San Beda College of Law CIVIL LAW REVIEW FAMILY CODE

DIVORCE (Art . 26)

ENGRACE NIAL v. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born four children, the petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was
void for lack of a marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Was the subsequent marriage void for lack of a marriage license despite
cohabiting as husband and wife for at least five years?
2. May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
RULING:
1. YES. At the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between
the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".
The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
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distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing
their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.
2. YES. The law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
GRACE J. GARCIA v. REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife
in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree
of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was
solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since
October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE:
Is the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio admissible as evidence
to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy?
RULING:
NO. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not
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take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence. Thus, the Supreme Court remands
the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial
evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
7
surnamed Sagalongos, in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She also filed a petition for letters of
administration. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
Respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.

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ISSUE:
Is the decree of divorce obtained in the US by deceaseds second wife,
automatically recognized in the Philippines?
RULING:
NO. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show
that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and prove.
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO, JR.
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in
1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines
and begot two children. The parties were subsequently divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982. Alice Reyes Van Dorn has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Upton filed suit against petitioner stating that Van Dorns business in Ermita,
Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asked that Van Dorn be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein private respondent
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
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on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject
of this certiorari proceeding.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property. For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and
its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree obtained by Upton in Nevada valid and binding in the
Philippines?
RULING:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.

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