GONZALEZ III V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues
relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionallycreated office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before
PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza
and four others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw also filed a similar charge
before the Office of the City Prosecutor,. While said cases were still pending, the
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over,
upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in
relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et at al in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was
dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant
had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of
respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of
the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of
the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the
complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision
finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et al guilty of Grave Misconduct was
approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval,
in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on August 23, 2010 in a desperate
attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of
eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months
without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman-prescribed rules
to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases

within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is
no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their
sons and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent
petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant
of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor
Barreras-Sulit
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining
Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA
compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the
hook notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability
for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice
conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. The Committee on Justice passed and
adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the
dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are
violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal
from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
These cases primarily seek to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy
Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who
belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Won granting the President the powerto remove a Deputy Ombudsman
diminishes theindependence of the Office of theOmbudsman
3. WoN dismissal of Gonzalez III was correct
HELD:

First Issue:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's
authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770
declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious
construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to
the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government
officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
Moreover, the Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a
Special Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy
Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an obvious
gap inthe law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly
provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the
same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the
removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that
matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the
law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In
fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special
Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint. In giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply

laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's
constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the
general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the
military and other law enforcement offices.
Second Issue
NO. Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish theIndependence of the Office of theOmbudsman. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to
free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a
protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons
under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Third Issue:
WoN dismissal of Gonzalez III was correct
No.His removal must be for any of the grounds provided in the removal of the
ombudsman. the alleged ground of betrayal of public trust was not present in his
case.
Congress laid down two restrictions on the Presidents exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned
acts, falling short ofconstitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal of
public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by
itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would
amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon
the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the
people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of
the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant

verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained
pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of
petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of
any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the
parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was
likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention
or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative
accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of
duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust.
Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing
of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds forher removal from office as providedfor
under the Constitution and theOmbudsman Act.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed
to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against
petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No.
11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and
omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of
public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman
Act is hereby DENIED.
DOCTRINES
Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing of a
motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Courts review of its ruling on
the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of
the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the
President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy
Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the
legal correctness of the OPs decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other

words, since the validity of the OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is
inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the
whole case including the constitutional issue remains alive for the Courts
consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must
be consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that all
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to
prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of removal only by
impeachment to favoured public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the
minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress
to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of
removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with
constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and
substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the
principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances. The
authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and
cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that
Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.

Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed by the

Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are
created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In
general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these independent
bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
independence would result in the impairment of their core functions. The
deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional
commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent
from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least
insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
independence granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference. Emilio

A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.

Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman reviews a case
for nine days. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In case of public
officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
The Deputy Ombudsman cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OPs
ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five
days as required for Hearing Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v.
Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome

mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature, a sui generis politicolegal process that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by
the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its
initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given
the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding
of guilt. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell BarerasSulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.
Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Courts authori

MORALES V CA AND BINAY

Facts:

Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal cases in connection
with the allegation that he is involved in anomalous activities attending the
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since
Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and
Phases III to V transpired during his first term. His re-election as mayor for a
second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.

The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al. under preventive

suspension.
The CA granted Binays prayer for TRO enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order.
According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO
considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior
term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged.
Under the Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to administrative
cases,
(1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which
the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct;
(2) an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and
(3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known
the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers.

Issue: WoN CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the WPI
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine
Ruling:
No. However, the condonation doctrine
abandonment is prospective in effect.

is

abandoned,

but

the

No. The CA's resolutions were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on the
condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it
cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion
based on its legal attribution.
However, the condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no
constitutional or statutory basis to support it.
The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution, AS A
PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY TO
THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea
that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the
fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
In fact the LGC and the RRACCS precludes condonation since in the first
place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post.
There is no presumption in any statute or procedural rule that the
electorate, when re-electing a local official, do so with knowledge of his life

and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct,
if he had been guilty of any.
In reality, most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and
concealed from the public. Condonation presupposes that the condoner has
actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown.
However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized
as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected.

(longer version)
Morales v CA and Binay
Facts:

A complaint was filed against Binay and other public officers of the City
Government of Makati charging them with administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, and criminal cases for violation of RA 3019, Malversation of
Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to
be involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during
his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.
The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay Jr., et
al., under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without
pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification
of the preventive suspension order.
The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Pea, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, it
found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the
extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised,
considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior
term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant
that he can no longer be administratively charged.

Binays contention:

Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in

2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as
City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative
cases against him moot and academic.
In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain
the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly

deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously
chosen and voted into office.
The Ombudmans contentions:

The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the

evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension
orders.
Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should
have been raised by before it during the administrative proceedings.
There is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB
Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine.
Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the
abandonment is prospective in effect.
A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly
issued.
1. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs
were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. By merely
following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.
B. The Condonation Doctrine
1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or implied forgiveness of an
offense, especially by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."
2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,
a. First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in
which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct.
b. Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor.
c. Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect
officers.
3. It is not based on statutory law but a jurisprudential creation.
a. It originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija. In which case, as there was no legal precedent on the issue
at that time, the Court, resorted to American authorities and found that
the weight of authorities seems to incline toward the rule denying the
right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior
term.

4. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Also, it would not
apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise.
C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
1. There is really no established weight of authority in the US favoring the
doctrine of condonation.
2. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
a. Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which
was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of
public office being a public trust.
3. The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution, AS A
PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY TO
THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea
that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the
fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another
elective post.
4. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
5. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the notion. In fact the
Local Government Code and the RRACCS precludes condonation since in the
first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal
could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post.
6. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have
been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms.
7. The proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are
assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any, is infirm. No such presumption exists in any statute or procedural
rule.
a. Most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and
concealed from the public. At a conceptual level, condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown.
8. Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good

law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon

should be respected.

JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.
Good Faith - - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January
1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently,
then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the
felony of usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that
he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred
that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he
immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counter-affidavit
also stated that he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine
National Police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.
HELD:
NO. The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he
reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive
suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioners own affidavit
states.Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too
flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of
his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law,
they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of
taking the law into their own hands.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. DECHAVEZ

G.R. NO 176702
November 13, 2013

FACTS: Dechaves served as the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture
(NSCA) from 2001 until his retirement in April 2006. On May 5, 2002, on a Sunday,
Dechavez with his wife drove the college service Suzuki Vitara to go to Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental. On their way back to the NSCA, they figured in a vehicular
accident resulting in minor injuries to them and damage to the vehicle. To claim
insurance, Dechavez executed an affidavit before the GSIS which subsequently
granted Dechavez's claims amounting to P308,000.00, while the NSCA
shouldered P71,000.00 as its share in the vehicle's depreciation expense. On
November 11 2002, 20 faculty and staff of the NSCA asked the COA to conduct an
audit investigation of NSCAs expenditures in the accident. The COA dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. Hence the complainants went before the Ombudsman,
Visayas, charging Dechavez with Dishonesty under Section 46(b)(l), Chapter 6, Tile I
of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Ombudsman dismissed Dechavez from the
service with all accessory penalties after finding him guilty, ruling that the
complainants sufficiently established their allegations, while Dechavez's defenses
had been successfully rebutted. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the Ombudsmans findings. It found that
complainants failed to sufficiently show that Dechavez had deliberately lied in his
May 10, 2002 affidavit. Dechavez sufficiently proved that he went on an official tip.
MR likewise denied. The Ombudsman argues that the guilt of Dechavez has been
proven by substantial evidence -the quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings. It likewise invokes its findings and posits that because they are
supported by substantial evidence, they deserve great weight and must be
accorded full respect and credit. Dechavez counters that the petition raises factual
issues that are improper for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. He
adds that the present case has been mooted by his retirement from the service on
April 9, 2006, and should properly be dismissed.

Issues: (1) Can the SC review questions of facts under Rule 45?
(2) Did Dechavezs retirement render moot the present case?

Held. (1) Yes. The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not
an absolute rule that admits of no exceptions. A notable exception is the presence
of conflict of findings of fact between or among the tribunals' rulings on questions of
fact. The case before us squarely falls under this exception as the tribunals below
made two critical conflicting factual findings.
(2) No. Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative
case
does
not

render the case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of
the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his
case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official
innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications.
OCA vs. Juan: Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be
answerable.
Baquerfo v. Sanchez: Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or
retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed
against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be defeated by the acts of the
respondent save only where death intervenes and the action does not survive.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.

G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying
political positions to vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the
former Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally charged by the Fact Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification
of Public Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan
et al. were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal
transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others. The
Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all
leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification
from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter
should not have considered the administrative complaints because: first, Section
20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary

investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x

x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of; and second, the administrative case was filed after
Andutans forced resignation
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation a year after the act was committed.
2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint
against a government employee who had already resigned.
HELD:
1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public
officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object
sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the
public service and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in our
government. Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman
from conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year,
reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the
administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section
20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.

2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against

Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned
prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines
its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service. The SC
observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public officials resignation does
not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the officials
resignation. However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the
present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of
the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case
already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation
obtains. First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he
was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998,
while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and
two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was
forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative
case against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any
official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time may still
be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the
act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State,
other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.