1. GR No.

194709 July 31, 2013

Minette Baptista, et al. v. Rosario Villanueva, et al.
FACTS: Petitioners were former union members of Radio Philippines
Network Employees Union (RPNEU), a legitimate labor organization and
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of
Radio Philippines Network (RPN). Respondents were the unions elected
officers and members.
On April 26, 2005, on suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners and
some other union members, filed a complaint before the executive board
of the company for the impeachment of the union president, but the
action was eventually abandoned.
The impeachment complaint was re-lodged against all the union officers of
RPNEU before the DOLE. A petition for audit covering the years 2000-2004
was also filed.
Thereafter, two written complaints were filed against the petitioners for
alleged violation of the unions CBL which requires exhaustion of remedies
with the union before resorting to the courts. Months later, a different
group of union members filed a complaint against the petitioners and 12
others for alleged commission of an act which violates a CBL provision that
prohibits joining or forming a union outside the 60-day period. The
complaints were consolidated.
The petitioners were requested to answer the complaint and to attend a
scheduled hearing. They denied the charges through an exchange of
communications. They questioned the procedure adopted by the
Committee in its investigation. Later, the Committee submitted a
recommendation for the expulsion of the petitioners. The BOD affirmed the
recommendation and the petitioners were served an expulsion notice.
RPNEUs officers requested that the petitioners be served notices of
termination of employment in compliance with their union security clause.
The petitioners filed separate complaints for ULP questioning the legality
of the expulsion and subsequent termination.
ISSUES: 1. Whether there is unfair labor practice
2. Whether the petitioners were afforded due process in the investigation
HELD:
1. No.
ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers right to
organize. Under the Labor Code, the prohibited act must necessarily
pertain to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of
the CBA. Absent the said vital elements, the acts complained, although
unseemingly unjust, would not constitute ULP.
The petitioners were not able to establish how they were coerced or
restrained by the union in a way that curtailed their right to selforganization. Onus probandi rests upon the party alleging ULP to prove

such.

2. Yes.
Due process is satisfied when a person was notified of the charge against
him and he was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. It cannot be
denied that petitioners were properly notified and were equally afforded
the opportunity to present their side.

2. GR No. 165381 February 9, 2011

Nelson A. Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI) and Hizon, et al.
FACTS: ETPI is engaged mainly in the business of establishing commercial
telecommunications systems and leasing of international datalines or
circuits that pass through the international gateway facility (IGF). The
other respondents are ETPIs officers. Culili was employed as a Technician
in the Field Operations Department. He was promoted to Senior Technician
in the Customer Premises Equipment Management Unit of the Service
Quality Department.
As a telecom company, ETPI was required under RA No. 7925 and EO No.
109 to establish landlines in Metro Manila and certain provinces. However,
due to interconnection problems with PLDT, poor subscription and other
business difficulties, ETPI was forced to halt its roll out of 129,000
landlines already allocated to a number of its employees.
Soon thereafter, ETPI implemented a Right-Sizing Program due to
business troubles and losses. The first phase involved the reduction of
workforce to only those employees that were necessary and that ETPI
could sustain. The second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization
which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of
certain departments.
As part of the first phase, employees who rendered at least 15 years of
service were offered the Special Retirement Program, with the option to
voluntarily retire at an earlier age and a retirement package equivalent of
two and a half months salary for every year of service. The offer was
initially rejected by Eastern Telecommunications Employees Union (ETEU),
the SEBA, but it later agreed to both programs. The retirement program
was available to 102 qualified employees. Culili was the only one who
rejected the offer.

The second phase necessitated the abolition, transfer and merger of

some departments. Among the departments was the Service Quality
Department. The functions of Culilis unit was absorbed by the Business
and Consumer Accounts Department. The function of Culili as Senior
Technician became unnecessary. His position was then abolished due to
redundancy and was absorbed by another employee already with the
Business and Consumer Accounts Department.
When Culili and three others discovered that their names were omitted in
ETPis New Table of Organization, they wrote the union president to protest
such omission. Thereafter, Culili was informed that he was terminated
from employment. Culili protested alleging that neither he nor the DOLE
were formally notified of his termination. He claimed that he only came to
know about it when he was handed a copy of the termination letter and
when he was barred from entering the premises when he reported for
work. He believed that ETPI already decided to dismiss him even before
the letter was served upon him evidenced by an earlier version of the
letter. He also asserted that ETPI contracted out the services he performed
to a labor-only contractor which prove that his functions did not really
become unnecessary, and this violated their CBA. He also claimed that he
was discriminated against when he was not offered the additional benefit
in the form of motorcycles offered to other employees who availed the
Special Retirement Program.
ETPI denied Culilis claims. It averred that since Culili did not avail of the
Special Retirement Program and his position was subsequently declared
redundant, it had no choice but to terminate Culili. Also, Culili still reported
for work despite the notice of termination which he ignored. ETPI also
alleged that Culili informed his superiors that he would agree to his
termination if he would be given special work tools which were worth
almost a million pesos.
Culili filed a complaint against ETPI and its officers for illegal dismissal,
ULP and money claims before the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUES: 1. Whether ETPI and its officers committed ULP against Culili
2. Whether Culili was illegally dismissed
3. Whether Culili is entitled to recover damages
HELD: 1. No.
There should be no dispute that all prohibited acts constituting ULP in
essence relate to the workers right to self-organization. An employer may
only be held liable for ULP if it can be shown that his acts affect in
whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.
There is no showing that ETPI was motivated by ill will, bad faith or
malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its employees right to selforganize. It even negotiated with ETEU before implementing its RightSizing Program.
2. No.

Under our laws, an employee may be terminated for reasons

involving measures taken by the employer due to business necessities.
There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is
greater than what is seasonably required to meet the demands of the
business enterprise. The determination of whether or not an employees
services are still needed or sustainable properly belongs to the employer
provided that there is no violation of law or commission of an arbitrary of
malicious act.
Among the requisites of a valid redundancy program are: (1) the
good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant position; and (2)
fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be
declared redundant (e.g. status, efficiency and seniority)
ETPI was upfront in its plan to implement a Right-Sizing Program. It
even negotiated with ETEU for the latter to understand the business
dilemma. This rules out bad faith. If Culilis position were indeed
indispensable to ETPI, it would have been absurd for the latter to abolish
the same. But, the position was abolished for being too specialized and
limited.
Culili failed to prove that his dismissal was orchestrated by the
respondents for the mere purpose of getting rid of him was never
transmitted. The letter which he used to establish that ETPI had already
decided to dismiss him prior to the actual dismissal. In fact, most of the
officers have not even dealt with Culili personally. Moreover, it cannot be
immediately concluded that the employer employed bad faith in
contracting out the function of Culili. Also, it has been established that his
termination was for an authorized cause and there was no bad faith in
doing so.
3. Yes.
In view of ETPIs failure to comply with the notice requirements
under the Labor Code, Culili is entitled to nominal damages in addition to
his separation pay. Aside from the manner the written notice was served
that is, ETPI simply asked one of its guards to serve the required written
notice on Culili, a reading of the notice shows that ETPI failed to properly
inform Culili of the grounds for his termination.

3. San Miguel Employees Union vs. Bersamira

G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Facts: SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with
Lipercon and D'Rite. It was expressly understood in the contract that the
workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and

that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig.

Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides that "temporary,
probationary, or contract employees and workers are excluded from the
bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement." The
Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed
up for union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC.
On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response
from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice,
CBA violations, and union busting. The Union again filed a second notice of
strike for unfair labor practice. Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon
and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. SMC filed a verified
Complaint for Injunction and Damages before respondent Court.
Respondent Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order for the purpose of
maintaining the status quo. Union filed a Motion to Dismiss SanMig's
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case/nature of the
action, which motion was opposed by SanMig. Anchored on grave abuse of
discretion, petitioners are now before us seeking nullification of the
challenged Writ.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Court correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the present controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to the resolution of that question, is the matter of whether, or
not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor
dispute.
Held: The Supreme Court held, that a "labor dispute" as defined in Article
212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning
terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." That a labor
dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom,
what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees
contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the
working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working
relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and
conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are
thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute.
Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed
up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. San
Mig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no
employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and
because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that
representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the
conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought

by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the

matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither
can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the
labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE.

4. G.R. No. L-19187

February 28, 1963
STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and V. SAN PEDRO,
petitioners, vs.LORETA C. SOL and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
Loreta C. Sol charged Sterling Products International for unfair labor
practice. She filed a complaint against the said firm for underpayment,
money equivalent of her vacation leave from 1952 to 1959, and Christmas
bonus for 1959, equivalent to one month salary. The complaint resulted in
her dismissal, without just cause. The company answered that SOL is an
independent contractor whose services were retained by petitioners to
submit reports of radio monitoring work performed outside of their
(petitioners') office; that petitioners no longer required complainant's
services and therefore, it gave her notice of termination, as it did in fact
terminate her services, as an independent contractor.
The Court of Industrial Relations held that the complainant is not an
employee of the respondent firm but only an independent contractor and
that respondent firm was justified in dismissing the complainant due to
economic reasons. The lower court reversed the decision ruling that
complainant was an employee and not an independent contractor and that
the company possessed and exercised its right to control the work of said
employee, that being the court ordered her reinstatement with back wage
and charged the firm of ULP. Aggrieved by the decision, the company filed
a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether Loreta Sol is an employee of the said company and
whether there is ULP
Held: YES. Respondent Sol was directed to listen to certain broadcasts,
directing her, in the instructions given her, when to listen and what to
listen, petitioners naming the stations to be listened to, the hours of
broadcasts, and the days when listening was to be done. Respondent Sol
had to follow these directions. The mere fact that while performing the
duties assigned to her she was not under the supervision of the petitioners
does not render her a contractor, because what she has to do, the hours
that she has to work and the report that she has to submit all these are
according to instructions given by the employer. It is not correct to say,
therefore, that she was an independent contractor, for an independent
contractor is one who does not receive instructions as to what to do, how

to do, without specific instructions.

Petitioners claim that respondent Sol was merely an employee and was
not connected with any labor union, the company cannot be considered
guilty of unfair labor practice, and we find this contention to be wellfounded. The term unfair labor practice has been defined as any of those
acts listed in the labor code Respondent Sol was not connected with any
labor organization, nor has she ever attempted to join a labor
organization, or to assist, or contribute to a labor organization. The
company cannot, therefore, be considered as having committed an unfair
labor practice.

5. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES INC. v. CLAVE, G.R. No. L-51641

Facts:
On January 4, 1960, the petitioner entered into a contract with the
Maritime Security Agency (agency) for the latter to guard and protect the
petitioners vessels while they were moored at the port of Manila. It was
stipulated in the contract that its term was for one year commencing from
the date of its execution and it may be terminated by either party upon 30
days notice to the other. The guards were not known to petitioner who
dealt only with the agency on matter pertaining to the service of the
guards. A lump sum would be paid by the petitioner to agency who in turn
determined and paid the individual watchmen.
Upon prior notice given by petitioner to the agency, the contract was
terminated on January 4, 1961 after it had run its term. On December 24,
1960, the agency (private respondents) cabled the petitioners office
protesting against the termination of their contract. On February 6, 1961,
the respondent union passed a resolution abolishing itself.
Later, on November 17, 1961, private respondents counsel wrote
the petitioner a letter where they pointed out that the termination of the
contract was primarily because of a misunderstanding between the
petitioner (represented by Capt. Morris) and Mr. A. Tinsay (operator of the
agency). On December 10, 1962, the respondent union passed another
resolution reviving itself.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner refused to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement with the said individual watchmen and discriminated against
them in respect to their tenure of employment by terminating their
contract on January 1, 1961 because of their union activities.
Held:
It is the agency that recruits, hires, and assigns the work of its watchmen.
Hence, a watchman cannot perform any security service for the
petitioners vessels unless the agency first accepts him as its watchman.
With respect to his wages, it is the agency that quantifies and pays the

wages to which a watchman is entitled. Neither does the petitioner have

any power to dismiss the security guards. In the light of the foregoing
facts, it is evident that the complaining watchmen cannot be considered
as employees of the petitioner.
In view of the findings that there is no employer-employee relationship, it
should necessarily follow that the petitioner cannot be guilty of unfair
labor practice. Under Republic Act 875, an unfair labor practice may be
committed only within the context of an employer-employee relationship.

6. SCHERING EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION v. SCHERING PLOUGH CORP., G.R.

No. 142506
Facts:
Sometime in January 1977, Lucia P. Sereneo (petitioner) was employed as
a professional medical representative by respondent company. Eventually,
she became a field sales training manager. On January 22, 1996, when she
was elected president of Schering Employees Labor Union (SELU) and
started the re-negotiation with respondent company on the CBA,
respondents suddenly became dissatisfied with her sales performance.
The respondent company sent her a notice asking her to submit an
explanation why she failed to implement marketing projects. Later she
was again required to comment on the complaint charging her with
misappropriation of company funds, falsification and tampering of
company records, and submission of false reports. This prompted
petitioner SELU to file with the NCMB a notice of strike on the grounds of
ULP and union busting. The notice of strike was dismissed by the NCMB in
its resolution. Subsequently, respondents sent petitioner Sereneo a
Memorandum terminating his services for loss of trust and confidence.
In their answer, respondents claimed that Sereneo failed to perform her
duties as professional medical representative prompting the company to
send her 2 letters charging her with wilful violation of company rules and
regulations. When she refused to submit her explanation, they found her
guilty of dishonesty, wilful breach of trust and wilful disobedience which
eventually led to her termination. The Labor Arbiter found respondents
guilty of ULP. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and dismissed the petitioners complaint. The CA affirmed the
decision of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Sereneo was illegally dismissed from
employment.
Held:
After a close view of the records, the NLRC found that petitioner falsified

company call cards by altering the dates of her actual visits to physicians,
misappropriation of company funds by falsifying food receipts, and that
she is dishonest. Hence, her dismissal from the service is on order.
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, fraud or wilful breach
by the employee of trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative is a ground for terminating an employment.
Upon scanning the records, petitioners accusation of union busting is
bereft of any proof.

7. CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION v.

COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., et
al.
G.R. Nos. L-30632-33 April 11, 1972

FACTS:
The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor
organization of Filipino managers supervisors in Caltex (Philippines). The
Association requested the Company that it shall be recognized as the duly
authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the
Company. For several attempts, the company ignored the request.
The Association filed notice to strike as the Company committed ULP for
refusing to bargain in good faith on the part of the Company. The
Company also allegedly resorted to union-busting tactics in order to
discourage the activities of the association and its members, including
discrimination and intimidation of officers and members of the association.
In due time, the strike was held. The Company claimed that the strike
conducted was illegal because the ground was merely for recognition.
There also an alleged unlawful means present during strike such as: the
blocking by a banca manned by two striking supervisors, the blocking at
the other establishment, the blocking by the strikers of incoming vehicles,
the refusal to surrender to their superiors the keys to the depots and
storage tanks and thus prevent the trucks from being used.
Thereafter, the parties had a return-to-work agreement.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the strike is illegal.
2. Whether the issue as to the invalidity of strike is moot and academic.
HELD:
1. NO, the strike was not illegal. The strike of the Association was declared
on the ground of bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and

by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its officials. It is incorrect

to say that the strike of the Association was mainly for the purpose of
securing recognition as bargaining agent.
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Carta of
Labor is the right to self-organization. Indeed, because of occasional
delays incident to a certification proceeding usually attributable to dilatory
tactics employed by the employer, to a certain extent a union may be
justified in resorting to a strike.
The SC was also convinced that the means employed by the strikers
during the strike cannot be labeled as unlawful. The Company itself
through the provocative, if not unlawful, acts of the non-striking
employees is not entirely blameless for the isolated incidents relied upon
by respondent court as tainting the picketing of the strikers with illegality.
It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of
illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment of the guilty party.
2. YES, the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned
their original positions and come to a virtual compromise and agreed to
resume unconditionally their former relations. To proceed with the
declaration of illegality would not only breach this understanding, freely
arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive animosities to the prejudice of
industrial peace. The return-to-work agreement was in the nature of a
partial compromise between the parties and, more important, a labor
contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield to the
common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines). The Return-towork agreement allows all employees to be taken back "with the same
employee status.

8. REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR and ROSENDO T. RESUELLO et

al.
G.R. No. L-20303
September 27, 1967
FACTS:
The respondent employees were discharged for having written and
published a patently libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or
contempt of officers, employees of the bank, employer, and the bank
itself. The letter referred to was a letter-charge which the respondents had
written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds
of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees.

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it
calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge.
In view of the foregoing, the prosecutor filed a complaint in the CIR
alleging that the Bank's conduct violated section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial
Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to
give testimony under this Act."
ISSUE: Did the Company commit ULP?
HELD: YES.
Since the respondents acted in their individual capacities when they
wrote the letter-charge, they were protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with
which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a). Indeed, when
the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other
management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the
Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining does
not end with the execution of an agreement; It is a continuous process.
The joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if
in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected
by the Industrial Peace Act.
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents
to air their grievances. Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an open
mind and a sincere desire to negotiate over grievances. The grievance
committee, created in the collective bargaining agreements, would have
been an appropriate forum for such negotiation. Indeed, the grievance
procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective bargaining.It is
intended to promote, as it were, a friendly dialogue between labor and
management as a means of maintaining industrial peace.

9.
T
&
H
SHOPFITTERS
CORPORATION/GIN
QUEEN
CORPORATIONvs.T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN
WORKERS UNION
Facts:
T&H Shopfitters Corporation/ Gin Queen Corporation workers union (THSGQ Union) et al filed a complaint for ULP by way of union busting, and

illegal lockout, with moral and exemplary damages and atty.s fees,
against T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen before labor arbiter.
The corporations were treated by the union as single entity and their sole
employer. To improve their working conditions, the respondents and the
petitioners held a formal meeting to discuss a formation of a union.
However, on the next day 17 EE were barred from entering from factory in
Zambales and were ordered to transfer to warehouse in Subic because of
expansion. They were even ordered to go on forced leave due to
unavailability of work.
Dole issued a certificate of registration in favour of THS-GQ Union.
Union stated that affected EE were not given regular work assignments,
and the corporations employed subcontractor to perform the job which
prompted the Union to seek assistance from NCMB. An agreement was
reach by giving the regular EE the priority to the distribution of work. But
the company did not complied with the agreement and even hired more
contractual workers.
The union filed PCE but put on hold. The CE election was scheduled on
Oct. 11, 2004.
The director of Gin queen informed the EE that the lease contract was
expired and the possible relocation. Some of EE checked the place and
found out that it was grassland. The Union members work as grass cutter
because of that union officers and some of its members refused to report
to work. The corporations summoned the union president to explain why
he should not be terminated.
A day before certification election the corporations sponsored a field trip
to the EE. The Union officers and its member were excluded. During the
night of the field trip a sale agent appeared convincing the EE not to vote
for union. When the election day came the EE were escorted at the polling
center.
Because of heavy work pressure exerted by petitioners the no union
prevailed. The union protested.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner corporations committed unfair labor practice
Ruling: Yes.
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to
Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before
the scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales
officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent
during the field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the
polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing
respondents functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site
to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational
basis for union members, all reek of interference on the part of petitioners.
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably

support an inference that, indeed, such were all orchestrated to restrict

respondents free exercise of their right to self-organization. The Court is
of the considered view that petitioners undisputed actions prior and
immediately before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly
innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting
their exclusive bargaining representative.
Petitioners had no business persuading and/or assisting its employees in
their legally protected independent process of selecting their exclusive
bargaining representative. The fact and peculiar timing of the field trip
sponsored by petitioners for its employees not affiliated with THS-GQ
Union, although a positive enticement was undoubtedly extraneous
influence designed to impede respondents in their quest to be certified.
This cannot be countenanced.
Not content with achieving a "no union" vote in the certification election,
petitioners launched a vindictive campaign against union members by
assigning work on a rotational basis while subcontractors performed the
latters functions regularly. Worse, some of the respondents were made to
work as grass cutters in an effort to dissuade them from further collective
action.

10. PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. V GARCIA 639 SCRA 312

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondents are employees of petitioner Prince Transport Inc., a
company engaged on the business of transporting passengers by land.
They were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors. As
alleged by respondents, sometimes in 1997, PTI caused the transfer of all
union members and sympathizers to one of its sub companies, Lubas
Transport allegedly to block the continued formation of the union.
Despite such transfer, the schedule of drivers and conductors, as
well as their company IDs were issued by PTI; the daily time records,
tickets and reports of the respondents were also filed at the PTI office, and
all claims for salaries were transacted at the same office; later, the
business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain
and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual
stoppage of its operations and respondents loss of employment.
Petitioners on the other hand, denied the material allegations of
the complaint contending that herein respondents were no longer their
employees, since; they all transferred to Lubas at their own request.
Respondents then filed a complaint charging PTI with illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice. The Labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint for unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that

they violated respondents right to self organization. Respondents then

filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and the CA ruled that
the petitioner company is guilty of ULP. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner PTI is guilty of ULP.
RULING:
Yes. It is. As to whether petitioner is guilty of ULP, the court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA that respondents
transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a
subterfuge to foil the formers right to organize themselves into a union.
Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the labor code, an employer is guilty of
ULP if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise
of their right to self organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Indeed, evidence of petitioners unfair labor practice is shown by the
established fact that, after respondents transfer to Lubas, petitioners left
them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. The
Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that

11: PARK HOTEL V. MANOLO SORIANO G.R. NO. 171118, 10 SEPTEMBER

2012
FACTS:
The petitioners were Park Hotel, the company, Gregg Harbutt, the
manager of the hotel and Bill Percy, the owner of the company. Harbutt is
an officer and stockholder of Burgos Corporation, a sister company of Park
Hotel.
Manolo Soriano was hired by the petitioner Park Hotel as a
Maintenance Electrician. His co-respondent Lester Gonzales was a
Doorman and then Supervisor. Co-respondent Yolanda Badilla was a
bartender of Js Playhouse. They were dismissed by the company for
allegedly stealing company property. At the time of the case they were all
employees of Burgos Corporation.
The respondents filed complaints against the petitioners before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, ULP, and damages. They alleged that they
were dismissed because they were allegedly organizing a union. They also
alleged that the petitioners forced them to sign resignation letters in the
presence of goons and that they were not actually given the allegedly
issued Memoranda for their alleged violations.
The LA ruled in the respondents favor finding the employees were

illegally dismissed and that the employers committed the ULP of union
busting by terminating the employees. It ordered the petitioner employer
to reinstate the employees and to pay them damages. The LA rendered a
new decision similarly favoring the employees when the case was
remanded to the LA upon appeal by the petitioners to the NLRC. An appeal
to the NLRC was dismissed. The CA likewise dismissed the certiorari field
against the NLRC and affirmed the judgment.
ISSUE
1. Whether the actions of the employer constitute an unfair labor practice
2. Who among the petitioners are liable for ULP if they are liable
HELD
1. Yes, the petitioners committed ULP.
The Court ruled that an unfair labor practice is committed when an
employer interferes, restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization. This includes dismissing an employee from
work because of he is exercising his right to self-organization.
In the case, the immediate impulse of the respondent employers was to
terminate the employees who were organizing a union. The
unceremonious dismissal of the employees was to restrain their attempt to
exercise their right to self-organization.
2. Percy and Harbutt are liable.
The Court ruled that an officer of a corporation may be deemed solidarily
liable for unlawful acts of the corporation. This rule also applies in cases
wherein an employee is terminated and an officer has acted with malice or
bad faith.
In the case, both Percy and Harbutt, as officers of Burgos, are liable
because they have acted maliciously in terminating the employees by
dismissing them without any valid ground and doing so to suppress their
right to self-organization.

12. G.R. No. L-8116

SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT
MICALLER, respondent.

August 25, 1956

STORE, ET AL.,

petitioner,

vs.NENA

Facts:
Nina Micaller , an employee of petitioner, was found by the trial court to
have been illegally dismissed from her position as a salesgirl. Moreover, it
ruled that the owners of Scottys Department Store are guilty of unfair
labor practice.
The controversy stemmed from the employers allegations of her
misconduct and serious disrespect to the management. As a rebuttal, the
respondent claimed that her dismissal was prompted by her organization

of a union which was later on affiliated with the National Labor Union.
Micaller buttressed her allegation with the fact that the owners went to her
house and questioned her further as regards her union activities, in
addition to tendering a paper for her to sign in order to withdraw from the
union. Thereafter, the manager of the store asked each employee about
their affiliation with the union. This impelled the Union to file a notice of
strike; an act which likewise pressed the petitioners to employ temporary
employees equal in number to the old.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practices.
Held:
Yes, petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice under the Industrial
Peace Act.
Since, in 1956, the law on this point is of recent enactment, the Court
found it difficult to determine what acts or circumstances may constitute
unfair labor practice within its purview for lack of appropriate precedents.
However, there are many American cases that may be resorted to where
been found guilty of unfair labor practice under similar circumstances and
was given the corresponding sanction. One of such cases, which in its
opinion is on all fours with the present, is NLRB vs. Harris-Woodson Co.
(CCA-4, 1947, 179 F 2d 720) where the following was held: .
As to the Board's finding of interference, there is abundant evidence of the
questioning of employees as to membership in the union and of anti-union
expressions by the company's superintendent made in such a way as to
discourage union membership. The rule with respect thereto is well settled
and was stated by us recently in the case of NLRB vs. Norfolf-Southern Bus
Corpn. 159 Fed 2d 518, where he Court said:
"Questioning of employees concerning union membership and activities
and disparaging remarks by supervisory employees made in such away as
to hamper the exercise of free choice on the part of the employees, have
been uniformly condemned as a violation of the Act.
As to the discharge of Edna B. Edler, the president of the union, it appears
that she was discharged in the Spring of 1945 at the time when question
of union representation was becoming acute. The Company contends that
the ground of the discharge was insubordinate language and conduct, and
evidence of a controversy between the employer and the superintendent
of the this was not the true reason for the discharge, but only a pretext. It
was shown that Mrs. Edler was a competent and efficient employee with a
long record of faithful service, and by the controversies and even quarrels
between the employees and the superintendent had not therefore led to
discharge. According to Mrs. Edler's testimony, which was accepted by the
Board, the controversy was a very minor character and furnished to
sufficient justification for the peremptory discharge of an efficient

employee with a long record of service. Under such circumstances, the

Board may very well have concluded that the true reason for the discharge
was other than the union and her activity in its behalf. This is all the more
reasonable in view of the manifest anti-union bias of the company's
officers and superintendent and for the controversy with regard to the
recognition of the union which had just been revived .

13. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. vs. Philippine Marine Officers Guild, et
al. G.R. Nos. L-20667 and 20669
Facts:
PMOG (herein private respondent) and Cebu Seamen Association (CSA)
are rival unions representing PHILSTEAM officers. On 15 and 18 June 1954,
PMOG sent petitioner co. set of demands and request for CB. Petitioner, in
its answer on 29 June 1954, required PMOG to prove its majority
representation. On the same date, petitioner started interrogating and
investigating its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out if they
had joined PMOG or authorized PMOG to represent them. PMOG replied
insisting its former demands. PMOG filed a notice of strike. Two
conferences were held at DOLE but to no avail.
Meanwhile CSA sent petitioner its own set of demands. The latter
recognized the latter as having majority representation. On August 24,
1954, PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a CBA. On the same date, PMOG
declared a strike. The RP President certified the dispute to CIR.
Issue: Did petitioner commit ULP? Is reinstatement of strikers proper?
Held:
Yes, petitioner committed ULP when it conducted investigations to check
majority status of PMOG. The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by
the company of its employees to a series of questionings regarding their
membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as to
hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor
practice.
Yes, striking employees are entitled to reinstatement, whether or not the
strike was the consequence of the employer's unfair labor practice, unless,
where the strike was not the consequence of any unfair labor practice, the
employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers and has
promised them continued employment.

15. G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,

NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN
PAGCU
and
RODULFO
MUNSOD,
petitioners,
vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in
the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second
and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate
in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4,
1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners
and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a
"violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No
Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.).
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found
herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo
Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status
as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
ISSUE: WHO IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE?
HELD: The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners
from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice
defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities
for ... mutual aid or protection" while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair

labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees

in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by
the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual
aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in
such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged
police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that
the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the
mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a
potent means of inhibiting speech."

16. G.R. No. L-21696

February 25, 1967
VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (VISTRANCO)
and RAFAEL XAUDARO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, UNITED WORKERS' & FARMERS' ASSOCIATION (UWFA)
VENANCIO DANO-OG, BUENAVENTURA AGARCIO and 137 others,
respondents.
FACTS: The Company is engaged in the loading and unloading of vessels,
with a branch office in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, under the
management of said Rafael Xaudaro. Its workers are supplied by the
United Workers and Farmers Association, a labor organization
hereinafter referred to as UWFA whose men (affiliated to various labor
unions) have regularly worked as laborers of the Company during every
milling season since immediately after World War II up to the milling
season immediately preceding November 11, 1955, when the Company
refused to engage the services of Venancio Dano-og, Buenaventura,
Agarcio and 137 other persons named in the complaint filed in case No.
62-ULP-Cebu of the Court of Industrial Relations and hereinafter referred
to as the Complainants owing, they claim, to their union activities. At
the behest of the UWFA and the Complainants, a complaint for unfair labor
practice was, accordingly, filed against the Company and Xaudaro with the
Court of Industrial Relations hereinafter referred to as the CIR in
which it was docketed as Case No. 62-ULP-Cebu. In due course, its
Presiding Judge issued the order appealed from, which was affirmed by the
CIR sitting en banc. Hence this petition for review by certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMPANY IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
HELD: Referring to the unfair labor practice charge against the Company,
we find, with the CIR, that said charge is substantially borne out by the
evidence of record, it appearing that the workers not admitted to work
beginning from November, 1955, were precisely those belonging to the
UWFA and the Xaudaro, the Company Branch Manager, had told them

point-blank that severance of their connection with the UWFA was the
remedy, if they wanted to continue working with the Company.

19. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC., vs NLRC

G.R. No. 170287
FACTS:
On June 21, 1999, the Club and the Alabang Country Club Independent
Employees Union (Union) entered into a CBA, which provided for a Union
shop and maintenance of membership shop.
Subsequently, in July 2001, an election was held and a new set of
officers was elected. The new officers conducted an audit of the Union
funds. They discovered some irregularly recorded entries, unaccounted
expenses and disbursements, and uncollected loans from the Union funds.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2001, in a meeting called by the Union,
respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras explained their side.
Despite their explanations, respondents Pizarro, Braza, and
Castueras were expelled from the Union and were furnished individual
letters of expulsion for malversation of Union funds.
In a letter dated October 18, 2001, the Union, invoking the Security Clause
of the CBA, demanded that the Club dismiss respondents Pizarro, Braza,
and Castueras in view of their expulsion from the Union. Respondents filed
for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed and
whether they were afforded due process.
HELD: Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on
the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized
causes under Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under Art. 284; and
(4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art. 285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to
the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the
CBA on Union security contains the provisions on the Union shop and
maintenance of membership shop. There is union shop when all new
regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as
a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of
membership shop when employees who are union members as of the
effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members,
must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining
unit or the agreement is terminated.
SC ruled that the Club substantially complied with the due process

requirements before it dismissed the three respondents.

In the above case, we pronounced that while the company, under a
maintenance of membership provision of the CBA, is bound to dismiss any
employee expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily.

20. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS CASIO

G.R. No. 149552
FACTS:
The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31
Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City.On November 30, 1991, IBMLocal 31, through its officers and board members entered into a CBA with
GMC.The effectivity of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1, 1991.
Casio was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year term in
June 1991, while his co-respondents were union shop stewards.
Rodolfo Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and
Mindanao, furnished Casio,et al. with copies of the Affidavits of GMC
employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot, charging Casio,et al. with acts
inimical to the interest of the union.Through the same letter, Gabiana gave
Casio,et al. three days from receipt thereof within which to file their
answers or counter-affidavits.However, Casio,et al. refused to
acknowledge receipt of Gabianas letter.
Subsequently, on February 29, 1992, Pino,et al., as officers and
members of the IBM-Local 31, issued a Resolution expelling Casio,et al.
from the union.
Gabiana then informed the company of the expulsion of Casio,et al.
from the union of IBM-Local 31 officers and board members.Gabiana
likewise requested that Casio,et al. be immediately dismissed from their
work for the interest of industrial peace in the plant.
GMC acceded to Gabianas request to terminate the employment of
Casio,et al.GMC terminated the employment of Casio,et al.
On March 27, 1992, Casio,et al., in the name of IBM-Local 31, filed a
Notice of Strike and alleged as bases for the strike the illegal dismissal of
union officers and members, discrimination, coercion, and union busting.
Casio,et al.filed before NLRC a complaint against GMC and Pino,et
al. for unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Casio, et al. was illegally dismissed?
HELD: There are two aspects which characterize the concept of due
process under the Labor Code: one is substantive whether the termination
of employment was based on the provision of the Labor Code or in

accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence; the other is procedural the

manner in which the dismissal was effected.
In the case at bar, the dismissal of Casio, et al. was indeed illegal,
having been done without just cause and the observance of procedural
due process.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of procedural due process.The law requires the employer to
furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written
notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which
his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2)
a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employers decision to
dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the
dismissal with illegality.
In the case at bar, Casio,et al. did not receive any other
communication from GMC, except the written notice of termination dated
March 24, 1992.GMC, by its own admission, did not conduct a separate
and independent investigation to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the expulsion of Casio,et al. by IBP-Local 31.It straight
away acceded to the demand of IBP-Local 31 to dismiss Casio,et al.

21. PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI) vs. ANACLETO L.

TAECA, GEREMIAS S. TATO, JAIME N. CAMPOS, MARTINIANO A.
MAGAYON, JOSEPH B. BALGOA, MANUEL G. ABUCAY, MOISES M.
ALBARAN, MARGARITO G. ALICANTE, JERRY ROMEO T. AVILA,
LORENZO D. CANON, RAUL P. DUERO, DANILO Y. ILAN, MANUEL M.
MATURAN, JR., LUISITO R. POPERA, CLEMENTINO C. QUIMAN,
ROBERTO Q. SILOT, CHARLITO D. SINDAY, REMBERT B. SUZON
ALLAN J. TRIMIDAL, and NAMAPRI-SPFL
G.R. No. 160828
PERALTA, J.:

August 9, 2010

Facts:
A CBA between PRI and respondents included a union security clause.
NAMAPRI-SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their letters to
terminate the employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to
the Union. Subsequently, PRI terminate the employment of the
respondents.

The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for

Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the
freedom period, is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of
respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the
freedom period. Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed
to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents
did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they
belong. Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined
the FFW.
Whether the respondents committed acts of disloyalty.
Held:
No.
We are in consonance with the Court of Appeals when it held that the
mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification
Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the freedom period, is
not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents
inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom
period. Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to
maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did
not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they
belong. Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined
the FFW.

23. ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INCvs.JOSE BALDO, SANGILO-ITOGON

WORKERS UNION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Case No.
23)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations in Case No. 50-ULP-PANG. finding the petitioner guilty
of unfair labor practices and ordering it to reinstate respondent Jose Baldo
to his former work with back wage.
In a complaint dated November 18, 1958, an Acting Prosecutor of the
Court of Industrial Relations charged the herein petitioner-employer,

Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., and Claude Fertig its General Superintendent,

with having committed unfair labor practices. The complaint prayed that
an order be issued against the herein petitioner to cease and desist from
the labor practices complained of and that the complaining employees, A.
Manaois and Jose Baldo be reinstated to their former positions in the
mining company without loss of employee benefits and with back wages
from the date of their respective dismissal until the date of their actual
reinstatement.
The petitioner admitted the fact of the dismissal of the two
complaining employees, but alleged that the complaining employees were
dismissed for just and lawful causes, namely, "inefficiency, utter disregard
and violation of safety rules and regulations established and enforced by
the respondent for the protection of the lives of the employees and
properties of the respondent company, utter disregard of the company
property and poor attendance records."
Baldo started working as miner in the respondent company sometime in
1954. He worked continuously therein until February 4, 1958 when he was
given a "30-day notice of termination of employment" to the effect that his
services will not be needed by the respondent company after March 5,
1958. Baldo refused to acknowledge receipt of said notice when Mowry,
mine's superintendent of the company, asked him to sign the same. It
appears that Baldo was on 15 days vacation leave with pay immediately
prior to his being served his separation notice. The complainant's evidence
tended to prove that Baldo was dismissed by the company because of his
membership in the complainant Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, a
legitimate labor organization; and, for having testified for the said union in
Case No. 3-MC-PANG a certification proceeding involving the employees of
the respondent company. Baldo failed to obtain a reinstatement therein.
The petitioner, in this appeal, also contends that the Court of Industrial
Relations had gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the
reinstatement of Jose Baldo with back wages. The petitioner points out
that it should not be made to pay back wages during the time that this
case had been pending.
Issue:
Whether the CIR acted with GAD when it ordered the reinstatement of
Jose Baldo with back wages and the Er had committed ULP.
Held:
In Negative. Er`s contention is without merit. When an employer commits
unfair labor practices he should be made to shoulder all the consequences
of his unfair acts. The matter of granting back wages or backpay to an
employee that is reinstated is discretionary with the Court of Industrial
Relations. This question had already been settled in a line of decisions
rendered by this Court (United Employees Welfare Ass'n. vs. Isaac Peral
Bowling Alleys, G. R. No. 10327, Sept. 30, 1958; Union of Philippine

Education Co. Employees vs. Philippine Education Co., 91 Phil. 93, 95). We
are satisfied that under the circumstances as shown by the records of the
present case the Court of Industrial Relations had not abused the exercise
of its discretion when it ordered the grant of back wages to respondent
Baldo from the date he was promised reinstatement to the day of his
actual reinstatement.

24. G.R. No. L-30658-59 March 31, 1976

SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION and SHELL & AFFILIATES SUPERVISORS
UNION, Petitioners, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
Facts:
The claims interposed that the members of the unions were not
being paid their overtime pay due them in accordance with the ruling in
NAWASA Consolidated case to wit: It has been held that for purposes of
computing overtime compensation a regular wage includes all payments
which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week,
including piece work wages, differential payments for working at
undesirable times, such as at night or on Sundays and holidays, and the
cost of board and lodging customarily furnished the employee.
The company filed an answer claiming that the employees who
rendered overtime work have been paid in accordance with law and their
CBA and that the NAWASA decision insofar as the computation of overtime
pay is concerned is not applicable to the factual situation and that claims
for overtime pay filed beyond the three-year period allowed by law have
already prescribed.
The trial court rendered its decision denying both the petitions for
lack of basis. The petitioners elevated their cases to the Court of Industrial
Relations and reiterated their claim for the re-computation of their
overtime pay by taking into account the fringe benefits enjoyed and
adding the same to the basic rate before computing the overtime pay but
the same were denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the pertinent ruling in the NAWASA is applicable to the case at
bar so as to follow the payment of additional overtime pay to the
petitioners notwithstanding their collective bargaining agreement.
Ruling:
We rule that the NAWASA case is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Having been stipulated by the parties that ".. the Tin Factory Incentive Pay
has ceased in view of the closure of the factory the fringe benefits as
described show that they are occasionally not regularly enjoyed and that

not all employees are entitled to them", petitioners failed to meet the test
laid down by this Court in the NAWASA case.
The collective bargaining agreement resorted to by the parties
being in accordance with R.A. 875, with its provision on overtime pay far
away beyond the premium rate provided for in Commonwealth Act 444,
the same should govern their relationship. It should be noted in passing
that Commonwealth Act 444 prescribes only a minimum of at least 25% in
addition to the regular of pay, whereas, under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement of the parties, the premium rate of overtime pay is as high as
150% on regular working days up to 250% on Sundays and recognized
national holidays.
Since this is their contract entered into by them pursuant to
bargaining negotiations under existing laws, they are bound to respect it.
It is the duty of this Court to see to it that contracts between parties, not
tainted with infirmity or irregularity or illegality, be strictly complied with
by the parties themselves. This is the only way by which unity and order
can be properly attained in our society.

25. De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees

Association, GR No. 169254
Facts:
On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University Employees Association
(DLSUEA-NAFTEU) members headed by Belen Aliazas (Aliazas faction) filed
a petition for the election of union officers in the BLR. They alleged that
there has been no election for DLSUEA-NAFTEUs officers since 1992 in
violation of the unions CBL. It would appear that DLSUEA-NAFTEU
repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the previously elected
officers led by Baylon Baz (Baz faction).When the matter was eventually
elevated to the BLR Director, the latter ruled that the Baz factions tenure
in office is valid and subsisting until their successors have been duly
elected and qualified.Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year
CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU). DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to
DLSU requesting for the renegotiation of the economic terms for the fourth
and fifth years of the then current CBA. DLSU denied the request and
contended that there is a conclusion of fact that there is an absolute void
in the leadership of respondent and no renegotiation can occur given the
void in the leadership of respondent.

Issue:
Whether DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain
collectively with DLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union dispute
between DLSUEA-NAFTEUs two opposing factions?Held:
Yes. Petitioner finds reason to refuse to negotiate with respondents
incumbent officers because of the alleged "void in the union leadership"
declared by the Regional Director in his March 19, 2001 decision, but after
the election of the union officers held on August 28, 2003, continued
refusal by the University to negotiate amounts to unfair labor practice. The
non-proclamation of the newly elected union officers cannot be used as an
excuse to fulfill the duty to bargain collectively.

26. Union of Filpro Employees-DFAI Unions KMU v. Nestle Phil., GR

No. 158930-31
Same facts as Case 3, Batch 4
Issue:
Whether Nestle committed Unfair Labor Practice?
Held:
No. Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith unto the
actuations of Nestl, it was UFE-DFA-KM who had the burden of proof to
present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor
practice.
it must be shown that Nestl was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation,
wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted in disclaiming unilateral
grants as proper subjects in their collective bargaining negotiations.
There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.Good faith or bad
faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts, to be precise, the crucial
question of whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in
good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. Necessarily, a
determination of the validity of the Nestls proposition involves an

appraisal of the exercise of its management prerogative.

27. G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU,
FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU,
and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
The Unions entered into separate CBAs with the Companies. Near the
expiration of their CBAs on September 30, 1957, the Unions submitted
proposals to the Companies to modify their CBAs on September 16, 1957.
There was mutual agreement that the benefits that will be agreed upon
will retroact to October 1, 1957.
However, negotiations were stalled by a deadlock on the issue of union
shop resulting to the filing of a Notice of Strike for deadlock on collective
bargaining on January 27, 1958. During conciliations under the DOLE, the
companies urged the unions to drop their demand for union security in lieu
of their demands in toto. ILACTEA-NATU dropped their demand and the
other unions followed upon threat that the benefits will no longer retroact
to October 1957 made by the companies.
Another stalemate occurred on the issue of salary increases on the April
25 May 6, 1958 negotiations. The Company refused to provide counterproposals but instead presented facts and figures and demanded that the
Unions present a workable formula to justify their proposals. The Unions
voted to strike in protest against what they considered as ULP on the part
of the companies.
After the notice of strike, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors
without increase in salary or in responsibility while negotiations were ongoing in DOLE. They resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958, the unions went on strike and picketed the offices of
Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga. The following day letters from the
company thru their acting manager and president were sent to each
striker, stating that they recognize their right to strike however, they
enumerated benefits which will be given to those who will return to work
voluntarily. Some were convince to desist.
During the strike and picket, the company made several attempts of
breaking the Unions picket lines. One such tactic whereby they organized
3 bus-loads of employees to penetrate the picket lines resulting to injuries
for both parties. The Company then filed criminal charges against the
strikers as evidenced by photographs as well as injunction with damages

for the pending criminal cases. CFI Manila issued an order restraining
strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing free and peaceful use of the
company gates, entrance and driveway - although the 120 criminal
charges against the strikers were later on dismissed except for slight
physical injuries for one striker and light coercion for two strikers.
Further, the each striker again received a letter from the company stating
that they must report back to work on or before June 2, 1958 or else they
will be replaced by someone else.
Due to the preliminary injunction and the ultimatum given by the
company, the strikers returned to work on June 2, 1958. Before being
accepted back to the company, however, they were required to secure
clearance from the City Fiscals Office and also screened by the company
management. Non-strikers with pending criminal charges were
immediately accepted back to the company without such requirement.
The company refused to accept the union officers most active during the
strike and picket although they obtained clearance from the CFO. 24 were
notified months later that they were dismissed retroactively as of June 2,
1958 and given separation pays while 10 were not readmitted but not
dismissed.
On July 29, 1958, the CIR prosecutor filed a ULP against the company for
interference with the right of unions to concerted action based on the two
letters sent as well as discrimination against union members regarding
readmission to work. The company filed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The CIR rendered a decision dismissing the case which was reaffirmed by
the CIR en banc.
The Union appealed the decision by certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the company committed ULP with regards interference to the
unions right to concerted action and discrimination against striking
members
HELD
Yes, the Company committed ULP.
The letters were directed to the individuals and were not coursed through
the unions. The action of the Company is considered as interference with
the exercise of the employees right to collective bargaining. Individual
solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or
his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease
striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. These are unfair labor practices
because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees,
an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's
molestation.
Although the CIR ruled that they strikers returned to work mainly due to
the preliminary injunction, it failed to consider the two letters sent by the
Company to the strikers because it could easily be disregarded by the

strikers. However, the Court ruled that interference constituting unfair

labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible
of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the
result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the
criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair
labor practice.
Moreover, there was discrimination on the readmission of the strikers. The
respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general.
They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of
their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the
first category were refused readmission even after they were able to
secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the
criminal charges filed against them.
The basis of dismissal for the union officers were also based on alleged
acts of misconduct which were the charges filed under the fiscals office
later on dismissed. Thus, there is no sufficient basis for dismissal. The
company insisted that failure to report to work is sufficient basis for
dismissal to which the Court stated that mere failure to report for work
after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar
reinstatement

28. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL [CABEU-NFL],

represented by its President, PABLITO SAGURAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. [CAB], represented by its President,
ANTONIO STEVEN L. CHAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186605 November 17, 2010
FACTS
CABEU-NFL sent CAB a proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Thus, the negotiations resulted in a deadlock.
However, CAB responded that the purpose of the conciliation has been
rendered moot and academic due to the following reasons: the union Mr.
Saguran represents has already lost majority status by disauthorization
and withdrawal of support of 90% employees and the employees formed a
new union, CABELA, which obtained registration and being a duly
organized labor union, concluded a new CBA with the company.
CABEU-NFL then filed a complaint of ULP against the company for refusal
to bargain.
ISSUE
Whether CAB was guilty of acts constituting ULP by refusing to bargain

collectively.
HELD
No, CAB did not commit ULP by their refusal to bargain with CABEU-NFL.
CAB is being accused of violating its duty to bargain collectively
supposedly because of its act in concluding a CBA with CABELA, another
union in the bargaining unit, and its failure to resume negotiations with
CABEU-NFL.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that CAB
was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and,
of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety
resulted in suspending negotiations with CABEU-NFL. CAB, believing that
CABEU-NFL is no longer representing the majority of the employees,
merely followed the will of the employees by negotiation with CABELA.
CABEU-NLF, with insufficient evidence, also failed to prove bad faith on the
part of CAB. Mere reliance to the letter response made by CAB does not
prove that CAB acted in bad faith.

29. BPI Employees Union-Davao City-FUBU vs. BPI, et. al.

G.R. No. 174912, July 24, 2013
Facts:
BOMC, which was created pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 1388,
Series of 1993, and primarily engaged in providing and/or handling
support services for banks and other financial institutions, is a subsidiary
of the BPI operating and functioning as an entirely separate and distinct
entity. A service agreement between BPI and BOMC was initially
implemented in BPIs Metro Manila branches. In this agreement, BOMC
undertook to provide services such as check clearing, delivery of bank
statements, fund transfers, card production, operations accounting and
control, and cash servicing, conformably with BSP Circular No. 1388. Not a
single BPI employee was displaced and those performing the functions,
which were transferred to BOMC, were given other assignments. The
Manila chapter of BPI Employees Union then filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice.
On January 1, 1996, the service agreement was likewise implemented in
Davao City. Later, a merger between BPI and FEBTC took effect on April 10,
2000 with BPI as the surviving corporation. Thereafter, BPIs cashiering
function and FEBTCs cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions
were handled by BOMC. Consequently, twelve (12) former FEBTC
employees were transferred to BOMC to complete the latters service
complement. BPI Davaos rank and file collective bargaining agent, BPI

Employees Union Davao City-FUBU (Union), objected to the transfer of the

functions and the twelve (12) personnel to BOMC contending that the
functions rightfully belonged to the BPI employees and that the Union was
deprived of membership of former FEBTC personnel who, by virtue of the
merger, would have formed part of the bargaining unit represented by the
Union pursuant to its union shop provision in the CBA. The Union is of the
position that the outsourcing of jobs included in the existing bargaining
unit to BOMC is a breach of the union shop agreement in the CBA. In
transferring the former employees of FEBTC to BOMC instead of absorbing
them in BPI as the surviving corporation in the merger, the number of
positions covered by the bargaining unit was decreased, resulting in the
reduction of the Unions membership. For the Union, BPIs act of arbitrarily
outsourcing functions formerly performed by the Union members and, in
fact, transferring a number of its members beyond the ambit of the Union,
is a violation of the CBA and interfered with the employees right to selforganization, and claims that it is unfair labor practice for an employer to
outsource the positions in the existing bargaining unit. Rule on the
contentions of the Union.
Issue:
Is it unfair labor practice for employer to outsource the positions in the
existing bargaining unit?
Ruling:
No. The rule now is covered by Article 261 of the Labor Code, which
provides that violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except
those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair
labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
Clearly, only gross violations of the economic provisions of the CBA are
treated as ULP. Otherwise, they are mere grievances.
In the present case, the alleged violation of the union shop agreement in
the CBA, even assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of
an economic provision in the agreement. The provisions relied upon by the
Union were those articles referring to the recognition of the union as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file
employees, as well as the articles on union security, specifically, the
maintenance of membership in good standing as a condition for continued
employment and the union shop clause. It failed to take into consideration
its recognition of the banks exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise
provided in the CBA, which included the hiring of employees, promotion,
transfers, and dismissals for just cause and the maintenance of order,
discipline and efficiency in its operations.
The Union, however, insists that jobs being outsourced to BOMC were

included in the existing bargaining unit, thus, resulting in a reduction of a

number of positions in such unit. The reduction interfered with the
employees right to self-organization because the power of a union
primarily depends on its strength in number. It is incomprehensible how
the reduction of positions in the collective bargaining unit interferes with
the employees right to self-organization because the employees
themselves were neither transferred nor dismissed from the service. The
union has not presented even an iota of evidence that petitioner bank has
started to terminate certain employees, members of the union. In fact,
what appears is that the Bank has exerted utmost diligence, care and
effort to see to it that no union member has been terminated. In the
process of the consolidation or merger of the two banks which resulted in
increased diversification of functions, some of these non-banking functions
were merely transferred to the BOMC without affecting the union
membership. BPI stresses that not a single employee or union member
was or would be dislocated or terminated from their employment as a
result of the Service Agreement. Neither had it resulted in any diminution
of salaries and benefits nor led to any reduction of union membership. As
far as the twelve (12) former FEBTC employees are concerned, the Union
failed to substantially prove that their transfer, made to complete BOMCs
service complement, was motivated by ill will, anti-unionism or bad faith
so as to affect or interfere with the employees right to self-organization.
It is to be emphasized that contracting out of services is not illegal per se.
It is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent
proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. In
this case, bad faith cannot be attributed to BPI because its actions were
authorized by CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of 1993 issued by the
Monetary Board of the then Central Bank of the Philippines. The circular
covered amendments in Book I of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Other Financial Intermediaries, particularly on the matter of bank service
contracts. A finding of ULP necessarily requires the alleging party to prove
it with substantial evidence. Unfortunately, the Union failed to discharge
this burden.

30. SAN MIGUEL FOODS INC. VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES

UNION-PTWGO535 SCRA 133 (2007)
Facts:
Some employees of San Miguel Foods Inc. (SMFI) brought grievance
against Finance Manager for discrimination, favoritism, unfair labor
practice and harassment. SMFI failed to act on the complaint which
prompted San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTWGO (the Union) to

file a case with the National Labor Relations Commission against SMFI, its
President. It prayed that SMFI et al. be ordered to promote the therein
named employees with the corresponding pay increases or adjustment
including payment of salary differentialsplus attorney s fees[,] and to
cease and desist from committing the same unjust discrimination in
matters of promotion.
ISSUE:Whether or not complaints for violation of seniority rule under the
CBA falls within the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction
HELD:As for the alleged ULP committed under Article 248 (i), for violation
of a CBA, this Article is qualified by Article 261 of the Labor Code, provides
that violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which
are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice
and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job
Security provision in the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI
appointed less senior employees to positions at its Finance Department,
consequently intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are
deserving of said appointment.
As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior
employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or
more qualified. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross
or flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which
the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.

31. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, et

al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. 502 SCRA 219 (2006), THIRD
DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his
employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike.
The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the
exclusive bargaining representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees
of Arellano University, Inc. (the University), filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the

University with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). After several controversies and
petitions, a strike was staged.
Upon the lifting of the strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the
Strike Illegal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The
NLRC issued a Resolution holding that the University was not guilty of ULP.
Consequently, the strike was declared illegal. All the employees who
participated in the illegal strike were thereafter declared to have lost their
employment status.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by
mere participation in an illegal strike
HELD:
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, an ordinary striking worker may not
be declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in
an illegal strike. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in the
commission of illegal acts during the strike. While the University adduced
photographs showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it
failed to identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the substantiality
of evidence test applicable in dismissal cases.
With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere
participation in the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.

32. G.R. No. L-34948-49 May 15, 1979

PHILIPPINE METAL FOUNDRIES INC., petitioner, vs.COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REGAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION REGEMAS and CELESTINO BAYLON
Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint against the union of ULP for
violating the CBA on no strike, no lockout clause. Sometime on 1963, the
the union stage a strike without notice of strike against the petitioner
because of the alleged illegal dismissal of their union president Baylon.
The dismissal was on the ground that BAylon continuously absented
himself without permission for more than 7 consecutive days from January
to September 1963, due to grounds not covered by the allowed leaves.
Thus, the absences were in violation to the CBA between the parties.
On October 3, 1963, the union president, before his termination, sent a
letter to the company written explanation of his absences. Two days later,
he invited the general manager of the company for a grievance
conference to thresh union problems. On the same day, the company

handed him his termination letter on the ground of his absences and union
activities.
Issue:
Whether Baylon was dismissed due to his absences or to his union
activities.
Whether the strike was illegal.
Held:
In determining whether a discharge is discriminatory, the true reason for
the discharge must be established. It has been said that while union
activity is no bar to a discharge, the existence of a lawful cause for
discharge is no defense if the employee was actually discharged for union
activity. There is no question that Celestino Baylon incurred numerous
absences from January to September 1963. Had the company wanted to
terminate his services on the ground of absences, it could have done so,
pursuant to Article V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as early as
March 1963 when he incurred twelve (12) consecutive absences without
permission. Its failure to do so shows that the infractions commited by
Baylon were disregarded.
The question of whether an employee was discharged because of his
union activities is essentially a question of fact as to which the findings of
the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive and binding if supported by
substantial evidence considering the record as a whole. 1 This is so
because the Industrial Court is governed by the rule of substantial
evidence, rather than by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in any
ordinary civil cases. 2Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. 3 It means such evidence which affords a substantial
basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. 4 Examining
the evidence on hand on this matter, We find the same to be substantially
supported.
It is admitted by petitioner that it accepted the invitation of Baylon for a
grievance conference on October 5, 1963. Yet, two hours after it accepted
the letter of invitation, it dismissed Baylon without prior notice and/or
investigation. Such dismissal is undoubtedly an unfair labor practice
committed by the company.
Under these facts and circumstances, Baylon and the members of the
Union had valid reasons to ignore the schedule grievance conference and
declared a strike. When the Union declared a strike in the belief that the
dismissal of Baylon was due to union activities, said strike was not illegal .
6 It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is
entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. 7 The
strike declared by the Union in this case cannot be considered a violation

of the "no strike" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement because it

was due to the unfair labor practice of the employer. Moreover, a no strike
clause prohibition in a Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable only
to economic strikes. 8
The strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice. In strikes
arising out of and against a company's unfair labor practice, a strike
notice is not necessary in view of the strike being founded on urgent
necessity and directed against practices condemned by public
policy, such notice being legally re. required only in cases of
economic strikes. 9

33. G.R. No. L-39040 June 6, 1990

ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.COURT
OF
INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS,
ROYAL
UNDERGARMENT WORKERS UNION (PTGWO) and ANTONIO CRUZ,
respondents.
Respondent Cruz was employed by petitioner corporation as an
electrician and was elected president of RUWU-PTGWO.
Now facing a charge for unfair labor practice, the company claimed
that it did not interfere with or prevent the union activities of its
employees. It asserted that the dismissal of Cruz was not impelled by
reason of union participation but solely by his infraction of company rules
and regulations, specifically, serious threats against the lives of three coemployees and intoxication while on duty.
Issue:
Whether the company is guilty of ULP.
Held:
Yes it is.
The charge by petitioner against respondent Cruz for being under the
influence of liquor on a certain date and for having threatened the lives of
his co-employees is too flimsy to merit serious consideration.
We have on record the undisputed facts that private respondent, as
president of RUWU, was known for his aggressive and militant union
activities; that he and his wife had been previously dismissed on the
ground of active participation in union affairs; that respondent Cruz was
dismissed again for the second time in the course of his campaign among
RUWU members to join the nationwide strike of PTGWO in which RUWU is
a member union.
In the light of the initial attitude of the company, the inducing cause
directly contributing to Cruz's dismissal is the company's antipathy to
complainant's union activity and not his misconduct.

34. G.R. No. L-31276 September 9, 1982

NATIONAL LABOR UNION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, EVERLASTING MANUFACTURING, ANG WO LONG and
BENITO S. ESTANISLAO, respondents.
Facts:
The twenty-one (21) complaining workers were members of the
National Labor Union. And were employees at Everlasting Manufacturing, a
business owned by Benito Estanislao.
Everlasting Manufacturing was then sold to Ang Wo Long. A few
days later a CBA was entered into between the NLU and Benito Estanislao,
who signed himself manager of the business.
After being issued a business permit to operate Everlasting
Manufacturing, Ang Wo Long sent individual letters to the twenty-one 21
complaining workers informing them that the business was to temporarily
close due to change of management. Within a few days of sending the
letter, Ang Wo Long employed 24 new workers in the Everlasting
Manufacturing.
Issue:
Whether Ang Wo Long is guilty of ULP.
Held:
Yes, he is guilty of ULP.
Knowledge or awareness of what is going on refers to a mental and
inner state of consciousness, cognizance, and information. Whether or not
Mr. Ang Wo Long knew the labor problems of the firm he purchased can be
determined only from an admission of Mr. Ang himself or from the
surrounding facts and circumstances indicative of knowledge or
awareness.
It is irrational to assume that Mr. Ang bought a business lock, stock,
and barrel without inquiring into its labor-management situation. His
dismissal of all the union members without retaining a few experienced
workers and their replacement with a completely new set of employees
who were strangers to the company was an attempt to rid the firm of
unwanted union activity.

35. CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION v NLRC 161 SCRA 655
FACTS:

Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress

(CLLC), a legitimate labor federation duly registered with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment, while the individual petitioners are former
employees of private respondent who were officers and members of the
petitioner union. Private respondent is a corporation engaged in packing
and crating, general hauling, warehousing, sea van and freight forwarding.
Sometime in January 1980, the majority of the rank and file employees of
respondent firm organized the E.G. Gochanco workers Union as an affiliate
of CLLC. On January 23, 1980 the union filed a petition for certification
election. On February 7,1980, the CLLC National President wrote the
general manager of respondent firm informing him the organization of the
union and requesting for a labor management conference to normalize
employer-employee relations. On February 26, 1980, the union sent a
written notice to respondent firm requesting permission for certain
members of the union to attend the hearing of the petition for certification
election.
The management refused to acknowledge receipt of the said notice. On
February 28, 1980, private respondent preventively suspended the union
officers and members who participated in the hearing. The common
ground alleged by private respondent for its action was abandonment of
work. All the gate passes of the employees to Clark air base were
confiscated by a base guard. Claiming that the private respondent
instigated the confiscation of their gate passes to prevent them from
performing their duties and that the respondent firm did not pay them
their overtime pay, 13th month pay and other benefits, petitioner union
and its members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and unfair labor
practice against private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether there is ULP.
HELD:
Yes.
Respondent company is guilty of ULP. It is no coincidence that at the time
of suspension and termination orders, the petitioners were in the midst of
certification election preliminary to a labor-management conference,
purportedly, to normalize employee-employer relationship It was within
the legal right of the petitioners to do so, the exercise of which was their
sole prerogative, and in which management may not as a rule interfere. It
is not only an act of arrogance, but a brazen interference as well, witht the
employees right to self-organization, contrary to the prohibition of labor
code against unfair labor practice.
As a consequence of such a suspension, the Clark Air Base guards
confiscated the employees gate passes, and banned then from the base
premise. We cannot be befooled by the companys pretenses that the

subsequent confiscation by the Americans of the complainants passes is

beyond the powers of management. Those passes would not have been
confiscated had not management ordered the suspension. Conversely, in
the absence of such suspension order, there was no ground to seize such
gate passes. Base guards, by themselves cannot bar legitimate employees
without the proper sanction of such employees, employers.

36. Quadra v. CA, GR NO. 147593, July 31, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Geronimo Q. Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and
actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank
and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Association of
Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]).
In April 1964, he was administratively charged before the Civil Service
Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of
duty and misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service. On July 14, 1965, the CSC rendered a decision finding petitioner
guilty of the charges and recommending the penalty of dismissal. The
following day, the General Manager of PCSO, Ignacio Santos Diaz, sent
petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the CSC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the CSC. At
the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with the CIR
a complaint for ULP against respondent PCSO and its officers.
On November 19, 1966, the CIR issued its decision finding respondent
PCSO guilty of ULP for having committed discrimination against the union
and for having dismissed petitioner due to his union activities. It ordered
the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position with full backwages
and with all the rights and privileges pertaining to said position.
Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the CIR. But while it
reinstated petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari.
During the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed
with the CIR a "Petition for Damages." He prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in connection with the ULP case.
Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the petition for damages.
Petitioner resigned from PCSO on August 18, 1967.
The petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained
pending with the CIR until it was abolished and the NLRC was created. On
April 25, 1980, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and
exemplary damages to petitioner in the amount of P1.6 million.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, prompting respondent

PCSO to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. It held that there
was no basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner
as his dismissal was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service
Commission that recommended petitioner's dismissal after conducting an
investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, but the same was denied for lack for merit.7
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners dismissal constituted ULP .
RULING:
It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately dismissed from
the service by reason of his active involvement in the activities of the
union groups of both the rank and file and the supervisory employees of
PCSO, which unions he himself organized and headed. Respondent PCSO
first charged petitioner before the Civil Service Commission for alleged
neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the service because of his union
activities. The Civil Service Commission recommended the dismissal of
petitioner. Respondent PCSO immediately served on petitioner a letter of
dismissal even before the latter could move for a reconsideration of the
decision of the Civil Service Commission. Respondent PCSO may not
impute to the Civil Service Commission the responsibility for petitioner's
illegal dismissal as it was respondent PCSO that first filed the
administrative charge against him. As found by the CIR, petitioner's
dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization.
A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is
attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or
is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public
policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in
a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

37 POLYMER RUBBER CORPORATION and JOSEPH ANG, v. BAYOLO

SALAMUDING
FACTS: Respondent Bayolo Salamuding, Mariano Gulanan and Rodolfo
Raif were of petitioner Polymer Rubber Corporation (Polymer), who were
dismissed after allegedly committing certain irregularities against Polymer.
The three employees filed a complaint against Polymer and Ang for unfair

labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime services,

violation of Presidential Decree No. 851, with prayer for reinstatement and
payment of back wages, attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complainant unfair labor
practice with conditions such as reinstatement, overtime pay and payment
of back wages.
The petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with modifications. The
NLRC deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages, service
incentive pay, and modified the computation of 13th month pay.The case
was subsequently elevated to the Supreme Court (SC) on a petition for
certiorari. The Court affirmed the disposition of the NLRC with the further
modification that the award of overtime pay to the complainants was
deleted.
Upon motion, the Labor arbiter a quo issued a writ of execution but the
same was returned unsatisfied and in the latter part of 2004, Polymer was
gutted by fire.
Labor arbiter issued a 5th alias writ of execution so that in its
implementation, the shares of stocks of Ang and USA Resources Corp.
were levied.
Polymer and Ang moved to quash said 5th alias writ of execution and to lift
notice of garnishment. They alleged that Ang should not be held jointly
and severally liable with Polymer since it was only the latter which was
held liable in the decision of the LA, NLRC and the Supreme Court. LA
granted the motion and the same was affirmed by the NLRC. Salamuding
file a petition for certiorari with CA.
CA stated that there has to be a responsible person or persons working in
the interest of Polymer who may also be considered as the employer.
Since Ang as the director of Polymer was considered the highest ranking
officer of Polymer, he was therefore properly impleaded and may be held
jointly and severally liable for the obligations of Polymer to its dismissed
employees
ISSUE: Whether or not Ang as Officer of the Corporation cannot be
personally held liable and be made to pay the liability of the corporation
HELD: YES
A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors,
officers and employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the directors
and officers acts as corporate agents, are not their personal liability but
the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent. As a rule, they
are only solidarily liable with the corporation for the illegal termination of

services of employees if they acted with malice or bad faith.29To hold a

director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites
must concur:
(1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented
to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith; and
(2) there must be proof that the officer acted in bad faith.In the instant
case, the CA imputed bad faith on the part of the petitioners when
Polymer ceased its operations the day after the promulgation of the SC
resolution in 1993 which was allegedly meant to evade liability. The CA
found it necessary to pierce the corporate fiction and pointed at Ang as
the responsible person to pay for Salamudings money claims. Except for
this assertion, there is nothing in the records that show that Ang was
responsible for the acts complained of. At any rate, we find that it will
require a great stretch of imagination to conclude that a corporation would
cease its operations if only to evade the payment of the adjudged
monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its employees.
In labor cases, for instance, the Court has held corporate directors and
officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of
employment of employees done with malice or in bad faith.
To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of
the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and later by the SC had already long
become final and executory.