Marx via Feuerbach: Species-Being Revisited

Jacob M. Held

Abstract: Although there has been consistent interest in Marx and Marxism there
has been little sustained interest in the origins of Marxs ethical thought and his
relation to the German philosophical tradition as a whole. Work has been done
linking Marx to Fichte, and a great deal more linking him to Hegel. However, the
fundamental concept joining them all is recognition, or interpersonal relations in
general. In this regard, none of the German thinkers can be understood without
first grasping their understanding of the human person as one among many. This
article begins this process for Marx. Although some literature has been devoted
to the explication of Marxs notion of species-being it is sparse and dated. In
this article I proceed to reiterate how important species-being is as the foundation to Marxs ethical philosophy. However, my main focus is on simply how to
understand the concept itself. I, therefore, devote the majority of the article to an
analysis of Marxs use of the concept in his early work as well as his critique of
Ludwig Feuerbachs use of it. This account provides the basis for understanding
Marxs concept of human essence and is the beginning of a project of rephrasing
Marxian ethics around the concept of recognition thus reconnecting him to the
German philosophical tradition.

Karl Marxs philosophy revolves around one prevailing ethical concern: alienation. His
emphasis on alienation is more than merely suggestive of a fundamental concern for the
well-being of the human person. At the root of Marxs ethical thought and Marxism in
general, lies a conception of human essence expressed through Marxs notion of speciesbeing, that is, the essence of humanity as a productive, social being. This essence is realized
in the social realm and is therefore dependent on interpersonal relationships, which are
determined by the mode of production. Marxs critique of capitalism stems from the fact
that the mode of production is the condition for the possibility of the manifestation of
human essence in virtue of the fact that it dictates the form of the most important relationship, labor or the expression of ones productive capacities. Inhuman modes of production
prevent or distort the expression of this essence; proper modes facilitate its flourishing.
Marxs emphasis on the intra and interpersonal dimension of subjectivity and the
role these relationships play in human flourishing indicates a debt owed to both Fichte
and Hegel, namely, the use of the concept of recognition as the foundational principle
to a theory of the self and a philosophy of right. Marxs concept of species-being is the
materialist appropriation of the German Idealist notion of selfhood. Understanding Marx
in this way proves not only to be fruitful in terms of elucidating Marxs theory as a whole
but is suggestive of his continued relevance for political thought beyond classic critical
2009. Idealistic Studies, Volume 39, Issues 13. ISSN 0046-8541.

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theory all the way to contemporary theorists such as Axel Honneth. A full account is not
possible here. Instead, the focus of this article will be on Marxs definition of species-being;
recognition and its relevance to Marxism will have to be left for another time.
Marx maintained, just as J. G. Fichte (17621814) before him, not merely an active
notion of the self that actualizes its potentialities in the world, but also that economic
structures played a crucial if not fundamental role in the process of self-expression and
actualization.1 Fichte recognized the importance of economic conditions in the formation
of inter and intra-personal relationships. Since ones essence as a social being can only
be realized though appropriate social relations, the economic structure of society, as a
major determinant of the structure of social relationships must be evaluated according
to a doctrine of right. Labor relations, as the primary relation between individuals are,
therefore, ethical relationships. Fichtes insight is the now obvious claim that political
economy plays a crucial role in determining the geography of the social world. Regarding labor as the expression of the human beings active powers and the role this plays in
human flourishing, Fichte states: Man should work; but not as a beast of burden. ... He
should work without anxiety, and with passion and enthusiasm. He should put time aside
to lift his spirit and his gaze to heaven. ... He should not eat with his beasts of burden;
rather his food should remain distinct from their fodder and his home distinct from their
stalls, just as his physique is distinguished from their physiques. This is his right, simply
because he is a man.2 Clearly, humankind is to be distinguished from animals in the way
in which it provides for itself and reproduces its life. Since activity as expressed through
labor as determined by the mode of production is so crucial for Fichte, he maintains that
the economy ought to be rationally planned. Fichte, in this way, attempted to connect his
theory of a social human essence that demands recognition with a theory of the state that
would elaborate the necessary apparatus for the realization of this essence through proper
social relations, in this case economic relationships.
Marx also understood the primary activity of the human being to be the reproduction of
the self via the material elements of nature through the mode of production. But for Marx,
this activity is the medium through which all relationships are determined. Thus, Marx
understood the ground of all inter and intrapersonal relations to be rooted in the material
means of production of society. If these means of production prohibit the development
of fitting interpersonal relationships and appropriate forms of life activity, namely, free
conscious, productive activity, then the mode of production is detrimental to the development of the people under it.
Marx builds his ethical critique of capitalism on his theory of human essence and the
necessary failure of capitalism to provide appropriate means for the realization of this
essence through befitting inter and intrapersonal relationships. Marx states: Suppose, we
had produced in a human manner. Then each of us would have in his production doubly
affirmed himself and the other. ... Our products would be like so many mirrors, from
which our essence shown.3 There is a normative component to this notion of labor; an
ethical demand that labor ought to be carried ought in a human mannerhuman, in this
case, being indicative of our essence as species-beings partaking in a species-life. Specieslife is communal life, the type of life necessary for the realization of species-essence.
Species-consciousness is the recognition of the fact that one is a communal being who

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realizes herself through productive relations: the relation she has to others, herself, her
own activity, and her products. Under capitalism, ones relation to ones activity, products,
fellow human beings, and essence are distorted. These distorted relationships prohibit the
subject from actualizing her essence as a social, active being and in fact pervert her essence into a form of consumerist existence; a passive, not active life. The critical theory
of Erich Fromm, and his distinction between the being and having modes of existence, is
the most notable contemporary adoption of this concept.4 Alienation is the pathological
state of people under a capitalist mode of production. Thus, Marxs vehement opposition
to capital is predicated on this conception of human essence and his concern with human
well-being.
This brief background serves to emphasize the importance that the concept of a shared
human essence plays in Marxs work. Without species being, Marxs critique of capitalism
would have no ethical basis and his politics would seem directionless and arbitrary. It is
paramount, therefore, that if one is to understand Marx and Marxism, one must begin
with species-being.
As mentioned above, Marxs concept of human essence is expressed through his notion of species-being (Gattungswesen). However, the term species-being is notoriously
difficult to interpret. There are several reasons for this difficulty. First, Marxs discussion
of species-being, although mentioned sporadically throughout his early and late works, is
only extensively dealt with in his earliest works, primarily the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, alternatively known as The Paris Notebooks. While some have
taken the absence, or limited use, of this term in his later works to be an indication that he
disavowed his use of it, his reliance on a concept of human essence is evident throughout
his work. However, this is beside the point. The problem with his limited use of the term
is that although his reliance on the concept is constant and unwavering throughout his
writing, it is only discussed clearly in limited places leaving much room for divergent
interpretations due to ambiguities and vagueness. Second, Marx borrows the term from
Ludwig Feuerbach (18041872), yet he changes its denotation. Therefore, a genealogy of
the term only serves to complicate matters. Only one previous scholar, Feuerbach, used it
in a technical sense, and Marxs use diverges from the original usage considerably. Thus,
although Feuerbachs use of the term is informative, species-being in Marxs sense can
only be grasped within the context of his critique of Feuerbach. Third, the term speciesbeing (Gattungswesen) itself is ambiguous. Wesen can mean two distinct things, either
being in the sense of an existent creature, or being in the sense of essence or specific
difference. Species-being can, thus, be rendered different ways each of which carries its
own distinct meaning. These ambiguities need to be resolved.
The first problem, namely, that Marx only explicitly discusses species-being in his
earliest writings is no problem at all. His early works provide an adequate resource to
understand the concept fully, as a discussion of the later two difficulties will prove, and
his later works, although never explicitly mentioning species-being can only be made
sense of if the concept in some form is still operative. For example, the fact that Marx
saw alienation as an ethical problem betrays a commitment to a concept of human wellbeing grounded in a conception of a human essence. The fact that human beings can
be described as alienated implies a standard of unalienated life. Unalienated life would

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presumably be life befitting the essence of the human being. Therefore, the fact that Marx
viewed alienation as a problem throughout his entire career strongly suggests that Marx
always maintained a theory of human essence. But, the debate over whether or not Marx
retained his early concept of species-being is not the focal point of this article. Instead, I
want to focus on how to understand species-being itself; how it applies to his later work
can be dealt with at a future time. The second and third points, namely, the interpretation
of the word itself and its relation to Feuerbach speak to the actual meaning of the term,
and it is this on which the remainder of this article will focus.
Feuerbach was one among several post-Hegelian humanist thinkers collectively known
as the young Hegelians. This group of thinkers was concerned with reformulating Christian belief into secular ideals by focusing on Christology and the lessons of Christs life.
Stefan Sullivan notes, They [the young Hegelians] asked themselves the question: If the
reconciliation of alienation and freedom is the central Christian message, how can this
be philosophically reformulated without faith in Jesus Christ.5
Foremost, Feuerbach was a theorist of alienation. From the beginning, his philosophy
emphasized the loss of man. He understood humankind to be living in a state wherein
its existence was less than its essence. Humankind was partial, fragmented, and split.
Humankind had torn itself asunder and rendered what is good Godly and what is banal
earthly. Feuerbach assessed this phenomenon primarily with regard to religion, specifically
Christianity. He viewed alienation as a sundering of one thing into two: a separation of its
essence from its existence. In the case of Christianity, the human being had been split into
her existence as a material being and her essence as spirit represented as God. Feuerbach
argued that human essence was thus represented in the Christian religion as something
beyond and forever unattainable by, the individual. Ones existence as a material being
was perceived as inherently distinct from ones essence as a transcendent being. The deity
was represented as perfection beyond the material human being, yet the characteristics
ascribed to the deity were, in fact, nothing other than the hypostatization of ideal human
characteristics. Thus, through religion there is a loss of self insofar as To enrich God, man
must become poor; that God may be everything, man must be nothing. ... Man denies
of himself only what he attributes to God.6 Accordingly, Feuerbach wanted to return the
human being to herself by reclaiming her essence from God.
Feuerbach uses the term species-being (Gattungswesen) in The Essence of Christianity to distinguish the essence of humanity as distinct from that of other animals. For
Feuerbach, the essence of the human being is consciousness and Consciousness in the
strongest sense exists only where the essence [Wesen] of ones species [Gattung], his essential nature [Wesenheit], is an object of thought.7 What distinguishes the human being
from the brute is that the human being does not merely have consciousness of himself as an
individual, but also his relation to his species [Gattung], to his general essence [Wesen].8
Human beings are, as such, conscious of themselves as not simply individuals, an ability
Feuerbach attributes to mere brutes, but also as a general, or universal, being. Feuerbach
states: Man is himself at once an I and Thou; he can put himself in the place of another.
He can do so because for him his species [Gattung], his essence [Wesen], and not only his
individuality, is an object of thought.9 The ability of the individual to take the place of
the other gives the human being unlimited potential and perspective. As Feuerbach states:

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Man is not, like an animal, a particular being [Wesen], rather he is a universal ... free
being [Wesen].10 As universal, human beings are unlimited, infinite, and free. As universal, individuality no longer binds the human being, she is able to direct herself towards a
myriad of objects and determine herself towards a myriad of ends. Whereas animals are
determined by their nature to specific ends, human beings have the capacity, as universal
beings, to determine their own ends. Feuerbachs point is that the characteristic feature
of human beings is their ability to choose their ends and their directedness. Particular
functions, particular actions, or particular objects do not limit human beings. Humanity
has the capacity to be self-determining; its actions are infinite.
Since the human being is essentially a universal being, she is also essentially a communal being. Within a community the human being is able freely to choose her ends since
her relationships with other individuals makes possible these pursuits. If one were to live a
solitary life, then one would be unable to determine oneself as one saw fit since one would
be preoccupied with survival. In a purely natural state one would be occupied with material
necessity; eating, clothing oneself, and building shelter. Under such circumstances ones
capacities can not be developed as fully as they might otherwise be. In a community, needs
can be met more easily since a diversity of talents makes possible greater efficiency and
productivity. Therefore, one does not need to focus merely on survival. As productivity
increases, time and resources are made available for leisure activities such as art. Thus, in
a community the human being is universal; others can expand ones horizons and make
possible what was impossible on ones own. Isolation is finiteness and limitedness,
community is freedom and infiniteness.11 Being communal is synonymous with being
free insofar as in a community one is able to surpass the mere satisfaction of needs and
determine oneself according to reason. In addition, the community offers the unique opportunity to develop distinctively human capacities, like language. This is another point
at which the affinity between the German Idealists and Feuerbach and Marx is present.
In the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte states that the concept of the human being
is, therefore, never the concept of a single being, which is unthinkable, but rather the
concept of a species.12 Human beings are necessarily and essentially social. Feuerbach
continues: Man for himself is man (in the everyday sense); man with manthe unity of
I and Thouis God.13 Humanity is absolute, once it is brought back to itself. All that
was put into God, when taken back by humanity, will give humankind the status of deity.
In short, Feuerbach, through his conception of species-being, is providing a definition of
the essence of humanity as self-conscious, social, and absolute.
Marxs criticisms of Feuerbachs theory of species-being, or human essence, are telling
and occur in a variety of forms presented most clearly in his first, sixth, seventh, and ninth
theses on Feuerbach. Marx criticizes Feuerbach for both the content of species-being and
the method by which Feuerbach derives this content. Regarding the former, Marx states:
In the Essence of Christianity, he [Feuerbach] considers only theoretic activity to be
authentically human. ... Therefore, he does not grasp the significance of ... practicalcritical activity.14 According to Marx, Feuerbachs emphasis on consciousness and the
human beings ability to conceive of herself as a member of a species and freely choose
her ends disregards activity, or production, as a characteristic feature of humanity. Marxs
point is that Feuerbach is ignoring the fact that human beings reproduce themselves in

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nature in such a manner that the objective world is human-sensible activity.15 Ones
relationship to ones self and others is mediated via ones activity in the world and the
relationship this activity has to oneself and others, that is, recognition is a material, active
process. Since Feuerbach only conceives of the human being as essentially a conscious
being and not an active, productive being, he neglects an essential aspect of humanity:
humanity must reproduce itself and realize itself within material reality, that is, we relate
to others and ourselves first as material producers. Marxs contention that the material
conditions for human realization, or production, are key elements for the realization of
the human essence is one way in which he distinguishes his conception of human essence
from that of Feuerbach.
Regarding the derivation of the content of species-being, Feuerbach, according to Marx,
conceives of an abstract essence of the human being derived through abstraction from
existent humanity and hypostatizes this into an eternal essence inhering in each individual.
Marx states: But the essence [Wesen] of man is not an abstraction inhering in isolated
individuals. Rather, in its actuality, it is the ensemble of social relations. Feuerbach ...
does not undertake a criticism of this actual essence [Wesen].16 Marxs concept of the
existent human being as the expression of ones essence within existent social structures
forces him to see existent humanity, namely, the essence of humanity in its actuality not as
the essence of humankind per se but as one particular manifestation of this essence among
countless possible and variable manifestations. The human being as an existent being only
can exist in the form society allows. Essence can actualize itself only as predetermined by
social pressures. The form of existent humanity is the form society imposes on humanity,
the mold into which ones essence is pressed. Human beings as they exist are not examples
of the essence of humanity; rather they are particular, contingent actualizations shaped by
the mode of production and its various effects on the determination of social interaction,
that is, the ensemble of social relations.
Marx is making a distinction between human nature and human essence, wherein human nature is the existent and contingent form of human essence, that is, the common core
of all humanity as historically and contingently expressed through epoch specific social
relations. Feuerbach, on the other hand, presumes existent humanity to be the exemplar of
the essence of humanity and in so doing fails to grasp the fact that human beings as they
exist are not necessarily pure expressions of their essence. An example is helpful.
In a late addition to the first volume of Capital, entitled Der Wertform, Marx uses the
example of law to demonstrate how this type of hypostatization can occur when dealing
with abstract concepts. He states: It is perfectly natural if I say: Roman law and German
law are both systems of law. However, if I say The Law, this abstraction, materializes itself
in Roman law and German law, concrete systems of law, then the association becomes
mystical.17
One can classify similar things such as systems of law under a singular concept in
an abstract way. However, doing so by itself does not impart ontological status onto the
abstraction, in this case Law. Yet, if this abstraction, this concept, becomes reified such
that the examples taken as instances of the abstract concept are now taken as manifestations of the concept itself, then one is making a mystical claim, namely, that Law has
manifested itself in two distinct forms, the German form and the Roman form. Marx

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views the proper relationship as follows. One predicates law of the Roman and German
systems of law. There is a standard, namely law, that must be met before any system
of positive law can be justifiably called law. Arguably, Roman and German systems of
law meet this criterion. This is acceptable. However, one, according to Marx, is mistaken
if one takes law as abstracted from two contingent legal systems irrespective of their
conformity with a previous ideal and extrapolates these contingent characteristics into
the essence of law itself. Law is not a subject actualizing itself in the form of Roman
and German law, even if it is a pre-existent ideal. The same is to be said regarding human essence. Marx states in his seventh these on Feuerbach: the abstract individual he
[Feuerbach] analyses belongs to a specific form of society.18 That is, one can abstract a
general conception of human from existent human beings. However, just as with Law
this does not merit that the abstraction is the ideal form of human manifesting itself in
various ways throughout history. One must look at existent human beings as one form of
human beings among many, just as German law is one system of law among many. What
appears as law does not necessarily express the essence of Law. It is the same with
humanity. The way human beings appear is not necessarily representative of their essence
as human beings. Feuerbachs method of abstracting elements of contingent existent human beings and reifying these into the eternal essence of humankind fails to grasp the true
essence of humanity by mistaking contingency for a manifestation of essence itself. The
true essence of humanity is discovered only through an uncovering of the common core
of all contingent forms of human nature, that is, the sine qua non of human existence,
namely, material production, specifically free, conscious activity.
This problem can also be rephrased as one of token and type. Feuerbach, in his attempt
to discover the type of being that human beings essentially are looks to token examples,
specifically those tokens surrounding him. He takes these tokens, specific individuals from
his time, geography, and culture, as representatives of the type, or essence, of humanity
generally and thus believes to have discovered the one true human essence by simply
hypostatizing this observed nature into the eternal human essence. He fails to appreciate
the variety of forms of human life. One can observe various cultures and witness a variety
of practices and behaviors. Human beings can exist in many different forms.
Regarding human essence, or species-being, Marx believes that existent human beings, the tokens, as they are cannot be taken to be necessarily representative of the type
human essence. Marx believes that doing so not only hypostatizes existent beings into
exemplars of an eternal essence, but it also denies that human beings are evolutionary and
dynamic. Marx, thus, makes the distinction between human essence and human nature.
Human essence, as stated above, is the sine qua non of humanity, the common core without
which humanity would fail to be uniquely and distinctly human. Human nature is how
this essence is expressed through and in social relations. As mentioned above, in his sixth
thesis on Feuerbach, Marx states [I]t [human nature, that is, human essence in actuality]
is the ensemble of social relations.19 Marx does not mean here that the individual is in
toto a construct of society. Rather, human essence, or Wesen, can be interpreted in multiple
ways. One of these ways is essence, the other is nature. Marx is making a distinction
between human essence and human nature wherein the latter is the material, contingent
expression of the former. When Marx states that human nature, Wesen, is an ensemble

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of social relations he is making the claim that human beings must exhibit their essence
through their material social relations.20 Feuerbach fails to make this distinction.
For Marx, the essence of the human being is free, conscious activity, that is, a way of
acting. Thus, one is not to take particular actions as the essence of human beings. Freeconscious activity is the essence of humankind, not any specific form of activity. Marx is
also adamant that any one type of action is not to be reified into the essence of humanity
since each particular form of human activity is epoch-specific. Human beings are active
creatures and the form of their activity can differ greatly over time and place.
Freedom of practical activity is paramount for Marx since free self-determinationthe
realization of ones essence as a free-conscious beingrequires that the material conditions
of life be determined by conscious activity. According to Marx, Feuerbach only considers
the abstract nature of humanity without considering its formation within actually existing
reality. This generalization, or abstraction of the character of the human being into thought,
for Marx, precludes Feuerbachs notion of species-being from having any direct relation
to the world of actual human beings. In addition, as mentioned above, Feuerbach reifies
particular human beings, or contingent human nature, into the eternal essence of humanity. Feuerbach, as a consequence, is implicitly apologetic for the status quo. If one fails to
exhibit behavior exemplary of that particular form of human activity, then one is perceived
as defective. The system that created that form of humanity is taken as the paradigm of
human behavior. Marx on the other hand, takes existent humanity as a contingent form of
human essence; a form through which ones species-character of free-conscious activity
can be more or less adequately expressed. For Marx, The presuppositions with which
we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but are real presuppositions from which one
can only abstract in ones imagination. We begin with real individuals, together with their
actions and their material conditions of life, both those in which they find themselves
and that they have brought about through their own actions. These presuppositions can
be confirmed in a purely empirical way.21 Marx begins with real individuals, or human
nature, in an attempt to explicate the shortcomings of the capitalist mode of production.
In failing to recognize that existent humanity is merely one form of a myriad of possible actualizations of human essence, Feuerbach takes the existent form as essential to
humanity. Marx uses a similar criticism against the utilitarian conception of human essence
as expressed by Jeremy Bentham. Marx writes, With the driest navet he [Bentham]
alleges that the modern petty bourgeois, especially the English bourgeoisie, is the normal
man. Whatever is useful to this particular kind of normal man and his world, is useful in
and for itself. He applies this yardstick to the past, the present, and the future.22
What both Bentham and Feuerbach fail to notice, according to Marx, is that the emergence of the human being as it exists is the result of a process of formation; the molding
of human essence. One cannot take the bourgeoisie as the essence of humanity anymore
than one could take a twenty-first century accountant as an instance of the essential human being. Both are children of their respective times. Marx thus proceeds by looking
behind existing human beings to the essence of humanity itself, its determinate way of
being: free-conscious activity.
The term species-being, Gattungswesen, is ambiguous due to Wesen. Wesen can
indicate a creature or being as in a particular existent thing, or the nature or character

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of something as a specific difference, namely, its essence.23 Thus, when the term Gattungswesen is used, it is paramount that this distinction be kept in mind in providing an
interpretation of the text in which it occurs. Marx exploits this distinction in his presentation of his theory of species-being in order to intimate the distinction between human
essence, or specific difference, and the form of that essence as it manifests itself within
the material conditions of the world. The latter is the species-existence, or the human
being as a species-creature, previously discussed as human nature. Thus, for Marx there
is a clear distinction between ones humanity as essence and the form of this humanity
as it must produce itself within given socio-politico-economic structures, namely, human
nature as a contingent manifestation of humanitys essence.
Marxs concept of species-being is meant to elucidate the essence of what it is to be
human. For Marx, Man is a species-being [Gattungswesen]. He not only makes his own
species the object of his practical and theoretical activity, but also the species of all other
things. To say the same thing a different way, he relates to himself as the actually, living
species, that is, he relates to himself as a universal and therefore free being.24 In this
statement, Marx makes explicit the distinction between Wesen as essence and Wesen as a
particular being. The human being first takes her own species, or specific difference, one
sense of Wesen, as an object of practical and theoretical action and secondly regards and
comports herself as the actuality of the human species, as a species-being in the other
sense, as a really existent manifestation of the essence of humanity within the community.
Both of these aspects of humanity must be considered if a complete picture of the human
being is to be provided.
The primary sense of species-being is species-essence. In this sense, Marx is indicating
that the unique characteristic of humanity is the species-character of humankind. Such
a characteristic is that which distinguishes the human being from all other creatures. It
is this character that makes the human being a unique and distinct being. Conscious
life-activity directly differentiates man from animal life-activity.25 It is essentially human that one actualizes oneself according to a rational plan. In so doing, Man makes
his life-activity itself into an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious
life-activity. He is not immediately identical to any of his determinations. Conscious lifeactivity directly differentiates man from animal life-activity. It is this alone that makes
man a species-being. He is only a conscious being, that is, his own life is an object for
his consideration, precisely because he is a species-being. This is the only reason for his
activity being free activity.26
Free conscious activity differentiates humankind from other animals insofar as human
beings can determine their activity, namely, the ends towards which it will be directed,
in a way other animals cannot. Human beings are distinct in that they have the ability
to conceive of themselves as active and direct this activity freely. Activity itself takes
the form of humanitys productive activity as it relates to nature and the production of
its means for survival, as well as its self-expression through freely productive activity.
However, the species-essence of humanity as free-conscious activity can be manifested
as the species-being of individual human beings in innumerable ways.
Here, Marx is taking the position that individual human beings are what they are in
virtue of an active essence. Yet, the determinate forms of this essence, its nature, must be

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actualized within existent social structures, hence, he stresses the importance of intersubjective relationships, especially labor relations.
If one interprets species-being as species-creature, thereby interpreting it as descriptive
of human nature it denotes the human being as a material, existent, and, therefore, social
being, or as Aristotle states, and Marx acknowledges, a zon politikon. Marx states in the
introduction to the Grundrisse The human being is in the literal sense a zon politikon,
not merely a social animal, but an animal that can individuate itself only in society.27
Marxs theory of species-being is thus both an account of what makes a human being human, and the fact that this essence of humanity is only (potentially) fully realized within
the community. Labor, as the definitive form of human productive activity is, therefore,
the medium through which we recognize both others and ourselves.
It is obvious that production, or labor, is paramount for Marxs analysis of society.
Labor is the activity through which a human being reproduces herself and thus actualizes
her latent active powers. The form of labor is the form of the realization of ones speciesessence. Thus, species-being is manifested through the material means of production as
a particular form of humanitys species-essence. Through labor, the human being directs
herself towards an end and this activity is conducted within a social environment such
that her interactions with others will be conditions for the possibility of her actualization
of latent potentialities. Her essence is realized through her labor, and that labor is inherently social in nature.
Gattungswesen as species-creature, or human nature, emphasizes the fact that Gattungswesen as species-essence is only made actual in social relations, and the form of
the social relations determine the form of species-being. Since essence takes the form
of the environment in which it actually exists it is crucial that social structures provide
means for the realization of species-essence. Although the parsing of an obscure often
forgotten technical term may appear irrelevant, the importance of species-being can not
be understated. Marxs concept of human essence serves to both connect him to the classical German tradition of philosophy, from Fichte to Feuerbach, and thus offer a greater
understanding of the role interpersonal relations play in his philosophy as a whole, as well
as ground his ethical thought and provide a foundation for a Marxist political philosophy.
One must take Marx at his word when he states, To be radical is to grasp matters at the
root. But for man the root is man himself.28 And one only understands man if one understands the essence of humanity.

University of Central Arkansas

Notes
1. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, Smmtliche Werke III, hrsg.
J. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit und Comp., 1965). For commentary on this connection between Marx and
Fichte, see Tom Rockmore, Fichte, Marx and the German Philosophical Tradition (Carbondale,
Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), chaps. 4, 5.

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147

2. Der Mensch soll arbeiten; aber nicht wie ein Lastthier ... Er soll angstlos, mit Lust und mit
Freudichkeit arbeiten, und Zeit brig behalten, seine Geist und sein Auge zum Himmel zu erheben,
zu dessen Anblick er gibildet ist. Er soll nicht gerade mit seinem Lastthier essen; sondern seine
Speise soll von desselben Futter, seine Wohnung von desselben Stalle sich ebenso unterscheiden,
wie sein Krperbau von jenes Krperbaue unterscheiden ist. Dies ist sein Recht, darum weil er nun
einmal ein Mensch ist. Fichte, Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, pp. 422423.
3. Gesetz, wir htten als Menschen produziert: Jeder von uns htte in seiner Produktion sich
selbst und den andren doppelt bejaht ... Unsere Produktionen wren ebensoviele Spiegel, woraus
unser Wesen sich entgegen leuchtete. Karl Marx, konomsiche Studien (Exzerpte), Marx/Engels
Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Erste Abteilung, Band 3, hrsg. V. Adoratskij (Glashtten im Taunus:
Verlag Detlev Auvermann HG, 1970), 549.
4. Cf. Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? (New York: Continuum, 2000).
5. Stefan Sullivan, Marx for a Post-Communist Era: On Poverty, Corruption and Banality
(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 11.
6. Um Gott zu bereichern, mu der Mensch arm warden, damit Gott alles sein, der Mensch
nichts sein ... Der Mensch negiert nur von sich, was er in Gott setzt. Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen
des Christentums, hrsg. Werner Schuffenhauer (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), pp. 6566.
7. Bewutsein im strengsten Sinne ist nur da, wo einem Wesen seine Gattung, seine Wesenheit
Gegenstand ist. Ibid., p. 28.
8. Verhltnis zu seiner Gattung, seinem allgemeinen Wesen. Ibid., p. 29.
9. Der Mensch ist sich selbst zugleich Ich und Du; er kann sich selbst die Stelle des andern
vertreten, ebendeswegen, weil ihm seine Gattung, sein Wesen, nicht nur seine Individualitt, Gegenstand ist. Ibid.
10. Der Mensch ist kein patikulres Wesen wie das Tier, sondern ein universelles ... freies
Wesen. Ludwig Feuerbach, Grundstze der Philosophie der Zukunft, Gesammlte Werke, Kleine
Schriften II (18391846), hrsg. Werner Schuffenhauer (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1970), p. 335.
11. Einsamkeit ist Endlichkeit und Beschranktheit, Gemeinschaftlichkeit ist Freiheit und
Unendlichkeit. Ibid., p. 339.
12. Der Begriff des Menschen ist sonach gar nicht Begriff eines Einzelnen, den nein solcher
ist undenkbar, sondern der einer Gattung. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts
nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, Smmtliche Werke III, p. 39.
13. Der Mensch fr sich ist Mensch (im gewohnlichen Sinn); der Mensch mit Menschdie
Einheit von Ich und Duist Gott. Ludwig Feuerbach, Grundstze der Philosophie der Zukunft,
Gesammlte Werke, Kleine Schriften II (18391846), hrsg. Werner Schuffenhauer (Berlin: AkademieVerlag, 1970), p. 339.
14. Er betrachtet daher im Wesen des Christentums nur das theoretische Verhalten als das echt
menschliche ... Er begreift daher nicht die Bedeutung der praktisch-kritischen Ttigkeit. Karl
Marx, Marx ber Feuerbach, MEGA, Erste Abteilung, Band 5, hrsg. V. Adoratskij (Glashtten
im Taunus: Verlag Detlev Auvermann KG, 1970), p. 533.
15. Karl Marx, On Feuerbach (Brussels 1843), Marx: Early Political Writings, ed. and trans.
Joseph OMalley with Richard A. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 117.
16. Aber des menschliche Wesen ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum inwohnendes Abstraktum.
In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhltnis. Feuerbach, der auf
die Kritik dieses wirklichen Wesens nicht eingeht. Marx, Marx ber Feuerbach, MEGA, Erste
Abteilung, Band 5, p. 535.

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Idealistic Studies

17. Sage ich: Rmisches Recht und deutsches Recht sind beide Rechte, so ist das selbstverstndlich. Sage ich dagegen: Das Recht, dieses Abstraktum, verwirklicht sich in rmischen Recht
und im deutschen Recht, diesen konkreten Rechten, so wird der Zusammenhang mystisch. Karl
Marx, Der Wertform, MEGA, Zweite Abteilung, Band 5, hrsg. Institut fr Marxismus-Leninismus
(Berlin: Dietz, 1983), p. 643.
18. [D]as abstrakte Individuum, das er analysiert, einer bestimmten Gesellschaftsform angehrt. Marx, Marx ber Feuerbach, MEGA, Erste Abteilung, Band 5, p. 535.
19. Ibid.
20. For a discussion on this point, see Lawrence Wilde, Ethical Marxism and Its Radical Critics
(New York: St. Martin Press, Inc., 1998), pp. 1824.
21. Die Voraussetzungen mit denen wir beginnen, sind keine willkurlichen, keine Dogmen,
es sind wirkliche Voraussetzungen, von denen man nur in der Einbildung abstrahieren kann. Es
sind die wirklichen Individuen, ihre Aktion und ihre materiellen Lebensbedingungen, sowohl die
vorgefundenen wie die durch ihre eigne Aktion erzeugten. Diese Voraussetzungen sind also auf rein
empirischem Wege konstatierbar. Karl Marx, Die Deustche Ideologie, MEGA, Erste Abteilung,
Band 5, hrsg. V. Adoratskij (Glashtten im Taunus: Verlag Detlev Auvermann KG, 1970), p. 10.
22. Mit der naivsten Trockenheit unterstellt er den modernen Spiebrger, speciell den englischen Speibrger, als den Normalmenschen. Was diesen Kauz von Normalmensch unde seiner
Welt ntzlich, ist an und fr sich ntzlich. An diesem Mastab beurteilt er dann Vergangenheit,
Gegenwart und Zukunft. Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der Politischen konomie, Erster Band,
Hamburg 1890 MEGA, Zweite Abteilung, Band 10, hrsg. Der Internationalen Marx-Engels-Stiftung
(Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1991), p. 547 fn.
23. Thomas E. Wartenberg acknowledges this distinction in his article Species-Being and
Human Nature in Marx, Human Studies, vol. 5 (1982): pp. 7795.
24. Der Mensch ist ein Gattungswesen, nicht nur indem er praktisch und theoretisch die Gattung, sowohl seine eigne als die der brigen Dinge zu seinem Gegenstand macht, sondernund
die ist nur ein andrer Ausdruck fr dieselbe Sachesondern auch indem er sich zu sich selbst
als der gegenwrtigen, lebendigen Gattung verhlt, indem er sich zu sich als einem universellen,
darum freien Wesen verhlt. Karl Marx, konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, MEGA, Erste
Abteilung, Band 2, hrsg. Institut fr Marxismus-Leninismus (Berlin: Dietz verlag, 1982), p. 368.
25. Die bewut Lebensthtigkeit unterscheidet d[en] Menschen unmittelbar von der thierischen
Lebensthtigkeit. Ibid., p. 369.
26. Der Mensch macht seine Lebensthtigkeit selbst zum Gegenstand seines Wollens und
seines Bewutseins. Er hat bewute Lebensthtigkeit. Es ist nicht eine Bestimmtheit, mit der er
unmittelbar zusammenfliet. Die bewute Lebensthtigkeit unterscheidet d[en] Menschen unmittelbar von der theirischen Lebensthtigkeit. Eben nur dadurch ist er ein Gattungswesen. Oder er ist
nur Bewutes Wesen, d. h. sein eignes Leben ist ihm Gegenstand, eben weil er ein Gattungswesen
ist. Nur darum ist seine Thtigkeit freie Thtigkeit. Ibid.
27. Der Mensch ist im wrtlichsten Sinn ein zon politikon, nicht nur ein geselliges Thier,
sondern ein Thier, das nur in der Gesellschaft sich vereinzeln kann (zon politikon in Greek in
the original). Karl Marx, konomische Manuskripte 1857/58, MEGA, Zweite Abteilung, Band
1, hrsg. Institut fr Marxismus-Leninismus (Berlin: Dietz verlag, 1976), p. 22.
28. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right: Introduction, in
Marx: Early Political Writings, ed. Joseph OMalley with Richard A. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p. 64.