Case: 1:15-cv-06844 Document #: 172 Filed: 01/18/17 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:1279

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CASE NO.: 1:15-cv-06844
Honorable Gary Feinerman
PRISCILLA RAINEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYCEON TERRELL TAYLOR,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
DEFENDANTS REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ELIMINATION AND/OR REDUCTION
(REMITTITUR) OF DAMAGES AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The Defendant, Jayceon Terrell Taylor, respectfully submits this reply memorandum in
further support of his Motion for Elimination and/or Reduction (Remittitur) of Damages and
Motion for New Trial (the Post-trial Motions).
In Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Elimination
and/or Reduction (Remittitur) of Damages and Motion for New Trial (Memo), Plaintiff
attempts to distract this Court from the merits of Defendants Post-trial Motions by claiming that
this Court is without jurisdiction. Plaintiff then makes the flawed assertion that the Post-trial
Motions of the Defendant are without merit. To the contrary, the supporting law indicates that
not only does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the Post-trial Motions, but that the Post-trial
Motions should be granted in full.

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The Defendant will reiterate and expound upon the reasons in his Post-trial Motions that
illustrate why a new trial should be granted and that the damages should be completely
eliminated, or at least drastically reduced.
ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Has Jurisdiction to Hear the Post-Trial Motions

Contrary to the Plaintiffs assertions, this Court was not divested of jurisdiction when the
Defendant filed his notice of appeal. Rule 4 of the Federal Appellate Rules of Procedure (Rule
4) states in pertinent part that:
(B)(i) If a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment
but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)the notice becomes effective
to appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last
such remaining motion is entered.
(ii) A party intending to challenge an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule
4(a)(4)(A), or a judgment's alteration or amendment upon such a motion, must file a notice
of appeal, or an amended notice of appealin compliance with Rule 3(c)within the
time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the order disposing of the last such
remaining motion. Rule 4 Fed. R. App. P. (emphasis added).
The Advisory Committee Notes of Rule 4, further support the Defendants position. They state
that a notice of appeal filed before the filing of one of the specified motions or after the filing
of a motion, but before disposition of the motion is, in effect, suspended until the motion is
disposed of, where upon, the previously filed notice effectively place jurisdiction in the court of
appeals. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. App. P. 4. (emphasis added).
At a minimum, the Defendants notice of appeal was filed prematurely; it will however,
become operative once the district court rules on the Post-trial Motions. See Pole v. Firkus, No.
06-2768, 2007 WL 7059403, at *1 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2007); Harrington v. Heavey, No. 04 C
5991, 2007 WL 257681, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2007). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
(Seventh Circuit) apparently agrees with the Defendant as it has stayed the appeal indefinitely

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until further notice from the Seventh Circuit. It is presumable that the Seventh Circuit will
resume the appeal proceedings, if necessary, after the Post-trial Motions have been heard by this
Court.
As provided by Rule 4, after the disposition of the Post-trial Motions, the Defendant will
be afforded 14 days with which to file an amended notice of appeal that includes the disposition
of the Post-trial Motions. This jurisdictional issue does not form the basis of the Defendants
Post-trial Motions, therefore Defendant specifically reserves the right to address this issue more
fully and brief this specific topic should the Court not be persuaded by his current argument, or
seek an additional brief on the matter.
II.

Plaintiffs Argument that the Post-trial Motions Became Operative on December

20, 2016, and were Untimely are Moot

This Court vacated the last sentence of its December 20, 2016 order [DE 153] on January 3,
2017. That sentence dismissed the Defendants (First) Post-trial Motions without prejudice due
to the fact that the Defendant failed to notice his motions for presentment. Since this Court
vacated the dismissal, the Defendant does not find any reason to address the Plaintiffs
arguments concerning the Post-trial Motions being operative or untimely since this Court already
ruled on the issue on January 3, 2017.
III.

Defendants Motions Have Merit

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Motion for New Trial is without merit. In order to

grant a new trial, the verdict must be against the weight of the evidence, the damages must be
excessive, or for other reasons, the trial must not have been fair to the moving party. Farfaras v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, No. 01 C 8720, 2005 WL 670523, at *1 (N.D. Ill. March
21, 2005). Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants Motion for Elimination and/or Reduction of
Damages (Remittitur) is also meritless.
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A. The Damages Are Excessive

As discussed in the Post-trial Motions [DE 158] the damages are excessive. A more in
depth discussion concerning the excessive damages shall follow infra.
B. The Trial Was Unfair to the Defendant
Despite what the Plaintiff may be believe, the Defendant had every intention to attend the
trial. See Declaration of Jayceon Terrell Taylor, a true and correct copy is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.1 Unfortunately, the Defendant underwent an emergency surgery on November 14,
2016, and was unable to make his flight later that evening. Id. The Defendants inability to be
present at the trial deprived him of the opportunity to controvert the allegations against him in
front of the jury and was thus unfair.
The trial was also unfair to the Defendant because the jury was never informed the reason for
the Defendants absence. Instead of being told that the Defendant had an emergency medical
procedure, the jury was given an adverse inference jury instruction. This instruction allowed the
jury to assume that the Defendants testimony would have been harmful to him; however this
could not have been further from the truth.
The jurys verdict demonstrates that they held the Defendants absence against him, despite
what the weight of the evidence held.
C. The Verdict Was Clearly Against The Weight of The Evidence
The jurys verdict was against the weight of the evidence and rendered based on their
fevered imaginings or personal vendettas against the Defendant. Farfaras at *4. At trial, the
Defendant presented the testimony of an eye-witness, Danny Surillo (Surillo), who was the
former general manager of Adriannas Nightclub (Adriannas), where the alleged incident took
place.
1

Executed version to be supplemented upon receipt.

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Surillo testified that he was present at Adriannas the night of the alleged incident and that he
actually walked the Defendant, and his party, into the nightclub that night. Surillo explained that
he was a celebrity hosts and was in the vicinity of the Defendant nearly the entire night.
Surillo continued to testify that he did not witness the events that the Petitioner alleges
occurred, nor did he receive any complaints or reports from his staff, security or other club
patrons concerning the Defendant and any misfeasance during the night in question. The
Plaintiff did not produce a single eye-witness of her own, nor did she produce any witness to
controvert Surillos testimony. In an attempt to discredit Surillo, the Petitioner produced a
process server who identified Surillo as the gentleman he served with a subpoena at Adriannas
nearly a year before. This was relevant because Surillo, for reasons unknown, but likely due to a
lack of understanding, denied being previously being served. A major difference though is that
the subpoena Surillo acknowledged receiving was personally addressed to him, the subpoena that
was previously served on him was not; it was addressed to Adriannas and its owners.
In addition to the jury allowing their apparent personal vendettas to cloud their judgment,
the verdict was also against the weight of the evidence because a battery never occurred. The
Defendants position on this remains unchanged and he maintains that he did not commit the acts
that the Plaintiff accused him of. Arguendo, even if the jury were to accept the Plaintiffs
version of events, they would still have to find for the Defendant.
In the video footage that displayed the altercation between the Plaintiff and Defendant and
was repeatedly shown to the jury, the Plaintiff made a statement against interest, and by her own
admission the elements of a battery were not satisfied. While discussing the alleged incident, the
Plaintiff was captured on camera saying when I got to the club, he grabbed my butt and realized
I didnt have no panties on, and he touched my pussy, and then did it three more times after that,

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so I was pissed off, not because he did it, but more so because [] people was below us taking
pictures. Pl. Ex. 3; 17: 4-21.
The Plaintiff proceeded to exclaim that she wanted to talk to [the Defendant] and tell
him, Yo, can we check and make sure nobody got pictures of that shit. Pl. Ex. 3; pg. 17: 2224.2 If a jury were to accept the Plaintiffs version of events, by her own accord she was not
bothered by what the Defendant supposedly did.
The jury was instructed by this Court that a battery means an intentional, offensive touching
of a person that was not authorized by that person. [DE 142, at 20]. The Court further instructed
the jury that in order to prevail on her claim, the Plaintiff was required to prove each of the
following propositions by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that Defendant intentionally
touched Plaintiffs body; (2) that the touching was unauthorized by Plaintiff; (3) that the
touching was offensive to Plaintiff; and (4) that the contact was the proximate cause of injury to
Plaintiff. [DE 142, at 27].
If any proposition was not proven then the Plaintiff could not prevail. By Plaintiffs own
admission, she was pissed off not because the Defendant allegedly touched her, but because of
the potential existence of pictures (none of which were ever produced). Because Plaintiff by her
own admission was not offended or bothered by the alleged touching a critical element and a
requirement she needed to prove in order to prevail on her battery claim was not met. If the
touching was not offensive then there was not and could not be a battery. The Plaintiffs own
admission prevents her from being able to fulfill the offensive requirement that is necessary for
her to succeed on her battery claim.

It should be noted that the Plaintiff did not produce a single picture or video of the conduct she alleged the
Defendant committed.

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When this fact is combined with the Plaintiffs behavior three (3) days after the alleged
incident, which was captured on camera, it is clear that the verdict was not only against the
weight of the evidence, but completely wrong. Three days after the alleged incident the Plaintiff
can be seen on camera flirting with the Defendant, giving him massages, goading him into
spanking her and exposing herself to him.
D. Damages Were Excessive
Contrary to the Plaintiffs assertions the damages awarded by the jury were excessive.
This includes both the compensatory and punitive damages awards. The jury awarded the
Plaintiff $1.1 million dollars in compensatory damages and $6.0 million dollars in punitive
damages for a total award of over $7.1 million dollars.
1. Compensatory Damages Were Excessive
When reviewing a compensatory damages award, the Court makes three inquires:
whether the award is monstrously excessive; whether there is no rational connection between
the award and the evidence, indicating that it is merely a product of the jurys fevered imaginings
or personal vendettas, and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar
cases. Farafas, at *4.
a. Compensatory Damages Award Was Monstrously Excessive
If a party fails to meet its burden than any award amount is excessive. The Plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the touching was offensive, and based on her statement in the video, no
reasonable jury could find, that the touching she alleges occurred, if true, was offensive.
The evidence of damages that the Plaintiff presented at trial was scarce, and her own
actions contradict any damages she had. For example, before many of her appointments with
her treating physician, the Plaintiff used her social media to promote the reality television series

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Shes Got Game. The Plaintiff would tweet and posts on Instagram telling people to watch the
show and watch her. She testified however and even told her doctor that she got rid of her social
media due to fears of the Defendant. Apparently, the jury missed these inconsistencies or
willfully chose to ignore them.
b. No Rational Connection Between the Evidence and the Award
As discussed supra, and in the Post-trial Motions, even if a jury were to find that the
events as alleged by Plaintiff took place, by the Plaintiffs own admission the touching was still
not offensive. If the touching was not offensive there cannot be a battery. The Plaintiff failed to
prove one of the elements necessary to succeed and did not meet her burden. She is therefore not
entitled to any damages when any of the requisite elements are missing.
c. Compensatory Damage Award Was Higher Than Typical
The Defendant presented three cases from the Northern District of Illinois where
suits were filed alleging various battery and groping claims. Through the Defendants research,
he discovered that the typical award in this District was between $200,000 $499,999 for a
battery claim involving groping.
In an effort to challenge the Defendants research, the Plaintiff produced several cases
where the damage awards were in the millions. Plaintiff conveniently failed to disclose that the
cases she mentions involve much more deplorable and reprehensible behavior than that alleged
to have occurred in the present matter.
For instance, in Pawell v. Metropolitan Pier Expo. Auth., 03-CV-3158 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(DE 124), the jury awarded the plaintiff $2,861,298 in a sexual harassment case. The Plaintiff
failed to mention that this was not a typical sexual harassment case. Due to the severe
harassment received by the plaintiff in Pawell, she suffered a miscarriage and lost her unborn

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baby. No amount of money can bring back a lost life or heal the pain associated with losing a
child. Given the severity of the conduct and the fact that a death was involved, it explains why
the jury likely felt inclined to award the plaintiff the amount it did. There was no death alleged
nor any deaths that occurred in the present matter, yet despite this fact, the Plaintiffs total
damages award was more than double that in Pawell.
In Equal Emplt Opportunity Commn v. Aaron Rents, 2011 WL 2732967 (S.D. Ill 2011),
the jury awarded the Plaintiff $95 million dollars, the Plaintiff alleged that what first began as
unwelcomed touching progressed to more severe conduct. On one occasion the plaintiffs
supervisor hit her over the head with his penis, and on another he pushed her down to the ground
and masturbated until he ejaculated on the plaintiff. The facts in Aaron Rents are much more
reprehensible and despicable than those alleged by the Plaintiff. The harm suffered by the
plaintiff would also seemingly be a lot more severe and warrant a bigger damages award.
In Teal v. Woodridge Nursing Pavilion, Ltd., 1992 WL 740236 (Ill. Cir.), also cited by
the Plaintiff, a jury awarded the plaintiff $2.2 million dollars after she alleged she was raped
inside her nursing home. The plaintiff in Teal was a 73 year old woman. The Plaintiff makes no
allegations that the Defendant penetrated or raped her. It should go without saying that rape is
one of, if not the most, despicable act man can inflict upon another, yet despite this horrendous
act, the plaintiff in Teal received less than one-third of the total amount awarded to the Plaintiff.
Even if her allegations were proved, which as discussed above they were not, one cannot
remotely compare the Plaintiffs allegations to the harm and trauma suffered by a rape victim.
The Plaintiff also cites Wisniewski v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Belleville, 2008 WL
4793249 (Ill. State Ct.), where a jury returned a verdict of $5 million dollars ($2.4 million in
compensatory damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages) in favor of a plaintiff who filed

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suit against a Catholic diocese that failed to prevent sexual abuse by one its clerics. In
Wisniewski, the Plaintiff alleged that multiple incidents of sexual molestation and abuse occurred
to multiple victims, most who were children over an extended period of time. Despite having
numerous victims and multiple incidents of abuse, the jury in Wisniewski issued an award where
the compensatory and punitive damages ratio was approximately 1 to 1. Despite the
involvement of children, the Wisniewski jury awarded an amount that was $2.1 million dollars
less than the amount awarded by the jury in the above-captioned matter even though acts
involving adults with children are much more repulsive.
A final case cited by the Plaintiff does not even come from Illinois, but rather the
Plaintiffs home-state of Florida. Notwithstanding the fact that the case is not persuasive and has
no precedential value, the Defendant intends to discuss it only because it appears that the
Plaintiff plans to signify that the case is on point since it too involves allegations of a defendant
grabbing a plaintiffs crouch. However, as with the other cases cited by the Plaintiff, thorough
review of the facts demonstrates that this case is far from on point.
In Medina v. United Christian Evangelistic Association of Florida, 2010 WL 752005
(S.D. Fla. 2010), the plaintiff claimed his genitals had been groped by a minister while giving
him a massage. The plaintiff also testified that he was coerced into performing oral sex, was
molested and at trial presented clothes that contained semen from the minister. Despite the clear
cut evidence, deplorable and reprehensible nature of the acts, the jury awarded the plaintiff a
total damages award of $5 million dollars, $2 million dollars less than what was awarded to the
Plaintiff.
It is undisputed that a groping is reprehensible; however, when compared to the repulsive
conduct as read in the cases cited by the Plaintiff, it becomes apparent that the Plaintiff is looking

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to mix apples and oranges. At no time during the trial did the Plaintiff allege suffering from any
loss of life, or death caused by the acts of the Defendant. She never alleged that there was any
penetration or that she was raped. She never alleged that she was coerced or forced to do
something against her will and she never alleged that she was ejaculated upon. The cases the
Plaintiff cites are filled with some horrendous fact patterns; however each of those plaintiffs met
their burden and likely suffered tremendous harm due to the egregious nature of the acts they
were involved in, yet the majority of them did not receive amounts that were anywhere close to
what the Plaintiff was awarded.
The cases cited by the Defendant in his Post-trial Motions [DE 158, at 6] much more
accurately reflect what typical jury awards from this District are like. They are also much more
closely related to the act in question than those cases presented by the Plaintiff.
2. Punitive Damage Award Was Excessive
When analyzing whether a punitive damage award is excessive Courts consider (1) the
degree of reprehensibility of defendants conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award; and (3) the difference between the
remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. See Farfaras, at *5
(N.D. Ill. March 21, 2005).
In evaluating the degree of a defendants reprehensibility, courts must consider whether
the harm was physical rather than economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference or
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm
was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). The Plaintiff takes great liberties in her Memo

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referring to the alleged incident as a series of repeated sexual batteries. In reality the incident
was an isolated incident alleged by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff and Defendant were around each
other for weeks filming a television series, yet Plaintiff only alleges one instance of inappropriate
behavior. The assertion that her damages resulted from a series of repeated sexual batteries is a
stretch.
The Plaintiff was awarded $1.1 million dollars in compensatory damages. In Campbell,
the Supreme Court held that when compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee. Id. The Supreme Court determined that $1 million for a year and a half was
substantial and complete compensation. Id. at 426.

Here, the verdict was also rendered

approximately a year and a half after the date of the alleged incident.

The Plaintiffs

compensatory damage award of $1.1 million dollars therefore should be considered substantial
and complete compensation. As such a more appropriate punitive damage award ratio would
been 1 to 1, or less.
The Supreme Court, in Campbell also held that compensatory damages contain a
punitive element and that in many cases in which the compensatory damages include an amount
for emotional distress, such as humiliation or indignation, by the defendants act, there is no clear
line of demarcation between punishment and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount
frequently includes elements of both Id.
Here, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $300,000 dollars for emotional distress as a part of its
compensatory damages award. $100,000 dollars was awarded for emotional distress in the past
and the other $200,000 dollars was awarded for any emotional distress the Plaintiff suffered from
in the future.

By providing a damage award for emotional distress, the jury already was

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punishing the Defendant. The additional $6 million dollars was clearly awarded arbitrarily and
was against the weight of the evidence. It may have been thought by the jury that it was going to
punish the Defendant, however an amount intended to punish the Defendant was already
awarded through the compensatory award.
The jury apparently relied on the Defendants Instagram posts, at a trial where he was
unable to be present, and based its punitive damages award off them.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points, authorities, statutes, and reasons, this Court should grant
the Defendants Motion for Elimination and/or Reduction of Damages and New Trial.
WHEREFORE Defendant, Jayceon Terrell Taylor, requests that this Court enter an
order eliminating and/or reducing the damages that the jury awarded, and/or enter an order for a
new trial so that the Defendant may have his fair day in court and all the evidence and facts may
be evaluated by a jury when the Defendant is present and can properly defend the allegations
against him.

Dated: January 17, 2017

CUMMINS & ASSOCIATES, LTD
John J. Cummins
Defendant Local Counsel
415 North LaSalle, Ste 401
Chicago, Illinois 60654
Telephone: (312) 464-9840
Bar No. 6210834
Email: JCummins@CumminsAssociates.com

s/Andrew Williams
THE WILLIAMS LAW GROUP
Andrew Williams
Attorney for Defendant
44 West Flagler Street, Ste 1575
Miami, Florida 33130
Telephone: (253) 970-1683
FL Bar No. 0111817
Email: Andrew@TheWilliamsLG.com
Secondary Email: WilliamsLawFlorida@gmail.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via e-mail
on January 17, 2016, on all counsel or parties of record on the Service List below.
s/Andrew Williams
Andrew Williams

SERVICE LIST
Steven R. Jaffe (Fla. Bar No. 390770)
Bradley J. Edwards (Fla. Bar No. 542075)*
Adam D. Horowitz (Fla. Bar No. 376980)*
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS,
FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L.
425 N. Andrews Ave., Suite 2 Fort
Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Telephone: 800-400-1098
E-mail: steve@pathtojustice.com
E-mail: brad@pathtojustice.com
E-mail: adam@pathtojustice.com
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice

Douglas R. Johnson (Bar No. 6216305)*

The Law Office of Douglas R. Johnson, P.C.
77 W. Wacker Dr., Ste. 4800 Chicago, IL 60601
Telephone: 312-444-1000
E-mail: douglas.johnson@illinoisattorney.com
Plaintiffs Local Counsel
Paul G. Cassel (Utah Bar No. 6078)
c/o S.J. Quinney College of Law
University of Utah
383 University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Telephone: 801-585-5202
E-mail: cassellp@law.utah.edu
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice

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EXHIBIT A

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CASE NO.: 1:15-cv-06844
Honorable Gary Feinerman
PRISCILLA RAINEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYCEON TERRELL TAYLOR,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY OF JAYCEON TERRELL
TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ELIMINATION AND/OR
REDUCTION OF DAMAGES (REMITTITUR) AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGLES

)
)
)

I, JAYCEON TERRELL TAYLOR, the undersigned affiant, state the following under
oath:
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and I am capable of making this declaration.
2. I am a resident of the State of California.
3. I am fully familiar with the facts sets forth herein, and if called upon as a witness, could
testify competently thereto.
4. I am the Defendant in cause number 1:15-cv-06844 in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois.
5. On November 13, 2016, I called the emergency telephone line of my dentists office due
to pain I was experiencing in my teeth.

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6. At the time, I called the dentists office the pain was only troublesome, however I wanted
to cure the issue before I left to Chicago, so that it would not get worse.
7. An appointment was scheduled for me on the morning of November 14, 2016.
8. Because my flight was at night, I did not believe that the appointment would have any
impact on my ability to travel.
9. My flight was scheduled to travel to Chicago later that evening at 11:25 pm and I would
have arrived in Chicago on November 15, 2016, at 5:25 am.
10. On the morning of November, 14, 2016, I awoke suffering from excruciating pain in my
mouth.
11. Upon arriving at my appointment, I was informed that I had a severe infection and that
I would need to have surgery. This was not anticipated.
12. Ultimately, I ended up having two procedures.
13. Due to the nature of the surgery and the resulting pain expected from it, I was advised
by the doctor that I should not fly due to the air pressure, which significantly exacerbates the
pain and could lead to a multitude of side effects.
14. I notified my manager, Cash Jones (Jones), to let my attorney know about the
emergency procedure.
15. Apparently, Jones waited to hear the results of that days proceedings, or was unable to
reach my attorney, the exact reason is unknown to me, but in any event, he notified my attorney
of my procedure when they spoke later that evening on November 14, 2016.
16. Jones then provided my attorney with a letter from my doctor as well as my flight and
hotel information so that it could be shown to the Court that this was not an attempt to shirk the
trial.

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17. On November 15, 2016, I presented the Court with a letter from my doctor.
18. I also produced copies of my hotel booking, my transportation, and the flights and
relevant lodging information of those who were expected to travel with me: Jones (manager); his
wife, Kimberly Jones; Lauren Stift, my assistant; and Joey Mills and Robert Dorsey, my security.
19. When I called the emergency line on Sunday, November 13, 2016 regarding the pain I
was experiencing I did not expect to have surgery, and I especially did not expect that I would
not to be able to fly later that night.
20. I was not looking to use the surgery for the purposes of undue delay.
21. I fully attended to appear at the trial proceedings and to provide my testimony on my
behalf my motion for continuance was made in good faith.
Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing Declaration and that the
facts stated in it are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and that this declaration was
executed this 16th day of January 2017 in Los Angeles, California.

Signature of Declarant

Date