie amat seipsum, propter quem
amatum odit adversarium... oditus non est causa finalis." Quodl. IV, q. 1; OTh IX, 297-298:
102-103, 107.
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respect to various objects. For instance, if someone hates sin because

of God, the act has both sin and God as ils object. In relation to God,
the act is called willing or love, and in relation to sin, willing-against
Of hatred. 118 In a case like this, in order to have willing-against, a
distinct act of willing is not needed. 119
1 shall now consider how Ockham applies the theologically
important distinction - put forward by Augustine - between
enjoyment (fruitio) and use (uti) to the acts of the will. 120 The most
118 " potest concedi quod idem actus numero respectu unius potest denominari detestatio
seu actus detestandi et respectu alterius actus amandi quando unica actu detestor aliquid
propter aliud amatum eodem actu ... /Potest dici quod sicut actus amandi et actus odiendi non
opponuntur nisi quando idem est amatum et oditum, quia quando unum est amatum et aliud
oditum non opponuntur,/ ita est dicendum de velle et noile et frui et uti. Et ideo ista
respectu eiusdem non possunt eidem competere secundum quod sunt quaedam connotativa,
quamvis possint competere eidem respectu diversorum." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1, 386: 22
- 387: 2, 6-12. (The text between the virgules is unsure, see the text critica! apparatus ibid.)
" ... eodem actu numero aliquis odit et detestatur peccatum et diligit Deum, et ideo iste actus
est actus caritatis ... Unde iste actus caritatis praedictus habet duo obiecta partialia
denominantia illum actum extrinseca denominatione, et ideo iste actus ut terminatur ad
Deum dicitur et est actus amoris, ut autem terminatur ad peccatum dicitur actus odii. Et sic
idem actus numero potest denominari oppositis et diversis denominationibus per
comparationem ad diversa obiecta partialia." Rep. IV, q. 10-11; OTh VII, 229: 13-14,
16-21. " ... aliquis idem numero est actus volendi et actus nolendi ... [exemplum:] actus quo
odio peccatum propter Deum habet peccatum pro obiecto et similiter Deum. Et iste actus ut
terminatur ad Deum dicitur actus volendi, quia non possum meritorie noile Deum; prout
autem terminatur ad peccatum dicitur actus nolendi, quia illo oditur peccatum." Quaest.
variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 139: 842-843, 848-852. "[Dubium 1:] ... si sic, tunc idem esset
actus volendi et nolendi, diligendi et odiendi, quia aliquis odit peccata propter Deum
tamquam tinem; et iste actus si terminatur ad Deum, erit actus diligendi...et ut terminatur ad
peccatum, est actus odiendi ... [Ad dubium 1:] Ad ali ud dico quod idem actus potest habere
diversas denominationes, ut terminatur ad diversa obiecta, sicut est in proposito. ldeo non
est inconveniens quod idem actus nominetur dilectio et odium respectu diversorum
obiectorum." Quodl. III, q. 16; OTh IX, 266-267: 98-101, 101-102, 124-127.
119 " ... potest intellectus apprehendere et dictare ante omnem actum voluntatis quod
peccatum sit detestandum propter Deum, et voluntas tunc potest conformiter velle illud
ostensum. Ergo talis actus nolendi non necessario praesupponit velle." Quaest. variae, q.
4; OTh VIII, 140: 864-868.
120 There is an article particularly dealing with Ockham' s theory of the Augustinian concept
of enjoyment, namely McGrade's "Ockham on enjoyment - towards an understanding of
fourteenth century philosophy and psychology", see McGrade 1981. See also Georgedes
1995, esp. 249-253, 264-270. Kuc also writes a little about "la dialectique difficile et mal
PASSIONS OF THE WllL
157
important texts in which Ockham deals with enjoyment and use are
Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1-6. According to
Aquinas, enjoyment is essentially a kind of cognition 121 while,
according to Ockham, it belongs to the area of the will, or more
precisely, is an act of the will. However, Ockham admits that this
cannot be sufficiently proved since the words (voces) concemed are
ad placitum. In a case like this, we ought to follow the authorities'
use of the words, and Ockham claims that they take frui to be an act
of the will alone. 122 Ockham proves quite painstakingly that they do.
The first proof concems the derivation ofthe termfrui: According to
the authorities, frui is derived from fructus. But fructus is the
ultimate. Therefore,frui is the ultimate act. But an act of the will is
the ultimate act. 123 The second proof deals with giving rest: Only an
act of the will is the one that maximally gives rest. Butfrui is an act
that maximally gives rest. 124
connue chez Occam defrui/uti", see Kuc 1986. So does Damiata, see Damiata 1993,86-92.
121 McGrade compares Ockham (and the Franciscan side) with Aquinas (and the Dominican
side), see McGrade 1981,708,710-711.
122 "Primum [utrum frui sit actus solius voluntatis] probari sufficienter non potest, cum
voces sint ad placitum et ideo utendum est eis sicut utuntur auctores, sed auctores volunt
quod frui sit actus solius voluntatis." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1, 395: 8-10.
123 "Hoc patet, quia secundum ~ 'frui' dicitur a fructu; sed fructus est ultimum, igitur frui
erit ultimus actus; sed actus voluntatis est ultimus." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1, 395: 11-13.
The editors ofthe text give references to two authorities, Scotus and William ofWare. See
ibid., 395, footnote 2. "Comme 'fruition' n'est qu'un derive de 'fruit', il faut dire que la
fruition est un acte de la volonte puisque, dans l'action humaine, c'est cet acte qui est
ultime, comme l'est le fruit dans le processus du developpement d'un arbre." Kuc 1986,
280. McGrade suggests that a partial explanation ofwhy Ockham places enjoyment among
the acts of the will "lies in the historical circumstance that the Latin term for enjoyment,
''jruitio,'' connotes a flourishing or fulfilment of a thing's nature. On what could be called
the high medieval and classical view of human nature and dignity, such flourishing is
located primarily in the operation of man' s highest and noblest powers ... " McGrade 1981,
713.
124 "Item, actus solius voluntatis est maxime quietativus; sed frui est actus maxime
quietativus; ergo etc." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1, 395: 14-15. About the arguments for the
premisses, see ibid., 395: 15 - 396: 9. See also Kuc 1986, 280. According to Ockham, the
thing that uItimately gives rest to the will can be understood in two ways: either to mean
something that is the uItimate that can be chosen because of itself and not because of
158
CHAPTER FOUR
Enjoyment belongs, according to Ockham, to the amicable love

acts. Ockham proves this by appealing to the "perfection" of
enjoyment: Amicable love is the most perfect love. But enjoyment is
the most perfect love. Therefore, enjoyment is amicable love. 125
Although pleasure is really distinct from enjoyment, enjoyment has
a close relationship with it: It can be, according to Ockham, a
consequence of enjoyment. 126
What kind of amicable love is enjoyment? According to
Ockham in Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1,
'enjoyment' can be taken in two ways. Broadly taken, it refers to alI
acts by which something is assumed in the faculty of the will because
of the thing it self and taking the thing as the highest or supreme that
can be presented to someone. In this way people are said to love God
because of himself and above aU. 127 The human will can actively and
something else or to mean something after which there is nothing else giving rest. In thc
first sense, it is enjoyment that gives rest to the will. In the second meaning, it is pleasure:
" ... aliquid quietare voluntatem ultimate potest intelligi dupliciter: vei quia est ultimum
eligibile propter se et non propter ali ud, vei quia est aliquid post quod non est aliud
quietativum. Primo moda dico quod fruitio quietat voluntatem, quia ipsa propter se est
eligibilis, non propter aliud adquirendum. Secundo moda delectatio ultimo quietat, quia
post delectationem nihil advenit voluntati quietans ipsam." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 3; OTh 1,428:
2-8.
125 " . amor amicitiae respectu cuiuscumque obiecti est perfectissimus; sed fruitio est amor
perfectissimus, ergo fruitio est amor amicitiae." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 441: 16-18.
" ... dico quod fruitio non est amor concupiscentiae, non plus fruitio patriae quam fruitio
viae ... dico quod fruitio est amor amicitiae." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 444: 14--15,21. "La
fruitio est un acte de volonte consistant dans ce que Guillaume appelle I'amour d'amitie."
Baudry 1958, 98.
126 " .
delectatione quae consequitur fruitionem." Rep. IV, q. 16; OTh VII: 7-8.
127 " dico quod frui multipliciter accipitur. Uno moda large pro omni actu quo aliquid
assumitur in facultatem voluntatis propter se tamquam summum, et hoc sive sit praesens
sive absens si ve sit habitum sive non sit habitum. Et hoc moda dicimur nos frui moda in via
quando diligimus Deum propter se tamquam summum et super omnia." ard. r, d. 1, q. 2;
OTh 1, 396: 22 - 397: 4. "Sed quod aliquis actus sit non referens potest esse dupliciter: vei
quod obiectum acceptetur tamquam summum sibi possibile praesentari, /hoc est tamquam
summe diligendum ab ea,l... Primus actus est actus fruendi, quando aliquid acceptatur
tamquam simpliciter summum." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1, 374: 20 - 375: 2,4--5. (The text
between the virgules is unsure, see the text critical apparatus ibid.)
159
naturalIy (ex puris naturalibus) elicit this kind of act. 128 Strictly
taken, 'enjoyment' refers only to the ultimate beatific act (actus
ultimus beatificus) which the blessed have in heaven. They have this
enjoyment through a clear and direct vision of the divine essence
(visio essentiae divinae clara et nuda). 129 With respect to these acts,
the will, according to Ockham, probably cannot be active at alI but
only passive. 130 Ockham' s uncertainty on this question was later
128 " . obiecto fruibili ostenso voluntati per intellectum sive clare sive obscure sive in
particulari sive in universali, potest voluntas active elicere actum fruitionis, et hoc ex puris
naturalibus, circa illud obiectum." Ord. r, d. 1, q. 2; OTh r, 397: 7-10. See also ibid., 397:
14 - 398: 10.
129 "Alio moda [frui] accipitur stricte pro actu ultima beatifico, sicut beati dicuntur frui in
patria; et isto moda non dicimur moda frui Deo." Ord. r, d. 1, q. 2; OTh 1, 397: 4-6.
" ... fruitio est finis noster mediante visione essentiae divinae clara et nuda." Rep. IV, q. 16;
OTh VII, 346: 12-13. It seems, however, that God can give actus beatificus also to those
on via. " ... actus beatificus dabatur Paulo in suo raptu, quia tunc vidit essentiam divinam ... "
Quodl. VI, q. 1; OTh IX, 587: 55-56. rt has to be noted that even the heavenly enjoyment
is a matter of the will: It does not refer to the whole felicitous perfection of the heavenly
life. The perfect heavenly state, felicity (jelicitas) or beatitude (beatitudo) includes vision,
enjoyment, pleasure and perhaps security: "Si autem beatitudo accipiatur pro quodam statu
ornnium bonorum aggregativo perfecto - sic defini tur felicitas - sic includit visionem illam
claram, fruitionem et delectationem, licet forte unam principalius et aIiam minus
principaliter." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 11; OTh VIII, 297: 252-255. "Accipiendo tamen
beatitudinem pro quodam statu ornnium bonorum aggregative perfecto, sicut loquuntur
Sancti, sic securitas pertinet ad essentiam beatitudinis, licet forte complete et essentiaIiter
posset aIiquis esse beatus sine tali securitate." Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 11; OTh VIII, 313:
580-584. " ... una pars beatitudinis est in intellectu, aIia in voluntate." Ord. I, d. 1, q. 2; OTh
r, 403: 7-8. See also Leff 1975, 522-524. The opposite of the perfect heavenly state is
misery (miseria). See Quaest. variae, q. 6, a. 9; OTh VIII, 268: 364-367.
130 " respectu actus beatifici voluntas nullo moda se habet active sed tantum passive." Ord.
r, d. 1, q. 2; OTh I, 397: 11-12. " ... conclusio, quod actus fruitionis qui est beatificus non sit
active a voluntate, potest persuaderi ...Teneo tamen istam partem tamquam probabiliorem,
quod respectu beatitudinis sive intellectus sive voluntatis solus Deus est causa effectiva, et
hoc propter nobilitatem ipsius beatitudinis." Ord. r, d. 1, q. 2; OTh r, 398: 12-13; 399: 23
- 400: 3 (Ockham's reasons, see ibid., 398: 22 - 399: 2). " ... actus quo beatus amat Deum
clare visum causatur a solo Deo, quia non libere causatur a voluntate creata. rgitur est
aIiquis actus qui non est in potestate voluntatis." Rep. II, q. 15; OTh V, 341: 3-5. See also
ibid., 8-10; ibid., q. 20; OTh V, 443: 10-13. See also Leff 1975, 517. In fact, God is the
total cause of all felicity (jelicitas): " ... eorum [angelos et homines] felicitas dependet a Deo
sicut a causa totali." Rep. IV, q. 15; OTh VII, 336: 5-6. About this theme, see aIso
McGrade 1981,723.
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censured by the papal commission in A vignon. 131 It seems that, to

Ockham, beatific acts belong to different species than natural acts;
that is, it is not the case that their intensity is simply stronger than the
intensity of natural acts. This being so, the wills of the blessed
people can have two enjoyment-acts, natural and supernatural,
towards God (unless it happens that God does not want to maintain
both).132 Ockham usually employs the term 'enjoyment' in its broad
meaning. 1 also do so unless 1 say specifically that 1 use it in its strict
meanmg.
When having enjoyment, is the will in a state of satiation
(satietas)? Scholars have found it difficult to understand what
Ockham means by 'satiation'. McGrade writes:
"There is no general explanation in Distinction 1 [in Scriptum in
librum primum Sententiarum] (or anywhere else in Ockham?)
either of the relation between satiation of a psychological capacity
and the properties intrinsic to an appropriate rane of objects or
of the relation between satiation and pleasure.,,13
131 "That [a beatific act of enjoyment is not actively from the will but from God alone],
however, can only be persuaded because the reasons are not themselves more than probable
and could be denied; an opinion for which Ockham was censured by the Avignon Masters."
Leff 1975, 516-517. See also Ord. r, d. 1, q. 2; OTh r, 398, footnote 2.
132 " ! dicatur quod tunc beatus semper haberet duos actus fruendi Deo: unum a solo Deo,
et alium active a se ipso. Consequens videtur inconveniens. Consequentia patet, quia
voluntas beati tenetur diligere Deum quantum potest et omnibus modis quibus potest; igitur
si potest active se habere ad aliquam fruitionem elicit eam nisi impediatur. Sed non
impeditur per actum beatificum, quia cum illi actus distinguatur specie et non contrarientur,
unus non impediet alium: Ad illud potest dici concedendo quod conclusio non est
inconveniens, quod beatus habeat duos actus respectu Dei: unum a solo Deo, alium a Deo
et a se ipso. - Qui autem vuit negare, potest dicere quod ilie actus non elicietur a voluntate
q uia Deus non vuIt sibi coagere ad actum ilIum." Ord. r, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1, 400: 23 - 40 I :
10. " ... contra: ... tunc actus beatificus esset eiusdem species cum actu naturali
dilectionis ... Similiter visio creaturae secundum istud posset esse beatifica, quia si sit
eiusdem speciei cum visione Dei, posset intendi quousque perveniret ad aequalem gradum
cum visione beata." Quodl. II, q. 13; OTh IX, 170: 72,75-79.
m McGrade 1981,717.
PASSIONS OF THE Wll.L
161
It is true that Ockham handles the relations mentioned by McGrade

only summarily. However, in Quaestiones variae, q. 4, Ockham
states that 'satiation' can be taken in two ways: 1) To mean
exclusion of alI potency and appetite with respect to any object other
than the satiating one. 2) To mean exclusion of alI distress and
anxiety.l34
Taking 'satiation' in the first way, no object of the will, not
even God, satiates the will. Even the blessed in heaven, who see God
clearIy and love him intensely, can also love something eise they
see. 135 Taking 'satiation' in the second meaning, i.e., referring to the
exclusion of alI distress, God is, according to theoIogy, the only
object that can satiate the will, and this satiation happens to the
biessed in heaven. 136 1t seems that, according to Ockham, enjoyment
134 " dicendum est quod satietas dupliciter accipitur: uno modo prout excludit ornnem
potentiam et appetitum respectu cuiuscumque alterius obiecti ab obiecto satiativo ... Aliter
potest accipi obiectum satiativum pro illo quod excludit ornnem tristitiam et anxietatem."
Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 117-118: 404-407, 430-431. See also Baudry 1958, 237.
m "Et sic dico quod nihil satiat potentiam beati intellectivam veI volitivam, nec Deus nec
creatura nec finitum nec infinitum, quia quantumcumque videatur Deus clare et diligatur
intense adhuc potest intellectus beati videre aliquam creaturam et eam diligere, quia non
videtur quod beatus sit peioris condicionis in hoc quam non beatus. Sed non beatus potest
hoc facere, igitur et beatus." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 117-118: 407-413. See also
ibid., 118: 414-429.
136 "Et sic solus Deus satiat et nulla creatura, quia si ipse diligatur beatifice, tanta erit
delectatio in beato quod excludet ornnem tristi tiam undecumque provenientem et similiter
anxietatem. Et ideo quantumcumque appeteret aliquid aliud a Deo, si per impossible non
consequeretur illud, non propter hoc tristaretur. Sed si diligeret creaturam intensissime et
apprehenderet Deum, et si non diligeret Deum, tristaretur et anxietur vehementissime. Et
ideo sic nulla creatura satiat, sed solus Deus." Quaest. variae, q. 4; OTh VIII, 118-119:
431-439. "Sed fruitio ordinata est duplex, quia quaedam est quietans simpliciter
voluntatem, qualis dicitur esse fruitio patriae... " Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; 0Th 1, 431: 17-18. " ...de
facto talis fruitio [quietans et satians voluntatem]est ponenda, sed hoc tantum est creditum
et non per rationem naturalem notum." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; 0Th 1, 439: 9-11. " ... dico quod
nullum aliud obiectum a Deo potest satiare voluntatem, quia nullus actus respectu
cuiuscumque alterius a Deo excludit ornnem anxietatem et tristitiam quin quocumque
obiecto creato habito potest voluntas aliquid aliud cum anxietate et tristitia appetere. Ad
probationem dico quod actus fruitionis respectu essentiae divinae est perfectissimus, et ideo
ille solus quietabit...ille actus excludit ornnem anxietatem et tristi tiam. Et hoc dico
naturaliter loquendo, quamvis forte de potentia Dei absoluta posset compati secum tristi tiam
162
CHAPTER FOUR
in this life does not bring satiation even in its second meaning. In this
life, enjoyment does not simply (simpliciter) give rest to the will, but
it can be accompanied by anxiety and distress. 137 Thus, nothing in
this life can satiate the will since even having an enjoyment of God
does not, in this life, exclude an distress. 138
It was stated that in Ockham, enjoyment belongs to amicable
love. It is amicable love (love because of the object it self) towards
something that is taken as the supreme possible object. What about
the traditional counterpart of enjoyment, use (uti)? In Scriptum in
librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, Ockham states that if 'use'
is taken broadly, it refers to every act of the will, and if taken strictly,
it refers to an act of the will that is distinct from (distinctus contra)
enjoyment. 139 However, Ockham still has the most proper way to
take 'use': Only an act with respect to an object propter aliud is most
et anxietatem. sicut fuit in Christo, secundum aliguos ... omnes alii actus compatiuntur secum
tristitiam et anxietatem ... dico quod voluntas in fruitione beatifica quietatur. Et quando
dicitur quod potest aliquid ultra appetere, dico quod verum est, sed non potest aliquid ultra
appetere cum anxietate et tristitia." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 446: 9-15, 19 - 447: 2, 3-4,
19-22.
137 "Sed fruitio ordinata est duplex ... alia non simpliciter quietat, sed permittit secum, etiam
naturaliter, anxietatem et tristitiam, qualis est fruitio viae." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 431: 17,
19-20. " ... fruitionis non quietantis, qualis est fruitio viae ... " Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1,445:
23-24.
138 Since this does not mean that there would be no pleasure in life, 1 do not think that one
should accept the extreme conclusions that McGrade offered for consideration: "It may
seem that Ockham' s philosophy makes God harder to reach than He was for earlier thinkers.
Revealed religion no longer presents itself as a solution to problems of which we were
already vividly aware or as the completion of a driving metaphysical ar cosmic quest that
we were already necessarily embarked on as men following natural reason. Does it follow
that nominalism entails a philosophical mind-set hostile to religion?" McGrade 1981,724.
139 " de usu quo dicimur uti aliquo tamquam obiecto. Et sic intelligendo quaestionem, dico
quod uti dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large et stricte. Large est omnis actus voluntatis,
secundum beatum Augustinum; stricte autem accipitur secundum quod est aliquis actus
voluntatis distinctus contra frui, et sic magis in particulari intelligitur quaestio." Ord. 1, d.
1, q. 1; OTh 1, 373: 18-23. Accarding to Kimberly Georgedes, by the broad way to take
'use', Ockham expresses "the Augustinian view that enjoyment is 'to use with joy"'.
Georgedes 1995, 250.
163
properly an act of using. 140 Taking 'use' in this way, not alI acts that
are not enjoyments are uses. There is love of an object on account of
the object itself (amicability) that is simply absolute love of an
object, without taking the object as the highest or non-highest. 141
Kimberly Georgedes comprehensively discusses these kinds of acts
in her dissertation. She seems to hesitate as to whether these "middle
acts" are a kind of enjoyment in Ockham. 1 would not say so.
However, Georgedes may be right when she ends up stating as
follows:
"Ockham allows for a legitimate act of the will which is neither
strictly enjoyment, nor use, and in so doing appears to break with
140 " sciendum quod aliquis potest assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis dupliciter: veI
propter se veI propter aliud ... Secundo moda assumitur in facultatem voluntatis quando
aliquid assumitur in facultatem voluntatis alia praesentato, ita quod si illud aliud non
praesentaretur voluntati, IveI non assumeretur in facultatem voluntatisl illud non
assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis ... Secundus actus est referens, quando non eliceretur
actus circa illud si nihil aliud sibi ostenderetur Ivei si nihi! ali ud assumeretur in facultatem
voluntatis/, sicut quando aliquis appetit potionem amaram quam non appeteret si non
appeteret sanitatem... tertius [ibi: secundus] actus est propriissime uti." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1;
OTh r, 374: 4-6, 9-13, 16-20; 375: 6-7. (The text between the virgules is unsure, see the
text critical apparatus ibid.) However, Ockham is careful enough to remark that something
is used only when there is exclusively a propter aliud -act with respect to it: " ... dico quod
non semper voluntas utitur illo quod amat amare concupiscentiae, sed quando praecise
diligit illud amare concupiscentiae et non amore amicitiae tune utitur illo. Nunc autem
voluntas non diligit Deum praecise amore concupiscentiae sed etiam amore amicitiae. Et
quando dicitur 'hoc est uti aliquo: diligere ipsum propter aliud' , dico quod hoc est verum
quando praecise diligitur propter aliud. Et hoc est quod dictum est prius, quod uti aliquo
proprie est quando voluntas elicit aliquem actum circa aliquid quem non eliceret nisi aliquid
aliud sibi praesentareturcirca quod habet actum suum." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1,393: 7-16.
141 "Sed quod aliquis actus sit non referens potest esse dupliciter ... vel absolute quod
acceptetur et absolute assumatur in facultatem voluntatis, nec ut summum nec ut non
summum... Secundus actus non est proprie frui nec proprie uti..." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh r,
374: 20-21; 375: 2-4,5-6. (See footnotes ibid.) " ... patet quod aliquid est volibile nullo alio
praesentato voluntati, et ita tune non eligitur propter aliud positive, et tamen non est finis
ultimus, sed propter alium tinem est eligibile." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1, 378: 8-10. (See
also ibid., 376: 23 - 378: 7.) Ockham does not explicitly caII this act here 'amicability'. but
it fits in the definition of 'amicability' , see the discussion about that. From the point of view
of enjoyment, McGradeends up calling this act "weak enjoying". McGrade 1981,710. (See
also Courtenay 1990, 17-18).
164
CHAPTER FOUR
the Au~ustinian tradition, or at least modifies it to some
extent." 42
Finally, it must be noted that in some cases, the very same act
can simultaneously have two denominations, that is, be called actus
fruendi and actus utendi - with respect to different objects. 143
The relevance of considering acts of will as enjoyments or uses
is mainly moral and theologica1. Morally or theologically taken, there
can be two kinds of enjoyment, ordered (jruitio o rdina ta ) and
disordered (jruitio inordinata). The enjoyment is ordered when its
object is something that is to be loved because of itself and
supremely, and disordered when its object is something that is to be
loved because of something else and less. l44 What then is the object
of ordered enjoyment? According to Ockham, it is always only God
himself. 145 A vision of God (visio Dei) is not such - unlike in
142
Georgedes 1995, esp. 14--15, 18-19,247-264,271-274,282-286 (the citation: 274).
.idem actus potest esse actus fruendi respectu finis ultimi et tamen esse actus utendi
respectu illius quod est ad tinem. Hoc patet, quia actus diligendi Dei est fruitio respectu
divinae essentiae, et tamen non fruitur creatura sed utitur...non est inconveniens eundem
actum numero voluntatis sortiri diversas denominationes propter diversitatem obiectorum,
ut illo actu dicatur voluntas frui una obiecto et uti alio obiecto." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh r,
385: 4-7, 14-16. " .. .idem est actus quo diligitur tinis et ea quae sunt ad tinem, - sed ut
terminatur ad tinem sic est actus fruendi, ut terminatur ad ea quae sunt ad tinem sic est actus
utendi ... " Rep. IV, q. 10-11; OTh VII, 229: 10-12. " ... per eundem actum utor creatura et
diligo Deum, propter quem diligo creaturam .. .idem actus potest habere diversas
denominationes, ut terminatur ad diversa obiecta." Quaest. variae, q. 7, a. 4; OTh VIII,
395-402:468-469,620-622.
144 " .. sciendum quod fruitio est duplex, scilicet ordinata et inordinata. Fruitio ordinata est
illa quando aliquid summe diligendum summe diligitur. Fruitio inordinata est illa qua
summe diligitur et propter se quod minus et propter aliud est diligendum." Ord. r, d. 1, q.
4;OThI,431: 13-17.
143 " ..
In some of the following citations propter se seems to be taken more strict1y than before
in the same distinction (quaestion 2), that is, to mean propter se tamquam summum: " ... frui
aliquo est amore inhaerere illi propter se; sed nihil est amandum propter se ni si solus Deus;
ergo solo Deo est fruendum. Praeterea, illo solo est fruendum quod non est ad aliud
ordinabile; sed omne ali ud a Deo est ad Deum tamquam ad finem ordinabile; igitur nullo
alia a Deo est fruendum. Praeterea, Augustinus r De doctrina christiana: 'Res quibus
fruendum est sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'." Ord. r, d. 1, q. 4; OTh r, 441: 7-14.
" ... quando dicitur quod fruitio est respectu Dei habiti, dico quod verum est, quia Deus est
145
165
Durandus of Saint-Poun;ain and some others. 146 Any theological or

other virtues are not such either. 147 Therefore, also in this case
Ockham is "a direct realist", as McGrade states. 148 This also means
that the object of the enjoyment for wayfarers and the blessed in
heaven is the same, GOd. 149 As McGrade remarks, it is like this even
though "the wayfarer knows God in or through concepts,
abstractively, while the blessed know him in Himself, intuitively".150
God himself is also the object of the pleasure that follows enjoyment
habitus; non tamen est prima respectu illius habitionis nec respectu actus quo habetur sed
respectu deitatis in se." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh I, 444: 21-24. " ... i11ud est obiectum fruitionis
ordinatae quod est propter se diligendum. Sed tale est solus Deus ... " Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh
1, 445: 24 - 446: 2. " ... dico quod solus Deus est summe diligendus, quia est summum
bonum." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 447: 5-6. God can be loved over ali (with enjoyment)
without faith (but not meritoriously): " ... aliquis ex puris naturalibus, sine fide, potest frui
Deo, quia potest summe diligere et super ornnia... " Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 443: 18-19.
146 " obiectum fruitionis viae est ipsemet Deus et non ipsa visio creata Dei..." Ord. 1, d. 1,
q. 4; OTh 1,443: 11-12. (A reference to Durandus' view, see ibid., 439, footnote 1. Just a
curiosity: Durandus was later a member ofthe papal comrnission that examined Ockham's
propositions in Avignon. See Gl1967, 932.) About this, see Damiata 1997,271-273. As
McGrade remarks, the vision should rather be loved with a wanting love (using). About this
and about enjoying God, see McGrade 1981, 721-722.
147 " . bona honesta, sicut virtutes et huiusmodi, non tantum propter se sunt diligenda sed
etiam propter ali ud, et ideo illis non est fruendum." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 447: 16-18.
148 " . his [Ockham's] thesis that God, not our idea of Him, is the object of ordinate
enjoyment makes the prince of nominalists a realist - a direct realist - in the modern sense
of the term, in which realism is opposed to idealism, and his thesis that God can be loved
even when He is very poorly known also seems to move in the direction of broader human
access to whatever it is that religion is really about." McGrade 1981, 724-725. "His
[Ockham's] espousal of direct realism against Durandus of St. Pour~ain's proposal of the
beatific vision as the proper object of enjoyment is a theological harbinger of typical
Ockhamist philosophical positions in the analysis of perception, imagination, memory,
concept formation, judgment, and reasoning." McGrade 1981, 726.
149 "ldeo dico quod obiectum fruitionis patriae est ipsemet Deus, quia amor amicitiae
respectu cuiuscumque obiecti est perfectissimus; sed fruitio est amor perfectissimus, ergo
fruitio est amor amicitiae. Sed amor amicitiae terminatur ad ipsum Deum in se; igitur et
fruitio ... idem est obiectum fruitionis viae et patriae, vei saltem non est nobilius obiectum
fruitionis viae quam patriae; sed obiectum fruitionis viae est ipsemet Deus ... " Ord. 1, d. 1,
q. 4; OTh 1,441: 15-19; 443: 9-11. See also Damiata 1997, 273-277.
150 McGrade 1981, 722.
166
CHAPTER FOUR
- if pleasure can be said to have an object at all. 151 It cannot,

however, be demonstrated naturally that the enjoyment of God is
possible for human beings: These kinds of things are just believed. 152
Nevertheless, anything other than God can be an object of disordered
enjoyment. 153
Let us then have a look at use from the point of view of ethics
or theology. What should be used, and what should not? Ockham
states that anything whatever can be used. 154 To put it more
accurately, the object of an act of using is everything that can be
taken (by whatever act) into the faculty of the will because of
something else. 155 Morally taken, there are two kinds of acts of using,
ordered use (usus ordinatus) and disordered use (usus inordinatus)
151 " .. potest dici quod proprie delectatio non habet obiectum, cum non sit actus. Hoc tamen
concesso, dico quod obiectum delectationis consequentis fruitionem est ipsemet Deus et
non actus aIiquis. Et quando dicitur quod beatus summe gaudebit de visione, dico quod
summe gaudebit de ipso Deo in se ... " Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 445: 12-16.
152 " non potest naturaIiter demonstrari quod talis fruitio divinae essentiae est nobis
possibilis, quia istud est mere creditum; et ita non potest naturaIiter demonstrari." Ord. 1, d.
1, q. 4; OTh 1, 433: 22 - 434: 2. For more about Ockham's discussion about this, see
Damiata 1997, 268-271, and McGrade 1981,719. See aIso Klocker 1966, 244. Kuc
remarks that there is a paradox: According to Ockham, the human being can enjoy God
without faith ex puris naturalibus, but this enjoyment cannot be anaIyzed without faith: "Le
paradoxe occamien Tt!side dans le fait que Guillaume defend l'homme aimant Dieu sans la
foi ex puris naturalibus, et ce en tant que theologien de la fruition dont l'analyse sans la foi
n'est pas possible." Kuc 1986,285.
153 " .. dico quod obiectum fruitionis inordinatae potest esse aIiud a Deo, quia scilicet omne
quod apparet intellectui erranti esse summum bonum et etiam illud quod non apparet, quia
potest voluntas ex libertate sua summe diligere quodcumque sibi oblatum et ita frui eo."
Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 4; OTh 1, 446: 3-7.
154 " quidlibet quod potest voluntas referre ad aliud, est obiectum usus; sed voluntas ex
libertate sua potest quodcumque referre ad aliud; ergo potest uti quocumque." Ord. 1, d. 1,
q.I;OThI,375: 11-14.
155 " . obiectum actus utendi est omne illud quod potest assumi in facultatem voluntatis per
quemcumque actum propter aliud, ita scilicet quod voluntas taiem actum circa illud - si ve
actum volendi sive actum nolendi sive detestandi sive patiendi sive quemcumque aIium non eliceret circa illud nisi aIiud sibi praesentaretur Ivei assumeretur in facultatem
voluntatisl circa quod etiam habet actum aliquem." Ord. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1, 392: 24 - 393:
6. (The text between the virgules is unsure, see the text critical apparatus ibid.)
167
or abuse (abusus).156 Everything can be used in a disordered way or

abused, but everything cannot be used in an ordered fashion. That is,
God can never be the object of usus ordinatus. If he is used at all, he
is used in a disordered fashion or abused. This is true for two
reasons. First, there cannot be an ordered willing-against (nolitio)
God since God cannot be hated in an ordered fashion. Second, there
cannot be an ordered willing (volitio) of God by uti-willing since
otherwise something el se could be loved in an ordered way more
than GOd. 157
Before turning to the 'irascible' phenomena of the will, 1would
now like to draw a short conclusion concerning Ockharn' s approach
to the 'concupiscible' phenomena in the will. Ockharn's main
interest is to prove that there is love and hatred in the will really
distinct from desire and avoidance and pleasure and distress.
Nevertheless, there is a strong link between love and pleasure and
hatred and distress, since pleasure and distress are passions caused
by love or hatred with respect to present objects.
According to Ockharn, there are tree types
'concupiscible' passions in the will:
1) desire (desiderium)
2) love (dilectio) / complacence (complacentia)
3) pleasure (delectatio).
of positive
Correspondingly, there are three types of negative 'concupiscible'

passions in the will:
156 " . uti secundum quod distinguitur contra abuti est ordinate uti." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh
1,390: 4-5. For the relation between usus inordinatus and abusus: " ... omnis usus respectu
Dei est inordinatus, et ita abusus." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh 1,391: 16-17.
157 " Deus non est obiectum usus ordinati, quia si sic, aut esset obiectum volitionis
ordinatae aut nolitionis. Non nolitionis, quia nullus potest ordinate odire Deum; nec
volitionis, quia tunc posset aliquid plus amari ordinate quam Deus." ard. 1, d. 1, q. 1; OTh
1, 375: 17-21. Evcrything else can be used in an ordered fashion. Sec ibid., 375: 23 - 376:
10; 390: 5-8; 391: 16-17. For the discussion of Ockham's statement that God could
command that he is to be hated, see Holopainen 1991, 135-145.
CHAPTER FOUR
168
1) avoidance (fuga)
2) hatred (odium) / 'displicence' (displicentia)
3) distress (tristitia).
Ockham's model of 'concupiscible' acts and passions of the will:
gaad abject
bad abject
absent abject
desiderium
dilectio
delectatio
present abject
x
x
fuga
odium
tristitia
x
x
In addition to classifying the passions of the will as such,

Ockham classifies them by focusing attention on why something is
willed. In this classification, some acts of the will are loving
something in itself and because of itself. Such acts are amicable love
(amor amicitiae). Some acts of the will are loving something because
of something else. Such acts are wanting love (amor
concupiscentiae). The third classification answers the question of
whether something is willed as the highest Of less high good. In it,
the acts ofthe will are divided into enjoyment (fruitio) and use (uti).
Broadly taken, 'enjoyment' refers to amicable love regarding an
object taken as supreme. Strictly taken, only an actus ultimus
beatificus is enjoyment. Broadly taken, 'use' refers to every act of the
will, and strictly taken, it refers to the acts of the wiH which are
distinct from (aH) enjoyment. Taking 'use' most properly, not aH the
acts that are not enjoyments are uses, but only acts with respect to an
object because of something else. Taking 'use' in this meaning, there
is love of an object on account of the object itself (i.e., amicability)
that is simply absolute love of an object, without taking the object as
169
the highest Of non-highest. This act is sometimes called the 'middle

act' .
Let us finally turn to the 'irascible' phenomena of the will. In
addition to the basic acts Of passions (resembling the traditional
'concupiscible' group), Ockham posits other acts, too, such as hope
(spes), despair (desperatio), and fear (timor) in the will. These acts
were traditionally called 'irascible'. They are caused by basic
('concupiscible') acts (or passions) when there is a certain act of
believing in the intellect. Thus, the will is not at all their immediate
efficient cause.
Hope (spes) is an act with respect to a future object. It
presupposes two things: (1) an act of desiring (desiderium)
something (this act is in the will), and (2) an act of believing
(credere) that the desired object will happen or is possible to happen
(this act is in the intellect). Is an act ofhope really distinct from those
two acts? Ockham thinks that it is rationally evident that it is distinct
from both of them separately. However, that it is distinct from those
two acts taking them conjointly (coniunctim), one can know only by
experience. Ockham thinks that an act of hope is an act of the will
that is caused naturally, not freely, by an act of desiring and an act of
believing conjointly. Thus, hope is notjust a certain desire and an act
of believing together, but a third act caused by them together. Still,
it cannot naturally be separated from the conjunction but only by
God's power. 158 Despair (desperatio) is an act that is naturally caused
158 " .. dico quod actus spei est actus voluntatis praesupponens tam actum credendi quam
actum desiderandi; et distinguitur ab utroque. Quod enim distinguitur ab actu desiderandi
patet; quia [si] stet in aliquo homine actus desiderandi et non credat assequi desideratum,
tunc non sperat; sed stante desiderio si credat assequi desideratum, statim sperat. Similiter
distinguitur ab actu credendi; quia credat quis aliquod bonum et non desideret, illud non erit
spes; sed si stante actu credendi sequatur desiderium, statim sequitur spes. Sed quod actus
spei distinguitur ab utroque coniunctim, non potest evidenter seiri ni si per experientiam...
dico quod [actus spei] nec est actus volendi nec nolendi, sed est unus actus naturaliter
causatus ab actu credendi et ab actu desiderandi coniunctim, et potest ab illis coniunctim
positis separari per potentiam divinam, non naturaliter. .. actus spei, quando creditur aliquid
bonum esse futurum, quod bonum est desideratum, causatur naturaliter, et habet pro obiecto
bonum futurum." Quodl. III, q. 9; OTh IX, 238-239: 15-25,26-30,35-38. " ... videturquod
170
CHAPTER FOUR
when there are conjointly (1) an act of desiring something (this act is
in the will), and (2) an act ofbelieving that the desired thing will not
happen or is impossible (this act is in the intellect).159
Just like hope and despair, fear (timor) is with respect to an
object that is not present. It is naturally caused when there are
conjointly (1) an act of avoiding something (this act is in the will),
and (2) an act of believing or suspecting that the avoided thing
cannot be avoided but it will happen (this act is in the intellect).l60
Courage (audada) is cited in Ockham in the Aristotelian lists of
passions. However, as far as 1 know, he does not deal with it in
connection with the will. If he had posited it in the will, it would
probably be the counterpart of fear. Like courage, anger (ira) occurs
in Ockham in the Aristotelian lists of passions, but as far as 1 know,
it is not discussed in connection with the will.
[spes] non requiritur nisi quod ostendatur obiectum diligibile tamquam possibile a nobis
haberi, et sic de aliis circumstantiis, et quod tunc ametur iJlud obiectum." Rep. III, q. 9, a.
2; OTh VI, 282: 15-18...... actus spei est volitio et desiderium efficax quo aliquis, ostenso
sibi per fidem quod fruitio Dei est sibi conferenda propter merita, statim elicit efficaciter
actum meritorium, si potest. Et iste actus non potest esse in desperantibus. Unde duplex est
desiderium: unum respectu possibilium, puta quando aliquis desiderat efficaciter aliquid
sibi ostensum tamquam possibile haberi per actum, et iJlud non est in desperantibus." Rep.
III, q. 9, a. 2; OTh VI, 284: 10-17. (Forthecontinuation, seethe following footnote.) Hope
as a habit, as a theological virtue: Rep. III, q. 9, a. 2; OTh VI, 283: 12-15; 284: 2-4; 286:
4-14; Quodl. III, q. 9; OTh IX, 239: 38-42. The objects of hope as a theological virtue:
..... potest dici de prima obiecto spei, quod est aliquod complexum obiectum eius
immediatum, et mediante iJlo inclinat ad omnia obiecta spei secundaria." Rep. III, q. 9, a.
3; OTh VI, 298: 6-8.
159 .. Aliud [desiderium] est respectu impossibilium, puta quando aliquis desiderat aliquid et
credit iIlud sibi esse impossibile, et illud potest esse in desperantibus." Rep. III, q. 9, a. 2;
OTh VI, 284: 17-19...... actus desiderandi potest esse in desperante... aliquis potest credere
et non sperare. Patet in desperantibus." Rep. III, q. 9, a. 2; OTh VI, 283: 11, 15-16.
160 ..... timor est respectu mali futuri, ita quod quando creditur vei dubitatur malum esse
futurum, quod malum est nolitum, tunc naturaliter causatur in voluntate actus timoris qui
habet malum futurum pro obiecto ... " Quodl. III, q. 9; OTh IX, 239: 32-35.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to analyze William Ockham' s conception
of human passions. No one has written a detailed monograph on this
theme so far. Nowhere in his works does Ockham present a
systematic theory of the human being and his or her properties, such
as passions, but he does write quite extensively about these matters
in various contexts, and in addition to those places, throughout his
works he makes remarks about them.
In the first chapter, 1 discussed Ockham's theory of terms and
their significations in order to be able to approach the terms dealt
with in this study and the things they signify. According to Ockham,
there are both absolute and connotative terms. The difference
between them lies in their signification: Absolute terms are ones that
have only a direct (primary) signification and that signify alI their
significata equally. Ockham's examples of those terms are, among
others, 'human being', 'animal', 'whiteness' and 'blackness'.
Connotative terms are the ones that signify something primarily
(directly) and something (else or perhaps even the same thing)
secondarily (indirectly). All categorematic terms that are not absolute
are connotative. In order to know which thing is signified by a term,
the term can be defined by a definition that expresses what the thing
is. That definition consists of the genus and some other terms
predicated of the thing. By its strict version, one can define only
those absolute terms that signify composite substances, but by its
looser versions also other absolute and even some connotative terms
can be defined.
AlI the distinct real and absolute things in this world can,
according to Ockham, be signified either by the term 'substance' or
by the term 'quality'. Thus, 'substance' and 'quality' are the most
general genus-terms ofthe things in the world. The term 'substance'
signifies the things that exist without inhering in or being a part of
any other thing. The term 'quality' signifies the things inhering in
171
172
CONCLUSION
substances through which substances have a certain character which

is referred to in answering the question of what a substance is like
(quale). One has to note that the term 'quality' does not, however,
always signify entities that are absolute and really distinct from the
substances. There are three classes of absolute qualities: Habit or
disposition, natural potency or impotency, and passion or passible
quality. 'Habit' in this use refers to qualities that are changeable only
with difficulty, and 'disposition' (usually) to easily-changeable
qualities. 'Natural potency' and 'natural impotency' refer to qualities
with which their subjects can easily act in a certain manner Of resist
an influence. In the case of corpOfeal qualities, 'passion' and
'passible quality' refer to the sensible qualities that cause passions of
the souls or are caused by them. 'Passion' and 'passible quality' in
the case of the souls refer to appetitive acts and their consequences.
The difference between passions and passible qualities is that the
former are easily changeable qualities while the IaUer ones are
changeable only with difficulty. Although this classification based on
Aristotle's Categories can also be applied to the qualities ofthe soul,
usually they are approached by Ockham with Aristotle's division of
the things of the soul in the Nicomachean Ethics.
In the second chapter, I discussed Ockham's theory ofthe souls
and other parts of the human being, the appetitive and other faculties
Of potencies of the souls, and the passions and other qualities of the
souls. It was argued that the absolute term 'human being' can be
defined by a strict definition that expresses the thing that it signifies,
that is, the human being. There are two versions of that kind of
definition: the one that is proper to natural philosophy, and the one
that is proper to metaphysics. The first part of the definition of
'human being' is the genus-term proper to the human being. The
most general genus of the human being is substance. The second part
of the definition refers to the differential parts of the human being. In
the definition proper to natural philosophy, the second part includes
terms (in oblique cases) expressing in quid the essential parts of the
human being.In the metaphysical definition, the second part includes
CONCLUSION
173
difference-terms (in the nominal cases) expressing in quale the

essential parts of the human being.
The essential parts of the human being are prime matter and
three substantial forms. Two of the forms are principles of life, and
therefore can be called 'souls'. The four parts of the human being are
not substances per se but partial beings which naturally are parts of
a complete being. However, alI of them can, at least by God's
absolute power, exist without being a part of a substance. Prime
matter is a naturally ingenerable and incorruptible entity which
receives various forms successively. Unlike forms, it does not
function as an immediate subject of any absolute qualities. It is
difficult to say what the function of prime matter is in the world,
according to Ockham, since prime matter is not necessary because of
locality or even extension. The form of corporeity perfects prime
matter so that a body develops. Because of experience, the form of
corporeity cannot be identified with the sensory form or soul in the
human being. Ockham seems to admit that the form of corporeity is
the immediate subject of the sensory form or soul. Despite this, the
sensory soul is also present in matter. As divisible, it exists in the
body circumscriptively, so that a part of it exists, for instance, in the
organ of sight and another part in the aural organ. All its parts have,
however, the same nature. Every human being has also a separate
intellectual form or soul. It is the ultimate and specific form of the
human being. Among other reasons, the existence of various
incompatible acts shows that there is a distinct intellectual soul in the
human being. However, it does not seem to Ockham that we could
learn from experience what the intellectual soul is like, but the
knowledge of it comes mainly from theology. According to theology,
the intellectual soul is a naturally ingenerable and incorruptible form
which remains in existence after the corruption of the human
composite, that is, after the death of the human being. As totally
indivisible, it is present in the body not circumscriptively but
definitively: A whole in the whole body and a whole in each of its
parts. In general, Ockham wants to maintain both the distinction of
the parts of the human being and the unity of the human being in his
174
CONCLUSION
anthropology. Ris solution is that there is a union between the parts

that stiH enables the parts to remain really distinct.
The souls can be said to have basic potencies or faculties that
are divided into appetitive and cognitive ones. The appetitive
potency of the sensory soul is called 'sensory appetite', and the
appetitive potency of the intellectual soul 'will'. The cognitive
potency of the sensory soul is called 'sensory cognition', and the
cognitive potency of the intellectual soul 'intellect'. The potencies of
the soul cannot, however, be distinguished from the soul it self or
from each other. Therefore, the terms conceming them signify the
soul itself and connote different acts in it.
Since the sensory soul, however, is an extended form in the
body and as such divisible into really distinct parts which have the
same nature, one can, referring to these parts, speak about really
distinct potencies in it. For instance, referring to the part of the soul
which perfects the organ of sight, one can speak about the potency of
seeing, and referring to the part which perfects the aural organ, one
can speak about the potency of hearing, and then it is indeed a
question of really distinct potencies. By the term 'sense', Ockham
means the composites in which a piece of the sensory potency
perfects a corporeal organ. There are five exterior senses in the
human being with sensations proper to them: Sight, touch, hearing,
taste and smell. In addition, there are the interior senses, such as
common sense or fantasy, with apprehensions proper to them.
'In his works, Ockham usually approaches the qualities of the
soul by applying Aristotle's division ofthe things ofthe soul in Book
2 of the Nicomachean Ethics, c. 4, according to which there are in
the soul habits, potencies and passions. Sometimes Ockham modifies
the list so that it includes a group of acts. By 'habit' he here means a
quality which is generated by acts and which inclines human beings
towards similar acts. By 'potency' he means a quality that is needed
in order to have acts in the soul. The term 'passion' refers to
phenomena of an appetitive potency of the soul. Sometimes it is used
to refer to all the appetitive acts and their consequences (pleasure and
distress) in the soul. Sometimes it refers only to some of them (for
CONCLUSION
175
instance, vehement acts). Whether both the sensory appetite and the
will are taken to be subjects of passions remains undear in some
texts. In Quodlibet II, q. 17, Ockham assumes a dear position of his
own on passions. By 'passion' he means every form that exists in an
appetitive potency that can naturally can be regulated by right reason
and which requires an actual cognition in order to exist. In other
words, according to him, a passion is a form distinct from a
cognition, a form which exists in an appetitive potency, and one
which requires an actual cognition in order to exist. The result is that
acts of the sensory appetite and the will are passions, and so are
pleasure and distress in the will, which are not acts.
On the whole, Ockham, in accordance with his principle of
economy, wants to identify the passions with the acts of an appetitive
potency as far as possible. In addition to the passions that are acts,
however, he has to posit two passions that normally follow them,
namely pleasure and distress. In Quodlibeta, where Ockham dearly
admits that the will in addition to the sensory appetite is a subject of
passions, he ends up thinking that even pleasure and distress are
really distinct from acts only in the will. Pleasure and distress in the
will are passions and not acts, since they cannot naturally exist
without acts of the will by which they are caused and conserved.
Passions as appetitive phenomena are, according to Ockham, distinct
from cognitions, but cognitions are usually their partial causes.
Therefore, right reason can regulate them.
Despite admitting that the term 'passion' can be used both for
sensory and intellectual phenomena, Ockham most often uses it for
acts of sensory appetite, and even for them, mostly in moral contexts.
As a matter of fact, positing passions only in the sensory part of the
human being was the traditional solution since Augustine. This was
because the passions were thought to be essentially connected to
bodily changes, and the phenomena of the will were not thought to
be such. Sometimes in the Middle Ages, the term 'passion' was used
for the phenomena of the will, but only in a loose sense or in another
sense than was applied to the forms in the sensory appetite. For
instance, Thomas Aquinas thought that by taking the term 'passion'
176
CONCLUSION
analogicaUy, one could posit passions in the will. By the end of the
13th century, however, the Franciscans seem to have begun to
reassess this solution. Before Ockham, at least Duns Scotus posited
passions in the will without emphasizing that it was a question of
passions in the loose sense of the term.
Another traditional solution with respect to passions was that
they were thought to be 'passions' also in the sense that they were
passive reactions to cognitions, in the sense that they were not free
acts of their subject. Ockham does not employ this criterion for
passions. For the acts of the sensory appetite it would, in his view, be
appropriate, but not regarding the acts of the will. There are,
however, according to Ockham, certain phenomena in the will that
are not freely caused by the will. Pleasure and distress are such
phenomena. It is worth noting that even in the places where Ockham
does not caU the acts of the will 'passions', he caUs pleasure and
distress 'passions'. Another group of the phenomena of the will that
are not its free acts are the acts necessitated by other acts of the will.
All those phenomena posited by Ockham could also be called
'passions' in the sense that they are not free acts of the will.
Why did Ockham and the other Franciscans end up diverging
from the beaten track and calling also certain phenomena of the will
'passions'? A reason might be that, according to them, the will and
its phenomena resemble the sensory appetite and its phenomena.
According to the Franciscans, the intellectual cognitions which
partially cause phenomena of the will do not only deal with universal
but also singular objects. In addition, the will is not bound by the
judgments of reason. Some of its acts are unpremeditated reactions
to things, and even when the intellect estimates alternative ways of
reaction, the will does not necessarily conform to the judgments of
reason. Even though the reactions of the sensory appetite are natural
and the reactions of the will are free, both of them are subjective
reactions of a human being.
In the third chapter 1 studied the sensory passions which
Ockham identifies with the acts of the sensory appetite. Sensory
cognitions are the most important efficient causes of the sensory
CONCLUSION
177
passions. There are both intuitive and abstractive sensory cognitions.

An intuitive cognition of a thing includes a kind of notification of the
thing that is apprehended, but it is not a proper judgment of the
existence of the thing. The external objects are known intuitively in
the five exterior senses, and the interior objects (sensory acts) in the
interior senses. In the natural course of things, intuitive cognitions of
objects are caused by the objects themselves as present. Abstractive
cognition is a cognition by which one cannot evidently know
contingent truths. Abstractive cognitions exist in the interior senses.
In the natural course of events, abstractive cognitions of objects are
caused by the intuitive cognitions of those objects or by the habits
generated by previous abstractive cognitions of the objects
concerned. Ockham thinks that an intuitive cognition of a thing can
suffice by it self to cause a passion in the sensory appetite. Often,
however, passions are caused by various abstractive cognitions. With
the help of habits, there can be sensory abstractive cognitions even
about complex objects. Regardless of what kind of cognition
functions as a cause, the sensory appetite is necessitated to act,
provided that the thing cognized is agreeable or disagreeable to the
appetite. It cannot resist the acts in it caused by the cognitions.
Sometimes, when Ockham speaks about cognitions causing passions,
he very strongly connects passions with certain senses. In most ofhis
texts, however, Ockham finds it sufficient to speak only about the
sensory appetite as a subject of the appetitive phenomena.
Although Ockham seems to think that sensory cognitions of
objects are (taken naturally) sufficient causes of the passions of
sensory appetite, he does not seem to think that they always function
as their total causes. Whether the sensory appetite itself is a partial
efficient cause of some of its acts remains unclear. At least, it is not
a cause of pleasure and pain in it self. As a matter of fact, Ockham
does not seem to be interested in the sensory appetite as a cause of its
passions. Instead, he is very interested in the habits or some other
things which incline the sensory appetite towards acts after there
have been acts in it. In Quodlibeta, Ockham strongly defends the
stand that there are no habits inclining towards similar acts generated
178
CONCLUSION
from acts in the sensory appetite. Corporeal qualities, such as heat

and coldness, generated by the acts of the sensory appetite through
exterior acts take their place. As sensible qualities, they cause acts in
the sensory appetite through sensory cognitions. They have relevance
for moral behavior, and they can even themselves be caHed 'moral
virtues', but their moral virtuousness is only extrinsic. There can
even be passions in the sensory appetite that do not have any
cognitions of their objects as their causes. Such passions of sensory
appetite are caused only by corporeal qualities. As examples,
Ockham mentions hunger and thirst in newbom children. It is
obvious that if a passion is posited without any cognition of its
object, difficulties arise in localizing it among the types of the
passions which are organized according to certain cogniti ve contents.
Ockham admits that, in the case of newbom babies, one cannot make
a distinction between an act or passion of appetite (desire) for food
and the pain of not having food.
Acts in the will are also considered by Ockham as partial
efficient causes of the passions of sensory appetite. Ockham says that
acts (and habits through them) of the will have passions of the
sensory appetite as their common objects, in the same way as bodily
executive operations. Through its acts (and habits), the will is
moraHy bound to curb overwhelming and deficient passions and
arouse moderate ones. On the whole, the virtuous will is bound to
make sure that the passions are moderate with respect to the
circumstances. The passions might also be in accordance with the
circumstances naturally, but in order to be morally virtuous, they
have to be conformed to a virtuous volition. Not aH the passions of
sensory appetite can be objects of acts of will. According to Ockham,
there are or can be sensory passions that are not objects of acts of
will and thus within a human being's power. At least precipitate and
exces si ve or vehement passions are like that. In the case of the
precipitate passions, the apprehension causes the passion so that the
person cannot control it by an act of his or her will. Excessive and
vehement passions impede the use of reason, and it can even happen
that the person has no intellections or volitions at aH. This is possible
CONCLUSION
179
because a passion can effect the corporeal quality which enables

intellections and volitions. Even the precipitate and excessive
passions can, however, perhaps be controlled indirectly by
controlling some of their causes, like cognitions and corporeal
qualities.
After looking at the causes of the passions of the sensory
appetite, 1 discussed briefly what they, in their turn, cause. Ockham
thinks that they effect bodily behavior and states. Medieval writers
traditionally thought that the causation for a great deal of the bodily
executive operations comes from the passions in the sensory
appetite, and Ockham seems to take this for granted. In the
traditional way, Ockham also links such acts as laughing with
pleasure and crying with pain. Ockham also refers to such bodily
effects of the passions as certain colors in the face. Because it is
obvious to Ockham that various bodily qualities (such as heat and
coldness) follow sensory passions, he rejects habits from the sensory
appetite. In some texts Ockham also focuses his attention on the
effects of the passions of the sensory appetite with respect to acts of
will.
In sensory appetite, Ockham posits a four-fold division of
basic, 'concupiscible' phenomena, not six-fold, as in the will.
Ockham thinks that there is desire for absent good objects, pleasure
regarding present good objects, avoidance of absent bad objects, and
pain regarding present bad objects. There is no love and hatred
distinct from pleasure and pain in the sensory appetite. On this basis,
it could perhaps be said that to illustrate the phenomena of the
sensory appetite Ockham seems to accept the Stoic model, which
involves four types of acts: positive and negative acts towards absent
and present things. That model was commonly known in the Middle
Ages and was used especially in the early part of that period. In
addition to the passions that were traditionally considered as
'concupiscible', Ockham, in various texts and contexts, posits at
least some of the passions that were traditionally considered as
'irascible' in the sensory appetite. However, Ockham seems to think
that the phenomena of sensory appetite are quite elementary and
180
CONCLUSION
show similarities to the functions of a non-psychic natural appetite.

The phenomena associated with the will are more sophisticated.
In the fourth chapter, 1 analyzed the passions of the wilI. Not
aU of them are acts, but there are two passions that are only passions
(caused by the acts of the will), namely pleasure and distress. One of
the causes of the passions of the will is intellectual cognition. As in
the sensory cognitive potency, there are intuitive and abstractive
cognitions of things in the intellect, but there are also cognitions
having complex objects, judgments. In the natural course of events,
the intuitive intellectual cognitions of exterior (sensible) things are
caused by present things and the sensory cognitions conceming them.
The intuitive intellectual cognitions of the things inside the
intellectual soul are caused by present things themselves and by an
act of the wilI. The abstractive cognitions of things are caused by
intuitive acts conceming those things or by habits generated by
previous abstractive cognitions. In order to have cognitions that have
complex objects, such as judgments, an act of the will is needed,
besides the cognitions, as a partial cause. Intellectual cognitions are,
according to Ockham, naturally necessary partial efficient causes of
those passions of the will which are acts. Ockham thinks that a
purely intuitive cognition of a thing can partially cause an act in the
will. Probably quite often there are also abstractive cognitions and
judgments of reason contributing to the acts of the will. The essential
thing with judgments of reason is that the will does not necessarily
conform to them. It can conform, but it can also not conform. The
human will, because of its defectiveness, can even will something
that the intellect finds impossible or involving a contradiction. Any
object whatever that is somehow agreeable to the will or to the
person, either truly or as estimated to be such, can be an object of
willing. Correspondingly, any object whatever that is somehow
disagreeable, either truly or as estimated, can be an object of willingagainst. By God's power, there can be acts in the will without any
cognition at alI. Ockham does not speculate about such acts, but on
the basis of what he says about the passions of sensory appetite
caused without cognitions, one can surmise that he believes it might
CONCLUSION
181
be difficult for human beings ta distinguish them. Those passions of

the will which are not acts, namely pleasure and distress, are
sufficiently caused by acts of the will, but certain cognitions can
intensify them.
The will itself is also a partial efficient cause of those passions
which are its acts. It is a special cause, since it is free in the meaning
of contingency. The freedom of the will does not mean, however,
that the will would not be inc1ined ta anything by itself. At least it is
sa inc1ined ta will something that causes sensory pleasure. Those
passions of the will which are not acts, namely pleasure and distress,
are not even partially caused by the will immediately, but by certain
acts of the will. According ta Ockham, the first Of absolute acts Of
the will, which are free, can, together with a cognition, necessitate
the will ta have other acts, that is, the acts which he calls the second
acts, and these can, in their turn, necessitate other acts. For instance,
if someone effectively wills ta become healthy and knows that he ar
she cannot become healthy without drinking a bitter medicine, his ar
her will is necessitated ta will the bitter medicine. Ockham admits
that in this case the act of willing the bitter medicine is caused by the
act of willing health together with the cognition concerned, without
any further activity of the will. Those passions of the will which are
not acts, pleasure and distress, are sufficiently caused by
complacence- Of amicable love -acts of the will Of by their negative
counterparts with respect ta present objects. After acts, the will can,
because of habits generated from them, be inc1ined ta similar acts.
Ockham seems ta hesitate over whether the habits in the will can
necessitate the will ta will something. If they can, the acts
necessitated by them can be called 'first movements' of the will.
Such acts are excused from sin, accOfding ta the authorities. Even the
passions of the sensory appetite are at least such immediate partial
efficient causes of acts of will that, having them, it is easier for the
will ta cause certain acts in itself. The real difficulty of the will with
respect ta the sensory passions still comes from the will it self: It is
difficult for the will not ta consent ta them because of the will itself,
but it should not consent if they are not good, and it can do sa.
182
CONCLUSION
After dealing with the causation of the passions and acts of the
will, 1 examined what the passions and acts of the will, in their turn,
immediately cause. At least those passions of the will that are acts
have an effect on the will itself. The acts can cause habits as well as
other (so-called second) acts in the will. Some acts also cause
passions that are not acts. Further, the passions of the will have an
effect on bodily behavior, just as the sensory passions have. Like the
passions of the sensory appetite, the passions of the will can also
cause absolute qualities in the body. Ockham, for instance, thinks
that pleasure may cause health. An important group of effects, which
at least those passions of the will which are acts have, are the effects
on the passions of the sensory appetite.
Even though Ockham does not say so explicitly, he de Jacto
considers the phenomena of the will in keeping with the division of
acts into 'concupiscible' and 'irascible' ones. His principal attention
is drawn to the 'concupiscible' phenomena of the will. He applies
various c1assifications to them. The first c1assification might be
characterized as an approach to the passions of the will as such. It
answers the question how something is willed Of willed-against, or
what kind of reaction one has to something. Its elements are desire
and avoidance, love and hatred, pleasure and distress. Unlike in the
sensory appetite, the four-fold division of basic, 'concupiscible'
phenomena does not work in the will. Against Peter Auriol' s view,
Ockham to agreat extent proves that, in addition to desire/avoidance,
and pleasure/distress, one has to posit a third pair of phenomena in
the will. The terms used for the positive acts concerned are 'love',
and 'complacence', and for the negative acts concerned 'hatred', and
'displicence'. Thus, the basic passions of the will are desire and
avoidance, love/complacence and hatredl'displicence', and pleasure
and distress. The objects of desire and avoidance are absent things,
the objects of love/complacence and hatredl'displicence' are either
absent Of present things, and the objects of pleasure and distress are
present things. Lovelcomplacence and perhaps hatredl'displicence'
are or can be absolute and, as such, free acts of the will, while desire
and avoidance are acts necessitated by them. Pleasure and distress
CONCLUSION
183
are not acts at alI but only passions of the will caused and conserved
by simultaneous love/complacence- or hatredl'displicence' -acts with
respect to present objects. The second c1assification answers the
question why something is willed. Its elements are amicable love and
wanting love. Amicable love is loving something in itself and
because of itself, and wanting love is loving something because of
something else. The third c1assification answers the question as to
whether something is willed as the highest or less high good. Its
elements are enjoyment and use. Broadly taken, 'enjoyment' refers to
amicable love regarding an object taken as supreme. Strictly taken,
only the actus ultimus beatificus is enjoyment. Broadly taken, 'use'
refers to every act of the will, and strictly taken, it refers to acts of
will that are distinct from (alI) enjoyment. Taking 'use' most
properly, not alI the acts that are not enjoyments are uses, but only
acts with respect to an object because of something else. Taking
'use' in this meaning, there is love of an object on account of the
object itself (i.e., amicability), that is simply absolute love of an
object, without taking the object as the highest or non-highest. This
act is sometimes called the 'middle act'. Only God is the object of
orderly enjoyment. No enjoyment of anything can satiate the will so
that the will could not elicit acts with respect to other objects, but
heavenly enjoyment offers the will satiation in the meaning of lack of
distress and anxiety. Earthly enjoyment cannot even do that. In
addition to the basic ('concupiscible') acts or passions, there are
other acts in the will, the ones that were traditionally called
'irascible'. They are caused partially by the basic acts of the will, and
partially by a certain act of believing in the intellect. Among them,
Ockham posits at least hope, despair and fear.
Ockham's theory of passions does not involve colorful or
dramatic illustrations of passions or the philosophy of life -type of
detailed teaching on how to live with various passions. Rather,
Ockham's analysis of passions is a cool and technical, semanticontologic al c1arification of certain phenomena of the human being
and reality. Employing his 'razor', Ockham takes great pains to
prove that most passions do not differ from appetitive acts of the
184
CONCLUSION
souls. Only two passions differ, namely pleasure and distress in the
will. Here we have Ockham's other key point conceming passions:
besides the sensory appetite, there are passions in the will. Passions
as appetitive phenomena are, according to Ockham, not cognitions,
but usually require them. Therefore, right reason can regulate
passlOns.
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NAMEINDEX
Adams, Marilyn McCord ix,
3, 4, 8-10, 13, 14, 31, 33,
35, 41, 76, 77, 111, 117,
122, 124
Alanen, Lilli ix
Albert the Great 2, 6
Alcuin 2
Alexander of Aphrodisias 43
Alexander of Hales 35
Anselm of Canterbury 71
Aquinas see Thomas Aquinas
Aristotle 5, 6, 12, 13, 16,
18-20, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56,
59, 61, 62, 67, 68, 71, 88,
104, 106, 172, 174
Augustine 71, 156, 175
Auriol see Peter Auriol
Averroes 6
A vicenna 5, 6
Baudry, Uon 3, 31, 53, 80,
115, 119, 158, 161
Boehner, Philotheus 3
BoIer, John 8, 13
Bonaventure, 1, 5
Brampton, C.K. 5
Brennan, Robert Edward 100
Brown, Deborah J. 9
Brown, Stephen 5
Buescher, Gabriel 15
Chalmers, David 8
Chatton, Walther 111
Clark, David W. 119-121, 131

Copleston, Frederick 37
Courtenay, William J. 3, 142,
163
Damiata, Marino 3, 35, 36,40,
43,47,157,165,166
Descartes, Rene 15
Duns Scotus see John Duns
Scotus
Durandus of Saint-Pourc;ain
165
Etzkom, Girard J. ix, 3,4, 14,
36
Federhofer, Franz 2, 37, 47,
48
Freppert, Lucan 97, 122
Fuchs, Oswald 3, 50, 51, 57,
77,80-82,88,93,115,135
Gal, Gedeon 165
Gannon, William Thomas 37,
40,41
Georgedes, Kimberly 3, 142,
156, 162-164
Ghisalberti, Alessandro 43, 47
Gilson, Etienne 2, 3
Goddu, Andre 8
Grant, Edward 15
Guilelmus Altissiodorensis
148
Hallamaa, OHi ix
Harvey, Ruth 6
201
202
NAMEINDEX
Henninger, Mark 14
Henry of Ghent 48
Hochstetter, Erich 2
Holopainen, Taina M. ix, 3,
41,43,97,101,122,167
Imbach, Ruedi 15
John Duns Scotus 1, 2, 7, 11,
36,43,48,49,71,72,76,
108, 109, 127, 140, 144,
145, 148-151, 157, 176
John of la Rochelle 100
John of Reading 144, 145
Jordan, Mark D. 100
Karger, Elisabeth 76
Kent, Bonnie Dorrick 72, 92,
119
King, Peter 50, 72, 100

Kirjavainen, Heikki ix
Klima, Gyula 13
Klocker, Harry R. 36,45, 166
Knuuttila, Simo ix, 5, 6, 73,
100,104
Kretzmann, Norman 124
Kuc, Leszek 35, 119, 156,
157, 166
Kug1er, Lothar 2
Kusch, Martin 1
Leff, Gordon 3,5,12,31,151,
159, 160
Leffler, Oliver 8
Leibold, Gerhard 5
Lottin, Odon 131
Loux, Michael J. 8, 14
Mannermaa, Tuomo ix
Massobrio, Simona 31
McGrade, Arthur Stephen ix,

3, 148, 156, 157, 159-163,
165, 166
McMullin, E. 25
Michon, Cyrille 8
Miethke, Jiirgen 5
Moody, Emest 12
Miiller, Sigrid 122
Muralt, Andre de 111
Normore, Ca1vin G. ix, 4, 8, 9
Panaccio, Claude 8, 13
Perler, Dominik 49, 121
PeterAuriol7, 140, 141, 142,
145-149, 151
Peter of Spain 6
Pluta, Olaf 1, 2, 43
Praepositinus of Cremona 148
Richter, Vladimir 5
Roger Bacon 1, 2, 35
Saarinen, Risto ix, 120
Scotus see J ohn Duns Scotus
Siebeck, Hermann 2
Siger of Brabant 43
Spade, Paul Vincent 8-10, 13,
14
Suk, Othmar 92
Tachau, Catherine H. 76
Thomas Aquinas 6,47,48, 49,
72, 100, 152, 157, 176
Tweedale, Martin 8
Tyorinoja, Reijo ix
Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm 111
Webering, Damascene 12
Weisheipl, James A. 5,27,31
Wengert, Robert G. 76
NAMEINDEX
Wemer, Karl 1, 142
White, Graham 13,20
Whiting, Margot ix
William of Auvergne 1
William ofWare 157
Williams, Thomas 11,43, 109
Wolter, Allan B. 27, 32
Wood, Rega 12, 14, 97, 122,
132
Yrjonsuuri, Mikko ix, 8, 111
Zavalloni, Robert 35
203
SUBJECT INDEX
anger (ira) 54, 59, 60, 62, 66,
97, 100, 105, 170
animal 8, 14, 19, 24, 33, 36,
39,40,48, 139, 171; brute
36,42,48,81,94
anxiety (anxietas) 161, 162,
183
appetite see natural appetite,
sensory appetite, will
Aristotelian 4, 6, 20, 21, 34,
52,53,60,148,170
avoidance (fuga) 84, 85,
100-105, 115, 127, 128,
140-146, 148, 149, 167,
168, 170, 179, 182
beatitude 144, 159
benevolence 151, 152
blessed 120, 143, 159-161,
165
body 6,36-39,42,43,47,49,
50, 57, 58, 71, 76, 77, 99,
108, 119, 138, 173, 174,
179, 182
categorematic term 7, 8, 171;
absolute 7-12, 14, 23, 70,
171, 172; connotative 7-9,
12-15, 70, 171; see also
term, signification
category 8, 9, 13,53
child 81, 94, 97,178
absolute
term
see
categorematic term
accident 36-38, 54
act 6, 17, 21, 32, 34, 35, 41,
42, 47, 48, 50-73, 75-91,
93-99, 101, 103-118, 120,
122-128, 130-146, 148,
151, 152, 154, 156-160,
163, 164, 166, 168, 169,
172-184, see also
cognition, passion etc.;
actuality 34, 45
action 30,88, 108, 125, 135
advantageous (commodum) or
disadvantageous
(incommodum) 116
affection (affectio): appetitive
phenomenon 71; affectio
commodi 71, 127; affectio
iusti 71; a class of quality
17,52
agreeable or disagreeable 81,
86, 127, 130, 177, 180
amicability or amicable love
(amicitia, amor amicitiae)
54, 59, 62, 127, 128, 140142, 145, 148-155, 158,
162, 163, 168, 181, 183
angel 12,30, 124, 149
205
206
SUBJECT INDEX
circumscriptive 38, 42, 73

circumstances 61, 96, 119,
122, 178
cognition 2, 3, 15,51,54,55,
64, 68, 70, 72, 173, 175,
184; intuitive 9, 57, 60, 69,
76-78; abstractive 57, 60,
68, 69, 76, 78; see also
sensory cognition,
intellectual cognition
color 8, 12, 15, 19-21,36,37,
53,77,99,171,179
complacence (complacentia)
127, 128, 130, 141-143,
146-148, 150, 151, 167,
181-183
complete or total being 26, 33,
38,39,173
concupiscence
(concupiscentia) 54, 59,
62, 90, 92, 150, see also
wanting love
concupiscible see passion
connotati ve term see
categorematic term
consent 122, 136, 181
continence 92
contingency or contingent 78,
88,113,118-121,134,137,
177, 181
courage (audacia) 54, 59, 62,
100, 105, 170
cry 99, 179
damned 143,144
definition: nominal 12; real

9-12,14,23-25,31,32,36,
171,
172;
per
additamentum 11, 12, 26,
32-34, 171
desire (desiderium) 54, 59, 62,
84-86, 94, 100-105, 115,
118, 125, 127, 128, 130,
140-150, 153, 167, 169,
170,178, 179, 182
despair (desperatio) 100, 105,
169, 170, 183
detest(detestatio) 131, 155
deviI or evi! angel 143, 144,
147, 149
devotion 150
displicence (displicentia) 142,
146, 148, 168, 182, 183
disposition 75, 76, 107, 108; a
c1ass of quality 16, 17, 52,
66, 172
distress (tristitia) 19, 54, 55,
59, 60, 63-68, 70, 72, 86,
101, 104, 107, 115, 118,
125-132, 137, 140-142,
144-146, 149, 161, 162,
167, 168, 174-176,
180-184
Dominican 157
element 25
enjoyment (fruitio) 3, 140,
141, 144, 156-166, 168,
183
envy (invidia) 54, 59, 62, 131
Eucharist 15
SUBJECT INDEX
experience or experiential 9,
32, 36, 42, 50, 77, 83,
88-90, 111, 121, 122, 133,
134, 150, 169, 173
extension 30-32, 42, 49, 50,
173, 174
exterior operation or bodily
behavior 60, 95, 99, 138,
178, 179, 182
exterior sense 50, 77, 81-83,
86, 174, 177; hearing 38,
49,50,77, 114, 173, 174;
sight 12, 19,38,49,50,77,
83, 173, 174; sme1l50, 77,
174; touch 19, 20, 50, 77,
104, 174; taste 19, 20, 50,
77, 104, 174; see also
sense
faith 37,42, 165, 166
fantasy see sense
fear (timor) 19,54,55,59,62,
65, 81, 97, 99, 100, 105,
169, 170, 183
felicity 159
first movement 131, 181
form: accidental 32, 53, 64,
68, 72, 175, see also
accident, quality;
substantial 5, 6, 14, 25-38,
40-42,45,46,49,173,see
also form of corporeity,
vegetative soul, sensory
soul, intellectual soul;
specific 40, 173; ultimate
207
40, 173; of the whole 36; a

c1ass of quality 16
form of corporeity 35-38, 43,
44,173
fornication 98, 104
Franciscan 6, 35, 37, 72, 73,
157, 176
freedom 3, 41, 72, 73, 88,
118-121, 123-125, 127,
128, 134-136, 137, 176,
181, 182
furious 144
genus 9, 10, 12-14,23-26,33,
45,46,171,172
God or divine 9, 28, 42, 75,
107, 119, 120, 122-124,
126, 140, 150, 151, 153,
156, 158-162, 164, 165,
164-167,183; God's power
15, 26, 31, 33, 39, 109,
112, 116, 169, 173, 180
good intention 124
hability 58
habit 3, 51, 52, 56-59, 62-64,
67-70, 75, 77-84, 88-93,
95,96, 107, 109, 113, 114,
118, 130-132, 135-138,
174, 177-182; a c1ass of
quality 16, 17,52,56, 172
hatred (odium) 54, 59, 62,
100, 104, 115, 140-142,
146, 154-156, 167, 168,
179, 182, 183
health 125, 139, 153, 181, 182
208
SUBJECT INDEX
hope (spes) 62, 65, 66, 100,

105, 169, 170, 183
hostile 55
human being 4, 5, 7, 8, 14,
23-25, 29, 32, 34-37,
39-46, 48, 50, 63, 71, 73,
87-89,91,95,97,100,111,
112, 117, 153, 166,
171-176,178, 181,183,see
also matter, form of
corporeity, sensory soul,
intellectual soul
humor 92, 139
hunger 94, 178
illness 15, 19, 139
imagination see sense
in quale 10, 23, 173
in quid 10, 23, 172
inc1ination 28, 56, 58, 63, 78,
83, 88-93, 98, 108, 114,
115, 122, 130-137, 174,
177,178,181
individuation 30
infinite regress 111, 112
inherence 14, 15,54, 171
intellect 8, 40, 48, 49, 69, 73,
77, 80, 98, 108-114, 116,
119, 124, 127, 133, 154,
169, 170, 174, 176, 180,
183, see also intellectual
cognition
intellection 15,21,43,53,98,
111, 112, 137, 178, 179,
see also intellectual
cognition, intellect, act
intellectual cognition 67, 73,

107, 108, 110, 115-118,
124-127, 130, 133, 134,
137, 157, 176, 180, 181;
intuitive 108-115, 180;
abstractive 109, 113, 115,
116, 180; having complex
object 80, 113, 114, 177,
180; judgment 61, 73, 77,
81,86, 109, 115, 116, 165,
176, 177, 180; see also
intellect, memory, recalling
act
intellectual soul or form 24,
32, 35, 39-44, 48, 51, 69,
88, 95, 98, 108-110, 173,
174, 180, see also intellect,
will
interior sense 50, 69, 78-81,
83, 84, 86, 174, 177;
common 50, 174; fantasy
50, 78, 79, 83, 84, 174;
imagination 21, 80, 165
irascible see pas sion
joy (gaudium) 54, 59, 62, 65,
66,97, 100
judgment see cognition
justice (iustitia) 52, 59, 62,
138
knowledge see cognition
language: mental 8; natural 7,
9,20,23
laugh 99, 179
liberum arbitrium 119
SUBJECT INDEX
life 35, 37, 39, 56, 153, 155,

159, 162, 173
love (amor, dilectio) 62, 65,
70, 100, 104, 112, 115,
117, 118, 120, 127, 128131, 140-156, 158,
161-165, 167, 168, 179,
181-183
mad55
matter: prime matter 11, 14,
24-34, 36-40, 43-46, 51,
71, 173; other meanings
25, 71
medicine 6, 90, 125, 155, 181
memory: intellectual 49, 80,
113-115; sensory 80
meritorious 124, 165
metaphysics 4, 10, 23-25, 172
misery 159
natural appetite 51, 106, 142,
180
natural philosophy 4, 7, 10,
23,24,172
natural potency or impotency
16, 17,52, 172
Ockham's razor 63, 70, 90,
175, 183
ontology or ontologic al 4, 8,
13,16,25,40,67,183
organ 38, 47, 49, 50, 57, 76,
108, 173, 174, see also
body
pain (dolor) 62, 63, 66, 82,
85-88,94,97-99, 101-105,
125, 126, 133, 177-179
209
papal commission in Avignon

160, 165
Parisian Articles of 1277 15,
35,40,120
partial being 26, 33, 173
particular 13, 109
passible quality: appetitive
phenomenoninthe soul 55,
56, 58, 172; a class of
quality 16, 18, 19, 20, 53,
55, 172
passion (passio): appetitive
phenomenon in the soul 35,7,19,20,47,52-55,5764, 66-68, 70, 106, 171,
172, 174-176, 183,184,see
also passion in the sensory
appetite, pas sion in the
will; concupiscible 100,
104-106, 140, 141, 167169, 179, 182, 183;
irascible 100, 105, 106,
140, 167-169, 179, 182,
183; excessive 97, 98, 178,
179; precipitate 97, 98,
117, 118, 127, 178, 179;
vehement 60, 61, 97, 98,
104, 134, 137, 175, 178;
see also desire, love,
pleasure etc.; a class of
quality 16, 18-20, 172;
other meanings 53-54, 67,
88
passion in the sensory appetite
60-63, 70-72, 75, 76, 81,
210
SUBJECT INDEX
82, 85-88, 90, 92-101, 103107, 122, 132-140, 175-182,

184, see also passion, desire,
pleasure etc.
pas sion in the will 4, 62, 6467, 70-72, 107, 108, 112,
115, 117-119, 125, 126,
132, 137-140, 142, 143,
145, 148, 167-170, 175,
176, 180-184, see also
passion, desire, love,
pleasure etc.
passionate 61, 63
per se primo modo 31
per se secundo modo 31, 54
pity (misericordia) 54, 59
pleasure (delectatio) 50, 54,
55, 59, 60, 68-70, 174; in
the sensory appetite 19,55,
63,82,85,86,88,98-105,
122, 125, 126, 133, 177,
179, 181; in the will 55,
64-67, 70, 72, 10 1, 104,
107, 115, 117, 118, 125132, 137, 139-147, 149,
150, 158-160, 162, 165167,175,176,180-184
potency: a faculty of the soul
4,47-51,56,61,172,174,
see also sensory cognition
(faculty), sensory appetite
(faculty), intellect, will; a
quality of the soul 47, 57,
59, 62, 67, 68, 174, see
also natural potency;
potentiality 27, 28, 32,

45,161
prime matter see matter
principle of economy see
Ockham' s razor
quality: absolute or nonabsolute 8, 13-16, 30-32,
36, 45, 46, 51, 171-173;
c1asses of 16-21, 52-56,
172; of the soul 4, 15, 21,
32,47,52-69,172,173,see
also cognition, passion
etc.; corporeal 18-21, 3637, 53, 55, 66, 75, 76, 8894, 98, 99, 108, 137-139,
172, 178, 179, 182
quantity 8, 29, 30
reason 61, 73, 97, 104, 116,
121, 123, 130, 149, 165,
169, 176,178, 180; natural
13, 42, 43, 162; right 63,
64, 70, 122, 133, 175, 184
recalling
act
(ac tus
recordandi) 68, 80, 114
reciprocity 151, 152
reflecti ve act 111, 112
relation 13-16, see also union
rest (quietatio) 140, 157, 158,
162
resurrection 29, 39,44
revenge (vindicatio) 101, 144
satiation (satietas) 120, 140,
160-162, 183
scientific knowledge (scientia)
52, 70
SUBJECT INDEX
sensation 21, 50, 53, 85, 86,

91, 174, see also sense,
sensory cognition
sense 18-20, 50, 66, 80, 86,
109, 110, 127, 174, 177,
see also exterior sense,
interior sense
sensory appetite (faculty) or
sensory appetitive potency
4, 41, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55,
58, 60-64, 70-73, 75, 76,
81-101,103-107,115,117,
123, 125, 126, 132-140,
174-182, 184, see also
pas sion in the sensory
appetite, sensory soul
sensory cognition 19, 20, 55,
75, 76, 85, 87, 91, 93, 94,
98,101,103,104,108-110,
113,176-180; intuitive 18,
60, 68, 69, 77-79, 81-85,
177; abstractive 60, 78, 79,
81-86, 177; see also
sensory cognition (faculty),
memory, sense
sensory cognition (faculty) or
sensory cognitive potency
48, 76, 80, 84, 85, 109,
113, 114, 174, 180; see
also sensory cognition
sensory soul or form 35-39,
41, 43, 44, 48-51, 69, 77,
78, 80, 87, 100, 108, 173,
174; see also sensory
211
cognition (facu1ty), sensory

appetite (faculty)
shame (verecundia) 19,99
signification 4, 7-10, 13-15,
23-26, 32, 48, 53, 57, 70,
79,99, 171, 172, 174, see
also term
simple entity 10, 11, 15, 26,
32,37,42
simpleton
97
sin 93, 131, 136, 143, 156,
181
singular 73, 176
soul 4, 6, 15, 18-21, 23, 24,
34-35, 39, 47, 48, 50-60,
62, 64, 66-68, 70, . 88,
172-174, 184, see also
vegetative soul, sensory
soul, intellectual soul, form
species 16, 79, 109, 113, 160
substance 6, 8, 10-16, 23-26,
31-34, 40, 42, 45, 46, 77,
171-173
supposition 23, 24
syncategorematic term 7, see
also term, signification
temperance 92
term 4-10, 12-15, 17, 18,
23-25, 32, 40, 47, 48,
50-57, 60-64, 70-72, 75,
79, 88, 92, 99, 107, 111,
114, 118, 141, 146-148,
154, 157, 160, 165, 171176,182, see also
categorematic term,
212
SUBJECT INDEX
syncategorematic term,
signification
thirst 94, 178
Thomistic 109
tinder of sin (jomes pe cea ti)
93
union 15, 16,44-46, 140, 142,
174
universal 13, 67, 73, 176
use (uti) 3, 156, 157, 162-164,
165-168,183
vegetative soul or form 35, 36,
48
venereal act 104
vice Of vicious 66, 96
virtue or virtuous 56, 58, 61,
63,66,71,92,93,96,122,
132, 165, 170, 178
volition 15, 21, 95, 96, 98,
126, 127, 129, 136-138,
148, 178, 179, see also
will, pas sion in the will, act
wanting
love
(amor
concupiscentiae) 140-142,
145, 148, 149-154, 165,
168, 183, see also
concupiscence
wi1l2-4,8, 15,41,42,48,49,
51, 54, 62, 64-67, 70-73,
75, 88, 89, 93, 95-99, 101,
104, 106-109, 111-113,
115-170, 174-176,
178-184, see also freedom,
passion in the will
zeal (zelus) 54, 59, 62
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PASSIONS IN WILLIAM OCKHAM' S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Board of Consulting Editors

Aims and Scope

PASSIONS IN WILLIAM OCKHAM' S

Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.

ISBN 978-1-4020-2119-0 (eBook)

Printed on acidjree paper

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2004

CHAPTER 3. SENSORY PASSIONS

CHAPTER 4. PASSIONS OF THE WILL

Quaest. Phys. Arist.

Quaestiones in fibros Physicorum

1.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

See Kusch 1995 and 1999.

psychology, among other things, in the second of these articles.

Siebeck 1888-1889, 1888-1890.

was to give a philosophical analysis of reality".9 On the whole, in the

first systematic analysis that deals with Ockham's theory of

AH of Ockham's philosophical and theological works are

Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Ad fidem codicum

Some researchers have thought that Ockham intended to write an exposition on

medieval philosophical psychology untiI the middle of the thirteenth

Knuuttila 2002. For medieval psycho1ogy, see also Harvey 1975.

contemporaries, such as Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol. My purpose,

1.2. TERMS AND THINGS

they signify things in order to be able to approach the terms dealt

For Ockham's theory of signification, see SL 1, c. 33; OPh 1, 95-96: 2-54.

24 Ockham on categorematic and syncategorematic terms, see SL 1, c. 4; OPh 1, 15-16:

being', 'animal', 'whiteness' and 'blackness' .27 According to Claude

Panaccio 1990,3; 1995, 190; 1999a, 267; 1999b, 56.

Ockham describes the difference between absolute and

Adams 1987,324. Reference to Ockham: SL III-2, c. 29; OPh 1,558-560: 47-100.

Spade 1990,602, footnote 18.

definition that imports the thing as a whole, and it is predicated in

be defined by a strict definition, since simple entities do not have

'whiteness', for instance, can be defined (following Aristotle) as

What are the things in the world signified by various terms?

a substance and a quality.58 According to Ockham, qualities can have

'affection,64 to qualities that are easily changeable. The very same

Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 276: 58-61.

Exp. Praed. Arist., c.14; OPh II, 276: 2 - 282: 26.

He first analyzes the corporeal passible qualities. He claims that, in

Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh 11,277-279: 7-20, 47-61.

Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279: 4-10.

Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 281: 63-66.

Exp. Praed. Arist., c. 14; OPh II, 279-280: 10-15.

2.1. THE HUMAN BEING

THE PASSIONATE HUMAN BEING

reveals the (functional) structure of the human being: the human

SL II1-3, c. 24; OPh 1, 684-685: 34-52.

it signifies is not a composite substance but a simple entity.6 It may

materia et forma substantialis sunt per reductionem in praedicamento substantiae quia

THE PASSIONATE HUMAN BEING

intelligible in itself, without form. IO Thus, in Summula philosophiae

like an empty space for something. 14 Ockham thinks that matter is an

THE PASSIONATE HUMAN BEING

matter successiveIy receives various forms in history19, and it has the

What is the function of prime matter in the world and

THE PASSIONATE HUMAN BEING

extended in themselves. 26 Thus, it is difficult to say what is the

In addition to prime matter, there are substantial forms in the

Wolter 1965, 142.